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Commercial Action1999

NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LTD. v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

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35846-EN-2002-11-13

NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCT CO. LTD. v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

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HCCL000027E/1999

HCCL27/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMMERCIAL ACTION NO.27 OF 1999

-------------------------

BETWEEN
NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCT CO. LIMITEDPlaintiff
AND
CHINA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant
and
THE PEOPLE'S INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDThird Party

-------------------------

Coram: Hon Stone J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 31 October 2002

Date of Judgment: 13 November 2002

-------------------------

J U D G M E N T

-------------------------

The Application

1. There is before the Court a summons dated 18 September 2002 taken out by the defendant.

2. Two forms of relief are requested: first, that the defendant have leave to further amend the existing Re-Re-Re-Amended Defence, and second, that the plaintiff do pay the defendant's costs of the Third Party Proceedings.

3. Both applications were strongly disputed. I deal with them in turn.

Leave to Amend

4. Judgment in this action was handed down on 28 June 2002. In that judgment the Court dismissed the assured plaintiff's claim against the defendant marine cargo underwriter which had declined to indemnify the plaintiff under the terms of a Marine Cargo Policy dated 1 June 1998. This judgment is under appeal.

5. Against this background comes this somewhat unusual application. The defendant now wishes to add a Counterclaim by way of further re-amendment, which for the first time canvasses a claim arising from the plaintiff's apparent refusal to refund a sum of US$47,000 which had been advanced by the defendant to the plaintiff in September 1998 at the time when the plaintiff's claim was under investigation by the defendant. It is said that such advance payment, which it seems was to cover interest charges imposed by the plaintiff's bank, was to be returned (less deduction of the insurance premium of US$6,572.38) if it subsequently was ascertained that there was no obligation to indemnify under the policy.

6. For the defendant, Mr Sussex SC says that this claim was not made before simply because it was assumed by his client that the plaintiff would repay the sum thus advanced should the defendant be successful in defeating the plaintiff's claim. This was a small matter which admittedly was not dealt with at the trial, he said, but which now could easily be cleared up on a cost-effective basis by permitting the amendment sought and thereafter further pleadings on the point and, if such proved necessary, by having a short further hearing to determine the issue, as to which there was no realistic defence. He suggested that his client may have been guilty of naivety in not initially claiming this sum as part of its case, but the matter now could be easily rectified.

7. In opposing the application for the plaintiff, Mr Graham submitted that it was far too late now to come in with further claims, and that in any event the court was functus and had no jurisdiction so to do since the Order reflecting the judgment of the court had been sealed. This was not a case wherein amendments of this sort ought now to be raised or allowed, he said.

8. The court has been referred to a number of cases dealing with when amendments can be made, even in extreme circumstances. There is, however, no need to refer to them in detail, because I am quite satisfied that in this instance, wherein the court is still occupied in dealing with matters, such as costs, arising from the case, that this is not an instance of the court being functus officio. Jurisdiction thus exists to entertain this application. The more pertinent question is whether the court should exercise its discretion to permit that which now is being sought?

9. In my view the answer is 'No'. This is an issue about which the defendant has been fully aware from the very outset of this case, some four years ago, and there is no reason whatever why a simple counterclaim of the type now mooted could not have been advanced and pleaded at the appropriate time, and thereafter adjudged as part of the trial. Whatever the merits of this residual claim - and it is said that there are none in favour of the plaintiff in my view it will not do to come back four months after judgment and request that the court re-open the substantive case on a new, albeit collateral, point. It was quite plain that the erstwhile good relations between these parties had disintegrated totally with the onset of this strongly-fought litigation, and if the defendant has chosen to proceed throughout the entirety of this case without raising this claim, it seems to me that it only has itself to blame.

10. There is a public interest in the finality of litigation, as Godfrey J (as he then was) observed in Wing Han Trading Co. Ltd. v. Tang Yan-Kit and Another [1991] 1HKLR 494, and nothing has been said to convince me, in the exercise of my discretion, that I should now permit this case to be re-opened on no other basis than that the defendant consciously chose not to mount this claim in the case as tried to judgment, only then to return to court, in effect on the premise that it had guessed incorrectly about what the plaintiff was likely to do in terms of repayment of these monies when faced with an adverse result. In my judgment a court would require an exceptional case before acceding to an application of this nature, and this case manifestly is not such.

11. It follows, therefore, that the application to re-amend after judgment, and to re-open this case on this 'repayment issue', is refused.

Third Party Costs

12. There has already been one disputed costs hearing to vary a costs order nisi (see the judgment in this regard handed down on 6 August 2002), and I confess that I had not appreciated that, subject to the "minor matters" remaining outstanding (see paragraph 20 of that judgment), there was anything of substance that required resolution by the court.

13. Nevertheless, that which apparently remains at issue is whether the plaintiff, who has lost the head action, should be responsible not only for payment of the defendant's costs of that action, but also for the costs incurred by the defendant in the third party proceedings commenced by the defendant against People's Insurance Company Ltd of Singapore, whom the defendant initially had joined as Third Party prior to reaching a settlement with the Singaporean insurer, thereby leaving the head action to proceed on its own. The terms of this settlement are described in Mr Horton's affidavit of 18 September 2002, and provided, inter alia, that the defendant would defend the action in Hong Kong in consultation with, and with the documentary assistance of PIC, and that should the defendant lose at trial the third party would contribute 43.5% of any sum adjudged due to the plaintiff, including the principal amount, costs and interest.

14. For all practical purposes PIC dropped out of this litigation, and compromise ensued, after it had failed to strike out the defendant's third party action, which application was based on a clause within a PIC policy which also had been issued to the plaintiff covering the lost shipment of palm olein.

15. In support of this application for the costs of these third party proceedings Mr Sussex made the point that, given the fact of such double insurance, it was inevitable, if PIC was not joined as 2nd defendant to the head action (as it should have been) that his client, as sole defendant, had little option but to move to join PIC as third party and thus obtain contribution for double insurance pursuant to the terms of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. Although the third party action had been dismissed by consent with no order as to costs between the defendant and third party, there was no reason in the circumstances, he submitted, why this plaintiff, which now had failed in its action against the defendant, should not be responsible for the costs incurred by the defendant in terms of those third party proceedings.

16. For his part Mr Graham opposed the making of such costs order. The Third Party action had been disposed of by a Consent Order of 22 September 2000, he said, and it was at this stage and at this stage only that the issue of third party costs had crystallized; or, put another way, third party costs had been "dealt with intoto" at the time of such discontinuation, and against the background of this third party settlement costs now should not be visited on the plaintiff. Nor, he added, should the defendant be penalized in costs for having decided to litigate in Hong Kong as opposed to Singapore.

17. I am unable to discern any merit in this argument. Once I am satisfied, as I am, that the third party proceedings were justified in the circumstances of this case, I fail to see why the PIC settlement, which was entered into on a 'no order as to costs' basis, should preclude the defendant now from making application that the unsuccessful plaintiff pay the defendant's own costs of the third party proceedings. It seems well-established that the court may order an unsuccessful plaintiff to pay the costs of third or fourth parties whose joinder was made inevitable by the plaintiff's claim see M/N 16/7/4 of the 2002 Hong Kong Practice - and, as Mr Sussex submitted, the defendant's costs are a fortiori.

18. At the end of the day, therefore, I am satisfied that it is appropriate, in the exercise of my discretion, further to order that the plaintiff do pay the defendant's costs of the third party proceedings in this action, save in so far as such third party costs already have been made subject of costs orders earlier made by this court. In this context I would add that, subsequent to the hearing of argument, I called for a breakdown of the plaintiff's costs in the third party proceedings (which document is exhibited to the further affidavit of Mr Horton dated 8 November 2002), which schedule makes it clear on its face that no claim is made for costs involved in the unsuccessful striking out application made by the third party. Naturally, such costs of the third party proceedings for which claim now is made are to be taxed, if not agreed, in accordance with usual principles.

19. It follows, therefore, that I make an Order in terms of paragraph 2 of the defendant's summons dated 18 September 2002.

Costs of these applications

20. The result of the foregoing is that each party has been successful in one of the applications before the court. It is not easy to attempt to estimate the proportion of the total time expended on each, although it is probably not far off a 50 : 50 split. In any event, I make an order nisi that there be no order as to costs of the defendant's summons dated 18 September 2002.

21. At the outset of his submissions Mr Sussex noted that the court was here concerned with "two final pieces of housekeeping" arising from this case. I trust that the finality to which he alluded accurately reflects the position, and that indeed nothing now remains outstanding for decision.

(William Stone)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr Peter Graham, instructed by Messrs Crump & Co, for the Plaintiff

Mr Charles Sussex SC, instructed by Messrs Richards Butler, for the Defendant

22882-EN-2002-08-06

NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LTD. v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

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HCCL000027D/1999

HCCL 27/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMMERCIAL ACTION NO. 27 OF 1999

-------------------------

BETWEEN
NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LIMITEDPlaintiff
AND
CHINA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant
AND
THE PEOPLE'S INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDThird Party

-----------------------

Coram: Hon Stone J. in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 29 July 2002

Date of Judgment: 6 August 2002

_____________________

JUDGMENT ON COSTS

_____________________

Introduction

1. On 28 June 2002 judgment was handed down in this action dismissing the plaintiff's action against the defendant. The court further made a costs order nisi that the defendant was to have the costs of the action, to be taxed if not agreed.

2. The plaintiff wished to be heard on the question of costs, hence this hearing. As was the position at trial, Mr Graham again appeared for the plaintiff. In essence, his submission covered three broad areas. I deal briefly with each.

Unsuccessful Issue

3. There were three main issues in the trial, of which non-disclosure/misrepresentation was one. In fact, by closing submissions misrepresentation had fallen away, although Mr Sussex SC, who appeared for the defendant underwriter then as now, continued strongly to press the non-disclosure argument.

4. This particular argument ultimately was unsuccessful. Out of the three issues which were put forward as grounds for avoiding liability under the policy in question, it was the only one upon which the defendant failed to get home, the reasons for such failure being set out in the Judgment.

5. Mr Graham submits that with regard to this separate identifiable issue, not only should the defendant not recover costs referable to trying that issue, but, to the contrary, the plaintiff should recover such portion of costs. So that on the assumption, for example, that this issue took up 30% of the time at trial, the defendant should have 30% of the trial costs to set-off against the balance of costs due to the successful defendant, which would result in the defendant recovering but one third of the overall trial costs. I reject this argument, which in my view would produce a costs order which manifestly failed to reflect reality.

6. In the alternative, the submission was that even if the plaintiff did not recover its costs attributable to this issue, then at the least the defendant also should not be able to recover those costs.

7. I am not persuaded by this argument either. On the basis of the principles laid down by Nourse LJ in In re Elgindata (No.2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207, at 1214 - a case which counsel both agree provides the relevant text for arguments of this nature - I do not think that the non-disclosure element of the case was one which should not have been pursued, nor that its ventilation at trial, in the words of Nourse LJ, "caused a significant increase in the length or cost of the proceedings". In fact, as matters stood a projected 15 day trial was reduced to 8 hearing days, and the non-disclosure argument was merely an issue explored in normal course with the witnesses on both sides.

8. Whilst I accept that there exists a discretion on the part of a trial judge to disallow costs in part which are referable to an issue that has failed and has taken up a substantial part of a trial, in my judgment this is not such situation, and I decline to exercise such discretion. This was an unusual and far from a straightforward case, in particular from the perspective of the defendant underwriter, and as might have been anticipated counsel on both sides conducted their respective cases with expedition, economy and a good deal of common sense. In the circumstances, therefore, Mr Graham has not succeeded in persuading me that there should be any departure from the general rule that costs follow the event. I further venture to suggest, as a matter of general approach to the issue of trial costs, that the occasions which justify the 'filleting' of costs according to success or failure upon any specific issue arising for decision within the composite whole are likely to be relatively few and far between, and in all probability will be plainly recognizable as meriting such treatment. However this, as I have said, is not one of those instances.

Wasted Costs

9. Mr Graham's complaint here is that two particular issues which had been raised by the defendant throughout were abandoned either on the eve of trial or at the trial itself, and that accordingly the plaintiff should be permitted to recover the costs referable to these matters.

10. The first of these is the allegation as to the plaintiff's lack of insurable interest, which was alive at the outset of the trial but ultimately was not pursued by Mr Sussex. I do not consider that this objection is well-founded. At the beginning of the case Mr Sussex made it clear that he was not relinquishing the point until he was satisfied that it would not run, and in fact this is what occurred. His submission at this costs' hearing was that he was entitled to wait and see if the plaintiff's evidence established the insurable interest asserted, not least because it had not been dealt with on the face of the witness statements, and in any event there had been some suggestion that part of the cargo at least had been paid for by Nam Kwong's intended purchaser, Beihei Guangxi, and that it was not until Mr Lao of Nam Kwong had clarified the position in the witness box that he felt able to surrender the point. I accept this, and dismiss the costs objection/application based on insurable interest.

11. Mr Graham's second complaint under this head has more substance. This focused upon the defendant's allegation as to the plaintiff's failure to avert or minimize its loss, a plea which was extant (at paragraph 6) within the defendant's pleadings until deleted in the Re-Re-Re Amended Points of Defence just before trial. In broad terms, this aspect of the defendant's case had been put on the basis that the missing cargo appeared to have been sighted in Indonesia in October 1998 and in Zhangjigang, China in December 1998, and it was contended that the plaintiff had failed to take all reasonable steps to retrieve the cargo and/or the sale proceeds and had failed to mitigate any loss allegedly suffered, the defendant here relying on the terms of clause 16 of the ICC(A) which places a duty upon an Assured "to take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimizing such loss".

12. A Notice to Admit Facts had been served on the defendant on 23 March 2001, said Mr Graham, which had required an admission that the plaintiff had taken such measures as were compliant with clause 16, but regrettably this had met with no response, and thereafter the entire allegation had been jettisoned at the eleventh hour. In the circumstances, he submitted, the plaintiff should have all the legal costs incurred referable to this plea.

13. Mr Sussex accepted that as to this allegation his client indeed should bear any relevant costs incurred as from the date of the Notice to Admit, but no further. In my view he was correct to make this concession, and the only further question thereby arising for decision is whether the abandonment of this positive allegation should attract an award of costs against the defendant for the period when it remained on the face of the pleading prior to the Notice to Admit.

14. As a matter of principle this question requires a determination of the legitimacy of this plea from the outset, and in this regard Mr Sussex drew attention to the existence in the papers of a sales invoice from Kong Hoo, dated 29 November 1998, referable to a cargo of palm oil shipped to China, which cargo in terms of quantity varied by 2 barrels only from the missing shipment. Accordingly, he said, it was not fair to assert that the plea in question had been made without reasonable basis. He noted, moreover, that it was open to a defendant underwriter in the circumstances such as this, wherein it was completely in the dark as to what in fact had taken place, to take every point legitimately open to it to take, a fortiori when the point in question related to provisions of the ICC(A) in terms of a duty imposed on the assured.

15. I am inclined to agree. Subject to the concession made, I do not consider that the defendant in this case should have to pay to the plaintiff all costs referable to this allegation, albeit ultimately not pursued. A measure of protection is, of course, afforded to the opposing party by means of a Notice to Admit, and with the benefit of hindsight this Notice could perhaps have been issued earlier. Accordingly, subject to the concession as to the relevant costs occasioned by the plaintiff in the post-Notice period, I do not accede to the plaintiff's application for costs in this regard, although equally I do not consider it appropriate for the defendant itself to recover any costs referable to this plea. Accordingly, the situation is thus: save that as from 23 March 2001 the plaintiff is to have those legal costs incurred as were referable to the plea that the plaintiff failed to avert or minimize its losses, such costs to be taxed if not agreed, there is to be no order as to the costs of and occasioned by such plea.

Other matters

16. The other matters raised by Mr Graham are relatively minor, and, it seems to me, can safely be disposed of under a 'general housekeeping' head.

17. As was recognized, interlocutory costs orders hitherto made in favour both of plaintiff and defendant are unaffected and continue to stand. However, what apparently is causing difficulties are what are said to be unresolved costs items. With the aid of a Schedule Mr Graham sought to point out 6 interlocutory items which he said thus far had not attracted orders for costs, but for which such orders ought to be made in favour of the plaintiff, and some 7 other items for which no orders had been made but for which he submitted that the defendant should not recover its costs.

18. Argument in this area is concerned as much with detail as broad principle, and regrettably papers were unavailable to facilitate investigation of the specific items with which the plaintiff was here concerned. I remain to be convinced that in those instances requiring costs orders such orders in fact have not been made, and in my view what is here necessary is for the respective solicitors to consult their records in an effort to agree what has or has not occurred. Absent agreement thereon, no doubt reference can be made to the court records, and if it transpires that indeed there are particular interlocutory matters for which costs provision for some reason has been omitted, and thus argument is required, such specific matter(s) can be dealt with by the solicitors at a short 9.30 appointment. For the present, however, I am in no position to take this aspect further, and it seems not unreasonable to observe that these minor matters profitably could have been discussed prior to this costs hearing.

Costs of the Order nisi hearing

19. In so far as a further 9.30 appointment be required, argument as to the costs of this hearing can be dealt with at that time. In any event I am told by leading counsel that material I have not thus far seen exists relevant to these particular costs. Alternatively, if no further argument arises apart from the question of the costs of this hearing, I am content to deal with this in correspondence upon the basis of such papers as are placed before me.

Summary

20. Subject to further minor matters, if any, requiring clarification, the plaintiff's application to vary the costs order nisi thus succeeds only in terms of the legal costs wasted by abandonment by the defendant of the plea that the plaintiff failed to avert or minimize its losses, which costs are to be dealt with in the manner outlined at paragraph 15 above. The costs order as drawn no doubt will reflect this fact. In so far as may be necessary, there is to be liberty to apply.

William Stone
Judge of the Court of First Instance

Representation:

Mr Peter Graham instructed by Messrs Crump & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Charles Sussex SC instructed by Messrs Richards Butler, for the defendant

22580-EN-2002-06-28

NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LTD. v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

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20912-EN-2002-02-08

NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LTD. v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

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HCCL000027B/1999

HCCL27/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMMERCIAL ACTION NO. 27 OF 1999

-------------------------

BETWEEN
NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LTDPlaintiff
AND
CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTDDefendant
AND
THE PEOPLE'S INSURANCE CO. LTDThird Party

-----------------------

Coram: Hon. Stone J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 5 February 2002

Date of Judgment: 8 February 2002

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J U D G M E N T

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1. This is a security for costs application mounted by the defendant herein pursuant to its summons dated 25 January 2002.

2. This is the second such application in the head action. By a summons dated 3 February 2000 the defendant sought security for costs in the sum of HK$1,388,448.65 up to and including the exchange of witness statements, an application which was heard on 24 February 2000.

3. Whilst there appears to be no engrossed order, on that occasion this court ordered that the plaintiff "provide security for costs, up to but not including trial, in the sum of HK$700,000, such security to be provided in a manner agreed between the parties", with the costs of the application being awarded to the defendant in any event.

4. This initial application was backed by an affidavit of Mr Andrew Horton sworn on 3 February 2000, Mr Horton himself appearing on that occasion, together with Mr Potts for the defendant. Exhibited to Mr Horton's affidavit was inter partes correspondence with the defendant upon the issue of security, together with a breakdown of costs (including costs attributable to the Third Party proceedings) which took the matter up to trial.

5. As earlier noted, the amount then sought has been $1.388 million. My notes of the argument at that application, to which I have now had the opportunity to refer, indicated that Mr Potts had conceded that security for costs was payable in principle, but maintained a hard line on quantum, being prepared to concede "$750,000 up to and including trial", whilst Mr Horton, for his part, declared that he "would be happy with $800,000 today". The latter figure, of course, did not include security for the costs of the trial, and in the event the sum of $700,000 was ordered.

6. This then is the background against which this second application is mounted. Once again, the application is backed by an affidavit from Mr Horton, dated 24 January 2002. This affidavit also exhibits a costs breakdown for the entire action, that is, up to and including trial, the figure thus produced amounting to $4,126,737.65. After deduction of the sum of $700,000 already provided, the present application now seeks additional security for costs of HK$3,426,737.65.

7. The shape of the argument is broadly thus. Mr Sussex SC, who appears for the defendant on this application (and who is designated senior counsel for defendant for trial) maintains that this is a serious commercial action which, by agreement, now has been set down for 15 days for the period 7-28 May 2002. The plaintiff's claim under an all-risks policy of marine insurance issued with regard to the vessel "Pacifica" is, he said, of substance, amounting to US$2.5 million together with interest thereon from October 1998, and raises difficult questions of fact and of law. In this latter regard, Mr Sussex noted that in total eight factual witnesses would be called to testify, together with three expert witnesses, and he outlined six distinct defences his client intended to run. These were, he asserted, eminently good defences to this action, which would be strenuously resisted, albeit whilst asserting misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff at the time of the issuance of the policy, he did not seek to implicate the plaintiff in what clearly was a serious fraud by shipowners involving in the disappearance of the "Pacifica", now regarded as a "phantom vessel", and the well-planned theft of her cargo of palm oil. In the circumstances, suggested Mr Sussex, the defendant was well able to justify the order for security now sought in the amount of $3.42 million.

8. Mr Potts did not agree. He made complaint about the late timing of this application, coming as it did but three months before trial, and suggested that this was a further attempt by the defendant to stifle the plaintiff's legitimate claim : it had, he said, received no moneys pursuant to its claim under its policy of marine insurance, and had been forced to maintain this action in order to be paid out what was legitimately due.

9. In common with the initial security for costs application, Mr Potts did not feel able to dispute primary liability to furnish security, but launched a strenuous and detailed attack upon all aspects of Mr Horton's draft bill, including in particular the time costs of the several solicitors involved for the plaintiff, and also the necessity to employ two counsel in what was, from his viewpoint, a relatively straightforward matter. On the basis of the individual revised figures produced whilst on his feet (the sum of which I have now recalculated), by the conclusion of his submission he had whittled the total amount sought from $3.42 million to approximately $1.79 million, each of these figures having been arrived at after making allowance for the original payment of $700,000.

10. It is evident from the approach now adopted that what the plaintiff was doing in proffering these new figures was twofold : first, seeking to 'top-up' the initial sum of $700,000 granted in security and second, to obtain security for the significant trial costs to come.

11. For my own part, and even assuming jurisdiction so to do, I decline now to revisit the initial security for costs figure simply on the basis that the plaintiff appears to have spent considerably more than its original estimate. This court already has made the determination of the amount of security to be furnished up to and including trial, and I do not now accede to the submission that this figure should effectively be upgraded.

12. What remains appropriate, in my view, is to consider the figures put up from now until the conclusion of the 15 day trial. In round figures these are anticipated counsels' fees and other disbursements of $1.938 million, and a further $484,000 comprising solicitors' costs, thus totalling $2.422 million.

13. A central feature in this equation is, of course, the justification or otherwise for the use by the defendant of senior and junior counsel in this case, although I am told by Mr Potts that he will be using but one counsel, albeit a junior of expertise and seniority. In this connection Mr Sussex submitted that since a certificate for two counsel was no longer required to be granted by the trial judge for trial in open court, it ought then to follow that in a security for costs context the amount of security to be furnished must reflect that fact.

14. Persuasive though this sounds at first blush, I am far from sure that that this result inexorably follows. To the contrary. In my judgment it is always open to the court to take a view about the case at the pre-trial stage, so that even though a certificate for two counsel may no longer be necessary at taxation, the ordering of security for the costs of both counsel does not, it seems to me, occur as a matter of course. All must depend on the particular circumstances, and I discern no difficulty in reviewing the case in the round in order to arrive at a view regarding the use, or otherwise, of two counsel.

15. The present case is undoubtedly a serious commercial action, with a significant sum of money at stake. I factor in, also, that there appear to be a significant number of documents (I pause to note that the number of relevant documents inevitably is far fewer than the mass of papers that is contained in large numbers of bundles), that there is a certain amount of cross-examination to be prepared, and that difficult points of law are to be argued. In my view, however, whilst eminently suitable for a counsel of Mr Sussex's standing, this case does not strike me as insuperably difficult, at least by the standards of commercial actions, so that I am unpersuaded that the defendant should be required to furnish security for the costs of junior counsel briefed to assist Mr Sussex, however desirable that may be thought to be.

16. After considering the draft bill regarding the anticipated costs to the conclusion of this trial, in the exercise of my discretion I order that the appropriate additional amount now to be furnished in security is $1.8 million, thereby producing an overall figure of $2.5 million in security for costs, which in the circumstances strikes me as about right.

17. Given the proximity of Chinese New Year, which in practical terms means the loss of an entire business week, I further order that the said sum be provided in a manner agreed between the parties, alternatively to be paid into court not later than five weeks from today's date, that is, by 4:00 p.m. on Friday, 15 March 2002. There is to be no interim stay, and indeed Mr Sussex properly did not ask for one.

18. I have reflected upon Mr Potts's assertion that this application had a 'stifling' aim. No affidavit has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff, and Mr Potts did not seek to suggest impecuniosity on behalf of his client, so that this submission is not made out. I would, however, comment that I regard it as unfortunate that this application for a significant further sum in security was not mounted with greater period of leeway prior to trial. Perhaps this was oversight and nothing more. In any event, I do not accept Mr Sussex's riposte that the application had been brought before, as he put it, the 'expiry' of the last order. That order had canvassed security for costs up to and including trial, and it cannot seriously be maintained that anticipated costs for trial would or could not earlier have been ascertained.

19. Unlike the previous instance, no pre-application correspondence has been exhibited to Mr Horton's latest affidavit upon the issue of security. Absent knowledge of any offer in this regard, I make an order nisi that the costs of this application be to the defendant in any event, to be taxed if not agreed. Whilst this court is always assisted by Mr Sussex SC, in my view this particular application was not appropriate for senior counsel, and could and should have been conducted either by Mr Horton (as on the last occasion) or by junior counsel if counsel's presence was regarded as necessary at all. In the circumstances, I see no reason why the plaintiff should bear the full brunt of the defendant's fees incurred for this application, and I further direct that the taxing master consider the defendant's bill of costs in light of these observations.

(William Stone)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr Charles Sussex, S.C., instructed by Messrs Richards Butler, for the Defendant

Mr Potts of Messrs Crump & Co., for the Plaintiff

33880-EN-2000-05-26

NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LTD. v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD. and THE PEOPLE\'S INSURANCE CO. LTD. (Third Party)

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HCCL000027A/1999

HCCL27/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMMERCIAL ACTION NO.27 OF 1999

---------------

BETWEEN
NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LIMITEDPlaintiff
AND
CHINA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant
and
THE PEOPLE'S INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDThird Party

---------------

Coram: Hon Stone J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 18 May 2000

Date of Judgment: 26 May 2000

 

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

 

The action

1. In this action the plaintiff claims against the defendant ("CIC") the sum of US$2,442,000 under a policy of marine insurance issued by the defendant on 1 June 1999.

2. The unusual circumstances surrounding the claim, which involves the disappearance of a mystery vessel named the "Pacifica" - alleged to be a 'phantom ship' used for the purposes of fraud - are set out in the judgment of this court dated 4 October 1999, wherein the defendant's application for a forum non conveniens stay of proceedings was dismissed.

3. As a consequence of that judgment, the defendant insurer applied for, and obtained leave to issue and serve third party proceedings out of the jurisdiction upon the third party insurer ("PIC") in Singapore. By Third Party Points of Claim dated 31 January 2000, CIC claims contribution against PIC pursuant to section 80 of the Marine Insurance Act on the ground that the plaintiff was double insured, PIC having also issued a policy of insurance on 1 June 1998.

The application

4. By summons dated 2 March 2000 PIC applied to strike out and dismiss the third party proceedings under Order 18 rule 19, RHC, alternatively for questions to be determined pursuant to Order 14A, RHC. It is this application which is the subject of this judgment, and for the purpose of argument has proceeded upon the basis of certain assumed facts, namely :-

first, that CIC's policy, although stated to be issued on 1 June, was in fact issued to the plaintiff on 8 June 1998;

second, that PIC's policy was initially issued to Pao Sang Trading on 1 June 1998 and was not assigned to the plaintiff until at least 10 June 1998; and

third, that as soon as the "Pacifica" left port at Pasir Gudang the loss occurred.

The argument

5. There is no dispute between the parties (assuming primary liability to have been established in the head action) that if in fact there was double insurance, CIC has a claim for contribution against PIC based upon section 80 of the Marine Insurance Act. However, PIC's case is that as the result of a particular clause in its policy (the existence of which is not disputed) double insurance does not arise. This clause reads :-

"APPLICABLE TO MARINE CARGO POLICIES

...

This insurance does not cover any loss or damage to the property which at the time of the happening of such loss or damage is insured by or would but for the existence of this Policy be insured by any fire or other insurance policy or policies except in respect of any excess beyond the amount which would have been payable under the fire or other insurance policy or policies had this insurance not been effected.

... "

6. Mr Shieh, on behalf of PIC, the applicant herein, submits shortly that the plain wording of this clause covers the present case. On the assumption that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff (the premise of the third party proceedings), the property in question was plainly covered by the defendant's policy at the time of its loss; and if of course the property was not so covered, the defendant would not be under any liability to the plaintiff, and there would be no question of the defendant claiming any contribution from the third party.

7. In response, Mr Smith for CIC basically took three points :-

first, that the words "any fire or other insurance policy" should be construed eiusdem generis and/or noscitur a sociis, so that, accordingly, the "other" policy in question should be construed as being akin to a fire policy, that is, a non-marine policy;

second, a temporal argument, given that the policy used the term "is insured", and as a matter of fact no other insurance was in place at the time of the occurrence of the loss on 1 June 1998; and

third, that at the time of the loss - assumed for present purposes to be 1 June and not later - in light of the principles of double insurance there was no required correspondence between risk and interest under the two policies until 10 June when Pao Sang assigned its interest under its policy to the plaintiff; in other words, there was no coincidence of such interest until the assignment which (at least for present purposes) postdated "the happening of the loss or damage".

8. In outline, therefore, these were the parameters of a vigorous argument on the basis of which - either by means of Order 18, rule 19 or by the Order 14A route - Mr Shieh maintained that his client was clearly entitled to be removed from these proceedings at this early stage.

Decision

9. I am unable to agree with this submission, and I refuse this application. Persuasively though the argument was crafted, I do not consider that the issues fall within the "plainly and obviously unsustainable" benchmark for an Order 18, rule 19 strike out, whilst in terms of Order 14A, in the exercise of my discretion I decline to proceed to determine the questions posed on the basis of assumed facts and absent the expert evidence that I am told by Mr Smith will be deployed by the defendant at trial upon the construction issue.

10. Notwithstanding the tripartite nature of his submission, it is probably fair to say that Mr Smith's principal contention focused around the construction argument. At bottom, this was that when read as a whole, and looking at the words, including the introductory words, in their proper context, it was strongly arguable that this clause was not intended to exclude the principle of double insurance enshrined in the Marine Insurance Act. Indeed, continued Mr Smith, unless the court presently was minded to construe the words as the third party now would have it, it would be difficult in the circumstances to rule at this stage that the words bore the contrary meaning for which he contended, in that at trial he would wish to lead expert evidence from persons in the marine underwriting profession as to trade usage and practice in terms of the sub-clause "any fire or other insurance policy or policies", and the way in which this is treated in the trade as excluding marine policies. Put another way, said Mr Smith, it was and is not common to find what is a non-contribution clause in marine insurance policies, precisely because such would be in conflict with established statutory principle.

11. Mr Smith supported this argument with reference to insurance texts - see, for example, O'May, Marine Insurance Law and Policy, 1993, at pages 502-503 - and also relied, in part at least, on the lately filed affirmation of Mr Lee Yuen Ki, a marine underwriter in the employ of Tai Ping Insurance Company Limited. This affirmation was received de bene esse in the face of Mr Shieh's objection as to admissibility; for the avoidance of doubt, I admit this evidence subject to the excision of paragraph 3 thereof, which for present purposes I disregard. In addition, Mr Smith proffered a draft reply on the point, noting that the present third party summons had been filed prior to the expiry of the time for the filing of a reply in the third party pleadings, and that the specific point on this clause had been taken for the first time in the third party defence; in fact, he continued, until that defence had been filed, his client had not had sight of this clause.

12. It is abundantly clear that there is going to be a trial of this action, and that on the facts this is going to be a highly contentious case. The defendant's stay application having failed, in the particular circumstances joinder of the third party naturally followed, and it is surprising to say the least that a knock-out blow of the type now said to be decisive was not raised by PIC in an attack on the jurisdiction in terms of an application to set aside the leave granted to the defendant to serve the third party proceedings out of the jurisdiction.

13. Be that as it may. After fully considering the evidence, together with the able submissions of counsel, in my judgment such an attack does not succeed at this juncture either. I am firmly disinclined to permit the third party to depart the proceedings at this early stage via either of the procedural routes suggested. The present application has not been made out. The matter is not so clear that it can fairly and confidently be adjudged in the manner now suggested. There is to be a trial involving all interested parties, and at that trial all relevant facts (such as, for example, the date of the loss) and all relevant issues, including, if appropriate, the contribution issue (one of the various matters pleaded in the third party defence), finally will be determined.

14. I order that the third party's application be dismissed. Absent agreement thereon, I will hear the parties on costs at a date and time to be appointed.

 

 

(William Stone)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

 

Representation:

Mr Clifford Smith, instructed by Messrs Richards Butler, for the Defendant

Mr Paul Shieh, instructed by Messrs Simmons & Simmons, for the Third Party

23034-EN-1999-10-04

NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LTD. v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

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HCCL000027/1999

HCCL27/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMMERCIAL LIST NO.27 OF 1999

---------------

BETWEEN
NAM KWONG MEDICINES & HEALTH PRODUCTS CO. LIMITEDPlaintiff
AND
CHINA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant

---------------

Coram : The Hon Mr Justice Stone in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 27 September 1999

Date of Delivery of Judgment : 4 October 1999

_____________________

J U D G M E N T

_____________________

The Application

1. This is the Defendant's application, by summons dated 19th May 1999, for an order that all further proceedings herein be stayed to the Court of Singapore on the basis that Singapore is a more natural and appropriate forum for the trial of this action and of all connected litigation, including third party indemnity proceedings.

The Background

2. The Writ herein, with Points of Claim indorsed thereon, was issued on 25th February 1999. At bottom, the Plaintiff's claim is simple. By a contract of insurance evidenced by a policy No.PMG-98-001134-7 dated 1st June 1998, the Defendant through its Macau branch agreed with the Plaintiff, in consideration for premium paid, to insure a shipment of 15,788 drums of refined bleached and deodorised palm olein valued at US$2.442 million on conditions covering marine risks as per Institute Cargo Clauses (A) dated 1st January 1982, on a voyage from Malaysia to Beihai, Guangxi, China on board the vessel "Pacifica" for loading/sailing on or about 1st June 1998.

3. The insurance is said to have attached when the cargo, duly certified, left the warehouse for the commencement of the transit, and on 1st June 1998 two bills of lading (Nos.2001/98 and 2002/98) were issued on behalf of Wheels Maritimes Sdn. Bhd., signed as agent for the Master, evidencing that the cargo was shipped on board the"Pacifica" on that date.

4. The "Pacifica" failed to deliver the cargo at Beihai and is now missing. However, the Defendant, China Insurance Co. Ltd. ("CIC"), has declined liability under the policy and has failed to pay the sum insured, that is, the cargo value of US$2.442 million.

5. Put thus, the claim is straightforward, the only other point worthy of note at this stage being the pleaded fact that this cargo was double insured, not only with the Defendant herein, but also with the People's Insurance Co. Ltd. ("PIC") of Singapore pursuant to Policy No. D98/513/11605 dated 1st June 1998; this policy was issued at Singapore pursuant to agreement between PIC and the supplier of the cargo, one Pao Sang Trading ("Pao Sang") of Singapore, which is pleaded to have assigned interest in this latter policy to the Plaintiff. Notwithstanding this aspect, however, the present suit seeks to enforce the CIC policy only, albeit the element of double insurance featured prominently in the argument upon this application.

6. But to return to the background facts. The "Pacifica" is a mystery vessel. It sailed with the cargo, but it and its cargo have now disappeared. It is said to be a "phantom ship", which is a term used within the International Maritime Bureau, which specialises in the investigation of maritime fraud, to describe a vessel which is employed as a vehicle for fraud. This phenomenon is, apparently, regrettably well known in Far East Shipping circles, the modus operandi being that shortly after leaving the port of shipment, delays occurred during the voyage, and during such delays the "phantom ship" proceeds to a new location to discharge her cargo and to achieve her disappearance. It is said in this case that the sequence of events concerning the "Pacifica", together with her eventual disappearance, conformed to this pattern; having proceeded first to Singapore (ostensibly for reasons linked to the payment under the relevant letter of credit opened in favour of Pao Sang, with the proceeds thereunder being remitted to Koo Hong Pte Ltd. ("Koo Hong"), Pao Sang's supplier), and having remained there until 12th or 13th June 1998, thereafter communications were received from the "Pacifica" indicating that the vessel was taking in water and encountering heavy weather, until on 19th July 1998 a message was received to the effect that the vessel had been lost with all her cargo.

7. Evidence filed in support of this application seeks to substantiate the contention as to wrongdoing, paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Mr Horton dated 27th May 1999 stating :-

"For example, it can readily be inferred from the facts which I set out below that the cargo which is the subject of this Action was the target of a well planned and executed theft by those operating the 'Pacifica', and that the intention to steal the cargo existed at and before the time that the vessel sailed from Pasir Gudang. Accordingly, it is improbable in the extreme that the vessel in fact sailed for Beihai when she left the loading port. It is overwhelmingly probable that she sailed for the alternative destination where the cargo was eventually discharged and disposed of. Accordingly, the Defendant will defend this claim on the basis, among others, of Section 44 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, which provides:

'Where the destination is specified in the policy, and the ship, instead of sailing for that destination, sails for any other destination, the risk does not attach.'"

This section 44 argument, to which brief reference is therein latterly made, also assumed prominence within this application.

The Argument

8. Mr Sussex, on behalf of the Defendant/Applicant, prayed in aid the well known principles laid down by Lord Goff in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex [1987] AC 460, submitting that, in the particular circumstances of this case, Hong Kong is plainly not the natural forum for the trial of this action and that Singapore is the forum with which this litigation has the most real and substantial connection.

9. To the contrary, Mr Coleman, representing the Plaintiff, whilst raising no dispute as to applicable legal principle, emphasised the existence of the burden on the Defendant to demonstrate why the Court should exercise its discretion to grant a stay, further stressing that the appropriateness of the forum is to be gauged in relation to the resolution of the specific issues raised in the proceedings, with the alleged connecting factors being evaluated in terms of such issues. And that when the real issues raised by this case were properly scrutinised, centering in particular upon misrepresentation and non-disclosure (issues stressed in Mr Horton's earlier affidavit evidence seeking time extensions), it followed, he said, that this application should fail in limine.

10. It is common ground that no evaluation of juridical disadvantage arose in this case, and it is fair to say that Mr Sussex founded his detailed argument upon two main heads :

(i) The existence of a body of relevant information available and compellable in Singapore

11. Mr Sussex made a good deal of the compellability point. The seller of this cargo, Pao Sang Trading, resides in Singapore, as does that seller's immediate supplier, Koo Hong. There was, said Mr Sussex, "reason to believe" that the gentleman associated with the participation of these companies in this transaction, in particular, one Mr Lee of Pao Sang and Mr Wong of Koo Hong, together with a broker by the name of Mr Ng, "know very much more about what happened to this cargo than they have so far been prepared to disclose to those investigating the loss on behalf of underwriters." It was thus envisaged that Norwich Pharmacal proceedings would be brought against these companies and individuals in order to obtain orders compelling them to disclose what they know.

12. Argument under this head extended to the ambit of the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination in Singapore, wherein the position presently appears to be that, subject to certain safeguards, this privilege is not available to be taken at trial, albeit it remains available in interlocutory proceedings. The compellability point was linked, also, with the section 44 issue, Mr Sussex maintaining that, for the purpose of establishing that the risk did not attach, if his client was able to prove where the vessel in fact went, there would be less necessity at any trial to rely on the Court for that which he termed"indulgent inference".

13. In my view this line of argument is, at bottom, illusory. I bear in mind that section 44 (together with sections 45 and 46 of the 1906 Act) represents but one element within this case, given the emphasis that has earlier been placed upon the issues of misrepresentation and non-disclosure, nor do I overlook the criticism Mr Coleman makes of the applicability of this line of argument given his submission that Clause 8 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (which provides that the risk attaches when the goods insured leave the warehouse for commencement of the transit) merits primacy in the circumstances of this case. Moreover, the idea that persons now being painted as probable conspirators, or at the very least accessories thereto (Mr Lee has apparently already placed a dollar value upon his story, for what that be worth) should be thought likely to co-operate, under subpoena, to tell the full story seems to me, to adopt Mr Coleman's comment in this regard, to be "far too optimistic", in that as a practical matter the Defendant was unlikely to get any information from Mr Lee prior to trial, nor in equally practical terms would it get anything from him at trial.

14. So that in reality, argument on these lines was no more, in my view, than clutching at evidential straws. And in any event, were expectations to be confounded and were Norwich Pharmacal litigation actually to yield valuable information, there is no reason of which I am aware why such information should not be adduced in the Hong Kong proceedings. And finally, whilst I accept the thesis that, at trial in Singapore, Mr Lee and his colleagues are compellable under threat of punishment by the State, I remain unconvinced that any competent advocate would contemplate putting one of these gentlemen into the witness box 'blind', so to speak, particularly given the existence of the circumstantial information which is available with regard to the movements of this particular vessel. In my judgment, therefore, this point is forensically attractive but substantively unconvincing.

15. The compellability issue elides into the other evidential aspect raised by Mr Sussex, namely, that possibilities exist for eliciting useful evidence as to this missing cargo from other sources within Singapore, namely, with regard to the vessel "Tenu", seized in the Malacaa Straits, and the vessel "Senei", which loaded in Indonesia for discharge in China a cargo bearing a passing resemblance to the missing cargo in the "Pacifica". In this context, also, reference is further made to another Singaporean Company, Diatechnology Pte. Ltd., which it is thought may be able to assist in the Defendant's further enquiries. Such may or may not be the case, but even on the assumption that such enquiries bear fruit, again it is not clear why such evidence, if voluntarily given, cannot as easily be adduced within the existing Hong Kong proceedings.

16. At the end of the day, therefore, I reject this line of argument as constituting good reason for a stay. Indeed, Mr Sussex was moved to observe, in his closing remarks, that if the only Singapore connection had been Mr Lee and his colleagues, his client "would not be troubling the court" with this stay application, but that taken in tandem with the 'double insurance' point, these aspects provided a powerful argument. I move now to this second issue.

(ii) Double insurance

17. It will be recalled that this risk was insured not only with the existing Defendant, China Insurance Co. Ltd., but also with the People's Insurance Co. Ltd. of Singapore.

18. Mr Sussex mounted his argument in this regard upon the proposition that, given his client's statutory right to contribution within the terms of what English law regarded as one insurance, it was therefore essential that the liability of PIS under this other policy should be determined in the same jurisdiction as the liability of CIC. Mr Sussex accepted that the Plaintiff was entirely within its rights to take the action it had and to sue one insured only, but maintained, since PIS is based in Singapore as is CIC also, that it was more appropriate to bring the entire action, including the third party contribution proceedings, in Singapore. In this latter regard, he isolated two points in particular :

first, if and in so far as it was possible, within the ambit of the existing Hong Kong action, to serve PIS out of the jurisdiction pursuant to Order 11 rule 1(1)(c) ("necessary or proper party"), absent appearance by PIS the position was problematic with regard to enforcement of a possible default judgment within the jurisprudence concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments; and

second, and more generally, the post-handover difficulty of enforcing Hong Kong judgments abroad, although with regard to the latter, Mr Coleman's researches had revealed that since 19th May 1999, Part 1 of Singapore's Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act had been extended to judgments of the Hong Kong SAR, which point Mr Sussex was minded to accept.

19. In opposition, Mr Coleman submitted that the two actions were fundamentally different, the present being a claim under a contract of insurance, and the inter-company claim being one under a statutory right to contribution. In this context Counsel were divided also over whether a claim to contribution arose only when payment to the primary liability had been affected (Mr Coleman's position) or whether it vested prior to crystallisation of such primary liability (as Mr Sussex submitted).

20. Although this latter question remained unsatisfactorily unresolved, absent citation of authority on the point, for my own part I am inclined to the view that liability to contribution vests only on crystallisation of primary liability. Nevertheless, for present purposes the point seems to me not greatly to matter. Because at the end of the day Mr Sussex's argument under this head is dependent upon suggesting potential problems in the context of a separate (albeit related) action between two insurers which has not yet seen the light of day, either in Hong Kong or in Singapore. And persuasively though this line of argument was advanced, in my view it is a somewhat ambitious approach to justify a stay of existing Hong Kong proceedings on the basis of an action not yet in existence.

21. It clearly remains open to the Defendant to mount third party proceedings within the context of the existing action, and in my judgment the mere fact that a potential contributory is based in Singapore does not suffice to get the Defendant home on this application.

Decision

22. It follows from the foregoing that, in the exercise of my discretion, this application is refused.

23. In the circumstances, and for the reasons outlined in this judgment, I do not consider that the Defendant has discharged the burden pursuant to the Spiliada benchmark of demonstrating that Singapore is "clearly or distinctly more appropriate" than Hong Kong, notwithstanding the Defendant's contention that Singapore constitutes the "centre of gravity" of this action. There is no doubt that there are historical factual links, if I can so term them, within the broad matrix of facts which have a Singaporean connection, but in my view these are not of direct relevance; there are, for example, similar important factual events in terms of the negotiation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in Macau in connection with the placing of the insurance, and there is and can be no suggestion that such conversations, or the passing of documentation, bears any connection with Singapore. And, as Mr Coleman pointed out, there has been no difficulty in the Defendant's solicitor obtaining five detailed witness statements in Hong Kong - in fact, the need to obtain these statements formed an important plank within the Defendant's earlier contentions that it should be permitted to garner such evidence before being required to file its Defence - nor, for that matter, has the Hong Kong forum inhibited the Defendant from the appointment of Hong Kong loss adjusters, and of raising enquiries here, activities which do not sit easily with criticism of Hong Kong as constituting the appropriate forum for the trial of this action.

24. Accordingly, when looked at in the round, the "solid practical reasons" advanced by Mr Sussex in support of the proposition that this litigation ought to take place in Singapore are not, in my judgment, made out sufficiently to persuade this Court to disturb jurisdiction, which in this instance it is founded in Hong Kong as of right. As Lord Goff put it in Spiliada, op.cit., at page 476F-G, the Court "will not lightly disturb jurisdiction so established", and indeed in these circumstances I decline the invitation so to do. Perceived convenience from the viewpoint of one party alone does not suffice to create another forum "clearly or distinctly more appropriate", and I bear in mind also that in commercial cases containing divers international elements the natural forum is sometimes less than easy to identify, as Lord Goff also remarked in Spiliada, op.cit. (at page 477).

Order

25. My Order, therefore, is as follows :-

The Defendant's Summons dated 19th May 1999 is dismissed with costs to be taxed, if not agreed.

Subject to any representations the parties wish to make today, I decline to permit further delay in a case in which the Writ was issued in February of this year. Accordingly, I propose to make the following immediate procedural directions :

(i) The Defence to the Points of Claim is to be filed within 14 days of today's date.

(ii) The Reply, if any, is to be filed and served within 14 days thereafter.

(iii) Application for leave to serve third party proceedings out of the jurisdiction, if any, is to be made within 28 days from today.

(iv) Discovery by exchange of list is to take place within 14 days after close of pleadings, with inspection 7 days thereafter.

(v) Mutual exchange of witness statements is to take place within 60 days from today.

(vi) Liberty to the parties to apply for further directions.

[Submissions from Counsel]

26. I have now had the advantage of observations from both parties on the proposed directions. As a result of those submissions, I am minded to amend my Order as follows :-

(i) In the circumstances of the case, I order that the costs be payable in any event, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. This was Mr Sussex's first point.

(ii) Second, due to the necessity of linking the Defence with the anticipated third party proceedings against the Singapore insurer, Mr Sussex has also asked for 28 days in terms of Direction (i), that is, with regard to the filing of the Defence. I also accede to that request. Having so acceded, I am sure that it will not be necessary, given the history of this matter, to consider any further time extension.

27. There being nothing further today, I take the opportunity to thank Counsel who appeared on this application for their assistance.

(William Stone)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

Representation:

Mr Russell Coleman, inst'd by M/s Crump & Co., for the Plaintiff

Mr Charles Sussex, inst'd by M/s Richards Butler, for the Defendant