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Miscellaneous Proceedings2018

HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. MONEY FACTS LTD AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV260/2008HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • CAMP46/2019HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. MONEY FACTS LTD AND OTHERS
  • HCA1143/2016HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND OTHERS
  • HCA1598/2008HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • HCA241/2016LEUNG YUET KEUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD
  • HCB2019/2000RE LEUNG YAT TUNG
  • HCCW111/2015HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • HCCW116/2015HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. MONEY FACTS LTD AND OTHERS
  • HCMP1988/2018HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • HCMP400/2022HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF LEUNG YAT TUNG

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[2024] HKCFI 1599-EN-2024-06-11

HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. MONEY FACTS LTD

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HCMP 1987/2018, HCMP 1988/2018 and HCMP 1471/2019
(HEARD TOGETHER)

[2024] HKCFI 1599

HCMP 1987/2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1987 OF 2018

____________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF Fonfair Company Limited

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

____________________

BETWEEN

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITEDPetitioner

and

 MONEY FACTS LIMITED1st Respondent
 LEUNG YUET WAH, LEUNG YUET KEUNG2nd Respondent
 and LEUNG YUET HOI 
 LEUNG YUET KEUNG3rd Respondent
 MARCON INVESTMENT LIMITED4th Respondent
 FONFAIR COMPANY LIMITED5th Respondent

____________________

AND

HCMP 1988/2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1988 OF 2018

____________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF Money Facts Limited

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

____________________

BETWEEN

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITEDPetitioner

and

 LEUNG YUET KEUNG1st Respondent
 MONEY FACTS LIMITED2nd Respondent

____________________

AND

HCMP 1471/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1471 OF 2019

____________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF ss.722 to 726 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Money Facts Limited

____________________

BETWEEN

 LEUNG YUET KEUNGPetitioner

and

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITED1st Respondent
 MONEY FACTS LIMITED2nd Respondent

____________________

(HEARD TOGETHER)

Before:Hon Harris J in Court
Dates of Hearing:4, 6, 11 December 2023
Date of Judgment:11 June 2024

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

Introduction

1.  I have before me the third series of Petitions issued by Harbour Front Limited (“Harbour Front”), a company controlled by Leung Yat Tung (“YT”) against his elder brother, Leung Yuet Keung (“YK”), in respect of Fonfair Limited (“Fonfair”) and Money Facts Limited (“Money Facts”, collectively the “Companies”). There is also a cross-petition issued by YK seeking an order that Harbour Front purchase YK’s shares in Money Facts. There is no dispute that if YK’s is successful, Harbour Front’s Petitions fail.

2.  Fonfair and Money Facts are used by the Brothers to hold land at Yau Tong (“Land”). The disputes between them relate to the sale or development of the Land. The Companies were originally managed by the Brothers and they had made a written shareholders’ agreement, but after differences between them arose YK took steps to remove YT from their Boards. In the two previous series of Petitions YT sought orders that would have resulted in him being able to participate in management of the Companies. The Petitions were dismissed:

(1) After trial by Kwan J (as she then was) in HCCW 880/2001 and HCCW 246/2022 on 2 February 2004.

(2) After trial by me in 2017 in HCCW 111/2015 and 116/2015. I dismissed both Petitions on 4 October 2017 and my reasons were handed down on 15 February 2018.

3.  Given the extensive judgments after trial and the Parties agreement to the facts contained in the Annex to this judgment, I will not repeat here the background to the dispute or its details.

4.  Kwan J had found in the first set of proceedings that Harbour Front was entitled to participate in the management of the Companies, however, Kwan J further found that YT had caused the breakdown of trust between the brothers and that he had been justly excluded from their management. The Petitions heard by me were founded on the assertion that YT had remedied the matters that Kwan J had found justified his exclusion from management and, thus, Harbour Front had become entitled to participate in management as envisaged by the shareholders’ agreement. I found that YT and his Family members, who had become involved in the dispute had not remedied the matters, which Kwan J had found justified Harbour Front’s exclusion from management. I stated the following concerning Harbour Front’s attempts to remedy its previous conduct:

“22. It should by September 2008 have been quite clear to Harbour Front and YT that if Harbour Front was to have any prospect of returning to a role in the management of Fonfair it would have to make good the losses it had caused to Fonfair and that if Harbour Front continued with its belligerent refusal to respect the decisions of the courts it was likely to find itself permanently excluded from a role in Fonfair’s affairs. Certainly one would have expected Harbour Front’s legal advisers, and it has had the same solicitor since the presentation of the Petitions in 2001, to have made the position clear to Harbour Front and YT.

23. Despite this at no time has YT or Harbour Front made an approach in writing to Fonfair or YK with a view to remedying the misconduct found by Kwan J…

36. On 30 March 2015 Harbour Front petitioned to wind up Money Facts and on 2 April 2015 petitioned to wind up Fonfair. The Petitioners advance the same complaints in both Petitions. I accept Ms Lok’s submission that it is a compelling inference given the history of this matter that the Harbour Front’s offers and proposals in March 2015 were not genuine, but were made with a view to interfering in the sale of the Land to Chung Sing as were the presentation of the Petitions.

…

41. As, in my view, is clear from the history of the disputes between YK and Harbour Front, which I do not think it can sensibly be suggested in practice is anything other than YT’s corporate alter ego, YT has made no sensible effort to try and establish what needs to be done to remedy the breaches of the Shareholders Agreement. The opposite is the position. YT and Harbour Front have made no effort to engage meaningfully to agree what is owed despite being given the interim reports. Instead Harbour Front tried to intimidate Lau & Au Yeung in to stopping compiling them. Harbour Front has made no effort to propose an alternative method for agreeing what is owed and moving on. The guiding mind behind Harbour Front, who as I have said I think it is reasonable to assume is YT, is motivated by an animosity towards YK and a lack of objectivity, which seems to render any prospect of Harbour Front doing what is required to remedy its breaches illusory.

42. I find that Harbour Front has fairly been excluded from management. In my view this will remain the case until such time as Harbour front takes genuine and substantial steps to remedy its misconduct. Mr Fung has cited no authority for the proposition that a finding that a shareholder has been fairly excluded from management becomes spent simply by effluxion of time even if the shareholder has made no substantive effort to remedy his wrong as I have found to be the position in the present case. This is entirely unsurprising as the proposition seems to me to be as meritless as it is unattractive. If a shareholder acts in such a way as to destroy the mutual trust which was central to any agreement that he could take part in management, it seems to me clear that until such time as he remedies the misconduct, if it is possible to do so and it might not, he loses the right to argue that his exclusion alone justifies the court making a winding-up order on the just and equitable ground or granting relief for unfair prejudice. The reason is simple: it would not be just and equitable to wind up in these circumstances and the exclusion from management is not unfair.”

5.  I note in passing that other litigation was brought unsuccessfully by Harbour Front following the February 2004 decision in which Kwan J, Recorder Kwok and the Court of Appeal found that Harbour Front had not remedied the matters, which Kwan J found had justified Harbour Front’s exclusion from management and did so in clear and firm terms.

6.  It seems to me quite clear that if YK had brought a cross-petition seeking a buyout order pursuant to sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 (“Ordinance”), certainly if he had done so before me, he would have been successful. Ms Lok argued that the correct analytical framework in which to determine the Petitions was to ask if there had been any change of circumstances since 2017, which adversely affects YK’s right to a buyout order. This is the converse of Harbour Front’s case in its Petitions, which I think can summarised as this: Harbour Front has corrected the wrongs it has been found to have committed in the previous proceedings to which I have referred and is entitled to participate in the management of the Companies as envisaged in the shareholders’ agreement.

The Legal Issues

7.  In the present Petition Harbour Front argues that as evidenced by [42] of my judgment, the findings of Kwan J and myself do not necessarily mean that Harbour Front is permanently excluded from relying on the shareholders’ agreement. If Harbour Front “takes genuine and substantial steps to remedy its misconduct …… if it is possible to do so and it might not be”, its exclusion will cease to be fair. What steps are adequate to remedy misconduct will depend on the nature of the misconduct and the circumstances. The greater the seriousness of the misconduct, the number of instances, the period of time over which it has taken place, and the general behaviour of the recalcitrant shareholder will all be material. It is obviously possible for breach of trust to be so serious that the trust and confidence of a shareholder has been irreversibly breached. It might reasonably be thought that this is a matter of common sense, but at the level of principle it derives from the characteristics of the equitable rights that may justify a shareholder objecting to another shareholder exercising their strict legal rights in a way inconsistent with the understandings between shareholders.

8.  At least since Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries[1] if not earlier, it is clear that shareholders are not, by the mere fact of shareholding, entitled to participate in management. Lord Wilberforce (at 370E-G) set out the elements typically required for there to be superimposition of equitable considerations:

(1) An association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual confidence; and

(2) an agreement, or understanding, that all, or some, of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the business.

9.  Such mutual understandings and agreements are not immutable and can change over time. “Relationships may obviously change significantly over time, and a company can become a quasi-partnership, with understandings between shareholders, and equally cease to be one as time passes and circumstances change, with those understandings changing accordingly.”[2]

10.  This is not surprising. The essence of what is commonly referred to as a “quasi-partnership” is that the company has not just corporate personality and a constitution, but also scope for personal obligations and rights binding the shareholders in equity based on (i) a relationship of mutual trust and confidence and (ii) an agreement or understanding that each (or some) shall have the right to participate in the management of the company. Accordingly, if the personal obligation and rights, or their substratum of mutual trust and confidence and equal participation, are deliberately or permanently renounced by a member, he cannot thereafter expect that equity will allow him to hold the other members to their equitable obligations: see Re Edwardian Group Limited[3].

11.  The agreement or expectation of equal participation is, therefore, not indefinite and is likely to be limited to a point in time at which “for some other reason the change in management and control became necessary”: R&H Electric v Haden Bill Electrical[4], citing Lord Templeman’s decision in Tay Bok Choon v Tahanson.

12.  These principles are illustrated by the Australian case of Fexuto v Bosnjak[5], where the majority shareholders excluded Mr Bosnjak from involvement in the management of the company. The trial judge held that, even if an expectation of participation in the management had existed, it had ceased to exist because of the emergence of a conflict over a long period of time between Mr Bosnjak and another controller ([84]). The trial judge held that the relations between them had “became strained to the degree that they could not work together” and concluded that “…the point has been reached where the brothers cannot work together and any legitimate expectation has ceased”. This observation was endorsed on appeal, where Spigelman CJ said (at [90]) that:

“There will be circumstances in which the emergence of irreconcilable differences will cause the court to conclude that an understanding or expectation as to participation in management should be taken to have ceased, in a manner not entitling the person excluded from such participation to relief under the statutory provisions. That would be so where the court decides that it is the person excluded who is responsible for the breakdown in the relationship.”

13.  This approach was endorsed in Nasser v Innovative Precasters[6]. Three venturers were parties to a “quasi-partnership” characterised by mutual cooperation and trust ([78]). However, there was a subsequent change in the individuals’ relationship due to a fight ([113]). Following the fight, the parties held grudges against each other, and the relationship changed fundamentally. This led the court to conclude that the expectation as to participation in the management came to an end by reason of the emergence of irreconcilable differences ([115]–[117]): “At that point, the pre-existing expectations about participation in day-to-day management were overtaken by mutual acceptance of the reality that Mr. Nassar would no longer participate”. As a result, although the petitioner had been excluded, it was not exclusion of the kind which would warrant a finding of oppression or unfair prejudice ([119]).

14.  This is also the law in Singapore. In Over & Over v Bonvests Holdings[7], the company in question started as a “quasi-partnership” during the formative years of its inception ([88]). However, as a result of events engendered mostly by the majority shareholders’ camp, a fundamental change in the character of the parties’ relationship was precipitated (“…This relationship was to be characterised by curt and eventually confrontational communications …”), and what began as a closely knit partnership underpinned by private share ownership was eventually replaced by a going concern that was effectively a listed subsidiary of the respondent ([96]–[97]).

15.  In Ng Yat Chi v Max Shares (No. 2)[8], the petitioner petitioned to wind up the company on the basis that it was just and equitable to do so. The petitioner contended that the company was intended to be a joint venture formed on the basis of a personal relationship involving mutual trust and confidence but there had been a breakdown in their relationship (568G). Rogers VP concluded that the company was not formed on the basis of a personal relationship. In obiter (572A-C), his Lordship held that even if there was a special relationship between the parties, such a relationship would have come to an end when the petitioner left the management of the company and gave up his position as managing director for reasons of his own. The misconduct had negatived the original agreement of mutual trust and confidence. Roger VP went on at 572D-I, to hold that the petitioner could not pray in aid a “special relationship” given his conduct in defrauding the company of its profits: “…it is reading Lord Wilberforce’s speech too literally to hold that simply because at the formation of the Company there was a personal relationship which involved mutual trust and confidence which may have been intended to be faithfully carried out, that relationship survived a blatant abuse of confidence on the part of the person seeking to found his case of justice and equity upon it. In short, by abusing his position and siphoning off profits, Mr. Ng had destroyed the basis of the mutual trust and confidence”.

16.  Harbour Front has not cited any authority in which a shareholder, who has been found to have caused a breakdown in trust has acted in a way, which a court has been satisfied remedies the misconduct sufficiently to restore the equitable rights the shareholder originally had. The authorities Harbour Front relies on concern a narrower proposition, namely, that a claimant who has found to have come to court with “unclean hands” and consequently is not entitled to equitable relief, can purge his mistake and renew an application for relief: Royal Bank of Scotland v Highland Financial Partners LP[9][10]; The Pui Ying Middle School of Hong Kong v So Shing Yit[11]. Although there are similarities between a case in which an equitable remedy is sought to right a legal wrong and a case in which relief is sought in a unfair prejudice petition, there are likely to be material differences. The latter is much more likely to involve a long term and close business relationship. Curing a breakdown in a business relationship is likely to be considerably more difficult than “purging” an isolated wrong, which the court considers deprives a party of a right such as specific performance in the case of Pui Ying Middle School. It is likely to require action, which rebuilds a damaged relationship. As I observe in [42] of my 2018 reasons this may not be possible. In other words, it is not just a matter of correcting individual mistakes, but restoring trust, or at least taking action, which the court takes the view goes sufficiently far to justify the other shareholder being required to act in accordance with the shareholders’ original understandings and agreements.

17.  It should have been quite clear to YT’s advisers, and YT or his Children if they read the judgments, that in order to remedy the misconduct they would need to need to show a recognition of the seriousness of their misconduct and demonstrate a bona fide desire to restore the status quo ante. It is necessary at the very least not only to correct the wrongs YT and his alter ego Harbour Front have committed, but to do so in a way that demonstrates a genuine attempt to restore trust. Self-evidently, it would not be sufficient to, for example, repay money which had been misappropriated, but to do so in a grudging and offensive manner.

18.  Harbour Front has also argued that in relation to YK’s petition a breakdown in trust and confidence does not necessarily justify ending the relationship by, in the present context, ordering a buyout. Ms Ho relied in particular on Lord Hoffmann’s statement in O’Neill v Phillips[12] “... even in partnership law a dissolution would be granted on the [grounds of breakdown in trust and confidence] in a case in which it was still possible under the articles for the business of the partnership to be continued”. Ms Ho referred to similar statements in Re Neath Rugby Ltd[13]and Grace v Biagioli, which suggest something more than a breakdown in trust is required. In the case of an unfair prejudice petition brought under sections 724 and 725 of the Ordinance for a buyout order, “something more” is likely to be an action that has prejudiced the shareholder in a manner, which so prejudices him as a shareholder that it is fair for him to be allowed to exit the company. What I understand Lord Hoffmann and the courts in Neath Rugby and Grace v Biagioli[14] to be saying is that even if trust between shareholders has broken down if it is possible for the commercial venture to be carried on in accordance with the company’s constitution a buyout order will probably not be justified. In other words as a matter of fact the relationship between shareholders may have been destroyed and it is genuinely difficult for them to work together, but that does not mean it is impossible for the shareholders to conduct the business of the company on the basis originally agreed[15]. However, this plainly is not such a case. It is obvious from the judgments that I have referred to earlier that YT has committed serious wrongs in relation to the Companies. Although, I accept that it does not necessarily follow that because a shareholders’ conduct has deprived him of the right he otherwise had to be involved in the management of the company it will be impossible for a company to be managed on the basis originally contemplated, in practice it is likely to be so. In the present case Ms Ho argued that as Harbour Front was a corporate shareholder the difficulties in operating the shareholders’ agreement could be resolved by Gillian and her brother representing Harbour Front. Theoretically this might be the case, but it would be naive not to recognise that this would only be so if they could effectively distance themselves from both their Father’s misconduct and the atmosphere of mistrust he had created, which was always likely to be very difficult particularly as Gillian was implicated in it. As I will demonstrate later, in practice Gillian continued with the confrontational approach I describe in my earlier decision.

19.  As I have already noted Harbour Front accepts that if YK’s Petition is successful its two Petitions inevitably fail. However, Harbour Front argues that there had been no irrevocable breakdown in trust in the mutual trust and confidence between Harbour Front and YK as of October 2018 by which time Harbour Front had remedied its previous wrongdoings. In my view this is analytically erroneous. Plainly YT (and as found by Kwan J Harbour Front is plainly his alter ego) had caused a serious breakdown in the trust and confidence in his relationship with YK at the time I dismissed Harbour Front’s Petitions in October 2017. The issue is whether Harbour Front subsequently remedied the causes of the breakdown. Ms Ho’s argument that, because YK continued to refer to the shareholders’ agreement in correspondence and has not purported to terminate it, he accepted that it was possible to implement it and he cannot, therefore, believe that the relationship has irretrievably broken down, is specious. The fact that he had until issue of his petition in September 2019 tried to operate the Companies in a manner consistent with the shareholders’ agreement does not mean that the relationship with YT and his children had not irretrievably broken down; it simply indicates how YK tried to manage the situation up until the point at which he thought that the best course was to take action to exit the Companies. In my view, if YK can demonstrate that Harbour Front continued after October 2018 to behave in a way, that damaged the relationship between the shareholders that is sufficient. Given the seriousness of Harbour Front and YT’s misconduct prior to 2017, it would not require much in order to demonstrate that trust and confidence has been permanently destroyed as a consequence of wrongdoings by Harbour Front that justifies the court finding unfair and prejudicial conduct and ordering a buyout. To look at the matter from the perspective of Harbour Front’s Petitions, unless Harbour Front can demonstrate that it has remedied the previous wrongs YK’s case will be made out.

Factual Matters

20.  Harbour Front’s initial reaction to my February 2018 decision was to issue notices of appeal. The appeals were withdrawn in November 2018. Correspondence between the Parties had stopped in August 2017. The correspondence between the Parties starts again with Harbour Front’s letter to YK of 17 July 2018. This letter starts by referring to an offer to purchase Money Facts and Fonfair to which Harbour Front would appear to be receptive. It is signed by Gillian. The third paragraph reads:

“We understand that both Harbour Front and you are minded to realise both our respective interests in the Land and to terminate our existing shareholders relationship so that we can move on, particularly in light of the long history of disputes. We observe that pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, we are both under an obligation, inter alia, to ensure that:-

(1) Money Facts should be operated so as to ensure as majority shareholder in Fonfair that Fonfair should pursue and negotiate any future development plan and other business to safeguard and maximize the interests of the shareholders of Fonfair; and

(2) Money Facts should be operated as a company to safeguard and maximize the interest of Harbour Front and Leung Yuet Keung in Fonfair.”

Gillian continues in a similar vein the pre-penultimate paragraph:

“For the above reasons and pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, we demand Leung Yuet Keung to jointly procure Money Facts to:-

(1) Procure Fonfair to conduct a public tender for sale of the Land in accordance to the Parallel Public Tender Arrangement;

(2) Procure Fonfair to give the Undertaking (as described above) in accordance to the Parallel Public Tender Arrangement; and

(3) Write to all Fonfair shareholders to agree to join in a public tender of sale for shares in accordance to the Parallel Public Tender Arrangement within the stipulated time in the July 2018 Letter.”

The letter makes no reference to YT repaying the sums that are owed or contains no acknowledgement of the findings of the courts that effectively YK was justified in excluding Harbour Front from management of the Companies. It seems to me a remarkably unempathetic letter to have sent in the circumstances. It suggests that Gillian had no grasp of the import of the court’s concerns about the way in which YT and Harbour Front had conducted themselves. It plainly indicates an assumption that despite the judgments Harbour Front is entitled to involve itself in the management of the Companies even though at that time no effort had been made to pay the sums owed to Fonfair despite the February 2018 decision.

21.  One might have thought that given the content and tenor of the judgments that if Gillian genuinely wanted to rectify the situation Harbour Front would either simply have agreed the sum owing. This is not what happened. As explained by Ms Ho in [27(1)] of Harbour Front’s written closing, its position was as follows: “As explained by Gillian Leungduring cross-examination, while Harbour Front initially had reservations to the accuracy of the interim reports because they were carried out by an accountant firm selected by YK, and none of the liabilities has been adjudicated upon in any form …… This is the reason Harbour Front initially requested for the quantum of Harbour Front’s liability to be formally adjudicated.” In other words, rather than try and agree the sum, she wanted more proceedings. This did not suggest a genuine attempt to establish a constructive working relationship. Whether this was because she was acting at the direction of her Father, whose judgment was blurred by his animosity to his brother, her own animosity or an inability to understand the gravity of the situation, it is difficult to assess.

22.  On 24 July 2018 Harbour Front wrote to Fonfair. The letter runs to 5 pages and again is signed by Gillian. It also does not start of with any kind of apology. It is a turgid repetition of the history of Fonfair’s attempts to resolve the dispute over the misappropriations by YT. It makes two proposals. The first was a payment of HK$12,762,695.14 to be made in full and final payment within 7 days of acceptance of the offer. The second was that the sum payable be referred to arbitration and HK$12,762,695.14 paid by way of security. On 25 July 2018 Harbour Front wrote to YK personally. The letter was signed by Gillian.

23.  On 27 July 2018 YK issued notices to convene extraordinary general meetings of Fonfair and Money Facts to consider Harbour Front’s proposal and give an update on the current status of the sale of the Land.

24.  On 3 August 2018 Fonfair replied to the 24 July 2018 letter. The letter was signed by YK. It suggests that Harbour Front’s letter is unhelpfully tendentious and that rather than rearguing what has taken place it should admit liability and cooperate in the reconciliation process. It suggests that the proposals are an attempt to create a paper trail to argue in future court proceedings that Harbour Front has remedied its past breaches of the shareholders’ agreement.

25.  The correspondence continues in a similar vein until 30 November 2018 when Harbour Front’s new solicitors write “unequivocally” accepting the reconciliation in the 2016 Interim Report. This was 18 days after Harbour Front had issued (12 November 2018) Petitions HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018. There followed correspondence in December and January 2019 between the Parties solicitors discussing the terms of the written confirmation concluding the agreement of the reconciliation. Harbour Front wanted to include a provision that by agreeing the reconciliation it had purged its breaches of the shareholders’ agreement. Understandably, Fonfair’s solicitors objected on the grounds that this was unnecessary and clearly was included to bolster Harbour Front’s case in the Petitions.

26.  It seems to me clear that the initial offer in July 2018 to pay HK$12 million was caused by Harbour Front’s wish to involve itself in the possible sale of the Land rather than a genuine recognition that the past wrongdoings should be remedied. The same is true of the November 2018 offer, which was clearly made with a view to improving Harbour Front’s position in the new proceedings.

27.  Ms Ho invited me in her closing to make findings in relation to matters predating the Petitions I heard in 2017, in particular:

(1) That Harbour Front did not sabotage the prospective sale of the Yau Tong property in 2008.

(2) That in relation to the Chung Sing offer in 2015, first, it was not acting mala fides in putting forward its offer to purchase the Land and YK’s shares. Secondly, there was no evidence that the winding up petitions in HCCW 111/2015 and HCCW 116/2015 had sabotaged the Chung Sing offer.

28.  It seems to me that this is unnecessary. As I have already stated it seems to me clear that by the time of the trial in 2017 Harbour Front’s conduct as found by Kwan J and subsequently by myself was sufficient to support a finding that Harbour Front’s conduct was unfairly prejudicial and justified making a buyout order at the end of 2017 had YK sought one.

29.  In August 2018 the shareholders of Fonfair had discussed at the annual general meeting the sale of the Land. YK took the view that it should be put up for sale by an invitation to purchase the Land and that although if the Fonfair’s shares were sold it would attract lower stamp duty the additional complications of the sale would likely not result in any financial benefit. Harbour Front’s correspondence suggests that it wanted to keep open the possibility of selling the Land or shares. On 2 October 2018 Harbour Front wrote to YK (this time a letter sent by Jerry Leung). The letter complains that Savills’ had published an advertisement for the “Sale by Public Tender” of the Land. The letter complains that Harbour Front were entitled to be kept informed of all the details of any proposed tender and, effectively, approve it. The advertisement is in general terms. It states that the “Basis of Sale: The property is to be sold on “as-is” basis with existing tenancy”. In subsequent correspondence Harbour Front complains that Fonfair has not adequately considered and obtained advice on a sale by selling shares. YK answered the complaints in detail, and in my view convincingly, in a letter dated 23 October 2018. Harbour Front replied on 31 October 2018 repeating is complaints and evincing an assumption that it was entitled to be actively involved in the management of the Companies. This was followed by issue of the Petitions and issue in November of an application for an injunction to stop the public tender in HCMP 1987/2018. Clearly, by this time what hope there was of re-establishing any trust and confidence had been destroyed, and destroyed by the time the “unequivocal” acceptance of the reconciliation report was communicated.

30.  The injunction was in my view an abuse. Most of the relief sought was rejected by DHCJ Kenneth Wong on 23 November 2018. He declined to grant any relief to allow Harbour Front’s participation in the management of Fonfair. The DHCJ did order that the Land could not be sold without Harbour Front’s consent prior to the determination of the Petitions. Plainly this interfered with the management of the affairs of Fonfair and prevented it operating in accordance with its articles of incorporation and prejudiced YK qua shareholder and given the history of this matter, clearly did so unfairly. Harbour Front argues that as the shareholders’ agreement had not been terminated it was entitled to rely on its terms and it gave it a right to participate in the management of the Companies’ affairs and the question of prejudice and fairness has to be considered in that light. I accept that if what had happened was that the board of Fonfair had decided to sell its major asset without consulting a major shareholder, who the other shareholders had, pursuant to a shareholders’ agreement, agreed needed to be consulted and agree the sale, this would be relevant in assessing whether interference by the shareholder with the lawful exercise of the board’s power was unfairly prejudicial to the major shareholder, because its rights under the articles were on the face of the matter infringed. However, the position in this case was far more complex. Harbour Front chose to sabotage the sale of the Land by interfering in the operation of Fonfair in circumstances in which the courts had twice found that Harbour Front had lost the right to complain that the Companies were not being run in accordance with the shareholders’ agreement. As I have said, it seems to me that Harbour Front’s conduct was unfairly prejudicial to YK.

31.  In 2019 YK wrote a letter to YT, which certainly on its face expressed in emollient language a desire to resolve their differences amicably. He suggested that an offer that had been received for the Land should be accepted. YK observes towards the end of the letter “It is in the best interests of Fonfair and us all to accept the offer, reap the profit and think of better things to do.” The clear implication being that it was best to sell the land and divide up the proceeds and for the Brothers to get on with their lives, which might be thought to be a sensible way of bringing the disputes to an end. YT did not reply. Instead, Gillian replied to “Mr. Leung”; not her “Uncle”. There is nothing in the letter, which acknowledges her Father’s wrongdoings, nothing in the language she uses, which attempts to introduce a more friendly tone or reciprocate the spirit in which YK’s letter appears to be written. The letter does not suggest an agreement in principle to selling the land and moving on. On the contrary we read this: “The obsolete past events you referred to, most of which were decades ago, shed little, if at all, light on the potentials of the Land. Without repeating what Harbour Front has already said in its previous letters, I would urge a proper and independent professional analysis be conducted to enable parties to decide what is best pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement.” In other words, nothing has changed in the views of those who run Harbour Front. It has been Harbour Front’s case for some time that YT is no longer interested in the Land and its associated disputes. Indeed, in her letter Gillian says this “Whether you choose to believe or not, my father is disinterested in the captioned matter and the series of litigations attached thereto.” This is not credible, however, if it was true it follows that Gillian was the person, who had to remedy the wrongs done in the past. Her letter does nothing to suggest that she recognised this. The tone and content were confrontational.

Disposition

32.  I will make an order in HCMP 1471/2019 that Harbour Front purchases YK’s shares in Money Facts. The precise terms of the order require further consideration as I have not received submissions on questions such as valuation. The Petition should be listed for a 30 minute case management hearing unless the Parties can agree directions.

33.  I dismiss HCMP 1987 and 1988 of 2018.

34.  I make a costs order nisi in each Petition. In HCMP 1471 that the 1st Respondent pay the Petitioner’s costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. In HCMP 1987 and 1988 the Petitioners pay all the Respondents’ costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

 (Jonathan Harris)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Ms Sabrina Ho and Mr Arthur Poon, instructed by Yiu & Associates, for the Petitioner (in HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018), and the 1st Respondent (in HCMP 1471/2019)

Ms Frances Lok and Mr Kwan Ping Kan, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the 1st and 3rd Respondents (in HCMP 1987/2018), and the 1st Respondent (in HCMP 1988/2018), and the Petitioner (in HCMP 1471/2019)

The 2nd Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1987/2018)

The 2nd Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1988/2018 and HCMP 1471/2019)

The 4th Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1987/2018)

The 5th Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1987/2018)


Annex

1.  In this Schedule of Agreed Facts, where appropriate, the following judgments are referred to:

(a) 2002 Judgment: Fonfair v Universal Dockyard (HCA 1886/2001, 25 January 2002) per DHCJ To.

(b) 2004 Judgment: Re Money Facts Limited (HCCW 880/2001, 2 February 2004), per Kwan J (as she then was).

(c) 2006 Judgment: Fonfair v UDL Management (HCA 2002/2001, 24 November 2006) per Poon J (as he then was).

(d) 2018 Judgment: Re Money Facts Limited [2018] HKCFRI 358 per Harris J.

(e) 2019 Judgment: Harbour Front v Money Facts & Ors[2019] HKCA 916.

A. BACKGROUND

2.  In the late 1950s, Mr. Leung Senior founded Universal Dockyard Limited (“Universal Dockyard”) and acquired the Yau Tong Property.

3.  The Yau Tong Property was subsequently sold in 1980 to Fonfair, the then subsidiary of Universal Dockyard. Universal Dockyard had occupied the Yau Tong Property for over 40 years, notably known by the shipbuilding market to be the home of Universal Dockyard.

4.  In 1966, Mr. Leung Senior passed away and his six (6) children, including YK Leung and YT Leung, received shares in Universal Dockyard as part of their inheritance.

5.  The Yau Tong Property is the only material asset of Fonfair Company Limited (“Fonfair”). The Yau Tong Property is the last piece of land inherited from the estate of the late Mr. Leung Man Kwong, the founder of Universal Dockyard and the father of YT Leung and YK Leung.

B. RELEVANT PARTIES

B1.Fonfair

6.  On 3 July 1980, Fonfair was incorporated in Hong Kong as a subsidiary of Universal Dockyard.

7.  In October 1980, Fonfair acquired the Yau Tong Property from the administrator of Mr Leung Senior’s estate.

8.  In September 1991, Fonfair was spun off from Universal Dockyard to keep the Yau Tong Property in the hands of the Leung family, when Universal Dockyard became listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

9.  On 13 February 1998, YT Leung’s 3958 shares in Fonfair were transferred to Harbour Front with the consent of YK Leung.

10.  Since March 2001, YT Leung resigned as director of Fonfair.

11.  At the 2006 AGM of Fonfair, YK Leung vote against the re-election of Fire Full Investment Limited (“Fire Full”). From 17 October 2006 up to present day, YK Leung and Marcon, a company owned and controlled by YK Leung, remain as the only directors of Fonfair.

12.  As at the date of the Petitions, the share capital of Fonfair has been held as follows:-

ShareholderNo. of SharesPercentage (%)
Harbour Front3,95832.96
Money Facts7,90065.79
Leung Yuet Wah,
Leung Yeut Keung and Leung Yuet Hoi
750.63
YK Leung250.21
Marcon500.42

B2. Money Facts Limited (“Money Facts”)

13.  On 5 June 1990, YT Leung and YK Leung entered into the Shareholders Agreement. (“the Shareholders Agreement”) and the Share Sale Agreement.

14.  On 21 May 1991, Money Facts was incorporated in Hong Kong. The purpose of forming Money Facts was to hold an equal amount of YT Leung’s and YK Leung’s shareholdings in Fonfair to form a majority block of shares in Fonfair pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement.

15.  On 3 September 1991, YK Leung and YT Leung entered into the Deed of Agreement and Release whereby it was provided that they should jointly acquire Money Facts and each was to take up 3,950 shares in Money Facts, that they should be the first directors of Money Facts and should cause the articles of association of Money Facts to be amended in the manner pursuant to the provisions of the Shareholders Agreement.

16.  On 13 February 1998, YT Leung’s 3,950 shares in Money Facts were transferred to Harbour Front with the consent of YK Leung.

17.  As at the date of the Petitions, the share capital of Money Facts has been held as follows:-

ShareholderNo. of SharesPercentage (%)
Harbour Front3,95050
YK Leung3,95050

18.  After YT Leung resigned as a director of Money Facts in March 2001, YK Leung appointed his nominee Wong Sum Yuen to be a director of Money Facts.

19.  On 16 June 2016, Marcon, a company owned and controlled by YK Leung, was appointed as a director, and replaced Wong Sum Yuen who resigned on 17 June 2016.

C. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT

20.  Money Facts was formed on the basis of a personal relationship between YK Leung and YT Leung involving mutual confidence. Fonfair was continued or operated on a similar basis to Money Facts, as the shareholding in Fonfair held by the estate of the Leung Man Kwong is so small as to be almost insignificant.

21.  The provisions in the Shareholders Agreement, which provide that (1) YK Leung and YT Leung had agreed not to cause Money Facts to issue further shares without their mutual consent, and (2) they should cause themselves to be elected as the only two directors in Money Facts, must have been designed to ensure that there was to be equality of control in Money Facts of the two shareholders.

22.  The Shareholders Agreement set out the three objectives of Money Facts in its role as the majority shareholder of Fonfair, including the important objective of pursuing and negotiating any future development plan of the Yau Tong Property. In view of these objectives, it must have been intended that YK Leung and YT Leung should have a right to participate equally in the business of Money Facts and through Money Facts in the business of Fonfair.

23.  There was an implicit agreement or understanding that both shareholders of Money Facts should participate in the conduct of its business and that through Money Facts, both should participate in the business of Fonfair, and that neither was to be excluded from management and control unless for good reason such change should become necessary.

24.  There was a quasi-partnership between YK Leung and Harbour Front in respect of their association in Money Facts and Fonfair giving rise to equitable considerations.

D. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE FINDINGS IN THE 2002 AND 2004 JUDGMENT

25.  The rental income of the Yau Tong Property was applied towards mortgage repayments of the loan taken out by Fonfair from Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited for payments to Universal Dockyard to facilitate the spin-off of Fonfair.

26.  This arrangement continued until November 1996 when a loan of $30 million was obtained from the Standard Chartered Bank against the Fonfair’s assets to discharge the HSBC loan (“SCB Loan”). The proceeds were then distributed between YK Leung and YT Leung in accordance with the ratio of their shareholding in Fonfair. YK Leung and YT Leung became responsible for the monthly repayment of the SCB loan. From then on, with Fonfair having been freed from the burden of making mortgage repayments, the rental income net of incidentals became available for distribution to the Fonfair’s shareholders, i.e. effectively to YT Leung and YK Leung in the approximate ratio of 2 to 1.

27.  YTL, who had the management of Fonfair, overdrew in favour of himself. This led to the appointment of an independent accountant firm, Messrs Lau & Au Yeung Certified Public Accountants Limited (hereinafter called “Messrs Lau & Au Yeung”) to review the accounts of Fonfair. As a result, it was revealed that YT Leung had overdrawn from Fonfair’s account $2,652,363, while YK Leung had been underpaid $1,988,432. The reconciliation account prepared by Messrs Lau & Au Yeung was accepted by both YT Leung and YK Leung. On 27 November 1997, Fonfair duly paid YK Leung the amount which he had been underpaid, while YT Leung was required to refund the amount overdrawn.

28.  In view of YT Leung’s misappropriation, it was agreed by YK Leung and YT Leung that Messrs Lau & Au Yeung be engaged to administer the accounts of Fonfair, and YK Leung to manage the lease of the Yau Tong Property to avoid further conflict of interest with YT Leung representing both Fonfair (as landlord) and Universal Dockyard (as tenant) at the same time (“1997 Agreement”). The 1997 Agreement was never implemented due to the lack of cooperation from YT Leung.

29.  From September 1998 to December 1999, almost all the rental income received by Fonfair from Universal Dockyard was misappropriated by YT Leung into the account of YT Leung Trading (a company controlled by YT Leung).

30.  Subsequent to December 1999, Universal Dockyard was allowed by YT Leung to remain in possession of the Yau Tong Property without payment of rent.

31.  YT Leung was adjudged bankrupt on 1 March 2001, which YK Leung admitted to be a “windfall” brought about by the bankruptcy of YT Leung.

32.  YK Leung obtained control of the board afterwards. The 2004 Judgment found that it had only become possible for Fonfair to bring HCA 1886/2001 against Universal Dockyard to enforce the tenancy agreement, after YK had secured control of the board upon YT’s bankruptcy. YT Leung assisted Universal Dockyard to resist Fonfair’s claim by producing documents purportedly made by Fonfair. These documents have been found by To. J. in the 2002 Judgment to be lacking in credence.

33.  After Fonfair obtained judgment against Universal Dockyard on 11 December 2001, the latter failed to pay the judgment debt or deliver up vacant possession. Irene Leung (wife of YT Leung), in her capacity as a director of Universal Dockyard, filed an affirmation in support of its application for a stay of execution for six months of Fonfair's writ of possession issued on 23 April 2002.

34.  On 7 May 2001, Fonfair commenced HCA 2002/2001 to recover its books and records from UDL Management Limited (“UDLM”). In December 2001, summary judgment was entered against UDLM requiring it to deliver Fonfair’s books and records to Fonfair’s auditors. UDLM did not comply with the order. This led to committal proceedings initiated by Fonfair against Irene Leung and Bobby Chan in HCA 2002/2001 which failed.

35.  On 21 June 2002, Fonfair presented a petition to wind up Universal Dockyard in HCCW 663/2002. Fire Full (nominee of Harbour Front) and Harbour Front objected to Fonfair’s petition to wind up Universal Dockyard, and actively assisted Universal Dockyard to resist the petition and to thwart Fonfair’s attempts to recover the judgment debt for arrears of rent (HK$8.5 million with interest as at March 2003).

36.  Kwan J (as she then was) found that, in siding with Universal, Harbour Front had acted against the interest of Fonfair and had defeated the first of the three purposes for setting up Money Facts. Kwan J also rejected Harbour Front’s submissions that its opposition to wind up Universal Dockyard was justified for “sentimental” or commercial reasons.

37.  Due to the misconduct of Harbour Front, there was a breakdown of the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the parties. As a result, Harbour Front cannot assert its right of equal participation in the management of Money Facts and Fonfair, and has failed to make out a case of wrongful exclusion from management.

E. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 2008 RECONCILIATION EXERCISE

38.  By 2008, Fonfair was expected to accumulate a surplus out of rental income. On 1 August 2008, Fonfair’s board resolved that the proportion of the surplus which represented Harbour Front’s interest in Fonfair be set-off against the sums owed by Harbour Front. Neither Harbour Front nor its solicitors objected to the Fonfair’s proposed course of action.

39.  At the 2010 AGM of Fonfair (held on 23 November 2010), an interim report was prepared by Messrs. Lau & Au Yeung.

40.  On 23 November 2016, Fonfair issued the 2015 Interim Report.

41.  On 23 November 2016, Fonfair issued the 2016 Interim Report.

F. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO HARBOUR FRONT’S SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO REMEDY OR HAS REMEDIED ITS BREACHES OF THE SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT

42.  On 30 March & 2 April 2015, Harbour Front petitioned for the winding up of Money Facts and Fonfair in HCCW 111 & 116/2015 respectively (the “2015 Petitions”).

43.  The 2015 Petitions were heard on 5-9, 13 June 2017.

44.  By a letter dated 7 June 2017 (halfway through the trial of the 2015 Petitions), Harbour Front through its then solicitors informed YK Leung that it was prepared to pay to Fonfair within 2 working days of notification:-

(1) An amount inclusive of the principal and interest which YK Leung alleged Harbour Front should pay to rectify the breaches identified under the 2004 Judgment; and

(2) A further amount to cover the estimated legal and other costs which Fonfair may have to incur for the determination or adjudication of the total liability of Harbour Front.

45.  By letter dated 5 July 2017, Harbour Front made a further offer to Fonfair (“without any admission or affecting our rights”) to make reparations, and amongst other things tendered to Fonfair a cheque of HK$3,022,000. By letter dated 19 July 2017 and 10 August 2017, Harbour Front repeated its offer dated 5 July 2017 and requested for confirmation of the amount due by Harbour Front to Fonfair. Fonfair responded to and rejected the offers and requests on 15 August 2017.

46.  On 5 October 2017, this Court dismissed the 2015 Petitions. Reasons for judgment was delivered on 15 February 2018.

47.  On 15 March 2018, Harbour Front filed Notices of Appeal in CACV 68 & 69/2018 to appeal against this Court’s order dismissing the 2015 Petitions.

48.  By letter dated 24 July 2018, Harbour Front proposed to pay Fonfair HK$12,762,695.14 or alternatively, the same sum as interim payment for the question of quantum to be adjudicated. Fonfair rejected Harbour Front’s proposal in its letter on 3 August 2018.

49.  On 9 August 2018, Harbour Front offered to pay Fonfair HK$15,616,705.23 (i.e. the full sum under Appendix I to IV of 2016 Interim Report) as security and HK$1,000,000 as security for legal costs, pending adjudication of quantum owed by Harbour Front. Fonfair rejected Harbour Front’s revised proposal on 16 August 2018.

50.  On 29 September 2018, Harbour Front through its solicitors tendered a cheque of HK$11,467,293.47, being the full sum under Appendix I to III of 2016 Interim Report, to Fonfair.

51.  On 8 October 2018, Fonfair rejected Harbour Front’s proposal.

52.  On 13 October 2018, Harbour Front through its solicitors, indicated its acceptance of the reconciliation exercise based on figures stated in the 2016 Interim Report.

53.  By letter dated 16 October 2018, Fonfair did not accept Harbour Front’s proposal.

54.  By letter dated 22 October 2018, Harbour Front through its solicitors Messrs. Yiu & Associates (“Yiu & Associates”) provided that:

“purely for the purpose of settlement without farther delay, we hereby re-confirm on behalf of Harbour Front its acceptance of the execution of the one off "reconciliation exercise" based on the figures contained in the 2016 Interim Report ("Settlement by Reconciliation Exercise"), which is Fonfair's/ YKL's own proposed and insisted form of settlement to fully and finally settle and to purge Harbour Front's past breaches including those of the Shareholders Agreement.”

55.  On 20 November 2018, Harbour Front filed a request for the dismissal of the appeal in CACV 68 & 69/2018. On 28 November 2018, the CA ordered the dismissal of the appeal.

G. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE LITTLEWOODS OFFER

56.  By Notices for annual general meeting (“2008 AGM”) dated 12 August 2008, the directors of Money Facts and Fonfair informed the shareholders of an offer from Messrs. Littlewoods Solicitors on behalf of their client (i.e. the “Littlewoods Offer”) to purchase the Yau Tong Property and Yau Tong Marine Lot No. 1.

57.  This Court found that Harbour Front did not comission a valuation of the Yau Tong Property and did not form a view as to whether the Littlewoods Offer was high or low or commercially advantageous to Fonfair.

58.  On 26 August 2008, Harbour Front commenced HCA 1598/2008 against directors of Money Facts (including YK Leung) for (inter alia) a declaration that YK Leung was in breach of the Shareholders Agreement and an injunction restraining YK Leung from voting in the 2008 AGM.

59.  On the next day, 27 August 2008, Harbour Front took out an urgent application for interim injunction against the Money Facts directors (including YK Leung) to restrain them from voting on the Littlewoods Offer at the 2008 AGM.

60.  On 29 August 2008, Recorder Kwok SC dismissed Harbour Front’s application as an abuse of process and held that the application was “frivolous and vexatious”. The learned Recorder ordered indemnity costs be paid by Harbour Front forthwith.

61.  On 2 September 2008, Harbour Front wrote a letter to Littlewoods Solicitors.

62.  On 3 September 2008, Harbour Front appealed and applied for interim injunction pending appeal. This was dismissed by Kwan J (as she then was) (“2008 Judgment”). Kwan J dismissed Harbour Front’s application because Harbour Front remains in breach of the Shareholders Agreement, and has thwarted the first of the 3 purposes for which Money Facts was set up. It has (up until then) made no reparation of the losses suffered by Fonfair as a result of its misconduct in the misappropriation of rental income and the thwarting of Fonfair’s attempts to recover the judgment debt of $8.5 million for arrears of rent owed by Universal Dockyard, which has been wound up in 2003.

63.  Subsequently, Harbour Front’s appeal was heard and dismissed by the CA, who found Harbour Front’s application an “abuse of process”.

64.  On 5 September 2008, Fonfair’s solicitors (Messrs. Ho & Ip) wrote to Littlewoods to clarify that Harbour Front’s various court applications have been dismissed by the Court.

H. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE CHUNG SING OFFER

65.  By Notices dated 20 March 2015, the board of Money Facts and Fonfair proposed EGMs for the two companies to be convened on 8 April 2015 for their shareholders to consider an offer received on 16 March 2015 from Chung Sing Real Estate Company Limited to purchase the Yau Tong Property at the price of HK$365,000,000.00.

66.  On 24 March 2015, Harbour Front made two offers:

(1) An offer to YK Leung to purchase all the shares owned by YK Leung in Money Facts and Fonfair at the price of HK$30,400 per share; and

(2) An offer to Fonfair for the purchase of the Yau Tong Property at the price of HK$379,600,000.00.

67.  By letter dated 26 March 2015, Harbour Front requisitioned EGMs to be convened by Money Facts and Fonfair for resolutions to be passed to mandate Fonfair’s acceptance of Harbour Front’s purported offer to purchase the Yau Tong Property and the rejection of the Chung Sing Offer.

68.  This Court found that Harbour Front had not commissioned a valuation of the Yau Tong Property before deciding to make its proposals.

69.  By letter dated 27 March 2015, Harbour Front requisitioned EGMs to be convened by Money Facts and Fonfair on 8 April 2015 for resolutions to be passed to mandate Fonfair, in the event that Fonfair did not accept Harbour Front’s offer, to take all such steps necessary to sell the Yau Tong Property by way of public auction and/or public tender for the best obtainable price (“Public Auction / Tender Proposal”).

70.  On 30 March 2015 Harbour Front petitioned to wind up Money Facts and on 2 April 2015 petitioned to wind up Fonfair (the “2015 Petitions”). This Court found that there is a compelling inference given the history of this matter that the Harbour Front’s offers and proposals in March 2015 were not genuine but were made with a view to interfering in the sale of the Land to Chung Sing as were the presentation of the Petitions.

71.  On 8 July 2016, Fonfair applies for validation order to (inter alia) renew the lease of the Yau Tong Property. Harbour Front opposes the application for validation. On 14 February 2017, this Court grants validation to Fonfair.

I. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 2018 LAND PUBLIC TENDER

72.  On 9 October 2018, advertisements of the 2018 Land Public Tender were published in various newspaper.

73.  On 30 November 2018, the 2018 Land Public Tender closed.

J. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE HCMP 1987/2018 &HCMP 1988/2018 PROCEEDINGS

74.  On 12 November 2018, Harbour Front issued HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018.

75.  On 23 November 2018, the Court granted an interim injunction in HCMP 1987/2017 restraining sale or disposal of the Yau Tong Property (unless with Harbour Front’s prior approval or consent)pending determination of the Petition or further order of the Court. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal on 23 August2019.

K. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE IDL OFFER

76.  By letters dated 21 and 24 May 2019 from Savills (Hong Kong)Limited, acting for a prospective purchaser with an offer to purchasethe Yau Tong Property at the price of HK$888 million. The name ofthe prospective purchase was partially redacted and is referred to inthese Petitions as “Investment Development Limited” (or “IDL”).

77.  By a Notice of Extraordinary Meeting dated 29 May 2019, an EGM ofFonfair was scheduled to be held on 17 June 2019 for shareholders toconsider the offer from IDL and to express their views as to what theyconsider to be appropriate in response. Money Facts had accordinglycalled an EGM to be held on 17 June 2019 by a Notice ofExtraordinary Meeting dated 29 May 2019.

78.  By a letter on 5 June 2019, Harbour Front, through Yiu & Associates, invited YK Leung to a without prejudice meeting on 17 June 2019,before the Money Facts’ and Fonfair’s EGMs.

79.  The aforesaid 3 meetings were convened on 17 June 2019.

80.  On 31 July 2019, Fonfair passed a written resolution which recited therelevant background and consideration in respect of the offer from IDL (revised on 29 July 2019 to the increased consideration ofHK$910,000,000 (the “IDL Offer”) and resolved to accept it.

81.  The IDL Offer lapsed on 16 August 2019.

82.  On 16 September 2019, YK Leung presented the Cross-Petition seeking buy-out of its shares in Money Facts.

83.  By Summons dated 3 October 2019, Harbour Front applies to strikeout and dismiss the Cross-Petition on the ground that it discloses noreasonable cause of action and/or is otherwise an abuse of process.

84.  On 7 August 2020, DHCJ Jat SC dismissed Harbour Front’sSummons, but reasoned that “as presently advised, I am scepticalthat YK’s pleaded case does fall within s.724(1)”.



[1]   [1973] AC 360, 379B-G.

[2]   Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights, 8th ed, [7.47].

[3]   [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch), [232] per Fancourt J.

[4]   [1995] 2 BCLC 280, 293d-h, 295d-g per Robert Walker J (as he then was).

[5]   (2001) 37 ACSR 672.

[6]   [2009] NSWSC 342.

[7]   [2010] 2 SLR 776.

[8]   [2001] 1 HKLRD 561.

[9]   [2013] 1 CLC 596.

[10]   [2012] 2 CLC 109.

[11]   [2021] HKCI 692.

[12]   [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1104F-G.

[13]   [2010] BCC 597, Stanley Burnton LJ [108].

[14]   [2005] EWCA Civ 1222, [61(6)].

[15]   Lau v Chu [2020] 1 WLR 4656, Lord Briggs [15].

[2019] HKCFI 567-EN-2019-03-12

HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. MONEY FACTS LTD AND OTHERS

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HCMP 1987/2018

[2019] HKCFI 567

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1987 OF 2018

_____________

 IN THE MATTER of FONFAIR COMPANY LIMITED
 and
 IN THE MATTER of sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

_____________

BETWEEN  
 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITEDPetitioner

and

 MONEY FACTS LIMITED1st Respondent
 LEUNG YUET WAH, LEUNG YUET KEUNG and LEUNG YUET HOI2nd Respondent
 LEUNG YUET KEUNG3rd Respondent
 MARCON INVESTMENT LIMITED4th Respondent
 FONFAIR COMPANY LIMITED5th Respondent

_____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Kenneth Wong in Chambers

Date of Last Written Submissions: 20 February 2019

Date of Decision: 12 March 2019

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  This is an application by the 3rd respondent for leave to appeal against the order this Court made on 26 November 2018. In that order, an interlocutory injunction was granted to restrain the 3rdrespondent by himself or through the 1strespondent or the 4threspondent from causing or procuring the 5threspondent to dispose of or sell a property known as Yau Tong Marine Lot Nos 2, 3 and 4 unless with the prior approval or consent of the petitioner. It should also be noted that the injunction was given against the petitioner’s undertaking as to any loss which the 3rdrespondent or any other party suffered and should be compensated, as well as its payment into court a sum of $4,149,411.76 being legal costs asserted to be due by it to the 5threspondent pending final determination of the figure, see paragraph 29(j) of my Reasons for Decision dated 26 November 2018.

2.  It is common ground that interlocutory injunction is within the discretion of this Court to make.  I have detailed the reasons for the exercising of my discretion in granting the said injunction in the said Reasons for Decision. 

3.  It has been well established that an appeal will not be entertained from an order which it was within the discretion of the judge to make, unless it be shown that he exercised his discretion under a mistake of law or in disregard of principle, or that he took into account irrelevant matters or the conclusion which the judge reached in the exercise of his discretion was outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible, see paragraph 59/0/54 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2019, Volume 1, Part A.

4.  Ms Frances Lok, counsel for the 3rdrespondent, in the draft Notice of Appeal and in her written submissions for this application, set out six grounds of appeal to demonstrate that the order was erred, namely (1) delay and abuse; (2) that “the interim orders sought would effectively dispose of the part of the substantive claim in the Petition”; (3) no question of keeping the status quo; (4) lack of substantive merits; (5) damages adequate; and (6) balance of convenience against granting the order.  In essence, the 3rd respondent is rehashing the arguments deployed at the last hearing before this Court when the order was made. All of these arguments have been dealt with in the said Reasons for Decision.

5.  I am not persuaded that the proposed appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is any reason in the interest of justice why the proposed appeal should be heard.

6.  I therefore dismiss the application with costs be paid by the 3rd respondent to the petitioner, such amount to be taxed if not agreed.

 (Kenneth Wong)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Written submissions by Ms Sabrina Ho, instructed by Yiu & Associates, for the petitioner

Written submissions by Ms Frances Lok, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the 3rd respondent

[2018] HKCFI 2596-EN-2018-11-26

HARBOUR FRONT LTD v. MONEY FACTS LTD AND OTHERS

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HCMP 1987/2018

[2018] HKCFI 2596

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1987 OF 2018

_____________

 IN THE MATTER of FONFAIR COMPANY LIMITED
 and
 IN THE MATTER of sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

_____________

BETWEEN  
 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITEDPetitioner
 and 
 MONEY FACTS LIMITED1st Respondent
 LEUNG YUET WAH, LEUNG YUET KEUNG and LEUNG YUET HOI 2nd Respondent
 LEUNG YUET KEUNG3rd Respondent
 MARCON INVESTMENT LIMITED4th Respondent
 FONFAIR COMPANY LIMITED5th Respondent

_____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Kenneth Wong in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 23 November 2018
Date of Decision: 26 November 2018
Date of Reasons for Decision: 26 November 2018

____________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

____________________________________

Introduction

1.  The petitioner (Harbour Front Limited, “Harbour Front”) applies for interlocutory injunction and disclosure of information by summons dated 12 November 2018.  The 3rd respondent (Mr Leung Yuet Keung, “Y K Leung”) opposes the application.

2.  The first hearing took place before this Court on 16 November 2018.  After this Court informed the parties of its decision that the status quo should be preserved, the summons was adjourned to 23 November 2018 for full arguments, with the 3rd respondent’s undertaking that he will not,whether by himself or through his agents or through the 1st and 4threspondentsor otherwise howsoever procure the 5th respondent (Fonfair Company Limited, “Fonfair”) to enter into any contract to privately sell a piece of land known as Yau Tong Marine Lot Nos 2, 3 and 4 (the “Yau Tong Property”) until the conclusion of the hearing on 23 November 2018.

3.  The matter is of some urgency because Fonfair has been conducting a sale by public tender of the Yau Tong Property and the closing date for return of the tender (the “Public Tender”) is 30 November 2018. Further, it was stated in the Public Tender that the Yau Tong Property may be sold by private sale prior to the closing date.

4.  Having heard the parties on 23 November 2018, given the urgency of the matter, this Court delivered its decision at 9:30 am on 26 November 2018.

5.  The decision is to continue to preserve the status quo, for the reasons below.

The Petition

6.  The Petition was filed on 12 November 2018, the same date as the summons for interlocutory injunction.  It seeks various reliefs in relation to the management and operation of Fonfair.  The reliefs sought inthe Petition include those now sought in the summons on interlocutory basis.  They are grounded on unfair prejudice, under sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 622. 

The parties

7.  Harbour Front is a company of the family trust of Mr Leung Yat Tung (“Y T Leung”).  Y T Leung and Y K Leung are brothers.  Harbour Front was, and still is, the majority shareholder of Fonfair.  It holds, directly or through the 1st respondent (Money Facts Limited, “Money Facts”), 65.86% shares in Fonfair.

8.  Money Facts holds 65.79% shares in Fonfair.  It was, and still is, owned 50% by Y K Leung and 50% by Y T Leung (subsequently transferred to Harbour Front with Y K Leung’s consent). 

9.  The 2nd respondent are the administrators of the estate of the late Mr Leung Man Kwong, the founder of Universal Dockyard and the father of Y T Leung and Y K Leung.  It holds 0.63% of the shares in Fonfair.

10.  Marcon Investment Limited, the 4th respondent (“Marcon”) is owned and controlled by Y K Leung.  It holds 0.42% of shares in Fonfair.

11.  Through himself, Marcon and Money Facts, Y K Leung holds 33.53% of the shares in Fonfair.  Since March 2001, he and Marcon have been the only two directors of Money Facts and Fonfair.  In effect, he is in sole control and management of both companies.

12.  Y T Leung was used to be a director of both Money Facts and Fonfair. After he was adjudged bankrupt in March 2001, he resigned as director of both companies.

13.  Y T Leung and Y K Leung have engaged each other in litigation for many years.  The disputes revolve around the control and management of Money Facts and Fonfair and also the Yau Tong Property.

Fonfair’s business and the Yau Tong Property

14.  The business of Fonfair and the Yau Tong Property was fully described in the Judgment of Kwan J (as Her Ladyship then was) in HCCW 880/2001 and HCCW 246/2002 dated 2 February 2004 (“KwanJ’s2004 Judgment”), paragraph 7:

“ Fonfair was incorporated in Hong Kong on 3 July 1980. The only material asset of Fonfair is Yau Tong Marine Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (‘the Yau Tong Property’), which has been held by Fonfairas the registered owner since October 1980 when it was acquired from the administrators of the father’s estate. Fonfair used to be a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Dockyard until the flotation of UDL Holdings Limited (‘UDL’) on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in September 1991. Fonfair was then spun off from Universal Dockyard to keep the Yau Tong Propertyin the hands of the Leung family. Since September 1991, Fonfair had leased the Yau Tong Property to Universal Dockyard and it was occupied by the companies in the UDL group until vacant possession was recovered by Fonfair in the latter part of 2002. Other than letting out the Yau Tong Property, Fonfair did not appear to have carried on any business activity.”

15.  The position remains the same today: the Yau Tong Property is the only material asset of Fonfair, and other than letting out the Yau Tong Property, Fonfair carries on no other business.

16.  According to the 2nd Affirmation of Ms Leung Chi Yin Gillian, Y T Leung’s daughter, based on articles and advertisements in various HongKong newspapers, in early November 2018, it was estimated that the value of the Yau Tong Property was around HK$1.2 billion to HK$1.5 billion.

Quasi-partnership between Y K Leung and Harbour Front

17.  In paragraph 49 of Kwan J’s 2004 Judgment, it was held in conclusion that there is a quasi-partnership between Y K Leung and Harbour Front in respect of their association in Money Facts and Fonfair which gives rise to equitable considerations.

18.  Money Facts was set up by Y K Leung and Y T Leung.  Their shareholders’ agreement dated 5 June 1990 states that there are three specific objectives of this company, which are to:

“ 1. ensure as the majority shareholder in Fonfair Ltd., that the rentaland other incomes received by Fonfair are properly administeredand that after reasonable provisions for expenses such incomes are distributed to the shareholders of Fonfair;

2. ensure as the majority shareholder, in Fonfair Ltd., that Fonfair shall pursue and negotiate any future development plan and other business to safeguard and maximise the interest of Fonfair shareholder;

3. safeguard and maximize the interest of YK and YT in Fonfair Ltd.”

19.  The shareholders’ agreement then stipulates that “YK and YTas sole shareholders in Newco [ie Money Facts] shall cause the election of YK and YT as the only two directors in Newco.  Both directors shall not be subject to rotation.”

20.  Therefore to me it is very plain that Money Facts and Fonfair were intended to be a quasi-partnership between the two brothers, such that each has the equal right of participation in the two companies.  Hence in clear terms were the findings in paragraph 40 of Kwan J’s 2004 Judgment:

“ I find that Money Facts was formed on the basis of a personal relationship between YK Leung and YT Leung involving mutual confidence. I also find that Fonfair was continued or operated on a similar basis to Money Facts, as the shareholding in Fonfair held by the estate of the father is so small as to be almost insignificant.”

21.  The equal right of participation of Y T Leung and Y K Leung in the management of Fonfair’s business is further explained in paragraphs 43 and 44 of Kwan J’s 2004 Judgment:

“ 43. Further, as mentioned earlier, it was apparent from the fax of YK Leung to YT Leung dated 16 May 1991 that the purpose of forming a new company to hold an equal amount of their shareholdings in Fonfair was to form a majority block of shares. Implicit in this arrangement was that Money Facts should exercise control over the affairs of Fonfair as the majority shareholder. The Shareholders Agreement set out the three objectives of Money Facts in its role as the majority shareholder of Fonfair, including the important objective of pursuing and negotiating any future development plan of the Yau Tong Property. In view of these objectives, it must have been intended that YK Leung and YT Leung should have a right to participate equally in the businessof Money Facts and through Money Facts in the business of Fonfair.

44. I hold that there was an implicit agreement or understanding that both shareholders of Money Facts should participate in the conduct of its business and that through MoneyFacts, both should participate in the business of Fonfair, and thatneither was to be excluded from management and control unless for good reason such change should become necessary.”

22.  Y K Leung consented to Y T Leung’s transfer of his shares in Money Facts to Harbour Front on the basis that Harbour Front had agreed to be bound by the provisions in the shareholders’ agreement in the place of Y T Leung: see paragraph 47 of Kwan J’s 2004 Judgment.

Exclusion of Y T Leung/Harbour Front from control and management of Money Facts and Fonfair

23.  Y T Leung and Harbour Front were excluded from control and management of Money Facts and Fonfair, for good reasons.  In the summary at paragraph 10.4 of Harris J’s Reasons for Judgment dated 15 February 2018 in HCCW 111/2015 and HCCW 116/2015, [2018] HKCFI 358 (“HarrisJ’s 2018 Judgment”):

“ 10.4 There was good reason for YK to exclude Harbour Front from management and it was thus not unfair:

(a) Section 156 of the then Companies Ordinance, Cap 32, prohibits bankrupt from acting as a director. Without finding that YT and Harbour Front should be treated as one entity, Kwan J held in [74]:

‘ there would be ample justification for refusing to appoint a nominee of Harbour Front as director if there is sufficient reason to think that YT Leung would indirectly take part in or be concerned in the management. In view of the matters mentioned earlier, I think it justified to regard it as likely that YT Leung would continue to be involved in the management and control of the companies if given the opportunity.’

(b) There was a case for investigation by the Official Receiveras to whether the transfer of YT’s shares to Harbour Frontwas at an undervalue and liable to be set aside pursuant to section 49 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap 6:

‘ I do not think Harbour Front can justifiably complain in these circumstances that its requests for appointing its nominee to the board of directors of the two companies were not complied with’: [75]–[82].

(c) There has been misconduct by YT, namely,misappropriating funds of Fonfair in the form of rent received by Fonfair for the occupation of the land by Universal, a company controlled by YT, and subsequently YT’s persistent failure to enforce the tenancy agreement made by Fonfair and Universal. As Kwan J notes in [84]–[88]:

‘ 84. Many of the relevant matters cannot be disputed as they formed the subject of findings in earlier proceedings involving YT Leung and Universal Dockyard. I do not propose to go into allegations of misconduct of YT Leung before Harbour Front became a shareholder of Money Facts and Fonfair in February 1998.

85. For the period from September 1998 to December 1999, almost all the rental income received by Fonfair from Universal Dockyard was misappropriated by YT Leung into the account of YT Leung Trading (see paragraph 13 of the judgment of Deputy Judge To in HCA No. 1886 of 2001, 25 January 2002). As mentioned earlier, YT Leung Trading is wholly owned by YT Leung.

86. Subsequent to December 1999, Universal Dockyard was allowed to remain in possession of the Yau Tong Property without payment of rent.…

87. It could be seen from the above that Harbour Front had not only objected to Fonfair’s petition to wind up Universal Dockyard but had actively assisted the latter to resist the petition and to thwart Fonfair’s attempts to recover the judgment debt for arrears of rent, which had grown to HK$8.5 million with interest at the time of the hearing in March 2003. In doing so, Harbour Front had changed its stance from asserting that there was no prospect of recovery against Universal Dockyard to justify incurring legal expenses to the opposite position that Universal Dockyard had a positive asset value to justify its investment in that company. In so siding with Universal Dockyard, Harbour Front had acted against the interest of Fonfair and had defeated the first of the three purposes for setting up Money Facts, which was to ensure that as the majority shareholder in Fonfair, ‘the rental and other incomes received by Fonfair are properly administered andthat after reasonable provisions for expenses such incomes are distributed to the shareholders of Fonfair’. I reject the submission made on behalf of Harbour Front that its opposition to wind up Universal Dockyard was justified for ‘sentimental’ or commercial reasons. I also reject the submission that the misconduct of YT Leung should have nothing to do with Harbour Front for present purpose. As I have stated at the outset, I have not considered the allegations of misconduct of YT Leung before Harbour Front became a shareholder in the two companies in February 1998. Thereafter, YT Leung’s position in the two companies was by virtue of his being a representative of Harbour Front.

88. I find that it was due to the misconduct of Harbour Front that there was a breakdown in the relationship of mutual trust and confidence.  In the circumstances, Harbour Front cannot assert its right of equal participation in the management of Money Facts and Fonfair.  So for this reason as well, whether singly or cumulatively with one or both of the other grounds that I have considered earlier, Harbour Front has failed to make out a case of wrongful exclusion from management.’”

24.  Therefore, Harbour Front was then not entitled to complain that it had been unfairly excluded from the control and management of Money Facts and Fonfair, because its hands were unclean.  As summarised in paragraph 10.5 of Harris J’s 2018 Judgment:

“ 10.5 Harbour Front has not come to court with clean hands. In [106] and [107] Kwan J held:

‘ 106. It follows from the findings I have made above that I am against Harbour Front on this issue. The breakdown of mutual trust and confidence was attributable to the misconduct of Harbour Front. By its misconduct,Harbour Front had acted in breach of the Shareholders Agreement, which was the original agreement of mutual trust and confidence, and had thwarted at least one of the three purposes for which Money Facts was set up.

107. As stated by Rogers VP in Ng Yat Chi v. Max ShareLtd. [[2001] 1 HKLRD 561] at 573D, ‘it cannot be right that a person can rely on principles of justice and equity when he founds his claim on an agreement which not onlyhas he not honoured but has deliberately abused’. Similarstatements were made by Ribeiro PJ in Ng Yat Chi v. MaxShare Ltd. (2001) 4 HKCFAR 299 at 302I in refusing leave to appeal:

‘ We also agree with the Court of Appeal that it lies ill in the mouth of a petitioner who has defrauded the company and his fellow investors to complain that he has not been accorded equitable treatment by those other investors, characterised as members of an alleged quasi-partnership.  It is a well-known principle that he who seeks equity must do equity.’”

25.  It follows that unless Harbour Front “cleaned” its hands by remedying its misconduct, it will not be ever entitled to complain of unfair prejudice.  Any complaints before remedying can only amount to abuse of process.  This has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal and various courts at the Court of First Instance.  As summarised in paragraphs 20 – 23 and 41 – 42 of Harris J’s 2018 Judgment:

“ 20. Both Recorder Kwok and Kwan J refused to grant injunctions because Harbour Front remained in breach of the Shareholders Agreement. Kwan J says this in [10] of her judgment:

‘ I cannot agree with this. On the evidence adduced in this application, Harbour Front remains in breach of the Shareholders Agreement, and has thwarted the first of the 3 purposes for which Money Facts was set up. It has made no reparation of the losses suffered by Fonfair as a result of its misconduct in the misappropriation of rental income and the thwarting of Fonfair’s attempts to recoverthe judgment debt of $8.5 million for arrears of rent owed by Universal Dockyard Limited, which has been wound up in 2003. Harbour Front is seeking equitable relief by invoking its rights under the Shareholders Agreement notwithstanding it has been and still is in breach of the agreement. I am unable to see how its misconduct is irrelevant to the equitable relief sought or that its breach of the agreement is spent.’

21. The Court of Appeal dismissed Harbour Front’s appeal. Rogers VP was similarly clear about the reasons in his judgment:

‘ In my view the commencement of this action was, as Mr Recorder Kwok said, an abuse of the process and appears to have been an attempt to re-litigate the matterswhich were raised in HCA 1937 of 2007 and in the winding up proceedings to which I have referred.  Furthermore and most importantly, Harbour Front has done nothing to repair the losses suffered by Fonfair as a result of its misconduct by misappropriating the rental income and, indeed, thwarting Fonfair’s attempts to recover its judgment debt from Universal Dockyard Ltd.  In those circumstances, quite apart from there being no serious question to be tried, Harbour Front is in no position to seek the court’s assistance by the grant of interlocutory injunctions in this case.”

22. It should by September 2008 have been quite clear to Harbour Front and YT that if Harbour Front was to have any prospect of returning to a role in the management of Fonfair it would have to make good the losses it had caused to Fonfair and that if Harbour Front continued with its belligerent refusal to respect the decisions of the courts it was likely to find itself permanently excluded from a role in Fonfair’s affairs.  Certainly one would have expected Harbour Front’s legal advisers, and it has had the same solicitor since the presentation of the Petitions in 2001, to have made the position clear to Harbour Front and YT.

23. Despite this at no time has YT or Harbour Front made an approach in writing to Fonfair or YK with a view to remedying the misconduct found by Kwan J. The closest on its own case that Harbour Front has come to offering to remedy its wrongful acts is exchanges between Harbour Front’s solicitor, Tsang Wai Kwan and YK at the AGM held on 23 November 2009.  Unfortunately, although Harbour Front had the tape made by YK at the AGM since May 2015, when it was exhibited to YK’s 1staffirmation in the Fonfair Petition, Harbour Front did not produce a transcript of it or refer to it in evidence until Mr Fung SC put selective parts of it to YK in cross‑examination.  Ms Lok produced a longer transcript and translation, which provides greater context. The exchange between Mr Tsang and YK concerns a reconciliation process, which I shall explain later.  It seems to me that what little Mr Tsang says falls far short of constituting a sensible proposal to make good the loss Harbour Front was liable for.  I will return to this subject in more detail later, but it seems to me that Harbour Front has very obviously failed to take appropriate action to cure the matters, which Kwan J found justified it from being excluded from management of the Companies and led the Judge to conclude that Harbour Front had not come to court with clean hands.

…

41. As, in my view, is clear from the history of the disputes between YK and Harbour Front, which I do not think it can sensibly be suggested in practice is anything other than YT’s corporate alter ego, YT has made no sensible effort to try and establish what needs to be done to remedy the breaches of the Shareholders Agreement.  The opposite is the position.  YT and Harbour Front have made no effort to engage meaningfully to agree what is owed despite being given the interim reports.  Instead Harbour Front tried to intimidate Lau & Au Yeung in to stopping compiling them.  Harbour Front has made no effort to propose an alternative method for agreeing what is owed and moving on.  The guiding mind behind Harbour Front, who as I have said I think it is reasonable to assume is YT, is motivated by an animosity towards YK and a lack of objectivity, which seems to render any prospect of Harbour Front doing what is required to remedy its breaches illusory.

42. I find that Harbour Front has fairly been excluded from management.  In my view this will remain the case until such time as Harbour front takes genuine and substantial steps to remedy its misconduct. Mr Fung has cited no authority for the proposition that a finding that a shareholder has been fairly excluded from management becomes spent simply by effluxion of time even if the shareholder has made no substantive effort toremedy his wrong as I have found to be the position in the present case.  This is entirely unsurprising as the proposition seems to me to be as meritless as it is unattractive.  If a shareholder acts in such a way as to destroy the mutual trust which was central to any agreement that he could take part in management, it seems to me clear that until such time as he remedies the misconduct, ifit is possible to do so and it might not, he loses the right to argue that his exclusion alone justifies the court making a winding-up order on the just and equitable ground or granting relief for unfair prejudice.  The reason is simple: it would not be just and equitable to wind up in these circumstances and the exclusion from management is not unfair.”

26.  In more concrete term on how Harbour Front had failed to remedy its misconduct, Harris J was critical of Harbour Front’s complaint in relation to the way in which Y K Leung addressed Harbour Front’s failure to make good the loss caused by Y T Leung’s breaches (see paragraph 57 of Harris J’s 2018 Judgment).  His Lordship commented that in response to the interim reports produced by Y K Leung’s accountants (the latest of which was in 2016 (“2016 Interim Report”) recording the losses that Y K Leung treated as attributable to Harbour Front and the amounts that he had drawn down from Fonfair, Harbour Front had failed to propose any sensible way of assessing the loss that had been suffered by Fonfair or to engage with Y K Leung constructively over the agreement of figures once Y K Leung started to provide the interim reports.  This demonstrated, in His Lordship’s view, that Harbour Front had no interest in having a constructive dialogue with Y K Leung over compensating Fonfair.

Has Harbour Front now taken genuine and substantial steps to remedy its misconduct?

27.  In these proceedings, Harbour Front now contends that ever since the hearing before Harris J in HCCW 111/2015 and HCCW 116/2015 in June 2017, Harbour Front has continuously taken active, serious and diligent steps to remedy its breach of the shareholders’ agreement identifiedin Kwan J’s 2004 Judgment, and that it has paid particular heed to Harris J’s said remark by maintaining a constructive dialogue with Y K Leung over compensating Fonfair.

28.  As such, in its submissions, Harbour Front should be allowed to reassert its rights under the shareholders’ agreement.  But instead, Y K Leung pushes ahead the Public Tender without Harbour Front’s knowledge, participation, approval or consent.

29.  Briefly, the steps which Harbour Front contends that it has taken to remedy its past breaches include:

(a)  On 7 June 2017, a written offer to pay was made by Harbour Front’s then solicitors to Y K Leung’s solicitors.

(b)  On 5 July 2017, another written offer was made by Harbour Front to Fonfair.  The offer was attached with a cheque for HK$3.022 million payable to Fonfair. 

(c)  On 10 August 2017, Harbour Front wrote to Fonfair demanding for “quantification of any alleged claims for which Harbour Front is liable to Fonfair together with details of such quantification”.

(d)  On 24 July 2018, Harbour Front by letter offered two alternatives to Fonfair: to fully and finally settled the matter by paying Fonfair the sum of HK$12,762,695.14, or alternativelyto pay the same amount to Fonfair as interim payment pending formal adjudication of the question of quantum.

(e)  On 9 August 2018, Harbour Front by letter offered to pay to Fonfair the sum of HK$15,616,705.23 which is the total amount asserted to be due by Harbour Front to Fonfair in Appendices I to IV of the 2016 Interim Report as security pending adjudication of the figures claimed by Fonfair.  Harbour Front also offers to pay HK$1,000,000 as security forany future legal costs award against Harbour Front should the process of adjudication or determination of Fonfair’s claims be not in Harbour Front’s favour.

(f)  On 29 September 2018, Harbour Front’s solicitors wrote to Fonfair and tendered a cheque in the sum of HK$11,467,293.47, being the total amount asserted to be due by Harbour Front to Fonfair in Appendices I to III of the 2016 Interim Report, as payment “to settle any liabilities owed by Harbour Front to Fonfair given rise by the breach of the Shareholders Agreement”.  

(g)  On 13 October 2018, Harbour Front’s solicitors wrote to Fonfair accepting Fonfair’s proposal of “execution of the one-off ‘reconciliation exercise’ based on the figures stated in the Interim Report.” The letter asked Y K Leung to regard Harbour Front as having fully purged its breach of the shareholders’ agreement, not to object or obstruct Harbour Front’s exercise of rights and entitlements under the shareholders’ agreement, including equal participation in management of both Fonfair and Money Facts, and to procure the appointment of Harbour Front’s representatives to the boards of Fonfair and Money Facts.

(h)  On 22 October 2018, Harbour Front’s solicitors wrote to Y K Leung and Fonfair reconfirming Harbour Front’s “acceptance of the execution of the one-off ‘reconciliation exercise’ based on the figures contained in the 2016 Interim Reports (‘Settlement by Reconciliation Exercise’), which isFonfair’s/YKL’s own proposed and insisted form of settlement to fully and finally settle and to purge Harbour Front’s past breaches including those of the Shareholders Agreement”.

(i)  On 9 November 2018, Harbour Front’s solicitors wrote to Y K Leung’s solicitors confirmed again its client’s acceptance of the Settlement by Reconciliation Exercise, and stated that its client’s acceptance is “not subject to any precondition”.

(j)  In the Petition, Harbour Front undertakes to pay into court HK$4,149,411.76 being legal costs asserted to be due by Harbour Front to Fonfair in Appendix IV of the 2016 Interim Report pending final determination of the figure.

30.  Ms Frances Lok (with Mr Vincent Chiu), Counsel for Y K Leung, submit that the offers by Harbour Front were not genuine attempts tomake amends for its misconduct, that they were a series of hostile, verboseand argumentative letters by which Harbour Fronts demanded its nomineesto be appointed to the boards of Fonfair and Money Facts, and that Harbour Front’s disputes of the extent of its liability and requests for adjudication amount to total denial of liability in substance.  Further, as Ms Lok submits, the cash offers made since late 2017 were made years too late, and they were meaningless when made, and Harbour Front’s acceptance of the 2016Interim Report in October 2018 was stated to be purely “for settlement” and was not reparation in good faith.

31.  Bearing in mind whether the breach has been fully remedied is a matter for trial, on the evidence put before me, for the purpose of this application, I am satisfied Harbour Front has shown it has made real effort in “purging” its past wrongs. Having read the correspondence, while some of the offers made by Harbour Front were really framed in no unequivocal manner, the rest of them, particularly those letters sent in September and October 2018, have shown at least some seriousness on the part of Harbour Front to remedy the breach as soon as possible.  While I can see such payment or confirmation might well be driven by Harbour Front’s strong desire to restore its right to participate in the management of the company, I cannot, for the purpose of this application, accept the argument that the tendering of the cheque for payment of HK$11,467,293.47 drawn in Fonfair’s favour as well as the written confirmation of unconditional acceptance of the reconciliation exercise based on figures stated in the 2016 Interim Report were not reparation in good faith.  Objectively these steps may well be considered by the trial judge hearing the Petition as effective remedies of the past breach.  I also do not accept that these steps must be regarded as taken too late, and that as a result of such delay Harbour Front has been permanently barred from participating in the management of the companies, notwithstanding the past breach has been reasonably remedied.  There is no deadline imposed whether in previous judgments or otherwise for Harbour Front to remedy its previous wrongs. 

Serious issues to be tried

32.  In my view, there are the two key issues in these proceedings, namely (a) whether the steps so far taken by Harbour Front, considered together, are adequate enough to be regarded as satisfactory remedy of its past breach of the shareholders agreement as found in the previous judgments, and (b) whether as a result of the remedy of the breach, HarbourFront’s right to equal participation in the control and management of Fonfairand Money Facts under the shareholders’ agreement has then been restored or can then be exercised.  Whilst these issues are to be determined at the hearing of the Petition, for the purpose of this application, I find the evidence adduced by Harbour Front, particularly regarding the steps that it has taken since after the hearing before Harris J in HCCW 111/2015 andHCCW 116/2015 in June 2017, has demonstrated a good arguable case thatHarbour Front’s exclusion from participating in the management of MoneyFacts and Fonfair notwithstanding its satisfactory remedy of its past breach of the shareholders’ agreement is unfairly prejudicial to its interest as a member of both companies.

33.  Given that the material events raised in these proceedings took place after the trial before Harris J in June 2017, namely remedial steps taken by Harbour Front since July 2017 and the Public Tender which will be closed on 30 November 2018, there is no question of re-litigating disputes in previous proceedings as argued by Y K Leung.

34.  However, I would add one rider.  It is trite that in cases where the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction will finally dispose of the action in favour of the successful party to the application, the Courtshould approach the matter on a broad principle that it should endeavour todo what will avoid injustice, but that the applicant has to show at least thatthey are likely to succeed at trial and that this requires a stronger evidentialcase than is required in ordinary matters to which the American Cyanamid principles apply: see Sunlink International Holdings Ltd v Wong Shu Wing [2010] 5 HKLRD 653, paragraph 10, per Harris J.

35.  Ms Lok drew to my attention that the three substantive reliefs sought in Harbour Front’s summons (paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) are reliefs sought in the Petition (prayers 6, 7 and 8).

36.  Mr Clifford Smith SC (with Ms Sabrina Ho and Ms Jacqueline Law), Counsel for Harbour Front, submit that the grant or refusal of the summons would not effectively dispose of the Petition in its entirety because the interlocutory injunction sought does not include any request for the reconstitution of the boards of directors of Money Facts and Fonfair to enable Harbour Front to participate in the management of the companies,which is part of the substantive relief sought in the Petition (prayer 5),and whether Harbour Front has fully remedied its past breaches of the shareholders’ agreement remains a matter to be resolved at trial.

37.  Unless and until it is determined by the Court at the hearing of the Petition that Harbour Front has remedied its breach satisfactorily and that it is now entitled to assert its rights under the shareholders’ agreement, Harbour Front, as held in previous judgments, would still be regarded as justifiably excluded from the management of Fonfair and Money Facts.  As such, this Court should be acute not to grant at this interlocutory stage such rights and entitlements to Harbour Front as if it has succeeded at the trial. This would be premature.

38.  In the circumstance of the present case, the primary objective should be to preserve the status quo, so that in the event Harbour Front succeeds at trial, the reliefs that it obtains will not become nugatory.

39.  If the Yau Tong Property is sold before the determination of the Petition, in the event that Harbour Front succeeds at trial, given that it is the only material asset of Fonfair and that Fonfair, as held in Kwan J’s 2004 Judgment, is in substance a quasi-partnership between Y K Leung and Harbour Front in light of the background and purposes in setting up the company as explained above, in my view, the reliefs to Harbour Front in re-participating in the management of the company may become practicallymeaningless.  Therefore, I consider it is essential to preserve the status quoby restraining the Yau Tong Property from being sold or disposed of before the determination of the Petition, unless the parties consult each other and agree otherwise.

40.  I do not consider it is necessary to compel Y K Leung to disclose to Harbour Front details of the Public Tender such as proposals from agents, appointment terms of agents, the tender document, reserve price, intended completion date and payment conditions, private offers from potential buyers as sought in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the summons.  This would effectively give Harbour Front a substantial part of the right to participate in the management of Fonfair, which Harbour Front is not entitled at this stage. 

Damages inadequate

41.  In light of the unique background of Fonfair as a family company, the quasi-partnership nature of Fonfair and Money Facts, and the implied agreement (as found in Kwan J’s 2004 Judgment) of equal entitlement to management and no exclusion unless for good reasons, it is apparent that deprivation of such equal right to participate in management is not a right that is quantifiable in monetary term.

42.  This view is fortified by Mr Smith’s submission with which I agree, that the situation in the present case is analogous to the right of a partner, in an appropriate case, to seek an order for specific performance or, more usually, an injunction to compel his co-partners to adhere to the terms of their agreement whilst the partnership is continuing.  An injunction could be granted if a partner excludes his co-partner from exercising his right to participate in the management of the partnership affairs: see Lindley & Banks on Partnership (20th ed), paragraphs 23-48, 23-139 and 23-140 and Araci v Fallon [2011] EWCA Civ 668 at paragraphs 36 – 39 per Jackson LJ and paragraphs 69 – 75 per Elias LJ.  Of course, the analogy would only be applicable to the present case if and only if the Court is satisfied that Harbour Front’s past breach has been remedied.

43.  I therefore do not accept Ms Lok’s submission that financial compensation after the sale of the Yau Tong Property will be adequate remedyfor wrongful exclusion of Harbour Front from participating in management of Fonfair (if so found by the Court after trial).

44.  Ms Lok relies on the following passage in the Court of Appeal’s Reasons for Judgment in CACV 260/2008 dated 18 September 2008, per Rogers VP:

“ Finally, I would for completeness just make the point that the application for interim injunctions (whether pending appeal or as sought in the appeal proper) was objectionable on the basis that, clearly (and as Mr Fung, I think, accepted) damages were an adequate remedy.”

45.  On clarification Ms Lok accepts that this is not a passage binding on this Court because it is a finding of fact in the context of the application in that appeal.  I also agree with Mr Smith that this passage is obiter dictum, made for completeness.  The paramount fact underlying the decision in this judgment was described by Rogers VP at paragraph 6 of the judgment, that:

“ The matters going to misconduct that were held against Harbour Front after the hearing of the winding up petitions have never been rectified. None of the debt owing has been paid or discharged.”

As held in above, there is now a serious issue to be tried on whether the breach has been remedied.

Balance of convenience

46.  Ms Lok submits that the following factors should be weighedagainst the grant of the injunction against the sale of the Yau Tong Property “unless with the prior approval or consent of Harbour Front”.

47.  Firstly, she submits that financial compensation would be adequate.  I disagree, for the reasons stated above on damages being inadequate.

48.  Secondly, she submits that there was delay in taking out this application.  I disagree.  The delay (if any) was not substantial — Harbour Front first learnt of the closing date of the Public Tender (ie 30 November 2018) from newspaper advertisements on 2 October 2018. They took out this application about 6 weeks later, on 12 November 2018.

49.  Thirdly, she submits that if injunction is granted and Harbour Front fails in the end in these proceedings, it would create false signal to the market that Fonfair had no authority to deal with the Yau Tong Property.  I disagree.  The advertisements for the Public Tender have stated clearly that the land may be sold privately prior to the tender closing or the invitation may be withdrawn.

50.  In this connection, as explained, the Court should be acute not to give Harbour Front any substantive right of management prematurely at this interlocutory stage.  By the same token, Y K Leung’s right to management of Fonfair should not be unnecessarily disturbed (except for the actual sale or disposal of the Yau Tong Property, which should be restrained for the reasons explained above).  Therefore, I am minded not to restrain the continual proceeding with and marketing of the Public Tender (ie paragraph 1(a) of the summons) as well as the offering or continual offering the Yau Tong Property for sale (ie paragraph 1(c) of the summons).  Of course, if the best bid received upon the closing of the Public Tender (or indeed any private offer from potential buyers) is considered by Y K Leung to be so commercially attractive that it would be in the best interest of Fonfair to accept that bid (or offer), Y K Leung may consider informing Harbour Front and the parties may put their heads together to discuss and see if Harbour View could come to agreement with Y K Leung and consents to the proposed sale.

51.  Fourthly, Ms Lok submits that the injunction is tantamount to interfering with the present management of Fonfair and imposing new directors onto Fonfair.  In principle I agree with Ms Lok on this factor.  I am not prepared to grant any order which carries this effect.  At the risk of repeating myself, I am only prepared to preserve the status quo — namely to keep the Yau Tong Property within the ownership of Fonfair, so that should Harbour Front succeed at the end, it will have a meaningful participation in the management of the company in accordance with the shareholders’ agreement.

52.  Fifthly, she submits that as Harbour Front has previously indicated the possibility of its intention to offer to buy or to bid for the Yau Tong Property, there will be a conflict of interest on the part of Harbour Front as a director of Fonfair as well as a potential purchaser; and with grant of the prohibitive injunction the Court would effectively sanction theconflict of interest.  I disagree.  First, the articles of association expressly allow a director to deal with the company after appropriate declaration of interest.  Second, which is more important, Harbour Front has not yet proved its case in these proceedings, and as explained above, at this interlocutory stage the Court will not grant any substantive right to Harbour Front to participate in the management of the company’s affairs including obtaining internal information of any potential sale to Harbour Front’s advantage.

Conclusion

53.  In conclusion, for the above reasons, I am prepared to grant the interlocutory relief restraining sale or disposal of the Yau Tong Property (unless with Harbour Front’s prior approval or consent) pending determination of the Petition or further order of the Court.  As to costs of this application, while I would remark here that clearly a certificate for two counsel is merited, my order is that costs should be reserved for the learned judge hearing the Petition.

54.  I thank Counsel for their helpful assistance.


 

 (Kenneth Wong)
 Deputy High Court Judge

  

Mr Clifford Smith SC, leading Ms Sabrina Ho and Ms Jacqueline Law, instructed by Yiu & Associates, for the petitioner

Ms Frances Lok and Mr Vincent Chiu, instructed by Ho & Ip, for 1st and 3rd respondents

The 2nd, 4th and 5th respondents were not represented and did not appear