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RE BALAGOT CHRISTINE RAFANAN

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[2026] HKCA 373-EN-2026-03-12

RE BALAGOT CHRISTINE RAFANAN

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CACV 282/2025, [2026] HKCA 373

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 1071

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 282 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3721 OF 2019)

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RE:BALAGOT CHRISTINE RAFANANApplicant

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Before: Hon Au JA and Winnie Tsui J in Court
Date of Judgment: 12 March 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 9 December 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 5 December 2025 (“the Judgment”)  ([2025] HKCA 1071). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims)  Philips Wong (“the Judge”)  dated 2 May 2025, by which the Judge dismissed her application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1785).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In her Notice of Motion, the applicant complained about the lack of legal and language assistance before the Board and the Court.  She claimed that the Board’s Decision and the Leave Decision were irrational as the Board only relied on generic or incomplete Country of Origin information without assessment of her specific circumstances.  She asserted that she would face real danger upon refoulement and that the Board and the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting her claim.

5.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions on 23 December 2025.  In those submissions, she claimed that the Judgment made no logical sense and that given her lack of language and legal assistance as well as the legal procedural complexity, she failed to properly present her case.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  Her assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Her allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions she had previously made before this court in her appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [3] - [12] of the Judgment. She did not identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  Clearly, her assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, her allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 9 December 2025 is dismissed.

(Thomas Au) (Winnie Tsui)
Justice of Appeal Judge of the Court of
First Instance

The applicant appeared in person

[2025] HKCA 1071-EN-2025-12-05

RE BALAGOT CHRISTINE RAFANAN

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CACV 282/2025, [2025] HKCA 1071

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 1785

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 282 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3721 OF 2019)

____________________

RE:     BALAGOT CHRISTINE RAFANAN  Applicant

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Before: Hon Au JA and Winnie Tsui J in Court
Date of Hearing: 25 November 2025
Date of Judgment:5 December 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong (“the Judge”) dated 2 May 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 1785) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing her application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 2 December 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 14 August 2018, refusing her non-refoulement claim.

2.  The applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting her appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [5] of the Leave Decision.  The Judge also sets out in detail the grounds advanced by the applicant in support of the Leave Application and the Judge’s reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [6] ‑ [25] of the Leave Decision.  We will not repeat the details herein.

3.  By the Notice of Appeal filed on 12 May 2025, the applicant mainly complained about the lack of language assistance and legal representation.  As a self-representing litigant, she claimed that she was unable to elaborate on any grounds as to the Leave Application.  She also complained that the Judge failed to consider her individual circumstances and difficulties.  The applicant also took issue with [13] of the Leave Decision[1], in that although the Duty Lawyer Scheme (“DLS”) advised her not to pursue her appeal, it is her legal right to pursue her appeal and took issue with the lack of legal representation.  She reiterated that she would face significant risk in the Philippines as her life would be in danger upon refoulement.

4.  The applicant also lodged written submissions in support of her appeal on 24 October 2025.  In those submissions, she argued that the Judge failed to properly scrutinise the Board’s assessment and misapplied the standard of review.  She again complained about the lack of legal and language assistance.  She further asserted that the Board’s findings were overly reliant on incomplete or insufficient Country of Origin information (“COI”) and failed to take into account her own personal circumstances, including her fear of harm from her previous spouse. The applicant also claimed that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting her claims.  She asserted that these amounted to procedural unfairness.

5.  We heard the appeal on 25 November 2025.  A Tagalog interpreter was present to provide language assistance.  During the hearing, she confirmed that she had nothing to add to her written materials.

DISCUSSION

6.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

7.  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

8.  In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out the errors in the Leave Decision with sufficient particulars and specifics.

9.  In our view, the present application is devoid of merit.  Her allegations are all vague, bare and general in nature.  General assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  More importantly, her complaints are mainly directed at the Board’s Decision and she fails to specifically identify errors in the Leave Decision.  Her submissions are essentially a repeat of those submissions advanced before the Judge, which the Judge had duly considered and rejected: see [7] ‑ [24] of the Leave Decision.  It is trite as a matter of law that an appeal against the refusal of leave by a judge in the Court of First Instance is not an occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration (supra) at [14(2)].  The applicant merely disagreed with the Judge’s observations, but failed to point out with specific particulars how the Judge had erred in law or on the facts.  Clearly, her assertions are not proper grounds of appeal and must fail.

10.  Specifically, regarding her complaints on the lack of language and legal assistance, we noted that all of the court documents filed by the applicant in this appeal as well as before the Judge are in English.  Clearly, the applicant is able to obtain assistance in English.  As noted by the Judge at [11] ‑ [14] of the Leave Decision, as a matter of law, a non-refoulement claimant is not entitled to free legal representation at all stages of the process and that the high standard of fairness required by law does not entail interpretation service being made available to an applicant all the time as she desires. Further, the applicant was also assisted by an interpreter during the hearing before the Board and was provided a fair opportunity to present her case and did so.  The Judge therefore has not erred in refusing her application.

11.  As to her allegations on the lack of reasons provided by the Board, these assertions clearly do not stand.  As observed by the Judge at [10] of the Leave Decision and evident from the Board’s Decision, the Board had considered her claims in detail, including the alleged risk of harm from her previous spouse, and gave detailed reasons in its decision.  The Judge had also given detailed reasons for rejecting the Leave Decision after thoroughly considering her case.  We see no procedural error or any basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.

12.  For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.

(Thomas Au) (Winnie Tsui)
  Justice of Appeal   Judge of the Court of
      First Instance

  

The applicant appeared in person


[1]   In the Notice of Appeal, the applicant mistakenly stated this as [18] of the Leave Decision.