TSO MAN KUEN JASMINE v. POON CHUK HUNG
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CAMP 27/2025, [2026] HKCA 121
On Appeal from [2024] HKDC1467
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 27 OF 2025
(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM DCCJ NO 1379 OF 2023)
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BETWEEN | ||
| TSO MAN KUEN JASMINE | Plaintiff | |
| and | ||
| POON CHUK HUNG | Defendant | |
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| Before: | Hon Barma and G Lam JJA in Court |
| Date of Judgment: | 9 February 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon G Lam JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
Introduction
1. This is a renewed application by the plaintiff for leave to appeal against the decision of HH Judge Alan Kwong on 2 September 2024 (“Decision”), by way of summons filed on 11 February 2025 in this Court. In the Decision, the judge dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal against Master Y. H. Chan’s decision of 7 June 2024 which dismissed the applications under paragraphs 3 to 7 of the plaintiff’s summons filed on 11 December 2023. The judge also ordered that the plaintiff pay costs assessed at $60,000.
Application to master
2. The plaintiff’s summons of 11 December 2023 was summarized by the judge at [2] of the Decision as follows:
“Whilst the contents of the said summons are convoluted, it can be seen that: –
(1) Under paragraphs 1 to 2, the Plaintiff seeks time extension for filing her amended reply and defence to counterclaim.
(2) Under paragraphs 3 to 4, the Plaintiff seeks summary judgment and/or interim payment against the Defendant.
(3) Paragraphs 5 to 7 concern calculation of compensation and consequential matters.”
3. As pointed out by the judge at [5], paragraphs 1 and 2 of the summons of 11 December 2023 had already been dealt with by a different master.
The Decision below
4. The judge dismissed the appeal against Master Chan’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment and/or interim payment and for calculation of compensation and consequential matters. In summary, the judge’s reasons were that:
(1) the plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under Order 14, rule 2(1), as her affirmations did not verify the facts pleaded in the statement of claim, and did not state a belief that the defendant had no defence to the plaintiff’s claim;
(2) the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment is premised on the allegation that the defendant made fraudulent representation(s) to her, yet the statement of claim does not contain any averment that the defendant made fraudulent misrepresentation(s); hence it is not open to the court to enter summary judgment for the plaintiff;
(3) there are genuine factual issues that need to be resolved at trial, such that the judge was unable to conclude that the defendant had no arguable defence, and summary judgment is not appropriate;
(4) in light of the above, the plaintiff failed to show that her claim would succeed at trial, and thus it would be appropriate to dismiss the application for interim payment as well as the applications regarding compensation and consequential matters.
Intended appeal to this Court
5. In her summons of 11 February 2025, the plaintiff raised numerous issues such as alleged document tampering and destruction of documents by the defendant, that do not relate to the reasons given in the Decision for dismissing the appeal against Master Chan’s decision of 7 June 2024.
6. To the extent that we can discern from the plaintiff’s summons of 11 February 2025 any proposed grounds of appeal against the Decision, it seems the plaintiff has raised the following grounds:
(1) judicial misconduct, including collusion with the defendant to pre-draft orders and judgments in the defendant’s favour, disregarding legal precedent and the plaintiff’s evidence;
(2) violation of legal precedent;
(3) bias and denial of due process, including lack of fair hearing;
(4) procedural impropriety;
(5) abuse of discretion or jurisdictional error.
7. In her written statement dated 24 April 2025, the plaintiff did not refer to any grounds of appeal. Instead, she stated that she has submitted miscellaneous applications to the District Court to set aside previous costs orders and judgments, and expects that upon approval, all existing orders will be withdrawn, eliminating the need to escalate her case to this Court. She also stated that she was attempting to negotiate a settlement with the defendant.
8. In the defendant’s written statement in opposition, he denied that he was in negotiations with the plaintiff, and denied the allegations made against him in the plaintiff’s written statement dated 24 April 2025.
9. Leave is required for an appeal to be brought from the District Court to the Court of Appeal: section 63 of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336). As provided in section 63A, leave to appeal will not be granted unless the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.
10. The procedure relating to an application for leave to appeal is governed by Order 59 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). Pursuant to Order 59, rule 2A(5), we consider it appropriate to determine the plaintiff’s application without a hearing on the basis of the written materials only.
11. The plaintiff’s summons of 11 February 2025 provides no particulars for her grounds of appeal, which are stated as general legal principles. The matters raised in the summons and in the plaintiff’s written statement fail to pinpoint any specific error in the Decision, fail to engage with the reasons given in the Decision for dismissing the appeal against the Master’s decision, and do not raise any arguable ground for disturbing the Decision.
12. We see no error in the judge’s reasons for dismissing the appeal against Master Chan’s decision of 7 June 2024, particularly in finding that there are genuine issues to be tried and that summary judgment would not be appropriate. The plaintiff’s intended appeal against the Decision has no prospect of success, and thus her application for leave to appeal must be dismissed.
13. We should add that we have, on a provisional basis, examined the affidavits filed by the plaintiff without leave on 31 December 2025 and 20 January 2026, and are satisfied that they do not materially assist the plaintiff in her application for leave to appeal.
Conclusion
14. For the reasons above, we refuse leave to appeal, and dismiss the plaintiff’s summons of 11 February 2025, with costs to the defendant, to be taxed if not agreed. Pursuant to Order 59, rule 2A(8) of the Rules of the High Court, we also order that no party may request that this determination be reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes.
| (Aarif Barma) Justice of Appeal | (Godfrey Lam) Justice of Appeal |
Written statement by the Plaintiff, acting in person
Written statement by the Defendant, acting in person