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Bankruptcy Proceedings2000

RE LEUNG YAT TUNG

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV260/2008HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • CACV271/2006LEUNG YAT TUNG v. THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER
  • CACV408/2001HEALTHY WHARF LTD. v. LEUNG YAT TUNG
  • CAMP46/2019HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. MONEY FACTS LTD AND OTHERS
  • HCA1143/2016HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND OTHERS
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  • HCCW111/2015HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER
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[2023] HKCFI 1279-EN-2023-05-12

RE LEUNG YAT TUNG

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HCB 2019/2000

[2023] HKCFI 1279

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 2019 OF 2000

_________________

 

IN THE MATTER of LEUNG YAT TUNG (the “Bankrupt”)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of an application under sections 96(2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6)

Before:Deputy High Court Judge H. Au-Yeung in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing:4 May 2023
Date of Decision:12 May 2023

_______________

DECISION

_______________


INTRODUCTION

1.  This is an application for joinder taken out by Harbour Front Limited (“Harbour Front”), made by virtue of a summons filed on 19 April 2022 (“the Joinder Summons”), for the purpose of opposing the application of the petitioning creditor (Healthy Wharf Limited (“Healthy Wharf”)) to remove the Official Receiver as the trustee-in-bankruptcy of Leung Yat Tung (“the discharged bankrupt”) and appoint two professional accountants in private practice as joint and several trustees-in-bankruptcy in her place.

BACKGROUND

2.  As indicated by the case number, this bankruptcy case has a long history, and the Court of First Instance has handed down quite a number of decisions in this case.

3.  As far as this joinder application is concerned, the background facts summarised by Ng J in Re Leung Yat Tung [2016] 4 HKLRD 462 are relevant and I respectfully adopt the same as follows:

“5. In February 1998, the Bankrupt, Leung Yat Tung (“B”) transferred to Harbour Front Limited (“Harbour Front”) certain shares owned by him allegedly at a gross undervalue. These shares consisted of:

(a) 50% of shareholding in Money Facts Limited (“Money Facts”);

(b) 32.96% of shareholding in Fonfair Company Limited (“Fonfair”).

6. Money Facts held 65.79% of Fonfair and Fonfair holds a valuable piece of land in Yau Tong, valued at around HK$464m to HK$500m in September 2015, according to a valuation report. On that basis, B’s direct and indirect shareholding of Fonfair would be worth around HK$300m. The figures are confirmed by the OR at the hearing to be more or less correct.

7. In March 2001, B was adjudicated bankrupt on the petition of the Petitioning Creditor for his failure to pay a judgment debt in the sum of HK$5,182,519.93. The OR was appointed trustee of the bankruptcy estate.

8. Thereafter, a total of 39 proofs of debt were received by the OR. Most of them were received in 2001, 2002 and 2003; 9 were received between March 2010 and December 2014.

9. B denied he had any beneficial interest in the shares in question. The Petitioning Creditor said investigation was called for as to whether the transfer of the shares by B to Harbour Front fell foul of section 49 of the BO. For reasons not entirely clear to this court, the OR did not see fit to bring proceedings to recover the shares from Harbour Front.

10. On 13 September 2005, the Petitioning Creditor applied to court to reverse the OR’s decision and for an order directing the OR to enter into a funding agreement with the Petitioning Creditor to enable the OR to proceed with the so-called ‘Avoidance Proceedings’. By Order dated 29 March 2006, the application was allowed by Recorder Edward Chan SC. Costs of the Petitioning Creditor (as well as the OR) were ordered to be borne out of the bankruptcy estate. The Petitioning Creditor’s costs were about HK$452,000. This sum forms part of the subject matter of the 1st summons.

11. In September 2006, the Funding Agreement was formally executed by the Petitioning Creditor and the OR.

12. Under the Funding Agreement,

(1) At Clause 2, the Petitioning Creditor undertook and agreed with the OR that whatever the outcome of the Avoidance Proceedings, it shall indemnify the OR against all judgments and orders (including adverse costs orders) made against the OR as well as all costs, expenses and liabilities made against or incurred by the OR in the Avoidance Proceedings.

(2) At Clause 3, the Petitioning Creditor gave an indemnity to the OR if it shall be held personally liable for any costs or other form of liabilities arising out of or in connection with the Avoidance Proceedings.

(3) Under Clause 4, the Petitioning Creditor agreed to provide security for its obligations in the form of an irrevocable bank guarantee in favour of the OR in the sum of HK$1.2 million. Subsequently, in September 2011, the bank guarantee was replaced by a cashier order of HK$1.2m. This is the subject matter of the 2nd summons.

13. In February 2007, the OR eventually lodged the Avoidance Proceedings to set aside the transfer of the shares and for an order that the shares be vested in the bankruptcy estate. A solicitors firm, Messrs Ho & Ip, were engaged by the OR to conduct the proceedings. Counsel and experts have also been engaged.

14. In the course of the Avoidance Proceedings, the Petitioning Creditor directly paid Messrs Ho & Ip’s bills of costs and disbursements incurred. The total amount so paid by the Petitioning Creditor comes to slightly over HK$3m. This sum also forms part of the subject matter of the 1st summons.

15. Trial of the Avoidance Proceedings was scheduled to commence before Madam Justice Au-Yeung on 7 January 2015. In December 2014, Harbour Front proposed to settle with the OR and sent it a cheque of around HK$5.18m. On 8 January 2015, a settlement was reached between Harbour Front and the OR.

16. On 13 January 2015, Au-Yeung J directed and authorized the OR to settle the Avoidance Proceedings.

17. On 12 February 2015, the OR and Harbour Front executed the Settlement Agreement. The terms were highly favorable to the bankruptcy estate.

(a) Under Clause 1, Harbour Front agreed to make full payment to the OR for the satisfaction of all proved debts and interest, together with all costs, fees, expenses and disbursements that the OR was entitled to receive under the provisions of the BO.

(b) Under Clause 3, Harbour Front’s previous payment of HK$5.18m to the OR should be treated as part payment under Clause 1 and the OR should be at liberty to use such funds for such purposes as it saw fit.

(c) Under Clause 4, Harbour Front agreed to charge the shares in favour of the OR as security of its payment obligations under Clause 1.

(d) Under Clause 5, as further security of its payment obligations, Harbour Front agreed to tender a cheque of HK$15m to the OR. The cheque was subsequently replaced by a bank guarantee of the same amount.

18. By an Order of this court in September 2015, RSM Nelson Wheeler Corporate Advisory Ltd was appointed to assist the OR in the adjudication of the proofs of debt submitted. The adjudication was completed in May 2016. 9 proofs of debt were admitted, including part of the Petitioning Creditor’s proof of debt to the extent of HK$4.26m. The total amount of proofs so admitted was in the region of HK$149 million.”

4.  Unfortunately, the execution of the Settlement Agreement (referred to in paragraph 17 of Ng J’s Decision quoted above) (“the Settlement Agreement”) was not the end of the saga.

5.  It has since then been alleged by Healthy Wharf that the Official Receiver has, among other things, failed to properly administer the estate of the discharged bankrupt (“the Estate”) and to enforce the Settlement Agreement, and that as a result, none of the key milestones, including (i) the completion of adjudication of proved debts; (ii) issuance of written demand to Harbour Front for settlement of the adjudicated proved debts, interest and costs; and (iii) provision of a bank guarantee by Harbour Front, was achieved within the stipulated time.

6.  For the above reasons, Healthy Wharf, by a summons filed on 21 January 2022 (“the Removal Summons”), applied to remove the Official Receiver from the office of trustee-in-bankruptcy of the discharged bankrupt, and to appoint two professional accountants in private practice in her place.

7.  At around the same time, on 19 January 2022, the Official Receiver issued a written demand to Harbour Front for payment of HK$22,456,000 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement (“the Written Demand”).

8.  Harbour Front takes issue with some of the items claimed in the Written Demand. It has therefore taken out an Originating Summons (HCMP 400/2022) on 19 April 2022 (“the Originating Summons”) to seek the Court’s determination of the disputes, as well as a summons in the said proceedings for leave to pay HK$16,920,000 into Court as substitute security in return for the discharge of the share charge and the release of its obligation to provide the Bank Guarantee[1] (“the Payment-in Summons”).

9.  On the same day, Harbour Front also took out the Joinder Summons and sought to be joined as a party in the removal application for the purpose of opposing the same, which is the subject matter to be resolved in this Decision.

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

10.  The applicable legal principles are trite.

11.  Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) provides that:

“(2) Subject to the provision of this rule, at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application—

(a) […]

(b) order any of the following persons to be added as a party, namely—

(i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon, or

(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which in the opinion of the Court it would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter.”

12.  In Man Whi Chung v Man Ping Nam [2003] 1 HKC 549, DHCJ A Cheung (as the Chief Justice then was) explained the operation of the said rule as follows:

(1) The applicant must show that he is sufficiently interested in the proceedings to which he or she wishes to be joined as an additional party. Under Order 15 r.6(2)(b)(i) (“the Necessity Limb”), a person “who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon” may be added as a defendant: [14];

(2) Adopting what Lord Diplock said in Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52 at 56, a party might be added under the Necessity Limb if his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action: [20];

(3) An alternative basis for joinder is set out in Order 15 r.6(2)(b)(ii) (“the Just and Convenient Limb”), which confers on the Court a wider jurisdiction to allow joinder. There must exist an issue common to (a) the applicant and any party to the cause or matter and (b) the parties to the cause or matter, which is “just and convenient to determine”: [21] – [22];

(4) The Court has a discretion to exercise even if a case falls within the provisions. But the fact that a case falls within either limb is by itself a strong reason for allowing the joinder. The rules of natural justice require that a person who is “affected” (in the sense of either the Necessity Limb or Just and Convenient Limb), or is potentially affected, by a decision of the court be given a proper chance to be heard: [43] (“the Discretionary Limb”).

13.  Counsel have also referred this Court to the case of Chen Hongqing v Liu Yiu Keung Stephen & Others[2021] HKCFI 440, in which the applicable principles have been set out by K Yeung J as follows:

“26. […]

(a) A liberal approach should be given to this rule so as to ensure that, as far as possible, all matters in dispute between the parties are completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings with respect to any of those matters is avoided;

(b) Under Limb 1, a party might be added if his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action will be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action;

(c) Specifically, under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(ii), the intervener is required to show that he has some interest which in some way directly related to the subject matter of the action. A mere commercial interest in its outcome, divorced from the subject matter of the action is not enough;

(d) Whilst some interest which in some way directly related to the subject matter of the action is necessary, the existence of a cause of action between the intervener and one of the parties is not a necessary perquisite for the purpose of joinder;

(e) Even where the interest in the subject matter alleged by the intervener is doubtful, the court is nevertheless prepared to exercise its discretion to allow the joinder so that the alleged interest could be properly tested at trial.

27. […] whilst the Court will not at the joinder stage engage itself in a scrutiny of merits or an adjudication of facts, it does not mean that the Court would take an intervener’s assertion of sufficiency of interest at face value and ignore any obvious legal impediments to its claim […] it will disallow a joinder application if it is “plain and obvious” that there can be no claim between the original parties and the party proposed to be joined […]

28. […] the Court will not exercise its discretion in favour of joinder if it is plain and obvious that the joinder of the proposed intervener would be pointless and futile. This is not unlike the approach which the Court adopts when approaching an application for amendment of pleadings.”

14.  In Yip Lai Fong & Another v Sin Tung Hng & Others (HCMP2423/2002, unreported, 20 March 2003), Chu J (as Chu VP then was) also had the following to say:

“In Wong Chun Loong Tony v. Ada Ltd [1991] 1 HKC 86, the Court of Appeal, applying the English case of Sanders Lead Co. Inc. v. Entores Metal Brokers [1984] 1 WLR 452, held that Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(ii) requires the would-be-intervener to possess some interest which is in some way directly related to the subject matter of the action, and that a mere commercial interest in its outcome, divorced from the subject matter of the action, is not enough. The Court of Appeal further held that there must exist between the would-be-intervener and any party to the cause or matter a question or issue arising out of, or relating to, or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter, which the court considers it just and convenient to determine as between the would-be-intervener and that party, as well as between the parties to the cause or matter.”

DISCUSSION

15.  Under Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement, Harbour Front is contractually liable to pay, inter alia, all costs, fees, expenses and disbursements that the trustee-in-bankruptcy is entitled to receive under the Bankruptcy Ordinance. Further, under Clauses 4 and 5 of the Settlement Agreement, it has provided and is still providing a bank guarantee in the sum of HK$15 million (“the Bank Guarantee”). It is paying finance costs to the bank from time to time to maintain the same.

16.  Against the above background, Harbour Front asserted that it has a direct pecuniary interest in the Removal Summons in that:

(1) The Official Receiver has been acting as the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the Bankrupt since 2001, and the administration of the Estate has reached its concluding stage. Replacing the Official Receiver now would inevitably increase the costs of the administration, as the new trustees would need to incur time and costs to review the materials concerning the administration of the Estate in the past 20 odd years, particularly for the purpose of defending the Originating Summons. Harbour Front may have to “foot the bill” pursuant to Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement should there be any increment in costs as a result of the change of the trustee-in-bankruptcy;

(2) Any change in the trustee-in-bankruptcy may result in delay in the progress of the Originating Summons and the Payment-in Summons, which in turn would lead to much finance costs payable by Harbour Front in respect of the Bank Guarantee;

(3) The aforesaid delay might also result in the accrual of much interest which is payable by Harbour Front.

17.  It was further submitted by Ms Ho and Mr Lam that by reason of Harbour Front’s direct pecuniary interest in the Removal Summons:

(1) The Official Receiver or Healthy Wharf ought to have joined Harbour Front upon the taking out of the Removal Summons;

(2) Harbour Front’s presence before the Court in the Removal Summons hearing is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. The issue concerned is “whether the change of trustee would increase Harbour Front’s liability under the Settlement Agreement”;

(3) Between Harbour Front and the Official Receiver, there exists an issue (which relates to the amount of costs and finance cost, etc.) arising out of or relating to or connected with the relief claimed in the Removal Summons which would be just and convenient to determine as between Harbour Front and the Official Receiver as well as between Healthy Wharf and the Official Receiver.

18.  Heavy reliance had been placed on the case of Chen Hongqing v Liu Yiu Keung Stephen & Others (supra), in which it was said in [26(b)] that a party might be added if his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action will be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action.

19.  Harbour Front also relied on, inter alia, Chu Yuen-wah v Lee Kwok-kee & Another [1995] 2 HKLR 280, in which it was held that the jurisdiction under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of the RHC is wide enough to permit the joinder of a party whose liability to pay is contingent not only upon the outcome of the proceedings which it seeks to join but also upon any other event or proceedings.

20.  With respect, I do not accept Harbour Front’s arguments.

21.  While I accept that it is likely that any replacement of the Official Receiver as trustee-in-bankruptcy would lead to increment of the total amount of money payable by Harbour Front pursuant to Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement, I do not accept that either the Necessity Limb or the Just and Convenient Limb under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) is satisfied:

(1) It is not necessary for Harbour Front to be joined as a party to the Removal Summons to ensure that all matters in dispute in that application may be effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon;

(2) At most Harbour Front only has a mere commercial interest in the outcome of the Removal Summons, which is divorced from the subject matter of the same, and this is not enough;

(3) As pointed out by Mr Lee for Healthy Wharf, the subject matter of the Removal Summons is all about the complaints of Healthy Wharf as a creditor of the discharged bankrupt on the Official Receiver’s fitness to continue to serve as trustee-in-bankruptcy in administering the Estate. This has nothing to do with Harbour Front which is not a creditor as such.

22.  As aforesaid, Harbour Front relied heavily on the case of Chu Yuen-wah (supra). In that case, the plaintiff wife claimed damages for serious injuries she suffered as a passenger in a car driven by her husband. She claimed that her husband drove negligently. The husband had purchased an insurance policy issued by the applicant insurer, who had given notice to the husband informing him that it would avoid the policy on the ground of misrepresentation and non-disclosure. Be that as it may, the insurer applied to be joined in the personal injuries claim commenced by the wife. It was held by the Court of Appeal that if the insurer did not intervene, the husband and the wife would collude in that the husband would admit liability and take no issue on quantum of damages claimed by the wife, and on this basis, the real issues in the trial would not be “effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon”. It was further held that even though the insurer was only under a contingent liability to pay any damages that the wife might recover (depending on the outcome of its proceedings to claim for a declaration that the insurance policy was avoided), that would not affect the Court’s jurisdiction to make an order of joinder in favour of the insurer.

23.  It can therefore be seen that the factual background of the Chu Yuen-wah case is totally different from the present case, and therefore Harbour Front’s reliance thereon is misplaced. In my view, the focus should not be placed on the contingent liability on the part of Harbour Front, but rather on whether it is necessary to join Harbour Front in the first place so that all matters in dispute in the Removal Summons may be effectively and completely determined or adjudicated. I do not agree that it is necessary.

24.  The situation of Chu Yuen-wah is similar to the case of Gurtner v Circuit& Another [1968] 2 QB 587 which was another case relied on by Harbour Front. In this case, the plaintiff pedestrian was injured by a motor-cycle driven by the defendant. When the plaintiff commenced legal proceedings against the defendant, the writ could not be served on the defendant because he had emigrated to another country and could not be traced. The plaintiff subsequently obtained an order of substituted service of the writ on the defendant. The Motor Insurer’s Bureau then applied to be added as a defendant because it might be liable under the terms of its agreement with the Minister of Transport to satisfy any damages awarded to the plaintiff.

25.  It was against the above background that Lord Denning M.R. stated, in relation to the Necessity Limb, that:

“It seems to me that when two parties are in dispute in an action at law, and the determination of that dispute will directly affect a third person in his legal rights or in his pocket, in that he will be bound to foot the bill, then the court in its discretion may allow him to be added as a party on such terms as it thinks fit. By so doing, the court achieves the object of the rule. It enables all matters in dispute to ‘be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon’ between all those directly concerned in the outcome.” (at 595D – F)

26.  His Lordship continued at 595F:

“I would apply this proposition to the present case. If the Motor Insurers’ Bureau are not allowed to come in as defendants what will happen? The order for substituted service will go unchallenged. The service on the defendant Circuit will be good, even though he knows nothing of the proceedings. he will not enter an appearance. The plaintiff will sign judgment in default of appearance. The judgment will be for damages to be assessed. The master will assess the damages with no one to oppose. The judgment will be completed for the ascertained sum. The defendant will not pay it. Then the plaintiff will be able to come down on the Motor Insurers’ Bureau and call upon them to pay because they have made a solemn agreement that they will pay. They made an agreement with the Minister of Transport on June 17, 1946, by clause 1 of which they agreed that if a judgment for an injured person against a motorist is not satisfied in full within seven days, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau will pay the amount of the judgment to the injured person […]

It is thus apparent that the Motor Insurers’ Bureau are vitally concerned in the outcome of the action. They are directly affected, not only in their legal rights, but also in their pocket. They ought to be allowed to come in as defendants. It would be most unjust if they were bound to stand idly by watching the plaintiff get judgment against the defendant without saying word when they are the people who have to foot the bill. […]” (at 595F – 596E)

27.  It was in the above factual scenario that the Master of the Rolls used the term “foot the bill” – the intervener was required to pay damages as if it was liable as a defendant. I do not agree that Harbour Front will have to “foot the bill” of the Removal Summons in the same sense, despite the fact that the outcome of the removal application may have an impact on the amount of money payable pursuant to Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement. As mentioned, in the present case, it can only be said that Harbour Front has a commercial interest in the outcome of the Removal Summons, but that is insufficient to constitute an interest directly related to the subject matter of the Removal Summons, which concerns the fitness of the Official Receiver to continue to be the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the Estate.

ORDER

28.  By reasons of the aforesaid, I dismiss the Joinder Summons.

COSTS

29.  I make a costs order nisi that Harbour Front shall bear the costs of the Joinder Summons.

30.  The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, shall be made by letter, and will be disposed of on paper) within 14 days hereof.

31.  The costs of the Joinder Summons of Healthy Wharf, the discharged bankrupt and the Official Receiver respectively shall be summarily assessed in lieu of taxation. Unless any application for variation of the aforesaid costs order nisi is made within time, they shall lodge and serve their respective statements of costs within 7 days after the expiry of the said 14-day period. Harbour Front shall lodge and serve its statements of objection within 7 days thereafter. Summary assessment of the costs of the Joinder Summons will be conducted on paper (no matter whether all statements of objection have been lodged within time) thereafter. The costs assessed shall be payable by Harbour Front within 14 days after assessment.

 ( H. Au-Yeung )
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Jonathan Lee, instructed by Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam, for the petitioning creditor (Healthy Wharf Limited)

Ms Sabrina Ho and Mr Justin Lam, instructed by Yiu & Associates, for the intended intervener (Harbour Front Limited)

Mr Li Chi Ngon, Peter of Poon & Cheung for the discharged bankrupt

Attendance of the Official Receiver excused



[1]   See Ng J’s Decision at [17(c) – (d)] and [15] below

112271-EN-2017-11-15

HEALTHY WHARF LTD v. THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF LEUNG YAT TUNG, A BANKRUPT

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HCB 2019/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 2019 OF 2000

____________

RE: LEUNG YAT TUNG

____________

BETWEEN
 HEALTHY WHARF LIMITEDApplicant
and
 THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF LEUNG YAT TUNG, A BANKRUPTRespondent

____________

Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Written Submissions: 19 October 2017 & 10 November 2017
Date of Decision: 15 November 2017

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

1.  On 29 August 2017, this Court handed down its Decision on the application made by the Creditor. The definitions contained in the Decision are adopted.

2.  On 15 September 2017, the Creditor by summons applied, out of time, for extension of the period of 14 days specified under O 42 r 5B (6) to apply to vary the costs order nisi made in the Decision.

3.  I agree with the OR, that the costs order in the Decision is an order nisi by virtue of the provisions of O 42 r 5B, without the need for express specification.  Notwithstanding the lack of a good reason furnished by the Creditor (the only one offered being its misunderstanding of the nature of the costs order) to justify the Creditor’s delay in making this application, the delay in question of 3 days is nevertheless short, and I can see no prejudice suffered by the OR as a result.  Hence, I am prepared to grant the extension sought by the Creditor to make the application for variation.  The question of the Court’s jurisdiction to grant the extension of time is dealt with in Man Wan Farming Ltd v Chief Executive in Council & Anor (No 2) [1998] 2 HKLRD 314, and in my decision in Elite Dragon Limited v Bel Global Resources Holdings Limited HCCL 8/2014, 14 July 2017.

4.  Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the Creditor and the OR, I am not prepared to vary the costs order nisi made.

5.  The Creditor argued that it should be entitled to part if not all of the costs relating to the Interim Order Costs and the Appeal Costs, which were accepted by the OR on 7 August 2017 as provable debts. However, as the OR pointed out, the OR had asked for apportionment of the total costs sought by the Creditor since 1 December 2016, for possible agreement.  No steps were taken by the Creditor to apportion these costs until 28 July 2017, when the Creditor provided the separate amounts of the Interim Order Costs and the Appeal Costs. The hearing of the Creditor’s application took place shortly thereafter, on 10 August 2017.  If the Creditor had taken steps promptly, after 1 December 2016, to provide the separate breakdowns of the Interim Order Costs, the Appeal Costs and the Petition Costs, agreement could have been made in good time before the hearing on 10 August 2017, saving the costs incurred up to 7 August 2017.

6.  The hearing on 10 August 2017 and the Decision only dealt with the parties’ remaining dispute on the Petition Costs, with the OR succeeding in the result.

7.  Overall, the fair order as to costs to be made is that the Creditor should bear the OR’s costs of the application for variation of the OR’s decision, including the application for variation of the order nisi.

  

  

 (Mimmie Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Miss Elaine Liu, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the applicant

Ms Lok Pui Man Ophelia, Acting Assistant Official Receiver, for the Official Receiver and Trustee in Bankruptcy

111058-EN-2017-08-29

HEALTHY WHARF LTD v. THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF LEUNG YAT TUNG, A BANKRUPT

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HCB 2019/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 2019 OF 2000

____________

  RE: LEUNG YAT TUNG

____________

BETWEEN
 HEALTHY WHARF LIMITEDApplicant

and

 THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF LEUNG YAT TUNG, A BANKRUPTRespondent
____________
Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 10 August 2017
Date of Decision: 29 August 2017

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

1.  This is an application by the petitioning creditor (“Creditor”), made under s 83 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (“Ordinance”) and rule 24 of the applicable Proof of Debt Rules (“Rules”), for the Court to reverse or vary the decision of the Official Receiver (“OR”), whereby the OR rejected the Creditor’s proof of debt in so far as the Creditor’s costs of the petition are concerned (as particularized below).

2.  By the time of the hearing and as a result of the correspondence between the parties, the issue in dispute was confined to the OR’s decision to reject as a provable debt the Creditor’s taxed costs incurred in the presentation of the petition (“Petition Costs”) for the bankruptcy of Leung Yat Tung (“Bankrupt”).  Other than the Petition Costs, the Creditor had additionally incurred: (1) costs as a result of the Bankrupt’s application for an interim order under ss 20 and 20A of the Ordinance, which application was dismissed by the Court, with costs to the Creditor on an indemnity basis by an order made on 1 March 2001 (“Interim Order Costs”); and (2) costs incurred in the Bankrupt’s appeal against the bankruptcy order and against the dismissal of the interim order application, which appeal was dismissed on 19 April 2001 with costs to be paid by the Bankrupt (“Appeal Costs”).  The OR has accepted that the Interim Order Costs and the Appeal Costs are provable debts, as distinct from the Petition Costs.

3.  The Petition Costs in this case are in the region of $249,000.  The bankruptcy order was made on 1 March 2001, on the basis of the Creditor’s statutory demand for a judgment debt due from the Bankrupt to the Creditor in HCA 1125/2005, in the region of $3.6 million, with interest and costs of the action.  Those sums form part of the Creditor’s proof of debt filed on 28 May 2001(“Proof”), and the OR accepted the Proof in respect of the underlying judgment debt.

4.  The basis of the OR’s rejection of the Petition Costs from the Proof is that such costs are the Creditor’s costs of the petition for bankruptcy, and as such, they are to be paid under s 37 of the Ordinance as part of the costs and charges of the bankruptcy, as distinct from other debts proved in the bankruptcy which are to be paid pari passu out of the assets of the bankrupt, after the payment of costs and other priority debts under s 38 of the Ordinance.

5.  The Creditor objects to the rejection of the Petition Costs, on the basis that they fall within the definition of “debts provable in bankruptcy” under s 34 of the Ordinance, and should be provable for that reason.  Section 34 (3) provides that “all debts and liabilities, present or future, certain or contingent, to which the bankrupt is subject at the date of the bankruptcy order, or to which he may become subject before the discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy order … shall be deemed to be debts provable in bankruptcy”.

6.  It was argued that if the Creditor is not allowed to prove for the costs it incurred in presenting the petition for bankruptcy, which led to the making of the bankruptcy order and the administration and distribution of the assets of the Bankrupt amongst his creditors, the Creditor would be unfairly prejudiced.  It would be deprived of the right to vote in accordance with the full amount of its proved debt, and of the right to receive interest from any surplus of assets remaining after the payment of debts which are proved in bankruptcy.  That, it was argued, could not have been the intention of the Ordinance. 

7.  As the OR’s decision to reject the Petition Costs as a provable debt is a decision on a point of law, rather than an exercise of discretion, the principles set out in Chung Kau HCB 581/2003, 5 May 2003, that the Court should not interfere with the decision of the trustee unless such decision was “perverse or clearly wrong”, do not apply.

8.  Neither party has been able to identify any authority which is directly on the point of whether a petitioning creditor’s costs of the bankruptcy petition can be proved.  The case of Lo Shing Kin v Sy Chin Mong Stephen (2014) 717 HKCFAR 903 relied on by the Creditor does not assist the present case, since the decision of the Court of Final Appeal concerns the costs of separate legal proceedings commenced before the petition for bankruptcy, and whether such costs are debts under liabilities incurred before the date of the bankruptcy order, or to which the bankrupt became subject at the date of the bankruptcy order, rather than the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings themselves.  Even if the Petition Costs are debts to which the Bankrupt became subject by reason of an obligation incurred under the Petition before the date of the bankruptcy order, the issue remains whether these Petition Costs are costs and expenses provided for, and to be dealt with, under s 38 of the Ordinance, and whether they can be proved.

9.  The OR relies on s 37 of the Ordinance, which provides that after payment of the expenses properly incurred in preserving, getting in or realizing any of the assets of the bankrupt, the assets remaining “shall” (subject to any order of the court) “first be liable to” various payments, which shall be made in a designated order of priority.  These payments include, firstly, the prescribed fees, charges and percentages payable to the OR, and costs, charges and expenses incurred or authorized by the OR (under s 37 (1) (a)), and then, secondly, “the taxed costs of the petition, including the taxed costs of any person appearing at the hearing of the petition whose costs are allowed by the court but excluding the interest on such costs” (under s 37 (1) (b)).  According to the OR, the Petition Costs are clearly costs referred to in s 37 (1) (b), which are costs to be paid in priority to other expenses and debts.

10.  The OR further highlights the fact that the Petition Costs were ordered to be paid “out of the estate of the debtor/Bankrupt”, whereas, by contrast, the Interim Order Costs were ordered to be paid by the debtor/Bankrupt, on indemnity basis.  The Appeal Costs were simply ordered to be paid, without specifying whether they were to be paid out of the estate, or to be paid by the Bankrupt.

11.  The OR seeks to rely on the decision of the English court in Cooke v Dunbar Assets plc [2016] EWHC 1888, and the passage of the judgment of the learned deputy judge who observed, as follows:

“ … the structure of the Insolvency Act is difficult to reconcile with the notion that the costs of insolvency proceedings constitute a contingent debt or liability for the purposes of being provable. Such a notion would not be harmonious with the priority of debts established by s 328; the expenses of the bankruptcy are afforded priority over other debts, preferential or otherwise. If the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings themselves, including any appeal, are provable in the bankruptcy, then the effect of s 328 in conjunction with rule 6.224 would be to deal with such costs twice, and differently, ranking in priority as an expense, and then again much lower in the order as a non-preferential debt.”

12.  On the behalf of the Creditor, Counsel argued that the above observations were made obiter, and in the context of the English Insolvency Act 1986 (“1986Act”), which is a regime different to the one under the Ordinance based on the earlier English Insolvency Act.  Counsel further highlights the fact that rule 12.2 of the Insolvency Rules, made under the 1986 Act (“Rule 12.2”), expressly provides that “all fees, costs, charges and other expenses incurred” in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings “are to be regarded as expenses” of the bankruptcy, and that Rule 12.2 has no equivalent provision in Hong Kong.

13.  I accept that the provisions of the Ordinance are not identical to those of the 1986 Act.  However, I am not satisfied that overall, there is any difference in the fundamental concepts or objectives of the bankruptcy regime, provided for in the Ordinance and in the 1986 Act.  These must be for the gathering in of the property of the bankrupt through a collective process, to enable the assets to be distributed among and shared rateably by the creditors in proportion to the debts which they are owed, in the most equitable way, in return for freeing the bankrupt from the accumulated burden of his debts and giving him the chance to make a fresh start.  One of the basic principles and aims of the bankruptcy regime is the payment of debts pari passu amongst the unsecured and non-preferential creditors.

14.  I am unable to see how the absence of an equivalent of Rule 12.2 would or should make the overall scheme of the Ordinance different to that of the 1986 Act.  By expressly providing that “all fees, costs, charges and other expenses” incurred in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings are to be regarded as “expenses” of the bankruptcy, Rule 12.2 has the effect of making such costs payable out of the bankrupt’s estate, in priority, as provided for under the “general rule as to priority” under the relevant rule of the English Act which sets out the expenses and other costs incurred or chargeable by the trustee in bankruptcy.  The existence of Rule 12.2 does not answer the question of whether such expenses and costs can be a provable debt.

15.  Section 37 of the Ordinance already makes express and clear provision that the taxed costs of the bankruptcy petition are to be paid first, from the assets of the bankrupt, as one item of the costs and charges, by way of priority.

16.  Under the Ordinance, s 38 (1) sets out, after the costs and expenses referred to in s 37, the debts to be paid “in priority to all other debts”, including wages, salaries and other payments payable to an employee under the Employment Ordinance.  Under s 38 (3), these debts “shall rank equally among themselves”, shall be paid in full unless the property of the bankrupt is insufficient to meet them, and under s 38 (4), these debts “shall be discharged forthwith so far as the property of the debtor is sufficient to meet them”, but this is expressly made subject to the provisions of s 37, and to the retention of such sums as may be necessary for the costs of the administration.

17.  The priority provisions of the Ordinance expressly provide, in s 38 (8), for “all debts proved in the bankruptcy” to be paid pari passu.  Only if there is any surplus after payment of the debts, will interest be paid from the surplus “on all debts proved in the bankruptcy”.

18.  The OR pointed out that rule 79 of the applicable Bankruptcy Rules provides, consistently with s 37, that where a bankruptcy order is made on a creditor’s petition, the costs of the petitioning creditor shall be taxed and paid out of the estate. 

19.  Having reviewed the relevant provisions of the Ordinance referred to above, and after considering the submissions made on behalf of both parties, I cannot agree that the Creditor is unfairly prejudiced by reason of its inability to prove for the Petition Costs.  It is clear that these costs are envisaged by and provided in the Ordinance to be paid, as a matter of priority, out of the estate of the Bankrupt, before the payment of preferential and other proved debts.  That is the advantage conferred on and enjoyed by the petitioning Creditor.  It cannot be said that its troubles of filing for the bankruptcy of the debtor, eventually permitting the creditors to share collectively in the recovery of their debts, are not compensated.  The costs incurred by the petitioning Creditor, when they are taxed, are recovered in full under s 37 from the assets of the bankrupt, before distribution to other creditors, who (in contrast to the Creditor) have to compete for payment and recovery, on pari passu basis, to the extent that their debts are unsecured. 

20.  Counsel for the Creditor argued that any contradiction between allowing the Creditor’s costs as an expense, and as a provable non-preferential debt, as referred to in the judgment in Cooke v Dunbar, can be reconciled to the extent that the Creditor should be permitted to prove for any of its unpaid costs.  In reality, it is difficult to envisage how such a situation can arise whereby a petitioning creditor would have to compete with the other creditors for the balance of any costs which could not be paid in full.  If there are sufficient assets, the Petition Costs would be paid first, in full, before the claims of other creditors are considered for distribution.  If the petitioning Creditor cannot be paid in full first, if and when other assets are collected, the petitioning Creditor and the OR will still be entitled to payment of any balance of their unpaid costs from such assets, before the claims of the other creditors are considered and paid on pari passu basis. 

21.  Since the Creditor is to be paid the Petition Costs in full, it is not unjust that it should not be entitled to a vote on matters relating to the administration of the bankruptcy, in respect of the Petition Costs.  The right to vote should be reserved for the creditors who will be competing for payment on pari passu basis.  The Creditor in this case will still be entitled to have its vote on the basis of and in accordance with the part of the debt it proves for the underlying judgment sum and, as now accepted by the OR, for the Interim Order Costs and the Appeal Costs which are to be paid by the debtor/Bankrupt.

22.  For all the above reasons, I dismiss the Creditor’s application, with costs to be paid to the OR.

(Mimmie Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

   

Miss Elaine Liu, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the applicant

Ms Lok Pui Man Ophelia, Acting Assistant Official Receiver, for the Official Receiver and Trustee in Bankruptcy

105373-EN-2016-07-08

RE LEUNG YAT TUNG

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HCB 2019/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 2019 OF 2000

_______________________

 RE: LEUNG YAT TUNG 

_______________________

Before:  Hon Ng J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 7 July 2016
Date of Delivery of Decision: 8 July 2016

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D E C I S I O N
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Introduction

1. There are two applications by Healthy Wharf Limited (“Petitioning Creditor”) before this court.

2. First, by summons dated 21 April 2015 (“1st summons”), the Petitioning Creditor seeks an order under section 38(5B) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (“BO”) that: 

“The [Official Receiver] do pay the Petitioning Creditor from the Bankrupt’s estate forthwith their expenses incurred in the application to set aside the transfer of share, and in any event with priority over payment of the fees, charges and percentages described in the Bankruptcy (Fees and Percentages) Order (Cap 6 sub Leg C) and payable to the Official Receiver, and costs, charges and expenses incurred or authorized by, the Official Receiver, whether acting as trustee or otherwise, including the costs of any person properly employed by him.”

3. Second, by summons dated 8 June 2016 (“2nd summons”), the Petitioning Creditor seeks the return of a HK$1.2m deposit it paid to the Official Receiver (“OR”) pursuant to a Funding Agreement between the two in September 2006.

Facts

4. The material facts are these.

5. In February 1998, the Bankrupt, Leung Yat Tung (“B”) transferred to Harbour Front Limited (“Harbour Front”) certain shares owned by him allegedly at a gross undervalue.  These shares consisted of:

(a) 50% of shareholding in Money Facts Limited (“Money Facts”);

(b) 32.96% of shareholding in Fonfair Company Limited (“Fonfair”).

6. Money Facts held 65.79% of Fonfair and Fonfair holds a valuable piece of land in Yau Tong, valued at around HK$464m to HK$500m in September 2015, according to a valuation report. On that basis, B’s direct and indirect shareholding of Fonfair would be worth around HK$300m. The figures are confirmed by the OR at the hearing to be more or less correct.

7. In March 2001, B was adjudicated bankrupt on the petition of the Petitioning Creditor for his failure to pay a judgment debt in the sum of HK$5,182,519.93.  The OR was appointed trustee of the bankruptcy estate. 

8. Thereafter, a total of 39 proofs of debt were received by the OR.  Most of them were received in 2001, 2002 and 2003; 9 were received between March 2010 and December 2014.

9. B denied he had any beneficial interest in the shares in question. The Petitioning Creditor said investigation was called for as to whether the transfer of the shares by B to Harbour Front fell foul of section 49 of the BO.  For reasons not entirely clear to this court, the OR did not see fit to bring proceedings to recover the shares from Harbour Front.

10. On 13 September 2005, the Petitioning Creditor applied to court to reverse the OR’s decision and for an order directing the OR to enter into a funding agreement with the Petitioning Creditor to enable the OR to proceed with the so-called “Avoidance Proceedings”. By Order dated 29 March 2006, the application was allowed by Recorder Edward Chan SC. Costs of the Petitioning Creditor (as well as the OR) were ordered to be borne out of the bankruptcy estate. The Petitioning Creditor’s costs were about HK$452,000. This sum forms part of the subject matter of the 1st summons.

11. In September 2006, the Funding Agreement was formally executed by the Petitioning Creditor and the OR.

12. Under the Funding Agreement,

(1) At Clause 2, the Petitioning Creditor undertook and agreed with the OR that whatever the outcome of the Avoidance Proceedings, it shall indemnify the OR against all judgments and orders (including adverse costs orders) made against the OR as well as all costs, expenses and liabilities made against or incurred by the OR in the Avoidance Proceedings.

(2) At Clause 3, the Petitioning Creditor gave an indemnity to the OR if it shall be held personally liable for any costs or other form of liabilities arising out of or in connection with the Avoidance Proceedings.

(3) Under Clause 4, the Petitioning Creditor agreed to provide security for its obligations in the form of an irrevocable bank guarantee in favour of the OR in the sum of HK$1.2 million. Subsequently, in September 2011, the bank guarantee was replaced by a cashier order of HK$1.2m. This is the subject matter of the 2nd summons.

13. In February 2007, the OR eventually lodged the Avoidance Proceedings to set aside the transfer of the shares and for an order that the shares be vested in the bankruptcy estate. A solicitors firm, Messrs Ho & Ip, were engaged by the OR to conduct the proceedings. Counsel and experts have also been engaged.

14. In the course of the Avoidance Proceedings, the Petitioning Creditor directly paid Messrs Ho & Ip’s bills of costs and disbursements incurred. The total amount so paid by the Petitioning Creditor comes to slightly over HK$3m. This sum also forms part of the subject matter of the 1st summons. 

15. Trial of the Avoidance Proceedings was scheduled to commence before Madam Justice Au-Yeung on 7 January 2015. In December 2014, Harbour Front proposed to settle with the OR and sent it a cheque of around HK$5.18m. On 8 January 2015, a settlement was reached between Harbour Front and the OR.

16. On 13 January 2015, Au-Yeung J directed and authorized the OR to settle the Avoidance Proceedings.

17. On 12 February 2015, the OR and Harbour Front executed the Settlement Agreement. The terms were highly favorable to the bankruptcy estate.

(a) Under Clause 1, Harbour Front agreed to make full payment to the OR for the satisfaction of all proved debts and interest, together with all costs, fees, expenses and disbursements that the OR was entitled to receive under the provisions of the BO.

(b) Under Clause 3, Harbour Front’s previous payment of HK$5.18m to the OR should be treated as part payment under Clause 1 and the OR should be at liberty to use such funds for such purposes as it saw fit.

(c) Under Clause 4, Harbour Front agreed to charge the shares in favour of the OR as security of its payment obligations under Clause 1.

(d) Under Clause 5, as further security of its payment obligations, Harbour Front agreed to tender a cheque of HK$15m to the OR. The cheque was subsequently replaced by a bank guarantee of the same amount.

18. By an Order of this court in September 2015, RSM Nelson Wheeler Corporate Advisory Ltd was appointed to assist the OR in the adjudication of the proofs of debt submitted. The adjudication was completed in May 2016.  9 proofs of debt were admitted, including part of the Petitioning Creditor’s proof of debt to the extent of HK$4.26m. The total amount of proofs so admitted was in the region of HK$149 million.

19. Since the security provided by Harbour Front under the Settlement Agreement includes a bank guarantee of HK$15m and shares worth around HK$300m, couple with the cash payment of HK$5.18m, it is likely that the admitted proofs of debt (save for the interest element which has yet to be worked out by the OR) will be substantially if not completely repaid. On any view of the matter, this is a good result for the bankruptcy estate and the creditors.

1st summons

20. I shall deal with the 1st summons first. The sums of money that we are concerned with in this summons are:

(a) HK$452,000 odd, being legal costs incurred and paid by the Petitioning Creditor in its application to reverse the OR’s decision. As I mentioned earlier, the OR’s decision was reversed by Recorder Edward Chan SC and costs of Petitioning Creditor were ordered to be paid out of the bankruptcy estate.

(b) HK$3m odd, being legal costs incurred and paid by the Petitioning Creditor pursuant to the Funding Agreement in the Avoidance Proceedings. 

21. In a nutshell, the basis of the 1st summons is that the 2 sums of money involved are out-of-pocket expenses actually paid by the Petitioning Creditor for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and eventually resulted in huge benefit to the bankruptcy estate and hence the creditors as a whole. The Petitioning Creditor has run the risk of funding the proceedings and should be given an advantage.

22. There are two main issues pertaining to this application ie whether the court has jurisdiction under section 38(5B) BO to grant the order and if yes how the court should exercise its discretion.

Jurisdiction

23. On question of jurisdiction, the OR fairly concedes that the Court has jurisdiction to make an order in relation to the HK$3m odd legal costs incurred and paid by Petitioning Creditor in the Avoidance Proceedings.  This concession is well made.

24. Section 38(5B) BO provides:

“Where any assets have been recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation given by certain creditors, or have been protected or preserved by the payment of moneys…, or where expenses in relation to which a creditor has indemnified a trustee have been recovered, the court may, on the application of the Official Receiver or the trustee or any such creditor, make such order as it deems just with respect to the distribution of those assets and the amount of those expenses so recovered with a view to giving those creditors an advantage over others in consideration of the risk run by them in so doing.” (emphasis added)

25. The Court’s jurisdiction under section 38(5B) BO is engaged if one of these three limbs is satisfied:

(a) assets have been recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation given by certain creditors; or

(b) assets have been protected or preserved by the payment of moneys or the giving of indemnity by creditors; or

(c) expenses in relation to which a creditor has indemnified a trustee have been recovered.

26. For the present purpose, only the first two limbs require consideration.

27. In the present case, there is no doubt that assets have been recovered in the Avoidance Proceedings ie the HK$5.18m cash and Harbour Front’s promise to pay secured the HK$15m bank guarantee and the shares in the two companies.  These assets have been recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation provided by the Petitioning Creditor in the Funding Agreement.

28. Hence, in this court’s view, the 1st limb of section 38(5B) BO is engaged and satisfied and the court does have jurisdiction to make the order sought by the Petitioning Creditor ie the payment of the HK$3m odd by the OR.

29. Concerning the sum of HK$452,000, the Petitioning Creditor’s submission is that the 2nd limb of section 38(5B) BO is also engaged: assets have been “protected or preserved” by the payment of monies.  Its argument is that the Petitioning Creditor has incurred and paid legal costs in the reversal proceedings in which it was successful. But for the reversal proceedings, there would have been no Avoidance Proceedings. Without the Avoidance Proceedings, there would not have been the substantial recovery by the OR under the Settlement Agreement for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and hence the creditors.

30. The OR takes a neutral stance on the court’s jurisdiction to order the payment of this sum to the Petitioning Creditor.

31. On the face of it, the Petitioning Creditor’s argument is straightforward. However, a problem is said to arise from the construction of the words “payment of monies” in reWu Kit Ping [1993] 2 HKC 614 which Ms Lok has very properly drawn to this court’s attention.  What happened in that case was this.

32. A company by the name Kin Ming and Radio and Electric Co was granted a charging order nisi and later order absolute against Miss Wu’s property (subsequently made bankrupt) in December 1992. In January 1993, the Applicant filed a bankruptcy petition against Miss Wu. In May 1993, Miss Wu was adjudicated bankrupt. In June 1993, the Applicant issued a summons seeking to set aside the charging order.  In August 1993, a consent order was made discharging the charging order. The Applicant then sought priority payment out of half of the sale proceeds from Miss Wu’s property.  It argued that it was entitled to priority under inter alia section 38(5B) BO.  It submitted that it was instrumental in the recovery of the sale proceeds and had run the risk of applying to have the charging order set aside. It should, therefore, be rewarded with some priority. The OR opposed the application. The application was dismissed.

33. At p 621 C-H, the learned Judge said this:

“However, in order to fall within s 38(5B), it must be shown that the assets had been protected or preserved by the payment of monies (or the giving of indemnity by creditors). All the applicant had done in this case was to take proceedings to set aside the Charging Order. It is true that legal costs had been incurred in doing so. Can this be regarded as ‘payment of monies’? I do not think so. Firstly, s 38(5B) allows the court to give an advantage or priority to one creditor over the others as a ‘reward’ for the risk he has run in recovering, protecting or preserving the assets of the bankrupt for the benefit of all creditors generally. Any advantage or priority to be given to one creditor will certainly have the effect of depriving the other creditors of an equal or appropriate distribution. The court should therefore exercise great caution and not give an advantage or priority so readily to any particular creditor unless the conditions set out in the section are satisfied and it is fair and just to do so. In view of this, I think that the section must be ‘construed strictly and its terms must not be unduly extended’ to avoid opening a floodgate (see p207, Williams and Hunter on Bankruptcy 19th Ed). Secondly, the term ‘payment of monies’ can be contrasted with the term ‘cost of litigation’ in the earlier part of the section (the first limb). While ‘payment of monies’ can have a wide meaning, I doubt if it is intended to include the payment of the costs of litigation in the context of this provision. What is contemplated by the payment of monies in the protection or preservation of assets are, in my view, payments such as payment to defray Crown Rent, rates or other expenses or payment incurred for the purpose of improving the property or payment to prevent the property from being forfeited or falling into dilapidation. I do not think therefore that the applicant falls within s 38(5B).” (emphasis added)

34. At first sight, it might appear that the learned Judge had held that payment of “costs of litigation”, whatever the nature of the litigation and whatever the nature of the assets involved, does not fall within the term “payment of monies” in the 2nd limb of the section. Upon a closer look, that is not what the learned Judge had decided.

35. In this court’s view, the learned Judge’s decision should be read in light of the factual context in that case. As remarked by jurists of the highest authority from time to time, in law, context is everything.

36. The asset in question, in the context of that case, was physical asset, specifically real property in Shatin[1]. In relation to such property, this court has no doubt that the learned Judge’s decision that costs incurred in removing a charging order against the property did not come within the 2nd limb of section 38(5B) BO is right.

37. The nature of payment of monies so to “protect and preserve” real property can vary. This is clear from the examples given by the learned Judge ie crown rent, rates, expenses incurred for the purpose of improving the property, or payments to prevent the property from being forfeited or falling into dilapidation.

38. In common parlance, “removing a charging order” against real property can hardly be regarded as “protecting”, “preserving”, or “improving” the real property. Nor can it be said to be “preventing” the real property from being forfeited or falling into dilapidation. Given it is accepted that section 38(5B) BO should be construed strictly, an applicant should not be given an “advantage” under that section unless he clearly comes within one or the other of the three limbs in the section.

39. The present case is different. The asset involved is not real property or any physical asset at all. It is a potential claim by the OR (stepping into the shoes of B) to recover shares in 2 companies which had been transferred to Harbour Front prior to his bankruptcy. In other words, the asset in this case is a chose in action. Under section 58 BO, on the making of a bankruptcy order, the property (as defined in section 2 which includes inter alia things in action) of the bankrupt shall vest in the OR.

40. With regard to choses in action, one cannot really speak in terms of “improving” the chose in action or “preventing” it from being forfeited or falling into dilapidation. But a chose in action can certainly be “preserved”. Since B’s assets including his choses in action are vested in the OR, if the OR did not institute the Avoidance Proceedings[2], no one else could. In other words, the claim to recover the shares would likely be lost. By the reversal proceedings, the claim (or the chose in action) had been “preserved”.

41. In these circumstances, it would not at all be stretching the ordinary meaning of the 2nd limb in section 38(5B) BO to say that the legal costs incurred and paid by the Petitioning Creditor in the reversal proceedings were monies paid in the “preservation” of B’s asset. If authority is required tin support of this view, the same can be found in the decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Re Kyra Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) 11 ACLR 767 at 772.

42. That is enough to dispose of whatever doubt there may be as to the court’s jurisdiction to order payment by the OR of the HK$452,000 to the Petitioning Creditor.

Discretion

43. The exercise of discretion is fairly straightforward.

44. The Petitioning Creditor assumed considerable risk under the Funding Agreement.  There was apparently no monetary limit to the indemnity given to the OR.

45. The Avoidance Proceedings were said to be complicated and, prima facie, this appears to be right. Judging from the bill of costs in the Avoidance Proceedings, Senior and junior counsel, as well as experts were engaged. The proceedings were commenced in 2007 and were only settled in 2015.  The Petitioning Creditor’s potential liability for costs was substantial.  Given the huge amount at stake, one would not expect Harbour Front to be a “rollover”, so to speak.

46. The total proofs of debt submitted to the OR was over HK$379m. The Petitioning Creditor’s debt was merely HK$5.18m, constituting about 1.36% of the total proofs of debt submitted.

47. The benefits reaped by the bankruptcy estate from the Avoidance Proceedings turn out to be substantial – Harbour Front is to discharge all the adjudicated debts and interest under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. According to the OR, the amount of the admitted proofs of debt is around HK$149m. The legal costs of around HK$452,000 and HK$3m claimed by the Petitioning Creditor are relatively small in comparison. No point was taken by the OR regarding the quantum of the costs.

48. The primary objective behind the section[3] is to encourage those who are willing to assist trustees/liquidators in recovery of assets. Very often, owing to lack of funding, trustees/liquidators might be unable to take action to recover assets and as a consequence, unmeritorious persons would be tempted to hold back on delivery of assets which they should otherwise make: per Rogers J (as he then was) in re Intertrans Far East Ltd [1994] 2 HKC 704, 706 E-G.

49. On the exercise of discretion, the only point taken by the OR is in relation to the timing of the payment out to the Petitioning Creditor. According to Ms Lee, although the adjudication of the proofs of debt was completed in May this year, the calculation of post-bankruptcy interest due to the 9 creditors has yet to be finalized. Hence, it would be premature to order the payment of the two sums claimed by Petitioning Creditor now.

50. The answer to that point is simple. The OR is only concerned with the calculation of interest due to 9 creditors. The rate of interest is either contractual rate or judgment interest: section 71(3) BO. Even though judgment rate does change from time to time, it cannot possibly be a huge task to do the calculation. Having discussed the matter with Ms Lee, she agreed that 7 days should be enough for her colleagues to complete the calculation of interest. This court is prepared to give them 14 days and this will be reflected in the Order to be made.

51. In these circumstances, and taking into account the objective behind section 38(5B) BO, with a view to giving the Petitioning Creditor an advantage over other creditors in consideration of the risk run by it, this court should exercise its discretion in granting the application.

2nd Summons

52. The 2nd summons can be dealt with briefly.

53. The HK$1.2m deposit was paid by the Petitioning Creditor to the OR pursuant to the Funding Agreement as revised in September 2011.

54. The Avoidance Proceedings were concluded in a favourable settlement for the OR in 2015 - all proceedings were stayed by a “Tomlin Order” made by Au-Yeung J on 13 January 2015. No further legal costs need to be incurred by the OR in the Avoidance Proceedings and there would not be any future adverse costs order against it. In short, there is simply no reason for the OR to hang on to the HK$1.2m deposit, which, after all, has been provided by the Petitioning Creditor to the OR interest free since 2011.

55. Ms Lee submits the deposit cannot be returned to the Petitioning Creditor just yet. The reason given is that there is still an outstanding issue between the OR and Harbour Front regarding interpretation of a clause in the Settlement Agreement ie how costs previously reserved in the Avoidance Proceedings should be dealt with. Such costs have not been specifically dealt with under clause 7.1 of the Settlement Agreement and the OR seemed to take the view that such costs should also be borne by Harbour Front. Unsurprisingly, Harbour Front took a different view and stated in correspondence that there should be no re-opening of the proceedings or re-visiting the terms of the Tomlin Order. The OR appears to be considering going to court to clarify the issue and looks to the Petitioning Creditor to indemnify its costs of doing so under the Funding Agreement.

56. This court does not understand the logic of the OR’s stance and no reasons or justifications have been provided by Ms Lee at the hearing.

57. The Avoidance Proceedings have been stayed by a Tomlin order with costs payable by Harbour Front to the OR. There were no adverse costs orders against the OR as such. Costs reserved are costs reserved - they are not adverse costs orders. Harbour Front is content to leave things as they are and is unlikely to take the initiative to go back to court for clarification. The OR has not paid a cent for the legal costs incurred in the proceedings - they have all been paid by the Petitioning Creditor. It seems to this court totally pointless for the OR to seek clarification on a matter which has no financial or practical significance to the OR (and none has been suggested by Ms Lee) just because the OR disagreed with Harbour Front on the interpretation of clause 7.1. 

58. In these circumstances, this court agrees with the Petitioning Creditor that there is no justification for the OR to hold on to the HK$1.2m deposit. It should be returned to the Petitioning Creditor.

Disposition

59. For the above reasons, this court allows both applications by the Petitioning Creditor.

60. This court will hear the parties on the exact terms of the Order to be made and on costs. 

(Peter Ng)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Frances Lok, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the Petitioning Creditor

Ms Fiona Lee of the Official Receiver’s Office, for the Official Receiver



[1] See 616B-C of the reported judgment

[2] Or assign B’s claim to the shares to others

[3] Or the equivalent section in the Companies Ordinance

87991-EN-2013-07-05

THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF LEUNG YAT TUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD

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HCB 2019/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO. 2019 OF 2000

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RE: LEUNG YAT TUNG

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BETWEEN

 THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF LEUNG YAT TUNGApplicant
 

and

 
 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITEDRespondent
__________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Lok in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 4 June 2013
Date of Decision: 4 June 2013
Date of Reasons for Decision: 5 July 2013

__________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

__________________________

 

1.  This is an application by the respondent, Harbour Front Limited (“Harbour Front”), for the following order:

(i) the application commenced by the applicant, the Official Receiver and trustee of the property of Leung Yat Tung, against the respondent for setting aside transactions under s 49 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6) and s 60 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap, 219) (“the Setting Aside Application”) be dismissed for want of prosecution (“the Want of Prosecution Application”); and

(ii) alternatively, the trustee shall proceed and complete the adjudication of proofs of debt and the Setting Aside Application be stayed pending such adjudication of proofs of debt and shall consult the creditors whose debts are so admitted in relation to the Setting Aside Application by way of convening a general meeting of creditors for such purposes.

2.  In the hearing on 4 June 2013, Harbour Front agreed to withdraw the Want of Prosecution Application.  For the other applications, I dismissed Harbour Front’s application to stay the Setting Aside Application pending the adjudication of proofs of debt (“the Stay Application”) and adjourned the other applications sine die with liberty to restore.  I now give my reasons for such decision.

Background

3.  This case has a long history involving the dispute of two brothers: the bankrupt Mr Leung Yat Tung (“the Bankrupt”) and his elder brother Mr Leung Yuet Keung (“Mr YK Leung”).

4.  Healthy Wharf Limited (“Healthy Wharf”), a BVI company controlled by Mr YK Leung and his associate, filed a bankruptcy petition against the Bankrupt on 14 June 2000.

5.  On 1 March 2001, the court made the bankruptcy order against the Bankrupt.

6.  On 14 June 2001 at an adjourned general creditors meeting, the Official Receiver (“OR”) was appointed as the trustee of the property of the Bankrupt with a creditors committee.

7.  Back in 1991, the Bankrupt was the registered owner of:

(i) 3,950 ordinary shares in Money Facts Ltd (“Money Facts”); and

(ii) 3,958 ordinary shares in Fonfair Co Ltd (“Fonfair”).

8.  Money Facts is holding approximately 65% of the ordinary shares of Fonfair.  Fonfair’s principal asset is the land situated at 44, Ko Fai Road, Yau Tong Bay, Kowloon.

9.  On 5 and 12 September 1991, the Bankrupt executed 2 declarations of trust of the said shares of Money Facts and Fonfair (“the Shares”) in favour of Harbour Front (“the Declarations of Trust”). Pursuant to the Declarations of Trust, the Bankrupt transferred the Shares to Harbour Front on 13 February 1998.

10.  The OR sought to challenge the authenticity of the Declarations of Trust.  On 29 March 2006, Mr Record Edward Chan SC granted leave to the OR and Healthy Wharf to enter into a funding agreement in respect of the intended Setting Aside Application.  On 13 July 2006, To DHCJ (as he then was) ordered the OR and Healthy Wharf to enter into a revised funding agreement.

11.  On 22 February 2007, the OR issued the notice for the Setting Aside Application asking the court, inter alia, to declare that the Declarations of Trust are void and to set aside the transfer of Shares made by the Bankrupt to Harbour Front on 13 February 1998.

12.  Pursuant to the order of To DHCJ dated 30 August 2007, pleadings and affirmations had been filed for the Setting Aside Application.  The court had also given directions later for the filing of expert evidence and the PTR will be held on 8 October 2013.

13.  On 1 March 2008, the bankruptcy order against the Bankrupt was discharged.

14.  On the other hand, proofs of debt in respect of the estate of the Bankrupt were submitted back in September 2001.   Up to now, the OR has not adjudicated upon the proof of debts.  According to the records of the OR, Harbour Front and its associates had filed proofs in excess of 60% of the total proofs of debt, while the proofs filed by Healthy Wharf and its associates account for about 12.8%.

15.  There was serious dispute amongst the creditors about the proofs of debt filed by the other creditors.

16.  Harbour Front is not a member of the creditors committee.  Harbour Front has written repeatedly to the OR asking for the adjudication of proofs of debt.  However, the OR is reluctant to do so because there is insufficient fund for the exercise.  Further, if the OR were to lose in the Setting Aside Application, there would be minimal assets in the estate of the Bankrupt for distribution amongst the creditors, and so there is no point to proceed with the adjudication of proofs of debt.

17.  I understand that Harbour Front has made an open offer to settle the Setting Aside Application with the OR.  In the case that the proofs of debt filed by Harbour Front and its associates are admitted, Harbour Front would be entitled to vote in the creditors committee.  Being the majority creditor, Harbour Front would then be able to instruct the OR to settle the Setting Aside Application.  Mr Remedios, counsel for Harbour Front, agrees that this is the main object of the Stay Application.

18.  In the hearing, the trustee in bankruptcy is separately represented by two teams of legal representatives: Ms Chan from the OR’s Office who would deal with Harbour Front’s request for adjudication of proofs of debt, and Mr Maurellet who would act for the trustee in bankruptcy in the Setting Aside Application.

19.  Ms Chan’s position is that the OR is prepared to proceed with the adjudication of proofs of debt provided that there would be adequate funding for the exercise.  I understand that Harbour Front is prepared to provide such funding.  However, both Ms Chan and Mr Maurellet object the Stay Application, and so the only issue before me is whether the court should stay the Setting Aside Application pending the adjudication of proofs of debt.

Merits of the Stay Application

20.  I dismiss the Stay Application for one simple reason: Harbour Front has no locus to ask for an order in the specific terms of the Stay Application.

21.  One must bear in mind that Harbour Front is now wearing two hats in the present case: one as the respondent in the Setting Aside Application and the other one as a potential creditor of the estate of the Bankrupt.  These two roles are distinct and should not be mixed together.  In asking the court to stay the Setting Aside Application pending the adjudication of proofs of debt, Harbour Front is actually mixing up its two roles.

22.  Adjudication of proofs of debt is a matter within the internal administration of the estate of the Bankrupt.  Harbour Front, as a respondent in the Setting Aside Application, simply has no locus to get involved in the adjudication of proofs of debt.  On the other hand, Harbour Front, as a potential creditor of the estate of the Bankrupt, has the right to ask for the adjudication of proofs of debt.  However, Harbour Front, in such capacity, has no direct locus in the Setting Aside Application or to get involved in the Setting Aside Application which is a matter between the OR and a third party which happens to be Harbour Front.  In asking the court to stay the Setting Aside Application pending the adjudication of proofs of debt, Harbour Front is actually mixing up its two roles and the court should not therefore grant an order in terms of the Stay Application.

23.  In asking for the adjudication of proofs of debt, Mr Remedios concedes that Harbour Front is exercising the right as a potential creditor of the estate of the Bankrupt.  As mentioned above, Harbour Front, in such capacity, has no locus to interfere in the Setting Aside Application and so Harbour Front should not be entitled to ask for an order linking up the two matters, ie. the request for the adjudication of proofs of debt and the conduct of defence in the Setting Aside Application.

24.  As the OR agrees to adjudicate the proofs of debt provided there is adequate funding, there is no need for the court to make any order regarding the adjudication at this stage.  I therefore adjourned the other applications under the Harbour Front’s summons dated 30 January 2013 sine die with liberty to restore.  If necessary, the parties can always come back to the court to ask for further directions relating to the administration of the estate of the Bankrupt, but one has to be cautious about the capacity under which the party is making a particular application before the court.

25.  For the above reasons, I granted leave to Harbour Front to withdraw the Want of Prosecution Application and dismissed the Stay Application.  For the other remaining applications, I adjourned them sine die with liberty to restore.

26.  In this Reasons for Decision, I also make the following order nisi on the issue of costs:

(i) the costs of the Want of Prosecution Application and the Stay Application, including all costs reserved, be to the applicant; and

(ii) the costs of the remaining applications under the respondent’s amended summons dated 30 January 2013 be reserved; and

(iii) for the avoidance of doubt, the OR be entitled to claim for the costs of two teams of legal representatives to deal with the respondent’s said amended summons.

27.  I allow the OR to claim for two sets of legal costs because Harbour Front has sought to deal with matter within the internal administration of the estate of the Bankrupt and an application involving a third party in the same summons.  The order nisi shall be made absolute 14 days after the date of the handing down of this Reasons for Decision.

(David Lok)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Carman Chan, of the Official Receiver’s office, for the applicant (for the application for adjudication of proofs of debt)

Mr Jose-Antonio Maurellet, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the applicant (for the Stay Application)

Mr Leo Remedios, instructed by Tsang & Lee, for the respondent

61695-EN-2008-07-11

RE LEUNG YAT TUNG

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HCB 2019/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO. 2019 OF 2000

____________

Re: LEUNG YAT TUNG

____________

Before: Hon Kwan J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 11 July 2008

Date of Decision: 11 July 2008

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This is a summons issued on 19 June 2008 by the Official Receiver and trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of Leung Yat Tung, a former bankrupt.  Mr Leung was discharged from bankruptcy on 1 March 2008, the Official Receiver continues to administer the bankruptcy estate.

2.  The summons was issued pursuant to section 82(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap. 6, which provides that the trustee may apply to court in the manner prescribed for directions in relation to any particular matter arising under the bankruptcy.

3.  The Official Receiver seeks an order in these terms in the summons:

(1)     notwithstanding the request by Windermere Pte Ltd (“Windermere”) by a letter dated 12 June 2008, the Official Receiver is not required to call a general meeting of creditors; and

(2)     the Official Receiver need not comply with the four proposed resolutions in the said letter of Windermere which had the support of a majority of the creditors.

4.  Windermere is a company associated with Mr Leung and is the assignee of a debt representing 32.34% of the overall indebtedness, although Windermere has not to date filed a proof of debt.

5.  By a letter to the Official Receiver of yesterday, Windermere stated that it withdraws its request to hold a general meeting of creditors to consider the proposed resolutions nos. 1, 3 and 4.  As for the proposed resolution in 2, Windermere stated this is to be revised as follows:

“That additional member or members be elected to the creditors’ committee to fill any vacancy or as is otherwise permissible up to the prescribed maximum.”

6.  That being the stance taken by Windermere, it will not be necessary for me to consider the resolutions proposed and withdrawn.

7.  The court has wide powers in the exercise of its jurisdiction in bankruptcy.  It has complete control over the administration of a bankrupt’s estate for the benefit of all persons interested, subject only to such express limitations as are found in Cap. 6.  Under section 82(3), the court has power to decline to order a trustee to carry out a creditor’s request to convene a general meeting of creditors pursuant to section 82(2), if the court considers that the holding of such meeting would serve no useful purpose and would only result in a useless waste of assets in the bankruptcy (In re J Burn, ex parte Dawson & Others [1932] 1 Ch 247 at 256 to 258, 260 to 261).  The court also has power, when the trustee applies for directions under section 82(3), to direct the trustee to disregard a resolution passed by the majority of creditors even though there was no fraud in the passing of the resolution, if there was impropriety or just cause for directing the trustee not to act in accordance with the creditors’ resolution (Ex parte Cocks, In re Poole (1882) 21 Ch D 397 at 402 to 403, 404 to 406).  As stated by Jessel, MR at 403, “the direction of the creditors is to be subordinate to the direction of the Court”.

8.  The relevant background matters may be stated as follows.

9.  The central issue for the Official Receiver in this bankruptcy is the transfer by Mr Leung of his shares in two companies, Fonfair Company Limited (“Fonfair”) and Money Facts Limited (“Money Facts”) into two family trusts.  Fonfair was held as to ⅓ by Mr Leung and ⅔ by Money Facts. Money Facts was owned equally by Mr Leung and his elder brother Leung Yuet Keung (“YK Leung”).  Mr Leung alleged he made two declarations of trust in 1991 declaring he held his shares in Money Facts and Fonfair as trustee on trust for Harbour Front Limited (“Harbour Front”), which in turn, in declarations signed by Mr Leung, declared it held them on trust for Harbour Front Unit Trust.  The Official Receiver maintains that such transfer of shares was not in fact made in 1991 but in February 1998, when Mr Leung executed bought and sold notes and instruments of transfer in favour of Harbour Front in respect of his shares in Fonfair and Money Facts, and such transfers fall foul of section 49 of Cap. 6 and are liable to be set aside as a transaction at an undervalue or is caught by section 60 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap. 219, or the principles on sham transaction.

10.  The Official Receiver obtained leave from Recorder Edward Chan, SC on 29 March 2006 to bring an action to set aside the transfer of shares in Fonfair and Money Facts by Mr Leung.  Proceedings were brought by a notice of application against Harbour Front on 22 February 2007.  This litigation is funded by Healthy Wharf Limited (“Healthy Wharf”) under a funding agreement entered into by the Official Receiver with leave of the court.  Healthy Wharf is the petitioning creditor and is controlled by YK Leung.

11.  According to the Official Receiver’s analysis, creditors holding 60.11% of the known debts of Mr Leung are related to him and the UDL Group of companies, of which Mr Leung was the former chairman.  Healthy Wharf and YK Leung hold about 12.8% of the overall debts.  In view of the composition of creditors, a resolution proposed by the camp of Mr Leung is likely to be passed at the creditors’ meeting.

12.  The bankruptcy order was made over 7 years ago.  The available assets to date are cash of $66,955.76.  There is no reasonable prospect of any dividend being paid.  The only hope of realising anything for the benefit of creditors is in the successful litigation of the section 49 proceedings.  The most important issues remaining in the administration of the estate are the section 49 proceedings and action relating to Mr Leung’s transfer of shares in Harbour Front after the presentation of the bankruptcy petition, in which serious allegations are made against Mr Leung.

13.  The creditors’ committee used to be made up of three members, Orix International Finance Limited (“Orix”), China Construction Bank (Asia) Corporation Limited (“CCBC”) and GE Capital (Hong Kong) Limited (“GE Capital”).  The composition has changed due to the assignment by GE Capital of its debt.  Orix and CCBC have confirmed in June 2008 they are prepared to continue to act as members of the creditors’ committee and they agree that the vacancy arising from the termination of membership of GE Capital should not be filled.

14.  Orix holds 14.97% of the total debts and CCBC holds 0.17% of the total debts.  They are independent creditors and Windermere has no objection to them remaining on the creditors’ committee.

15.  Windermere seeks to call a general meeting of creditors for the purpose of electing additional member or members to the creditors’ committee to fill the vacancy arising from the termination of membership of GE Capital.  It is not apparent from the proposed resolution how many additional members Windermere proposes to elect.  In the submission of Miss Lam for Windermere, she submitted that to address concerns that the two independent creditors might be out-voted, Windermere could propose that only one additional member is to be appointed to the committee.

16.  The purpose of appointing an additional member, as I understand from Miss Lam’s submission, is so that Windermere’s interest as a substantial creditor would be properly represented and looked after, and to ensure a balanced representation of creditors on the committee.  She submitted that creditors in general meeting enjoy an “overriding right” to resolve that a creditor be appointed to fill a vacancy in the membership of the creditors’ committee, by virtue of rule 122ZN(3) of the Bankruptcy Rules.  Furthermore, procedural safeguards could be put in place to ensure non-participation of the additional member in decision-making on any question in which he faces a conflict of interest.

17.  I do not agree with her submissions.  Rule 122ZN(3) must be read with sub-rule (2), which provides that “the vacancy need not be filled if the trustee and a majority of the remaining committee-members so agree, provided that the number of members does not fall below the minimum required by rule 122ZE(1)”, which is at least two members.  As mentioned earlier, Orix and CCBC have confirmed that the vacancy is not required to be filled.  The Official Receiver agrees with this.  In any event, even if a resolution were to be passed by the creditors that a particular creditor be appointed to fill the vacancy, the court may direct the trustee to disregard it, if just cause is made out.

18.  In this bankruptcy, the only meaningful business remaining that the Official Receiver is required to deal with are the section 49 proceedings and action relating to Mr Leung’s transfer of shares in Harbour Front after the presentation of the petition.  In view of the inherent conflict in the composition of interested creditors, the Official Receiver considers it necessary to seek direction for the future administration of the estate from the court.  No meaningful purpose would be served by having a creditor related to or associated with Mr Leung on the creditors’ committee, as such creditor would not be able to vote or be consulted upon in view of the potential conflict of interest.  If a resolution were to be passed appointing a creditor associated with Mr Leung or the UDL Group of companies as an additional member, I would direct the Official Receiver to disregard it.

19.  In her oral submissions, Miss Lam has taken a fallback position.  She asked the court to remove the creditors’ committee altogether if the court is not minded to direct the Official Receiver to hold a creditors’ meeting to consider the proposed resolution of appointing an additional member to the creditors’ committee.  Miss McKenna for the Official Receiver takes a neutral position.

20.  I am inclined to allow the creditors’ committee to remain.  As submitted by Miss McKenna, the members of the committee are independent creditors.  It may be that their views could serve as a guide for the court in any applications that might be made in future by the Official Receiver for directions concerning the remaining business in this bankruptcy.

21.  The order I make today is that notwithstanding the request by Windermere by letters dated 12 June 2008 and 10 July 2008, the Official Receiver is not required to call a general meeting of creditors, as it would serve no purpose to call a meeting if the court is only to direct the trustee to disregard the proposed resolution.

22.  I order the costs of the Official Receiver and trustee in this application to be paid by Windermere.

 (S Kwan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Miss Phyllis McKenna, for the Official Receiver

Miss Catrina Lam, instructed by Messrs Tsang & Lee, for Windermere Pte Ltd

53041-EN-2006-06-30

RE LEUNG YAT TUNG

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HCB 2019/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING NO. 2019 OF 2000

_________________________

 

Re: LEUNG YAT TUNG, the Bankrupt

 

_________________________

Coram: Master Lung in Court

Date of Hearing: 27th March and 12th June 2006

Date of Handing Down : 30th June 2006

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D E C I S I O N

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The Application

1. This is the application of the Official Receiver and Trustee (the trustee) under section 30A of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (the Ordinance) for an order that the relevant period of 4 years shall cease to run for 4 years so that Mr. Leung, the bankrupt shall be discharged on 1st March 2009.  The petitioning creditor Healthy Wharf Limited supports this application.  Mr. Leung opposes it.  At the hearing the petitioning creditor has not attended.

The Law

2. Section 30A of the Ordinance provides that subject to other provisions under this section, a bankrupt will be discharged from bankruptcy by the expiration of the relevant period of 4 years beginning with the commencement of the bankruptcy.  Section 30 of the Ordinance provides that the bankruptcy of a person commences with the day on which the order is made.

3. Section 30A(3) provides that where the court is satisfied on the application of the trustee or one of the bankrupt’s creditors that a valid objection based on one or more of the grounds set out in subsection (4) has been made, the court may order that the relevant period shall cease to run for such period, not exceeding, in the case of a bankrupt, who has not previously been adjudged bankrupt, 4 years.

The trustee’s grounds for the application

4. Section 30A(4) sets out the grounds on which an objection can be made to the discharge of a bankrupt.  The trustee relies upon the following grounds:

(a) that the discharge of Mr. Leung would prejudice the administration of his estate;

(b) that Mr. Leung has failed to co-operate in the administration of his estate.

The legal principles

5. The trustee also relies upon the following legal principles as adopted and decided by Madam Justice Le Pichon, as she then was, in Re Li Tat Kong [2000] 3 HKC 360:

(a) If the bankrupt fails to co-operate with the trustee after bankruptcy, or if a bankrupt’s conduct before bankruptcy was unsatisfactory, he should not be automatically discharged. (377B)

(b) It is incumbent on the bankrupt to make a full and frank disclosure and to proffer all pertinent information regarding his assets and financial dealings to the trustee. (377D)

(c) It is not good enough for a bankrupt to adopt a purely passive or reactive role, responding when asked in the expectation that with any luck, pertinent matters might be overlooked. (377G)

(d) The court will have regard to the scope and purposes of the statutory provisions conferring the discretion.  There should be an adequate investigation of the conduct and affairs of the bankrupt.  In a case presenting features, which call for an exercise of discretion upon the question when and on what terms the bankrupt should be discharged, the investigation should generally be carried to a conclusion before a discharge is granted or permitted to occur. The bankrupt cannot complain unfairness of delay in the investigation where there has been concealment or lack of cooperation on his own part. (377H-I)

(e) The court will also have regard to the interests of commercial morality and the public interest. (378B)

Mr. Bartlett, counsel for the bankrupt does not dispute the above legal principles.

The factual background

6. Mr. Leung was the chairman of UDL Holdings Ltd., a listed company.  There were and still are numerous associated or subsidiary companies.  A petition was presented on 14 June 2000 for Mr. Leung’s bankruptcy.  Mr. Leung agreed to pay the debt by instalments before Madam Justice Le Pichon.  He also agreed to make full disclosure of his financial position.  He filed the affirmations but the petitioner rejected his proposal of payment by instalments.  The hearing of the bankruptcy was adjourned.  Meanwhile before hearing of the bankruptcy petition, Mr. Leung filed the application for an interim order.  This application was heard together with the petition before Mr. Justice Cheung.  Cheung J. in his judgment delivered on 1 March 2001 ruled that the starting and fundamental point in the application must be that Mr. Leung should make a full and frank disclosure of his finance.  In his view, Mr. Leung at that time had failed to do so.  Cheung J. rejected his application for an interim order. (209B) The references following refer to the page numbers of the bundle of documents in this proceeding.

7. What attracted more attention and criticism from Cheung J. is the Family Trust, viz. The 747 Trust and The Harbour Front Unit Trust created by 2 Trust Deeds both dated 2 September 1991.  The trustee suspects that Mr. Leung used the trust device to hide all his assets behind the Family Trust from his creditors.  Mr. Leung claimed that he was not a beneficiary under the Family Trust.  Evidence showed that he was in a position to deal with the assets of the Family Trust.  In September 1999, Standard Chartered Bank informed him that it would lend $20 million on the security of the Yau Tong property, which is part of the assets of the Family Trust.  The value of this property, as according to his own valuation in 1991, was HKD90 million.  In November 1999, Mr. Leung offered to sell to his brother, Leung Yuet Keung, a director of the petitioner, the whole or part of the interest of the Yau Tong property for $80 million or $50 million respectively. (220H) The judge also commented that Mr. Leung would either assert that he was able to deal with the property under the Family Trust or distance himself from the Family Trust when the matter suited him. (220R-221B) Harbour Front Trust Ltd. is the trustee of Harbour Front Unit Trust and is wholly owned by him.  Cheung J. expressed his view in the judgment:

“In my view, whether the debtor owns beneficiary interest in the Family Trust, is clearly one of the matters that need to be investigated in bankruptcy so that any hidden asset should be made available for distribution. (223E)”

8. The fact claimed by Mr. Leung in the hearing before Cheung J. that he always held as the trustee only of the shares of Money Facts Ltd. and Fonfair Co. Ltd., both of which hold the beneficial interest of the Yau Tong property, has been held to be contradicted by the prospectus and annual reports of UDL.  The judge also took the view that whether the transfer of the shares of these 2 companies to Harbour Front Ltd. for nominal value or no consideration and that whether the transaction was caught by section 49 of the Ordinance should be investigated (224N-Q).

9. Mr. Leung appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decisions of Cheung J.  His appeal was dismissed.  The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Leung had failed to disclose his assets fully and frankly.  Rogers J.A. in his judgment commented on the Family Trusts, both of which are BVI companies.  In particular, he said that on the face of the documentation, it appeared that Mr. Leung had both control over the trustee and almost the entire beneficial interest in the Harbour Front Unit Trust (245K).  He further commented that if Mr. Leung no longer had any beneficial interest in or to be derived from the Harbour Front Unit Trust, then there was no explanation from Mr. Leung as to how he came to divest himself of the interest in the units, which he had at the inception of the Trust (249L).  Le Pichon J.A. also called into question the fullness or candour of Mr. Leung’s information, particularly in relation to the unexplained dramatic increase in earnings, his beneficial interest (if any) in the Harbour Front Unit Trust, the transfer of assets into that Trust and the true extent of his liabilities, etc. (255H) She also asked for explanation of how Mr. Leung had divested himself of his beneficial interest in the Harbour Front Unit Trust (256C-M).

10. The above are the events leading to Mr. Leung’s bankruptcy in February and April 2001.  I set out those facts to show that as early as the commencement of the his bankruptcy, Mr. Leung had already known that the courts were concerned about his non-disclosure of his assets, especially his transfer of his shares in Fonfair Co. Ltd. and Money Facts Ltd. to Harbour Front Ltd., the trustee of Harbour Front Unit Trust, his beneficial interest in The Family Trust etc.  The trustee in bankruptcy has a duty to clear all these issues raised by the courts in the administration of Mr. Leung’s estate.

11. In recent proceedings, the above matters remain to be the courts’ concern.  In an application for winding up of Money Facts Ltd. taken out by Harbour Front Ltd., which Cheung J. and the Court of Appeal had suspected to be controlled by Mr. Leung, 4 Declarations of Trust were brought to the attention of Kwan J.  Two of the Declarations of Trust are dated 5 September 1991, by which Mr. Leung declared that he held the Money Facts Ltd.’s shares on trust for Harbour Front Ltd. and Harbour Front Ltd. in turn declared that such shares are held on trust for the Harbour Trust Unit Trust.  The other two Declarations of Trust are dated 12 September 1991, by which Mr. Leung declared that he held the Fonfair shares on trust for Harbour Front Ltd. and Harbour Front Ltd. in turn declared that such shares are held on trust for the Harbour Trust Unit Trust. Mr. Leung did not produce these 4 Declarations of Trust to Cheung J. and the Court of Appeal in 2001.  Kwan J. has highlighted some 9 irregular features and suspicions on these Declarations of Trust in her judgment (176-180).  The Judge also observes that Mr. Leung took a cavalier attitude towards truthfulness in his cross-examination (145C-D).

12. In the course of administration of Mr. Leung’s estate, the trustee had sent him a list of questions on the Family Trusts before the interview with him on 29 August 2001.  Mr. Leung replied on 28 August 2001, giving answers that, in the trustee’s view, are not meaningful.  At the interview on 29 August 2001, Mr. Leung said that he was not a beneficiary of the Family Trusts and advised that the Family Trusts were arranged in 1991 to avoid the impact of his sudden death on the operation of UDL Holdings Ltd. and that his immediate family members, including his wife and children, were the beneficiaries of the Family Trusts (19).  The trustee says in the report that Mr. Leung was uncooperative and refused to provide her with the information and document requested.  As a result, the trustee held a public examination of Mr. Leung before Master Hui under section 19 of the Ordinance.  At the end of the public examination on 17 February 2006, Master Hui made an order that Mr. Leung shall within the next 21 days supply information or produce documents by way of affirmation to the trustee.  The documents or information are:

(a) All profit and loss accounts of Harbour Front Limited, audited or otherwise from inception to 1991 to present;

(b) Management accounts/ledger account of Harbour Front Limited from inception to present;

(c) All assets of Harbour Front Limited and supporting documents from inception in 1991 to 2005;

(d) Company register of members of Harbour Front Limited from inception in 1991 to present;

(e) All documents relating to investments of Harbour Front Limited from inception in 1991 to present;

(f) All bank statements of Harbour Front Limited from inception in 1991 to present.

Mr. Leung has failed to comply with the above order.  I have been told that Master Hui’s order is being appealed.  Mr. Leung has applied to stay the above orders.  His application has failed.

The supplemental report

13. The trustee has filed one supplemental report, which brings in the transcripts of the public examination of Mr. Leung before Master Hui.  Mr. Bartlett opposed this supplemental report.  In the end, I allowed it to be filed and I will consider it, bearing in mind that Mr. Leung will appeal against Master Hui’s order.  Having considered the findings of the Court of Appeal and the Courts of the First Instance, I consider that the trustee is perfectly entitled to the information as ordered by Master Hui.  The trustee reports that he has received proofs of debt claiming the total sum of HKD173,331,915.23, SDG4,844,265.30 and USD9,587,639.50.  The total assets realized amount to HKD92,307.84.  No dividend has been declared.

14. The trustee relies on the ground that Mr. Leung had deliberately resisted investigation in his affairs, dealings and his properties.  The trustee is of the view that the discharge of the bankruptcy would prejudice the administration of his estate.  Further, the trustee also submits that the discharge of Mr. Leung will make her unable to proceed with the public examination of him.

15. Mr. Leung disputes the trustee’s allegation that he was uncooperative in her investigation into his assets.  He argues that he has been cooperative with the trustee all along and the trustee was not dealing with the investigations reasonably.  He says that if the trustee was dissatisfied with the answers given in June 2002, the trustee should have made further investigations and to proceed with the public examination without waiting.  Instead the trustee has chosen to wait until a few weeks before the automatic discharge and applied for suspension on 3 February 2005 without having previously taken any steps towards fixing the hearing date of the public examination.  He complains that the trustee’s conduct is prejudicial to him (33-34).

The Family Trust enquiries

16. I now review the enquiries made by the trustee in relation to the Family Trust and see how Mr. Leung had responded to the enquiries.  On 1 March 2001, the court made the bankruptcy order against Mr. Leung.  On 27 August 2001, the trustee wrote to Mr. Leung and requested him to answer those questions on a list attached to the letter.  Question 1 asked Mr. Leung to provide, inter alia, the history of the Family Trust, including but not limited to the past and present beneficiaries and the assets under the Family Trust.  Question 3 asked him to account for his control and interest (past and present) in Fonfair Co. Ltd., Money Facts Ltd., Harbour Front Ltd. and Y T Leung Trading Co. Ltd.  The answer that Mr. Leung gave to question 1 was that he was not in a position to disclose any information relating to the trust.  He asked the trustee to refer to the officers of the trust or trust documents already in her possession.  To question 3, he simply said that he was director to those companies but held no beneficial interests in any of those companies.  The trustee pursued the matter by obtaining an order from Master Ho on 11 January 2002 to have Mr. Leung examined under section 19 of the Ordinance.  On 2 April 2002, the trustee sent a letter enclosed with a list of questions for the public examination to him.  By a letter dated 3 June 2002, Mr. Leung answered the questions.  To those questions concerning the particulars of the 747 Trust and the Harbour Front Unit Trust (The Family Trust), he answered that he had nothing to add in addition to his previous submission.  He referred the trustee to the administrators of the trust in question for detail of the administration and other information.  The trustee pursued the matter by conducting a public examination of Mr. Leung before Master Hui, who has made the order ordering Mr. Leung to answer the questions in paragraph 12 above.  Mr. Leung has refused to answer these questions.  In my view, the trustee is justified to say that Mr. Leung has been uncooperative to her investigations into the Family Trust.

17. Counsel for the trustee explains in court that the trustee had to arrange funding for the public examination. Therefore she has taken time to obtain funds from the creditors.  Counsel submits that Mr. Leung has a duty to provide full particulars to the trustee in the administration of the estate without prompting by the trustee.  Mr. Leung cannot blame the trustee for taking time to make application to court for the appropriate order if he contributed to the delay himself.  She relies on the legal principles set out in paragraph 5 above in Re Li Tat Kong.

The UDL group companies

18. The trustee also says in the report that Mr. Leung has in the questionnaire disclosed that he held shares in 22 companies (the UDL Group) on trust for UDL Holdings Limited and he said that he had no beneficial interest in them.  In support, she produced copies of the declarations of trust and Instrument of Transfer stating that Mr. Leung held shares of the 22 companies on trust for UDL Holdings Limited.  The trustee observed that most of the Declarations of Trust were executed after the presentation of the bankruptcy petition on 14 June 2000.  She took the view that Mr. Leung tried to use the trust device to avoid his creditors.  She sent a letter (617) to Mr. Leung to account for the circumstances surrounding the trusts such as source of the funds, reasons for executing the trust, the relationship between him and the beneficial owners.  She also asked Mr. Leung to explain why there were no witnesses to attest the Declarations of Trusts.

19. The trustee complains that Mr. Leung only advised her that the shares were held on trust for UDL Holdings for various reasons and circumstances, which were deemed necessary.  He failed to provide substantive reasons.  He also said that he was not in a position to give further information as to the history and circumstances.  He referred the matter to the Company Secretary (619), Mr. Peter Yuen, who replied that it was the established practice of the UDL Group that the Chairman should hold on trust of a nominal number of the shares of the UDL Group in favour of the parent company and the nominee shareholder would in turn execute a declaration of trust and sign a blank share transfer form of the shares (621).  The trustee considers that the Declarations of Trusts for the shares in UDL Group are self-serving documents and she is not satisfied on evidence as to the genuineness of the trust.

20. Mr. Leung in his affidavit argues that he has tried his best to answer the queries raised by the trustee and he has referred the enquiries to the Company Secretary, who is in a better position to answer the questions.  On a close examination of the questions put by the trustee, I consider that the only question that Mr. Leung has not answered is why there were no witness to attest the Declarations of Trusts.  The other questions have been answered, though may be indirectly.  I would not put much weight on this allegation raised by the trustee for her application.

Transfer of shareholdings after bankruptcy

21. The trustee complains against Mr. Leung for transferring his shareholdings in various companies shortly after presentation of the bankruptcy petition.  The trustee reports in the first report that Mr. Leung has transferred his one share in Giant Strong Investment Limited, Multi-Wishes Limited and Y T Leung Dredging & Construction Limited respectively to Y T Leung Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. Ltd. and Sincere Place Limited respectively on 16 August, 8 August and 10 August 2000.  The trustee has written letters to those companies telling them that the transfer might be caught by section 42 of the Ordinance.  UDL Marine Assets (HK) Ltd. wrote to the trustee and explained that Mr. Leung did not have beneficial interest in the shares and the transfer was made pursuant to the Scheme of Arrangement of UDL Holdings Limited, which was sanctioned by the court on 28 April 2000 (753).  This seems to tally with the explanation given by Mr. Peter Yuen mentioned above.  The trustee may want to make further investigations into the matters.  Again, I do not place much weight on this complaint.

22. Finally, the trustee complains that 4,999 shares in Fire Full Investment Limited registered in Mr. Leung’s name on 9 May 2001 had been transferred to Y T Leung Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Company Limited as shown by the Company Registry Record on 13 September 2004 without her consent.  Mr. Leung in his affidavit denies that he has made the transfer after the bankruptcy order.  He explains that the transfer was made on 10 August 2000 for $344,783.03, which was not received by him as it was set off against a debt he owed to Y T Leung Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Company Limited.  He suggests that it is an error of the record that was updated by the filing of the annual return (42). The trustee does not pursue further on this issue for the time being.  Again, I do not consider it has much weight in support of the trustee’s application.

23. The main issue is the Family Trust that the trustee finds Mr. Leung not co-operating with her in her investigations. Up till now, the trustee is still not satisfied with the answers given to her in the investigations into the true beneficiaries of the Family Trust and how Mr. Leung had divested of his property to the Family Trust. These are the questions Cheung J., the Court of Appeal and Kwan J. had asked in the previous proceedings. These questions remain unanswered now. Without the co-operation of Mr. Leung, it is doubtful that the trustee is able to find the answers.

Mr. Leung’s arguments

24. Mr. Bartlett submits that the trustee does not seek to support the application on the ground under section 30A(4)(b) of the Ordinance that the discharge of Mr. Leung would prejudice the administration of his estate. This is obvious in light of section 19 of the Ordinance:

“Where a bankruptcy order has been made, the Official Receiver may at any time before the discharge of the bankrupt apply to the court for the public examination of the bankrupt.”

It follows that if the bankruptcy order is discharged, such right of the Official Receiver will be forfeited. It is not arguable that public examination is a powerful and efficient instrument for the Official Receiver to secure co-operation of Mr. Leung to obtain the information required for the administration of his estate. This may provide the answer to the submission by Mr. Bartlett that the court should not make the order sought for by the trustee as Mr. Leung is still under an obligation to co-operate with the trustee under section 30A(8) of the Ordinance after his discharge. The sanction is the punishment for contempt of court. Section 30A(8) is for the discharged bankrupt to co-operate with the trustee “for the purpose of completing the administration of the estate”. The trustee’s power for investigation into the assets of Mr. Leung will be curtailed once the bankruptcy order is discharged.

25. Mr. Bartlett also submits that this court should not take into consideration findings of Cheung J., the Court of Appeal and Kwan J. as they are the opinions, not the facts. With respect to counsel, I am unable to agree. It is obvious that the courts found facts, which were not disputed by Mr. Leung such as the Yau Tong property mentioned in paragraph 7 above. Kwan also found as the fact that the Declarations of Trusts were not disclosed to Cheung J. and the Court of Appeal. Cheung J. and the Court of Appeal did give directions to the trustee to make into investigations into the Family Trust in order to trace Mr. Leung’s assets for their distribution to the creditors. The trustee has a duty to carry out the court’s directions. As I have said above, all questions relating to the Family Trust remain unanswered up till now.

Findings

26. Having considered all the circumstances in this matter, I find that the grounds advanced by the Official Receiver are proved. I am satisfied that Mr. Leung had deliberately refused to supply the trustee with the information relating to the Family Trust, which will not assist Mr. Leung to dispel the trustee’s suspicion that he is hiding his assets behind the Family Trust. Mr. Bartlett submits that even if the court is satisfied the grounds under s.30A (4), the court has a discretion whether to make a suspension order. He further submits that a suspension order is not appropriate in light of the trustee’s inordinate delay and tardy progress of her investigation over the past 5 years.

Exercise of discretion

27. In considering exercising my discretion, I bear in mind the legal principles in Li Tat Kong’s case set out in paragraph 5 above. The court will have regard to the scope and purposes of the statutory provisions conferring the discretion. The discretion should be exercised to provide rehabilitation for the bankrupt. It must be on the basis that the bankrupt rehabilitates after discharging his obligations under the law. His obligations under the law include co-operation with the trustee for full and proper administration of his estate, so that the creditors would obtain their fair share of dividends from his estate. The legislation certainly does not allow the bankrupt a haven to hide his assets and obtain his automatic discharge after a statutory period of 4 years. On the facts before me, it is apparent that Mr. Leung will continue to refuse to co-operate with the trustee on any questions touching on the true identities of the beneficiaries and other related issues of the Family Trust. As I have said, I do not believe the trustee is able to obtain the answers without the co-operation of Mr. Leung. The authority decided that investigation should generally be carried to a conclusion before a discharge is granted or permitted to occur. (para.5 (d) supra) Mr. Leung complains delay by the trustee in applying for public examination. The trustee explains that she needs fund from the creditor to continue with the public examination. The burden is on Mr. Leung to co-operate with the trustee and give the information relating to the Family Trust. I accept the trustee’s explanation. To discharge Mr. Leung from bankruptcy simply means that the creditors will be denied their legitimate claims against his estate even though he has assets to paid them. This is contrary to the interests of commercial morality and the public interest. (para.5(e) supra.) I am convinced that the public interest will not be served by Mr. Leung’s early discharge from bankruptcy.

Period of suspension

27. As to the appropriate period of suspension, the trustee asks for the maximum of 4 years whilst Mr. Bartlett submits that it should be no more than one year. Mr. Bartlett refers to the case of Li Tat Kong, in which the bankrupt was found guilty of not co-operating with the trustee, that he was hiding his assets from the trustee and the court found that the public interest would not be served by his early discharge from bankruptcy. That case is exacerbated by the fact that Mr. Li was imprisoned for six months by court for suppressing information relating to his financial affairs in the examination of judgment debtor. The Judge suspended the discharge for 3 years only. He submits that Mr. Leung in this case is in a much better position. He has never been ordered to imprisonment by the court. There has been tardiness in the investigation by the trustee. On these bases, Mr. Leung should be treated more leniently than Mr. Li Tat Kong.

28. Looking closely at these two cases, I find that this case is more serious than the case in Li Tat Kong. Mr. Li was ordered imprisonment for not telling the truth in court in his examination as a judgment debtor. Le Pichon J. did consider this factor in her judgment in her exercise of her discretion whether a suspension order should be made against him. There are unusual circumstances in Mr. Li’s case but not found in this case:

(a)   There were 21 months of the 4-year period Mr. Li was a free man. This was due to a composition approved by the court, which annulled the receiving order. This annulment order was set aside by the court on the ground that it was vitiated because the mandatory public examination of Mr. Li had neither been held nor dispensed with as required by ss.20(6) and 25(1) of the Ordinance in its unamended state which applied to the bankruptcy of Mr. Li. [2000] 3 HKC at 372A.

(b)  In summary administration, the trustee was erroneous to assume that the bankrupt with less than $200,000 estate had no assets to conceal and could not have been privy to serious misconduct. As a result, no in-depth investigation had been made into Mr. Li’s affairs by the trustee. [2000] 3 HKC at 379B.

29. On the other hand, I find the following aggravating factors in this case:

(a)  Mr. Leung had failed to make full and frank disclosure of his finance in his application for an interim order before Mr. Justice Cheung. The Judge had made it clear that the trustee suspected that Mr. Leung used the trust device to hide all his assets behind the Family Trust. As early as in March 2001, Mr. Leung was aware what the court and the trustee were concerned about – his Family Trust.

(b) In the appeal against Mr. Justice Cheung’s order, the Court of Appeal had also found that Mr. Leung had failed to disclose his assets fully and frankly. The court also expressed concerns about the assets of the Family Trust. The Court of Appeal also held that investigations should be made in the Family Trust.

(c)  Kwan J. had, in her judgment, highlighted suspicions about the Family Trust.

(d) The trustee had, before interviewing Mr. Leung, given the questions relating to the Family Trust. Mr. Leung refused to give answers to those questions.

(e)  In the public examination under the Ordinance, Master Hui had ordered Mr. Leung to provide answers relating to the Family Trust to the trustee. Mr. Leung refused to comply with this order.

(f)   The amount involved is substantial. The total sums of provable debts are HKD173,331,915.23, SDG4,844,265.30 and USD9,587,639.50. No dividend has been paid to the creditors.

30. I ask myself what mitigating factor there is for Mr. Leung for his discharge of bankruptcy. Unfortunately, I find none.

Orders

31. In the circumstances, I consider that a proper period by which Mr. Leung’s automatic discharge is to be postponed is 4 years. Accordingly, the appropriate order is that the relevant period for the purpose of section 30A of the Ordinance shall cease to run for 4 years.

32. Pursuant to Order 42 rule 5B(6) of the Rules of The High Court, I make an order nisi for costs in favour of the trustee. I consider the matter appropriate to be assessed gross sum under Order 62 rule 9(4)(b) of the Rules of the High Court. Subject to the application to vary the order nisi, I order that there be liberty to the Official Receiver to apply for gross sum assessment of the costs by filing and serving the schedule of costs within 14 days after the period for application to vary the order nisi has expired. The bankrupt shall be at liberty to file and serve the list of objections within 14 days thereafter. The hearing for the gross sum assessment shall be fixed to be heard by me for 30 minutes.

 

(K.W. Lung)
Master

Ms. K. Cheung, Government Counsel of the Official Receiver and Trustee.

Mr. J. Bartlett instructed by Messrs. Tsang & Lee for the Bankrupt.

Appeal allowed: see CACV271/2006 dated 5 June 2007

46585-EN-2005-10-10

RE LEUNG YAT TUNG

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HCB 2019/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO. 2019 OF 2000

 

_________________________

Re: LEUNG YAT TUNG

_________________________

Coram : Master J. Wong in Court

Date of Hearing : 7 June 2005

Date of Handing Down Decision : 10 October 2005

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

The Dispute

1. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Master Ho’s Order dated 23 February 2003 herein, the following issues were put before this Court, viz:

“… whether the Petitioning Creditor can file the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong on 21st February 2005 and what role the Petitioning Creditor plays in the Official Receiver’s application …”

Background

2. On 14 June 2000, based on a judgment debt of HK$3,566,479.37 and interest under HCA 1125/2000, the Petitioning Creditor Healthy Wharf Limited commenced the present proceedings against the Debtor Mr. Leung Yat Tung (“the Bankrupt”) who opposed the same by applying for an interim order under sections 20 and 20A of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (“BO”).

3. The 2 matters were heard by the Hon. Cheung J. on 20, 21 and 28 February 2001.  The learned Judge later handed down his Judgment dismissing the application of interim order because the Bankrupt failed to  discharge his primary responsibility with a full and frank disclosure of his net worth.  A bankruptcy order was made.

4. The Bankrupt was aggrieved and took up the matter to appeal.  It was dismissed by the Hon. Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA on 19 April 2004.  The Court found that the proposal was not serious, inadequate and unsuccessful, despite further evidence had been filed attempting to counter the criticisms made below.

5.  On 11 January 2002, upon the application by the Official Receiver (“OR”) as trustee in bankruptcy of the Bankrupt, Master Ho ordered the Bankrupt to be publicly examined pursuant to section 19 of the BO.  Such examination is yet to be carried out.

6. According to section 30A(2)(a) BO, the Bankrupt might have been discharged on 1 March 2005, i.e. 4 years from the making of bankruptcy order on 1 March 2001.  It is commonly known as automatic discharge.  However, on 8 November 2004, the OR, pursuant to section 30A(5) BO, notified that he:

“… intend to object the bankrupt’s discharge on the following grounds-
  
(i) that the discharge of the bankrupt would prejudice the administration of his estate;
  
(ii) that the bankrupt has failed to co-operate in the administration of his estate;
  
…”

7. On the next day, 9 November 2004, the OR also informed all the Creditors of the Bankrupt of the intention to object the Bankrupt’s automatic discharge.  On 29 January 2005, the Petitioning Creditor as well as two other Creditors Fonfair Company Limited and Leung Yuet Keung served 3 Forms 82 on the OR and filed the same with this Court, stating that they also objected the Bankrupt’s discharge on the following grounds:

“(i)in the case of a discharge to which section 30A(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Chapter 6) applies, that the bankrupt is likely within 5 years of the commencement of the bankruptcy to be able to make a significant contribution to his estate;
   
 (ii)that the discharge of the bankrupt would prejudice the administration of his estate;
   
 (iii)that the bankrupt has failed to co-operate in the administration of his estate;
   
 (iv)that the conduct of the bankrupt, either in respect of the period before or the period after the commencement of the bankruptcy, has been unsatisfactory;
   
 (v) [deleted]
   
 (vi) [deleted]
   
 (vii) that the bankrupt has committed an offence under section 129 (fraudulent conduct on the part of the bankrupt) or any of sections 131 to 136 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Chapter 6) (obtaining credit, gambling offences, failure to keep proper accounts, absconding with property and concealing oneself to avoid service of bankruptcy proceedings);
   
 (viii)[deleted]”

8. On 3 February 2005, the OR filed its summons for order under section 30A BO to oppose the Bankrupt’s discharge on the 2 grounds stated in the notice of 8 November 2004.  A report was also filed to support the summons on the same date.

9. On 16 February 2005, the Bankrupt filed his Notice of Intention to oppose the OR’s application.

10. Then, on 21 February 2005, the Petitioning Creditor filed the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong to support the OR’s application, and relying also on the 3 additional grounds contained in the Form 82.

11. The parties appeared before Master Ho on 23 February 2005.  The Bankrupt opposed the Petitioning Creditor to take part in the OR’s application and the filing of the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong upon the ground of failure to comply with section 30A(6) BO.  The 2 preliminary issues were then adjourned for argument and was fixed before me on 7 June 2005.  Mr. F. Ip of Messrs. Ho & Ip acted for the Petitioning Creditor, Mr. W.K. Tsang of Messrs. Tsang & Lee represented the Bankrupt and Ms. K. Cheung appeared for the OR.

Ruling

12. Upon considering the evidence authorities and submissions from the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the Petitioning Creditor can file and rely on the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong dated 21 February 2005 in the OR’s application and can take part in the same to oppose the Bankrupt’s automatic discharge, but only to the extent of the 2 grounds pursued by the OR, and not the 3 additional grounds of its own.  My reasons appear as follows.

Reasons

14. At the hearing, the parties disputed 3 questions:

(a)Has the Petitioning Creditor failed to comply with section 30A(6) BO and rule 88 of the Bankruptcy Rules (“the BR”) by not taking out an application 14 days before the automatic discharge?
  
(b) Does this Court have the jurisdiction or discretion to waive such failure, if any?
  
(c)Should this Court exercise his discretion in favour of the Petitioning Creditor, if applicable, in the circumstances?

15. My short answers to the questions are:

(a)Yes.
  
(b)No.
  
(c)Not applicable.

Non-compliance of s 30A(6) BO & r 88 BR

16. Sections 30A(5) and (6) of the BO states that:

“(5) Not less than 3 months before the end of the relevant period under this section, the trustee shall—
      
  (a) send a notice by ordinary mail to the last known address of each proving creditor; or
      
  (b) publish a notice in English and Chinese, respectively, in an English and a Chinese newspaper circulating in Hong Kong, advising the creditors that—
      
   (i) the bankrupt will, in the absence of an objection, be discharged;
      
   (ii) the trustee does or does not intend to object to the discharge and, where does intend to do so, giving the grounds of the objection;
      
   (iii) each of them has a right to object to the discharge and giving the grounds on which an objection can be based and the procedure for making an objection.
      
 (6) Where the trustee or a creditor objects to the discharge of a bankrupt, he shall—
      
  (a) notify the court; and
      
  (b) in the case of a creditor, also notify the trustee, not less than 14 days before the end of the relevant period under this section, stating the grounds of his objection and applying [emphasis added] for an order under subsection (3).”

Rule 88 of the BR further supplements:

“88.  Application for suspension of discharge
    
 (1) The following applies where the trustee or one of the bankrupt’s creditor applies to the court for an order under section 30A(3) of the Ordinance.
    
 (2) Where the application is made by—
    
  (a)the Official Receiver, as trustee, he shall with his application file a report; or
    
  (b)a trustee other than the Official Receiver or by a creditor, he shall with his application [emphasis added] file an affidavit, setting out the reasons why it appears to him that such an order should be made.
    
 (3) The court shall fix the date, time and place for the hearing of the application, and give notice of it to the trustee and the bankrupt and, where the applicant is a creditor, to the applicant.
   
 (4) Copies of the applicant’s report or affidavit under this rule shall be sent by him to the bankrupt, and where the applicant is a creditor, to the trustee, so as to reach them at least 21 days before the date fixed for the hearing.
   
 (5) The bankrupt may, not later than 7 days before the date of the hearing, file in court a notice specifying any statements in the applicant’s report of affidavit that he intends to deny or dispute and, where he does so, he shall send copies of it, not less than 4 days before the date of the hearing, to the applicant and, where the applicant is not the trustee, to the trustee.
   
 (6) If on hearing the court makes an order suspending the bankrupt’s discharge, copies of the order shall be sent by the applicant to the bankrupt and, where the applicant is not the trustee, to the trustee.”

17. These provisions clearly govern how and what the parties should do in relation to applications to object the automatic discharge.  In my view, the procedures are clear.  The OR shall give not less than 3 months’ preliminary notice of his intention to the Bankrupt and the Creditors before the automatic discharge will take place.  If the matter is to be pursued against the bankrupt by either the OR or the Creditor, formal notice as well as application are to be given not less than 14 days of the automatic discharge.  Upon application, the Court will fix a hearing date, usually for call-over.  The parties shall then observe r.88 as to the time for filing and serving of the evidence so that sufficient time would be given to everybody to prepare their cases.

18. A literal reading of the two provisions can tell that, on top of the Report (by the OR) or the Affidavit in Form 82 (by the Creditor), “separate” application must be made (usually by way of summons).  Probably, common sense is the best justification.  If one simply “files” something with the Court, it will only go quietly into the Court File.  Nothing further will be done.  It must be the summons triggering the whole process by informing the Court, fixing the date, and so forth.  To support such interpretation, the following references can be located in the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2004, Vol 2, page 651 J1/95:

“…… The trustee’s notice to creditors under s.30A(5) is to be in Form 83.  The application [emphasis added] for postponement of discharge is made by summons [emphasis added].  Notice of intention to object to the bankrupt’s discharge has to be given in Form 82 (s.30A(6)).  An order of suspension of discharge under s.30A(3) is in Form 81 BFR.

Where the application [emphasis added] is made by a trustee other than the Official Receiver or by a creditor, he shall with his applications [emphasis added] file an affidavit, setting out the reasons why it appears to him that such an order should be made ……”

Jurisdiction or Discretion to waive non-compliance

19. I now turn to the next question to see if this Court has the necessary jurisdiction or discretion to waive the non-compliance of the Petitioning Creditor in issuing the application with 14 days before the automatic discharge.  In my view, the answer is negative.

(a) To start with, I agree that the legislation entrusts a wide power in the hands of the Court to avoid “injustice” by any formal defect, irregularity and non-compliance with the rules.
    
 (i) section 124(1) BO:
    
  “124.  Formal defect not to invalidate proceedings
    
   (1) No proceeding in bankruptcy shall be invalidated by any formal defect or by any irregularity unless the court is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by any order of the court.”
    
  (ii) rules 203 and 204 BR:
    
  “203.  Non-compliance with rules
    
    Non-compliance with any of these rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the court so directs, but such proceeding may not set aside, either wholly or in part, as irregular, or amended or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the court may think fit.
    
   204.  Abridgment of enlargement of time
    
    The court may, under special circumstances and for good cause shown, extend or abridge the time appointed by these rules or fixed by any order of the court for doing any act or taking any proceeding.”
    
(b) However, the power is not without limitation.  The defect must be “formal” or “mere irregularity” before it can trigger the court’s jurisdiction to see if the non-compliance can be waived.
    
 (i) Useful reference can be located in the Judgment of the Hon. Mrs. Le Pichon (as she then was) from Re Li Tat Kong [2000] 3 HKC at page 369 and 370
    
 “The court’s jurisdiction is engaged upon an application being made under s 30A(3).  Although on its face s 30A(6) appears to require any person (whether the trustee or creditor) wishing to object to make an application, multiple applications of themselves serve little purpose save where they are based on different grounds.  The primary purpose of sub-ss (3) and (6) of s 30A is clear: unless an application is made, the court’s jurisdiction will not be engaged [emphasis added].  They also serve to inform the bankrupt of the specific grounds of objection.  Where different grounds [emphasis added] are relied on by different parties, separate applications [emphasis added] would ensure that the bankrupt is not taken by surprise.”
    
  (ii) Further, similar provisions in the bankruptcy legislation were thoroughly considered by learned Judges in 2 Australian cases.  In Re: Van Reesema v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1983) 50 ALR 253, by a majority, the Federal Court of Australia held that the objection filed by the Official Receiver did not comply with the provision in the legislation, and as such, rendered the same to be inoperative and have no effect.  Sweeney J. said at page 268 that:
    
  “Reliance was placed by the trustee on s 306(1), which provides that proceedings under the Act are not invalidated by a formal defect or an irregularity unless the court is of opinion that it has caused substantial injustice which cannot be remedied by an order of the court.  Although I consider the objection to be a proceeding under the Act for the purposes of this provision, I do not think that the defect is formal, nor is it a mere irregularity.  For reasons already given the defect goes to the very substance of the matter.
    
 It follows that at the date his Honour made the order pursuant to s 33(1)(b) allowing the amendment of the objection, the appellant had been discharged by operation of law.  No valid objection pursuant to s 149(3)(c) had been entered.  The objection being a proceeding under the Act, his Honour had power to allow the amendment of it.  But, in my opinion, the amendment was futile and should not have been allowed.  The appellant having been discharged, amending the objection achieved nothing ……”
    
  (iii) And, the Van Reesema (ibid) case was followed in Donnelly v Edelston (1992) 109 ALR 651 where Ryan J. held at page 658 that
    
  “…… the failure to file it is not a mere non-compliance with the Bankruptcy Rules.  It is a failure to establish a condition precedent prescribed by the Act itself to precluding an automatic discharge from bankruptcy.  If I am right in concluding that the court has no power under the Act to relieve from that failure, that absence of power cannot be supplied by resort to a provision in the rules.
    
 For these reasons I am led to conclude that the court has no discretion to permit the filing of a notice of objection after a discharge has occurred upon the expiration of three years from the date of the bankruptcy …”
    
(c) In our case, the Petitioning Creditor only filed the notice (Form 82) but never took out its application at all.  It relied 3 additional and different grounds than the 2 of the OR.  The Bankrupt was not informed of the stand of the Petitioning Creditor until the serving of the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong on 21 February 2005.  It amounts to the “surprise” as described by the Hon. Mrs. Le Pichon (as she then was) in Re Li Tak Kong (ibid).  Hence, I have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter because it has not even placed before the Court.
  
(d) To look at the present case from the views of the Australian Courts: But for the application of the OR, the Bankrupt would have been discharged on 2 March 2005, it would be too late for the Petitioning Creditor to come to this Court.  The defect of failure to take out proper application goes to the very substance of the matter and is neither formal defect nor mere irregularity.

No discretion to be exercised in favour of the Petitioning Creditor in its own “application”

20. From my above analysis over the question of jurisdiction over the Petitioning Creditor’s application, it follows that there is simply no room for me to do anything to waive the non-compliance.

The Answers to the Issues put before the Court

21. Having answered the 3 questions, I do not consider the parties’ dispute can be resolved.  In my opinion, there remains the pending application by the OR relying on the 2 grounds.  Hence, can the Petitioning Creditor, not having itself made an application pursuant to section 30A(3) BO, still be heard in the OR’s summons objecting the automatic discharge of the Bankrupt?  This is one of the very questions put before the Court in Re Li Tat Kong (ibid).  In this respect, Madam Le Pichon J. (as she then was) held that the irregularities are technical and could be waived by the Court.  Upon consideration of the facts put before her, the learned Judge further ruled that the bankrupt had not been prejudiced in any way and allowed the creditor to be heard.  At page 369 and 370 of the judgment, it was stated that:

“… In the present case, the trustee’s advice was dated 20 July 1999.  On 24 July 1999, the creditor notified the trustee of its intention to object.  It did not notify the court as required by s 30A(6)(a).  The trustee made his application pursuant to s 30A(3) on 13 October 1999.  The creditor did not issue its own summons.  The creditor’s objection to the automatic discharge set out in its letter to the trustee dated 24 July 1999 was exhibited to the trustee’s supplemental report filed pursuant to the court’s directions on 26 November 1999.

It was submitted that the fact that the trustee made an application pursuant to sub-s (3) did not relieve any creditor who wished to object of its own obligation to apply for an order under sub-s (3).  The question is whether a creditor who has not himself made an application pursuant to s 30A(3) is entitled to be heard on an application made by another interested party objecting to the automatic discharge.

……

… I see no reason why the irregularity should not be waived.  Mr. Li had full notice of the grounds of the creditor’s objections as these had been exhibited to the trustee’s supplemental report dated 26 November 1999 well before any affidavit in opposition was filed by Mr. Li.  In fact, his affirmation was not filed until 14 January 2000, which was after a directions hearing on 6 January 2000 at which the creditor was present and was granted leave to file a reply to Mr. Li’s affirmation.  It is to be noted that the creditor was represented at that hearing and no objection was taken as to his standing.  In those circumstances, it is clear that the irregularities are technical and that Mr. Li has not been prejudiced in any way.  Accordingly, the discretion to waive any irregularity ought to be exercised in the creditor’s favour.”

22. Hence, when the Petitioning Creditor is relying only on the OR’s summons, this Court can waive the defect unless substantial injustice has been caused and it cannot be remedied.  Mr. Tsang said that the Bankrupt had suffered substantial prejudice:

“7. The Petitioning Creditor’s eleventh hour attempt to introduce new grounds for objection is a cause of substantial and completely unnecessary prejudice to the Bankrupt.  The Fifth Affirmation of Leung Yuet Keung filed on 23 March 2005 demonstrates the breadth of information and detail which could be given by the Petitioning Creditor at very short notice, and the indisputable capability of the Petitioning Creditor to file an application or evidence well within time, had it chosen to do so.
   
 8.The Bankrupt was able to file his affirmation in reply to the Trustee’s Report on 21 February 2005, just 7 days after receiving the Trustee’s application and Report and before the hearing on 23 February 2005.
   
  - 2nd Affirmation of Leung Yat Tung p.2, para 6
   
 9. Had the Petitioning Creditor applied within time, then there is every reason to suggest that the Bankrupt could have responded promptly by filing appropriate evidence, as he did in relation to the Trustee’s Report before the first hearing.  As it was, the Bankrupt only received the Petitioning Creditors affirmation on the evening of 21 February 2005 and was taken by surprise.
   
 10.The consequent delay which the Petitioning Creditor’s belated filing of evidence has caused to the Bankrupt is in itself serious and substantial prejudice to the Bankrupt as through the fault of the Petitioning Creditor, his possible discharge from bankruptcy and his inability to have the matter determined earlier as is his entitlement has been substantially delayed.  It is unnecessary to respond to the allegations in the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong at this stage as it had been admitted as evidence.”
   
  (skeleton submission of Mr. Tsang)

23. However, with respect, I am not persuaded.

(a) After the introduction of the 3 additional grounds has been rejected, it remains only a matter of evidence or additional evidence for the court to consider to see if the 2 complaints by OR can be established.  Although the Affirmation of Ip tak Kong purported to make complaints against the Bankrupt under “5” grounds, I see no reason why they cannot be taken as a whole for the purpose of pursuing only the two grounds of the OR.
  
(b)Rule 88(4) BR requires the affidavit of the Petitioning Creditor to be served on the Bankrupt at least 21 days before the scheduled hearing.  The hearing was fixed at 23 February 2005.  The affidavit of the Petitioning Creditor only reached the Bankrupt in the evening on 21 February 2005.  There appears to have some 19 days’ late.  However, it should be noted that the rule aims at allowing sufficient time for the Bankrupt to prepare his case.  23 February 2005 was only the call-over hearing.  The matter was adjourned for argument.  Directions can certainly be given to regulate the filing of affidavit evidence so that all the parties will be able to prepare their cases.
  
(c)Finally, bare assertion of prejudice is not sufficient.  The Bankrupt does not condescend with any particulars at all.  There is no evidence before me that the Bankrupt has been made unable to deal with the allegation/evidence in the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong dated 21 February 2005 because it was served late for some 3 weeks’ time.

Costs/Further Directions

24. I do not have the benefit of hearing arguments on costs from the parties.  Mr. Tsang succeeded on the 3 questions put before me while Mr. Ip convinced me on the question of locus and use of the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong in the application of the OR.  As between the Petitioning Creditor and the Bankrupt, I see fit that there be no order as to costs.  Regarding Ms. Cheng, she appeared only to assist this Court and the dispute really did not touch on the OR.  I therefore direct that costs of the OR be costs in the cause of his summons.  These costs orders nisi will become absolute after the expiry of 14 days from today.

25. Since I have allowed the Affirmation of Ip Tak Kong to be relied upon at the OR’s summons, I further make the following directions.

(a) The Bankrupt be at liberty to file and serve a further affidavit in opposition thereof within 21 days from today,
  
(b)The OR and/or the Petitioning Creditor be also granted leave to file and serve further report/affidavit in reply 21 days thereafter.

     

(Jack Wong)
Master

                                                                        

Ms. K. Cheung for Official Receiver and Trustee.

Mr. F. Ip of Messrs. Ho & Ip for Petitioning Creditor.

Mr. W.K. Tsang of Messrs. Tsang & Lee for Bankrupt.

 

36647-EN-2001-03-01

HEALTHY WHARF LTD. v. LEUNG YAT TUNG

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