Case Detail

CACV 551/2024, [2025] HKCA 806

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 500

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 551 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2116 OF 2019)

-----------------------------------

RE:

KANDIAH VASUDEVAN

Applicant

-----------------------------------

Before:

Hon Chow JA and Cheng J in Court

Date of Judgment:

9 September 2025

___________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________

Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1. On 5 June 2025, this court (Chow JA and Cheng J) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung given on 10 December 2024 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non-refoulement claim.

2. The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1] We will not repeat them here.

3. The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed on 17 June 2025, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. In the Notice of Motion, he alleges generally that there is some error in the decisions of the authorities. He also complains that the authorities rejected his claim without proper investigation into the evidence produced and by totally relying on “some web news which is not officially recognised”, and he does not consider his case was determined fairly (which complaint he had already raised in the appeal).

4. The applicant lodged written submissions in support of the application on 30 June 2025. In the written submissions, he essentially repeated his submissions made in the appeal. Attached to the written submissions was a four-page document which appeared to consist of two Identity Cards (“the Identity Cards”) issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu for two families respectively to show that they were refugees from Sri Lanka.

5. Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6. The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised.

7. Neither the Notice of Motion nor the written submissions identify any supposed error in our judgment and they raise no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal. The complaints raised in the Notice of Motion and the written submissions have been dealt with at paragraphs 11 and 12 of our judgment dated 5 June 2025, and the mere repetition of these complaints, mainly directed at the Board, will not render any assistance to this application.

8. The Identity Cards are new evidence, and the applicant has not made any application for leave to adduce new evidence for the purpose of this application. In any event, to justify the admission of new evidence, the applicant has to satisfy the three conditions established in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489[2] (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524, at §14(3)). On the face of the Identity Cards, there is no indication as to the dates on which they were issued. Parts of the information relating to the two families on the Identity Cards was either written in a foreign language or illegible. The applicant has not provided any translation of the content of the Identity Cards to this court, nor has he provided any explanation as to why he was not able to produce them earlier in the proceedings or made any submissions as to how they are relevant to this application. We do not consider that the Identity Cards which the applicant seeks to rely upon as documentary evidence in support has any bearing on the merits of this application. We therefore do not consider that the applicant has shown that the second Ladd v Marshall condition is satisfied in relation to the Identity Cards.

9. Having reached the view that the second Ladd v Marshall condition is not satisfied, it is not necessary to consider the first or third Ladd v Marshall conditions. Finally, we do not consider there are any, or any sufficient, exceptional circumstances to justify exercising our residual discretion to admit the Identity Cards as new evidence notwithstanding the non-satisfaction of the Ladd v Marshall conditions for the purpose of this application.

10. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

11. For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 17 June 2025 is dismissed.

(Anderson Chow)
Justice of Appeal

(Yvonne Cheng)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

The applicant acting in person

[1] See [2025] HKCA 500

[2] The three conditions are: (1) it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use in the court below; (2) the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and (3) the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible.

CACV 551/2024, [2025] HKCA 500

On Appeal From [2024] HKCFI 3304

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 551 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2116 OF 2019)

________________________

BETWEEN
	KANDIAH VASUDEVAN	Applicant
	and
	TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/ NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE	Putative Respondent
	and
	DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION	Putative
		Interested Party

_____________________

Before:

Hon Chow JA and Cheng J in Court

Date of Hearing:	15 May 2025
Date of Judgment:	5 June 2025

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1. This is the Applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“the Judge”) dated 10 December 2024 (“the Order”) refusing to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 5 July 2019, whereby the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 6 September 2018.

BACKGROUND

2. The Applicant is a national of Sri Lanka. He claimed that he sneaked into Hong Kong illegally in July 2006. He was arrested by the police on 16 April 2007. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a torture claim[1] on 21 April 2007, which was rejected by the Immigration Department on 14 February 2013. His appeal against the rejection of the torture claim was dismissed by the Board on 5 April 2013. On 26 April 2013, he lodged a non-refoulement claim, which was assessed on all applicable risks other than the risk of torture. His claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) because he was a member of LTTE, but had leaked information to his uncle when he heard about a plan to kill his uncle. He also claimed that he would be harmed or killed by the Sri Lankan authorities due to his prior involvement with the LTTE. Details of the Applicant’s claim were summarised by the Judge at §§4 and 5 of his decision dated 10 December 2024.

3. By a Notice of Decision dated 6 September 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director dismissed the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim with reference to the following risks: BOR 2 risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3], and persecution risk[4].

4. The Applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. On 5 July 2019, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal, and confirmed the Director’s Decision (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s reasons for its decision were summarised by the Judge at §9 of his decision, as follows:

“The Board had asked the [Applicant] quite a number of questions. It came to the conclusion that the [Applicant] was not a truthful witness [54]. The Board rejected his evidence on the facts of his claim [69]-[73]. It rejected his claim on BOR 3 risk [77], BOR 2 risk [80] and Persecution risk [84]-[85].”

THE JUDGE’S JUDGMENT

5. On 24 July 2019, the Applicant filed a Form 86 to apply leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. No ground for seeking relief was given in the Form 86 or his affirmation of the same date.

6. On 10 December 2024, the Judge gave his Judgment (“the Judgment”) refusing to grant leave to apply for judicial review, for the following reasons:

“[12] The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to the Board’s Decision on the [Applicant’s] appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact-finding power vested in the Director and the Board…
[13] The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the [Applicant] said he had told the Board all his problems. He asked this Court to review the Board’s Decision.
…
[15] The Board, for the reasons given above, found that the [Applicant’s] claimed risks were unfounded. There is no valid ground from the [Applicant] to challenge the Board’s Decision.
[16] There is no reason that the Court should interfere with the Board’s finding of the facts.
[17] The [Applicant] fails to show that he has any realistic prospect of success in his proposed judicial review of the Board’s Decision.”

THIS APPEAL

7. In his Notice of Appeal filed on 17 December 2024, the Applicant stated the following:

“[T]he Applicant face hardship if he is to return back to his country and the Torture Claims Appeal Board has significantly relied on the source of news which is not officially recognized, or it is simply hearsay. They have also relied on some cases which are outdated considering the dramatic change. The lack of credible source of information has resulted in them making groundless speculations.” [sic]

8. In his 3-page written submission lodged on 14 April 2025, the Applicant stated that he disagreed with the decisions of the Director and the Board. He alleged that he believed his case had not been determined fairly and the decisions of the Director and the Board were also unreasonable and irrational in public law sense. He also complained about not being provided with legal or language assistance, and that he did not fully understand how his case was determined.

9. At the hearing of the present appeal, the Applicant stated that he had nothing to add to the points raised in his notice of appeal and written submissions.

DISCUSSION

10. In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court of Appeal’s role is not to examine the Board’s decision afresh as if it was a fresh application for judicial review (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at §14(6)).

11. Further, the assessment of evidence, country of origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini[2019] HKCA 1022. No such error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board is shown in the present case.

12. As earlier mentioned, the Applicant did not give any ground of judicial review in the Form 86 or his affirmation filed in support of the leave application below. The matters stated in the Notice of Appeal and his written submissions are new points which were not raised in his application below. He is not entitled to raise them for the first time in the Court of Appeal. In any event, they are all vague and general, and plainly have no substance. As for his complaints about lack of legal or language assistance, the Applicant was provided with legal and language assistance in relation to the assessment of his non-refoulement claim by the Director. He also had language assistance in the hearing of his appeal before the Board. It is well established that a non-refoulement claim is not entitled to legal and/or language assistance at every stage of the non-refoulement process.

13. The Applicant has failed to identify or show any error in the Judgment refusing to grant leave to apply for judicial review, or raise any viable ground of appeal against the Order.

14. The Applicant’s appeal against the Order has no merit, and is dismissed.

(Anderson Chow)
Justice of Appeal

(Yvonne Cheng)
Judge of the Court of
First Instance

The Applicant, acting in person

[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[2] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of his life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

RE KANDIAH VASUDEVAN

Related cases with same parties

Files (2)