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Miscellaneous Proceedings2022

SIDHU BALBIR SINGH v. THE ADJUDICATOR OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

Related cases with same parties

  • HCAL601/2018RE SIDHU BALBIR SINGH

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[2023] HKCA 47-EN-2023-01-18

SIDHU BALBIR SINGH v. THE ADJUDICATOR OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

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CAMP 36/2022

[2023] HKCA 47

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 36 OF 2022

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 601 OF 2018)

________________________

BETWEEN

 SIDHU BALBIR SINGHApplicant
 and 
 THE ADJUDICATOR OF THE Putative
 NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICERespondent
 and 
 IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENTPutative
  Interested Party

________________________

Before: Hon G Lam and Chow JJA in Court
Date of Written Submissions: 16 December 2022
Date of Judgment: 18 January 2023

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 21 July 2022, this Court gave its judgment (“the CA Judgment”) dismissing the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal out of time against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan dated 20 September 2019 refusing to grant him leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 4 August 2017, which dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 August 2016.

3.  By Notice of Motion dated 2 December 2022, the Applicant applies for leave to appeal the CA Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. In the Notice of Motion, the Applicant makes some general complaints about errors of law and irrationality, but fails to identify any alleged error in the CA Judgment.

4.  In his written submissions dated 16 December 2023, the Applicant provides some personal background information, sets out some provisions of the ICCPR/Hong Kong Bill of Rights, and refers to some general principles relating to assessment of non-refoulement claims, but again fails to identify any alleged error in the CA Judgment.

5.  Under s 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal in any civil cause or matter if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal (as the case may be), the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  No question of great general or public importance involved in the proposed appeal is identified in the Notice of Motion. We are unable to see any such question being involved in the proposed appeal. We are satisfied that the intended appeal has no merits and no reasonable prospect of success. There is also no basis to grant leave to appeal on the “or otherwise” limb in s 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance.

7.  Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal is refused and the Notice of Motion is dismissed.

(Godfrey Lam)
Justice of Appeal
(Anderson Chow)
Justice of Appeal

The Applicant, acting in person

[2022] HKCA 1000-EN-2022-07-21

SIDHU BALBIR SINGH v. THE ADJUDICATOR OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HTML content

CAMP 36/2022

[2022] HKCA 1000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 36 OF 2022

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 601 OF 2018)

____________________

BETWEEN  
 SIDHU BALBIR SINGHApplicant
 and 
 THE ADJUDICATOR OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE Putative
Respondent
 and  
 IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT Putative Interested Party

____________________

Before: Hon G Lam and Chow JJA in Court
Date of Written Submissions: 14 February 2022
Date of Judgment: 21 July 2022

____________________

JUDGMENT

____________________

Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 28 January 2022, the Applicant filed a summons dated 2 December 2021 seeking “leave to appeal out of time” against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) dated 20 September 2019 (“the Order”) refusing to grant him leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 4 August 2017, which dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 August 2016.

3.  Having considered the documents, we are of the view that it is appropriate to determine this application on paper without an oral hearing under Order 59, Rule 14A of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.

BACKGROUND

4.  The Applicant is a national of India.  He had previously made a torture claim with the Immigration Department on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by the family of his girlfriend who opposed their relationship and/or by the police (his girlfriend’s brother being a police officer).  After his torture claim[1] had been rejected by the Immigration Department, the Applicant raised a non-refoulement claim on the same basis.  He was required to submit a Supplementary Claim Form (“SCF”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism which adopted, inter alia, the provisions of section 37Y of Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, and attend a screening interview before the Immigration Department for the purpose of his non-refoulement claim based on other applicable grounds including BOR 3 risk[2] and persecution risk[3].  The Applicant failed to return the completed SCF despite having been repeatedly reminded to do so for more than one year.  Accordingly, the Director treated the Applicant as having withdrawn his non-refoulement claim and, by a Notice of Decision dated 25 August 2016, refused to allow him to re-open his claim.  Details of the Applicant’s case have been summarised by the Judge at §§1-6 of the CALL-1 Form ([2019] HKCFI 815).

5.  The Applicant appealed the Director’s decision to the Board.  On 4 August 2017, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal and confirmed the Director’s decision (“the Board’s Decision”).  The Board considered that the Applicant had not provided any justification for his failure to return the SCF, and agreed with the Director that the Applicant had failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that due to circumstances beyond his control he had been unable to return the completed SCF.

JUDGE’S DECISION

6.  On 10 April 2018, the Applicant filed a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.

7.  On 20 September 2019, the Judge refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review for the following reasons:

“13. In the applicant’s case, a delay of more than five months must be regarded as substantial, for which he did not provide any explanation either in his Form 86 or his supporting affirmation, and as he failed to attend the oral hearing of his application, there was no opportunity to extract any explanation from him either.

14. As for the merits of his intended application, again in the absence of any grounds proposed by him or of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality identified in the Board’s decision, I do not see any reasonably arguable ground or any prospect of success in his intended challenge.

15. In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the applicant’s claim. As a matter of fact, even up to now the applicant has not submitted or produced his SCF.

16. For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for his substantial delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly his application is dismissed.”

8.  On 20 August 2020, the Judge refused the Applicant’s application by summons dated 7 May 2020 for an extension of time to appeal against the Order.  The Judge did not accept the Applicant’s explanation, namely, that he was unrepresented and was therefore not aware of the requirement to file his appeal within 14 days, as a valid explanation for his substantial delay of more than 7 months to lodge his intended appeal.  More importantly, the Judge considered that the Applicant had failed to provide any draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision, or why it may be argued that the decision was unfair or unreasonable (see [2020] HKCFI 1961, at §4-7). The Judge concluded that the Applicant did not have any prospect of success in his intended appeal, and it would be futile to extend time for what appeared to be a hopeless appeal.

THIS APPLICATION

9.  By a summons dated 2 December 2021 and taken out on 28 January 2022, the Applicant applied for leave to appeal out of time against the Order. In his supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the Applicant stated that he was unaware of the 14-day time limit for appeal, and complained that the decision by the Judge was reached unfairly without allowing him an opportunity to clarify his case and the situation in his home country.

10.  In his 4-page written submissions dated 14 February 2022, the Applicant made generic submissions on some general principles of law relating to non-refoulement claims.  He claimed that the Board did not act in a procedurally fair manner in dealing with his application and failed to properly assess his credibility.

DISCUSSION

11.  Following the approach this Court has adopted in Tang Chai On v Tang Sing Ki [2016] 5 HKLRD 104 at §§3-8, we would treat the present application as a renewed application for extension of time to appeal against the Order.

12.  In deciding whether to extend time to appeal, this Court will take into account the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the chances of the appeal succeeding, and the degree of prejudice to the other party if an extension of time is granted.

13.  The prospect of success of an intended appeal is important.  The court will not grant extension of time to appeal for a hopeless appeal to be pursued: Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike[2019] HKCA 702, at §19.

14.  The court’s general approach in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement claims is set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524, at §14.

15.  A delay of over 7 months is very substantial.  We agree with the Judge that the Applicant has failed to provide any good explanation for the delay.

16.  Regarding the Applicant’s chances of success of his intended appeal, the Applicant has failed to point to or substantiate any alleged error of the Judge in his decision dated 20 September 2019, and has failed to raise any viable ground of appeal against the Judge’s decision.  The Applicant’s contention that the Judge did not give him an opportunity to clarify his case is plainly without substance, in view of the fact that he did not attend either hearing before the Judge.

17.  There is no prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended appeal.

DISPOSITION

18.  The application for extension of time to appeal is refused, and the Applicant’s summons dated 2 December 2021 is dismissed.

(Godfrey Lam)      (Anderson Chow)
Justice of Appeal  Justice of Appeal  

The Applicant, acting in person


[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.