RE NATTAPON CHAISONGKAM
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CACV 277/2025, [2026] HKCA 823
On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 1072
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 277 OF 2025
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3164 OF 2019)
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| RE: | NATTAPON CHAISONGKAM | Applicant |
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| Before: | Hon Au JA and Winnie Tsui J in Court |
| Date of Judgment: | 30 April 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. On 8 December 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 5 December 2025 (“the Judgment”) ([2025] HKCA 1072). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 8 May 2025, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1412).
2. The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment. We will not repeat them here. After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.
3. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.
4. In his Notice of Motion, the applicant states:
“1. The learned Judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality to the decision made by the Director of Immigration refusing my application for Judicial Review.
2. There is some error in law in my decision. The decision maker just relied on COL information and my previous facts, which were favor on rejecting my claim.
3. Actual life occurs in different situations than COL information. Officers and courts prefer to ignore the overwhelming evidence of violence towards minorities, searching for unrealistic silver linings.
4. The Judge did not apply the law properly.” (sic)
5. In his supporting affirmation filed on 8 December 2025, the applicant further states that he is unrepresented and has no means of seeking any proper legal advice. He also claims that there is a good ground of appeal that was not necessarily considered in his previous appeal before this court and that the merit of this ground of appeal constitutes sufficient reason in allowing his appeal. However, he has failed to condescend upon particulars as to what the said ground of appeal is.
6. Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions on 22 December 2025. In those submissions, he had cited various general propositions and legal authorities on the high standards of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness, as well as section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which relates to the late filing of notice of appeal before the Board. However, the applicant has failed to specify how those legal principles are relevant to his case.
7. In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit. His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence. General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. His allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [3] - [11] of the Judgment. He had not identified any specific error in the Judgment. It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3]. His assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.
8. Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.
9. Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.
10. For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit. The Notice of Motion is dismissed.
| (Thomas Au) | (Winnie Tsui) |
| Justice of Appeal | Judge of the Court of First Instance |
The applicant acting in person