HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
2022

EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v. WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LTD AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • HCA954/2019EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v. WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LTD AND ANOTHER

Files (3)

[2025] HKCA 544-EN-2025-06-12

EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v. WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LTD AND ANOTHER

HTML content

CACV 424/2022, [2025] HKCA 544

On Appeal From [2022] HKCFI 2966

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 424 OF 2022

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO 954 OF 2019)

____________________

BETWEEN  
 EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBHPlaintiff
 and 
 WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LIMITED1st Defendant
 GALAXY MICROSYSTEMS LTD2nd Defendant

____________________

Before :Hon Au JA, Hon Chow JA and Hon Anthony Chan J in Court
Date of Hearing : 20 May 2025
Date of Judgment : 12 June 2025

________________

JUDGMENT

________________


Hon Anthony Chan J (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

1.  This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the Judgment of Harris J whereby, inter alia, its action against the 2nd Defendant was dismissed with costs.

2.  The focus of this appeal concerns the learned Judge’s finding that the 2nd Defendant had made out its defence of bona fide purchaser for value without notice (“BFP Defence”) against the Plaintiff’s claim.

Background

3.  The background facts can be succinctly stated. The Plaintiff was (and is) a German company.  It was the victim of an email fraud by which a payment of US$438,364.54 intended for a US supplier was transferred by the Plaintiff on 19 March 2018 to the bank account of the 1st Defendant held with CTBC Bank.  On the following day, US$436,810 (“Sum”) was transferred from the 1st Defendant’s account with CTBC Bank to the 2nd Defendant’s account with CTBC Bank.   

4.  An action was brought by the Plaintiff against both Defendants to recover the money it had transferred under fraud.  The 1st Defendant did not defend the action and judgment was subsequently entered against it in favour of the Plaintiff by the Judge.

5.  The 2nd Defendant did not dispute that (a) the first transfer to the 1st Defendant was the consequence of fraud as alleged by the Plaintiff; and (b) the Sum was transferred to its account from the 1st Defendant’s account the day after the latter account was credited with US$438,364.64.  Apparently, it was not in dispute that the Sum was traceable to the US$438,364.54.  A number of causes of action were advanced by the Plaintiff against the 2nd Defendant to recover the Sum, namely, money had and received, knowing receipt, dishonest assistance and constructive trust.

6.  The 2nd Defendant was in the business of selling computer hardware.  The total revenues of the 2nd Defendant’s business for the financial years from 2016 to 2019 were in the region of HK$4 billion to HK$5.5 billion. 

7.  The 2nd Defendant had a customer called Shenzhen Jiashi Weiye Technology Co Ltd (“JWT”).  They began trading in 2016 and had yearly framework agreements which contained the basic terms of their business dealings.  Under those terms, monthly payment was to be made by JWT to the 2nd Defendant.  Subsequently, JWT became one of the 2nd Defendant’s largest customers and the way in which payment was made changed. 

8.  Instead of monthly payment, payments were made in tranches by JWT.  Some payments were made through remittance agents, including the 1st Defendant.  Remittance agents were used because the payments were made in USD and using their service would avoid delay.  Prior to the receipt of the Sum by the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Defendant had acted as remittance agent for JWT on 168 occasions involving payments in excess of US$45 million.  These payments were trouble free. 

9.  In the course of their business, JWT also made payments to the 2nd Defendant’s Mainland manufacturer on its behalf.  This helped to reduce the cost to the 2nd Defendant in exchanging USD into RMB to pay the manufacturer.  JWT’s payments to the 2nd Defendant’s manufacturer would be set off against the balance in the running account between the 2nd Defendant and JWT (see below). 

10.  The 2nd Defendant maintained a debtor account ledger for JWT (“Ledger”).  It was a running account from which whether JWT’s account with the 2nd Defendant was in credit or debit on various dates could be seen.  The relevant page of the Ledger, which covered the period from 17 March to 21 March 2018, showed that on 20 March 2018 JWT’s account was credited with a sum of US$1,064,700.70.  It was a composite sum made up of 6 payments (“Composite Sum”), one of which was the Sum which was internally transferred from the 1st Defendant’s CTBC account to the 2nd Defendant’s account with the same bank.

11.  Before the Composite Sum was booked in the Ledger on 20 March 2018, JWT was shown to have a debit balance of HK$9,400,122.98.  After the booking of the Composite Sum, the debit balance was reduced to HK$1,095,457.52. 

12.  As indicated above, the 2nd Defendant relied upon the BFP Defence against the Plaintiff’s claim.

Findings of the Judge

13.  The Judge found that the 2nd Defendant had a genuine and substantial business in selling computer hardware.  It sold computer products to JWT and was paid in arrears.  The Sum was accepted as payment from JWT for goods which had already been delivered by the 2nd Defendant.  At the time of receipt of the Sum (20 March 2018), the 2nd Defendant was acting bona fide (ie, had no notice of any wrongdoing).

14.  Accordingly, the Judge found that the 2nd Defendant had made out its BFP Defence.  The rest of the Plaintiff’s causes of action necessarily failed in light of the establishment of the BFP Defence.

Grounds of appeal and the 2nd Defendant’s Respondent Notice

15.  There are 5 Grounds of Appeal.  There is much overlap between Grounds 1 to 3 and between Grounds 4 and 5.  Essentially, there are 3 issues raised in the Grounds of Appeal.

16.  First, the Plaintiff’s contends that the 2nd Defendant could not have made out its BFP Defence without being able to identify the goods or the invoice(s) which were paid by the Sum.

17.  Second, the 2nd Defendant had acquired constructive notice that the Sum represented money defrauded from the Plaintiff by 22 March 2018 at the latest by reason of (a) the freezing of its CTBC account on 21 or 22 March 2018; and (b) its failure to make reasonable inquiries as to the proprietary of the receipt of the Sum.  Further, even if consideration had been given by the 2nd Defendant for the Sum by way of reducing the running account balance with JWT, the communication of the reduction only took place after it had acquired constructive notice.

18.  Third, the Judge should have considered the Plaintiff’s causes of action in knowing receipt and dishonest assistance, which would give rise to remedies of different nature. 

19.  A Respondent’s Notice had been filed by the 2nd Defendant.  However, only 3 of the additional grounds set out in that Notice were referred to in the Skeleton Submissions of Mr Nip SC, who appeared with Mr Wong for the 2nd Defendant. 

20.  Firstly, it is contended that if it was necessary to identify the goods paid for with the Sum, the Judge would have found that the receipt of the Sum was clearly referable to the goods under 5 invoices (Invoices 171, 172, 176, 177 and/or 178) (“5 Invoices”).

21.  Secondly, the Plaintiff is precluded from running the case that the 2nd Defendant had acquired constructive notice after being informed of the freezing of its CTBC account when there was no pleaded case by the Plaintiff to such effect.

22.  Thirdly, the Plaintiff is precluded from running the case that communication of the reduction of the running account only took place after 22 March 2018 when there was no pleaded case by the Plaintiff to such effect.

Analysis

23.  We are unable to see any merit in this appeal. In respect of the first issue, the key findings made by the Judge are: (a) the 2nd Defendant was paid in arrears for the goods it sold[1]; (b) the Sum, as part of the Composite Sum, was booked in the Ledger and with which the balance owed by JWT was reduced to a little over HK$1 million on 20 March 2018[2]; and (c) any payment made when the running account was in debt necessarily must be attributable to goods supplied[3]. 

24.  These findings are not challenged in the Notice of Appeal.  We are unable to see any reason or logic why the 2nd Defendant was required to identify the specific goods or invoice(s) that could be attributed to the Sum or the Composite Sum.  JWT was at the time indebted to the 2nd Defendant to the tune of HK$9,400,122.98 (see para 11 above), which represented outstanding payment for goods sold and delivered.  Whether the Sum was received for batch A or batch B of such goods hardly mattered for the purpose of establishing the fact that the Sum was received for value given. 

25.  Mr Ng, who appeared with Ms Tse for the Plaintiff, had cited no authority to support the first issue.  Given the unchallenged findings of fact, we take the view that the Plaintiff’s contention is not sound in principle. 

26.  Mr Ng submitted that the Judge had wrongly made an assumption that the payment of the Sum (or the Composite Sum) was for the 5 Invoices.  We do not agree.  The Judge clearly took the view that it was unnecessary for the 2nd Defendant to identify the specific goods or invoice(s) paid for[4]. However, in dealing with one of the “subsidiary objections” of Mr Ng (who also appeared below), the Judge said that: “If one treats the [Sum] as attributable to [the 5 Invoices] or any of them it follows that the goods had been collected at the time payment was made and before [the 2nd Defendant] became aware of the fraud[5]”. The Judge was making no assumption but was addressing one of Mr Ng’s objections.

27.  The second issue is underpinned by the proposition that for the 2nd Defendant to give value for the Sum the reduction of the running account had to be communicated to JWT.  It is contended by the Plaintiff that the communication only took place in early April 2018 when the 2nd Defendant and JWT carried out a reconciliation of their records.

28.  With respect, the proposition is premised on a misunderstanding of the case of Holy AG v BMW Ltd[2022] HKCFI 798.  The facts of that case are similar to the present.  A transfer of Holy AG’s funds was induced by an unknown fraudster.  Part of that sum (Proceeds) was traced to the bank account of Touki Trading, which was in the business of importing and distributing second-hand electronic goods.  Touki Trading had a running account with a customer who had ordered some goods from it and arranged for the Proceeds to be paid to Touki Trading.  After receipt of the Proceeds, the balance in the running account was adjusted.  Cheng J rejected Touki Trading’s case that value was given by it for the receipt of the Proceeds.  The learned Judge referred to the principle that executed consideration must be given to ground a BFP Defence[6] and said :

“In the present case, I do not agree that the mere making of entries by Touki Trading unilaterally in its record of the running account on 6 March 2020 constitutes the giving of value for receipt of the [Proceeds] on 5 February 2020. There is nothing to suggest that any entry made on 6 March 2020 could not have been simply amended or reversed by Touki Trading, at least at any time prior to communication to [the customer] that his debts had been discharged. …[7]”

29.  In order to understand the above dicta, it is important to note that in Holy AG the goods ordered by the customer had not been delivered until after Touki Trading had notice of fraud[8].  Further, the running account was in credit in favour of the customer prior to the receipt of the Proceeds, and the credit balance was increased by the Proceeds when they were received on 5 February 2020[9].  These features distinguish the present case from Holy AG, and explain the comment of the court that an entry unilaterally made by Touki Trading in its record could be amended or reversed prior to communication to the customer.  We do see any general principle having been established by the dicta.

30.  This argument of the Plaintiff was ran before and rejected by the Judge below.  Apart from disagreeing with Mr Ng’s reading of Holy AG, the Judge held that it was “clearly a bad argument on the facts”.  The evidence of the 2nd Defendant, which the Judge accepted, was that it had sent JWT an email on 21 March 2018 confirming the receipt of the Sum[10].

31.  It was pointed out by Mr Nip, which is confirmed by the transcript, that when the 2nd Defendant’s finance manager was asked in re-examination about the purpose of the email, he answered: “To inform the other side that we confirmed the receipt of their money and also to offset their debt[11]”.

32.  Two further points should be made.  Mr Ng submitted that before the 2nd Defendant communicated the reduction of the running account with JWT, its consideration remained executory, not executed.  We disagree.  The 2nd Defendant had provided executed consideration for the receipt of the Sum because goods had been delivered to JWT and the payment for which was outstanding.

33.  Finally, Mr Ng’s submission about the 2nd Defendant acquiring constructive notice of fraud is a red herring.  The finding of the court below was that the 2nd Defendant was acting bona fide in accepting the payment on 20 March 2018[12].  The fact that the 2nd Defendant might have acquired constructive notice subsequently had no impact on its BFP Defence.  This was the view taken by the Judge[13] and is clearly right.

34.  For these reasons, we reject the second issue.

35.  The third issue is irrelevant unless the Plaintiff can succeed on the first or second issue.  A BFP Defence is equally effective against the other causes of action of the Plaintiff. 

36.  Given the lack of merit in this appeal, it is unnecessary to deal with the Respondent’s Notice.

Disposition

37.  For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed.  The costs of this appeal be paid by the Plaintiff, to be taxed if not agreed with a certificate for 2 counsel.  We take the view that the Respondent’s Notice is unnecessary and we make no order as to the costs of the same.

38.  We are grateful to counsel for their assistance.

( Thomas Au )( Anderson Chow )( Anthony Chan )
Justice of AppealJustice of AppealJudge of the Court of First Instance

  

Mr Felix Ng and Ms Tiffany Tse, instructed by C.Y. Lam & Co., for the Appellant (Plaintiff)

Mr Norman Nip, SC and Mr Alexsander Wong, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for the Respondent (2nd Defendant)


[1]     Judgment, [22].

[2]     Judgment, [23].

[3]     Judgment, [24] and [27].

[4]     Judgment, [26]-[27].

[5]     Judgment, [28].

[6]     Para 25 of the judgment in Holy AG.

[7]     Holy AG judgment, [26].

[8]     Holy AG judgment, [7]-[8].

[9]     Holy AG judgment, [6(1)]-[6(2)].

[10]   Judgment, [17].

[11]   Bundle C/tab 39/p 346P-U.

[12]   Judgment, [22].  It is common ground that the reference to “29” March 2018 was a typographical error. 

[13]   Judgment, [14].

[2024] HKCA 34-EN-2024-01-11

EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v. WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LTD AND ANOTHER

HTML content

CACV 424/2022, [2024] HKCA 34

An appeal from [2022] HKCFI 2966

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 424 OF 2022

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 954 OF 2019)

________________________

BETWEEN

 EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBHPlaintiff
 and 
 WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LIMITED1st Defendant
 GALAXY MICROSYSTEMS LTD2nd Defendant

________________________

Before : Hon Cheung and Barma JJA in Court
Date of Decision : 11 January 2024

_______________________________________________

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COSTS

_______________________________________________

Hon Cheung JA (giving the Decision of the Court) :

1.  The plaintiff claimed costs of $143,166 which includes counsel’s fee of $35,000 (for drafting affidavit in opposition and written submissions) in respect of its application for security for costs of the appeal. We assess the party and party costs at $83,000 which includes $35,000 for counsel’s fee.

2.  The plaintiff also claimed costs of $64,994 which includes counsel’s fee of $30,000 (for drafting summons and supporting affirmation) in respect of its application for variation of the costs order for security. We assess the party and party costs at $30,000 which includes $20,000 for counsel’s fee.

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal

C.Y. Lam & Co. for the Plaintiff

Chong & Partners LLP for the 2nd Defendant

[2023] HKCA 1072-EN-2023-09-18

EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v. WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LTD AND ANOTHER

HTML content

CACV 424/2022, [2023] HKCA 1072

An appeal from [2022] HKCFI 2966

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 424 OF 2022

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 954 OF 2019)

________________________

BETWEEN

 EXCLUSIVE NETWORKS DEUTSCHLAND GMBHPlaintiff
and
 WAKOON TRADING (H.K.) LIMITED1st Defendant
 GALAXY MICROSYSTEMS LTD2nd Defendant

________________________

Before : Hon Cheung and Barma JJA in Court
Date of Decision : 18 September 2023

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

Hon Cheung JA (giving the Decision of the Court) :

I.  Security for costs of the appeal

1.  This is the 2nd defendant’s application for an order that the plaintiff do pay into court $907,500 as security for costs of the appeal lodged by it against the judgment of Harris J dated 28 September 2022 (‘the Judgment’).

2.  Having considered the papers, we are of the view that it is appropriate to deal with this application on paper, without an oral hearing, pursuant to Order 59, rule 14A(1) of the Rules of the High Court (‘RHC’) (Cap. 4A).

3.  According to the affirmation of Mr. Chong Ling Wan filed on behalf of the 2nd defendant, the application is made on the following grounds :

1)  The plaintiff is a company ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction;

2)  There is no evidence that the plaintiff has fixed or permanent assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy the 2nd defendant’s costs in the event that the plaintiff is unsuccessful in the appeal proceedings;

3)  The plaintiff has provided security for costs in the proceedings at first instance; and

4)  The plaintiff’s appeal against the Judgment made in favour of the 2nd defendant has no strong prospect of success.

4.  The plaintiff opposes the application on three grounds :

1)  Security for costs should not be ordered because the merits of the appeal are strong;

2)  The 2nd defendant has not demonstrated that the enforcement of costs order against the plaintiff would face undue delay or difficulties; and

3)  The amount of legal fees sought is exorbitant.

II.  Principles

5.  Under Order 59, rule 10(5) of RHC, the Court of Appeal may, in special circumstances, order security to be given for the costs of an appeal as may be just. For this purpose, ‘special circumstances’ include, inter alia, cases where if the appellant fails in the appeal, the respondent may encounter difficulty in terms of delay or expenses in enforcing the costs order against the appellant. The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate that there will be delay or expenses in enforcing an adverse costs order against the appellant.

6.  The Court, however, has a discretion and is entitled to consider other relevant factors such as the strength of the appeal to determine whether or not it would be just to order security for costs to be provided. But once a special circumstance is shown, it is generally up to the appellant to demonstrate countervailing factors militating against an order being made.

III.  Our view

1)  Difficulty or Expense in Enforcement of Costs

7.  In our view, the 2nd defendant has discharged the burden of showing that there will be delay or expenses in enforcing the costs order against the plaintiff. The plaintiff is a company incorporated in Germany. It does not dispute that it has no assets in Hong Kong. It merely stated that it is a sizeable company with presence in multiple jurisdictions without providing any details. The problem in terms of time and expenses in enforcing a court order against a foreign litigant does not require elaboration.

8.  In the written submission Mr. Ng for the plaintiff relied on Germany being a country listed in the 2nd Schedule of the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Order Ordinance (Cap. 319) (‘FJREO’) and submitted that there were no material difficulties in enforcing the costs order against the plaintiff. The case of Lim Yi Shenn v Wong Yuen Lee [2012] 3 HKLRD 505 was cited.

9.  This Court has stated in Dracco Netherlands BV v Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG[2018] HKCA 75 that :

‘ 3.6 Third, the Judge had wrongly taken into account the reciprocal enforcement provisions under the FJREO. The reliance of this provision was only made at the hearing before the Judge. Clearly, in order for the defendant to meet this point, he was entitled to adduce evidence in the nature of Netherlands law on how a Hong Kong judgment is to be enforced in the Netherlands against the plaintiff. While the burden rests with the defendant to show that it is just to require the plaintiff to provide security, plainly the defendant must be given an opportunity to adduce evidence on the operation of reciprocal enforcement of judgments in a foreign country.’

10.  In the present case, the 2nd defendant is deprived of such an opportunity when the reliance on FJREO is only made by way of counsel’s submission. In any event, generally speaking, the provisions for reciprocal enforcement of judgments in different jurisdictions are merely for a foreign judgment to be treated as a local judgment in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought. It does not mean that the problems enforcing a judgment, particularly in a foreign country, in terms of delay or expenses are in any way lessened. As Kwan VP held in ATAL Technologies Ltd v Stratech Systems Ltd (unrep., CACV 125/2011, 8 November 2011) :

‘ 7. The applicable legal principles may be stated shortly as follows. The rationale for the practice of ordering security where the appellant is resident abroad is deemed expectation of undue delay or expense in enforcing the costs order abroad. The presumption that it is difficult to enforce the costs order abroad may be disproved by the appellant.’

11.  The Recorder in Lim Yi Shenn recognized in [64] that the reciprocal enforcement arrangement is not by itself conclusive. Unlike that case which did not order security against a foreign litigant, in the present case Germany is not a common law jurisdiction and the national language is not English.

12.  The only issue in this application is whether the plaintiff is able to show that its appeal is so meritious that this Court should not order it to provide security so as not to stifle a genuine appeal which has a high chance of success.

13.  The Judge found that the plaintiff was defrauded in a scam and the plaintiff’s money was transferred to the account of the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff sought to recover the money on the ground of money had and received, knowing receipt, knowing assistance and constructive trust. The Judge, however, found that the 2nd defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice (‘the defence’) which provided a complete defence to the plaintiff’s claim. The appeal is solely on the correctness of the defence. It is sufficient for us to say that for the purpose of the appeal, the plaintiff is able to show that it has a reasonably arguable appeal but we are not prepared to hold that the appeal is so meritious that we should not exercise our discretion in ordering security.

2)  Quantum

14.  As to the amount of security, according to the 2nd defendant’s Schedule of Estimated Costs, the estimated costs of the appeal (excluding the present application) are $907,500, comprising $217,500 as solicitors’ fees and $690,000 as fee for two counsel. The costs of the present application are estimated at $129,600 which includes counsel fee of $60,000.

15.  The 2nd defendant was represented by one counsel in the trial below. The appeal, although involving issues of law, is not a particularly difficult one. We are of the view that the appropriate amount of security of appeal on a party to party basis excluding the present application is $350,000.

IV.  Conclusion

16.  Accordingly, we will make the following orders :

1)  The plaintiff is to pay into court within 28 days the sum of $350,000 as security for the costs of its appeal;

2)  The appeal is stayed until the sum is paid;

3)  In default of payment, the appeal is dismissed without further order together with costs of the appeal to the 2nd defendant; and

4)  The 2nd defendant is to have the costs of this application, summarily assessed at $90,000.

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal

Mr. Alexsander Wong, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for the 2nd Defendant

Mr. Felix Ng, instructed by C.Y. Lam & Co., for the Plaintiff