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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2024

HARJIT SINGH v. MR. LAW MAN CHING, VIO AND OTHERS

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[2025] HKCFI 1038-EN-2025-03-13

HARJIT SINGH v. MR. LAW MAN CHING, VIO AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCAL 2393/2024

[2025] HKCFI 1038

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2393 OF 2024

________________________

BETWEEN  
 HARJIT-SINGHApplicant

and

 MR. LAW MAN-CHING, VIO1st Respondent

and

 MRS. ROMLAH2nd Respondent

and

 HONG KONG POLICE FORCE TO ICAC 3rd Respondent
 20+ HK DEPARTMENTS 

________________

Before:  Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Decision: 13 March 2025

 

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________

A. Introduction

1.  By my previous Decision dated 2 January 2025 [2025] HKCFI 100, I dismissed the Applicant’s application made by his Form 86 dated 6 December 2024. 

2.  Though on its face apparently seeking a writ of habeas corpus, such an application was fundamentally misconceived where the Applicant was not detained at all, let alone arguably unlawfully.  I dismissed the application in that regard for that reason. 

3.  If it was intended to be an application seeking leave to apply for judicial review, I held that, in so far as the matters set out in the documents were intelligible at all, no specific public law grounds of review had been identified, contrary to the mandatory requirements of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) Order 53 rule 3(2).  It also seemed to me that at least significant aspects of the complaint were out of time or stale for judicial review purposes. 

4.  Now by summons dated 6 March 2025, supported by his affirmation dated 5 March 2025, the Applicant requests an extension of time for him to appeal from my Decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review. 

5.  I see no reason why this application cannot appropriately be dealt with on paper. 

B.  Consideration

6.  The summons simply states that the Applicant does not agree with my Decision, and that I did not consider his claim properly, so he requests the Court to scrutinise his problem properly.  The affirmation simply identifies that because it is out of time to appeal, he requests the extension of time and is making the summons for that purpose.  No formulated grounds of appeal are attached to either document.

7.  On an application for an extension of time to appeal, the Court will take into account circumstances including at least (1) the length of the delay and therefore the extension sought, (2) the explanation for the delay, and (3) the apparent merits of the proposed appeal. 

8.  The 14-day time period for an intended appeal permitted under RHC Order 53 rule 3(4) expired on 16 January 2025, and so the present application is itself approaching two months later.  That is not an insignificant delay. 

9.  Notably, there is no real attempt in the documents provided for the present application to explain the reason for the delay, and the failure to take out the application within good time. 

10.  As to the potential merits of the proposed appeal, the statement that the Applicant disagrees with the Decision is of little value.  Nor has the Applicant sought to explain why his “claim” was not properly considered.  In fact, the materials attached to the application essentially amount to a repeat of some of the previous materials about his underlying complaint, and a cry for some help.  With respect, those materials do not identify any meritorious grounds of appeal, where it is trite that an appeal is not simply an occasion to re-run the arguments presented before the Court below.

C.  Result

11.  In the circumstances, the Applicant has failed to identify good reason why the Court should exercise its discretion to extend the time for his proposed appeal. 

12.  Therefore, I dismiss the application made by summons for the extension of time, and I make no order as to costs. 

 (Russell Coleman)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
  High Court
The applicant, acting in person
Judge of the Court of First Instance
[2025] HKCFI 100-EN-2025-01-06

HARJIT SINGH v. MR. LAW MAN CHING, VIO AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCAL 2393/2024

[2025] HKCFI 100

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2393 OF 2024

________________________

BETWEEN

 HARJIT-SINGHApplicant
 and 
 MR. LAW MAN-CHING, VIO1st Respondent
 and 
 MRS. ROMLAH2nd Respondent
 and 
 HONG KONG POLICE FORCE TO ICAC
20+ HK DEPARTMENTS
3rd Respondent

________________

Before: Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Decision: 6 January 2025

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________

A.  Introduction

1.  By his application dated 6 December 2024, the Applicant seeks a writ of habeas corpus. The application was filed together with a supporting affirmation of the same date.

2.  But the Applicant has not requested an oral hearing – indeed, he ticked the box to show he did not want an oral hearing – and I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this application on the papers.

B.  Fundamental Misconception

3.  An application for writ of habeas corpus may be applicable when the applicant suggests that he or she is the subject of unlawful detention.

4.  However, nothing in the present application or in the supporting affirmation suggests that the Applicant is currently being detained. Indeed, the application appears to contain his own residential address, and mobile telephone numbers. On this basis, the habeas corpus application is entirely inappropriate, and it falls to be dismissed.

C.  Unintelligible Complaints

5.  In fact, the supporting affirmation and its attachment seem potentially to identify an entirely different grievance – though the matters set out are, with respect, largely unintelligible. The body of the affirmation reads as follows (capitals in original) (sic):

1. 2011 to CRIME-CYBERCRIME, Google account hack-log in MR. VIO and MRS ROMLAH.

2. 22 DEC 2014 to NOW MY THOUSEND COMPLAINTS ON – CHEATING/FRAUD with CLOSED. MY COMPLAINT POLICE TO ALL NOT GIVE FINAL RESULT COPY.

3. CAPO-WANCHAI HQ 21-07-2015 on give me 3-page fake copy. Police tuen mun nt in next later 2 months written fake report.

4. Police to all in my name on Mr. VIO team send fake letters (closed complaint).

5. [2 telephone numbers set out] Google ACCOUNT IN LOGIN-ALL Mobie system HACK.

6. 31-12-2015 to want SWD welfare 50 month not give me 76-year old me road on sleep.

7. More 4 Page on affirmation.

6.  There are indeed 4 attached pages, but I do not intend to rehearse the contents of those pages in this Decision. Suffice it to say that, in so far as the matters set out are intelligible at all, the complaint seems to be about the way that the Police and the Complaints against Police Office have handled his reporting of a crime that his Google account may have been hacked. He also refers to having filed complaints with more than 20 government departments, yet no one has been able to help him. I acknowledge some level of desperation in, for example, the Applicant’s statement that if what he puts forward is not true he suggests that he wants “full life prison or hang me”.

7.  However, even if the application is taken to be some form of application for leave to apply for judicial review, no specific public law grounds of review have been identified – contrary to the mandatory requirements under the Rules of High Court Order 53 rule 3(4). The matters referenced also seem to go back many years, despite the requirement that any application for leave to apply for judicial review should be made promptly and in any event within 3 months of the impugned decision.

D.  Result

8.  As an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the application is fundamentally flawed and misconceived because it is clear that the Applicant is not actually detained (whether lawfully or otherwise).

9.  As an application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success, and most of the matters touched on are in any event stale for judicial review purposes.

10.  The Applicant’s application is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.

  (Russell Coleman)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The applicant, acting in person