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Employee's Compensation Case2022

WONG KA CHUN v. SIU WAH TRANSPORTATION LTD

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[2026] HKDC 675-CH-2026-04-23

WONG KA CHUN v. SIU WAH TRANSPORTATION LTD

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DCEC 2547/2022

[2026] HKDC 675

香港特別行政區

區域法院

僱員補償案件2022年第2547號

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申請人WONG KA CHUN 

及

答辯人SIU WAH TRANSPORTATION LIMITED 

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主審法官:區域法院暫委法官黃承德法庭聆訊
審訊日期:2026年3月5日
判案書日期:2026年4月 23 日

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判案書

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引言

1.  本申請為申請人黃嘉俊先生根據《僱員補償條例》(香港法例第282章)第9、10及10A條向答辯人兆華貨運有限公司追討僱員補償的申請。

2.  庭審時,申請人由黃約翰律師事務所之陳錦德律師代表。答辯人沒有律師代表,由其公司董事李錦君先生代表行事。

意外發生的經過

3.  自約2018年起,一位李錦林先生開始駕駛答辯人名下的16噸貨車。答辯人在《經修訂回答書》中指稱,答辯人與李錦林先生之間屬於總承判商(principal contractor)與次承判商(sub-contractor)的關係。李錦林先生負責替答辯人送貨至其客戶。

4.  大約在2020年,申請人經中學同學介紹,認識了該中學同學的叔叔李錦林,並於2020年11月起在李錦林駕駛的貨車上擔任跟車工人。於所有相關時期,李錦林駕駛的正是答辯人名下那輛車牌為WR9341的16噸貨車。

5.  在2020年12月15日,李錦林駕駛該16噸貨車與申請人一同前往沙頭角坪輋路,將貨物送交答辯人的客戶。約在15:41,二人抵達送貨地點後,申請人站在該貨車車斗上,使用電動喞車卸下由卡板承載的貨物。當喞車的鏟叉插入卡板後,申請人試圖拉動喞車,喞車上貨物因堆疊過高勾到車斗頂部,導致喞車失控,喞車將申請人推向車斗內側板。申請人來不及鬆手,右手因此被夾在喞車與車斗內側板之間而受傷。

6.  申請人受傷後,隨即經由救護車送往北區醫院治理。經醫生診斷,確診其右手小指割傷,傷及肌腱及手指神經血管。翌日,申請人在北區醫院接受手術,並於同日出院。

7.  雙方對上述意外發生的經過並無爭議,亦不爭議申請人是在受僱工作期間因工遭遇意外以致身體受傷。

雙方的案情

8.  申請人於2022年12月13日根據《僱員補償條例》第9、10及10A條提出本案的僱員補償申請。申請人的案情如下:

(1)     2020年某天,申請人的中學同學得悉申請人正在找工作,便介紹其叔叔李錦林予申請人認識,並着申請人自己聯絡對方。

(2)     據申請人的說法,當時李錦林正替答辯人擔任送貨司機,並知道答辯人需要聘用跟車工人,遂代表答辯人與申請人洽談工作。經雙方商議,李錦林表示答辯人同意聘用申請人,申請人亦答應為答辯人工作。

(3)     雙方並未簽署僱傭合約,申請人的月薪為港幣18,000元,由李錦林在下一個月月初以現金向申請人支付。據申請人所指,李錦林會將薪金放入印有答辯人公司名稱的信封後再交給他。

(4)     日常工作安排方面,李錦林會駕駛印有答辯人公司名稱及聯絡資料的貨車,到其指定地點接載申請人,申請人無需前往答辯人的公司。申請人與李錦林之間的工作安排,有WhatsApp對話記錄作憑證。

(5)     申請人亦確認,他與答辯人的董事李錦君先生素未謀面。在受僱期間,申請人記得曾經見過答辯人公司的員工,但現在已記不清楚具體有哪些人。申請人確認工作上聽從李錦林的安排,上班時間及地點均由李錦林通知。當時申請人的固定月薪為港幣18,000元,不會因送貨單數的多寡而有所增減。

9.  申請人的主要案情指申請人是答辯人的僱員。但即使法庭判定申請人是李錦林的僱員,申請人的替代案情指由於答辯人是總承判商,李錦林是次承判商,答辯人仍須根據《僱員補償條例》第24條向申請人支付補償。

10.  答辯人否認其與申請人之間存在僱傭關係,但答辯人在其《經修訂回答書》第2A(b)段中承認李錦林是其次承判商。李錦君先生作供時亦再次向本席確認,答辯人與李錦林之間屬於「大判」與「二判」的關係。答辯人的具體案情如下:

(1)     答辯人是一家運輸公司,負責承接客戶訂單托運貨物。

(2)     在2020年12月時,答辯人一直聘用一批常規員工,負責駕駛公司擁有的四輛貨車,答辯人亦有為該些員工供強積金供款。

(3)     此外,答辯人亦有尋找其他職業司機作為合作伙伴,負責駕駛公司另外的兩輛貨車及一輛輕型貨車送貨。答辯人每月會向該等合作伙伴支付港幣25,000元(輕型貨車司機)或港幣50,000元(貨車司機),但此等合作伙伴並非答辯人的常規僱員,答辯人公司亦不會派出跟車工人協助。

(4)     答辯人會在前一晚會向合作伙伴發出送貨指示(俗稱order),合作伙伴須按送貨指示上的地點完成當日送貨。李錦君先生供稱,在送貨指示發出後,合作伙伴自行決定送貨流程,自行管理時間及人手,跟車工人的人數亦由該合作伙伴自行決定及安排。答辯人公司不會干涉,部分合作伙伴甚至沒有聘用跟車工人。

(5)     李錦林在2018年至2020年12月31日期間是答辯人的合作伙伴,答辯人每月向李錦林支付港幣50,000元的合作費。答辯人會在每月5日前發出一份名為「發票」的文件,記錄合作伙伴所報銷的車輛開支及上月的合作費用,支付方式則按合作伙伴的要求而定,以支票或現金支付。如以支票支付,支票抬頭人亦按合作伙伴的要求填寫。

(6)     李錦君先生多次強調,他本人直到收到勞工處文件時方才知悉申請人的存在,他與申請人並不認識,因此申請人並非答辯人的僱員。任何僱員補償,均應由李錦林來承擔。

11.  根據上述雙方的案情,本案的爭議點包括:

(1)     申請人究竟是答辯人還是李錦林的僱員?

(2)     倘若申請人是李錦林的僱員,答辯人是否須按《僱員補償條例》第24條承擔支付僱員補償的法律責任?

(3)     倘若答辯人需負上支付僱員補償的責任,根據《僱員補償條例》第9、10和10A條提出的補償金額是多少?

雙方的證供

12.  申請人及答辯人的董事李錦君先生是審訊期間僅有的兩位作證證人。本席在仔細考慮兩位證人的證供以及其他文件證據後,認為兩位證人均為誠實可信的證人,並接納二人的證供。申請人和答辯人明顯地對對方與李錦林之間的交往及關係並不了解。本席認為雙方的證供實際上沒有抵觸。本席將在下文中一併分析兩位證人的證供,以及雙方在本案中呈交的文件證據。

申請人是何人的僱員?

13.  根據《僱員補償條例》第5(1)條:

「(1) 除第(2)及(3)款另有規定外,不論受僱於任何工作的僱員,如在受僱工作期間因工遭遇意外以致身體受傷,其僱主須負有按照本條例支付補償的法律責任。」

14.  《僱員補償條例》第2(1) 條就「僱員」一詞作出定義:

「在本條例中,除文意另有所指以及除 第4條 及本款但書另有規定外, 僱員 ( employee ) 一詞指在本條例生效之前或之後,已與任何工作的僱主訂立僱用合約或學徒訓練合約的人,或現正根據與任何工作的僱主訂立的僱用合約或學徒訓練合約而工作的人,不論有關工作是屬體力勞動、文書工作或其他的性質的,亦不論該合約是明訂或隱含、口頭或書面的…」

15.  在Poon Chau Nam v Yim Siu Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 156一案中,終審法院常任法官李義在判案書第17-18段中指出,法庭在判定某人是否另一人的僱員時,會按照僱傭關係的各個表徵來審視雙方的關係,並根據整體印象決定雙方是否存在僱傭關係;這是細緻入微而非機械式的做法。有關的表徵包括:僱主所行使的控制程度,提供服務的人士是否自行預備所需器材,他是否自行聘用助手,他所承擔的財政風險的程度,他所賦有的投資或管理責任的程度,以及他在任何範圍內有機會從妥善管理其工作中得到利益。

16.  此外,上訴法庭亦在何偉強對億豐投資有限公司 [2023] 6 HKC 39;[2023] HKCA 929第25段採納了時任區域法院暫委法官李慶年在鄧秋悅訴傅劍波 [2011] 1 HKLRD 509一案所歸納出的11項相關指標:

(1)     被指稱為僱主者,是否對被指稱為僱員者的工作,有僱主應有的控制權?

(2)     被指稱為僱員者,是否自備工作所需工具?

(3)     被指稱為僱員者,是否自聘工作所需幫工?

(4)     被指稱為僱員者,是否須負上財政的風險,及其性質與程度?

(5)     被指稱為僱員者,是否可從他優秀的管理中,獲得利潤?

(6)     被指稱為僱員者,是否須負上投資及管理的責任,及其性質與程度?

(7)     被指稱為僱員者,可否正確地被識別為指稱為僱主者的商業組織一份子?

(8)     被指稱為僱主者,對被指稱為僱員者是否須負上保險及稅務責任?

(9)     被指稱為僱員者,有否在有關方面營商?

(10)     雙方對這關係的個人看法?

(11)     這行業或專業的傳統結構及慣例, 會否有助理解?

17.  上訴庭亦指出,在這11項相關指標中對任何特定指標的的權重應取決於案件的具體情況。雖然這11項相關指標看起來相當全面,它們不一定涵蓋所有相關的考量。

18.  在本案中,就上述11項相關指標,本席的分析如下:

(1)     首先,李錦林對申請人的工作擁有控制權,包括決定申請人工作時間及地點,以及監督申請人的送貨工作等。

(a)     申請人的工資安排由李錦林決定及支付,如在2020年11月12日,李錦林透過WhatsApp向申請人表示「總之18,000蚊一個月仲系紅色假期放假,總之人哋啲紅色就放假嘅咁樣咯,月尾出糧,即係一號出糧佢,有時唔定嘅,有時三號四號呀,咁樣出糧嘅」。申請人作供時亦向本席確認,其薪金是由李錦林以現金形式支付。

(b)     申請人的上班時間由李錦林決定。

(c)     李錦林在2020年11月23日14:29向申請人稱:「我話你行快兩步唔好樣樣嘢都好似散步咁,知唔知啊,做嘢做嘢爽手啲叫你」。以上對話反映李錦林會親自監督申請人的派貨工作。

(d)     李錦林亦會就申請人送貨的先後次序給予指示,如在2020年11月27日11:28,李錦林透過WhatsApp指示申請人「嗰單新偉華呢,原來就係我哋車位左手邊嗰間咋,就啱啱我哋車尾嗰間,睇吓邊嗰返到嚟,返到嚟就做咗先,即係我哋開尾板呢隔離嗰間」。

(e)     相反,答辯人對申請人的工作無控制權。正如李錦君先生所述,答辯人發出order給李錦林後,李錦林須要自行決定送貨的流程及管理時間和人手。

(2)     申請人在工作期間無需自備工具,送貨所用的貨車及唧車均由答辯人提供。

(3)     申請人在工作時無需自聘幫工。

(4)     根據申請人的證供,若因違例而需繳交交通罰款,李錦林會要求他承擔一半。除此之外,申請人無需負上任何財政風險。油費、隧道費、車輛維修保養等相關開支均由答辯人負責。

(5)     申請人月薪亦為固定港幣18,000元,不會因送貨單數的多寡或業務管理的優劣而有所增減。

(6)     申請人在工作期間無需負上投資及管理的責任。

(7)     申請人在工作期間使用答辯人公司的貨車送貨,貨車車身上印有答辯人的公司名稱及聯絡資料,故本席認為答辯人有可能被外界識別為答辯人公司的一員。

(8)     答辯人無需為申請人負上保險及稅務責任。李錦君先生供稱答辯人在案發期間聘用了一批常規員工,並每月為他們繳交強積金供款及報稅。反之,答辯人並沒有為李錦林或申請人繳交強積金供款或報稅。

(9)     申請人並非以經營業務的方式從事相關工作,本案雙方均同意申請人屬僱員身份。

(10)     申請人認為自己是答辯人的僱員,但此認知是來自李錦林而非答辯人。答辯人則認為自己並非申請人的僱主,因為答辯人從不認識申請人,更遑論曾經聘用對方。

(11)     本案沒有相關行業傳統結構或慣例的證據。

19.  本席認為本案的案情與Wong Kin v Him Kee Food Distribution Ltd [2016] 2 HKLRD 665頗爲相似。Wong Kin一案中的爭議點為申請人到底是總承判商(Him Kee)還是次承判商(Futer)的僱員。區域法院法官李樹旭在該案裁定該案的申請人並非總承判商的僱員,主要理由如下:

(1)     申請人的待遇與Him Kee的僱員存在明顯差異,包括Him Kee的僱員有簽訂僱傭合約、Him Kee每月透過銀行轉帳支薪、Him Kee有為僱員繳納強積金供款及報稅等(見判案書第67及69段);

(2)     此外,申請人從來不受Him Kee管轄:Him Kee的管理層不會過問申請人有否上班或Futer轄下是否有足夠的員工送貨、Futer在聘請申請人前無需取得事先取得Him Kee同意、且申請人月薪的金額及支付方式均由Futer決定等(見判案書第70段)。

20.  經仔細考慮所有相關證人供詞、文件證據以及適用的法律原則後,本席認為在意外發生時,申請人是李錦林的僱員,而非答辯人的僱員。以下數點對法庭判斷申請人是何人的僱員至關重要。

21.  首先,在意外發生前,申請人與答辯人可謂毫無關係。申請人並非由李錦君先生聘請,亦無需到答辯人公司打卡上班。正如李錦君先生供稱,答辯人不會理會李錦林或其他合作伙伴有否自行聘用跟車工人。雖然本案有證據顯示申請人似乎曾與答辯人的某些員工見過面,但申請人自己也承認對那些人的身分並不知曉。即使本席接納申請人確曾與答辯人的員工碰面,亦不足以證明申請人是由答辯人聘用的僱員。

22.  代表申請人的陳律師指出,李錦君先生作為老闆未必事必躬親,聘請跟車工人的事宜有可能交由李錦林代為處理,而且李錦林會用印有答辯人公司名稱的信封支薪給申請人,因此陳律師指以上的因素均支持申請人是答辯人的僱員的推論。

23.  然而,本案沒有任何證據支持李錦林獲答辯人授權聘用申請人擔任跟車工人。本席認為,倘若申請人是答辯人的僱員,答辯人支薪時不可能需要按照李錦林(或其他合作伙伴)的指示將合作費拆分。根據答辯人出具予李錦林的支付記錄,答辯人每月支付港幣50,000元予李錦林,並在付款時按李錦林的指示將該50,000元拆分並支付予不同人士,這正好反映申請人(或李錦林安排工作的其他人士)並非答辯人的直接僱員,否則答辯人無需按李錦林指示分配薪金,更不用透過李錦林發放。

24.  其次,答辯人本來已經聘用了一批常規員工,並為他們繳付強積金,並向法庭提交了相關銀行轉帳記錄為證,毫無疑問申請人不在該批員工之列。本席認為這一點直接反映申請人的待遇與答辯人其他僱員的待遇存有極大差異:見Wong Kin第67及69段。

25.  雖然申請人在結案陳詞指出,本席不應就這一指標給予過多比重,因為答辯人可能故意不為申請人繳納強積金供款或報稅,以規避僱傭關係。此外申請人在意外發生時受僱不足60日,故答辯人並未需要為申請人繳納強積金供款。

26.  本席認為,本案缺乏證據證明答辯人存心不為申請人繳納強積金供款或報稅,陳律師之陳詞純屬臆測。答辯人亦有為其常規員工作強積金供款,正正反映答辯人了解其作為僱主的責任,故陳律師的陳詞與本案的客觀證據不符,本席不予採納。至於陳律師指申請人受僱不足60日便發生意外,本席認同陳律師提出,該情形或可解釋為何答辯人沒有為申請人繳納強積金供款。

27.  然而,本席認為陳律師的陳詞忽略了一點,根據申請人的主要案情,申請人與李錦林均為答辯人的僱員。申請人未在本案中挑戰答辯人提供的強積金供款記錄。倘若李錦林真的是答辯人的僱員,記錄應該有所提及,但為何記錄中從未提及李錦林?本席認為較爲合理的推論應為李錦林從不是答辯人的僱員,答辯人也未替李錦林繳納強積金供款。本席認為申請人的主要案情與客觀證據不符。

28.  陳律師陳詞又指出,本案中送貨的車輛車身印有答辯人的名稱及聯絡資料,以及申請人負責運送的訂單是答辯人公司所承接的訂單,故雙方之間必然存有聯繫。然而,雙方之間的聯繫未必等同僱傭關係。正如本席在結案陳詞期間向陳律師指出,即使申請人是「二判」的僱員,也有可能使用「大判」提供的工具及負責「大判」承擔的工作。因此,本席認為以上因素對本議題的答案不具指向性。

29.  最後,陳律師亦依賴答辯人向李錦林出具的發票中使用「每月薪金」字眼,以及李錦君先生在答辯人的銀行月結單中將部分支出標註為「借糧」(即預支薪金的粵語俗稱),主張李錦林與答辯人之間存在僱傭關係,李錦林只是代答辯人聘請申請人而已。

30.  本席不認同陳律師的說法。雖然李錦君先生在盤問下承認答辯人出具的支付記錄採用「薪金」這一詞的確不夠明確,惟他亦解釋,公司只是為了方便會計記帳,才將合作費簡稱為「薪金」。本席接納答辯人的解釋。答辯人在支付記錄上着重的是金額本身,而非以法律上精準辭彙來描述支款性質。例如,答辯人的支付記錄是以答辯人出具予李錦林的「發票」(invoice)形式呈現。但顯然,相關的發票不是要求李錦林付款,反而恰恰相反。正如終審法院在Poon Chau Nam一案所言,法庭應該考慮證據所反映的整體印象,而非以咬文嚼字的方式檢視答辯人發出的發票或紀錄。無論如何,這僅是本席需要考慮的諸多因素之一,本席拒絕接納申請人以這一點作為主要理據,從而推論申請人是答辯人的僱員。

31.  綜合考慮到本案相關所有因素後,本席的整體印象明顯指向申請人是李錦林的僱員。因此,本席裁定申請人在案發當時是李錦林的僱員,而非答辯人的僱員。

答辯人是否第24(1)條所指的總承判商?

32.  《僱員補償條例》第24(1)條訂明:

「凡任何人(在本條內稱為總承判商)於其行業或業務運作期間或為了其行業或業務的目的,與次承判商訂約將總承判商所承擔的工作全部或部分轉由次承判商執行或在其監督下執行,則總承判商負有法律責任向由該次承判商或其他次承判商僱用以執行該工作的僱員,支付根據本條例規定的並且是該僱員假若由總承判商直接僱用則總承判商負有法律責任支付的補償;凡向總承判商提出補償申索或針對總承判商進行法律程序,則在引用本條例時,凡提述僱主之處,須以總承判商代替,但參照收入計算的補償額,則須參照該僱員得自直接僱用他的僱主的收入計算。」

33.  答辯人在其《經修訂回答書》第2A(b)段中已承認就《僱員補償條例》第24(1)條而言,李錦林是其次承判商。在庭審時,李錦君先生亦多次確認答辯人與李錦林之間是「大判」與「二判」的關係。申請人亦表示,倘若法庭裁定申請人是李錦林的僱員,申請人接受李錦林是答辯人的次承判商。無論如何,本席認為本案的證據確實顯示答辯人與李錦林之間是總承判商與次承判商的關係。

34.  根據Poon Hau Kei v Ho Shui Keung (t/a Keung Kee Scaffolding Engineering) [1999] 2 HKC 242, 第247頁C-D行,上訴法庭指出《僱員補償條例》第24(1)所指總承判商與次承判商的關係包含以下三個要素:

“(i) There must be work undertaken by the principal;

(ii) It must be in the course of, or for the purpose of, his trade or business; and

(iii) He must contract with another person for the execution of the whole, or some part, of the work.

This can be seen to be a helpful and plainly correct statement of the requirements of s 24(1)…”

35.  雖然Poon Hau Kei v Ho Shui Keung (t/a Keung Kee Scaffolding Engineering) [1999] 2 HKC 242一案最終因其他與第24條的解釋無關的原因被終審法院推翻判決,本席認為這無損上訴法庭對第24條的正確解釋。

36.  李錦君先生在盤問下同意,答辯人是以承接客戶托運訂單的方式經營業務,因此在經營過程中,答辯人透過合約向第三方客戶承擔了托運貨物的責任。此外,李錦君先生作供時亦同意,李錦林負責派送的貨物,正是由答辯人從客戶手上承包得來的托運貨物。因此,毫無疑問答辯人將部分承包的托運工作,透過合約外判予李錦林。

37.  在庭審期間,答辯人認為任何僱員補償應由申請人的直接僱主李錦林來承擔。這顯然不代表作為總承判商的答辯人在第24(1)條項下沒有相關責任,惟答辯人有權跟據第24(2)條主張由其他在第24條以外負有法律責任向申請人支付補償的人(包括申請人的直接僱主)予以彌償。

38.  綜上所述,本席裁定答辯人是第24(1)條所指的總承判商,須承擔向申請人支付僱員補償的法律責任。

補償金額

第9條

39.  意外發生後,申請人接受僱員補償(普通評估)委員會對其傷勢進行評估。在《表格9》中,該委員會認為申請人的受傷情況為「右尾指割傷引致右尾指僵硬及無力」,根據委員會的評估,申請人因傷所喪失的賺取收入能力的百分比為1%。

40.  在本案中,雙方均沒有對《表格9》提出上訴。本席將以評估委員會在《表格9》中就申請人永久喪失賺取收入能力所評定的1%作為唯一適用及不能推翻的證據(見Ng Ming Cheong v Mass Transit Railway Corporation [1997] HKLRD 1231)。

41.  由於雙方同意申請人在意外發生前的月入為港幣18,000元,因此申請人在第9條下可獲得港幣17,280元(96 x 18,000 x 1%)的補償。

第10條

42.  《僱員補償條例》第10(1)及(2)條訂明:

「(1) 凡損傷引致暫時地完全或部分喪失工作能力,須在顧及喪失工作能力頗有可能持續的時間,以及其在程度上頗有可能出現的變化下,以下述的按期付款作出補償或以據此計算的整筆款項作出補償。按期付款的數額須為按以下方式計算所得的按月付款數額,或以該按月付款數額為準再按相稱比率定出的數額︰僱員在意外發生時所賺取的每月收入與意外發生後暫時喪失工作能力期間在某類適合他受僱從事的工作或業務所賺取或有能力賺取的每月收入,兩者之間差額的五分之四。

(2)     為施行本條,不論受傷後果如何,凡由註冊醫生、註冊中醫、註冊牙醫、普通評估委員會或特別評估委員會證明為需要的缺勤期間,須當作為暫時地完全喪失工作能力的期間。」

43.  高等法院上訴法庭曾在余達金對朱東成 [2009] 6 HKC 411一案第23至26段中解釋上述條文第 (1) 款與第 (2) 款之間的關係以及相關的舉證責任:

“23. In our view s 10(2) enables the employee to make a claim for compensation without having to prove a negative – that during the certified period the incapacity ‘incapacitates [the] employee for any employment which he was capable of undertaking at the time of the accident’ (see the definition of the term ‘total incapacity’ in s 3(1) of the Ordinance).

24. However s 10(2) does not mean that the court is bound to award compensation at four-fifths of the employee’s pre-accident earnings during the certified period. As noted previously, s 10(1) contemplates that even for total temporary incapacity, the compensation would be reduced if there were earnings that the employee was earning, or was capable of earning, in some suitable employment during the period of temporary incapacity.

25. Does the employee bear the burden of proving that he had no earnings that he was earning, or was capable of earning, in a suitable employment during the period of temporary incapacity so that there should be no reduction under s 10(1)? Although the employee is the applicant for compensation, we are of the view that he does not bear that burden. The intention of the Ordinance is to provide quick financial relief to employees incapacitated by work-related injury in a no-fault scheme (LKK Trans Ltd v Wong Hoi Chung (2006) 9 HKCFAR 103, 114). It is assumed that had the accident not occurred, the employee would have continued in the same type of employment receiving the same earnings. Given the intention of the Ordinance and the difficulty of proving a negative, the legislature would not have intended that it was for the employee to prove that during the certified period of incapacity, that he was not earning, or was not capable of earning, wages in a suitable employment after the accident.

26. Accordingly in our judgment, the burden is on the employer to prove that circumstances existed for a reduction in compensation. If the employer can prove that the employee was actually earning money during the certified period (as in this appeal), those earnings would be put into the s 10(1) calculation.  Also if the employer can prove that despite the certified incapacity, the employee was still capable of earning money in a ‘suitable’ employment, those potential earnings would also be put into the s 10(1) calculation.”

44.  就第10條下的賠償而言,申請人向法庭呈遞了以下的證據:

(1)     根據申請人提交的醫生證明書、《表格7》及《表格9》,申請人在2020年12月15日至2021年1月12日(共29天)及2021年1月14日至2021年10月12日期間(共272日)合共獲發301天病假。

(2)     在2021年3月1日至14日期間,申請人曾在Beyond Korea(Tai Po)Limited擔任廚師一職,合共賺取了港幣6,774元的收入。

(3)     在2021年5月1日至2021年10月3日期間,申請人曾在Teawood Taiwanese Dining Bar Limited擔任廚師(一級)一職,合共賺取了港幣93,268元的收入。

(4)     在2020年4月1日至2021年3月31日期間,申請人曾受僱於Talent Consultancy Ltd,擔任保安工作,並賺取了港幣10,450元的收入。然而,本案中並無任何證據證明相關收入具體是在何時賺取的,而申請人在其證人陳述書第21段亦有提及他忘記了自己是在病假期間還是受傷之前為該公司工作。答辯人沒有在盤問期間就這方面向申請人作出任何提問。上訴法庭在余達金案指出,相關的舉證責任在僱主一方,故本席認為答辯人未能在相對可能性的衡量下證明申請人在病假期間曾為Talent Consultancy Ltd工作並賺取收入。因此,本席不會就這項收入對申請人在第10條下可獲得的賠償作出扣減。

45.  因此,本席裁定根據第10條,答辯人須向申請人支付港幣44,438元的賠償(18,000 x 301/30 x 4/5 – 6,774 – 93,268 = 44,438)。

第10A條

46.  根據《僱員補償條例》第10A(1)條,倘若僱員在受僱工作期間因工遭遇意外以致身體受傷,僱主須承擔相關的醫療費用。

47.  根據申請人提供的醫療紀錄,他在意外當天被送往北區醫院急症室治理的醫療費用為120元。申請人亦曾在2021年1月14日、4月22日及6月17日三次前往骨科專科門診覆診。本席接納陳律師的陳詞,根據適用的《醫院管理局收費表》,專科門診每次的標準診金為港幣80元。本席裁定根據條例第10A條,答辯人須向申請人支付港幣360元(120 + (80 x 3))的醫療開支。

48.  因此,本席裁定答辯人須向申請人支付合共港幣62,078元(17,280 + 44,438 + 360)的僱員補償。

結論

49.  本席裁定:

(1)     答辯人須向申請人支付港幣62,078元的僱員補償及所產生的利息;

(2)     利息由該事故發生當日(即2020年12月15日)起計算至判決日,利率為判定利率的一半,而判決後至付款日期的利息則以判定利率計算。

50.  有關本案的訟費,本席同時頒下暫准訟費令。答辯人須支付申請人在本案的訟費,若雙方未能就訟費金額達成共識,則交由法庭評定。除非與訟其中一方於本判決日起計的14天內向法庭申請更改上述暫准訟費命令,否則上述訟費命令將在頒發本判案書之日的14日後成為絕對命令。

( 黃承德 )
區域法院暫委法官

  

申請人:由黃約翰律師事務所之陳錦德律師代表

答辯人:由公司董事李錦君先生代表行事

[2025] HKDC 1292-EN-2025-07-30

WONG KA CHUN v. SIU WAH TRANSPORTATION LTD

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DCEC 2547/2022

[2025] HKDC 1292

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 2547 OF 2022

________________________

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BETWEEN

WONG KA CHUNApplicant
And
SIU WAH TRANSPORTATION LIMITEDRespondent

________________________

Before: Deputy District Judge Vincent Chen in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 30 July 2025
Date of Decision: 30 July 2025

________________________

DECISION

________________________


1.  This is scheduled to be the trial of the captioned proceedings.  This dispute arises out of the alleged personal injury suffered by the Applicant in an accident on 15 December 2020, arising out of and in the course of the employment by the Respondent. At the time of the accident, the Applicant was working as a delivery worker. When the Applicant was operating a pallet truck inside the lorry, the pallet truck lost control and crushed him.  The Respondent denies that the Applicant was employed by it.

2.  There are two other applications before me, namely: (1)  the Applicant’s application dated 18 June 2025 for leave to amend the Application filed on 13 December 2022 (“Amendment Application”)  and (2)  the Respondent’s application dated 14 July 2025 to seek to have this trial adjourned (“Adjournment Application”). I will deal with these applications below.

A.  The Amendment Application

A1.  The lateness of the application

3.  First, I note that this application was taken out by the Applicant very late and has the likely effect of jeopardising the trial dates of these proceedings.

4.  Lateness without explanation itself is a ground to refuse late interlocutory applications. The applicant for leave must establish, by affidavit evidence, exceptional circumstances to explain and justify the delay: Hong Kong Changyi Real Estate Development Limited v Neo-China (Group)  Infrastructure Investment Limited & Anors, unreported, HCA 1576/2011, 25 February 2014 at §1 per Mimmie Chan J. The prejudice to the other party is particularly serious when a milestone date is likely to be jeopardized: Credit One Finance Ltd v Leong Wun Heng[2019] 4 HKLRD 591 at §14.

5.  In the present case, I note, however, that the Respondent does not object to any adjournment. Quite the contrary, the Respondent took out its own application to have the trial adjourned. Any potential prejudice to the trial dates should be considered with that in mind.

6.  By the Amendment Application, the Applicant seeks leave to add and include an alternative basis of liability against the Respondent. In addition to seeking to claim against the Respondent as his employer, the Applicant now also claims that the Respondent should be liable as a principal contractor under section 24(1)  of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282)  (“Ordinance”). The relevant new pleas are pleaded in the Amended Application in §§1(b)  & 3(3)  as underlined:-

“Alternatively, at all material time 李錦林 also known as 家希阿叔 was a sub-contractor within the meaning of the Ordinance to a principal contractor within the meaning of the Ordinance namely the Respondent.”

“On 15th December 2020, in the course of his employment with the Respondent, or alternatively, with 李錦林 also known as 家希阿叔 who was the sub-contractor of the Respondent, the Applicant was delivering goods at near Ping Che Road, FLG3/FLG3; Chiu Lik Company ˃ Chin Shing. When he was operating a pallet truck inside the lorry, the pallet truck lost control and crushed him. As a result, he sustained injuries.[1]”

7.  In the Affirmation in support of this application, the Applicant explained that he previously worked with 家希阿叔 but did not know his full name or that he might be a sub-contractor of the Respondent. In January 2025, in one of the Respondent’s witness statements (ie the witness statement of 李錦君), it was revealed that the delivery work was sub-contracted to a 李錦林 (“Lee”), who used one of the Respondent’s lorries.

8.  On 17 June 2025, in a letter from Messrs Cheng, Yeung & Co, the solicitors acting for the Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board (“Board”)  to the Applicant’s solicitors, correspondence between the Board and the Respondent was enclosed by which the Respondent confirmed that the identity of 家希阿叔 was in fact Lee. The relevant part of the said letter reads as follows:-

“Upon our enquiries, the Respondent has confirmed that 李錦林 had been the driver of WF9341 during its contract with 李錦林 and he was the driver of WF9341 on the date of the alleged accident. In light of your client’s case that he was riding on WF9341 on the date of the alleged accident, it is not difficult to conclude that 家希阿叔 was in fact 李錦林.” (emphasis added)

9.  The Amendment Application was taken out on 18 June 2025, the very next day after the said letter from Messrs Cheng, Yeung & Co. It is the Applicant’s stance that the said letter has prompted him to make the Amendment Application, based on the new information revealed therein.

10.  The Respondent disputes that the Applicant only learned of the new information on 17 June 2025. The Respondent suggests that, by reason of the witness statement of 李錦君, at least in January 2025, the Applicant had already known of the full name of the driver of the relevant vehicle and that Lee was a sub-contractor of the Respondent.  The Respondent argues that the Applicant should have taken out this application in January 2025, rather than in June 2025.

11.  I disagree with the Respondent. First, the witness statement of 李錦君 underwent an amendment very recently on 23 June 2025. In the un-amended version dated 16 January 2025, in §3, the Respondent’s witness states that the Respondent had ended its co-operation with Lee in March 2020, ie before the date of the accident. Hence, a fair reading of this witness statement cannot lead to any reasonable conclusion that 家希阿叔 was in fact Lee.

12.  The witness statement of 李錦君 was later amended on 23 June 2025 by which the said co-operation between the Respondent and Lee is alleged to have ceased only on 31 December 2020, ie after the date of the accident.

13.  At the hearing, the Respondent refers me to some documents (ie invoices issued by the Respondent to Lee until December 2020)  by which the Respondent suggests that the Applicant should have known that their co-operation had not ended in March 2020.

14.  I do not think that this is a fair submission. First, these documents do not reveal any sub-contractor relationship between Lee and the Respondent. To the contrary, it shows that Lee was an employee of the Respondent and had received “salaries”. Second, this argument effectively means that the Applicant should have performed his own investigation work to find out and correct a mistake contained in the Respondent’s own witness statement.

15.  The Respondent also suggests that the Applicant should have contacted Lee himself and if he had done so, he would have known about the sub-contractor relationship earlier. This submission is, with respect, speculative as there is no basis to suggest that Lee would have confirmed himself to be a sub-contractor of the Respondent.

16.  Given the aforesaid, I am satisfied that the earliest that the Applicant could have applied to amend the Application was after the receipt of the letter on 17 June 2025 from Messrs Cheng, Yeung & Co. Therefore, while this application was made very late in the days, there is a legitimate reason explaining the late introduction of this alternative case.

A2.  The lack of notice under section 24(6)  of the Ordinance

17.  The Respondent further objects the proposed amendment on the basis that it is premature and thus defective for the failure to serve the notice required under section 24(6)  of the Ordinance, which reads as follows:-

“An employee shall, before making any claim or application by virtue of this section against a principal contractor, serve on the principal contractor a notice in writing stating—

(a)  the name and address of the employee;

(b)  the name and address of the sub-contractor by whom he is employed;

(c)  the address of the place of employment of the employee;

(d)  the particulars of the accident and the injury suffered; and

(e)   the amount of compensation to be claimed.”

18.  Section 24(6)  and its interaction with section 24(7)  of the Ordinance were considered by the Court of Appeal in Wong Leung Tak v Wong Lee (Brothers)  Transportation Company Limited, unreported, CACV 151/1989, 30 March 1990 in which the following paragraphs at §§55-57 are illustrative:-

“… Under section 24(6)  an employee is required, before making any claim or application under section 24 against a principal contractor, to serve him with a notice giving the information stipulated in that provision, which includes the name and address of the employer sub-contractor and the amount of the compensation claimed. Under section 24(7)  of the Ordinance a principal contractor against whom a claim or application is made by an employee under section 24 is required to give notice thereof to the sub-contractor specified in the section 24(6)  notice who is "thereupon entitled to intervene in any application made against the principal contractor".

The notice provision contained in section 24(7)  is picked up by rule 22(1)  of the Employee's Compensation (Rules of Court)  Rules which requires that a notice, presumably under section 24(7), to a sub-contractor of a claim or application for compensation made against the principal contractor shall be in Form 10, which is a simple form giving notice of the claim and making no reference to a claim for indemnity by the principal contractor against the employer. Rule 22(1)  goes on to provide that if the employer sub-contractor to whom such notice is given desires to intervene he is required forthwith to lodge with the registrar of the court and serve on the applicant and the principal contractor a notice, in Form 11, that he so intervenes.

Having so intervened, the sub-contractor is required to lodge an answer to the application in accordance with rule 22(2)  and under rule 22(3)  the court may on the hearing of the application, if satisfied that he is entitled to intervene, order that the sub-contractor be made a respondent.”

19.  That decision, however, has not discussed or spelled out the consequence (if any)  as to the failure for the applicant to serve the notice pursuant to section 24(6).

20.  The Applicant has referred me to the decision in 譚國武 v 三星電子香港有限公司 & Anors [2021] 1 HKLRD 142 in which the consequence of a failure to serve the notice under section 24(6)  was discussed. In that case, having reviewed the legislative purpose behind this section, the Court held (and I summarise)  as follows:-

(a)  Under section 24(6), there is no time limit stipulated for the giving of a notice to the principal contractor.  

(b)  Section 24 is to provide a procedural mechanism to enable a principal contractor, which/who shall be severally liable to pay compensation to the employee, to intervene in proceedings an employee brought against the employer.  Hence, it is important for the principal contractor to have notice of the proceedings under section 24(6)  if the former is not a party to the proceedings so that the principal contractor can rely on section 24(7)  and rule 22(1) of the Employees’ Compensation (Rules of Court)  Rules (together with its prescribed Form 10) to apply to intervene.

(c)  The failure to comply with section 24(6)  will not make the employee’s claim unmaintainable.

(d)  Further, under the deeming provision of section 14(3)  of the Ordinance, a notice (whether written or oral)  given “to an employee employed by a sub-contractor” or “to any foreman or other official … shall be deemed to be notice to the principal contractor”.

(e)  In that case, the applicant’s issuance of the joinder application was regarded by the court as the giving of the notice under section 24(6).

21.  At the hearing, I enquired with the Respondent whether it could produce any other authorities contradicting 譚國武 v 三星電子香港有限公司 & Anors, supra. The Respondent replied in the negative but sought to distinguish that decision from the present. Despite his efforts, I find the observations therein equally applicable to our case.

22.  I agree with the analysis in 譚國武 v 三星電子香港有限公司 & Anors, supra. The lack of a formal written notice under section 24(6)  of the Ordinance in itself should not render the Applicant’s proposed amended claim premature or defective. In any event, the Respondent is already a party to these proceedings. The Respondent has knowledge and notice of the alternative claim now made by the Applicant against it. The lack of formal written notice served under this section has not given rise to any prejudice to the Respondent. If necessary, I also find that the Amendment Application by itself qualifies as sufficient written notice for the purpose of section 24(6)  of the Ordinance.

23.  Therefore, there is no merit in this objection by the Respondent.

A3.  Conclusion on the Amendment Application

24.  Having found that the Applicant has provided a good explanation regarding the lateness of the Amendment Application and having rejected the Respondent’s argument that the proposed amendment is premature and thus detective, I am also satisfied that the amendments are necessary to enable the real questions and controversy between the parties to be decided.

25.  In the present case, the role and involvement of Lee and his relationship with both the Applicant and Respondent are crucial and it will shed light on whether the Respondent should be liable to pay employee compensation to the Applicant under the Ordinance as an employer or as a principal contractor.

26.  Further, as noted above, although allowing the proposed amendments is likely to affect the trial dates (a matter to be further addressed below), it cannot be said that the Respondent will suffer any serious prejudice as the Respondent is also seeking an adjournment by its Summons.

27.  Having balanced all the factors, I exercise my discretion to allow the Amendment Application.

B.  The Adjournment Application/Whether the trial can still proceed?

28.  Having granted leave for the Applicant to amend the Application, it appears to me that it is in the interest of justice that the trial of these proceedings should be adjourned. I bear in mind that trial dates being milestone dates should not be adjourned or varied save and except under exceptional circumstances. I find that such circumstances exist in the present case.

29.  First, leave should be granted to the Respondent to amend its Answer to make any corresponding changes. Given that the new amendment made by the Applicant represents a major shift of case against the Respondent (by the addition of an entirely new alternative case). The Respondent should be given sufficient time to formulate its response and amend its Answer accordingly. It would not be fair to the Respondent to ask it to rush to formulate its case in the course of this 2-day trial.

30.  Second, now that the Applicant has prayed in aid of section 24(1)  of the Ordinance, time should be given for the Respondent to decide whether to give notice pursuant to section 24(7)  of the Ordinance which reads:-

“Where a claim or application is made by virtue of this section against a principal contractor, the principal contractor shall give notice thereof to the sub-contractor specified in the notice served on the principal contractor under subsection (6), who shall thereupon be entitled to intervene in any application made against the principal contractor.”

31.  I note that the service of such a notice may further give rise to an intervening application by the sub-contractor.

32.  Third, given the new alternative case now raised by the Applicant, the parties will need further time to consider and, if necessary, adduce factual evidence to address such matters, which may lead to further witness statements or further discovery from the parties.

33.  In these circumstances, it appears to me that the proper course is to have the trial of these proceedings adjourned to allow time for, inter alia, the aforesaid to happen (if so advised).

C.   Costs

34.  Today result is that I grant both applications made by the parties. I would not have granted any adjournment of the trial proceedings but for the Amendment Application. Hence, both summonses are in that sense linked together and their costs order should be considered in one go.

35.  Although leave to amend is granted, there is no denying that that application was made very late. The Applicant is seeking indulgence of this Court to allow this very late application. That said, the said lateness is partly attributable to the mistake made in the Respondent’s witness statement, which was only rectified very recently in June 2025. It can thus be said that both parties are partly at fault leading to the present situation.

36.  Considering all the circumstances, the proper costs order should be that there be no order as to costs in respect of both applications.

D.  Orders/Directions

37.  I grant the following directions today:-

(a)  The Applicant do have leave to amend the Application filed on 13 December 2022 as shown in red as appears in the draft Amended Application annexed to the Applicant’s Summons dated 18 June 2025 and as further corrected orally by the Applicant at the hearing on 30 July 2025;

(b)  The Applicant do file and serve the Amended Application within 7 days from today;

(c)  The Respondent do have leave to file and served its Amended Answer within 21 days thereafter;

(d)  The costs of and occasioned by the amendment be to the Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed;

(e)  The trial of these proceedings be adjourned to a date to be fixed with 2 days reserved;

(f)  The second trial day on 31 July 2025 be vacated; and

(g)  There be no order as to costs in respect of both summonses including the costs of this hearing.

( Vincent Chen )
Deputy District Judge

Mr I Chan, of John W Wong & Co, for the applicant

Mr Sousa Richard Alvaro, of Chan, Lau & Wai, for the respondent



[1] At the hearing, the Applicant has sought to further amend the draft Amended Application by taking out the word “LP EB0083” from this paragraph. This cited paragraphs here are the ones before this Court for determination.