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Construction and Arbitration Proceedings1999

MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD v. CHINA INSURANCE CO LTD

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19306-EN-2002-09-10

MALAYA BANKING BERHAD v. CHINA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

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HCCT000048/1999

HCCT48/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS NO.48 OF 1999

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BETWEEN
MALAYA BANKING BERHAD (as agent for and on behalf of the syndicate of banks comprising Malayan Banking Berhad, Overseas Union Bank Limited, and Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited)Plaintiff
AND
CHINA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant

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Coram: Hon Burrell J in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 3 and 4 September 2002

Date of Decision: 10 September 2002

 

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D E C I S I O N

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1. There are two summonses before the court. By the first, the defendant seeks a dismissal of the action by a striking out application and, alternatively a ruling under Order 14A to the same effect. By the second, the defendant seeks a stay of the proceedings pending the addition of two new plaintiffs.

2. The first summons involves an attack by the defendant on the validity of the damages claimed in the action. Originally two main heads of damage were claimed. They have been referred to as the "Delay Damages" claim and the "Wasted Expenditure" claims. Prior to the hearing Mr R. Tong, SC who appeared for the plaintiff with Mr A. Chan, informed the court that he would not be pursuing the "Delay Damages" claim and that the Statement of Claim would be amended to that effect in due course. This concession shortened the first summons to the extent that the issues now before the court are :

"Striking out application/Dismissal of action

1. the following parts of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim be struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and/or frivolous or vexatious and/or tending to embarrass the fair trial of this action and/or an abuse of process:

(1) ...

(2) the 3rd sentence, and Paragraph 4 of the Particulars, of Paragraph 15 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim (the 'Wasted Expenditure Damages Claim'); or

(3) ...

2. if an order is made pursuant to paragraph 1(2)above, this action be dismissed;

Order 14A application

3. alternatively to the orders sought in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the following questions of law and/or construction be determined:

(1) ...

(a) ...

(b) ...

(2) whether, on the true construction of Clause 24 of the said Development Agreement, the rights of United Trump International Limited following a valid termination of the Development Agreement are exclusively those provided for under Clause 24 and are limited to the recovery of additional costs (if any) of completing the Works following such termination;

(3) ...

4. ...

5. ...

6. if the answer to the question in paragraph 3(2) above is 'yes', the Wasted Expenditure Damages Claim be dismissed;

7. ..."

3. The plaintiff is one of three banks who lent money to United Trump International Limited ("UTIL") to buy and develop a building site. A firm called Molitoko became the contractors. The defendant insurance company (represented by Ms G. Li SC and Mr Thomas Lee) executed a performance bond in the sum of $30 million, in favour of UTIL, which guaranteed the performance of the contractor. After less than one year on site UTIL, in 1998, terminated Molitoko's contract. Molitoko has since gone into liquidation. In these proceedings the plaintiff's claim is limited to the value of the bond.

4. I now deal with the three issues in turn.

Order 14A application

5. If the question posed under the O.14A application is answered in the affirmative the effect would be that the plaintiff's claim be dismissed, there being no remaining claims.

6. The court's approach to such an application has been recently summarised by Ma J in Rockwin Enterprizes Ltd v. Shui Yee Ltd & others [2001] HKEC 1102. It involves a three step approach as follows :

"(1) is the relevant question one of law or construction?

(2) if so, is that question one that should be determined under the O.14A procedure? This step throws up three requirements:

(a) the court must have all necessary facts and matters before it in order to determine the question;

(b) if determined by the court, the question will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any issue or claim therein;

(c) the court must in its discretion be satisfied that the question is one that ought to be determined under O.14A; and

(3) if 'yes' to both steps above, what is the determination of the question and what orders should be made in consequence?"

7. Put simply the question posed in the application is - having terminated the contract under clause 24 (thus, a contractual termination) are the plaintiff's damages limited to the additional costs of completing the contract? If so, the plaintiff cannot claim any loss under the heading of "wasted expenditure."

8. In fact, the contract never was completed. The site is now a car park. The issue goes to the heart of the case because the defence claim that the contract was terminated for reasons other than Molitoko's poor performance. They say the contract was abandoned and there is no causal link between the losses incurred by the plaintiff and the alleged breach for which the surety is answerable.

9. The plaintiff, on the other hand, puts its case quite simply that they will seek to prove that Molitoko were in breach of contract, termination followed as a result and the damages claimed flow from that breach. The damages claimed which they say flow from the breach come under two heads. Firstly, construction costs and secondly, interest payments.

10. The material parts of the clause in question, namely clause 24, which it is accepted by the plaintiff is the clause under which the termination was made, are as follows :

"24.1 Without prejudice to any of its rights or remedies, the Owner may by notice to the Developer, which notice shall not be given unreasonably or vexatiously, terminate this Agreement if the Developer shall have committed any one or more of the following defaults, viz. :

((a)-(e) list of defaults) ...

24.2 Notice of termination shall be given in writing and, once given, shall be irrevocable. Such notice shall specify the default complained of the Developer and call upon the Developer to remedy, rectify or mitigate the default therein complained within 7 Business Days from the date of the notice. If the Developer still refuses or fails to comply with the Owner's demand under the notice within time, then the notice shall take immediate effect on its expiry and this Agreement wholly terminated if by the expiration of the period, the Developer still fails or wrongfully refuses to attend to and rectify, remedy or mitigate the matter therein complained.

24.6 On termination as aforesaid, the Developer shall allow and pay to the Owner the amount of any direct loss and/or damage caused to the Owner in such circumstances, including, without limitation, liquidated damages under Clause 18 if due to such termination, the Works has to be completed beyond the Completion Period.

24.7 Until after the completion of the Works under Sub-clause 24.4, the Owner shall not be bound by any provisions of this Agreement to make any further payment for the Price to the Developer. Upon such completion and upon verification within reasonable time of the accounts therefor, the Architect shall certify the amount of expenses properly incurred by the Owner and the amount of any direct loss and damage (including liquidated damage) caused to the Owner by the termination. "

11. Ms Li submits that the whole of clause 24 contemplated the completion of the project. If, on the other hand, the project was abandoned and not completed, as she submits is the situation here, and if the expenses have been wasted as a result of the abandonment there can be no clause 24 damages for which the surety might be liable.

12. Although the court has been assisted by both counsel on the O.14A issue in some detail, having considered the matter, I feel I can deal with it quite shortly. Following the three step approach in the Rockwin case, I am not persuaded that the question posed in a pure matter of law or construction; I do not consider that I have all the material facts and matters before me to determine the question and I am not satisfied that it is a question which is suitable for determination under O.14A. Ultimately, there is a discretion whether or not to make a ruling under O.14A. Any court would think long and hard before making a ruling which would have the effect of dismissing a $30 million claim. Ma J made the following remarks when considering the exercise of the discretion :

"26. It is of course not possible to set out all the circumstances which may be relevant in any given case to the exercise of the court's discretion. Much will depend on the perception and instinct of the Judge seized of the matter.

27. Of course, the residual discretion becomes exercisable really only where the two requirements (referred to in paragraphs 20(a) and (b) above) have been fulfilled. Here, it is important to emphasise that the question of law or construction is one that is suitable for determination without a trial. In other words, the court must have all the necessary facts and matters before it in order to determine the question of law or construction. Where the court is not seized of all relevant facts, it would be an extremely rare case (if ever) in which the procedure under Order 14A would be adopted."

13. I accept the plaintiff's submission that the question posed is not a question of pure law or construction. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the damages it claims as a result of a termination under clause 24 is, in my judgment, likely to or may depend on findings of fact. Before a court can safely answer that question there would have to be, at least, some investigation into the circumstances of the termination. The plaintiff does not accept that at the time of the termination the project was being abandoned, which is at the heart of the defendant's submission. The issue of "abandonment" has been raised in the defence. The defence rely on it and to that extent there is a burden on them to prove it.

14. Moreover, even if the question posed under O.14A were pure law, as it involves an issue of construction of a contractual clause a court would be entitled to consider the factual matrix at the time of the contract to ascertain the true intentions of the parties.

15. In short, the bottom line is that I have no doubt that the court's discretion should be exercised to decline to answer the O.14A question. The legal argument alone does not equip the court to do so in this particular case. Mr Tong simply says - I will seek to prove the damages at trial. By that he means not merely that losses were incurred but that they were incurred as a result of Molitoko's defaults, thus making the bond payable. Regardless of the evidence, which the plaintiff submits it will be necessary to consider when the court ultimately decides the validity of the wasted expenses claim, Mr Tong points to clause 24.6 in support of his submission that as a matter of pure legal construction he has a plainly arguable case that the question posed should be answered in his favour. Clause 24.6 says : "On termination ... the developer shall pay ... any direct loss ... including without limitation, liquidated damages ...". The suggests that liquidated damages (which are now not claimed) is but one head of damage claimable.

Striking out application under O.18 r.19

16. This is an alternative application which seeks the same result but by a slightly different route. It is primarily a pleading point. Ms Li's submission is premised on the basis that the project was abandoned. She argues that the fact of abandonment may be assumed from the fact that the damage claimed is wasted expenditure.

17. It is submitted by the defence that the pleading is deficient in two important respects. Firstly there is no reference in the Statement of Claim (as amended) that the project was, in fact, abandoned. Secondly, there is no plea to the effect that the contractor's default (for which the defendant would be liable under the bond) caused the abandonment and thus that the wasted costs flowed therefrom. It is argued that these are more than merely technical defects in the Statement of Claim. They are fundamental defects because no reasonable cause of action is disclosed due to the lack of a causal link between the alleged breach and the claimed damages.

18. After due consideration I have concluded that the application to strike out has not been made good, for the following brief reasons.

19. The test to be applied in a strike out application is to decide if the claim is uncontestably bad or is bound to fail. A claim for wasted expenses is not, of itself, bad in law.

" Sometimes, however, the plaintiff may be compelled by circumstances to frame his suit on a different basis as to damages, not on the basis of the loss of his bargain but on the basis of his out-of-pocket loss. In other words he is claiming not to be put into the position he would have been in had the contract been performed, but to be put into the position he would have been in had it never been made, which is a normal measure of damages akin to that in tort. In such cases expenses incurred in preparation or in part performance will be properly recoverable and will not involve an inconsistency of compensation."

(McGregor on Damages, 16th edition)

20. This particular claim for wasted expenses is arguably not bad in law either. Mr Tong has demonstrated this in part by his resistance to the O.14A application. Moreover, the plaintiff's pleaded case does not make abandonment the central element of the claim. In argument Mr Tong emphasized that it was not the central element of the claim. He stands by the pleaded case which fully particularizes breach followed by termination followed by claimed damages which he recognizes he must prove flow from the breach. I agree that framed as it is, there is no necessity to plead "why, when and by whom" the project had been abandoned. It is fundamental in a striking out application that the matters pleaded by the plaintiff must be assumed to be facts for the purpose of the application.

21. Looking at the pleading as a whole it adequately sets out the plaintiff's case. It is apparent from the pleaded defence that it is understood by the defence that the claim is based on allegations of default by Molitoko. The defence goes on to say that the claimed losses would have arisen irrespective of Molitoko's alleged defaults because in truth the project was abandoned. That is a matter of fact for the defence to prove. The amended Statement of Claim however avers that at the time of the termination it was UTIL's intention to continue the project. In any event, the pleadings still require some further amendments described by Mr Tong as "tidying up" arising out of this application.

Joinder summons

22. The plaintiff, Maybank, is only one of three banks which provided the loan to UTIL to embark on the project. They sue "as agent and on behalf of the syndicate of ... (the three banks)". Ms Li seeks an order that the proceedings be stayed until the other two banks consent to being joined as co-plaintiffs. In fact, they do not wish to be co-plaintiffs and have consented to being represented by Maybank.

23. The defence take no issue with Maybank's contractual right to represent the co-lenders. However they invite the court to exercise its residual discretion not to let the case proceed in its present form. In my judgment there are several reasons why this discretion should not be exercised.

(1) I am satisfied that the action has been properly constituted under O.15 r.12 as a representative action. The Hong Kong White Book states :

" The rule as to representative proceedings should be treated as being not a rigid matter of principle but a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice, and should be applied, not in any strict or rigorous sense, but according to its wide and permissive scope."

Thus, representative actions are not solely for cases where there are numerous plaintiffs.

(2) The defence contention that under O.15 r.4(2) that where persons are jointly entitled to relief they should all be joined as parties is not applicable to this case. The syndicated loan agreement makes the banks rights and obligations several not joint.

(3) The original Statement of Claim was served in May 1999. The fact that approximately three years have passed before this application is first made in a factor against exercising the discretion.

(4) A discretion should not be exercised without good reason. In this application the defence advance two main reasons neither of which are compelling.

(5) The first reason is described as a "continuing concern" over discovery and "a wish to probe ... with each of the three banks". The defence describe it as a "wish to probe", the plaintiff submits it is in fact a fishing exercise into the documents of a non-party. Part of the defence case is that the termination of Molitoko was vexations. If so, it was UTIL which acted vexatiously and not the lesser lending bank or banks. Maybanks discovery obligations have been discharged. I do not regard the defence's non specific "concern" as a sufficient reason to create two extra plaintiffs.

(6) The second reason is the defendant's "concern" over costs should they successfully defend the claim. This reason is without merit. Maybank is the largest Bank in Malaysia. Moreover it is a foreign plaintiff and there has been no application for security for costs.

(7) The Bond upon which the plaintiff sues has been assigned solely to the plaintiff, not all three banks. Maybank also has an "irrevocable" authority to sue alone as a representative of all three banks.

(8) By virtue of O.15 r.12(3) a judgment against the plaintiff is binding on all the parties it represents.

24. In conclusion both counsel invited the court to be silent on the question of costs in this decision. Even though both applications by the defence have been unsuccessful there remains an issue on costs arising out of the plaintiff's abandonment of its "Delay Damages" claim. The parties may now attempt to agree an appropriate costs order. If that is not possible a short hearing will have to be fixed in due course.

(M.P. Burrell)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

Representation:

Mr Ronny K.W. Tong, SC leading Mr Anthony Chan, instructed by Messrs Simmons & Simmons, for the Plaintiff

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr Thomas Lee, instructed by Messrs Masons, for the Defendant

Remarks:

Appeal by the Defendant to the Court of Appeal. Appeal allowed. Please refer to the appeal judgment of CACV000424/2002.

36448-EN-2001-02-23

MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD v. CHINA INSURANCE CO LTD

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HCCT000048A/1999

HCCT48/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO.48 OF 1999

-----------------

BETWEEN
MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD (as agent for and on behalf of the syndicate of banks comprising Malayan Banking Berhad, Overseas Union Bank Limited and Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited)Plaintiff
AND
CHINA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant

-----------------

Coram: Hon Burrell J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 20 February 2001

Date of Decision: 23 February 2001

 

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DECISION

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1. There are three summonses before the court. Firstly, an application by the defendant for further discovery (dated 8 February 2001). Secondly, an application by the plaintiff for further discovery (also dated 8 February 2001). Thirdly, an application under Order 18, rule 19 by the defendant to strike out parts of the plaintiff's claim, dated 14 February 2001.

2. The applications for further discovery arise out of the plaintiff's original application dated 31 October 2000 to strike out, if the experts' reports were not exchanged in time. The defendant maintains that it cannot properly prepare its experts' reports until after the discovery issues have been resolved.

3. The defendant's recent strike-out claim arises because of certain answers given by the plaintiff to a request for further and better particulars from the defendant.

4. The contractual background of the matter has been helpfully and succinctly set out in Mr Thomas Lee's (counsel for the defendant) skeleton submission as follows:-

(1)Charter Victory owned the site at Tong Mei Road. Charter Victory sold the site to United Trump International Limited ("UTIL") under a sale and purchase agreement. One Mr Chau controlled Charter Victory; one Mr Khoo controlled UTIL.
(2)Under the Development Agreement, Molitoko (also controlled by Mr Chau) agreed that it would redevelop the site for UTIL as a hotel.
(3)Under the Performance Bond, China Insurance guaranteed to UTIL the performance of Molitoko under the Development Agreement.
(4)Under the Loan Agreement, Maybank (as part of a consortium of banks) agreed to make loans to UTIL to finance the project. The loans were very large: HK$332,500,000.
(5)Pursuant to the Assignment, UTIL purported to assign to Maybank its rights under the Development Agreement and the Performance Bond as security for these loans.
(6)All the above agreements were executed in late 1996/April 1997. On 20 March 1998, about 12 months later, UTIL terminated the Development Agreement, alleging various breaches on Molitoko's part.
(7)Maybank now looks to China Insurance under the Performance Bond for loss and damage allegedly suffered.

5. The pleaded defence, put briefly, is that the Development Agreement between UTIL and Molitoko was not terminated for the reasons alleged in the Re-amended Statement of Claim but for larger economic reasons. Molitoko's case is that they were terminated because the development was facing drastic delays and increased costs because of the Building Authority's rejection of the amended plans for the project. This came at a time, in 1997 and early 1998, when Hong Kong was being adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the Hong Kong hotel market. In effect, it is said by the defence, that the project was simply abandoned for economic reasons and not because of any breach of contracts by Molitoko. When Molitoko was terminated, the site was a "big hole in the ground". It still is.

1.The defendant's summons under Order 24, rule 3 (for a further and better list) and Order 24, rule 7 (for specific discovery)

6. Because issues of precision, relevance and necessity are at the heart of this application, I consider it necessary to set out the terms of orders sought, in full :-

"1.The Plaintiff do within 14 days file and serve a further and better list of the documents which are or have been in its possession, custody or power relating to any matter in question in this action and that a responsible officer of the Plaintiff do make and file an affidavit verifying the said list and serve a copy thereof on the Defendant together with the said list.
2.Further or in the alternative to the Order sought in paragraph (1) hereof, a responsible officer of the Plaintiff do within 14 days make and file an affidavit stating whether the Plaintiff has or has at any time had in its possession, custody or power any category of documents specified in the Schedule hereto; and if such documents or any of them have been but are not now in its possession, custody or power, stating when it parted with the same and what has become of the same.
3.The affidavit to be made and filed under paragraph (1) and/or (2) hereof confirms that the deponent officer of the Plaintiff has made enquiries of responsible officers of the syndicate of banks represented by the Plaintiff.
4.There be inspection of the documents disclosed in the list ordered under paragraph (1) and/or the documents referred to in the affidavit ordered under paragraph (2) hereof, ... within 7 days of the service of such list and/or affidavit.
5.The time for exchange of provisional experts' reports pursuant to the Order of the Honourable Mr Justice Findlay dated 29th September 1999 be extended until 56 days after service of the list ordered under paragraph (1) and/or the affidavit ordered under paragraph (2) hereof...."

7. The wordings of the schedules are also important :-

"SCHEDULE

1. All documents that are or have been in the possession, custody or power of the Plaintiff or any of the members of the banking syndicate of which the Plaintiff is the agent ('the syndicate') and which have not previously been disclosed in the various Lists of Documents served on behalf of the Plaintiff, that relate to the financial planning of the project to redevelop the site at Tong Mi Road referred to in the Amended Statement of Claim, and in particular documents and correspondence emanating from any of

1.1United Trump International Limited ('UTIL');
1.2Mr Khoo Chai Kaa ('Mr Khoo');
1.3Any companies in which Mr Khoo and/or his family business has had a substantial interest at material times (namely, from mid-1996 to the present day) -- including Brem Maju Sdn Bhd, and Nikmat Maju Development Sdn Bhd;
1.4Any members of the syndicate
Or their respective agents or advisers, including feasibility studies for the development; cash-flow projections; valuations of the site; budgets and financial models regarding the purchase price to be paid for the site and the projected construction cost of the hotel to be erected thereon; projections as to the income to be generated by the hotel to be erected on the site, and the hotel occupancy rates underpinning those projections; assessments as to the adequacy of the income to be generated by the hotel to service and repay the loans made or to be made by members of the syndicate to help finance the acquisition of the site and the construction of the hotel; and documentary evidence as to the financial worth of the entities listed in 1.1 to 1.3 above and their prospective ability to make the interest payments and capital injections that might be called for to acquire the site and procure the completion of the proposed hotel thereon.
2. All documents that are or have been in the possession, custody or power of the Plaintiff or any of the members of the banking syndicate of which the Plaintiff is the agent ('the syndicate') and which have not previously been disclosed in the various Lists of Documents served on behalf of the Plaintiff, that relate to the decision to terminate the employment of Molitoko Limited under the Development Agreement referred to in the Amended Statement of Claim, and/or the decision not to appoint others to complete the work required of Molitoko under the said Agreement, and/or the decisions as to whether and when to sell the site, and in particular documents and correspondence emanating from any of
2.1United Trump International Limited ('UTIL');
2.2Mr Khoo Chai Kaa ('Mr Khoo');
2.3Any companies in which Mr Khoo and/or his family business has had a substantial interest at material times (namely, from mid-1996 to the present day) -- including Brem Maju Sdn Bhd and Nikmat Maju Sdn Bhd;
2.4Any members of the syndicate

Or their respective agents or advisers, including any (revised) feasibility studies for the development; any (revised) cash-flow projections for the project; any (revised) valuations of the site and/or assessments of property market conditions; any (revised) budgets and financial models regarding the projected construction cost of the hotel, including any projections or advice received as to Molitoko's possible entitlements to extensions of time and/or additional payment for the hotel construction work; any (revised) projections as to the likely date of completion of the hotel; any (revised) projections as to the income to be generated by the hotel to be erected on the site, and the hotel occupancy rates underpinning those projections; any (revised) assessments as to the adequacy of the income to be generated by the hotel to service and repay the loans made (or to be made) by members of the syndicate to help finance the acquisition of the site and the construction of the hotel; any (updated) documentary evidence as to the financial worth of the entities listed in 2.1 to 2.3 above at or around the time the said decisions were made, and their prospective ability to make the interest payments and capital injections that might be called for to procure the completion of the proposed hotel, and thereafter to repay the loans made by members of the syndicate in connection with the project; and any advice received as to the risks and likely financial consequences of terminating Molitoko's employment under the Development Agreement."

8. This issue has caused extensive correspondence between solicitors. The pleadings, affirmations and affidavits are also very lengthy. It would not be appropriate, on this application, to be drawn too much into the complex contractual issues for trial. The court must simply identify the core issues for trial and then determine if the application for discovery (under Order 24, rule 7) identifies documents or clauses of documents with sufficient precision, which are relevant and necessary for the resolution of the dispute and which exist in the other side's possession, custody and power.

(a) Relevance. The main plank of the plaintiff's opposition to this application is relevance. They also submit it is a "fishing" exercise and is oppressive and the court should exercise its discretion and refuse the application. The plaintiff submits that the issue at trial will be --- has the plaintiff proved the defendant was in breach? If not, they lose. It matters not, so it is argued, what the true reason or motive for the termination was. If there was no contractual basis for the termination, the plaintiff will lose anyway.

9. In my judgment, this approach is too simplistic. It is at the very core of the defendant's pleaded case that notice of termination was given "unreasonably or vexatiously", contrary to clause 24.1 of the contract :-

"24.1 Without prejudice to any of its rights or remedies, the Owner may by notice to the Developer, which notice shall be given unreasonable or vexatiously, terminate this Agreement if the Developer shall have committed any one or more of the following defaults, viz. :- ..."

10. It is fair to say that the mere fact of an issue being pleaded is not determinative of relevance. However, in this case, the detail of the pleaded case, the length of the affidavit evidence adduced in support and the nature of the correspondence seeking discovery, all demonstrate that this is a valid defence properly advanced. The defence have nailed their colours to the mast and opened up a new dimension to the case. They take a risk in so doing but refusing their application for discovery would prevent them from running a valid defence. Should they lose they will have incurred considerably greater costs than otherwise. However, they should not be denied the evidence. They do not shy away from alleging both "unreasonableness" and "vexatiousness" on the part of UTIL. They seek to demonstrate at trial that UTIL acted "vexatiously" as defined in John Jarvis v. Rockdale Housing Association (1986) 36 BLR at page 68 that they had "an ulterior motive to oppress, harass or annoy".

11. Mr Anthony Chan, counsel for the plaintiff, also complains that this is a "fishing expedition". I do not agree. The fishing analogy is that the line is cast in the hope of catching an hitherto unknown fish. Here, the reality is that fish abound in these waters. It is more of an exercise in harvesting than in fishing. What is remarkable is that, as yet, only 10 documents have been discovered in a major building development involving loans of over $300 million.

12. In short, I consider that this application primarily turns on the issue of relevance. Once the court is satisfied that the documents or class of documents sought are indeed relevant, the remaining issues can be dealt with quite shortly.

(b) Necessity. Given the nature of the pleaded defence which, I have determined, gives rise to relevant matters, i.e. matters which need to be determined to make a just resolution of the case, the requirement of necessity follows as night follows day. To force the defendant, when seeking to prove their "economic collapse" argument, to rely on factual matters in the public domain and deny them sight of the class of document the seek from the plaintiff, would force them to fight with one hand tied behind their back.

(c) Existence of the documents and evidence that they are in the plaintiff's possession, custody and power. The evidence in support of the existence of relevant documents is extensively dealt with in the defendant's affidavits. That such documents exist is really a matter of common sense and experience. In any event, no serious argument is mounted against this ingredient.

(d) Sufficiently precise? Given that, by its very nature, the summons does not specifically identify specific documents, the terms of the schedule are as precise as it is possible to be. It is not a general request to have a look at anything which might be relevant. It is carefully drafted and aimed at specific companies and individuals and relates to specific issues relevant to the defence.

(e) Caveat. In the interests of proper case management, the court should be cautious before granting discovery applications, especially where, as with this case, the resulting discovery may be costly and time consuming. The 2001 Hong Kong Civil Procedure makes the following comments :-

"... Even if the documents requested are relevant, the discovery must be refused if it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. So where the documents related to flagrancy of breaches of copyright, and flagrancy would become sufficiently clear from the documents already ordered to be discovered, the additional discovery requested was not be ordered (Full Range Electronics Co. Ltd v. General-Tech Industrial Ltd & Another, above)."

and :-

"... The increasing emphasis on active case management has resulted in exhortations from the Court of Appeal that interlocutory discovery skirmishes should be avoided if possible and that the real issues in dispute ought to be identified and brought to trial for resolution without waste of time and extensive discovery. A recent example is Cable & Wireless HKT Telephone Ltd v. City Telecom (H.K.) Limited, CACV197/1999, February 1,2000, CA, in which Rogers J.A. expressed the view that this was a case that required strong case management to ensure that the issues between the parties were properly and efficiently dealt with. The judge then identified the issues in the case and said that they should be resolved expeditiously and by limiting discovery where possible. ..."

13. All this must of course be balanced against the interests of justice. The ultimate driving force is always the search for the truth. In the present case, I am satisfied that, in spite of the consequential implications on cost and delay, the order sought should be granted. I think the "real issues" have been identified and the discovery summons cannot be "avoided" (see Cable & Wireless case, supra).

2.The plaintiff's application for further discovery (also under Order 24, rules 3 and 7)

14. On the same day as the defendant's summons for discovery, the plaintiff filed its own summons, seeking the following order :-

1.the defendant do within 14 days file and serve a further and better list of the documents which are or have been in its possession, custody or power relating to any matter in question in this action and that a responsible officer of the defendant do make and file an affidavit verifying the said list and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff together with the said list;
2.further or in the alternative to the Order sought in paragraph 1 hereof, a responsible officer of the defendant do within 14 days make and file an affidavit stating whether the defendant has or has at any time had in its possession, custody or power any category of documents specified in the Schedule attached hereto; and if such documents or any of them have been but are not now in its possession, custody or power, stating when it parted with the same and what has become of the same;
3.the affidavit to be made and filed under paragraphs 1 and/or 2 hereof confirms that the deponent officer of the defendant has made enquires of Chau Chi Chung or responsible officers of the three companies controlled by Chau Chi Chung;
4.there be inspection of the documents disclosed in the list ordered under paragraph 1 and/or the documents referred to in the affidavit ordered under paragraph 2 hereof within 7 days of the service of such list and/or affidavit;

Schedule

1.Documents including correspondence, minutes, memos and/or notes passing between Kinton Development Limited, Charter Victory International Limited and Molitoko Limited/Man Bond Hong and internal minutes, memos and/or notes within these companies in connection with the development.
2.File A (Files B to F were inspected by Simmons & Simmons at Masons' offices on 12 June 2000).

15. As to paragraph 1 of the summons, it is too vague and imprecise.

16. As to paragraph 2 and 3, the defendant resists the summons on three bases :-

(i)The words "in connection with the development" are too vague.
(ii)The issue at which the documents being sought is directed is the contention that Mr Chan of Charter Victory was not developing the project properly. This, says the defendant, is not the pleaded case of the plaintiff, therefore it cannot be relevant.
(iii)The documents sought may be within the custody or power of Mr Chan but are not within the defendant's custody or power. The defendant being the "bondsman". The claim is in relation to the bond, the maximum value of which is $30 million.

17. In fact, the defendant makes the point, in lengthy correspondence, that it has attempted to acquire documents and information from Mr Chau, even though there is no obligation on them to do so. They are also reluctant to disclose personal details about Mr Chau, such as his contact number, for fear of breaching the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance.

18. All these points are well made and already set out in correspondence. In my judgment, however, their position should be clarified by affidavit. The affidavit may take the matter no further than their stated position in correspondence. I, nonetheless, consider such an affidavit desirable in the context of this case. The affidavit should purport to comply with paragraph 2 of the plaintiff's summons in so far as it is able to do so and without breaching the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance.

3.The defendant's strike out application under Order 18, rule 19

19. This is a discrete issue, unrelated to the discovery issues hitherto.

20. In the Re-amended Statement of Claim, three heads of damage are particularized. Firstly, "liquidated damages"; secondly, "post-termination damages arising out of Molitoko's defaults"; and thirdly, "estimated minimum additional construction costs". (There is also an alternative claim based on "wasted expenditure".) It is the third head of claim, "additional construction costs" which the defendant submits is not based on any reasonable cause of action. The particulars claim :-

3.1Payment to consultants for preparation of re-tender and award of new contractHK$1,000,000
3.2Estimated minimum difference between new contract sum and old contract sumHK$15,000,000

21. The defendant submits that, as a fact, the state of the site when Molitoko were dismissed has not changed to this day. It was then and is now a very large hole in the ground. It has remained in this state for three years. There is no sign of any activity. The defendant "believes" it is being offered for sale.

22. They submit that the overwhelming reality is that there is not a glimmer of hope that the development will be completed by UTIL. Until new construction costs have actually been incurred, a liquidated claim cannot succeed.

23. On the other hand, the plaintiff submits that a very high threshold has to be reached before a claim is struck out. Moreover, it is always open to UTIL to complete the development and damages would be claimable at trial even if the quantum had not been crystallized.

24. Even though it took some time before Molitoko actually left the site and only then, reluctantly under a court order, the fact that this has been a totally idle site since 1998 and bearing in mind the timing and circumstances of their dismissal, I am convinced that if UTIL had the slightest intention of reviving the project, they would have taken some steps by now. None has been taken. In my judgment, the claim will never arise and should be struck out.

25. In conclusion, the court's decisions on the three summonses are as follows :-

1.Defendant's amended summons re-dated 8 February 2001; Order in terms of paragraphs 1 to 5 and paragraph 7.
2.Plaintiff's summons dated 8 February 2001; defendant do file and serve an affidavit within 14 days hereof in compliance with the directions of this judgment at page 12. No order as to costs.
3.Defendant's summons dated 14 February 2001; Order in terms.

26. Finally, there was a fourth matter before the court, namely, a request for further and better particulars in paragraph 6 of the defendant's amended summons of 8 February 2001. Those particulars have now been answered. All that remains in the question of costs. The costs of that application shall also be to the defendant.

 

 

(M.P. Burrell)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Representation:

Mr Anthony K.K. Chan, instructed by Messrs Simmons & Simmons, for the Plaintiff

Mr Thomas Lee, instructed by Messrs Masons, for the Defendant