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RE NGUYEN XUAN CHUNG

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[2025] HKCA 1091-EN-2025-12-18

RE NGUYEN XUAN CHUNG

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CACV 544/2024, [2025] HKCA 1091

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 621

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 544 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2157 OF 2019)

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RE:NGUYEN XUAN CHUNGApplicant

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Before: Hon Au and G Lam JJA in Court
Date of Judgment: 18 December 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 24 July 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 8 July 2025 (“the Judgment”)  ([2025] HKCA 621). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”)  dated 3 December 2024, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2024] HKCFI 3382).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant alleges that his life would be in danger if he returned to Vietnam and that creditors and gangsters in Vietnam are cruel and violent and are willing to kill people to satisfy their anger and ferocity.  He also alleges that internal relocation is not feasible because there will be many difficulties and obstacles that he will have to face in the new location.  He further contends that the nationwide social network of gangsters and clandestine connections with corrupt people in the government and police apparatus make it quite possible for those creditors and gangsters to find out his new address.  He further alleges that the Immigration Department did not consider his human rights under various legislations but failed to particularise his complaint.

5.  Contrary to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant did not lodge any written submissions.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [8] - [14] of the Judgment.  He did not identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 24 July 2025 is dismissed.

(Thomas Au) (Godfrey Lam)
Justice of Appeal Justice of Appeal

The applicant acting in person

[2025] HKCA 621-EN-2025-07-08

RE NGUYEN XUAN CHUNG

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CACV 544/2024, [2025] HKCA 621

On Appeal From [2024] HKCFI 3382

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 544 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2157 OF 2019)

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RE:  NGUYEN XUAN CHUNG Applicant

____________________

Before: Hon Au and G Lam JJA in Court
Date of Judgment: 8 July 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) dated 3 December 2024 ([2024] HKCFI 3382)(“the Leave Decision”) refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 24 July 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 8 April 2019 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his non‑refoulement claim.

2.  On 12 December 2024, the applicant indicated his consent in writing for this appeal to be disposed of on paper.  Accordingly, we proceed to consider this appeal on paper based on the available materials.

BACKGROUND

3.  The applicant is a national of Vietnam.  He entered Hong Kong illegally sometime in October 2018.  On 3 December 2018, he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor over his unpaid debts. Details of the applicant’s claim were summarised by the Judge at [1] ‑ [5] of the Leave Decision.

4.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director dismissed the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds including torture risk[1], BOR2 risk[2], BOR3 risk[3], and persecution risk[4].

5.  The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 24 April 2019.  After considering the evidence and materials before it, the Board decided to determine the appeal on paper.  By the Board’s Decision, the Board dismissed his appeal and confirmed the Director’s Decision.  The Board’s reasons were summarised by the Judge at [9] of the Leave Decision:

“9. In its decision the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from his creditor but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of his creditor to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, and that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon him return to Vietnam as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other areas of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.”

THE JUDGE’S DECISION

6.  On 29 July 2019, the applicant filed a Form 86 together with a supporting affirmation to apply for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision.  No ground of challenge was advanced in his Form 86.  In his supporting affirmation, he merely stated that he did not agree with the Board’s Decision.  As the applicant did not request for an oral hearing, the Judge considered and determined his application on paper.

7.  By the Leave Decision, the Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review.  His reasons were set out at [10] ‑ [14] of the Leave Decision:

“10.  On 29 July 2019, the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form or his supporting affirmation of the same date in which he just stated that he does not agree with the Board’s decision but without putting forward any proper ground for his intended challenge, nor did he request any oral hearing for his application. As such, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis for his intended challenge.

11.  As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non‑refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh[2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh[2018] HKCA 328; ReMudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara[2018] HKCA 400; and NupurMst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524.

12.  In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risks of harm in the Applicant’s claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Vietnam, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

13.  In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

14.  For all these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.”

THIS APPEAL

8.  In his Notice of Appeal filed on 12 December 2024, the applicant mainly complained that, if refouled, his life would be seriously threatened by his creditor and local gangsters as it might be possible for them to locate him.  He also claimed that internal relocation would be completely unfeasible as he was not an active person and there would be no guarantee that he would be able to adapt to the new place. He also complained that the Immigration Department failed to consider his human rights under various legislations but failed to particularise his complaint.

9.  In his supporting affirmation filed on 12 December 2024, the applicant claimed that he understood that there “was a good ground of appeal that was not necessarily considered at the leave stage” and that the Director and the Board did not “see the grounds to reserve their decisions”.  Again, the applicant failed to particularise what the alleged ground was.

10.  Contrary to the directions of the Registrar of Civil Appeals dated 12 December 2024, the applicant failed to lodge any written submissions.

DISCUSSION

11.  The Court of Appeal’s general approach in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases is set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)]).

12.  In our view, the applicant’s appeal has no substance.  At the outset, his assertions are all general, vague and bare which are not proper grounds of appeal.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  More importantly, he failed to identify any error with specific particulars against the Leave Decision.  Accordingly, his assertions are not valid grounds of appeal.

13.  In any event, for completeness, we have considered the Leave Decision carefully and are unable to see any arguable ground of appeal against the Leave Decision.  We agree with the Judge’s observations and see no basis to disturb the Leave Decision.

14.  For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is hereby dismissed.

(Thomas Au) (Godfrey Lam)
Justice of Appeal Justice of Appeal

  

The applicant acting in person


[1]  This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[2]  This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[3]  This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4]  This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.