CAMP 234/2022
[2022] HKCA 1812
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 234 OF 2022
(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2781 OF 2018)
________________________
BETWEEN |
| | YUYUN | 1st Applicant |
| | SINGH ANSHDEEP SINGH DESKA | 2nd Applicant |
| | and | |
| | TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/
NON-REFOULMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE | Putative
Respondent |
| | and | |
| | DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION | Putative
Interested Party |
________________________
Before: Hon Au and Chow JJA in Court
Date of Judgment: 15 December 2022
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. On 7 July 2022, the Applicants took out a summons to apply for an extension time to appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“the Judge”) dated 2 March 2022 refusing to grant them leave to apply for judicial review (“the Order”).
2. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 3 October 2018, whereby the Board dismissed the Applicants’ appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 28 February 2018 rejecting the Applicants’ non-refoulement claims.
3. Having considered the documents, we are of the view that it is appropriate to determine this application on paper without a hearing under Order 59, Rule 14A of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.
BACKGROUND
4. The Applicants are nationals of Indonesia. The 1st Applicant entered Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper on 23 August 2007. Her employment contract was terminated prematurely on 3 May 2008. She did not depart after the expiry of her limit of stay, and overstayed instead. On 21 December 2009, she gave birth to the 2nd Applicant. On 2 March 2010, she lodged a torture claim[1] on her own behalf. On 14 May 2012, she further lodged a torture claim on behalf of the 2nd Applicant. On 22 November 2012, both torture claims were refused by the Director. On 9 January 2013, the Applicants’ appeals/petitions against the refusal of their torture claims were rejected. On 26 February 2014, through their legal representative, the 1st Applicant lodged non-refoulement claims for herself and on behalf of the 2nd Applicant, alleging that they would be harmed or killed by the 1st Applicant’s stepfather due to some family disputes. Details of the Applicants’ claims have been summarised by the Judge at §§1-6 of the CALL-1 Form ([2022] HKCFI 582).
5. The Director was informed that the applicants’ non-refoulement claims were a joint application. Thus, the 2nd applicant’s claim was assessed as part of the 1st applicant’s claim. By a Notice of Decision dated 28 February 2018, the Director rejected the Applicant’s non-refoulement claims on the following applicable grounds: BOR 2 risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3], and persecution risk[4] (“the Director’s Decision”).
6. The Applicants appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. On 3 October 2018, the Board dismissed the Applicants’ appeal, and confirmed the Director’s Decision (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s reasons for its decision were summarised by the Judge at §10 of the CALL-1 Form, as follows:
“The Board made the following findings: (i) the 1st applicant only suffered bruises in the fight with the stepfather; (ii) she failed to provide any proof that her mother would scold her for religious reasons; and (iii) state protection and internal relocation were both available to the 1st applicant. Thus, there were no substantial grounds for believing that there would be real risk of harm of her being harmed or killed by the stepfather [19]. Further, there was no state involvement [21]. In assessing the individual grounds, the Board also found that the 1st applicant did not file any evidence in relation to the death sentence and genocide and thus BOR2 risk was irrelevant to the 1st applicant’s case [28]. For these reasons, the Board rejected the 1st applicant’s claim and thus dismissed the applicants’ appeals.”
7. On 6 December 2018, the Applicants filed a Form 86 to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
THE JUDGE’S DECISION
8. On 2 March 2022, the Judge dealt with the leave application on paper, and refused to grant the Applicants leave to apply for judicial review for the following reasons:
“[13] The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to its Decision on the applicants’ appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).
…
[21] The Court of Appeal in Fabio Arlyn Timogan v Evan Ruth Esq, Adjuciator of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office[2020] HKCA 971 set out the principles for treatment of non-refoulement claims by children in paragraph 34…
[24] The 2nd applicant’s case is based on the 1st applicant’s facts. The Board found that there were no substantial grounds for believing that there would be real risk of harm of her being harmed or killed by the stepfather [19]. It can therefore be seen that 2nd applicant will not be subjected to any real risk of harm of being killed by the 1st applicant’s step-father.
[25] The applicants were legally represented at the screening stage before the immigration officer. There was no child specific issue submitted to the immigration officer for his consideration. Under the high standards of fairness, the immigration officer had no duty to speculate any child specific issues under the circumstances. See Re: RS case above.
…
[28] However, the Board had found that the applicants were not subjected to the risk of harm of being killed by the 1st applicant’s step-father. Furthermore, the state was not involved and there should be state protection for the applicants. Though the Board might have made an error in the interpretation of BOR2, I consider that this issue will not give a realistic prospect of success in the applicants’ intended application for judicial review as there was no factual evidence in support of the applicants’ case in relation to BOR2 risk.
[29] In accordance with Peter Po Fun Chan (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 §14, I consider that leave should not be granted to the applicants to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.”
9. On 10 June 2022, the Judge refused the Applicants’ application by a summons dated 21 April 2022 for an extension of time to appeal against the Order ([2022] HKCFI 1524).
THIS APPLICATION
10. By a summons taken out on 7 July 2022, the Applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to appeal against the Order. In her supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the 1st Applicant merely stated as follows:
“Affirmation for extension of time to appeal. The High Court dismissed my leave and did not consider my application for extension of time.”
11. The Applicants have failed to lodge any written submissions contrary to the directions given by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 7 October 2022.
DISCUSSION
12. In deciding whether to extend time to appeal, the court will take into account the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the chances of the appeal succeeding, and the degree of prejudice to the other party if an extension of time is granted.
13. The prospect of success of an intended appeal is important. The court will not grant an extension of time to appeal for a hopeless appeal to be pursued: Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike[2019] HKCA 702, at §19.
14. The Court of Appeal’s general approach in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases is set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524, at §14. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court of Appeal’s role is not to examine the Board’s decision afresh as if it is a fresh application for judicial review (see Nupur Mst, at §14(6)).
15. Further, the assessment of evidence, country of origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini[2019] HKCA 1022. No such error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board is shown in the present case.
16. In so far as the 1st Applicant’s application is concerned, she has failed to point to or substantiate any alleged error of the Judge in his decision of 2 March 2022, and has failed to raise any viable ground of appeal against the Order.
17. In relation to the 2nd Applicant’s application, the Court’s approach in considering a minor’s claim for non-refoulement protection is set out in Re Jasvir Singh[2021] HKCA 53, at §§30 to 33.
18. In the present case, the 2nd Applicant’s claim was premised fundamentally on the 1st Applicant’s claim. The Board, after considering the evidence in the case, rejected the 1st Applicant’s claim on the facts, and further found that state protection and internal relocation were available to her. There was no factual basis which could support the 2nd Applicant’s non-refoulement claim on any of the applicable grounds.
19. We do not see any material that may give rise to a concern that there might be non‑refoulement grounds that related specifically only to the 2nd Applicant but had not been advanced to the Board or considered by it because of a lack of legal representation on his behalf before the Board.
20. There is no prospect of success in the Applicants’ intended appeal.
DISPOSITION
21. The application for extension of time to appeal is refused, and the Applicants’ summons of 7 July 2022 is dismissed.
22. For the avoidance of doubt, the non-compliance with Order 80 rule 2 in these proceedings is treated as a mere irregularity without rendering the 2nd Applicant’s application a nullity.
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal | (Anderson Chow)
Justice of Appeal |
The Applicants, acting in person
[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[2] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of her life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.