ELA SAFRIYANTI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]

HCAL 843/2022

[2026] HKCFI 2549

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 843 of 2022

BETWEEN
	Ela Safriyanti	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board /	Putative
	Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office	Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Bonnie Cheng:

1.   The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  By Form 86 dated 29 August 2022 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 19 July 2022 (“Board’s Decision”), which affirmed the Decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 28 July 2021. 

2.  An oral hearing, which was requested by the Applicant, took place before me on 25 February 2026.  The Applicant attended in person. 

3.  At the hearing, the Applicant indicated that she had nothing to add to the papers submitted for her Leave Application. 

Background

4.  The Applicant is from Indonesia.  Her background and the basis of her application for non-refoulement were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision at this hyperlink.[1] I will not repeat them here.  Unless otherwise specified, I adopt the abbreviations in the Board’s Decision. 

5.  In short, the Applicant claimed to be in fear of being harmed or killed by a moneylender who she borrowed a large sum of money from but failed to make repayment to. According to her, she was mistreated by the moneylender and threatened with serious harm. 

Discussion

6.  Leave application is meant to be a filtering process and the court is not expected to give elaborate reasons for its decision: Re Zunariyah[2018] HKCA 14 at §23.  I therefore set out below brief reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the materials before me. 

7.  The court’s role in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board.  While the court adopts in non-refoulement cases an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, it should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1).  There must be a reasonably arguable case, namely one which enjoys a realistic prospect of success, before leave for judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17. 

8.  In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to state the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly: Ho Loy v Director of Environmental Protection (HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016) at §142.  He or she is also under a duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17. 

9.  In the Leave Application, the Applicant has not stated any ground of judicial review.  She has not identified any error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision to demonstrate a reasonably arguable case. 

10.  In any event, I have reviewed the Board’s Decision and I do not detect any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.  The Board assessed the evidence in detail and gave adequate reasons for its decision.  In particular:

(1)   The Board found that the Applicant was not a credible witness.  She was reluctant and declined to answer questions which reasonably should have been within her knowledge: §§89, 125. 

(2)   The Board also observed material inconsistencies and implausibility in the Applicant’s evidence.  For example, the Board found it implausible that the Applicant and her husband could have obtained such a large loan.  Her evidence that they had not done any calculations prior to obtaining the loan was implausible.  The Board also noted that the agreed interest alone was more than 5.78 times the monthly aggregate income of the Applicant and her husband: §§90-123. 

(3)   On the whole, the Board took the view that the moneylender was a fictitious character and the loan a fabrication: §126. 

(4)   In any event, the Board noted that the Applicant had not sought state protection after an alleged incident of assault in January 2018.  The Board considered the relevant COI and found there was insufficient evidence that the Applicant would not be able to access reasonable state protection if she were to be returned to Indonesia: §§129-134. 

(5)   Further still, the Board found in any case that there was no real chance of the moneylender tracking the Applicant down if she were to relocate to an alternative location such as Jakarta, which the Board regarded as a feasible option given the Applicant’s work experience: §§140, 150. 

11.  In the premises, I conclude that the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable. 

Conclusion

12.  I make an order that the Leave Application be dismissed.  

Dated the 5^th day of May 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

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