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2023

RE DRAGON SEAFOODS LTD

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[2025] HKCA 177-EN-2025-02-24

RE DRAGON SEAFOODS LTD

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CACV 375/2023, [2025] HKCA 177

On appeal from [2023] HKCFI 2624

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 375 OF 2023

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCW NO 265 OF 2021)

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of section 177(1)(d) and 178(1)(c) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, Cap 32
 and
 IN THE MATTER of DRAGON SEAFOODS LIMITED (豐泰水產有限公司)

________________________

Before: Hon Kwan VP and Harris J in Court
Date of Decision: 24 February 2025

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

Hon Kwan VP (giving the Decision of the Court):

The Summons

1.  This is an application to extend time for providing security for costs on appeal.

2.  On 21 October 2024, upon the respondent’s application, we ordered the petitioner to provide security for the respondent’s costs in the appeal in the following terms ([2024] HKCA 966) (“Security for Costs Order”):

“(1) The petitioner do provide security for the respondent’s costs of this appeal by making payment into court in the sum of HK$600,000 within 28 days from the date of this decision.

(2) All further proceedings in the appeal be stayed until such security is provided and notice of payment is given to the Registrar of Civil Appeals and the solicitors for the respondent.

(3) In default of security being given within the time set out in (1) above, the appeal do stand dismissed without further order, with costs to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.”

3.  The petitioner did not provide the security for costs within the stipulated 28-day period, which expired on 18 November 2024. Pursuant to the sanction imposed in paragraph (3) of the Security for Costs Order, the appeal has been dismissed with costs to the respondent.

4.  On 19 December 2024, 31 days after the stipulated period as mentioned and 17 days after the 14-day period under Order 2 rule 4[1], the petitioner issued the present summons (“Summons”) for an order that:

“(1) Time for the Petitioner to apply for relief from sanction be extended for 7 days from the date of the order to be made herein;

(2) Relief from sanction of paragraph 1 of the [Security for Costs Order] be granted to the Petitioner and thereby the Petitioner’s appeal be reinstated;

(3) Further to paragraph (2) hereinabove, the time for the Petitioner to provide security in the sum of HK$600,000 for the Respondent be extended for 7 days from the date of the order to be made herein; and

(4) Costs of this application be to the Respondent in any event.”

5.  We would approach the Summons as the petitioner’s application for an extension of time to apply for relief from sanction from the 14-day period stipulated under Order 2, rule 4 to the date that the Summons was issued.

6.  The Summons is supported by the 2nd Affirmation of Leung King Wai William (“P’s 2nd”), the principal of the petitioner’s solicitors. It is trite that an affirmation should contain evidence and not submissions. With due respect to Mr Leung, the submissions in §§29 to 33 of P’s 2nd should be made in his written submissions and should not be included in an affirmation.

7.  On 20 December 2024, this court gave directions for the filing of affidavit evidence and written submissions, and that the Summons would be dealt with on paper (“Directions”). By letter dated 10 January 2025, Messrs Kwok, Yih & Chan, solicitors for the respondent, indicated that to save costs they would not file any affirmation or written submissions in opposition. They merely stated that the petitioner has failed to obtain relief from sanction within 14 days of the failure to comply with the Security for Costs Order and any bank restrictions with Russian entities referred to by the petitioner would have existed at the time of the respondent’s application for security for costs filed on 15 December 2023. Hence, the petitioner has had ample time to overcome the alleged hurdles and make appropriate arrangement to transfer funds for the security for costs.

8.  The petitioner lodged its “Reply Submission” on 24 January 2025 in response to the above observations in the letter of the respondent’s solicitors.

The petitioner’s 3rd Affirmation filed without leave

9.  The Directions specifically directed that no further document shall be filed without leave. Contrary to the Directions, the petitioner filed the 3rd Affirmation of Mr Leung (“P’s 3rd”) on 3 February 2025, without any application for leave of the court or consent from the respondent.

10.  P’s 3rd exhibited a copy (the original was being couriered to Hong Kong) of the Affirmation of Mr Smirnov Konstantin Vladimirovich (“Smirnov” and “Smirnov’s Affirmation”), the managing director of the petitioner, which was signed, notarized, and authenticated by an apostille, along with a Russian-to-English translated copy.

11.  Leaving aside the absence of leave, it is not clear why Smirnov’s Affirmation was not mentioned in the petitioner’s Reply Submission dated 24 January 2025, as Mr Leung had sight of the Russian-to-English translated copy of Smirnov’s Affirmation which was couriered to Hong Kong on 21 January 2025 although the original was not yet received when he made P’s 3rd on 3 February 2025.

12.  There is no indication from the respondent of its stance regarding P’s 3rd and Smirnov’s Affirmation. But for the fact that there seems to be no new substantive matters deposed to in P’s 3rd or Smirnov’s Affirmation, we would have excluded these affirmations from our consideration as evidence adduced without leave contrary to the Directions.

Legal principles

13.  The legal principles for (i) an application for relief from sanction imposed by an unless order, and (ii) an extension of time for non-compliance of Order 2, rule 4, are well-established. They are set out by Au JA in Mututal Brilliant Limited v Shin Ho Cable (Holdings) Company Limited & Anr[2024] HKCA 519, at §§62 to 66. In the weighing exercise to be undertaken by the court in the exercise of its discretion to grant relief from sanction, a weighty factor is proportionality of the sanction in the circumstances of the case[2].

14.  The legal principles governing the extension of time to provide security are summarised by Lok J in Two-Way Media Ltd v PCCW Ltd & Ors [2022] 4 HKC 373, at §5:

“(i) It is the norm for the applicant to provide adequate explanation for making the application for extension of time. Without evidence explaining why the applicant has not paid the security as ordered, why it needs more time, its financial circumstances, and why no application for extension of time has been made earlier, there is simply no basis for the court to exercise the discretion to grant an extension of time.

(ii) Litigants should be disabused of the notion that court orders do not mean what they say. A party seeking an extension of time does not have the luxury of proceedings at a pace that is to its liking. Rather, it has to proceed with all due dispatch and approach the matter with a sense of urgency.

(iii) The lack of prejudice to the other party is not itself a ground for granting an extension which is otherwise unjustified.”

The petitioner’s case

15.  The petitioner’s case, as deposed to by Mr Leung, is that the delay in providing security was due to the difficulty in wiring funds to Hong Kong, which is beyond the petitioner’s control. We do not propose to set out in detail all the evidence on these matters, save as follows:

(1)  The petitioner made an attempt to transfer funds as early as 12 March 2024 (on Mr Leung’s advice in December 2023, not long after the respondent’s application for security for costs was taken out), by transferring the funds to the account of the petitioner’s solicitors at the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited (“BOC”). A transaction record (Exhibit LKWW-2) and “a copy of the WhatsApp correspondence between the Petitioner’s solicitor and [Smirnov’s son]” (ie, Exhibit SKV-1) were exhibited. However, due to “tightening regulations relating to transactions with Russia entity”, the funds had “probably” gone through the process of approval by the intermediate bank’s compliance department. It was also alleged that BOC was “very unlikely” to process transaction related to Russian entities. The transfer of funds was unsuccessful in the end, and Mr Leung was informed by the petitioner on 13 May 2024 that the funds were returned to the petitioner’s account.

(2)  Mr Leung stated that he had explored alternative transaction methods through the “subsidiaries of small Chinese banks” during the period from March to June 2024. However, these subsidiaries informed the petitioner’s solicitors that they had halted all transactions with Russian entities since February/March 2024 since the USA authorised secondary sanctions in December 2023 targeting financial institutions.

(3)  After the Security for Costs Order (ie 21 October 2024), the petitioner’s solicitors enquired again with BOC and China CITIC Bank International Limited regarding receiving funds from Russian entities to comply with the Security for Costs Order.

(4)  On 6 December 2024, the petitioner’s solicitors finally received the funds from the petitioner and the petitioner is now able to comply with the Security for Costs Order. There were other communications with the respondent’s solicitors afterwards. As the respondent’s solicitors refused to consent to the application for relief from sanction, the Summons was eventually issued on 19 December 2024.

(5)  As to the reason why the Summons was issued belatedly, Mr Leung explained that until the petitioner’s solicitors have received the funds from the petitioner on 6 December 2024, they were “unable to provide the Court with a definite timeline for when the Petitioner will be able to comply with the Security for Costs Order.” (P’s 2nd, at §§15 and 22)

16.  Mr Leung also submits that the length of the delay in issuing the Summons is short, and the reasons for the delay were neither deliberate nor contumacious, but due to circumstances beyond their control. He further submits that the respondent would not suffer any real prejudice as no hearing date has been fixed yet. He asserts that any prejudice suffered by the respondent could be remedied by an order for costs and the prejudice the petitioner would suffer if the appeal remains dismissed would be very serious.

Discussion

17.  We do not think the delay in issuing the Summons can be regarded as short. It is 31 days after the stipulated 28-day period under the Security for Costs Order and 17 days after the 14-day period under Order 2 rule 4.

18.  We do not accept that the petitioner has made a good explanation for failure to comply with the Security for Costs Order for the following reasons.

19.  It is evident that the underlying proceedings have been ongoing since 2021 and the appeal since 2023. The petitioner should proceed with all due dispatch and approach the matter with a sense of urgency. As Mr Leung has deposed, he advised the petitioner shortly after the application for security was issued in December 2023 that the plaintiff should wire sufficient funds for making the security for costs payment if the respondent’s application should be granted by the court. The petitioner only attempted to do so in March 2024.

20.  Regarding the attempted transfer in March 2024, we note from the transaction record (Exhibit LKWW-2) that the purpose of the purported transfer of RMB 1,392,725 was stated as: “Payment of the legal services Agreement dated 16.02.2023, inv. 23047 dd 14.02.2024, contracts No. 23051601/00 77/0000/4/1 of 04.05.2023”. This does not appear to be for the purpose “to ensure compliance of court order”, as asserted by Mr Leung in §5 of P’s 2nd.

21.  No reason was proffered as to why the transferred funds were returned to the petitioner’s account. Mr Leung merely stated that he was informed of this on 13 May 2024. Nor were we told of the steps taken by the petitioner to effect the transfer again, which was alleged to have been made successfully on 6 December 2024.

22.  Mr Leung deposed that his firm explored alternative methods, such as wiring through subsidiaries of small Chinese banks from March to June 2024. There was no follow-up action. Put simply, the petitioner seems to have done nothing further after June 2024, at least not until after the Security for Costs Order.

23.  There is no documentary evidence to show that the petitioner’s solicitors had received the funds, or the actual amount received, or any attempt to deposit the funds in court as security. Instead, the petitioner asks for another 7 days in the Summons to provide the security.

24.  Notwithstanding the above unsatisfactory features, we have decided to exercise our discretion to grant relief from sanction, in the overall interests of justice. The petitioner’s solicitor deposed that since 6 December 2024, his firm “ultimately and at long last received the funds from the Petitioner”, so the petitioner is now able to comply with the order to pay into court HK$600,000 as security for costs. Weighing the prejudice suffered by the respondent in granting relief from sanction, and the prejudice to the petitioner in refusing relief from sanction, we do not think it would be a proportionate exercise of discretion to refuse relief in this situation.

Orders

25.  We order that the time for the petitioner to apply for relief from sanction imposed by paragraph 3 of the Security for Costs Order be extended to the date of the issuance of the Summons on 19 December 2024. We grant relief from the sanction imposed and order that the petitioner’s appeal be reinstated on condition that it complies with paragraph 1 of the Security for Costs Order by paying HK$600,000 into court as security for the costs of the respondent in this appeal, within 3 days from the date hereof.

26.  We would have ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent’s costs of the Summons, as the petitioner is seeking an indulgence from the court. It is not apparent to us whether any meaningful costs have been incurred by the respondent in this regard, as it has only written a letter by its solicitors on 10 January 2025 and did not file any affirmation and submissions to save costs. We therefore make an order nisi there be no order as to the costs of the Summons.

(Susan Kwan)
Vice President
(Jonathan Harris)
Judge of the Court
of First Instance

William K W Leung & Co, for the Petitioner (Appellant)

Kwok, Yih & Chan, for the Respondent (Respondent)



[1]  Order 2 rule 4 provides: “Where a party has failed to comply with a rule or court order, any sanction for failure to comply imposed by the rule or court order has effect unless the party in default applies to the Court for and obtains relief from the sanction within 14 days of the failure.”

[2]  Quoting from Order 2 rule 5(1); Top One International China Property Group Co Ltd v Top One Priority Group Ltd [2011] 1 HKLRD 606 at §41; Lee Sai Nam v Li Shu Chung & Ors, HCA 1711/2009, 31 May 2013 at §§120 to 122 and 148.

[2024] HKCA 966-EN-2024-10-21

RE DRAGON SEAFOODS LTD

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CACV 375/2023, [2024] HKCA 966

On appeal from [2023] HKCFI 2624

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 375 OF 2023

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCW NO 265 OF 2021)

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of section 177(1)(d) and 178(1)(c) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, Cap 32
 and
 IN THE MATTER of DRAGON SEAFOODS LIMITED (豐泰水產有限公司)

________________________

Before: Hon Kwan VP and Harris J in Court
Date of Decision: 21 October 2024

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

Hon Kwan VP (giving the Decision of the Court):

A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the respondent’s application by summons dated 15 December 2023 for security for costs in the sum of HK$1,045,100 (“Application”) against the petitioner in this appeal.

2.  By a notice of appeal dated 17 November 2023, the petitioner appealed against the judgment of Anthony Chan J (“Judge”) on 20 October 2023 ([2023] HKCFI 2624) (“Judgment”) dismissing the petitioner’s re-amended petition filed on 25 July 2022 to wind up Dragon Seafoods Limited (“Company”).

3.  Pursuant to the directions dated 11 January 2024 by Master Yip, the parties have filed affirmations and lodged skeleton submissions for the Application. As notified to the parties, the Application shall be dealt with on paper unless otherwise directed by this court. We proceed to determine the Application on paper.

B.  BACKGROUND

4.  The relevant background facts have been summarised at [7]‑[20] of the Judgment. We only need to highlight the following for present purposes.

5.  The petitioner is a judgment creditor of the Company in respect of a judgment debt of US$3,387,116.25 (plus interest and costs) under a judgment dated 15 March 2021 in HCA 1240/2017. The Company was placed in creditors’ voluntary liquidation on 29 January 2021. By the petition, the petitioner seeks to have the creditors’ voluntary liquidation converted into a compulsory liquidation.

6.  The sole liquidator of the Company, Mr Arboit (“Liquidator”), has adopted a neutral stance to the petition.

7.  The Company was part of a substantial fisheries group with operations across Russia and Europe. The group was jointly owned by Mr Vitaly Orlov and Mr Magnus Roth in 1997 before it fractured into two camps in April 2016. Subsequently in August 2019 a buyout was ordered by Coleman J, which was completed in April 2021.

8.  One camp consists of Norebo Holdings JSC and its subsidiaries (including Norebo Europe Ltd (“NEL”) and Ohodsk Fishing Co Ltd (“OFCL”) as indirect subsidiaries), which was under Mr Orlov’s control since April 2016 (“Orlov Camp”). Mr Erik Gunnar Mansfeld is one of NEL’s directors.

9.  The other camp consists of Three Towns Capital Ltd (“TTC”) and its subsidiaries (including the Company as a wholly owned subsidiary), which was under Mr Roth’s control since April 2016 (“Roth Camp”). With the court-ordered buyout, Mr Roth bought out Mr Orlov’s 50% interest in TTC in April 2021 and became the sole shareholder.

10.  There was a long history of bitter contest between the Company and the petitioner over the unpaid price of fish products owed to the petitioner, which began in 2012. While there is no evidence both Mr Orlov and Mr Roth were driving the Company’s dispute with the petitioner when this started in 2012, there is no reason to believe that Mr Orlov was not at least alive to the Company’s dispute with the petitioner until he parted company with the Roth Camp in April 2016.

11.  Mr Mansfeld had been a director of the Company from March 2008 to January 2011. Mr Helge Rolf Klock was appointed a director of the Company in October 2013 and has been its sole director since 2016.

12.  The respondent opposes the petition as a creditor of the Company in respect of a debt of US$2,773,862, having acquired the debt from NEL and OFCL under a deed of assignment dated 5 April 2022. The respondent was owned by Mr Orlov and Mr Roth prior to April 2022 and by Mr Roth since April 2022. Mr Klock is the sole director of the respondent. It is accepted by the respondent that the Company and the respondent are connected.

13.  The petitioner complained there had been a scheme (“Scheme”) to strip the assets of the Company by Mr Klock as the director and Mr Roth and/or Mr Orlov as the ultimate shareholders between 2017 and 2019. In summary, the complaint was as follows:

(1)  The Company’s net assets and retained earnings had decreased from US$4,295,503 (in 2016) to US$5,306 (in 2017) and turned into net liabilities of US$30,344 (in 2018) and US$3,285,437 (in 2019).

(2)  Substantial debts were owed by various entities to the Company, including: (i) a debt of US$4,890,786 owed by TTC (“TTC Debt”), (ii) a debt of US$3.5 million owed by Brackway Services Inc (“BSI”) under two loan agreements dated 13 May 2016 (“BSI Debt”), (iii) a debt of US$852,000 owed by NEL (“NEL Debt”), which was handled by Mr Klock unlawfully, in breach of his fiduciary duty and his duty to creditors, and was liable to be set aside.

(3)  For the TTC Debt, by a director’s resolution dated 31 December 2017 signed by Mr Klock, dividends of US$4,060,000 (“Dividends”) were declared in favour of TTC, which set off most of the TTC Debt.

(4)  For the BSI Debt, the Company wrote it off in 2019. Mr Klock provided no explanation why BSI was dissolved shortly after it received the loans of US$3.5 million, and there is no evidence that the Company took any step to recover the loans either before or after the dissolution of the BSI.

(5)  For the NEL Debt, Mr Klock’s evidence was that it was netted off against a liability owed to NEL’s related company, but there is no supporting evidence.

14.  The petitioner also complained about the process of the creditors’ voluntary liquidation, which the Judge held to be unfounded (see [29]-[42] of the Judgment). The Liquidator was nominated by NEL (under Mr Orlov’s control) and had been working on the liquidation (including potential claims of the Company, such as those under the Scheme). The petitioner (via its solicitor Mr Leung) participated actively in the liquidation process and had complimented the Liquidator on his work. The relationship between the Committee of Inspection (“COI”) members (including the petitioner) and the Liquidator was amiable, until the petitioner made a volte-face on about 7 December 2021 demanding the adjudication of its judgment debt in HCA 1240/2017, which was acceded to by the Liquidator with the consent of the COI.

15.  The Liquidator received information that the court might have been misled by the petitioner in granting summary judgment in HCA 1240/2017 and rejecting the Company’s defence of part payment of US$2.4 million, when the petitioner (via its solicitor Mr Leung and its chairman Mr Smirnov) stated on oath that the Company did not transfer the US$2.4 million. There is now evidence in the form of a bank confirmation that such transfer did take place. The Judge agreed with the respondent the issues raised warranted investigation and remarked that the petitioner only became dissatisfied with the Liquidator when he decided to act on the materials and asked for the petitioner’s explanation.

C.  THE JUDGMENT AND THE APPEAL

16.  The petitioner advanced these grounds in support of the petition:

(1)  The Liquidator was appointed by corporate vehicles owned and controlled by the Company’s ultimate shareholders and director, who orchestrated and benefited from the Scheme.

(2)  The Liquidator fails and/or refuses to investigate the Scheme.

(3)  The Liquidator has been attempting to assign the claims of the Company in favour of a funder (called Remedy), and the terms of the proposed assignment make no commercial sense. At the hearing below, the petitioner confirmed that it no longer takes issue with the suitability of the funder.

(4)  The Liquidator refuses to recognise and accept the judgment in HCA 1240/2017 and insists that the petitioner must prove the Company’s indebtedness in question.

(5)  The Liquidator fails and/or refuses to investigate whether the indebtedness allegedly owed to the respondent exists.

17.  The legal principles (set out at [54]-[62] of the Judgment) on the unfettered discretion to convert a voluntary liquidation into compulsory liquidation are not the subject of the appeal.

18.  For Ground (1), the Judge found no lack of independence of the Liquidator despite his nomination by a company controlled by Mr Orlov. Since February 2021, the Liquidator has been discharging his duties to the satisfaction of the COI, and, as confirmed by the petitioner, no allegation of impropriety is made against him. The fact that the Liquidator raised the issue of the complained transactions under the Scheme showed no favouritism, and the petitioner only became dissatisfied when the Liquidator decided to act on the information received in respect of the petitioner’s judgment debt and asked for explanations.

19.  For Ground (4), regarding the information received by the Liquidator which called into question the bases for granting summary judgment against the Company, the Judge applied the less technical test for miscarriage of justice in Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O’Brien (1990) 8 ACLC 248 and held that the Liquidator acted properly in seeking comments from the petitioner on the information received.

20.  The Judge found no substance in the complaint in Ground (5), as the petitioner’s counsel has accepted that it is normal practice for the adjudication of proofs to wait until there is asset for distribution.

21.  For Ground (2), the Judge found that the Liquidator had investigated the Dividends, which were central to the Scheme, and had decided with the agreement of the COI that it should be pursued, but the pursuit was stalled by the lack of funding arrangement. The Judge also found the weight of the evidence is that the dispute over the petitioner’s judgment debt is the main reason for the lack of progress in approving the funding agreement with Remedy. As for the lack of investigation in respect of the BSI Debt and the NEL Debt, the Judge found it is reasonable to prioritise the potential claims given the lack of resources.

22.  Lastly, for Ground (3) (which the Judge described as “the only valid complaint”), the Judge found that although the draft Deed of Assignment did not contain a time frame to protect the Company, it was in draft form and can be further negotiated. There is no real danger of the Liquidator executing the Deed of Assignment without the approval of the COI, and hence there is no real substance in this complaint.

23.  Accordingly, the Judge found no sufficient reason to turn the creditors’ voluntary liquidation into a compulsory one and he dismissed the petition. He ordered the costs of the respondent and the Liquidator be paid by the petitioner, to be taxed if not agreed, and that the costs of the Official Receiver in the sum of HK$6,500 be deducted from the petitioner’s deposit.

24.  The petitioner appealed against the Judgment and advanced these broad grounds of appeal:

(1)  The Judge erred in law or acted in disregard of the applicable principles (including the principles in Re STX PAN Ocean (HK) Co Ltd (In Liq) [2014] 5 HKLRD 581 at [48]-[51]) on the exercise of discretion to convert a voluntary liquidation into compulsory liquidation.

(2)  The Judge incorrectly and inappropriately permitted the respondent to launch challenges to the valid and final summary judgment dated 15 March 2021 in HCA 1240/2017.

(3)  The Judge misapplied his discretionary power, misapprehended the facts, or failed to take into account material matters.

25.  By a respondent’s notice dated 8 December 2023, the respondent contended that the Judgment should be affirmed on the additional ground that the Judge should have found that the petitioner had alternative and more effective remedies such that it would be inappropriate for him to exercise his discretion to convert the voluntary winding-up to a compulsory winding-up.

D.  THE APPLICATION

26.  In the Application, the respondent seeks security for costs on appeal against the petitioner in the sum of HK$1,045,100 by payment into court within 28 days from the date of the order to be made. The respondent has requested the petitioner to provide security before making the Application but this was rejected.

27.  This court may, in special circumstances, order that “such security shall be given for the costs of an appeal as may be just”, pursuant to Order 59, rule 10(5) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A).

28.  The principles governing an application for security for costs of an appeal are well established. As summarised by Chow JA in Quest Investments Ltd v Lee Wai Tung[2021] HKCA 926 at [10]:

(1)  “Special circumstances” include cases where a respondent to an appeal will likely encounter undue delay or be put to undue expense in enforcing any order for costs in respect of the appeal.

(2)  The fact that the appellant is resident abroad is prima facie proof that there will be difficulty or expense in enforcing a costs order.

(3)  However, in all cases, the court retains a residual discretion not to order security if the appellant can demonstrate sufficient countervailing factors which would militate against such order being made.

29.  This court may form a preliminary view of the merits of the appeal in determining whether to order security. This is one aspect of the court’s assessment of any countervailing factors, and, unless the appeal is very strong or hopeless, the court will generally look to the existence of other factors to tilt the balance.

30.  Relevant considerations concerning the assessment of the quantum of security for costs are not controversial, and may be stated as follows:

(1)  The court normally takes a broad brush approach and does not conduct a taxation of the respondent’ costs in fixing the quantum of security. The exercise on which it is engaged is to arrive at an appropriate estimate of the likely amount of costs which would be ordered to be paid by the appellant to the respondent on a party and party taxation: see Great Bill Ltd v JFK Holding Company Ltd and Another, CACV 53/2012, 13 September 2012 at [20].

(2)  One of the factors to bear in mind when fixing the amount is the underlying objectives in Order 1A, rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court, in particular rule 1(c) and (d) which highlight proportionality in the conduct of proceedings and fairness between the parties: see Rich Fine (HK) Investment Ltd and Another v Leung Yiu Chuen[2018] HKCA 965 at [8] ‑ [12].

(3)  To facilitate the court’s decision on the appropriate amount of security, the applicant’s legal representatives must provide a realistic estimate of the time and costs likely to be incurred in each stage of the proceedings which must bear some logical correlation to the complexity of the case and the issues involved. Otherwise, the court is deprived of the assistance that it rightly expects: see Hero Rich International Ltd v Benefun International Holdings Ltd, HCA 1433/2009, 11 November 2009 at [38]; Re Days International Ltd, HCCW 299/2011, 26 January 2015 at [26].

31.  In support of the Application, the respondent relies on three grounds: firstly, the petitioner has not paid the respondent’s costs in the court below; secondly, the petitioner is a Russian corporation with no known assets in Hong Kong; and thirdly, the petitioner’s financial position is doubtful, it was in liquidation from 2019 to about 2021. The respondent also submits that the appeal could not be described as a strong one.

32.  In the skeleton submissions dated 14 February 2024, the petitioner responds to the first and third grounds and mentions for the first time it does not dispute the liability to provide security.

33.  It is therefore not necessary for this court to assess the alleged undue delay or expense which the respondent might encounter in enforcing a costs order against the petitioner, or give a preliminary view of the merits of the appeal. The only issue is the quantum of security to be ordered.

34.  The sum of $1,045,100 sought as security covers the costs of the Application (HK$163,400) and the appeal proper (HK$881,700), with a breakdown of the actual and future costs and disbursements provided in the respondent’s skeleton bill of costs exhibited. The amount for the costs of the Application comprised items 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 in the skeleton bill. The inclusion of the costs for the security for costs application is permissible: Re China Star Enterprise Hong Kong Ltd, CACV 241/2012 & CACV 41/2013, 11 April 2013 at [45] - [46].

35.  Separately, the respondent has lodged a statement of costs for the Application for summary assessment of HK$190,750.

36.  The petitioner suggests that the quantum of security should be reduced to HK$309,950, which covers the costs of the Application (HK$62,350) and the appeal proper (HK$247,600). The petitioner’s main objections are that the time spent was duplicated or excessive, and that it is not necessary to instruct a Senior Counsel for the appeal. There is no objection as to the form of the security to be ordered.

37.  The respondent’s response is that the instruction of a Senior Counsel is necessary in light of the petitioner’s instruction of a Senior Counsel with over 40 years’ experience and a junior counsel with over 30 years’ experience.

38.  Adopting a broad brush approach, and having considered the grounds to be raised in the appeal, we think it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the respondent to instruct a Senior Counsel assisted by a junior counsel. We order that security should be provided on this basis.

39.  For the costs of the Application, there is a choice of ordering such costs to be paid in any event (in which case the costs would be included in the security to be provided) or to be paid forthwith. The first alternative was not taken in Re China Star Enterprise Hong Kong Ltd as the court was dissatisfied with the skeleton bills placed before the court which made it difficult to attempt gross sum taxation and thought it better to leave taxation to be conducted in the usual way. There is no difficulty with making a gross sum assessment of the respondent’s statement of costs of the Application in this instance, and there is no reason why costs of the Application should not follow the event.

40.  We decline to include in the security the costs of the Application. We order security to be provided in the sum of HK$600,000, as the estimated reasonable costs of the appeal on a party-and-party basis.

41.  As to the costs of the Application, we order the petitioner to pay the respondent’s costs within 14 days, which we assess on a gross sum basis. We reduce the respondent’s costs from HK$190,750 to HK$80,000.

42.  We make the following orders:

(1)  The petitioner do provide security for the respondent’s costs of this appeal by making payment into court in the sum of HK$600,000 within 28 days from the date of this decision.

(2)  All further proceedings in the appeal be stayed until such security is provided and notice of payment is given to the Registrar of Civil Appeals and the solicitors for the respondent.

(3)  In default of security being given within the time set out in (1) above, the appeal do stand dismissed without further order, with costs to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

(4)  The petitioner do pay the respondent the costs of the Application within 14 days hereof, summarily assessed at HK$80,000.

(Susan Kwan)
Vice President
(Jonathan Harris)
Judge of the Court
of First Instance

Mr William Leung, of William K W Leung & Co, for the Petitioner (Appellant)

Mr Terrence Tai, instructed by Kwok, Yih & Chan, for the Respondent (Respondent)