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Miscellaneous Proceedings2025

AGGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD v. WING YIP BUILDING MATERIALS & ENGINEERING CO., LTD

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[2026] HKCFI 41-EN-2026-01-09

AGGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD v. WING YIP BUILDING MATERIALS & ENGINEERING CO LTD

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HCMP 446/2025

[2026] HKCFI 41

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 446 OF 2025

_______________

BETWEEN  
 Aggressive Construction Company LimitedPlaintiff
 and
 Wing Yip Building Materials &Defendant
 Engineering Co., Limited 

_______________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Alan Kwong in Chambers
Dates of Written Submissions:16 and 23 December 2025
Date of Decision:9 January 2026

_______________

DECISION

_______________

A.Introduction

1.  In this decision, I adopt the definitions and nomenclature that were used in my judgment dated 13 November 2025 (see[2025] HKCFI 5586) (the “Judgement”).

2.  The issues in dispute in these proceedings concern whether there are bona fide disputes on substantial grounds in relation to the claims under the 1st SD and 2nd SD issued by the Defendant, such that the Plaintiff is entitled to an injunction restraining the Defendant from pursuing a winding-up petition.

3.  At the hearing that took place on 13 November 2025, the parties focused on arguing whether there were bona fide disputes, and they did not make submissions on matters relating to balance of convenience/justice.

4.  For the reasons set out in the said Judgment, I was of the view that:-

(1)     the Plaintiff was able to raise a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds in relation to the claims under the 1st SD (see paras 18 to 33); and

(2)     the Defendant failed to raise a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds in relation to the claims under the 2nd SD (see paras 34 to 49).

5.  In the premises:-

(1)     I granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendant from presenting, taking out, and/or advertising any winding-up petition against the Petitioner based on the 1st SD;

(2)     I refused to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendant from presenting, taking out, and/or advertising winding-up petition against the Petitioner based on the 2nd SD; and

(3)     I made no order as to costs.

(see paras 50 to 52)

6.  It appears that the parties had confusion as to whether the orders that I made were final or interlocutory in nature.  As pointed out in my letter to the parties dated 1 December 2025, what was fixed before me at the hearing on 13 November 2025 was the Plaintiff’s summons dated 24 March 2025 seeking an interlocutory injunction against the Defendant. Thus, I could only have disposed of the Plaintiff’s interlocutory applications under its summons dated 24 March 2025 (as opposed the underlying originating summons).

7.  By summons dated 27 November 2025[1], the Plaintiff seeks leave to appeal my decision of refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction in its favour in regard to the 2nd SD.

8.  Pursuant to my directions given on 2 December 2025, the parties have lodged written submissions, which I have considered.

B.     Legal Principles

9.  Under section 14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4), no leave to appeal shall be granted unless the proposed appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interest of justice that the appeal should be heard.

10.  The party that seeks to appeal bears the burden of satisfying the Court that his or her appeal has a reasonable prospect of success.  This means an appeal with prospects that are more than fanciful but which do not need to be shown to be probable: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 at para 17.

C.     Deliberation

11.  As stated in the draft notice of appeal annexed to its summons dated 27 November 2025, the Plaintiff’s sole intended ground of appeal is as follows:-

“The learned Judge misconstrued clause 4.1 of the 3rd Sub‑Contract (AGG/A024a/SUB/03081). On the true construction of this clause, the liability to pay is only triggered if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Defendant makes a payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department (呈交糧款申請書予商務部) and (2) the Plaintiff’s commercial department receives it in such a way. On that construction, there is a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds on whether (1) has been satisfied.”

12.  For the following reasons, I am not of the view that the Plaintiff’s intended appeal is reasonably arguable.

13.  First of all, the Plaintiff’s complaint does not even arise in light of my factual findings (which are not challenged):-

(1)     It is the Plaintiff’s case that any application for payment must be made to the Plaintiff’s commercial department, and the premise of the Plaintiff’s complaint is that the Defendant’s payment application (which gave rise to the claim under the 2nd SD) was not made to the Plaintiff’s commercial department at all.

(2)      This is a false premise.

(3)     As pointed out in paragraphs 35 and 36 of my Judgment, the Defendant’s payment application was emailed to “[email protected]” (which belongs to Mr KK Tam, an executive assistant of the Plaintiff), and it was addressed to, inter alios, Mr Jan Poon, who is the Plaintiff’s commercial manager.

(4)     For the reasons elaborated in paragraphs 39 to 46 of my Judgment, I drew an adverse inference from the Plaintiff’s inexplicable failure to adduce any evidence from, inter alia, Mr KK Tam and Mr Jan Poon. I found that the Defendant’s payment application must have been provided to and received by Plaintiff’s commercial manager (ie Mr Jan Poon) and/or commercial department via Mr KK Tam. 

(5)     My factual findings are not challenged by the Plaintiff.

(6)     In the premises, on my factual findings, it can be said that the Defendant’s payment application was indeed made to the Plaintiff’s commercial department, and this was done through Mr KK Tam.

(7)     In this connection, I accept that Mr KK Tam was not under an obligation to provide and/or forward the Defendant’s application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department, and he could have refused to render assistance.  However, once Mr KK Tam chose to render assistance by providing and/or forwarding the Defendant’s payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department, it cannot be said that no payment application had been made to the Plaintiff’s commercial department at all.  

(8)     Having considered the circumstances relating to the parties’ dispute and the evidence before the court, I found that what happened was that Mr KK Tam did render cooperation by providing and/or forwarding the Defendant’s payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial manager (ie Mr Jan Poon) and/or commercial department.  This was the only explanation as to why the Plaintiff refused to adduce any evidence from any of the relevant personnel, including Mr KK Tam and Mr Jan Poon: see my Judgment, paras 39 to 46.

14.  Second, in any event, I am the view that there is no merit in the Plaintiff’s argument that so long as its commercial department did not receive a payment application from the Defendant directly, it was not under any obligation to pay:-

(1)     For the reasons elaborated in paragraphs 47 to 48 of my Judgment, it is obvious that the underlying objective of the relevant provisions of the 3rd Sub-Contract (ie the signing sheet and clause 4.1) is to ensure that the payment application would reachthe Plaintiff’s commercial department, such that it would be in a position to process the same within 30 days.

(2)     The crux of the parties’ dispute is whether the Plaintiff’s commercial department had actually received the payment application.  As pointed out, I found that Mr KK Tam must have provided and/or forwarded the Defendant’s payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial manager (ie Mr Jan Poon) and/or commercial department, and my factual findings are not challenged.

(3)     With respect, I simply cannot see how it can be said that no payment application had been made when the Plaintiff’s commercial department and/or commercial manager had actually received the same. The suggestion is not even logical.

(4)     It appears to me that what the Plaintiff seeks to do is to make a song and dance about the person through whom its commercial department received the Defendant’s payment application. This is not the focus at all. Instead, the focus is whether the payment application had actually reached and/or been received by Plaintiff’s commercial department, such that the same could be processed.

(5)     In this connection, the 3rd Sub Contract does not stipulate the method by which to submit a payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department.  There is nothing in the 3rd Sub Contract suggesting that the Defendant may not submit a payment application via another person (such as Mr KK Tam).  As pointed out in paragraph 48 of my Judgment, there is no sound commercial reason why the Defendant may not rely on another person (such as Mr KK Tam) who is willing to render assistance.

15.  For the above reasons, I conclude that the Plaintiff’s intended appeal is unarguable.  As such, I refuse to grant leave to appeal to the Plaintiff.

16.  For completeness, it should be mentioned that in light of the conclusion in my Judgment, the Plaintiff has already paid the indebtedness under the 2nd SD (ie HK$348,824.89) to the Defendant.  In this connection, I am inclined to accept the Plaintiff’s suggestion that it was effectively compelled to make the payment, and thus if my conclusion in respect of the 2nd SD were wrong, the Plaintiff may have a right to seek restitution against the Defendant.

17.  In the premises, it is, to say the least, arguable that from a practical point of view, the Plaintiff’s intended appeal is not wholly academic.  However, for the reasons explained above, I am not of the view that the Plaintiff’s intended appeal is arguable, and this is the reason why I refuse to grant leave in favour of the Plaintiff.

D.     The New Evidence Application

18.  The Plaintiff seeks leave to adduce the 3rd affirmation of Mr Lee Sun Wing for the purposes of addressing the following matters:-

(1)     the fact the indebtedness under the 2nd SD was paid to the Plaintiff on 14 November 2025; and

(2)     the fact the Plaintiff engaged 23 sub-contractors, and the sub-contracts with these sub-contractors contain clauses that are similar to clause 4.1 of the 3rd Sub-Contract.

19.  Insofar as the fact that the indebtedness under the 2nd SD has been paid is concerned, this is incontrovertible.  Indeed, the Defendant does not assert that the indebtedness has not been repaid.  I am not of the view that it is necessary for the Plaintiff to adduce any new evidence on this matter.

20.  As regards the suggestion that the Plaintiff engaged other sub‑contractors on terms similar to clause 4.1 of the 3rd Sub-Contract, the Plaintiff contended that if my Judgment were correct, these sub-contractors would leave their payment applications with the Plaintiff’s employees who are not part of its commercial department, and these employees would be expected to pass on the payment applications.  This would be burdensome and unworkable.

21.  With respect, it appears that the Plaintiff has misunderstood my Judgment. The undesirable practical consequences alleged by the Plaintiff would not arise at all. At the risk of repetition, it should be reiterated that I did not find and/or conclude that Mr KK Tam and/or any employee of the Plaintiff had an obligation to pass on the Defendant’s payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department.  On the contrary, as pointed out above, I was (and still am) of the view that they did not have such an obligation. They were entitled to return the payment application to the sub-contractor and/or indicate that no assistance would be rendered.  Nonetheless, once Mr KK Tam (and/or any other person) chose to render assistance by forwarding or providing the payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department and the payment application did reach the Plaintiff’s commercial department, there would be no room to suggest that no payment application had been made to the Plaintiff’s commercial department at all.

22.  In any event, it appears that the sub-contracts with other sub‑contractors were at all material times in the Plaintiff’s possession.  I do not see any good reason why the same were not produced as evidence before the hearing on 13 November 2025 took place.  I am not of the view that the first condition of Ladd v Marshall is satisfied.

23.  For the above reasons, I refused to grant leave for the Plaintiff to adduce the 3rd affirmation of Mr Lee Sun Wing.

E.     Disposition

24.  For all the above reasons, I dismiss the Plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal and application to adduce the 3rd affirmation of Mr Lee Sun Wing.

25.  Costs should follow the event.

26.  I order the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant’s costs in respect of the aforesaid applications, to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for 2 counsel.

27.  I thank Mr Bernard Man SC, Mr Alvin Cheung, Mr Richard Leung, and Mr Tommy Cheung for their helpful assistance.

(Alan Kwong)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Bernard Man, SC and Mr Alvin Cheung, instructed by M/s LCP, for the Plaintiff

Mr Richard Leung and Mr Tommy Cheung, instructed by M/s CFN Lawyers, for the Defendant


[1] See paragraph 2 of the summons.

[2025] HKCFI 5586-EN-2025-11-13

AGGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD v. WING YIP BUILDING MATERIALS & ENGINEERING CO., LTD

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HCMP 446/2025

[2025] HKCFI 5586

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 446 OF 2025

_________________

BETWEEN

 Aggressive Construction Company LimitedPlaintiff
 and 
 Wing Yip Building Materials &
Engineering Co., Limited
Defendant

_________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Alan Kwong in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 13 November 2025
Date of Judgment: 13 November 2025

_________________

J U D G M E N T

_________________

A.  Introduction

1.  By originating summons dated 24 March 2025, the Plaintiff seeks to restrain the Defendant from presenting, taking out, and/or advertising any winding-up petition based on (i) the alleged indebtedness of HK$3,884,236.78 as stated in the statutory demand dated 13 March 2025 (the “1st SD”); and (ii) the alleged indebtedness of HK$358,824.89 as stated in the statutory demand dated 13 March 2025 (the “2nd SD”) (collectively the “SDs”).

B.  Material Background

2.  The following matters are not in dispute.

3.  The Plaintiff was engaged by the Hong Kong Housing Authority (“HKHA”) as the main contractor for a construction project in Tai Po (the “Tai Po Project”).

4.  By a sub-contract dated 27 May 2021 (the “1st Sub‑Contract”), the Plaintiff engaged the Defendant as its sub‑contractor with regard to the design, supply, and installation of the suspended ceilings in the Tai Po Project.

5.  By a further sub-contract that was also dated 27 May 2021 (the “2nd Sub-Contract”), the Plaintiff engaged the Defendant as its sub‑contractor with regard to the design, supply, and installation of the fireproof boards in the Tai Po Project.

6.  By a third sub-contract dated 5 August 2017 (the “3rd Sub‑Contract”), the Plaintiff also engaged the Defendant as its sub-contractor with regard to the design, supply, and installation of the suspending ceiling in another construction project in North Point.

7.  It is not in dispute that the Defendant had served SD1 and SD2 on the Plaintiff.

8.  The 1st SD concerns the alleged indebtedness under various payment applications[1] in relation to the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts. The total amount claimed is HK$3,884,236.78.

9.  The 2nd SD concerns the outstanding balance in respect of the revised contract sum as stated in the final account statement relating to the 3rd Sub-Contract. The amount claimed is HK$358,824.89[2].

C.  The Plaintiff’s Contentions

10.  Mr Victor Dawes SC, leading Mr Alvin Cheung, (for the Plaintiff) contended that there are bona fide disputes on substantial grounds in relation to the Defendant’s claims under the SDs.

C1.  The 1st SD

11.  Insofar as the 1st SD is concerned, Mr Dawes raised two contentions.

12.  First:-

(1)  The 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts provide that the “liquidated damages for delayed performance” are respectively HK$3,000 per day and HK$10,000 per day[3].

(2)  Whilst clause 6.2 of the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts provides that the Defendant must complete its subcontract works within the construction period[4], clause 6.6 provides that if the Defendant cannot comply with the completion deadlines as provided in the construction schedule, then, without prejudice to its other rights, the Plaintiff can claim liquidated damages and deduct the same from Plaintiff’s progress payments.

(3)  Relying on a list of outstanding works dated 21 March 2025 compiled by HKHA (the “List of Outstanding Works”), the Plaintiff suggested that the Defendant failed to complete 9 pieces of work for the Tai Po Project. According to the List of Outstanding Works:-

(a)  6 items of work had been overdue for 249 days;

(b)  1 item of work had been overdue for 218 days; and

(c)  2 items of work had been overdue for 111 days.

(4)  In the premises, based on the figures set out in the List of Outstanding Works, Mr Dawes submitted that as of 21 May 2025, the Plaintiff had a valid cross-claim in liquidated damages in the amount of HK$4,030,000[5] based on the Defendant’s delay in performing the works under the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts.

13.  Second:-

(1)  Clause 4.1 of the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts provided that:-

“除特別聲明外,糧期為每月一次,原則上糧款於分判商按承建商指定時間呈交糧款申請書予商務部收到後起計30個工作天內支付。”

(2)  Relying on the phrase “除特別聲明外”, Mr Dawes contended that the Plaintiff has a contractual discretion to make payments outside of the period of 30 work days, and the question of whether the Plaintiff exercised its contractual discretion rationally and in good faith is a matter that cannot be summarily determined on affidavits.

(3)  Mr Dawes emphasized that as certificate for practical completion had been issued, the Tai Po Project was winding down. As such, the Plaintiff was entitled to examine the quality and quantity of the Defendant’s works with the “utmost certainty”, such that the risk of overpayment could be avoided.

C1.  The 2nd SD

14.  As regards the 2nd SD, Mr Dawes submitted that under clauses 4.1 and 4.2 of the Sub-Contracts, any application for payment (ie “糧款申請書”) should be submitted to the Plaintiff’s commercial department, which is tasked with processing, verifying, and certifying the amount payable to the Defendant. However, the payment application that gave rise to the claim under the 2nd SD was simply emailed to “[email protected]”[6], which belongs to an executive assistant (namely Mr KK Tam). As such, no proper payment application was made.

D.  Legal Principles

15.  It is not in dispute that the court may grant a quia timet injunction to prevent the presentation of a winding-up petition if the company can show that the intended petition would be an abuse of the court’s process.

16.  The legal principles are summarized by Kwan J (as Kwan VP then was) in Re Sinom (Hong Kong) Ltd [2009] 5 HKLRD 487 at para 11:-

“As with a petition where there is a bona fide dispute of the debt on substantial grounds (a disputed debt petition), where the company has a genuine and serious cross-claim against the petitioner greater than or equal to the petitioner’s debt (a cross‑claim petition), such a petition may be restrained from proceedings (Re Pan Interirors Ltd [2005] EWHC 3241, paras. 34-39). It is an abuse of the process of the court to make a statutory demand or present a winding-up petition based on a claim to which there is a triable defence (Re Company [1992] 1 WLR 351). A cross-claim petition is regarded in the same way (Southern Cross Group Plc v Deka Immobilien Investment GmbH [2005] BPIR 1010, paras. 29-30; Re Pan Interiors Ltd, para. 35).”

17.  Petitions are not meant for debt collection purposes, and the court’s winding-up jurisdiction will only be exercised in clear cases. Where there is a real and substantial dispute of fact, the court will generally dismiss the petition. While the onus is on the company to adduce credible evidence, the court is not required to make findings at this stage. Rather, it has to be satisfied that the company has a credible case that should go to trial: see Madison Lab Ltd v Pu Yan[2020] HKCFI 382 at para 18 (per DHCJ Abraham Chan SC); Re Leung Cherng Jiunn [2016] 1 HKLRD 850 at para 27(5) (per Kwan JA, as Kwan VP then was); and Re China Shanshui Investment Co Ltd (HCCW 398/2015, 28 September 2016) at para 7 (per Harris J).

E.  Deliberation: the 1st SD

18.  Whilst Mr Dawes heftily relied on the List of Outstanding Works, it appears that this document (which was dated 21 March 2025) only came into existence after the 1st SD (which was dated 13 March 2025) was issued.

19.  In their submissions, Mr Richard Leung, together with Mr Tommy Cheung, (for the Defendant) emphasized that:-

(1)  There were no contemporaneous documents that set out the Plaintiff’s complaints based on delay and the extent of the delay.

(2)  There was no evidence showing that the latest timetable was contemporaneously provided or communicated to the Defendant. As such, there is no basis for establishing the exact period of the delay, and it is unknown as to whether the Plaintiff’s cross claim would exceed the Defendant’s claim under the 1st SD.

20.  There is substance in Mr Leung’s submissions.

21.  However, the List of Outstanding Works is a piece of compelling evidence that amply supports the Plaintiff’s case. This is not a self-serving document manufactured by the Plaintiff for the purpose of this litigation. Instead, the List of Outstanding Works was compiled by HKHA, which was not directly involved in the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

22.  The List of Outstanding Works contained (i) photographs showing the status of the works; (ii) descriptions of the works; and (iii) descriptions of the omissions. More importantly, the List of Outstanding Works also set out (iv) the “committed” target completion dates with regard to the specific work items; as well as (v) the overdue days with regard to each of the specific work items.

23.  It appears to me that HKHA genuinely took the view that certain aspects of the works under the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts (ie the works relating to the suspended ceilings and fireproof boards) had remained outstanding and not been completed according to agreed schedules. Otherwise, HKHA would not have compiled and issued the List of Outstanding Works at all. In this connection, the List of Outstanding Works does expressly set out the “committed” target completion dates with regard to the specific work items. On the available evidence, I have no reason to suppose that HKHA conjured up these “committed” target completion dates out of the blue.

24.  I accept that the Plaintiff has not adduced contemporaneous records showing that it complained to the Defendant about the delay and/or non-completion. However, this could be ascribed to the fact that the Plaintiff did not vigilantly supervise the Defendant. In my view, depending on the circumstances (which can only be ascertained at trial), the lack of complaint on the part of the Plaintiff could be equivocal. It does not ipso facto show that the Plaintiff accepted that the Defendant’s works had been completed already.

25.  On the available evidence, there are, in my view, issues to be tried and resolved at trial. I cannot summarily conclude that the Plaintiff’s cross-claim based on delay and incomplete works is a malicious afterthought, and that the Plaintiff is not in a position to pursue a cross‑claim for HK$4,030,000 based on the computation set out in the table produced at page 743 of Bundle C3[7]. I accept Mr Dawes’s submissions that it is, to say the least, arguable that the Plaintiff is entitled to seek liquidated damages against the Defendant pursuant to 6.2 and 6.6 of the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts [8] as well as the key terms under the signing sheet[9]: see Wilmot-Smith on Construction Contracts (4th Ed) at para 11.12‑23.

26.  As pointed out, the List of Outstanding Works was only available after the 1st SD was issued. As such, it cannot be said that the Defendant was abusive in issuing the 1st SD.

27.  Nevertheless, on the strength of the List of Outstanding Works, it is, by now, clear that the Plaintiff has a bona fide and arguable cross‑claim based on delay and incomplete works, and that the quantum thereof may exceed the Defendant’s claim under the 1st SD. As such, it would be abusive if the Defendant continues to seek relying on the 1st SD for the purpose of pursuing and prosecuting a winding-up petition against the Plaintiff.

28.  In the premises, the appropriate course to take is to grant an injunction restraining the Defendant from presenting, taking out, and/or advertising any winding-up petition against the Plaintiff based on the 1st SD.

29.  In light of the aforesaid conclusion and analysis, it is unnecessary to deal with the Plaintiff’s contention regarding contractual discretion. However, for completeness, I will briefly set out my views as follows.

30.  As pointed out by Mr Leung, the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts contain an agreed contractual mechanism under clauses 14 and 23 enabling the Plaintiff to claw back any overpayment that it made to the Defendant. It appears the parties contractually agreed that any overpayment would be dealt with at a later stage, and the Defendant’s application for payment should not be impeded or delayed.

31.  In the premises, I am not of the view that the phrase “除特別聲明外” in clause 4.1 contains the effect asserted by the Plaintiff. In this connection, I agree with Mr Leung that whilst the term “特別聲明” is not defined at all, there is nothing “exceptional (特別)” about the fact that contractors and sub-contractors may have arguments with each other regarding the quality of the works being performed.

32.  In any event, it does not appear that the Plaintiff had made a contemporaneous declaration (聲明) that in light of the concern of overpayment and the fact that the Tai Po Project was winding down, the Defendant’s payment applications should be deferred or withheld. Without making a contemporaneous declaration, I am not of the view that the Plaintiff had invoked its alleged contractual discretion at all, and it appears that the contention advanced by the Plaintiff is merely an afterthought.

33.  For the above reasons, I do not accept the Plaintiff’s contention based on alleged contractual discretion.

F.  Deliberation: the 2nd SD

34.  As mentioned, the Plaintiff disputes the 2nd SD on the ground that the 2nd Defendant’s payment application that gave rise to the claim thereunder was not issued or provided to Plaintiff’s commercial department.

35.  Although the payment application was emailed to “[email protected]” (which belongs to Mr KK Tam, an executive assistant), the document was addressed to “Mr Jacob/Raymond/Jan Poon”[10].

36.  It is not in dispute that Mr Jan Poon is the Plaintiff’s commercial manager[11].

37.  Mr Leung submitted that approaching the matter practically and commercially, one can reasonably expect that the payment application would be passed on to the Plaintiff’s commercial department for handling.

38.  I see the force of Mr Leung’s submissions.

39.  Had the Plaintiff adopted the stance that its general staff would not forward the Defendant’s payment application to its commercial department, there would have been evidence showing that this was the case.

40.  There is no evidence showing Mr KK Tam indicated that (i) the Defendant’s payment application would not be forwarded to the Plaintiff’s commercial department; or (ii) the Defendant might only directly send the payment application to Mr Jan Poon or some other member(s) of the Plaintiff’s commercial department.

41.  More importantly, there is no evidence showing that the Defendant’s payment application was never provided to and received by the Plaintiff’s commercial department.

42.  In this connection, it is telling that:-

(1)  Mr Lee Sun Wing, who filed 2 affirmations on the Plaintiff’s behalf, did not suggest that the Defendant’s payment application had never been provided to and/or received by the Plaintiff’s Mr Jan Poon or other members of its commercial department[12].

(2)  There is no evidence showing that Mr KK Tam had left the Plaintiff’s employment. However, the Plaintiff, for no explicable reason, chose not to adduce any evidence from Mr KK Tam to confirm that he did not forward or provide the Defendant’s payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department or Mr Jan Poon.

(3)  There is no evidence showing that Mr Jan Poon had left the Plaintiff’s employment. However, the Plaintiff, for no explicable reason, chose not to adduce any evidence from Mr Jan Poon to confirm that he and/or the Plaintiff’s commercial department had never received the Defendant’s payment application.

43.  In my view, had Plaintiff’s commercial department and/or Mr Jan Poon never received the Defendant’s payment application via Mr KK Tam, Mr Lee Sun Wing would have stated so in his affirmations filed in these proceedings, and the Plaintiff would have adduced evidence from Mr Jan Poon and Mr KK Tam to confirm that this was the case.

44.  The Plaintiff’s complete silence is wholly inexplicable, and I am prepared to draw an adverse inference against the Plaintiff: see South China Securities Ltd v Lam Kwen Yuen [2012] 5 HKLRD 524 at para 7 (per DHCJ Lisa Wong SC, as Lisa Wong J then was); and Tullet & Tokyo International Securities Ltd. v. APC Securities Co. Ltd [2001] 2 HKLRD 356, at 365B-J (per Le Pichon JA).

45.  I am of the view that the truth is that the Defendant’s payment application must have been provided to and received by Plaintiff’s Mr Jan Poon (who was expressly named in the payment application) and/or Plaintiff’s commercial department via the Plaintiff’s Mr KK Tam. At the risk of repetition, I reiterate that had this not been the case, the Plaintiff could have informed the Court. The complete silence on the part of the Plaintiff speaks volumes and is indicative of what had happened.

46.  I am unable to accept the suggestion that the Defendant is not entitled to payment simply because instead of sending the payment application to Mr Jan Poon or the Plaintiff’s commercial department directly, the Defendant provided the payment application to Mr Jan Poon or the Plaintiff’s commercial department via Mr KK Tam. This suggestion is contrived.

47.  In this connection:-

(1)  The signing sheet in respect of the 3rd Sub-Contract[13] provides that:-

“糧期為每月一次,原則上糧款於乙方[14]按甲方[15]指定時間呈交糧款申請書予地盤商務部收到起計30個工作天內支付。” (emphasized added)

(2)  Clause 4.1 of the 3rd Sub-Contract[16] provides that:-

“除特別聲明外,糧期為每月一次,原則上糧款於分判商按承建商指定時間呈交糧款申請書予商務部收到後起計30個工作天內支付。” (emphasized added)

48.  The underlying objective of the parties’ contractual arrangement is to ensure that the Plaintiff’s commercial department would “receive” the payment application, such that it could process the same within 30 days. Thus, it suffices so long as the payment application reaches and is received by the Plaintiff’s commercial department. I do not see any sound commercial reason why the Defendant could not provide the payment application via a staff of the Plaintiff (such as Mr KK Tam). The suggestion that the Defendant might only directly provide a payment application to the Plaintiff’s commercial department via its own efforts elevates form over substance, and completely disregards the underlying objective of the parties’ contractual arrangement.

49.  For the above reasons, I am of the view that the Plaintiff has failed to raise any bona fide dispute on substantial grounds insofar as the 2nd SD is concerned. As such, I will not grant an injunction to restrain the Defendant from presenting, taking out, and/or advertising a winding-up petition against the Plaintiff based on the 2nd SD.

G.  Conclusion

50.  I grant an injunction restraining the Defendant from presenting, taking out, and/or advertising any winding-up petition against the Plaintiff based on the 1st SD.

51.  I dismiss the Plaintiff’s application for an injunction seeking to restrain the Defendant from presenting, taking out, and/or advertising any winding-up petition against the Plaintiff based on the 2nd SD.

52.  Having heard counsel’s submissions and considered the circumstances relating to these proceedings in the round, I am of the view that it would be appropriate to make no order as to costs. The key matters that I take into account are as follows:-

(1)  The Plaintiff is the successful party insofar as the 1st SD is concerned.

(2)  The Defendant is the successful party insofar as the 2nd SD is concerned.

(3)  The amount of the claim under the 1st SD is considerably larger than the amount of the claim under the 2nd SD. However, it remains the case that the dispute relating to the 2nd SD took up considerable time and resources of the parties.

(4)  The List of Outstanding Documents (which is a piece of compelling evidence that supports the Plaintiff’s case regarding the 1st SD) was only available after the 1st SD was issued, and it cannot be said that the Defendant was abusive in issuing the 1st SD. However, the Defendant continuously sought to rely on the 1st SD after having an opportunity to review the List of Outstanding Documents.

(5)  Insofar as the 1st SD is concerned, I do not accept the Plaintiff’s contention on contractual discretion, which was considerably elaborated in the parties’ submissions and evidence.

53.  Mr Victor Dawes SC, Mr Alvin Cheung, Mr Richard Leung, and Mr Tommy Cheung have provided helpful assistance to me by making submissions that were precise and focused. I express my gratitude to each of them.

  ( Alan Kwong )
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Victor Dawes, SC and Mr Alvin Cheung, instructed by M/s LCP, for the Plaintiff

Mr Richard Leung and Mr Tommy Cheung, instructed by M/s CFN Lawyers, for the Defendant



[1]  These are payment applications nos. 10 to 14, the details of which are set out in the contents of SD1.

[2]  The revised contract sum as per the final account statement is HK$14,352,996.41, and the aggregate payment that was received previously was HK$13,994,171.52. Hence, the outstanding balance is HK$358,824.89.

[3]  See Bundle C1, pages 120 and 152.

[4]  In the 1st and 2nd Sub-Contracts, it was stated that the commencement date was “expected” to be July 2020, but the actual commencement date would be the date when the person in charge of the worksite gave notification (實際開工日期以地盤負責人通知為準). It was also stated that the contractual period would be 29 months since the date when works were actually commenced, but this would be lengthened or shortened, depending on the progress of the works (按工程進度延長或縮短之日期). See Bundle C1, pages 120 and 152.

[5]  The figure is computed under the table produced at Bundle C3, page 743.

[6]  See Bundle C3, page 637

[7]  The quantum only covers the period up to 21 May 2025.

[8]  See Bundle C1, pages 120 and 152.

[9]  See Bundle C1, pages 120 and 152.

[10]  See Bundle C3, page 637

[11]  See paragraph 39 of the 2nd Affirmation of Lee Sun Wing, which was filed on behalf of the Plaintiff (Bundle B, page 76)

[12]  In paragraph 50 of Mr Lee’s 1st affirmation filed on the Plaintiff’s behalf on 25 March 2025, he alleged that the Defendant had never made a payment application. This is obviously incorrect. In paragraph 19 of his affirmation filed on behalf of the Defendant on 24 April 2025, Mr Cheng Ka Wing produced and referred to the aforesaid payment application (which was dated 17 January 2025): see Bundle C3, page 637. In paragraphs 37 to 40 of his 2nd affirmation in reply filed on 22 May 2025, the Plaintiff’s Mr Lee merely pointed out that the said payment application was not directed to the Plaintiff’s commercial department and hence not in compliance with the contractual procedure. Whilst Mr Lee admitted that Mr Jan Poon (who was named in the Defendant’s payment application) was the Plaintiff’s commercial manager, he did not assert that Mr Jan Poon or the Plaintiff’s commercial department had not received and/or been provided with the Defendant’s payment application; nor did he assert that Mr KK Tam had not provided or forwarded the Defendant’s payment application to Mr Jan Poon or the Plaintiff’s commercial department

[13]  Bundle C2, page 381

[14]  This refers to the Defendant.

[15]  This refers to the Plaintiff.

[16]  Bundle C2, page 384