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Miscellaneous Proceedings2023

FOO CHAU HUNG 對 FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN) (符樹雲), the administrator of the estate of Foo Chau Ha, Deceased

Related cases with same parties

  • HCMP1499/2023FOO CHAU HUNG 對 FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN) (符樹雲), the administrator of the estate of Choi Kuk Far, Deceased 及另一人

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[2025] HKCFI 1400-CH-2025-04-17

FOO CHAU HUNG 對 FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN) (符樹雲), the administrator of the estate of Foo Chau Ha, Deceased

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HCMP 1499/2023及
HCMP 1500/2023
(一併審理)

[2025] HKCFI 1400

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

雜項案件2023年第1499號

____________________

原告人FOO CHAU HUNG 
 及 
第一被告人FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN)
(符樹雲), the administrator of the estate of Choi Kuk Far, Deceased
 
第二被告人FOO SHU CHUEN
(符樹全)
 

____________________

及

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

雜項案件2023年第1500號

____________________

原告人FOO CHAU HUNG  
 及 
被告人FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN)
(符樹雲), the administrator of the estate of Foo Chau Ha, Deceased
 

____________________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官陳嘉信內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2025年3月20日
判決書日期:2025年4月17日

判決書

引言

1.  符樹雲先生(「第一被告人」)以兩份日期為2024年9月30日之傳票(「D1傳票」)申請更改本席2024年9月17日判決(「判決」)中的訟費命令。第一被告人的申請如下:

「1.  法官陳嘉信先生2024年9月17日的判決第35段指Costs of and occasioned by the Originating Summonses in this action (including all costs reserved, if any)  be paid by the 1st Defendant personally (ie not to be reimbursed by the estate)  to the Plaintiff on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed的訟費命令被更改為

甲、原告人支付第一被告人70% 在本案所花的訟費及

乙、第一被告人支付原告人30% 在本案所花的訟費;

2.  本申請訟費歸於以上申請。」

2.  第一被告人的申請基於以下原因:

(1)  原告人在原訴傳票列出的第一至四項濟助,只有第四項獲接納(「原因 (1)」);

(2)  原告人聲稱第一被告人會向母親遺產申索而造成利益衝突的指控,獲法庭裁定不成立(「原因 (2)」);

(3)  原告人拒絕第一被告人在正審聆訊前嘗試庭外和解的邀請(「原因 (3)」);

(4)  第一被告人稱自己品格良好,故訟費不應按彌償基準計算(「原因 (4)」)。

背景

3.  本案是一宗遺產管理糾紛。原告人和第一被告人屬兄妹關係,而原告人展開此訴訟初時主要爲了主張兩人成為其母親和妹妹遺產的共同管理人/雙承辦人。案情詳見判決第7至17段。

4.  有關是次訟費聆訊的事實如下:

(1)  2022年4至5月期間,第一被告人曾多次向原告人毫不含糊地表示他同意和原告人共同管理母親的遺產,有關委託文件由原告人代表律師準備;

(2)  上述其中包括2022年5月18日,第一被告人的代表律師江炳滔律師事務所(Messrs Benny Kong & Tsai)(「BKT」)去信原告人,正式確認第一被告人就母親的遺產同意雙承辦的方案,及願意和原告人合辦遺產管理書的申請;

(3)  2022年7月4日,第一被告人透過BKT突然去信原告人,詢問原告人會否透過BKT共同就母親的遺產提出申請,並要求同日中午前得到答覆,但信函沒有提到原告人不在期限內回覆的後果;

(4)  2022年7月5日,在原告人未作回覆前及不知情的情況下,第一被告人背棄了其向原告人對於雙承辦的明確承諾,擅自向遺產承辦處申請擔任母親遺產的唯一管理人;

(5)  同月,第一被告人亦在原告人不知情的情況下,擅自申請了擔任妹妹遺產的唯一管理人;

(6)  2023年9月11日,原告人展開了此訴訟,起初主要尋求的濟助爲雙承辦,其替代方案為委任獨立第三方作母親和妹妹遺產的管理人;

(7)  在正審聆訊時,原告人認為其跟第一被告人的關係已缺乏誠信和信心,故沒有再主張雙承辦的方案,只主張其替代方案;

(8)  就解除第一被告人作為唯一遺產管理人的職務這爭論點,原告人其中提出的理由為第一被告人有可能對母親遺產作出申索,有利益衝突的風險;

(9)  經正審後,本席裁定原告人利益衝突的指控不成立[1],但由於第一被告人顯然背棄了其對原告人對於雙承辦的承諾,導致原告人對第一被告人完全失去信心,第一被告人不適宜繼續擔任唯一遺產管理人[2];

(10)  因此,本席最終作出命令解除第一被告人為唯一遺產管理人的職務,委任了獨立第三方練先生,作為新的遺產管理人[3]。

討論

原因 (1)

5.  按《高等法院規則》(第4A章)第62號命令第3(2) 條規則,法庭就訟費的事宜具有酌情決定權。

6.  英國上訴法庭在Re Elgindata Ltd (No.  2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207 一案第1214頁表明,一般而言,勝訴一方可得訟費,但若果勝訴一方提出了不成立的爭論點或指控,而因此導致訴訟時間或訟費大幅增加,則勝訴一方可被剝奪全部或部分訟費。再者,若勝訴一方是不當或不合理地提出其不成立的爭論點或指控,法庭更可以進一步命令勝訴一方支付敗訴一方的全部或部分訟費:

“The principles are these.  (i)  Costs are in the discretion of the court.  (ii)  They should follow the event, except when it appears to the court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made.  (iii)  The general rule does not cease to apply simply because the successful party raises issues or makes allegations on which he fails, but where that has caused a significant increase in the length or cost of the proceedings he may be deprived of the whole or a part of his costs.  (iv)  Where the successful party raises issues or makes allegations improperly or unreasonably, the court may not only deprive him of his costs but may order him to pay the whole or a part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.”(強調後加)

7.  由上述可見,勝訴一方的行為必須是不當或不合理,法庭才可命令其支付敗訴一方的全部或部分訟費。本席曾在Leung Chi Cheong v Liu Che Wun (廖志韻)& Anor[2025] HKCFI 367一案第16段強調過這一點:

“[A]n order to deprive the successful party wholly or partly of his costs under principle (iii)  of Elgindata, supra is distinguished from an order for that party to pay the whole or a part of the unsuccessful party’s costs under principle (iv).  The latter requires that the overall successful party is shown to have raised issues or made allegations unreasonably or improperly: Chan Shun Kei, supra, at §§36-37; Hong Kong Kam Lan Koon Ltd v Realray Investment Ltd [2005] 4 HKC 162 at §§10-11.”

8.  應用以上的原則於本案中,本席不接納原因 (1) 為更改訟費命令的理由。

9.  首先,本案真正的爭論點是第一被告人應否擔任唯一遺產管理人。如果答案是否定的話,遺產應否被第一被告人及原告人共同管理,或是被獨立第三方管理,則是其次的爭論點。在此基礎上,儘管原告人最終沒有得到雙承辦的濟助,原告人仍能成功說服法庭解除第一被告人作為唯一遺產管理人的職務,實際上是勝訴的一方。

10.  無論如何,如上所述,原告人在正審時已放棄主張雙承辦的方案,見判決第4至5段:

“4.  At the hearing, P no longer seeks to be appointed as a co-administratrix of the Estates, given the serious breakdown of trust and confidence between P and D1.  P is content for Mr Lin Siu Leung David (“Mr Lin”), an independent solicitor, to be appointed for the due and proper administration of the Estates in the interest of all beneficiaries.

5.  P therefore seeks an order that (i)  D1 be removed as the administrator of the Mother’s Estate and the Sister’s Estate; and (ii)  Mr Lin be appointed in his stead with fresh grant of letters of administration for the Estates.”

11.  原告人亦向法庭解釋,原告人是收到第一被告人的第一份誓詞後才從中發現第一被告人對雙承辦的方案覺得不接受且不可能。其後原告人已第一時間在其第二份誓詞第15至16段中表明不再主張雙承辦。故此,雖然原告人在原訴傳票列出的第一至第三項濟助(即雙承辦及相關事宜)沒有獲接納,但訴訟時間或訟費並沒有因此而大幅增加。就這爭論點,法庭則沒有理據以Elgindata的原則 (iii) 剝奪原告人任何訟費。

12.  再者,從本案的證據可見,第一被告人曾向原告人作出對於雙承辦的明確承諾,而其後,直至其第一份誓詞之前,一直沒有向原告人提出過他對雙承辦有所反對[4],或他有所反對的原因[5]。在這情況下,原告人初時提出雙承辦的方案並無不當或不合理之處。法庭因此亦沒有基礎以Elgindata的原則 (iv) 命令原告人支付第一被告人的任何訟費。

原因 (2)

13.  同樣地,基於Elgindata原則 (iii) 及 (iv),本席亦不接納原因 (2)。

14.  第一,就原告人提出有關利益衝突的指控,雙方並沒有援引任何額外的證據或傳喚其他的證人。本席就這方面考慮到的證據主要局限於第一被告人呈交的表格N4.1[6]。所以,雖然原告人的指控被裁定不成立,但這爭論點沒有導致訴訟時間或訟費大幅增加。Elgindata原則 (iii) 因此不適用。

15.  第二,原告人事實上於訴訟期間才收到第一被告人呈交的表格N4.1,而且第一被告人亦很後期在其補充陳詞中,才確認他不會向母親的遺產作出申索。故此,原告人本來就此方面抱著疑惑,並無不當或不合理之處。Elgindata原則 (iv) 則不適用。

原因 (3)

16.  原因 (3) 較容易處理。

17.  第一被告人指他在2023年12月18日曾邀請原告人在律師的見證下,「心平氣和地相討解決方案」,但遭受原告人拒絕。

18.  第一被告人的邀請確實沒有提出任何實際解決糾紛的另類辦法或和解提議,不構成更改訟費命令的理由。無論如何,第一被告人亦沒有提出理據證明最終勝訴的原告人拒絕相討有何不合理之處。

原因 (4)

19.  最後,就彌償訟費,上訴法庭於Choy Yee Chun (The Representative of the estate of Chan Pui Yiu)  v Bond Star Development Ltd [1997] HKLRD 1327一案第1335頁C-E表明,除了命令按彌償基準計算訟費必須是「適當」(appropriate)之外,法庭的酌情權不應受到束縛或限制。法庭亦可以考慮訴訟開展前發生的事情(events prior to the institution of the proceedings),包括導致訴訟的背景情況(the circumstances leading to the litigation)(見 Choy Yee Chun第1338頁F-H)。

20.  在本案中,本席同意原告人的陳詞,認為第一被告人訴訟前的行為不合理。

21.  如上文提到,第一被告人於2022年7月4日透過BKT去信原告人,突然提議更改兩人就母親遺產管理原本已達成協議的安排。本席認為,第一被告人在信函內要求原告人於同日下午前回覆的條件實在不可理喻,而事實上,第一被告人就這一點亦在其第一份誓詞第34.2段中承認過「所提供的回應時間太短,有道理」。更重要的是,第一被告人亦從未提過如果原告人不在期限內回覆的話,第一被告人將會獨自申請擔任母親遺產的唯一管理人。其後第一被告人卻一直沒有回覆原告人的詢問,更在原告人不知情的情況下,擅自申請擔任唯一的遺產管理人,顯然背棄了其對原告人對於雙承辦的明確承諾。

22.  對於第一被告人的行為,本席已在判決第25段作出過以下的批評:

“However, P is on much more solid ground when she complains that D1 clearly went back on his unequivocal promise of co-administration and secretly obtained Mother’s LA and Sister’s LA behind P’s back.  This demonstrates his refusal and failure to inform and communicate with P, his difficult and deceptive attitude in respect of the administration of the Estates, and more importantly a want of honesty. In my view, on this ground alone, P has justifiably lost confidence in D1’s ability to duly administer the Estates.  The deep-rooted distrust between P and D1 is sufficiently serious to render the continuance of the sole administration by D1 untenable.” (強調後加)

23.  考慮了整體情況,本席認為彌償訟費在本案中是「適當」(appropriate)的。

總結

24.  基於上述原因,本席撤銷第一被告人的D1傳票申請,維持原判的訟費命令為最終命令。

25.  本席亦作出命令,就D1傳票所涉及的訟費由第一被告人支付原告人(即不得由遺產償還)。如果雙方未能同意訟費數額,則由訟費評定官評定。

 

 

( 陳嘉信 )
高等法院原訟法庭法官

  

原告人(HCMP 1499/2023及HCMP 1500/2023):由譚百全律師行李美玲律師代表

第一被告人(HCMP 1499/2023)及被告人(HCMP 1500/2023):無律師代表,親自出庭應訊


[1] 見判決第23至24段

[2] 見判決第25段

[3] 見判決第27至30段

[4] 見判決第12至13段

[5] 見判決第22段

[6] 見判決第24段

[2024] HKCFI 2325-EN-2024-09-17

FOO CHAU HUNG v. FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN), the administrator of the estate of Foo Chau Ha, Deceased

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HCMP 1499/2023 and
HCMP 1500/2023
(Heard Together)

[2024] HKCFI 2325

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1499 OF 2023

________________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF the estate of Choi Kuk Far

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Letters of Administration under Grant No HCAG 10038 of 2022

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Sections 33 and 36 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap 10) and Order 76 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A)

BETWEEN

 
 FOO CHAU HUNGPlaintiff

and

 FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN)
(符樹雲), the administrator of the estate of Choi Kuk Far, Deceased
1st Defendant
 FOO SHU CHUEN (符樹全)2nd Defendant

________________________

AND

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1500 OF 2023

________________________

 IN THE MATTER OF the estate of Foo Chau Ha
and
 IN THE MATTER OF Letters of Administration under Grant No HCAG 17097 of 2022
and
 IN THE MATTER OF Sections 33 and 36 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap 10) and Order 76 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A)

BETWEEN

 
 FOO CHAU HUNGPlaintiff

and

FU SHU WAN (also known as FOO SHU WAN)
(符樹雲), the administrator of the estate of Foo
Chau Ha, Deceased
Defendant

________________________

Before: Hon Wilson Chan J in Court
Date of Hearing: 10 April 2024
Date of Judgment: 17 September 2024

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  There are two Originating Summonses before the court for determination:

(1)  HCMP 1499/2023 concerns the estate of Choi Kuk Far (“Mother”, “Mother’s Estate” and “Mother OS”); and

(2)  HCMP 1500/2023 concerns the estate of Foo Chau Ha (“Sister”, “Sister’s Estate” and “Sister OS”).

2.  They are both taken out by the plaintiff, Madam Foo Chau Hung (“P”) against Mr Fu Shu Wan (the 1st defendant in HCMP 1499/2023 and the defendant in HCMP 1500/2023, “D1”) in his capacity as the administrator of respectively Mother’s Estate and Sister’s Estate (collectively, the “Estates”), pursuant to section 33 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance, Cap 10 (“PAO”).

3.  The 2nd defendant in HCMP 1499/2023, Mr Foo Shu Chuen (“Brother”), is named as a defendant as he is a beneficiary of Mother’s Estate (and indirectly a beneficiary of Sister’s Estate) and he has neither consented to the Mother OS nor the Sister OS.

4.  At the hearing, P no longer seeks to be appointed as a co-administratrix of the Estates, given the serious breakdown of trust and confidence between P and D1.  P is content for Mr Lin Siu Leung David (“Mr Lin”), an independent solicitor, to be appointed for the due and proper administration of the Estates in the interest of all beneficiaries. 

5.  P therefore seeks an order that (i) D1 be removed as the administrator of the Mother’s Estate and the Sister’s Estate; and (ii) Mr Lin be appointed in his stead with fresh grant of letters of administration for the Estates.  

6.  On 13 December 2023, DHCJ MK Liu ordered that the substantive hearing of the Mother OS and the Sister OS are to take place together, with evidence from both proceedings to be mutually admissible (“Dec Order”). 

B.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7.  I refer to the factual background set out in P’s Skeleton Submissions, which is largely based on contemporaneous documents.

8.  P and D1 are siblings.  Their late father and Mother had 4 children.  In the order of seniority they are (i) D1, (ii) Sister, (iii) P and (iv) Brother, which were/are all married.

9.  On 14 June 2021, Sister (who had no children) was killed by her husband who then committed suicide and died on the same day.  On 12 December 2021, Mother died at the age of 91.  They both died intestate.

10.  In early August 2021, P learnt from D1 that Mother had instructed Messrs Benny Kong & Tsai (“BKT”) to handle Sister’s Estate.  However, at that time Mother was already 91 years of age, illiterate and suffered from memory issues (for example, not recalling Sister’s tragic death).  P therefore instructed Messrs Hom & Associates (“H&A”) and proposed to handle the administration of Sister’s Estate for Mother’s benefit on 9 September 2021.

11.  Shortly thereafter, P received a photograph of a purported written instruction from Mother to her nursing home dated 10 September 2021 (witnessed by D1’s wife, “Cheng”), seeking to cut P off from any contact with her and stated that Mother’s intention may be ascertained via D1 or Cheng.  It only transpired in D1’s 3rd Affirmation filed in  HCA 1500/2023 (ie on 1 December 2023 after the Mother OS had been taken out) that Mother purportedly gave written authorisation to D1 (and nobody else) to administer Sister’s Estate and her assets (“Mother’s Purported Authorisation”), also on 10 September 2021 and witnessed by Cheng.

12.  P wanted to avoid disputes and proposed to jointly administer Mother’s Estate by H&A’s letter dated 26 April 2022.  On the same day, D1 unequivocally agreed via WhatsApp and WeChat with P that P and D1 were to co-administer Mother’s Estate with H&A as their solicitors[1].  D1 again unequivocally confirmed the same on 8 May 2022 via WeChat with P, adding that Brother also agreed to the arrangement[2].  Subsequently, by letter dated 18 May 2022, BKT (acting for D1) formally put on record that D1 agreed to co-administer Mother’s Estate together with P (which Brother also supported) and D1 was minded to cooperate with P in the application for letters of administration.  There was no indication that it was not acceptable for H&A to act as the solicitors.  For reasons better known to him, D1 now alleges that he felt “challenged” by the idea of co-administration with P since 26 April 2022.

13.  Notwithstanding D1’s unequivocal agreement to co-administer Mother’s Estate with P through H&A, by BKT’s letter dated 4 July 2022, D1 suddenly asked if P would jointly make application in respect of Mother’s Estate through BKT and requested P to reply by noon on the same day.  P conceded on 18 July 2022 as she felt unreasonable to allow this logistic issue to ruin their agreed cooperation, and P still reposed trust on D1 as her eldest brother.  It should be noted that in the 4 July 2022 letter, there was no indication that D1 would apply to be the sole administrator of Mother’s Estate.

14.  P did not hear from D1 about the joint administration in the next 2 months.  Thus, by H&A’s letter dated 12 October 2022, P recorded that she had been ready to make the relevant application in respect of Mother’s Estate, just that she was relying on D1’s earlier promise and waiting for BKT to prepare the relevant application, and gave notice that H&A would immediately proceed with her application on a solo basis if no response was forthcoming.  Also in October 2022, P (not D1) managed to correspond with Sister’s former employer (the “IRD”) to ascertain Sister’s death benefits.

15.  With no response from D1, on 12 December 2022 P applied for letters of administration of Mother’s Estate.  Upon the Probate Registry’s requisition dated 11 January 2023 and H&A’s search at the Probate Registry, it transpired that D1 had reneged on his earlier agreement and made his own solo application way earlier on 5 July 2022 (ie the day immediately after BKT enquired if P was to join D1 to prepare a joint application via BKT), worse still, with D1 affirming the Form N4.1 even earlier on 30 June 2022 (ie before BKT’s letter dated 4 July 2022).  The letters of administration for Mother’s Estate (“Mother’s LA”) was granted to D1 as the sole administrator on 6 September 2022. 

16.  D1 then completely ignored P’s legitimate requests for a copy of Mother’s LA as a beneficiary of Mother’s Estate.  Further, by letter dated 27 April 2023, P still asked for D1’s consent to have her joined as an additional administratrix as per their earlier consensus.

17.  In late July 2023, P learned from the police that D1 was applying to collect the articles of Sister and the late brother-in-law.  Upon H&A’s search at the Probate Registry, it transpired that the letters of administration for Sister’s Estate (“Sister’s LA”) had also been granted to D1 as the sole administrator on 10 July 2023.  It was only pursuant to the Dec Order that D1 finally provided P with a copy of Sister’s LA.

C.  RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES

18.  Section 33(3) of the PAO provides that:

“The court may, if satisfied that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the persons beneficially entitled thereto so require, suspend or remove an executor or administrator (other than the Official Administrator) and provide for the succession of another person in place of such executor or administrator and for the vesting in that other person of any property belonging to the estate.”

19.  The principles concerning the exercise of the court’s power under section 33(3) of the PAO have been recently summarised in Lau Wai Ling Winnie v Lau Yu Ming David[2024] HKCFI 354 at §15:

“(1) The discretion to remove an executor or an administrator under section 33 of the PAO involves an assessment and a value judgement in all the relevant circumstances of whether removal is required for the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries.

(2) Not every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees would induce the court to remove the executor or the administrator.

(3) The acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to show a want of honesty, or want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity.

(4) Hostility between the executor/administrator and the beneficiary is not a ground for removal, unless the breakdown of the relations between them is such as to lead to the administration coming to a standstill, or makes it difficult or impossible for the administration to be completed by an existing personal representative.

(5) In exercising its discretion, the court should have regard to the size of the estate, the nature of the assets that need to be administered, the background and education, training and experience of the remaining and substituted personal representatives and the interests of the beneficiaries. The view of the majority beneficiaries is a relevant factor.

(6) The discretion to remove an executor or an administrator is to be exercised with great caution and sparingly. In general, removal is not to be preferred unless the administration is still far from completion. The courts are reluctant to exercise the discretion where the incumbent executor or administrator wishes to carry on, without allowing that incumbent an opportunity to repair or remedy any defects and progress promptly with due administration. The fact that administration of the estate could have been done better is not of itself sufficient ground.” (Emphasis supplied)

D.  DISCUSSION

D1.  D1’s arguments against removal and allegations against P

20.  It appears D1’s argument against his removal as administrator is that he was Mother’s sole provider, guarantor and agent (“唯一供養人,保證人,委托人”), and he solely made provisions for Mother for 25 years before she passed away.

21.  D1 further alleges that co-administration with P is not viable for the following reasons (collectively, “Allegations”):

(1)  On 14 June 2021, P promised to appoint D1 as administrator of Sister’s Estate if D1 would clean up the death scene of Sister and their brother-in-law.  Yet on 17 June 2021, P proposed that she was to deal with Sister’s Estate.  On 28 May 2022, P further proposed that she was to be the single administrator;

(2)  P is not fit to administer the Estates given her health and mental conditions;

(3)  P failed to provide various documents to D1, for example, Hong Kong Identity card and certificate for cremation of Sister and the brother-in-law;

(4)  P attempted to wrestle control over the administration of Sister’s Estate from Mother; and

(5)  P spent hundreds of thousands on prayer sessions and burial services without D1’s or Brother’s consent, and insisted that such expenses should be paid from the Estates.

22.  It is significant to note that none of the above reasons were put to P before D1 proceeded to apply to be appointed as the sole administrator of Mother’s Estate.  If they were genuine reasons, which I hold them not to be, surely D1 should have put the Allegations to P before going back on his promise of joint representation.

D2.  D1 should be removed as administrator of both Estates

23.  First, P submits that with D1’s heavy emphasis on his financial provision to Mother prior to her death, it is unknown whether D1 will make any claim against Mother’s Estate for reimbursement.  P submits it is plain that D1’s personal (and financial) interest may potentially conflict with the due administration of Mother’s Estate.  This alone justifies his removal. 

24.  I do not agree with P’s submissions in this regard.  First, in the Form N4.1 dated 30 June 2022 lodged by D1 in respect of Mother, it was stated that Mother’s Estate has no liability.  D1 is likely to be estopped by such a statement.  Further, in the Supplemental Skeleton Submissions of D1, he has confirmed that he would not make any claim against the Mother’s Estate.

25.  However, P is on much more solid ground when she complains that D1 clearly went back on his unequivocal promise of co-administration and secretly obtained Mother’s LA and Sister’s LA behind P’s back.  This demonstrates his refusal and failure to inform and communicate with P, his difficult and deceptive attitude in respect of the administration of the Estates, and more importantly a want of honesty.  In my view, on this ground alone, P has justifiably lost confidence in D1’s ability to duly administer the Estates.  The deep-rooted distrust between P and D1 is sufficiently serious to render the continuance of the sole administration by D1 untenable. 

26.  Moreover, D1’s reliance on Mother’s Purported Authorisation is not to the point.  Authority conferred to D1 (if any) under Mother’s Purported Authorisation has already terminated upon the Mother’s death.

D3.  Independent professional administrator should be appointed in place

27.  Given the degree of hostility and distrust, I agree that an independent professional administrator should be appointed in place of D1.

28.  Mr Lin of Messrs CP Lin & Co has over 30 years of relevant experience as a solicitor.  D1 has not challenged Mr Lin’s professional qualifications and experience or suitability to act as administrator of the Estates. 

29.  Given the relatively simple constitution and modest amount of the Estates, P envisages that the major tasks would be for Mr Lin to (i) collect assets for the Estates (the bulk of which is made up of Sister’s IRD death benefits); and (ii) impartially entertain claims against the Estates (and to consider whether there is sufficient supporting documentation and justification for the expenses). The remainder may then be distributed to the beneficiaries.  These should be straightforward matters for an experienced solicitor.  In any event, his remuneration will be capped under section 60 of the PAO. 

30.  P submits and I agree that the benefit derived from professional administration in this case (in particular the efficient and impartial collection and distribution of assets to all beneficiaries) far outweighs the cost.  One should not lose sight of a realistic possibility that, if D1 is to remain as sole administrator of the Estates and there are doubts as to whether he is impartially discharging his duties, parties may well have to engage in time-consuming and costly litigation.  Appointing an independent professional administrator effectively eliminates or substantially reduces the risk.

E.  CONCLUSION

31.  By reason of the foregoing, I hold that D1 should be removed as administrator of both Estates and Mr Lin should be appointed as the new administrator. 

32.  In respect of Mother’s Estate in HCMP 1499/2023, I make the following order:

(1)  D1 be removed as the administrator of Mother’s Estate;

(2)  Mr Lin of Messrs CP Lin & Co be appointed as the new administrator in place of D1;

(3)  D1 shall within 14 days from the date hereof lodge with the Probate Registry the Letters of Administration (Grant No HCAG 010038/2022);

(4)  D1 shall within 28 days from the date hereof furnish by way of affirmation a just and true account of Mother’s Estate under his administration and serve a copy on P, the 2nd defendant and Mr Lin.

33.  In respect of Sister’s Estate in HCMP 1500/2023, I make the following order:

(1)  D1 be removed as the administrator of Sister’s Estate;

(2)  Mr Lin of Messrs CP Lin & Co be appointed as the new administrator in place of D1;

(3)  D1 shall within 14 days from the date hereof lodge with the Probate Registry the Letters of Administration (Grant No HCAG 017097/2022);

(4)  D1 shall within 28 days from the date hereof furnish by way of affirmation a just and true account of Sister’s Estate under his administration and serve a copy on P and Mr Lin.

34.  P submits that costs should follow the event with D1 bearing P’s costs on an indemnity basis in light of D1’s unreasonable and uncooperative stance which obstructs and delays the proper administration of the Estates.  Further, D1 should bear these costs personally, relying on Lam Ka Wai Rebecca v Lam Jenny, the Administrator of the Estate of Lam Kam Wai[2023] HKCFI 530.

35.  Accordingly, I make the following order as to costs:

(1)  Costs of and occasioned by the Mother OS (including all costs reserved, if any) be paid by D1 personally (ie not to be reimbursed by the estate) to P on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

(2)  Costs of and occasioned by the Sister OS (including all costs reserved, if any) be paid by D1 personally (ie not to be reimbursed by the estate) to P on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

36.  The above order as to costs is nisi and shall become absolute in the absence of any application within 14 days to vary the same.

 (Wilson Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

  

Mr Vincent Lung and Ms Ivy Ho, instructed by Messrs Hom & Associates, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant in HCMP 1499/2023 and the defendant in HCMP 1500/2023 acted in person

The 2nd defendant in HCMP 1499/2023 was not represented and did not appear


[1] “同意。雙申請人是最好辦法。”

“虹,要不要約你律師,簽名做委託文件,幫我們做雙承辦人。”

[2] “我和細佬都只同意雙承辦人的做法”