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HKSAR v. LAM TSZ HIM AND ANOTHER

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[2025] HKCA 447-EN-2025-05-23

HKSAR v. LAM TSZ HIM AND ANOTHER

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CACC 87/2024 [2025] HKCA 447

On appeal from [2024] HKDC 592

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 87 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 16 OF 2022)

_______________

 HKSARRespondent
 v 
 Lam Tsz Him (林子謙) (D2)1st Appellant
 Tsang Tsz Long (曾梓朗) (D4)2nd Appellant

_______________

Before:Hon Macrae VP and Zervos JA in Court
Date of Hearing:13 May 2025
Date of Judgment:13 May 2025
Date of Reasons for Judgment:23 May 2025

__________________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

__________________________________


Hon Zervos JA (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is a case of insurance fraud in which six defendants were charged with a single conspiracy to defraud, contrary to common law and punishable under section 159C(6) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200). On 28 March 2024, following a trial before HH Judge E Lee (the Judge) in the District Court, D1, D2 (the 1st appellant), and D4 (the 2nd appellant) were found guilty of the charge, while D3, D5, and D6 were acquitted. For the purposes of this judgment, the appellants and the other defendants will be referred to by their trial designations (D1-D6). On 15 April 2024, the Judge sentenced D2 to 25 months’ imprisonment and D4 to 28 months’ imprisonment.

2.  On 24 February 2025, the Single Judge refused D2 and D4 leave to appeal against conviction, but granted them leave to appeal against sentence.

3.  At the conclusion of the hearing, we allowed the 1st and 2nd appellants’ appeal against sentence. We substituted the 1st appellant’s sentence with 20 months’ imprisonment, and the 2nd appellant’s sentence with 24 months’ imprisonment. We indicated that we would hand down our reasons in due course, which we now do.

The conspiracy to defraud

4.  The particulars of the conspiracy charge alleged that the six defendants, who were employees (variously as manager or agent) of AXA China Region Insurance Company Limited (AXA), between 25 November 2014 and 28 September 2017, conspired together to defraud AXA by dishonestly falsely representing that the financial consultant’s declarations in the policy application forms were genuinely made. By doing so, they induced AXA to approve those policy applications and to pay commissions and bonuses to D1, D2, D3, and D4 in connection with the relevant policies.[1]

5.  AXA is an insurance company that, at the material times, offered various insurance products and D1 to D6 were insurance agents. D1 was the direct upline manager of D2 to D6, although D4 took up the position of unit manager on 1 March 2016.

6.  The conspiratorial enterprise involved creating false policies to collect commissions and bonuses. One defendant would offer free insurance to a friend or an acquaintance to obtain their personal data. False representations were made in the relevant application forms by naming an uninvolved defendant as the financial consultant (i.e. the handling agent), thereby causing AXA to approve the insurance application and pay commissions and bonuses to the uninvolved defendant and the upline manager. The monthly or annual premiums of the policies were mainly paid by D1, although sometimes they were paid in cash or by D4. The premium payments were made or maintained to enable the defendants to earn commissions and extra bonuses, according to AXA’s management calculation method. This practice was known as “diverting” policies, which the Judge explained as follows:

“36. PW9 confirmed PW8’s evidence on calculation of agent’s bonuses, namely the higher the aggregate number of insurance policies sold by an agent, the higher the bonuses that would be paid to that agent. PW9 elaborated that this was precisely one of the reasons why AXA did not permit the ‘diverting’ of policies, i.e. one AXA agent who actually dealt with a client recorded the name of another AXA agent who was never involved in the selling process as the financial consultant in AXA documents so that the latter would get commissions or bonuses despite having no involvement. She explained that by diverting policies, the agent who had policies ‘diverted’ to him/her might be able to reach certain performance targets and would be paid additional bonuses by AXA. The upline manager of the agent would also be paid. That agent would not have been entitled to such bonuses in the first place if he/she did not actually sell the insurance policy in question.”

7.  During the period of the conspiracy, a total of ten policies were processed under this scheme, resulting in AXA approving the policies and paying commissions and bonuses to D1 to D4. The relevant particulars of the purported policyholders and the involvement of the relevant defendants, as stated in the Admitted Facts, were as follows:[2]

(1) Leung Sin Tung Pavlova (PW1) was a friend of D1 and the purported policyholder of Policy 1 (the premium was paid in cash and a commission was paid to D3’s account); Policy 2 (the premium was paid by D1 and D4[3] and commissions were paid to D3’s bank account with payments transferred to D1); and Policy 3 (the premium was paid in cash and commissions were paid to D3’s account).

(2) Lau Kwok Pan (PW2) was a friend of D5 and the purported policyholder of Policy 4 (D1 and D4 paid premiums and commissions were paid to the accounts of D2 and D4, with payments transferred to D1 or D1’s mother).

(3) Ho Man Wai (PW3) was a friend of D1’s mother and the policyholder of Policy 5 (the premiums were paid in cash and commissions were paid to the accounts of D1 and D3); and Policy 6 (D1 and D4 paid the premium and commissions were paid to the accounts of D2 and D3, with payments transferred to D1’s account).

(4) Ng Siu Him (PW4) was a friend of D6 and the purported policyholder of Policy 7 (the premium was paid by D4 and a commission was paid to D3’s account); Policy 8 (D4 paid the premium and a commission for Policy 7 and Policy 8 was paid to D3’s account, with payments transferred to D1’s account); Policy 9 (D4 paid the premium and a commission was paid to D3’s account, with payments transferred to D1’s account); and Policy 10 (the premium was paid in cash but no commission was paid).

8.  D1 was the named manager in the application forms of Policies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 10. D2 was one of the named financial consultants in the application forms of Policies 2[4], 4, 6, and 10. D3 was the named financial consultant or one of the financial consultants in the application forms of Policies 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. D4 was one of the named financial consultants in the application form of Policy 4 and the named manager in the application forms of Policies 7, 8, and 9. He also made various payments for the premiums or renewal premiums for Policies 2 (although D4’s involvement in this policy was unclear), 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9.[5]

9.  Most of the premiums for the false policies were paid by D1, and most of the commissions and bonuses were ultimately paid to him. The Judge addressed this in his reasons for verdict:[6]

“130. … D1 paid for all the substantial yearly premiums ranging from $190,000 odd to close to $300,000. D4 paid for the small premiums (and renewal premiums). D1 was never the handling agents on paper of any of those policies (D2, D3 and D4 were). D4 was on paper only one of the handling agents for Policy 4.

131. However, whenever commissions were paid by AXA into the accounts of D2, D3 and D4 (as they were handling agents on paper), almost every time on the same day or shortly afterwards, similar sums were paid out from those accounts to D1’s account (or account of D1’s mother) and cash withdrawals were made. Sometimes even much bigger sums were paid out to D1’s account. It was not in dispute that D1 was in possession of the relevant bank cards of D2 and D3 with passwords so that D1 was in control of those accounts. It was also not in dispute that D4 had paid D1 money on those occasions, although claiming for an innocent reason of investing in D1’s furniture business.

132. Although D1 was not the policyholders or even the handling agents, he paid for the very substantial premiums of about $730,000. If that is the end of it, it would be most unusual and unreasonable for D1 to do that. It simply does not make any sense.

133. The matter of course did not end there. Almost simultaneously on each occasion (on the same day or shortly afterwards), the commissions and bonuses totalling close to $770,000 paid out by AXA to the respective accounts of D2, D3 and D4 (who were the handling agents on paper) were transferred to D1’s account (or that of D1’s mother). D1 was in control of those respective accounts of D2 and D3 as D1 had the relevant bank cards and passwords. D4 agreed that he did pay out of his commissions and bonuses from his account to D1, but claiming for an innocent purpose of investing in D1’s furniture business.”

10.  The economic loss suffered by AXA according to the Judge’s findings was as follows:

“92. This issue is quite straight forward as there had been clear evidence from PW8 that the commissions and the bonuses paid out by AXA in respect of Policies #1 to 10 were in total $748,866.56. In particular, the bonuses, according to PW8 and PW9, were to be calculated not only based on these 10 policies alone but also a bundle of other policies sold in a month or a quarter. As such, PW8 worked out the figures of the extra bonuses in respect of Policies #1 to 10 paid out by AXA to D1 to D4 to be $296,030.31.

93. Another way of considering that issue of economic loss suffered by AXA was to compare the total premium received and the total amount (commissions, bonuses, overrides included) paid out by AXA arising from these 10 policies in question. According to PW8’s evidence, for Policies #1 to 10, AXA had received total premiums of $815,833.15 and had paid out a total sum of $944,802.36 to D1 to D4. The net loss was therefore $128,969.21.

94. In addition to the above actual economic loss, I also find that AXA was put at risk of further economic loss by having approved and issued these 10 policies. It is apparent that these 10 policies were approved and issued to the policyholders by AXA in the absence of the knowledge of the false representations contained therein (including the false financial consultant’s declarations and other false particulars of the applicants’ employment and income). These policies would not have been approved and issued if AXA was aware of those false representations, as confirmed by PW5 of AXA’s Underwriting Department. It followed that these 10 policies, which would not have been approved and issued in the first place, must have exposed AXA to risks of economic loss arising from any potential claims by the policyholders and/or the beneficiaries.”

11.  D1, D5, and D6 did not give evidence. D2, D3, and D4 testified in their defence. They called a common witness, Emily Hui (DW5), a handwriting expert, who testified that the signatures on the relevant application forms, in which D2, D3, and D4 were the named financial consultants, were not written by them. The prosecution did not contest this expert evidence.[7] The defence of D2, D3, and D4 was that they “blindly” followed D1’s instructions and there was no conspiracy or dishonesty on their part.

12.  D2 testified that he had no involvement in the scheme and gave his bank card to D1 to organise investment seminars and repay a debt. D2 said he wanted to quit but did not because D1 warned him that he would have to return the allowances that he had previously received from AXA.[8] D3 testified that D1 was his instructor in church and that he trusted him. He said he did as D1 instructed him in respect of the policies. He also called a friend as a defence witness (DW3), who testified as to D3’s character and relationship with D1.[9] He confirmed that D3 trusted D1 implicitly and would do as he was told by him.

13.  D4 testified that he simply followed D1’s instructions; D1was the manager of both D3 and D4. He explained that the numerous transfers of funds into D1’s account, and those he made into AXA’s account, were related to his investment in D1’s furniture business.[10]

14.  The Judge acquitted D3 because “it was at least possible” that he was an innocent dupe.[11] He also acquitted D5 and D6 because of the lack of proof showing that they were involved in the scheme.[12] He convicted D1, D2 and D4. He rejected D2’s case that he was “ignorant” of the existence or handling of Policies 4, 6 and 10. However, he found that D2 was a party to the conspiracy because he wanted to keep his job with AXA and retain his earlier allowances.[13] He considered that D2, as a member of the finance and insurance industry, would have appreciated the consequences of providing his bank card to D1.[14] He rejected D4’s evidence that he was “ignorant” of the scheme and was just following D1’s instructions.[15] He dismissed D4’s explanation that the transfers of funds to D1 were for investing in D1’s furniture business. He found that the financial transactions related to the policies in which D4 was involved, Policies 4,6, 7, 8, and 9.[16] He concluded that the only reasonable inference was that D4 knowingly assisted D1 pursuant to the conspiratorial agreement.[17]

15.  The Judge found that D1, D2 and D4 had conspired together to defraud AXA by the dishonest scheme of “diverting” policies.[18]

The sentences

16.  The Judge concluded that D1 played a pivotal role in the scheme, as evidenced by his significant involvement in the various policies and his control of the respective bank accounts of D2 and D3, from which he made bank transfers and cash withdrawals.[19] In his sentencing remarks, the Judge identified the criminality of the defendants:

“26. Quite clearly, D1 was the key figure and integral to this dishonest scheme. Not only that he was the upline manager of the other defendants in most of the relevant times, but he was also playing the major role. To get the scheme started, D1 paid for all the substantial yearly premiums in the subject policies for about $730,000 in total. By having control over the respective accounts of D2 and D3 as well as receiving transferred payments from D4, D1 was eventually able to recoup close to $770,000, excluding the various cash withdrawals totalling $140,000 from the respective accounts of D2 to D4.

27. As I found in my reasons for verdict, D1 though playing the pivotal role could not have worked on and executed this dishonest scheme of “diverting” policies alone. D1 needed and in fact had obtained the cooperation of D2, D3 and D4, in particular but not limited to transferring the commissions and bonuses from their accounts to D1’s. I found both D2 and D4 knowing and participating parties to this conspiracy and that D3 could possibly be an innocent dupe having been used by D1.

28. I found D2 a party to this conspiracy and a participant in this dishonest scheme of “diverting” policies, for D2 to lend his name to D1 to falsely represent D2 as the financial consultant in some of the subject policies where D2 in fact had no involvement in order to defraud AXA to pay out commissions and extra bonuses. D2 also willingly and knowingly provided the bank card to his salary account maintained by AXA to enable D1 to obtain the relevant commissions and bonuses.

29. I also found D4 a party to this conspiracy and a participant in this dishonest scheme of “diverting” policies, for D4 to assist D1 in submitting those relevant application forms with false representations in the financial consultant’s declarations, to defraud AXA to pay out commissions and extra bonuses. D4’s role was essential as it included paying for some of the premiums and renewal premiums to cause the subject policies to become effective or continue to remain effective. In addition to that, D4 also lent his name to become the named financial consultant in one subject policy and named manager in 3 others, as well as leaving his mobile phone number on some AXA’s payment slips to maintain contact and keep track of some of the subject policies. I therefore found D4 to be the second-in-command to assist D1 in this dishonest scheme.”

17.  The Judge found that the actual economic loss caused to AXA was in the region of about $130,000 to $300,000, depending on the different methods of calculation, emphasising that this was one of the factors to consider in sentencing. He considered that the “major criminality” lay in the defendants’ breach of trust as employees, and more importantly, in the sophistication of the dishonest scheme.[20]

18.  When sentencing the three convicted defendants, D1, D2 and D4, the Judge gave each of them a reduction of 2 months for their good backgrounds and agreeing a substantial quantity of the documentary evidence, thereby shortening the length of the trial.

19.  The Judge found that D1 was “the key figure and integral to this dishonest scheme”, who played a major role in initiating and executing the scheme. In sentencing D1, he adopted a starting point of 36 months’ imprisonment, which he reduced by 2 months to 34 months’ imprisonment. In sentencing D2 and D4, he treated them to some degree differently from D1. He adopted a starting point of 27 months’ imprisonment for D2 and 30 months’ imprisonment for D4, which he reduced by 2 months, resulting in sentences of 25 months’ imprisonment for D2 and 28 months’ imprisonment for D4.

Discussion

20.  A defendant participating in a joint enterprise typically shares equal culpability, even if he or she has a different role from other participants. Accordingly, sentencing courts generally decline to apportion blame and adjust sentences to any marked degree when defendants are participants in a joint enterprise: HKSAR v Muhammad Rizwan and Ors[21]; HKSAR v Wong Kam[22]. This principle reflects the fact that the crime could not have been completed without each participant’s contribution. A participant is generally aware of the object and plan of the joint enterprise, and possibly also of the roles of others in its execution. A differential sentencing approach may be warranted where the crime is a conspiracy to commit multiple offences, and the defendant is a participant in only one or some of them. In such cases, culpability depends primarily on the defendant’s involvement in the offence or offences that form part of the conspiracy.

21.  Three issues have been raised concerning the sentences imposed on D2 and D4. First, the conspiracy concerned ten policies, but D2 and D4 were not involved in all of them. D2 was involved in three (Policies 4, 6, and 10), and D4 in five (Policies 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9).[23] The issue is whether they should have been sentenced differently, taking this factor into account. This will, of course, depend upon the nature of their role and involvement in the specified policies and the conspiracy overall.

22.  Secondly, D1 played a key and prominent role in this fraudulent scheme. He initiated and implemented the scheme. Both D2 and D4 claimed that they acted on D1’s instructions. The issue is to what extent this factor should have been taken into account when sentencing D2 and D4. The Judge appears to have made some allowance, but the question is whether it was sufficient in the circumstances. Notably, the Judge acquitted D3, who testified that he was deceived by D1 into lending his bank card and that he was unaware of D1’s fraudulent conduct. D2 also put forward a similar defence, claiming he lent his bank card to D1 and merely followed D1’s instructions.

23.  Thirdly, the actual loss caused by the scheme was $128,969.21, which in D2’s case was limited to three policies and in D4’s case to five policies. The question is whether the loss suffered in the policies in which they were involved was less than the loss suffered by the ten policies. However, as pointed out by the Judge, the loss suffered was one of several factors to be taken into account in the sentence to be imposed. Furthermore, there is the additional question as to whether it was correct for the Judge to consider the potential loss to the insurance company of any claims made under the policies when this was not the object of the criminal enterprise and did not feature in the criminality involved.[24] However, he explained that in sentencing the defendants, he only took into account the actual economic loss.[25]

24.  In addressing the appropriateness of the sentences imposed on D2 and D4, it is necessary to consider the nature of the conspiracy. In our view, an accurate description of the criminality involved is that of a “wheel conspiracy”, where a number of conspirators deal with a central conspirator at the hub, and all are members of the same conspiracy. The central conspirator here was D1, who was the creator and driving force of the scheme. It is noteworthy that D1 was the upline manager and in charge of the other defendants, as well as the main beneficiary of the fraudulent scheme.

25.  D1 would recruit other insurance agents to participate in the scheme, who would individually obtain the personal particulars of others to take out false insurance policies. D1, and sometimes D4, would pay the policy premiums to authenticate and maintain the policy, although this would only be temporary. In the meantime, the insurance agents involved would receive a commission or bonus depending on the nature and terms of the policy, as well as their sales record with the company. Once the commission or bonus was paid, the payment of the premiums would stop. It is apparent that D1 was instrumental in implementing and operating the scheme and used the others involved in various capacities, which sometimes included using their bank accounts, either to pay the policy premiums or share in the proceeds of this fraudulent scheme. It would appear that the financial transactions underpinning the scheme were made or arranged by D1 and that the bulk of the proceeds of the fraud were received by D1 through the accounts of D2 and D3, either as a reward or to reinvest in the scheme. In the circumstances, the Judge was correct in distinguishing the role and culpability of D1 from the other conspirators involved. He was clearly the major miscreant in this scheme, and the Judge dealt with him accordingly when passing sentence. The issue, therefore, is whether the Judge, in the unusual circumstances of dealing with a joint enterprise where offenders would normally be punished on the same or similar basis, made appropriate allowance for the nature and level of involvement of the other conspirators for the part they played.

26.  The prosecution allegation and case against the defendants was that this conspiratorial enterprise consisted of ten policies, and it was on this basis that they were convicted. Whilst D2 and D4 were parties to the conspiratorial agreement concerning the ten policies, they were only actively involved in some of them. D2 was involved in three policies (Policies 4, 6, and 10), in which he was listed as the financial consultant. He additionally let D1 use his bank account through which various transactions concerning the fraudulent scheme were conducted. It also appears that the proceeds of the fraud perpetrated in the three policies were transferred to D1. D4 was involved in five policies (Policies 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9), in which he either paid the premium or was listed as the financial consultant or manager. It appears that the proceeds of the fraud perpetrated in the five policies were transferred to D1.

27.  Mr David Boyton, representing D4, submitted that as this case involved a wheel conspiracy with D1 at its centre and D2 and D4 each at the end of one of the spokes in the wheel, they should be punished for the policies in which they were involved. He further submitted that the Judge, having accepted that “the major criminality lies in the element of the defendants’ breach of trust”, required considering the individual role of the defendant applying the first band of Ng Kwok Wing[26], which suggests a sentence of less than 2 years’ imprisonment for a theft involving a breach of trust of under $250,000.[27]

28.  In the rather exceptional circumstances of this case, it seems appropriate that D1’s fellow conspirators, who were only involved in some of the fraudulent transactions, should be punished on that basis. These fraudulent transactions were separate and distinct, but a spoke in the wheel of the conspiracy. As already noted, D2 was only involved in three policies as a named financial consultant, although he lent his bank card to D1, who carried out numerous financial transactions in furtherance of this fraudulent scheme. D1 also used D3’s bank card for the same purpose. D4 was involved in five policies and paid premiums or renewal premiums in various amounts, with the payments in Policies 7, 8, and 9 being for small amounts for a batch of policies at the end of the period of the conspiracy. We do not think the characterisation of him being “second-in-command” to be appropriate in the circumstances, but he did indeed play a greater role than D2. Significantly, D1 was behind the false policies, paying the premiums and ultimately receiving, most, if not all, the commissions or bonuses. This is an important factor and warrants adjustment to their sentences.

29.  We agree with the starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment adopted by the Judge in relation to the overall conspiracy consisting of ten policies. In sentencing the defendants, the Judge reduced the starting point by 2 months in respect of each defendant, for their good characters and for agreeing to most of the prosecution case. We will do the same.

30.  In the case of D2, we would adopt a starting point of 22 months’ imprisonment, which after a reduction of 2 months, would result in a sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment. In the case of D4, we would adopt a starting point of 26 months’ imprisonment, which after a reduction of 2 months, would result in a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment.

Conclusion

31.  For the foregoing reasons, we allowed the sentence appeals of D2 and D4 and substituted their sentences with 20 months’ imprisonment and 24 months’ imprisonment respectively.

(Andrew Macrae)(Kevin Zervos)
Vice PresidentJustice of Appeal

Ms Nisha Mohamed, counsel on fiat, of the Department of Justice, for the respondent

The 1st appellant appeared in person

Mr David Boyton, instructed by T K Tsui & Co, for the 2nd appellant



[1]   Appeal Bundle (AB), 1-2.

[2]   AB, 20-25, at [9]-[56].

[3]   AB, 85, at Footnote no 30 and AB, 118, at Footnote no 71. It is noted that the Admitted Facts did not state that D4 paid the premium for Policy 2.

[4]   AB, 84, at Footnote no 27. It is noted that the Admitted Facts did not state that D2 was named as a financial consultant for Policy 2.

[5]   AB, 45-52, at [5]; 84-86, at [101]; and 118, at [182].

[6]   AB, 102-104.

[7]   AB, 76-77, at [81] and [82].

[8]   AB, 67-69, at [47]-[53].

[9]   AB, 69-72, at [54]-[63].

[10]   AB, 72-76, at [64]-[80]; and 118, at [183]-[184].

[11]   AB, 117, at [181].

[12]   AB, 91-93, at [119]-[126].

[13]   AB, 109, at [151]; and 113, at [166].

[14]   AB, 109, at [152].

[15]   AB, 118, at [182]-[183].

[16]   AB, 122-123, at [196]-[200].

[17]   AB, 124, at [202].

[18]   AB, 127, at [212]-[213].

[19]   AB, 105-107, at [138]-[144].

[20]   AB,137, at [25].

[21]   HKSAR v Muhammad Rizwan and Ors[2019] HKCA 643, at [99].

[22]   HKSAR v Wong Kam [2013] 1 HKLRD 39, at [32].

[23]   AB, 20-25, at [9]-[10]; 84-86, at [101]; 45-52, at [5]; and 118, at [182].

[24]   AB, 82-83, at [91]-[94].

[25]   AB, 137, at [25].

[26]   HKSAR v Ng Kwok Wing [2008] 4 HKLRD 1017.

[27]   AB, 137, at [25].

[2025] HKCA 190-EN-2025-02-24

HKSAR v. LAM TSZ HIM AND ANOTHER

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CACC 87/2024 [2025] HKCA 190

On appeal from [2024] HKDC 488

and [2024] HKDC 592

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 87 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 16 OF 2022)

_______________

 HKSARRespondent
 v 
 Lam Tsz Him (林子謙) (D2)1st Applicant
 Tsang Tsz Tong (曾梓朗) (D4)2nd Applicant

_______________

Before: Hon Zervos JA in Court
Date of Hearing: 27 January 2025
Date of Judgment: 24 February 2025

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

1.  This is a case of insurance fraud in which six defendants were charged with conspiracy to defraud, contrary to common law and punishable under section 159C(6) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200). On 28 March 2024, following a trial before HH Judge E Lee (the judge) in the District Court, D1, D2 (the 1st applicant) and D4 (the 2nd applicant) were found guilty of the charge, while D3, D5 and D6 were acquitted. In this judgment I will refer to the applicants and the other defendants by their trial designations.

2.  On 15 April 2024, the judge sentenced D2 to 25 months’ imprisonment and D4 to 28 months’ imprisonment.

3.  On 23 April 2024, D2 and D4 each filed a notice of application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. D2 and D4 have each applied for legal aid which has been refused. At the leave hearing, D2 appears in person, while D4 is represented by Mr David Boyton and Mr Thomas Martin.

The brief facts

4.  The particulars of the conspiracy charge alleged that the six defendants, who were employees (variously as a manager or agent) of AXA China Region Insurance Company Limited (AXA), between 25 November 2014 and 28 September 2017, conspired together to defraud AXA by dishonestly falsely representing that the financial consultant’s declarations in the policy application forms were genuinely made, thereby inducing AXA to approve those policy applications and to pay commissions and bonuses to D1, D2, D3 and D4 in connection with the relevant policies.[1]

5.  AXA is an insurance company that, at the material times, offered various insurance products and D1 to D6 were members of company’s staff. D1 was the direct upline manager of D2 to D6, although D4 took up the position of unit manager on 1 March 2016.

6.  The conspiratorial enterprise alleged against the defendants operated as follows. One of the defendants would offer free insurance to a friend or acquaintance to obtain their personal data. False representations were made in the relevant application form by naming an uninvolved defendant as the financial consultant, that is, the handling agent, thereby causing AXA to approve the insurance application and pay commissions and bonuses to the uninvolved defendant and the upline manager. The monthly or annual premiums of the policy would be paid, mainly by D1 and other times in cash or by D4, for one occasion or several occasions, which would then cease. This practice, known as “diverting” policies, would enable the defendants to earn commissions and extra bonuses according to the calculation method of AXA management.

7.  During the conspiracy period, a total of 10 policies were processed under this scheme, resulting in AXA approving the policies and paying $748,866.56 in commissions and bonuses to D1 to D4. Relevant particulars of the purported policyholder and the involvement of the relevant defendants, as stated in the admitted facts, were as follows:[2]

(1)  Leung Sin Tung Pavlova (PW1) was a friend of D1 and the purported policyholder of Policy 1 (the premium was paid in cash and a commission was paid to D3’s account); Policy 2 (the premium was paid by D1 and D4[3] and commissions were paid to D3’s bank account with payments transferred to D1); and Policy 3 (the premium was paid in cash and commissions were paid to D3’s account).

(2)  Lau Kwok Pan (PW2) was a friend of D5 and the purported policyholder of Policy 4 (premiums were paid by D1 and D4 and commissions were paid to the accounts of D2 and D4, some payments to D1 or D1’s mother).

(3)  Ho Man Wai (PW3) was a friend of D1’s mother and the policyholder of Policy 5 (the premium was paid in cash and a commission was paid to the accounts of D1 and D3); and Policy 6 (the premium was paid by D1 and D4 commissions were paid to the accounts of D2 and D3, some of which was paid to D1’s account).

(4)  Ng Siu Him (PW4) was a friend of D6 and the purported policyholder of Policy 7 (the premium was paid by D4 and a commission was paid to D3’s account); Policy 8 (the premium was paid by D4 and a commission for Policy 7 and Policy 8 was paid to D3’s account and transferred to D1’s account); Policy 9 (the premium was paid by D4 and a commission was paid to D3’s account and then transferred to D1’s account); and Policy 10 (the premium was paid in cash but no commission was paid).

8.  The involvement of the defendants in each of the policies was as follows. D1 was the named manager in the application forms of Policies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 10. He was also one of the named financial consultants in the application form of Policy 5. D2 was one of the named financial consultants in the application forms of Policies 2, 4, 6 and 10. D3 was the named financial consultant or one of the financial consultants in the application forms of Policies 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. D4 was one of the named financial consultants in the application form of Policy 4. He was the named manager in the application forms of Policies 7, 8 and 9. He also made various payments for the premiums or renewal premiums for Policies 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9.[4]

9.  In his examination of the policies, the judge found that:[5]

“130. … D1 paid for all the substantial yearly premiums ranging from $190,000 odd to close to $300,000. D4 paid for the small premiums (and renewal premiums). D1 was never the handling agents on paper of any of those policies (D2, D3 and D4 were). D4 was on paper only one of the handling agents for Policy 4.

131. However, whenever commissions were paid by AXA into the accounts of D2, D3 and D4 (as they were handling agents on paper), almost every time on the same day or shortly afterwards, similar sums were paid out from those accounts to D1’s account (or account of D1’s mother) and cash withdrawals were made. Sometimes even much bigger sums were paid out to D1’s account. It was not in dispute that D1 was in possession of the relevant bank cards of D2 and D3 with passwords so that D1 was in control of those accounts. It was also not in dispute that D4 had paid D1 money on those occasions, although claiming for an innocent reason of investing in D1’s furniture business.

132. Although D1 was not the policyholders or even the handling agents, he paid for the very substantial premiums of about $730,000. If that is the end of it, it would be most unusual and unreasonable for D1 to do that. It simply does not make any sense.

133. The matter of course did not end there. Almost simultaneously on each occasion (on the same day or shortly afterwards), the commissions and bonuses totalling close to $770,000 paid out by AXA to the respective accounts of D2, D3 and D4 (who were the handling agents on paper) were transferred to D1’s account (or that of D1’s mother). D1 was in control of those accounts of D2 and D3 as D1 had the relevant bankcards and passwords. D4 agreed that he did payout of his commissions and bonuses from his account to D1, but claiming for an innocent purpose of investing in D1’s furniture business.

134. Also, as can be seen from the above fund flow, at or around the relevant times when all those transfers took place, there were in addition several cash withdrawals totalling $140,000 from the respective accounts of D2, D3 and D4.”

10.  The judge found that D1 played a pivotal role in the scheme, as evidenced by his significant involvement in the various policies and his control of the respective accounts of D2 and D3, through which he made bank transfers and cash withdrawals.[6]

11.  The commissions and bonuses paid out by AXA in respect of the 10 policies were $748,866.56. The bonuses were calculated on the basis of other policies that had been sold in a month or a quarter, and the extra bonuses in respect of the 10 policies to D1, D2, D3 and D4 were $296,030.31. In calculating the actual economic loss suffered by AXA, a comparison was made between the total premiums received and the total amount of commissions and bonuses paid out in respect of the 10 policies. AXA received total premiums of $815,833.15 and paid out a total of $944,802.36 to D1, D2, D3 and D4. On this basis, the actual economic loss suffered by AXA was $128,969.21. However, that judge also found that AXA was put at risk of further economic loss arising from any potential claims by the policyholders.[7]

12.   D1, D5 and D6 did not give evidence, whereas D2, D3 and D4 testified in their defence. They called a common witness, Emily Hui (DW5), a handwriting expert who testified that the signatures on the relevant application forms, where D2, D3 and D4 were the named financial consultants, were not written by them. The prosecution did not contest this expert evidence.[8] The defence of D2, D3 and D4 was that they “blindly” followed D1’s instructions and there was no conspiracy or dishonesty on their part. D2 testified that he had no involvement in the scheme and gave his bank card to D1 for organising investment seminars and repayment of a debt. D2 said he wanted to quit but did not because D1 warned him that he would have to return the allowances that he previously received from AXA.[9] D3 testified that D1 was his instructor in church and that he trusted him. He said he did as D1 instructed him in respect of the policies. D3 also called a friend as a defence witness (DW3), who testified as to D3’s character and relationship with D1.[10] He confirmed that D3 trusted D1 implicitly and would do as he was told by him. D4 testified that he simply followed D1’s instructions, who was the manager of both D3 and D4. He explained that the numerous transfers of funds into D1’s account and those he made into AXA’s account were related to his investment in D1’s furniture business.[11]

13.   The judge acquitted D3 because “it was at least possible” that he was an innocent dupe.[12] D5 and D6 were acquitted because of a lack of proof as to their involvement in the scheme.[13] D1, D2 and D4 were convicted. The judge rejected D2’s case that he was “ignorant” of the existence or handling of Policies 2, 4, 6 and 10, and that he intended to keep his job with AXA.[14] He considered that D2, as a member of the finance and insurance industry, would have appreciated the consequences of providing his bank card to D1.[15] The judge rejected D4's evidence that he was “ignorant” of the scheme and was just following D1’s instructions.[16] He dismissed D4’s explanation that the transfers of funds to D1 were for investing in D1’s furniture business. He found that the financial transactions related to the policies in which D4 was involved.[17] He concluded that the only reasonable inference was that D4 knowingly assisted D1 pursuant to the conspiratorial agreement.[18]

14.  The judge found that D1, D2 and D4 had conspired together to defraud AXA by the dishonest scheme of “diverting” policies.[19]

D2’s appeal against conviction

15.  The challenge to D2’s conviction is based on a series of complaints in respect of the judge’s handling of various evidential matters. D2 complains that the judge erred in his finding of facts that he would have appreciated the fraudulent purpose behind lending his bank card to D1 (which he argues the judge wrongly rejected his explanation that he lent his bank card to support insurance seminars and repay a debt); that his employment in the finance and insurance industry meant that he would have been aware of the requirements and procedures in applying and issuing policies (which he argues was wrong because his role required minimal expertise and the four policyholders in which he was allegedly involved had no connection with him); and that his statements in his video recorded interviews concerning the selling of insurance policies (which he argues was later clarified in his evidence in court as a misunderstanding). The judge addressed these matters in his reasons for verdict and rejected D2’s submissions on these matters. It was open to the judge to make these findings based on his analysis of the evidence and what he accepted and rejected.

16.  D2 argues that there was no direct evidence against him that he was a knowing party in the conspiracy and the case against him was circumstantial. The fact that the case against D2 was circumstantial does not, without more, provide a basis to question the conviction. As a circumstantial case, the judge drew inferences that were in accordance with the legal principles.

17.  D2 complains that D3 was given the benefit of the doubt by the judge that D1 deceived him, but this was not extended to him, when this was also his defence. D3’s case was different from the case advanced on behalf of D2 at trial and this was made abundantly clear in the judge’s reasons for verdict. Whilst D2 advanced the defence that he was deceived by D1, the judge in his analysis of the evidence rejected this defence.

18.  D2 contends that the prosecution did not prove he was dishonest under the Ghosh test[20] and the judge was wrong to make such a finding. The Judge’s findings against D2 were mainly based on his financial relationship with D1 and his involvement in the policies in question. The application of the Ghosh test is discussed in greater detail in D4’s appeal against conviction.

19.  Finally, D2 raises a number of evidential matters, mainly complaining about the judge’s consideration of the evidence, but I find no substance in these complaints.

20.  I do not find the complaints advanced by D2 against his conviction to be reasonably arguable.

D4’s appeal against conviction

21.   The essence of the complaint against the conviction is that a burden was placed on D4, as he was entitled to benefit from the same reasonable doubt that was afforded D3. D3 was acquitted because he might have been manipulated by D1.[21] The judge found that it was at least possible that D3 had been manipulated by D1 as described and that D3 could possibly be an innocent dupe.[22]

22.  Mr Boyton accepts that the defence case, as it related to D4, was factually different from D3. D3 was younger than D4. D3 had been introduced to D1 under unusual circumstances, while D4 was more senior and a unit manager since 1 March 2016. D3 called, as a defence witness, DW3, whose evidence the judge accepted.[23] He complains that the judge’s analysis of D4’s evidence did not consider the exploitative nature of D1 towards D4, even though he found that D3 had been “manipulated by D1”.[24] While D3 was of young age and more impressionable, the manipulative nature of D1 was still a factor that should have inured to the benefit of D4 and should have been considered when assessing the case against D4.

23.  As noted, D1 was D4’s upline manager, and D1 instructed D4 on various matters. D4 claimed in his defence that he blindly followed D1’s instructions on the policies[25] and that the funds he transferred to D1 were an investment in a furniture business, but these claims were rejected by the judge. Mr Boyton submits that the judge’s reasons for verdict reveal that he did not approach D4’s case in the same way as he did with D3’s case. He refers to the following findings of the judge that (i) no “reasonable person”[26] would have invested such a large sum of money (with D1); (ii) it “could not be true”[27] that D4 thought surplus capital from the alleged furniture business was the source of money being returned to him; (iii) “no reasonable person”[28] would have relied on what his senior told him as to the source of his monthly commission payments; (iv) the depositing of money into D1’s bank account for investment purposes was described as “irrational and devoid of common sense”[29]; (v) D4’s defence was a “lame excuse”.[30] It is contended that these phrases are categorical, and not consistent with the judge’s own direction to acquit if the account given “may be true”.[31] Moreover, the judge failed to demonstrate in his reasons for verdict the same consideration was applied in D4’s case, as it was for D3. D4 did not have a burden, he was entitled to benefit from the same reasonable doubt that was afforded D3. This did not accord with the principle of inferential reasoning of drawing the only reasonable inference from the proven facts.

24.  I am not persuaded that this complaint is reasonably arguable. First, as acknowledged by Mr Boyton, D4’s case was different from D3’s case. He was a senior employee of the company, who had attained a managerial position, and was well aware and familiar with the procedures relating to policies. By his conduct, he would have known that he was involved in “diverting” policies. To this end, his role included submitting application forms with false representations in the financial consultant’s declarations and paying for some of the premiums and renewal premiums for the policies to become effective or continue to remain effective. Secondly, it was D4’s defence that he blindly followed D1 and the judge was clearly focused on whether this was the case and whether D4 was manipulated by D1, which he rejected. Thirdly, the judge, in questioning or rejecting aspects of D4’s case, was commenting or explaining why he found them improbable or implausible. He did not place a different standard of proof on D4 or shift the burden of proof on D4. It is apparent from the judge’s reasons that he found D4 guilty on the requisite standard of proof and evidence that he found showed that D4 was aware of the false and fraudulent nature of the policies in which he was involved. Finally, the judge accepted the defence case of D3 but rejected D4’s defence which was primarily based on his contention that he believed he was dealing with D1 in relation to a furniture business.

The Ghosh test

25.   It is submitted by Mr Martin that the judge’s incorrect assessment of D4’s case was exacerbated by his application of the Ghosh test. Although the judge found that D4 was a “knowing and willing party” to the agreement,[32] he contends that the judge did not sufficiently address the second limb of Ghosh, namely whether or not D4 was subjectively dishonest by ordinary standards.

26.   As stated in Mo Yuk Ping v HKSAR[33], the courts in Hong Kong apply the Ghosh test for the offence of conspiracy to defraud, namely whether the defendant’s conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people; and if so, did he himself realise that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest.

27.   In advancing this ground, Mr Martin injects into his submission the criticisms of the Ghosh test in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (trading as Crockfords Club)[34] and R v Barton [35], which replaced the dishonesty test by the following questions, what was the defendant’s actual state of knowledge or belief expounded as to what was the defendant’s actual state of knowledge or belief as to the facts; and was his conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people. Despite the change of approach with the test of dishonesty in the United Kingdom, the issue is whether the judge correctly stated and applied the Ghosh test.

28.  The short answer to this submission is that the judge was plainly aware of the terms of the Ghosh test. There is nothing to suggest he did not correctly apply it, notwithstanding the intricate and detailed analysis of the judge’s reasons for his verdict by Mr Martin.

29.   The judge noted that for the offence of conspiracy to defraud, dishonesty was an essential element, and the means agreed upon must be dishonest according to the Ghosh test. He correctly set out the two questions he had to decide when applying the test.[36] He was clearly mindful that there was an issue as to the element of dishonesty and he discussed this in some detail in his reasons.[37] He explained that the issue of dishonesty was fairly straightforward. He noted that it was not in dispute that the respective financial consultant’s declarations in the application forms of the ten policies contained false representations, namely the named financial consultants were in fact not the handling agents and that at least the employment details, in particular the income of the applicants, were untrue or exaggerated.[38] He went on to observe that the submitting of these application forms with false representations caused the insurance company to pay out commissions and extra bonuses that they would not have otherwise paid out if the truth had been known and was clearly a dishonest scheme according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people.[39] Mr Martin takes issue with the judge’s remarks that the defendants, by agreeing to participate in this scheme, would have realised it was dishonest according to the standards of reasonable and honest people, as a matter of common sense but also as members of the insurance industry with its rules and requirements.[40]

30.  Mr Martin contends that the judge's approach left open the possibility that (1) D4’s evidence was rejected; (2) the scheme was dishonest by ordinary standards; but (3) D4 did not realise that what he had done was dishonest by ordinary standards. He also obliquely criticises the judge’s remarks that the defendants were members of the insurance industry when their defences were different. The judge was acutely aware that their defences were different and addressed each in turn. The point that the judge was rightly making by his remarks was that the defendants were working as insurance agents and aware of the requirements and obligations when arranging policies and submitting application forms to the company. When those documents contained false representations it would have been obvious to them that what they were doing was dishonest. With respect, I am unable to accept that the judge’s remarks hinted at him taking an objective approach to the subjective limb of the Ghosh test. It is appropriate to refer to Lord Lane’s remarks in Ghosh when setting out the dishonesty test that, “In most cases, where the actions are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly.”[41]

31.  Mr Martin also suggests that the judge’s analysis of D4’s defence was focussed on the issue of whether or not D4’s evidence about the scheme being for a furniture business was to be believed, and whilst he rejected this evidence, there was still the possibility that D4 was “an innocent dupe”. It is obvious that the judge, in his analysis of the evidence with respect to the conspiratorial enterprise and the conduct of the defendants together with his finding that D4 was a knowing and willing party to the conspiracy, rejected the defence contention that D4 was an innocent agent.

32.  I am not persuaded that the complaints advanced by Mr Boyton and Mr Martin in respect of D4’s conviction are reasonably arguable.

The sentence appeal by D2 and D4

33.  When sentencing the three convicted defendants, D1, D2 and D4, the judge gave each of them a reduction of 2 months for their good backgrounds and admission of a substantial quantity of documentary evidence, thereby shortening the length of the trial.

34.  The judge found that D1 was “the key figure and integral to this dishonest scheme”, who played a major role in initiating the scheme and a pivotal role in its execution. In sentencing D1, he adopted a starting point of 36 months’ imprisonment which he reduced by 2 months to 34 months’ imprisonment. In sentencing D2 and D4, he treated them to some degree differently from D1. He adopted a starting point of 30 months’ imprisonment for D4 and 27 months’ imprisonment for D2, which he reduced by 2 months, resulting in a sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment for D4 and 25 months’ imprisonment for D2.

35.  It is complained that the judge failed to consider delay as a mitigating factor. However, after reconsideration of the matter, Mr Boyton withdrew this ground. Notwithstanding the abandonment of this ground, there were other matters that were raised in oral submissions regarding the sentences imposed on D2 and D4.

36.  In the case of joint enterprise crimes, those who participate in the commission of such an offence will usually share equal culpability even though their role was different from other participants: HKSAR v Muhammad Rizwan and Ors[42]. This is so because without each participant playing his part in the joint enterprise, the crime would not have been completed. A participant will be aware of the object and plan of the joint enterprise and possibly also the role of others in its execution. The issue raised for consideration is that the conspiracy concerned ten policies, but D2 and D4 were not involved in all of them. D2 was involved in four (Policies 2, 4, 6 and 10), and D4 was involved in six (Policies 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9).[43] The question is whether they should have been sentenced differently taking this factor into account. This will, of course, depend upon the nature of their role and involvement in the policies in question.

37.  Next, there is the matter that D1 played a key and dominant role in the overall scheme. It seems the scheme was initiated and driven by D1. The issue is to what extent this factor should have been taken into account when sentencing D2 and D4. The judge appears to have made some allowance, but the question is whether it was enough in the circumstances of the case. This factor is particularly a relevant matter in D2’s case, in light of the evidence concerning whether he was “an innocent dupe” as the judge considered in D3’s case.

38.  Finally, there is the question of the actual loss incurred by the scheme, which is limited to four policies in D2’s case and the six policies in D4’s case. The issue is whether the loss is considerably less than the loss incurred as a result of the ten policies. However, as pointed out by the judge, the loss incurred was one of several factors to be taken into account in the sentence to be imposed. Furthermore, there is the additional question as to whether it was correct for the judge to consider the potential loss to the insurance company of any claims made under the policies when this was not the object of the criminal enterprise and did not feature in the criminality involved.

39.  I am satisfied that D2 and D4 have reasonably arguable grounds of appeal against sentence.

Conclusion

40.  For the reasons I have given, I refuse D2 and D4 leave to appeal against conviction but grant them leave to appeal against sentence.

41.  I remind D2 and D4 of their right to renew their application for leave to appeal against conviction to the Court of appeal, but they are also informed of the consequences of doing so, which may include a direction of any loss of time spent in custody pending their appeal, if the Court were to come to the view that there was no justification for the renewal of their application.

  (Kevin Zervos)
Justice of Appeal

Ms Nisha Mohamed, counsel on fiat, for the respondent

The 1st applicant appeared in person

Mr David Boyton and Mr Thomas Martin, instructed by T K Tsui & Co, for the 2nd applicant



[1]  Appeal Bundle (AB), 1-2.

[2]  AB, 20-25, at [9]-[56].

[3]  AB, 85, at Footnote no. 30 and AB, 118, at Footnote no. 71.

[4]  AB, 45-52, at [5], 84-86, at [101] and 118, at [182].

[5]  AB, 102-104.

[6]  AB, 105-107, at [138]-[144].

[7]  AB, 82-83, at [91]-[94].

[8]  AB, 76-77, at [81] and [82].

[9]  AB, 67-69, at [47]-[53].

[10]  AB, 69-72, at [54]-[63].

[11]  AB, 72-76, at [64]-[80] and 118, at [183]-[184].

[12]  AB, 117, at [181].

[13]  AB, 91-93, at [119]-[126].

[14]  AB, 109, at [151] and AB, 113, at [166].

[15]  AB, 109, at [152].

[16]  AB, 118, at [182]-[183].

[17]  AB, 122-123, at [196]-[200].

[18]  AB, 124, at [202].

[19]  AB, 127, at [212]-[213].

[20]  R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, 1064E.

[21]  AB, 117, at [181].

[22]  AB, 117, at [181].

[23]  AB, 115, at [171]-[172].

[24]  AB, 117, at [181].

[25]  AB, 123, at [201].

[26]  AB, 120, at [190].

[27]  AB, 120, at [191].

[28]  AB, 121, at [193].

[29]  AB, 122, at [195].

[30]  AB, 121, at [194].

[31]  AB, 79, at [84(g)].

[32]  AB, 125, at [208].

[33]  Mo Yuk Ping v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKLRD 750 (at [46]).

[34]  Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (trading as Crockfords Club) [2018] All ER 406, at [74].

[35]  R v Barton (2021) QB 685, 724, at [82].

[36]  AB, 78, at [84(d) and (e)].

[37]  AB, 83-84, at [95]-[99].

[38]  AB, 83, at [96].

[39]  AB, 84, at [97].

[40]  AB, 84, at [98].

[41]  Ghosh, 1064E-F.

[42]  HKSAR v Muhammad Rizwan and Ors[2019] HKCA 643, at [99].

[43]  AB, 20-25, at [9]-[10], AB, 84-86, at [101], AB, 45-52, at [5] and AB, 118, at [182].

[2024] HKCA 972-CH-2024-10-28

香港特別行政區 訴 林子謙

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CACC 87/2024,[2024] HKCA 972

原案件:[2024] HKDC 488 及 [2024] HKDC 592

香港特別行政區

高等法院上訴法庭

刑事司法管轄權

上訴期間申請保釋

刑事上訴案件2024年第87號

(原區域法院刑事案件2022年第16號)

__________________

答辯人香港特別行政區 
 對 
申請人LAM TSZ HIM (林子謙) (D2) 

__________________

主審法官: 高等法院上訴法庭法官彭偉昌
聆訊日期: 2024年10月15日
判決日期: 2024年10月15日
判決理由書日期: 2024年10月28日

判 決 理 由 書

1.  申請人(D2)經審訊後被裁定一項 ‘串謀詐騙’罪成立,原審區域法院法官李俊文把他判囚25個月。申請人不服,在被拒法援後親自就定罪及判刑提出上訴許可申請,在現階段則希望取得保釋等候上訴。

控方案情

2.  案發時申請人在AXA(‘安盛’)任職。

3.  控方指他在2014年11月25日至2017年9月28日期間,和包括D1在內的另外五名安盛員工,串謀向安盛提交十份據稱是真實的保單,導致安盛通過批核這些保單,和向相關人士發出佣金和額外花紅十多至數十萬元(視乎不同計算方法)。

4.  犯案方法是以舊同學或朋友的名義向安盛投保,其後由自己供款。

5.  申請人於在被捕後的警誡錄影會面承認:他曾經和D1協議,由D1向安盛提交以申請人名義與客戶簽訂的保單,但他本人卻沒有實質參與銷售過程;他亦曾經向D1提供自己收取安盛佣金的銀行户口和密碼。

辯方案情

6.  申請人作供指:他對涉案保單的簽訂亳不知情,強調他全職投身金融業(是‘匯訊金融集團’的副總裁),只視保險工作為副業;申請人自2014年中欠下D1債項,若辭退副業需要額外向安盛補貼金錢;他在D1游說下決定保留副業,並同時希望D1介紹更多實力雄厚的內地客戶給他認識;另外他想協助D1舉辦投資講座(計劃最終泡湯)但未能墊支所需的成本,於是D1要求他交出銀行卡作為保證;交出銀行卡的另一作用是讓D1自行支賬作為他的償還款項。

7.  辯方亦傳召筆跡專家證明保單上的不是申請人的簽名。

原審裁決

8.  原審法官質疑申請人提供了三個不同的理由以解釋自己為何將銀行卡和密碼交由他人保管。原審法官拒絕接納他庭上的解釋,認為申請人的真正目的是讓D1以他的名義開單和向安盛收取佣金。

9.  原審法官認為,申請人明知他和D1協議收取佣金和額外花紅的方法並不誠實,不會獲安盛接受,因此裁定申請人罪成。

10.  原審法官補充說,即使保單上沒有申請人的簽署,這也不能否定串謀的存在。

原審判刑

11.  原審法官考慮到申請人的角色,以低於同案其他被告的27個月作為量刑基準;此外又考慮到申請人背景良好和同意大部分案情,遂酌情減刑兩個月,以致最終刑期是25個月。

上訴理由

12.  申請人在表格XI提出五項有關定罪的上訴理由,在聆訊前則撤回理由4(原審大律師不專業)。

13.  剩下的上訴理由泛指,由於控方未能證明、或證據不足以顯示他有干犯控罪,原審法官的裁決是錯誤的。申請人提出多項事實爭議,包括上訴理由2所列舉的如:筆跡專家證實保單上的簽署不屬他、他欠下銀行10萬元款項和多次轉賬給D1還款、他在案發期間部分時間不在香港、他與保單持有人並不認識,和他投放在保險這副業的工作時間不多。上訴理由3批評原審法官拒絕接納他將銀行卡交予D1作為保證,以及在會面記錄中其他開脫性辯解,此外又指本案並無串謀的證據。上訴理由5指,原審法官既然裁定同案D5無罪,所以亦應裁定他無罪。

14.  刑期方面,申請人指本案涉及的款項低於一百萬,加上檢控有延誤,25個月的刑期是過重,應減至7至15個月。

討論

15.  正如我在聆訊中花了不少時間去解釋,申請人就定罪提出的所謂上訴理由,全部都與事實的認定有關而原審法官的認定則理由充分和無可詬病。一言蔽之,申請人的辯護理由非常難以置信,反之他在警誡會面的其中一個解釋則構成直接招認。

16.  我在聆訊中也解釋,與本案同類的案件沒有量刑指引,而原審法官亦已準確列出本案的嚴重性,例如是作案手法複雜和違反誠信等。基於這些理由,25個月的刑期無論如何也不算明顯過重或原則犯錯。

結論和判決

17.  申請人提出的上訴理由,都不是合理可供辯的上訴理由,根本無法達到取得保釋的水準。我拒絕他的保釋申請。

  (彭偉昌)
高等法院上訴法庭法官

申請人:  無律師代表,親自應訊

答辯人:  由律政司外聘杜俐琛大律師代表