HCAL 1571/2025
[2026] HKCFI 1179
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1571 OF 2025
________________________
BETWEEN |
| | JOYEL RAJAN | Applicant |
| | and | |
| | DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION | Putative |
| | | Respondent |
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| Before: | Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public) |
| Date of Decision: | 2 March 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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A. Introduction
1. By Form 86 dated 9 July 2025, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge the Deportation Order issued against him on 19 March 2025 under section 20(1)(a) of the Immigration Ordinance Cap 115 (“Ordinance”). The Form 86 also states that he would like to seek relief in respect of the “prolonged detention without lawful justification under section 29 of the Ordinance”, and the failure to provide adequate medical care and lawful access to personal data during his detention in Hong Kong’s correctional institutions.
2. The Director of Immigration (“Director”) is named as the Putative Respondent, and (other) Government departments responsible for overseeing immigration and security affairs related to deportation orders are named as Putative Interested Parties.
3. The application is made by the Applicant from outside Hong Kong, in the circumstances which I shall identify below.
4. On 14 July 2025, I gave directions: (1) permitting the Director leave to search and make copies of the documents in the court file and to file an Initial Response by 18 August 2025; and (2) permitting the Applicant to file a Reply to the Initial Response on or before 15 September 2025. I indicated that, depending on the contents of the Initial Response and the Reply (if any), I would then decide whether to deal with the application for leave to apply for judicial review on paper, and if so I would proceed to do so without further notice to the parties.
5. The Initial Response was filed on 15 August 2025, on behalf of the Director, and also on behalf of the Secretary for Security (“Secretary”) as the decision-maker in respect of the Deportation Order. The Initial Response was signed by Ms Angel Zhi, Acting Senior Government Counsel.
6. A Reply to the Initial Response was filed by the Applicant by way of an affidavit dated 29 August 2025. It is lengthy with many exhibits.
7. The Applicant applied for legal aid on 10 September 2025. That triggered the automatic 42-day stay, which expired before the end of October 2025. Legal aid was refused on 17 November 2025.
8. By emails on 2, 3, and 11 February 2026, the Applicant indicated his wish to submit additional documentary evidence in support of his application, including “medical reports of [his] wife and copies of complaint records made to relevant authorities”, and he asked for clarification as to the proper procedure for submitting new evidence to the Court.
9. However, having considered the materials thus far filed, I do not think that the Applicant will be prejudiced by not being given the opportunity to file further evidence long after the expiry of the period within which he could have filed – and did file – his lengthy Reply to the Initial Response.
10. I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this application on the papers.
11. This is my Decision.
B. The Application
12. No intended grounds of judicial review are identified on the Form 86 itself, in breach of the mandatory requirement under Rules of the High Court Order 53 rule 3(2). In his supporting affirmation, the Applicant addressed: (1) the background; (2) his detention history; (3) medical neglect and psychological abuse; (4) violation of procedural rights; (5) destruction and redaction of medical records; (6) his wife’s mental health and family separation; and (7) the relief sought by him.
13. In a way with which I broadly agree, Ms Zhi sought to summarised the allegations made by the Applicant in his affirmation. With some variations by me, they can be summarised as follows:
(1) The Deportation Order was issued under section 20(1)(a) of the Ordinance, despite the fact that his sentence did not exceed two years, which is the statutory threshold for such action.
(2) The Applicant was not given a chance to explain his marriage or family situation before the Deportation Order was made, and his right to family life was violated.
(3) The Deportation Order for life is grossly disproportionate to the offence for which he was convicted.
(4) The Applicant suffered tooth pain and was seen by doctors multiple times. A doctor at Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre (“LCKRC”) recommended referral to a dental specialist but the referral was omitted in official medical records later obtained by the Applicant, and the medical records were heavily redacted.
(5) The Applicant was never taken to a dentist despite repeated requests and was given painkillers instead without proper diagnosis.
(6) The Applicant was subjected to systematic coercion at TGCI, of which the failure to deal with medical condition and formal complaints were a part.
(7) The Applicant was not provided with a Malayalam interpreter and he was forced to sign documents without understanding them.
14. I am prepared to treat those matters as the essence of the intended grounds of review.
15. By way of his Reply, the Applicant filed an affirmation which he said was to address: (1) procedural irregularities and breach of natural justice; (2) misrepresentation of facts by immigration authorities; (3) coercion and duress during detention at the Tai Tam Gap Correctional Institution (“TGCI”); (4) medical neglect and denial of proper healthcare; (5) disproportionate nature of the lifetime deportation order; and (6) humanitarian grounds and violation of family rights.
16. The Reply affirmation repeated much of the essence of his original affirmation, albeit at greater length. He offered his own summary of the grounds for judicial review as being:
(1) Legal Invalidity of the Deportation Order.
(2) Procedural Irregularities and Fundamental Breach of Natural Justice.
(3) Coercion, Duress and Medical Neglect Vitiate any Purported Consent.
(4) Humanitarian Grounds and Violation of Family Rights.
17. As can be seen, those grounds essentially mirror or echo the matters I have set out above which I can treat as grounds encompassed by those four headings.
18. The Reply Affirmation also has numerous exhibits. Some of them relate to or repeat the matters underpinning his earlier dismissed non-refoulement claim (“NRC”), which is not something to be revisited by this Court on this application.
19. In passing, I also note that the Applicant’s two affirmations were made by the Applicant in the English language, and though notarised there is no suggestion that it was interpreted to him.
C. Background Facts
20. I take the background facts from the Applicant’s affirmation and the Initial Response, and the attached documents.
21. The Applicant is an Indian national born in 1999. He arrived in Hong Kong on 8 May 2023 and was permitted to remain in Hong Kong until 22 May 2023 as a visitor. He did not depart, and overstayed in Hong Kong after 23 May 2023.
22. On 18 October 2023, the Applicant lodged a NRC. The NRC was rejected on 9 February 2024. The Applicant’s appeal/petition to the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office was dismissed on 16 October 2024.
23. In the meantime, on 2 December 2023, the Applicant married a Ms Lee Man Yee, a Hong Kong permanent resident (“HKPR”) in Hong Kong. On 25 January 2024, the Applicant submitted an application for entry for residence to join Ms Lee as a dependant in Hong Kong, which application was refused on 8 October 2024.
24. On 11 January 2024, the Applicant was arrested for the suspected offence of “overstayer taking employment”. On 24 July 2024, the Applicant was convicted of that offence and sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment.
25. Shortly prior to that, on 18 April 2024, a Removal Order had been made against the Applicant. The Applicant’s appeal against the Removal Order was dismissed by the Immigration Tribunal on 7 August 2024.
26. On 12 February 2025, the Applicant was discharged from prison and admitted to TGCI for detention under the Ordinance.
D. The Deportation Order
27. Whilst serving his term of imprisonment, the Applicant was interviewed by an officer of the Immigration Department (“ImmD”) and notified of the Director’s intention to apply for a deportation order against him. The Applicant was served with the ‘Notice of Consideration of Deportation’ and ‘Explanatory Note’, and he stated on the ‘Grounds against Deportation’ dated 12 November 2024 that he objected to the intended deportation for the reason that his family members were living in Hong Kong. He also expressed his intention for Ms Lee to comment on the making of a deportation order against him, and acknowledged that Ms Lee would contact ImmD for that purpose within seven days.
28. By letter dated 20 November 2024 – but received by ImmD on 26 November 2024 – Ms Lee made handwritten representations on behalf of the Applicant to object to the making of a deportation order against him. The grounds stated included that: (1) the Applicant is a kind, considerate and diligent person with no bad habits and high academic qualification with advanced English proficiency; (2) the Applicant was remorseful of his wrongdoing and the offence committed by him was not one of the most serious in nature; (3) Ms Lee could hardly visit the Applicant in India due to poor security concern; (4) Ms Lee has a stable job and rental income to support the Applicant’s living in Hong Kong; and (5) the Applicant and Ms Lee have entered into a lawful marriage and Ms Lee pleaded for a chance to let the Applicant stay in Hong Kong for their reunion.
29. On 20 January 2025, the Applicant also again raised objection to the making of the deportation order, but without providing any reasons.
30. ImmD records show that, during an interview on 4 March 2025, Ms Lee was emotional and showed concern with the deportation procedure and health situation of the Applicant, she claimed that the Applicant had suffered from depression and she hoped that the Applicant’s removal could be effected as soon as possible. I note that the applicant suggests in his evidence that this note is a distortion of what Ms Lee actually said, which was that she wished for the Applicant to be released from detention so that they can be reunited and lived together in Hong Kong, and she could care for him.
31. On 12 March 2025, the Applicant was served with the ‘Notice of Consideration of Deportation’ and ‘Explanatory Note’. The Applicant stated on the ‘Grounds against Deportation’ dated 12 March 2025 – apparently in his own handwritten English – that he did not object to the making of the Deportation Order and wanted to go back to India faster. He also submitted a written representation – again apparently in his own handwritten English – which, amongst other things, stated that he did not consent to ImmD’s contact with Ms Lee regarding matters related to his deportation. He confirmed that, apart from Ms Lee, he had no other family members/local connection in Hong Kong.
32. On 17 March 2025, a memo was sent from the Director to the Secretary making an application for the Deportation Order, on the ground that the Applicant’s continued presence in Hong Kong was undesirable. The Deportation Order was made by the Secretary (as delegated by the Chief Executive) after his consideration of all circumstances. The Deportation was made, as already stated, under section 20(1)(a) of the Ordinance.
33. On 28 March 2025, the Applicant was served with the Deportation Order. A record of service identifies that the Applicant himself signed to acknowledge receipt and understanding of the Deportation Order, and the certification also bears the signature and ‘chop’ of the interpreter present, as well as the signature of the immigration officer. On the same evening, the Applicant was removed under the Deportation Order to India.
34. Also on the same day, the Applicant signed a ‘Declaration of Treatment Received Under Supervision/Enquiry’ confirming that he did not “have any loss, damage or complaint (including interpretation services) during the period when [he was] under the supervision/inquiry of member(s) of [ImmD]”. That document also bears the signatures of the immigration officer and the interpreter present.
35. I note that in his evidence, the Applicant alleges that he was not in fact served with the Deportation Order on 28 March 2026, and that he had not been served with a copy before his forcible removal from Hong Kong to India on that day. The Applicant says that a copy of the Deportation Order was only sent and received by Ms Lee at her address in Hong Kong on or about 6 May 2025, which was then forwarded to the Applicant in India.
36. The Applicant suggests that the signatures on the acknowledgement of service of the Deportation Order, as well as various other forms and declarations made during his detention period, do not resemble his authentic signature. He requests handwriting analysis because either (a) the signatures were forged by someone else, or (b) the documents were signed under extreme duress and coercion, affecting his normal signing ability – a somewhat equivocal and internally contradictory assertion. He invites the Court to draw appropriate adverse inferences “if the signatures are found to be inconsistent or forged”.
37. On 1 May 2025, the Applicant submitted a request to rescind the Deportation Order. Whilst that decision was pending, the Applicant commenced these judicial review proceedings on 9 July 2025.
E. Intended Challenge to Deportation Order
38. As indicated, the apparently intended grounds of review to the making of the Deportation Order are that: (1) it was issued despite the fact that he was not sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding two years, which is the statutory threshold for such action; (2) he was not given a chance to explain his marriage or family situation, and his right to family life was violated; (3) he was not provided with a Malayalam interpreter and he was forced to sign documents without understanding them; and perhaps (4) he was coerced into agreeing to be removed from Hong Kong.
39. There is no merit in any ground.
40. First, the offence of which the Applicant was convicted is an offence punishable with imprisonment for not less than two years. That is sufficient to trigger the possible exercise of the power under section 20(1)(a) of the Ordinance, and it is a misconception to think that the actual sentence imposed must have exceeded two years for the statutory threshold to have been passed. There is no reasonably arguable unlawfulness in the making of the Deportation Order.
41. Secondly, the Applicant plainly was given the opportunity to make representations regarding the possibility of a deportation order being made. Both he and Ms Lee indeed made representations, which were taken into consideration by the Secretary as part of the overall relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The Applicant’s suggestion that his representations were ignored is merely to state that he thinks that those representations should have led to a different decision. There is no reasonably arguable procedural irregularity in the making of the Deportation Order.
42. Further, it is trite that the Applicant’s marriage or family ties to Hong Kong and his purported rights to family life under Article 19(2) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights are humanitarian or compassionate circumstances or matters which the Secretary was under no legal obligation to take into account when making the decision to issue the Deportation Order. It is also trite that there is no policy of family union or reunion applicable to immigration, removal/deportation or security matters in Hong Kong. However, the Secretary did in fact take the representations as to humanitarian and compassionate factors or circumstances into account – as is shown in the relevant internal Minute M.2 – and the weight to be given to such factors was a matter for the Secretary and Director. The Court would not intervene absent procedural unfairness or irrationality (where it is settled law that establishing irrationality is a high threshold). Here, there is no reasonably arguable procedural unfairness or irrationality.
43. Thirdly, as to the point on interpretation, it was plainly reasonably open to the Director and the Secretary to proceed on the basis that the Applicant was well able to communicate in and understand documents in the English language. This is for numerous reasons, including:
(1) Ms Lee’s representation letter specifically stated and relied upon the assertion that the Applicant possessed advanced English proficiency.
(2) The Applicant himself had on various occasions indicated to ImmD that he was able to speak and write English.
(3) His screening interview on his NRC was conducted in English in the presence of his legal representative.
(4) This was the consequence of the Applicant’s own statements on his NRC form that (a) he could speak or write English, and (b) he did not require an interpreter when attending interview.
(5) Indeed, in the Part 7 of the NRC form, the Applicant also made ‘Confirmation A’, on the basis that he did not need the assistance of an interpreter, and that he was able to read English and fully understood the entire content of the form and all attached documents.
(6) The objections to deportation were apparently made by the Applicant himself in English.
44. I have also already noted that the lengthy documents filed in these proceedings were made by the Applicant in English, without the need for any interpretation. I also note that when served with the Deportation Order, the Applicant was served in the presence of an interpreter fluent in Hindi, Punjabi and English, when the Applicant showed understanding of the contents of it.
45. Although he now suggests otherwise, it seems that the Applicant himself signed to certify that he had received a copy of the Deportation Order and that he understood. The relevant document also bears the signature of the interpreter present, as well as the immigration officer effecting service. With respect, it seems to me to beggar belief that the Applicant could have been deported on 28 March 2025 without his having previously been served with the Deportation Order. The Applicant’s assertions made to the contrary are in essence bare assertions contradicted by the contemporaneous written documents signed by the various persons present – and in the context of his somewhat equivocal and internally contradictory challenge to (just) his own signature.
46. Even in his Reply affirmation, the Applicant has himself emphasised his educational qualifications and prospects, said to include legitimate educational opportunities abroad with the academic capability to pursue international studies.
47. In the circumstances, the Applicant’s further assertion that complaints he made after the event to the Indian Consulate are evidence that his change of decision regarding deportation was not voluntary, but the result of coercion and threats, lacks reasonable credibility. There is no reasonably arguable procedural unfairness arising from the absence of any interpreter at various points in the process leading to the Deportation Order.
48. Fourthly, it is a misconception to think that the making of the Deportation Order – or putting it into effect – somehow required the Applicant’s consent. Hence, the allegations that he was coerced in agreeing to be removed seem rather beside the point, and in any event the Applicant’s apparent contemporaneous agreement to be removed does not seem likely to me to have been significant or determinative in the decision-making process to issue the Deportation Order. It can also be noted that the Applicant was already subject to a Removal Order, the making and execution of which also would not require the Applicant’s agreement.
49. Lastly, as to the suggestion of the disproportionate nature of the lifetime Deportation Order, it can be noted that most deportation orders are made on the basis of deportation for life. Further, the relevant applicable period is a matter for the Secretary, not for the Court.
F. Alleged Prolonged Detention Without Lawful Justification
50. Whilst in the Form 86 the Applicant stated that he sought relief in respect of alleged prolonged detention without lawful justification, no particulars were provided in either the Form 86 or his affirmation as to the relief sought.
51. However, on an assumption that the relief sought by the Applicant is damages for alleged unlawful detention under the Ordinance, I accept the submission made by Ms Zhi in the Initial Response, that a private law action would be the more appropriate forum to deal with such a claim for damages, likely involving determination of various factual disputes for which judicial review is unsuitable. It is partly in those circumstances that I consider there to be no prejudice to the Applicant in any inability to file further evidence or documents.
52. Judicial review is a remedy of last resort, and leave to apply for judicial review would unlikely be granted if there is an effective alternative remedy. Here, there would be such an effective alternative remedy, even if the claim for damages is assumed to be on the basis of an alleged breach of public duty by public officers.
53. In any event, there was plainly prima facie lawful authority under the Ordinance for the Applicant to be detained for the relatively short period between 12 February 2025 (when he was released from prison and taken to TGCI) and 28 March 2025 (when he was removed from Hong Kong under the Deportation Order after it was made). On the materials provided, there does not seem to be any reasonably arguable basis to suggest, in accordance with the well-known Hardial Singh principles, that the lawful detention somehow became unlawful.
G. Alleged Failure of Medical Care
54. As to the complaint about the request from medical treatment whilst the Applicant was at LCKRC, first it can be noted that that event was during the Applicant’s imprisonment as a result of his conviction, and the Applicant was not detained by the Director at that time.
55. As to the concern that medical records received by the Applicant were redacted, that appears to have been the result of the application of guidance notes issued by the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (to remove the personal data of third parties).
56. As to the period of detention of the Applicant under the Ordinance, the records available to the Director identify that the Applicant had complained of toothache and gum pain during his detention at TGCI. The Applicant received a prescription for medication and was referred to the dental unit of Stanley Prison for further examination. Despite the voluminous materials attached to the Applicant’s affirmation, I do not see any reasonably arguable public law failure.
57. In this regard, I also consider there to be no prejudice to the Applicant in any inability to file further evidence or documents. The suggested medical reports of the Applicant’s wife are unlikely relevant to his own medical condition, and might go only to compassionate and humanitarian factors, which do not fall to be weighed by the Court. Similarly copies of complaints made to “relevant authorities” do not seem to me to be relevant to the ongoing proceedings.
H. Delay
58. Ms Zhi also stated that the application for leave to apply for judicial review should be dismissed on the basis that it was not made promptly. However, in the overall circumstances (which need not be rehearsed at any length), I would not have dismissed the application on this basis alone.
I. Result
59. Nevertheless, on the basis that the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
60. I make no order as to costs.
| | (Russell Coleman)
Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court |
The applicant, acting in person
Ms Angel Zhi, Senior Government Counsel (Ag) of the Department of Justice, for the putative respondent