RE HOANG THI LINH

CACV 54/2025, [2025] HKCA 1066

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 594

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 54 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2372 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 10 July 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 26 June 2025 (“the Judgment”) ([2025] HKCA 594).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 28 January 2025, by which the Judge dismissed her application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 205).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In her Notice of Motion, the applicant alleges that her life will be in danger if she returned to Vietnam and that creditors and gangsters in Vietnam are cruel and violent and are willing to kill people to satisfy their anger and ferocity.  She also alleges that internal relocation is not feasible because there will be many difficulties and obstacles that she will have to face in the new location.  She further contends that the nationwide social network of gangsters and clandestine connections with corrupt people in the government and police apparatus make it quite possible for those creditors and gangsters to find out his new address.  She further alleges that the Immigration Department did not consider her human rights under various legislations but fails to particularise her complaint.

5.  Contrary to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant did not lodge any written submissions.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  Her assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Her allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions she had previously made before this court in her appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [9] ‑ [15] of the Judgment.  She did not identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3].  Clearly, her assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, her allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 10 July 2025 is dismissed.

CACV 54/2025, [2025] HKCA 594

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 205

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 54 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2372 OF 2019)

____________________

____________________

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 28 January 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 205)(“the Leave Decision”), refusing her application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 1 August 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 26 September 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing her non-refoulement claim.

2.  On 7 February 2025, the applicant indicated her consent in writing for this appeal to be disposed of on paper.  Accordingly, we proceed to consider this appeal on paper based on the available materials.

BACKGROUND

3.  The applicant is a national of Vietnam.  She entered Hong Kong illegally on 15 August 2015 and was arrested by the police on 2 September 2015.  The applicant made a non-refoulement claim on 5 September 2015 on the basis that, if refouled, she would be harmed or even killed by her creditor, who had triad background, because she failed to repay the loan owed to him.  Details of the applicant’s claim were summarised by the Judge at [3] ‑ [7] of the Leave Decision.

4.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director dismissed the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds including torture risk[1], BOR2 risk[2], BOR3 risk[3], and persecution risk[4].

5.  The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 4 October 2017.  The applicant attended the oral hearing before the Board on 18 June 2019.  By the Board’s Decision, the Board dismissed her appeal and confirmed the Director’s Decision.  The Board’s reasons were summarised by the Judge at [11] ‑ [17] of the Leave Decision:

“11. The Board noted material discrepancies in the applicant’s evidence regarding (i) the loan amount [93]-[95]; (ii) when she started her business [96]; (iii) whether she suffered any physical harm from the creditor [97]-[100]; (iv) whether the creditor had made enquiries about her background before lending her money [101]-[102] and (v) whether she had any employee for her business [104].

12. The Board found the applicant lacked relevant knowledge towards her own business [103]. It was also found implausible that the expenditure of her business would be greater than the income [105]-[108] and that she could start her business immediately upon getting the loan as the country of origin information indicated that there were lots of formalities to go through [128]-[130].

13. In relation to the loan from the creditor, the Board considered it weird that the applicant could sometimes afford paying instalments and could not in other occasions [112]-[114]. The Board also considered it implausible that the creditor would lend such a large sum of money to the applicant for starting up her business given her background, working experience and past income [131]-[138].

14. The fact that the applicant did not seek non-refoulement protection immediately upon arriving in Hong Kong [122]-[124] and her failure to seek protection in China further damaged her credibility [125]-[127].

15. The Board found the applicant was not a witness of truth and that her claims could be given no credence. In light of the applicant’s background, employment history, past income and lack of basic knowledge relating to her business, the Board did not accept that she had borrowed a large sum of money from the creditor to startup a business and considered this simply to be a fabrication [142]-[146], [189]-[191].

16. Based on such findings and given that there was no evidence of involvement from the Vietnamese government in the matter while the claimed harm also failed to reach the requisite level of severity, the Board rejected the applicant’s claim on Torture risk, Persecution risk, BOR 2 and BOR 3 risk [153]‑[175], [192], [196]-[199]. In any event, state protection [147]-[151], [193]-[194] and internal relocation [176]-[188], [195] would also be available to the applicant.

17. The applicant’s appeal was therefore dismissed and the Director’s decision was confirmed.”

THE JUDGE’S DECISION

6.  On 15 August 2019, the applicant filed a Form 86 together with a supporting affirmation to apply for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision.  No ground of challenge was advanced in her Form 86 or supporting affirmation.

7.  On 23 December 2024, the applicant attended an oral hearing before the Judge and a Vietnamese interpreter was present to provide language assistance.

8.  By the Leave Decision, the Judge refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review.  His reasons were set out at [20] ‑ [25] of the Leave Decision:

“20.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to the Board’s Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact-finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

21.  The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that the Board did not accept his evidence and asked this Court to review it.

22.  In Re: Kartini[2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:

‘13. (1) … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.’

23.  The applicant has failed to raise any valid ground to challenge the Board’s Decision. In my view, the Court has no reason to interfere with it.

24.  The applicant therefore fails to show that she has any realistic prospect of success in her proposed judicial review of the Board’s Decision.

DISPOSITION

25.  I refuse to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss her application.”

THIS APPEAL

9.  In her Notice of Appeal filed on 7 February 2025, the applicant mainly complained that, if refouled, her life would be seriously threatened by her creditor and local gangsters as it might be possible for them to locate her.  She also claimed that internal relocation would be completely unfeasible as she was not an active person and there would be no guarantee that she would be able to adapt to the new place.  She also complained that the Immigration Department failed to consider her human rights under various legislations but failed to particularise her complaint.

10.  In her supporting affirmation filed on 7 February 2025, the applicant claimed that she understood that there was “a good ground of appeal that was not necessarily considered at the leave stage” and that the Director and the Board did not “see the grounds to reserve their decisions”.  However, the applicant failed to specify what the said ground was.

11.  Contrary to the directions of the Registrar of Civil Appeals dated 7 February 2025, the applicant failed to lodge any written submissions.

DISCUSSION

12.  The Court of Appeal’s general approach in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases is set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)]).

13.  In our view, the applicant’s appeal has no substance. At the outset, her assertions are all general, vague and bare which are not proper grounds of appeal.  General assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar[2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  More importantly, she failed to identify any error with specific particulars against the Leave Decision.  Accordingly, her assertions are not valid grounds of appeal.

14.  In any event, for completeness, we have considered the Leave Decision carefully and are unable to see any arguable grounds of appeal against the Leave Decision.  We agree with the Judge’s observations and see no basis to disturb the Leave Decision.

15.  For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is hereby dismissed.