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Matrimonial Causes2023

TKY v. YSGA

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[2024] HKFC 28-EN-2024-02-09

TKY v. YSGA

HTML content

FCMC 2208/2023

(formerly FCMC 903/2022)

[2024] HKFC 28

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 2208 OF 2023

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BETWEEN

 TKYPetitioner
 and 
 YSGARespondent

------------------------

Before: HH Judge C.K. Chan in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Mode of Hearing: By way of written submissions
Respondent’s Written Submissions: 17 November 2023
Petitioner’s Written Submissions: 1 December 2023
Date of Decision: 9 February 2024

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D E C I S I O N
(LEAVE TO APPEAL)

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1.  This is a hearing of the respondent father (“the father”)’s application for leave to appeal against my judgment dated 20 October 2023 in which I have granted a joint custody order, with care and control to the petitioner mother (“the mother”) and defined access to the father (“the custody order”). The order itself was very lengthy due to the fact that both parties had put forward very detailed and meticulous proposals on access (the father’s proposals on access were 6 pages and the mother’s proposals were 5 pages). Therefore, I do not propose to repeat the whole order in this decision.

2.  On 17 November 2023, the father issued the present summons asking for leave to appeal against 3 aspects of the custody order, namely:

(1)  The order that the mother was given care and control of the 2 daughters (§2 of the custody order);

(2)  The order giving defined access to the father during term time (§2 (a)(i) and (ii) of the custody order):

(i)  Every Wednesday after school to 8:30pm;

(ii)  Staying access from Friday after school to Saturday 8:30pm; and

(3)  The order granting telephone or video access to the father on every Monday between 6:00pm to 8:00pm for not more than 30 minutes (§2 (d)(i) of the custody order).

3.  Despite these 3 aspects of appeal, I think what the father really wants is an equal sharing of care time of the 2 daughters during term time.

The Law on Leave to Appeal

4.  Leave to appeal is governed by s. 63A (2) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 which reads:

“(2) Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that-

(a) The appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) There is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

5.  As to what constitutes a reasonable prospect of success, it has been held that the prospects of succeeding in the intended appeal must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, but without having to be “probable”: SMSE v KL[1].

6.  I do not think the above general principles are in dispute.

The Father’s Grounds of Appeal

7.  Ms. Madeleine Booth representing the father put forward 5 grounds of appeals.

Ground No.1: Gender Discrimination

8.  Ms. Booth referred to §65 (1) of the judgment:

“65. Despite the fact that both parties could be regarded as suitable carer by reference to past care and their ability to provide future physical care, there are other considerations that the court must take into account. They include:

(1)  The age and gender of the daughters. They are aged 4 and 3 and as expected, it would be difficult for them to express any clear wish in their parents’ dispute. But the facts that they are girls and of very young age naturally mean that the mother will probably has an advantage in the comparison of the parties’ respective strength in the daughters’ future care. I hope that this will not be taken as a gender discrimination issue. But experience tells us that the needs of young children, especially girls may be more suitably met by a loving mother. As they grow up, both their physical and emotional needs may be better met by a parent of their same sex. The mother would be in a better position to explain the change in their physiology as they mature. It may also be easier for the daughters to share their feelings and emotions with their mother. According to SIO, A has indicated that she liked to talk about her inner feelings with and was more dependent on the mother (A/043).”

9.  Ms. Booth submits that the above ruling was discriminatory if the gender of a parent leads to the belief that they are somehow the more suitable parent to meet the needs of young children, especially girls. This was a fundamental error in both principle and discretion, warranting re-consideration of the appropriate care and control order for the girls.

10.  Reference was also made to PD v KWW [2010] 4 HKLRD 199, per Hartmann JA at §§45-46:

“[45] There was a time also, not so long gone, when the roles of the mother and the father in the raising of their child were viewed with almost equal rigidity. The mother was best left to care for the chi8ld, certainly when the child was young. The father was best left to provide financial support and to exercise rights of guardianship. As for his contact with the child, visitation was deemed sufficient. Today, such sexiest views are obsolete.

[46] Social imperatives change. When they are important and lasting, the common law can, and should, keep pace with that change.”

My Views

11.  I entirely agree with Hartmann JA’s observation that pure gender plays no part in the determination of the issue of custody (necessarily include the issues of care and control, and access) and that was why I said in the judgment that by reference to the parties’ gender, I hoped that it would not be taken as a gender discrimination issue. I was fully aware of the potential argument on gender discrimination. This court then went on to explain why the mother had the advantage (as a parent of the same sex of the daughters) in explaining the change in the daughters’ physiology when they matured. The daughters also found it easier to share their feelings and emotions with the mother, which was a fact as confirmed by the SIO. Therefore, it was not a decision based on pure gender.

12.  I am not satisfied that the father is having any reasonable prospect of success in this ground of appeal.

Grounds 2 & 3: Disproportionate weight given to Status Quo and the 26 April 2022 incident

13.  Ms. Booth submits that this court has given disproportionate weight to the disruption to the daughters’ routine, and failed to consider or give proper weight to:

(i)  the importance of the father’s involvement in the daughters’ weekday and weekend care;

(ii)  the father’s shared care plan which caused minimal disruption to the daughters’ routine, involving less handovers, less travel than the current order;

(iii)  the original routine was disrupted by the mother’s non-consensual removal of the daughters from the FMH on 26 April 2022;

(iv)  the consequences and implications of the 26 April, 2022 incident; and

(v)  the daughters’ adaptability and the father’s ability to care for the children.

My Views

14.  I do not accept the proposition that this court has failed to consider or give proper weight to the 5 matters as stated in the preceding paragraph. The importance of the father’s participation in the daughters’ care is indisputable but the real issue here is: whether he should be given an absolute half share of the total care time as demanded by him.

15.  As provided in the custody order, the parties will basically share the daughters’ time equally outside school term and on special occasions. For term time, the father was given weekend staying access from Friday after school to Saturday 8:30pm, meaning that he will have equal sharing of all weekends as well. In other words, the father has already been given 50% of the daughters’ care time during non-school attending period.

16.  As to the daughters’ school attending period (i.e. from Monday morning to Friday morning during school term), I have already stated at §65 (2) of the judgment that in my view, a mid-week changeover is too disruptive when the daughters will enter primary education shortly. More importantly, there has already been on-going arguments on who should keep the school bags during the father’s access indicating that the dispute might be further escalated if the supervision on the daughters’ studies and school works is to be changed mid-week. That was why this court only gives the father Wednesday after school to 8:30pm, i.e. 1 evening (Wednesday) instead of 2 out of a total of 4 evenings (Monday to Thursday). By this arrangement, the father has already been given very generous access, albeit one evening less than he had wished and thus not an exact 50% of the total care time.

17.  As to the 26 April 2022 incident, the father seems to have placed much emphasis on it trying to convince this court that it was the mother who took away the daughters without his consent and thus creating the so called “status quo” in her favour. Ms. Booth also submitted that this court failed to consider the consequences and implications of that incident, including (i) the abduction of the daughters; (ii) serious disruption to their then routine at the FMH; (iii) not disclosing the daughters’ whereabouts to the father; (iv) forcing the father to move out of the FMH by using the daughters as leverage; and (v) restricting the father’s access to the daughters.

18.  In my view, it was quite obvious that before the 26 April 2022 incident, the relationship of the parties had already broken down. Both decided to stay at the FMH, presumably for the sake of the daughters. The subsequent tensions created by them staying under the same roof was quite understandable. This had eventually culminated into the 26 April 2022 incident, whereat the mother called the police and later left the FMH with the daughters.

19.  At trial, both parties alleged the other being emotionally unstable during the incident. After hearing their evidence and viewing the footage recorded, I did not find the father being emotionally unstable. On the other hand, there was some footage showing the mother raising her voice causing a daughter to cover her ears. Under these circumstances, especially in view of the very tensed situation at the time, I do not find the behaviours of the mother being reprehensible that it must have any negative bearing on her ability to take good care of the 2 daughters in the future. The same could also be said of the subsequent events of the mother leaving the FMH with the daughters; and the parties having difficulties in communication and arrangement on access shortly thereafter. The allegation of the daughters being abducted by the mother was not accepted by this court.

20.  I am not satisfied that the father is having any reasonable prospect of success in his intended appeal on Grounds 2 and 3.

Ground 4: Disproportionate weight given to the Social Investigation Report (“SIR”)

21.  The court was criticised in relying on the SIR where the Social Investigation Officer (“SIO”)’s recommendations on care and control were not based on full and accurate facts or a balanced and open-minded approach.

22.  The SIO was criticised for adopting the view that there should be a primary and secondary carer. She was also criticised for not investigating into the 26 April 2022 incident and had conducted more interviews with the mother than the father.

23.  I am of the view that these are not fair criticism of the SIO. The SIO is a professional appointed for investigating into the facts of the case and providing recommendations for the court’s consideration. How to carry out such investigation is entirely within the ambit of her professional discretion. The number of interviews to be conducted on a party is also within that discretion. I have read the SIR and heard the SIO’s evidence at trial. I am not convinced that the SIR or the evidence of SIO was in any way biased.

24.  There is no merit in Ground 4 of the father’s intended appeal.

Ground 5: Reduced e-access

25.  Ms. Booth submits that this court has erred in failing to identify any reasons for the substantial reduction in the father’s e-access with the children, i.e. he was given e-access on Monday evening only.

26.  Taking into account the overall arrangement on access, by giving the father Monday e-access has already ensured that he will have contact with the daughters at least once every other day. Moreover, the daughters are still very young and as they mature, the access arrangement inevitably has to be adjusted according to their needs and welfare. In the meantime, I maintain my view that the current e-access arrangement is a reasonable one.

27.  I am not satisfied that the father is having any reasonable prospect of success in his intended appeal on Ground 5.

Conclusion

28.  After considering the father’s proposed Grounds of Appeal, I am not satisfied that he has any reasonable prospect of success in overturning this court’s decision on care and control and access, and there is no other reason in the interest of justice in granting leave to appeal. Under these circumstances, the father’s application for leave to appeal is refused.

Costs

29.  These are children matters. The mother is now acting in person and has made no submission on costs. I order that there shall be no order as to costs, including all costs reserved, if any.

  C. K. Chan
District Judge

Representation:

The Petitioner acting in person

Ms. Madeleine Booth, Barrister-at-law, instructed by Messrs. Withers, solicitors for the Respondent



[1]  (2009) 4 HKLRD at para 17

  

[2024] HKFC 27-EN-2024-02-09

TKY v. YSGA

HTML content

FCMC 2208/2023

(formerly FCMC 903/2022)

[2024] HKFC 27

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 2208 OF 2023

------------------------

BETWEEN

 TKYPetitioner
 and 
 YSGARespondent

------------------------

Coram: HH Judge C.K. Chan in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Mode of Hearing: By way of written submissions
Date of Respondent’s Written Submissions: 15 December 2023
Date of Petitioner’s Written Submissions: 29 December 2023
Date of Decision: 9 February 2024

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D E C I S I O N
(Variation of Costs Order Nisi)

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1.  This is a hearing of the Respondent (“the husband”)’s summons dated 21 September 2023 in which he asked for, inter alia, that the costs order nisi in the MPS Judgment dated 7 September 2023 (“the MPS Decision”) in favour of the Petitioner (“the wife”) to be varied to:

(1)  Insofar as costs of the MPS part of the Judgment is concerned, the wife do pay the husband’s costs and occasioned by such application; and

(2)  Insofar as costs of the Litigation Funding part of the Judgment is concerned, costs of the same be in the cause of the application, pending result of the husband’s intended appeal.

The Wife’s MPS Application and Costs Order Nisi

2.  In her MPS summons dated 17 November 2022, the wife asked for:

(1)  Interim maintenance (“IM”) for the benefit of the household and 2 children of the family in the sum of HK$164,800 per month, to be back dated to 31 January 2022; and

(2)  Legal costs provisions (“LCP”) as follows:

(a)  From 31 January 2022 to 31 October 2022, a sum of HK$158,800 per month, totalling HK$1,588,000 forthwith;

(b)  From 1 November 2022 onwards at HK$163,893 per month until the Financial Dispute Resolution (FDR) hearing or further order, whichever is earlier, payable on the 1st day of each month; and

(c)  Amount to be determined by the Court, payable on the 1st day of each month, from FDR hearing or further order specified in (b) above for the remaining period of these proceedings.

3.  In counsel’s skeleton submissions, the wife has modified her claim for LCP to:

(1)  HK$158,000 from January 2022 to October 2022; and

(2)  HK$203,733 (with Senior Counsel to be engaged) or HK$173,200 (with only junior counsel to be engaged) per month from November 2022 to January 2024 (estimated date of FDR).

4.  On the other hand, the husband asked for the MPS summons to be dismissed altogether, or alternatively, the court should only grant a MPS order in the sum of HK$22,750 per month, with no LCP or backdating, and costs be given to the husband.

5.  The MPS application was dealt with on paper and on 7 September 2023, the court granted the following MPS Order:

(1)  The husband shall pay a monthly sum HK$28,000 to the wife as the children’s interim maintenance (HK$14,000 each) payable on the 1st day of every month, starting 1 December 2022, until further order of the court.

(2)  The husband shall pay MPS by way of legal costs provision in the sum of HK$1,200,000 payable by 12 monthly instalments of HK$100,000 each on the 1st day of every month starting 1 October 2023 and the last instalment ending on 1 September 2024.

6.  As the wife has to come to court before she could get the above orders, she was also given the costs of the application, including all costs reserved, with certificate for counsel on a nisi basis. The husband now asks for the costs order nisi to be varied.

The Husband’s Submissions

7.  The husband submits that despite the fact that an interim maintenance (“IM”) order of HK$28,000 per month was made for the benefit of the 2 daughters, the amount was much lower than what the wife had asked for in the summons (HK$164,800 per month). The IM of HK$28,000 was only 17% of the amount claimed, and the claim for backdating was also refused. In fact, the sum awarded was even lower than what the husband had been paying at the time, i.e. HK$31,000 per month. The husband submitted that it was unnecessary for the wife to make such an application which had led to the husband spending unnecessary costs. Therefore, the husband should be given the costs of and incidental to this part of the MPS application.

The Wife’s Submissions

8.  The wife is now acting in person. In her 2-page submissions, she basically said that the total sum of MPS/IM granted was HK$128,000, not HK$28,000 per month. She does not agree that her MPS application was unnecessary and so the husband’s application for variation of the costs order nisi should be refused.

The Law on Costs in Interlocutory Matters

9.  O.62 r.3 (2A) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A and the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H provides for costs in interlocutory matters:

“(2A) If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to costs of or incidental to any interlocutory proceedings, it may, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event or make such other order as it sees fit.” (underline added)

10.  Therefore, for interlocutory proceedings, costs follow the event is an option, but not necessarily the norm. In considering on what order to be made in respect of the costs of interlocutory proceedings, apart from the result of the proceedings, the court has to give equal consideration to the conduct of the parties by reference to the underlying objectives as set out in O.1A r.1.

11.  Further guidance on how a court should exercise its discretion on costs can be found in O.62 r.5 which states the court shall take into account the following relevant matters:

“5. (1) The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account-

(aa) the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A, rule 1;

(a) ---;

(b) ---;

(c) ---;

(d) any written offer which is expressed to be “without prejudice save as to costs” and which relates to any issue in the proceedings, but the Court may not take the offer into account if, at the time it is made, the party making it could have protected his position as to costs by means of a sanctioned payment or a sanctioned offer under Order 22;

(e) the conduct of all the parties;

(f) whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful; and

(g) any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the Court’s attention.

(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(e), the conduct of the parties includes-

(a) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;

(b) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular allegation or issue;

(c) whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated his claim; and

(d) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings.”

My Views

12.  In exercising the court’s wide discretion on costs, a central issue to be asked is: whether it was necessary for the wife to come to court before she could obtain the order on MPS/IM. In this case, it may be true to say that as far as the IM for the 2 children is concerned, the final order of HK$28,000 per month was well below the sum claimed by the wife at HK$164,800. But if one looks at the offer of the husband, which was nil, or alternatively, only a monthly sum of HK$22,750, it was quite obvious that the wife had to come to court before she could get the IM order at HK$28,000. There is no submission by the husband that he had ever made a without prejudice offer above that sum.

13.  Again, it may be true to say that the IM that the husband had been paying was HK$31,000 per month up to the hearing, but it was not a sum that he had been paying on a voluntary basis. He was ordered to pay such sum at a previous hearing and this sum had never been offered by him at any stage before or at the MPS argument. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the winner of the IM application must be the wife.

14.  Moreover, if one looks at the MPS/IM Order as a whole, the husband was also ordered to pay LCP (as part of the MPS application) in the sum of HK$1,200,000 payable by monthly instalment of HK$100,000 each. The husband did not make any offer on LCP. Therefore, the wife’s application is necessary before she could get such an order from the court.

15.  I note that the husband is arguing that he is now seeking leave to appeal against the MPS Order. But until he has overturned the MPS Order on appeal, the MPS Order stands and the wife should be regarded as the winner on the application. I see no reason why she should bear the costs of the husband, or be deprived of any part of her costs.

Conclusion and Order

16.  Based on the above discussion, I see no reason not to regard the wife as the winner of the MPS application and so should be entitled to its costs. The costs order nisi is now made absolute.

Costs

17.  Costs to follow event. The wife shall have the costs of and incidental to this variation application. Such costs and the costs of the MPS application are to be assessed summarily. I hereby direct the wife to lodge and serve a 2-page (A4 paper) statement of costs for summary assessment within 14 days and the husband to lodge and serve his list of objections (if any) also limited to 2 pages of A4 paper within 14 days thereafter. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will proceed to assess the costs on a summary basis.

  C. K. Chan
District Judge

Representation:

The Petitioner acting in person

Messrs. Withers, solicitors for the Respondent

[2024] HKFC 25-EN-2024-02-09

TKY v. YSGA

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FCMC 2208/2023

(formerly FCMC 903/2022)

[2024] HKFC 25

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 2208 OF 2023

------------------------

BETWEEN

 TKYPetitioner
 and 
 YSGARespondent

------------------------

Coram: HH Judge C.K. Chan in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Mode of Hearing: Assessment on Paper
Date of Petitioner’s Statement of Costs: 27 December 2023
Date of Decision: 9 February 2024

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D E C I S I O N
(Summary Assessment of Costs)

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1.  On 12 December 2023, this court handed down a Decision refusing to grant leave in respect of the Respondent husband (“the husband”)’s application for leave to appeal against the court’s MPS Decision dated 7 September 2023. As directed, the Petitioner wife (“the wife”) being the winning party submitted a 2-page Statement of Costs for the court’s summary assessment, which I now do. I note that on 1 December 2023, the wife has filed a Notice to Act in Person. The husband has not lodged any objections to the wife’s Statement of Costs.

2.  In the wife’s Statement of Costs, she claimed costs in the sum of HK$132,852, with HK$100,000 being counsel fee and HK$32,852 being the solicitors’ costs and disbursements.  I find the costs as claimed being necessary and proper and I would round it up to HK$130,000, payable by the husband forthwith.

  C. K. Chan
District Judge

Representation:

The Petitioner acting in person

Messrs. Withers, solicitors for the Respondent

[2023] HKFC 251-EN-2023-12-12

TKY v. YSGA

HTML content

FCMC 2208/2023
(formerly FCMC 903/2022)

[2023] HKFC 251

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 2208 OF 2023

------------------------

 

BETWEEN

 TKYPetitioner
 and 
 YSGARespondent

------------------------

Coram: HH Judge C.K. Chan in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Mode of Hearing: By way of written submissions
Date of Respondent’s Written Submissions: 21 September 2023
Date of Petitioner’s Written Submissions: 5 October 2023
Date of Decision: 12 December 2023

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DECISION

( Leave to Appeal )

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1.  This is a hearing of the Respondent (“the husband”)’s application for leave to appeal against this court’s judgment on MPS/Interim Maintenance dated 7 September 2023 (“the MPS Judgment”).

2.  In the MPS Judgment, this court granted the following orders of MPS/Interim Maintenance in favour of the Petitioner (“the wife”) and the 2 children of family:

(1)  The husband shall pay a monthly sum HK$28,000 to the wife as the children’s interim maintenance (HK$14,000 each) payable on the 1st day of every month, starting 1 December 2022, until further order of the court.

(2)  The husband shall pay MPS by way of legal costs provision (“LCP”) in the sum of HK$1,200,000 payable by 12 monthly instalments of HK$100,000 each on the 1st day of every month starting 1 October 2023 and the last instalment ending on 1 September 2024.

3.  On 21 September 2023, the husband issued the present summons asking for leave to appeal against the LCP Order, but not the interim maintenance order for the benefit of the children. He also asks for a stay of the LCP Order and leave for him to adduce fresh evidence that his parents are unwilling to provide any funds to be given to the wife as LCP. In his draft Notice of Appeal, the husband has put forward 5 grounds of appeal, which will be discussed further below in this decision.

The Law

4.  Leave to appeal is governed by s. 63A (2) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 which reads:

“(2) Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that-

(a) The appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) There is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

5.  As to what constitutes a reasonable prospect of success, it has been held that the prospects of succeeding in the intended appeal must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, but without having to be “probable”: SMSE v KL[1]

The Husband’s Draft Notice of Appeal

Draft Grounds 1 and 2: Financial Assistance from Husband’s Family

6.  Under draft ground no. 1, Mr. John Scott SC (leading Ms. Madeleine Booth) for the husband submitted that I have erred in assuming that the husband could obtain “assistance from his family”. He submitted that where a spouse enjoys access to wealth but without absolute entitlement to it, the court will not act in direct invasion of the rights of, or usurp the discretion exercisable by, a third party. The court will also not exert pressure on a third party to enhance the means of the maintaining spouse, citing the case of KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314, §42 (see also §48). It was further submitted that for the third party’s financial resources to have any bearing on the order to be made, the court must make a finding of fact on the evidence as to (i) the extent of the financial assistance provided by the third party; and (ii) the likelihood of such assistance to be continued in the foreseeable future. But this court is simply not in a position to properly make those findings of fact at this interlocutory juncture, where the evidence had not been argued in full.

7.  Furthermore, there is now evidence that the husband’s parents are in fact unwilling and have refused to pay LCP to the wife. This forms the second ground of appeal, and the husband will apply to introduce such new evidence at the hearing of the appeal after leave is granted.

My Views

8.  As submitted by Mr. Felix Li, counsel for the wife that evidence has already been given in the wife’s affirmation on the financial assistance given by the husband’s parents since 2018, amounting to HK$19.5 million. At §51 of the MPS Judgment, this court accepted the fact that the husband’s family did provide financial assistance to him in terms of the provision of a luxurious accommodation (the Pokfulam Residence) and loans (or gifts as contended by the wife) for the purchase of landed properties or to cover his monthly expenses. It may be true to say that at this interlocutory stage, the court may not be in a position to rule on whether such financial assistance really amounts to HK$19.5 million, but it was quite clear that such financial assistance had to be rather substantial. Even in the husband’s Form E (A/147), he stated that he owed his mother over HK$3 million, being HK$1.65 million for the purchase of landed property and HK$1.4 million to cover his daily expenses. He also stated (A/141-2) that his mother has given him US$300,000 for safekeeping. Furthermore, the husband has already spent over HK$3 million in legal costs, another HK$400,000 to be incurred in this appeal. Presumably, the funding of his legal costs must also come from the parents. Therefore, even by adopting a broad-brush estimation, it is not difficult for this court to conclude that the financial assistance given by the husband’s family had to be substantial, certainly in the millions, if not tens of millions.

9.  On the issue of whether such substantial financial assistance will continue, I note that there was no credible evidence at the MPS hearing to suggest that such financial assistance would cease. Therefore, it was a reasonable assumption that such financial assistance would indeed continue.

10.  As for Ground 2 of the husband’s intended appeal, it merely states the husband’s intention to apply for the introduction of new evidence in the event that leave to appeal is granted. I accept Mr. Li’s submission that it should not form part of this court’s consideration on whether leave to appeal ought to be granted.

11.  I am not satisfied that the husband has a reasonable prospect of success under Grounds 1 and 2.

Ground 3: The Husband’s Capital

12.  Ground 3 concerns with my acceptance that the husband had HK$3,100,000 cash in bank, which according to the husband had already been exhausted.

13.  The HK$3,100,000 figure was taken from the husband’s Form E dated 26 May 2022 (A/142). It is true to say that the husband did say at §25 of his affirmation dated 10 February 2023 (A/71) that:

“25….I understand running a new business has its risks and hence I anticipated the HK$3.5 million I made from the sale of the Greenview Property would be able to cover the family expenses for some 2 to 3 years but unfortunately this sum has already run out as a result of these proceedings.” (Italics added)

14.  However, this was a bare assertion by the husband without any supporting evidence on how the sum of HK$3,100,000 being depleted over a period of less than 9 months. The court was entitled to rely on the previous figures in the husband’s Form E, instead of half a sentence of a bare assertion in his affirmation.

15.  I am not satisfied that the husband has a reasonable prospect of success under Ground 3.

Ground 4: The Financial Circumstances of the Wife

16.  Ground 4 concerns with the court’s alleged error in granting LCP when the wife had financial resources to pay her legal costs and her non-disclosure of means.

17.  Mr. Scott submitted that the wife did have (i) shares worth HK$300,000 and (ii) personal valuables of HK$956,654 (which she did not disclose). The combined sum of over HK$1.2 million should be enough to cover her legal costs up to FDR. Moreover, the wife had received loans from banks and her cousin, and also money from her parents, indicating that the wife had the ability to raise loans for her legal costs. Therefore, it was unjust to order the husband’s family to pay LCP to her.

18.  At §49 of the MPS Judgment, I have already dealt with this point very briefly:

“49. The husband also contended that the wife should have sufficient assets or borrowing powers to cover her future legal costs. But by looking at the rather uncompromising approach adopted by the parties in this litigation, I am not surprised that much of the wife’s available financial resources have already be spent on legal fees.”

19.  On a broad-brush basis, I accepted that the wife had already exhausted her means to pay for future legal costs. As to the allegation of non-disclosure on the part of the wife, that was a dispute of facts that could not be resolved in a MPS hearing.

20.  I am not satisfied that the husband has a reasonable prospect of success under Ground 4.

Ground 5: Quantum of LCP

21.  Mr. Scott submitted that a LCP Order in the sum of HK$1,200,000 was disproportionate in view of the subject matter of the proceedings. He submitted that (i) it was a short marriage of 4 years; (ii) there was insubstantial joint marital acquests; and (iii) the lesser earning capacity of the husband.

22.  As far as legal costs are concerned, I share the same feeling that the legal costs incurred by both parties so far are getting out of hand and that is why I reduce the initial claim of over HK$3 million of LCP to an order of HK$1,200,000. But as I have stated at §48 of the MPS Judgment, the legal costs incurred by the husband at that time was already about HK$3,400,000. He is going to incur another HK$400,000 in this appeal. I understand that he has already filed summons to argue on the costs order nisi in the MPS Judgment. He has filed another application for leave to appeal on children matters. His total legal costs will likely be over HK$5 million, if not more and we have yet to reach the FDR stage. I do not think that he has any legitimate complaint to say that a sum of LCP at HK$1,200,000 is disproportionate.

23.  I am not satisfied that the husband has a reasonable prospect of success under Ground 5.

Conclusions and Orders

24.  Based on the above discussions, I am not satisfied that the husband has any reasonable prospect of success in his intended appeal (on all 5 grounds) and there being no other reasons in the interest of justice that leave should be granted, I refuse to grant leave to appeal and the husband’s summons dated 21 September 2023 is dismissed.

Costs

25.  Costs to follow event. The wife shall have the costs of and incidental to this summons. Such costs are to be assessed summarily. I hereby direct the wife to lodge and serve a 2-page (A4 paper) statement of costs for summary assessment within 14 days and the husband to lodge and serve his list of objections (if any) also limited to 2 pages of A4 paper within 14 days thereafter. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will proceed to assess the costs on a summary basis.

  C. K. Chan
District Judge

Representation:

Mr. Felix Li, Barrister-at-law instructed by Messrs. Wellington Legal, solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. John Scott SC and Ms. Madeleine Booth, Barristers-at-law, instructed by Messrs. Withers, solicitors for the Respondent



[1]  (2009) 4 HKLRD at para 17

[2023] HKFC 181-EN-2023-09-07

TKY v. YSGA

HTML content

FCMC 2208/2023

(formerly FCMC 903/2022)

[2023] HKFC 181

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 2208 OF 2023

____________________

BETWEEN  
 TKY  
 and 
 YSGA Respondent

____________________

Coram: HH Judge C.K. Chan in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Mode of Hearing:By way of written submissions
Date of Petitioner’s Written Submissions:7 March 2023
Date of Respondent’s Written Submissions: 11 April 2023
Date of Petitioner’s Reply Submissions: 19 July 2023
Date of Handing Down Judgment:7 September 2023

------------------------

J U D G M E N T

(MPS/Interim Maintenance)

------------------------

1.  This is a hearing of the petitioner wife (“the wife”)’s application for maintenance pending suit (“MPS”)/interim maintenance (“IM”) against the respondent husband (“the husband”).

2.  I note that both counsel have referred to the application simply as MPS but I have decided to use the term “MPS/interim maintenance” or “MPS/IM” instead because the term “interim maintenance” were the actual wordings used in the summons.  I understand that many practitioners have the habit of using those 2 terms (i.e. MPS and IM) interchangeably, but there is in fact a subtle difference between the two.  For MPS, it is an order to be granted under section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 (“MPPO”) for the benefit of a spouse, while IM is an order of maintenance, despite its interim nature, for the benefit of a child of the family, presumably under section 5 of the same Ordinance.  Despite such difference, it is widely accepted that the legal principles governing both applications are in fact similar.

Parties’ Respective Position

3.  In her summons dated 17 November 2022 (A/1-2), the wife asked for:

(1)  IM for the benefit of the household and 2 children of the family in the sum of HK$164,800 per month, to be back dated to 31 January 2022; and

(2)  Legal costs provisions (“LCP”) as follows:

(a)  From 31 January 2022 to 31 October 2022, a sum of HK$158,800 per month, totalling HK$1,588,000 forthwith;

(b)From 1 November 2022 onwards at HK$163,893 per month until the Financial Dispute Resolution (FDR) hearing or further order, whichever is earlier, payable on the 1st day of each month; and

(c)  Amount to be determined by the Court, payable on the 1st day of each month, from FDR hearing or further order specified in (b) above for the remaining period of these proceedings.  

4.  Despite such prayers in the summons, in counsel’s skeleton submissions, Mr. Chan for the wife has modified the claim for LCP to:

(i)      HK$158,000 from January 2022 to October 2022; and

(ii)     HK$203,733 (with Senior Counsel to be engaged) or HK$173,200 (with only junior counsel to be engaged) per month from November 2022 to January 2024 (estimated date of FDR).

5.  For various reasons which will be discussed briefly below, the husband asked for the summons to be dismissed, or alternatively, the court should only grant a MPS order in the sum of HK$22,750 per month, with no LCP or backdating, and costs to the husband.

Brief Background

6.  The wife is aged 41. She is a Certified Accountant and currently a partner of a reputable international accountancy firm.

7.  The husband is also aged 41.  According to him, he is now running his own real estate consultancy.

8.  The parties were married in 2018 and separated in 2022.  This was a relatively short marriage of 4 years.  Within wedlock, 2 daughters were born and they are now aged 4 and 3 respectively.  The wife issued a petition for divorce based on behaviour on 31 January 2022, but that was later amended to 1-year consent on 2 March 2023.  A decree nisi of divorce has been granted on 15 June 2023.

9.  For the custody of the 2 children of family, the parties had quite divergent views on their arrangement.  A trial has just been conducted thereon and the court’s decision is still pending.

10.  On 28 November 2022, the wife issued the present application for IM, which was opposed by the husband. Directions were given for the application to be decided on paper, and after reading the parties’ submissions, these are the decisions of the court.

Legal Principleson MPS/IM

11.  In HJFG v KCY[1], Hartmann JA, at paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment, gave a succinct summary of the law in this area by referring to the judgment of Mostyn QC, sitting then as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in England, in TL v ML [2006] 1 FLR 1263, 1289:

“37. The principles that have been emerged over time to guide judges in matters of interim maintenance have been fashioned in the main to ensure fairness. This is well illustrated in the judgment of Nicholas Mostyn QC, sitting then as a Deputy Judge, in TL v ML [2006] 1 FLR 1263, 1289, in which, having looked at earlier authorities, he derived the following principles that speak specifically to fairness or are based on the need to ensure it. For present purposes, it is sufficient to cite the relevant principles without citing the Judge’s reference to the source of those principles:

(a) The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is “reasonableness”, which is synonymous with “fairness”.

(b) A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living. This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

(c) In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing. That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

(d) Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumption about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee.

38. Finally, it is to be noted that in application for interim maintenance, when the amount to be paid is for a limited period only and not all the evidence is necessarily before the court, it is not appropriate, nor indeed in most cases possible, for the court to conduct a detailed investigation into the finances of the parties.   While, in order to determine what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, that analysis can be conducted on a “broad-brush” basis.”

12.  Therefore, the overriding considerations for such applications are reasonableness and fairness.   In order to achieve these objectives, the Court has to balance the reasonable needs of the applicant and the ability to pay of the respondent on an interim basis: LJ v LWHH [2003] 3 HKC 455 at 461D.

13.  In undertaking this balancing exercise, the Court will adopt a broad brush approach, and not a detailed investigation of the financial positions of the parties.

14.  I do not think the above general principles are in dispute.

Interim Reasonable Needs of the Wife and Children

15.  At paragraph 88 of the wife’s 2nd Affirmation (A/35-38), she set out her claims for MPS/IM as follows (by reference to Part 4 of her Form E):

Part 4  Current Monthly Expenses

4.1  General

Item Amount
Rent           62,000
Mortgage instalments           0 (set off by rental income)
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water)           5,000
Management fees           0 (set off by rental    income)
Food           15,000
Household expenses           8,000
Car expenses           12,000
Insurance premia           0
Domestic helper(s)           15,000
Other (specify)           0
Total monthly household expenses           HK$117,000

4.2 Personal Expenses                        Nil

4.3 Children

Item Amount
School fees           35,000
Extra tuition fees           0
School books and stationery           1,000
Transport to school (including school bus)           0
Medical / Dental           0 (covered by  insurance)
Extra Curricular Activities           5,000
Entertainment / presents           2,000
Holidays           0
Clothing / Shoes           1,000  
Insurance premia           0
Lunches and pocket money           1,500
Other Transport           0
Child-minding fees           0
Uniform           300
Others (toys and books)           2,000
Total monthly expenses for children           HK$47,800

Total Monthly Expenses
(4.1+ 4.2 + 4.3)
          HK$164,800

16.  It is to be noted that the wife is not claiming any MPS for her own personal expenses, which she quantified at HK$100,000 per month.  Basically, she is saying that she could afford her own expenses, whilst the husband should bear the general and children expenses.

17.  The husband raised objections to various items of the general and children expenses on which I shall give my broad-brush views.  In his objections, the father stated how much he was willing to pay as his share.  But in my following assessment, I would first rule on the amount of reasonable expenses to be incurred by the wife and the children.  At a later stage, I would consider the father’s ability to pay, after which I would rule on how much he has to pay or share.

18.  For the objected items:

(1)  The wife claimed a monthly sum of HK$62,000 as rent.  The husband said he would only share 25% of it (HK$15,500) as the wife could utilize her rental allowance from her employer. As I said above, I would assess the item’s reasonableness as a whole first and leave the sharing part to a later stage. I note that the family was previously housed in a rather luxurious home at Pokfulam (“the Pokfulam Residence”) owned by the paternal grandparents.  I am satisfied that rental payment of HK$62,000 for a flat smaller in size than the Pokfulam Residence is not unreasonable. 

(2)  The wife asked for HK$5,000 as utilities payment. The husband offered HK$1,250.  Again, I do not think the father is objecting to the fact that wife is actually paying this sum, but only that he would only agree to pay 25% of that amount.  I am satisfied that the monthly expenses of HK$5,000 on utilities is reasonable.

(3)  The wife asked for HK$15,000 as food, but the father only offered HK$5,000.  I understand that this family used to have 2 domestic helpers and it would not be unreasonable for the wife to also engage 2 domestic helpers to assist her in child caring.  But even for a household of 5 persons, I have to take into account that the 2 children are spending a not insignificant amount of time with the husband. Moreover, the wife claims to be spending HK$10,000 as her own meals out of home. Therefore, I would say a monthly sum of HK$12,000 for food for the general household sounds more reasonable.

(4)  For household expenses, the wife asked for HK$8,000, whilst the husband only agreed to HK$1,000 saying that she had failed to provide clear breakdown and the sum being excessive.  I agree that the sum of HK$5,000 may sound more reasonable.

(5)  The wife asked for HK$12,000 as private car expenses.  The husband said he has already given a Volvo for the wife’s use and so he objected to this item.  The wife accepts that she is having the use of the Volvo but she said the associated outgoings of the car, set by her at HK$12,000 should be borne by the husband.  For my part, I would assess the monthly outgoings of the car, e.g. petrol, ad hoc car parking, etc., at HK$5,000.

(6)  I have already said above that the engagement of 2 domestic helpers by the wife is reasonable, and so is the monthly outgoings at HK$15,000 in this regard.

(7)  The wife asked for the children’s school fees at HK$35,000.  The husband said he undertook to pay for the children’s school fees.  I have no reason to believe the husband would default on his undertaking.  I would accept his undertaking to pay the children’s school fees.

(8)  For expenses on school books and stationary, I am not convinced that it is reasonable or practicable for them to be covered by the husband’s undertaking.  Therefore, I would accept HK$1,000 to be included in the wife’s monthly budget for the children.

(9)  For ECA at HK$5,000. The husband said he was not consulted on the children’s ECA and it was unreasonable for him to pay for whatever ECA to be arranged by the wife.  Of course, I would expect the parties to discuss on future ECA for the children. But for the assessment of the amount payable on the children’s ECA, I am satisfied the monthly sum of HK$5,000 is reasonable.

(10)  For entertainment/presents, the wife asked for HK$2,000.  The husband objected quoting the lack of consultation and the amount being excessive.  I am satisfied that HK$2,000 is reasonable.

(11)  For clothing/shoes, the wife asked for HK$1,000.  The husband objected saying that he had also bought clothing and shoes for the children.  That may be the case, but I do not consider the wife spending HK$1,000 per month for 2 children is in any way unreasonable.

(12)  For lunch/pocket money, the wife asked for HK$1,500.  The husband objected saying that the children would have lunch at home most of the time.  HK$1,500 is a modest sum which I do not consider to be unreasonable.

(13)  For uniform, the wife asked for HK$300.  The father did not object to the quantum but he said he would give an undertaking to cover that.  I do not consider an undertaking on this outgoing to be practicable. I would allow this item of uniform in the sum of HK$300.

(14)  For toys and books, the mother asked for HK$2,000.  The father objected by saying that these should have been covered by other items, e.g. school books and entertainment/presents.  He said he would also buy toys and books for the children.  I do not consider the husband’s objection to be reasonable.  I would allow the sum of HK$2,000 for this item.

19.  By way of summary, and based on the husband’s undertaking to pay for the 2 children’s school fees, I am satisfied that the wife and the children are having the following interim reasonable needs as far as the general expenses and children’s expenses are concerned:

General Expenses

Rent           62,000
Utilities           5,000
Food           12,000
Household expenses           5,000
Car expenses           5,000
Domestic helper(s)           15,000
Total monthly household expenses           HK$104,000

Children Expenses

Item Amount
School fees           0 (by undertaking)
School books and stationery           1,000
Extra Curricular Activities           5,000
Entertainment / presents           2,000
Clothing / Shoes           1,000  
Lunches and pocket money           1,500
Uniform           300
Others (toys and books)           2,000
Total monthly expenses for children           HK$12,800

Total Monthly Expenses

          HK$116,800

20.  Although the wife has deliberately left out her own expenses (HK$100,000) in this application for MPS/IM, I think it is only fair for the court to have brief consideration thereon as this might affect her ability to contribute towards the general expenses and children expenses.  The wife set out her own expenses in the Form E as follows:

4.2 Personal

Item Amount
Meals out of home            10,000
Transport            5,000
Clothing / Shoes            15,000
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics)            3,000
Entertainment / presents            3,000
Holiday            5,000
Medical / Dental            3,000
Tax            27,000
Insurance premia            17,000
Interim maintenance            0
Contribution to parents            12,000
Dependent family members            0
Others (specify)            0

Total monthly personal expenses

           HK$100,000

21.  I note that the husband claims that his personal expenses amount to HK$16,410 only, implying that the wife’s expenses must be excessive.  Whilst I accept that different individual may have different needs or spending patterns, but if the wife is claiming financial difficulty in supporting the children, I agree that there may be room for her to practise some economy in her monthly budget.  On a broad-brush basis, I would reduce her expenses on meals out of home by HK$3,000 to HK$7,000.  I note that she is claiming private car expenses and so I would reduce her transport expenses by HK$3,000 to HK$2,000.  Clothing could be reduced by HK$8,000 to HK$7,000 and holidays by HK$3,000 to HK$2,000.   There is no evidence on the needs of the wife’ parents and so I would take out this item on contribution to parents at HK$12,000 altogether.  In short, I would reduce the wife’s reasonable monthly expenses by HK$29,000 to HK$71,000. 

The Parties’ Respective Ability to Pay

The Wife’s Financial Circumstances

22.  The wife is a partner in a reputable international accountancy firm.  She said her total monthly income was HK$160,000.  The husband disputed by saying that there was insufficient financial disclosure and there was evidence suggesting that the wife might be entitled to various allowances from the company.

23.  It is my view that it is not uncommon for the remuneration package of private companies to be structured in a way to minimise taxation.  Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the wife’s remuneration are paid through allowances, instead of by direct salary.  For the purpose of this hearing, I am satisfied that the wife’s total monthly income is HK$160,000.

24.  In her Form E, the wife stated that she was the registered owner of a property at Happy Valley (“the Yik Yum Property”).  She stated to be a 70% beneficial owner with 30% holding on behalf of the husband’s friends.  The property was valued at HK$12,880,000 net.  The property was rented out at HK$19,500 which was just sufficient to pay the mortgage and related expenses.  I am satisfied that it may not be possible for the Yik Yum Property to be liquidated to cater for the wife and the children’s immediate needs at this interim stage.

25.  The wife also stated in her Form E that she had cash of HK$260,000 and stocks in the sum of HK$330,000, but at the same time, she also had liabilities of HK$960,000, mainly in the form of credit card debts.  The Form E was dated 27 May 2022, which was more than a year ago.  There was no update on her asset position in the wife’s supporting affirmation, except by saying that she had inadvertently omitted to report the loans she owed to her cousin Howard at HK$350,000. 

26.  At this interim stage, I am satisfied that the wife is not having any immediately realisable assets that she may deploy to cover her monthly expenses and legal costs in the interim period.

27.  With a monthly income of HK$160,000 and personal expenses of HK$71,000, I am satisfied that the wife does have ability to contribute HK$89,000 towards the general and children expenses.  In paragraph 19 above, I have determined that the reasonable monthly general and children expenses are HK$116,800, and therefore I am satisfied that the wife is having a monthly deficit of HK$27,800 (HK$116,800 – HK$89,000 = HK$27,800), as far as the general and children expenses are concerned.

The Husband’s Financial Circumstances

28.  The husband’s financial ability is highly contentious.  However, I have to remind myself that this is a MPS/IM application at which there will not be a detailed and in-depth investigation of the parties’ respective financial circumstances.

29.  In his Form E, the husband stated that he was employed and self-employed.  I think what he meant was that he was “employed” by RCL, which is a business owned by his father, but with minimal personal involvement in the sense that he only represents the company to attend industrial conference about once every 2 years.  He said he received a monthly income of HK$19,570 from this company.

30.  The husband’s more full-time business engagement is with ARECL, a real estate consultancy in identifying properties with redevelopment potentials for clients.  It was a company established on 1 April 2022 but not yielding any notable income for him.

31.  It is not surprising that the husband’s rather limited income is now challenged by the wife.  She viewed this as a deliberate tactic to downplay his income and assets so as to defeat the wife’s claim for ancillary relief or maintenance for the children.  It is also the wife’s case that the husband comes from a very rich family and he must have received generous financial support from his parents.

Discussion

32.  By looking at the husband’s tax returns for 2019/2020 and 2020/2021, the husband’s then annual income were HK$1,026,015 and H$720,127 respectively, averaging about HK$85,000 a month in 2019/2020 and about HK$60,000 a month in 2020/2021. He said he resigned from his then employment (with a company called PL) in 2020 because he wanted to spend more time with his 2 young children.  I accept that this was not a litigation tactic as that happened sometime before the wife’s petition for divorce in 2022.  

33.  Be that as it may, I have to point out that the court is more concerned with a party’s earning capacity, but not simply on how much a party “choose” to earn. In this regard, I note that the husband is aged 41.  He is still in his prime years (of course, the same can also be said of the wife).  He has received very good education and graduated from a reputable university in USA.  He used to assist in the family business and as a matter of fact, he is still holding some shares in certain family companies.  There is no reason why he could not return to work full time for the family businesses. 

34.  Furthermore, it is quite clear that the husband has received, and is still receiving financial support from his family.   The most obvious one is the provision of a rather luxurious accommodation at the Pokfulam Residence.  According to him, he has received millions of dollars of “loans” from his mother, to purchase the Yik Yum Property and for daily expenses (A/147).  Even if this court accepts these so called “loans” were in existence, they had to be in the form of soft loans, with no pressing need for immediate repayment. Of course, I am not saying that the husband must have unlimited financial resources simply because he is the son of a wealthy father.  But I am prepared to assume that the husband must be in better financial position than a person earning simply HK$19,750 per month. 

35.  The next question to be asked is: under these circumstances, how much income should this court infer the husband to be earning? Or put it differently, how much is the husband able to earn if he has exercised his reasonable earning capacity, either seeking a reasonably remunerated employment, or simply going back to work for the family businesses?  Before a full-blown trial is possible, and proceeding on a broad-brush basis, I am prepared to infer the husband is having an earning capacity similar to that of his monthly income in 2019/2020, i.e. a monthly sum of HK$85,000.

36.  As to the husband’s other assets, the husband’s stance is that his interest in the Yik Yum Property is about HK$1,721,400 (A/141).  He also has HK$3,114,506 cash in his bank accounts (A/142).  He still has 3 cars (A/144).  Even though one of them (a Volvo) is to be used by the wife, the husband is still driving 2 Mercedes (E350 and E03).  The combined estimated value of the 3 cars were HK$950,000.

37.  As to the husband’s outgoings, they were reported as HK$141,110 in his Form E (A/152), but over half of that amount was for payment of rent for the wife and the children (HK$31,000), domestic helpers mainly for child care (HK$15,000) and school fees (HK$35,000).  If we take away some other expenses like mortgage repayment at HK$18,000 (which according to the wife, would be covered by the rent received), insurance premia at HK$6,000 and other various expenses of the children at HK$9,900, the personal expenses of the husband were only HK$26,200, which cannot be regarded as unreasonable in the circumstances of this case.

38.  Before we come to a determination on the husband’s financial ability to pay MPS/IM, we need to address a very important facet of the wife’s argument, i.e. the alleged enormous wealth of the husband’s parents. The wife is saying that the husband comes from an extremely wealthy family.  During marriage, the family was housed at the Pokfulam Residence, which was large and luxurious.  The house was owned by the husband’s parents and they were allowed to stay there rent free.  All the household expenses were covered and 2 domestic helpers were employed to look after the children.  In her supporting affirmation, the wife has used a very large section to delve into the enormous wealth enjoyed by the husband’s family and also by the husband himself.

39.  In my judgment, whether the husband’s parents could be regarded as enormously wealthy is a topic subject to debate. Certainly, this hearing is not a suitable forum for such debate. Be that as it may, I have, at paragraph 34 above, ruled that the husband must have, and still is receiving financial support from his family. By such ruling, I was further prepared to infer the husband is having an earning capacity of HK$85,000 per month and I would thereafter say no more on the so called “enormous wealth” of the husband’s parents in this judgment.

40.  Based on the above discussion, I am prepared to order the husband to pay IM at the rate of HK$27,800 for the children, to be rounded up to HK$28,000 per month in order to cover the deficit of the wife.  By this amount, I am fully aware that the husband would be running a small deficit each month: HK$85,000 (inferred earning capacity) – HK$35,000 (school fees) – HK$15,000 (domestic helpers) – HK$6,000 (insurance premia) – HK$9,900 (various expenses on the children) – HK$26,200 (personal expenses) – HK$28,000 (IM) = HK$35,100 in deficit.  But with his current cash in bank and further financial support from family, I am satisfied that this is a reasonable arrangement for IM to be put in place until further order.  The IM should also be backdated to 1 December 2022.

Legal Costs Provision

41.  The second part of the wife’s summons is for LCP.  Her case is that she has now exhausted her financial resources, and in order to continue with her application of ancillary relief, a LCP has to be sought from the husband.

42.  In counsel’s written submissions, Mr. Chan for the wife has set out the number of complicated issues that have to be dealt with in the wife’s ancillary relief application.  These issues include the investigation into the substantial financial resources of the husband’s parents; the understatement of the husband’s income and earning capacity; the concealment of his shareholding and directorship in family businesses; his concealment of closed down business; his dissipation of large sums to his mother and family businesses; the dispute on the beneficial ownership of 2 landed properties; and dispute as to the truthfulness and nature of loans allegedly owed by the husband to this mother.

43.  Mr. Chan has further set out the procedural steps and interlocutory applications that have to be taken out, including the present MPS/IM application; specific discovery application; third party discovery application against the husband’s parents or family businesses; section 17 application; and TL v ML application on beneficial ownership of certain properties or assets.           Due to the complexity of these issues, the wife intends to instruct Senior Counsel at an hourly rate of HK$12,000 with assistance from a Junior at the hourly rate of HK$2,800.  Only if a Senior Counsel is not allowed that she would consider to instruct a more senior junior.

44.  At paragraph 44 of her 5th Affirmation (A/108-109), the wife set out her legal costs to be incurred from then to FDR (basically covering a period from CDR to FDR) in the sum of HK$3,216,000.  Assuming that the FDR will take place in 15 months’ time, the average monthly legal costs will be HK$214,400 (HK$3,216,000/15 = HK$214,000).  However, by the time of this MPS/IM application, the trial on custody has already taken place and so Mr. Chan revised the wife’s LCP budget in paragraph 33 of his written submissions.  The revised legal costs from CDR to FDR has come down to HK$3,056,000.  If divided by 15, the average monthly legal costs will become HK$203,733.  Alternatively, if Senior Counsel is not allowed, the estimated legal costs will be HK$2,598,000, averaging HK$173,200 a month over a period of 15 months from now to FDR.

45.  The husband objects by saying that the wife’s legal costs must be inflated.  In the wife’s Form H dated 2 February 2023, i.e. before the custody trial and the present application for MPS/IM, the wife has already incurred a staggering sum of HK$3,587,200 on costs (B2/299-300).  If the costs of the custody trial are to be included, the total costs incurred will become HK$4,030,400.  Counsel submitted that these costs are disproportionate and suggestive of inflated figures.  Counsel further submitted that the wife also fails to demonstrate that she has no assets or none that can reasonably be deployed by her for legal costs.  Those assets include her stocks worth HK$300,000 and undisclosed personal valuables of HK$956,654.

The law

46.  In H v H (Interim Maintenance) [2007] HKFLR 311, HH Judge Bruno Chan (at paragraph 44 of his judgment) cited the English Court of Appeal case of Currey v Currey [2006] EWCA Civ 1338 as follows:

“44. There is no question over the court’s jurisdiction to award a costs allowance in an order for maintenance pending suit subject to certain fairly stringent conditions, as recently refined by the English Court of Appeal in Currey v Currey [2006] EWCA Civ 1338, [2007] FLR as follows:

(1) That the applicant has no assets, or none that can reasonably be deployed.

(2) That she can provide no security for borrowing, or none which can reasonably be offered.

(3) That she cannot reasonably obtain legal services by offering a charge on the outcome of the litigation.

(4) That she cannot secure publicly funded legal help at a level of expertise apt to the proceedings.”

47.  I do not think that the above legal principles on legal costs allowance are in dispute.

Discussion

48.  One of the husband’s main objections to LCP is the amount claimed being totally out of proportion and must have been inflated.  On the face of it, there is some force in the argument.  But if one looks at the costs incurred by the husband, one would realise that such argument is rather disingenuous. According to counsel’s submissions (at paragraph 45), the wife’s total costs of HK$4,030,400 was in fact “HK$600,000 more than H”, indicating that the costs incurred by the husband was in the region of about HK$3,400,000.  Obviously, both parties’ costs were disproportionate.

49.  The husband also contended that the wife should have sufficient assets or borrowing powers to cover her future legal costs.  But by looking at the rather uncompromising approach adopted by the parties in this litigation, I am not surprised that much of the wife’s available financial resources have already be spent on legal fees.

50.  As far as the husband’s ability to pay LCP, I think there is little dispute that the amount of assets that are currently under his name is not substantial. They include some cash in bank (about HK$3,100,000), and some interest in landed properties (the Yik Yum Property) which is not readily realisable.  However, it is the case of the wife that the husband comes from a very wealthy family and therefore, an investigation into the family fortune is justified in order to see whether he has any hidden interest therein.  That is why she views the instruction of Senior Counsel and the taking out of a long list of interlocutory applications being justified.   

51.  In my view, whilst the intended investigation into the financial well-being of the husband’s parents cannot be concluded as totally without merit at this rather early stage, one also has to bear in mind the fact that this was a relatively short marriage of 4 years (the parties married in 2018 and separated in 2022). Joint marital acquests or asset accumulation cannot be regarded as very substantial. The wife is a Certified Accountant working as a partner in a reputable international accountant firm, earning a good income of HK$160,000 per month.  On the contrary, the husband’s independent earning capacity has never been high in comparison with the wife.  In his good years, his average monthly income was about HK$85,000 (2019/2020).  There is no doubt that the husband has received financial assistance from his family, in terms of living in a rather luxurious home (the Pokfulam Residence) provided by his parents and receiving loans (or gifts as contended by the wife) for the purchase of landed properties or to cover some of his monthly expenses.  But a claim for HK$3,056,000, or even a lesser sum at HK$2,598,000 is a sum simply too high as LCP just for financial investigation, related interlocutory applications and FDR.  I would say that a sum of about HK$1,200,000 (roughly about half of the lesser sum) is a more reasonable figure, covering a period of 12 months, by which time a FDR is expected to be ready.  Within this budget, whether the wife would engage a more senior counsel is simply a matter of her own decision.  It may be high time for her to consider practising economy in budgeting her legal costs. Equally, I would expect the same from the husband in budgeting his legal costs in future litigation.  There will not be any backdating of the LCP.

52.  If one should take a step back to look at the final result, with both children’s school fees being covered by the husband’s undertaking and a Volvo being provided, the wife will have a monthly budget of about HK$188,000 (HK$160,000 + HK$28,000 = HK$188,000) for her and 2 children’s expenses, which I believe would give them a reasonable living standard comparable to the one enjoyed during marriage.  In addition, she will also have LCP of HK$1,200,000 which is, in my view, enough for her to obtain high quality legal service to pursue her claim for ancillary relief up to FDR.

53.  On the other hand, if one should look from the angle of the husband, he might have to dig into his capital in order to cover the MPS/IM and LCP order.  But I am sure that he could still afford them, and if necessary, with assistance from his family.

Conclusion and Order

54.  Based on the above discussion and subject to the undertaking of the husband to pay the children’s school fees, I will grant the following MPS/IM order:

(1)  The husband shall pay a monthly sum HK$28,000 to the wife as the children’s interim maintenance (HK$14,000 each) payable on the 1st day of every month, starting 1 December 2022, until further order of the court.

(2)  The husband shall pay MPS by way of legal costs provision in the sum of HK$1,200,000 payable by 12 monthly instalments of HK$100,000 each on the 1st day of every month starting 1 October 2023 and the last instalment ending on 1 September 2024.

Costs

55.  Costs to follow event.   The wife has to come to court before getting the MPS/IM orders and therefore, should also get the costs of the application, including all costs reserved, with certificate for counsel.   This will be in the form of an order nisi to be made absolute after the expiry of 14 days from the handing down of this judgment.  Within 14 days from the costs order being made absolute, the wife shall lodge and serve a 2-page (A4 paper) statement of costs for summary assessment and the husband to lodge and serve his list of objections (if any) also limited to 2 pages of A4 paper within 14 days thereafter.  Upon receipt of these documents, the court will proceed to assess the costs on a summary basis.       

 C. K. Chan
  District Judge
Representation (By way of written submissions):
Mr. Ken Chan, Barrister-at-law instructed by Messrs. Wellington Legal, solicitors for the Petitioner
Ms. Madeleine Booth, Barrister-at-law, instructed by Messrs. Withers, solicitors for the Respondent


[1] [2012] 1 HKLRD 95