RE CHINNU SINGH

CACV 201/2025, [2026] HKCA 867

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 1124

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 201 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3812 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 23 December 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 19 December 2025 (“the Judgment”)  ([2025] HKCA 1124).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims)  Martin Wong (“the Judge”)  dated 11 April 2025, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1489).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484)  (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I would like to inform to Court of Final Appeal. There are some Error in my law maker authorities. They were totally Relied on same web news which officialy not Recognized. There are not give me Justice, also They are not proper Investigation in my claim by authorities. I do not Think my case determined fairly.” (sic)

5.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions on 6 January 2026.  In those submissions, he complained about the lack of legal and language assistance and that the Board had been discriminatory towards him and breached procedural fairness by unlawfully fettering its discretion, acting in a procedurally unfair manner, failed to meet the “greater care and duty owed to self-represented claimants” and its decision had been unreasonable or irrational.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence and are not proper grounds of appeal.  More importantly, his complaints are mainly directed at the Board’s Decision and he has failed to point out any error in the Judgment with specific particulars.  Plainly, his assertions are not proper grounds of appeal.

7.  As to his assertions regarding lack of language and legal assistance, they lack particulars, and in any event, have not been raised before the Judge or this court on appeal.  It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed before it, or which are fact-sensitive: see Re Orense Marian Masangkay[2022] HKCA 33 at [7] and Re Dandiwal Sandeep Singh[2021] HKCA 870 at [7].  We also note that the all documents filed into court are in English.  Clearly, the applicant is able to obtain assistance in English.  In any event, a matter of law, a non-refoulement claimant is not entitled to free legal representation at all stages of the process and that the high standard of fairness required by law does not entail interpretation service being made available to an applicant all the time as he desires:Re Zunariyah[2018] HKCA 14 at [18]; Re Zahid Abbas[2018] HKCA 15 at [11] and Re Tariq Farhan[2018] HKCA 17 at [11].  Further, the applicant was also assisted by interpreters during the respective hearings before this court, the Judge, and the Board,[1] and had been provided with ample opportunities to present his case.  We see no prejudice suffered by the applicant.  His complaints must fail.

8.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

9.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

10.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.

The applicant acting in person

CACV 201/2025, [2025] HKCA 1124

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 1489

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 201 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3812 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Martin Wong (“the Judge”) dated 11 April 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 1489) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 25 November 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 2 October 2018, refusing his non-refoulement claim.

2.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [5] of the Leave Decision.  The Judge’s reasons for refusing the Leave Application are also set out at [6] ‑ [11] of the Leave Decision.  We will not repeat those details herein.

3.  By the Notice of Appeal filed on 15 April 2025, the applicant stated:

“I should be happy to provide the court with any further information regard to my Notice of Appeal with new written submission. Bundle of thanks.” (sic)

4.  The applicant lodged his written submissions on 10 November 2025.  In those submissions, he complained that the Director had failed to appreciate or give the proper importance or weight to the presence of state acquiescence in his case.  He further asserted that the Board acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on the Country of Origin information (“COI”) but failed to take into account his personal background and experience.  He further asserted that the Board failed to place sufficient weight on his COI which “supported the aversions that the police in his country would not be able to protect”.

5.  We heard the appeal on 9 December 2025.  A Punjabi interpreter was present to provide language assistance.  During the hearing, he confirmed that he had nothing to add to his written materials.

DISCUSSION

6.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

7.  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

8.  In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant in this appeal to point out the errors in the Leave Decision with sufficient particulars and specifics.

9.  However, nowhere in his Notice of Appeal or written submissions did the applicant identify any error with specific particulars committed by the Judge.  His assertions are mainly directed against the Board’s Decision, and are in any event all general, bare and vague allegations unsupported by specific particulars or evidence.  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal and must fail on this basis alone. 

10.  In any event, his arguments are devoid of merit.  General and bare assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute valid grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  As noted by the Judge at [6], the Court would not usurp the role of the Board unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.  In that respect, the weight given to the evidence by the Board must also be solely within the province of the Board.  As observed by the Judge at [8] ‑ [9], the Board had thoroughly considered the applicant’s claim and situation in his home country with the relevant materials and COI.  The Judge is clearly correct to find that there was no procedural unfairness, error of law or irrationality in the Board’s Decision: [10] of the Leave Decision.  As to his complaints against the Director’s Decision, given that the applicant had appealed to the Board, it is therefore not open to him to seek to judicially review against the Director’s Decision: Re Moshsin Ali[2018] HKCA 549 at [45].

11.  For the above reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.  The applicant’s appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed.