RE A

CACV 88/2011,
CACV 111/2012 and
HCMP 839/2015
(Heard together)

CACV 88/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 88 OF 2011

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 116 OF 2010)

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CACV 111/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 111 OF 2012

(ON APPEAL FROM DCEC NO. 199 OF 2011)

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HCMP 839/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 839 OF 2015

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 141 OF 2013)

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DECISION

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Hon Cheung JA:

1.  The issue that the Court has now to determine in these three cases is whether the applicant is a person under disability and is required by Order 80 Rule 2(2) of The Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) to be represented by a next friend or guardian ad litem who in turn must act by a solicitor under Order 80 Rule 2(3) of The Rules of the High Court.

2.  Under Order 80 Rule 3(5), where, after any proceedings have been begun, a party to the proceedings becomes a mentally incapacitated person, an application must be made to the Court for the appointment of a person to be next friend or guardian ad litem, as the case may be, of that party.

3.  The mental state of the applicant was disclosed by herself in her written submissions for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in CACV 88/2011 which caused the Court to raise this issue.  As the applicant has brought two other cases, namely, CACV 111/2012 (an appeal against the decision of the District Court and where the applicant has issued 17 summonses seeking various relief) and HCMP 839/2015 (an application for appeal out of time against the refusal to grant leave for judicial review) which are also pending before this Court, this Court directed these three cases are to be heard together for the issue to be determined.

4.  In the medical report of Dr Poon dated 27 June 2016 the applicant was stated to have been admitted to the Shatin Hospital for treatment of depression and Dr Poon described her as a mentally incapacitated person within the meaning of the Mental Health Ordinance (‘MHO’) (Cap 136).  Dr Wong in the report of 9 August 2016 further confirmed that the applicant is a mentally handicapped person. 

5.  Order 80 Rule 1 defines a ‘person under disability’ as ‘a person who is ……a mentally incapacitated person’.  It then defines ‘mentally incapacitated person’ to mean:

‘ … a mentally disordered person or a mentally handicapped person (within the meaning of the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap. 136)) who, by reason of mental disorder or mental handicap, as the case may be, is incapable of managing and administering his property and affairs.’

6.  By section 2 of the MHO, ‘mentally handicapped person’ is defined as ‘a person who is or appears to be mentally handicapped’, and ‘mental handicap’ is defined to mean:

‘ …a patient or a mentally handicapped person.  Patient is defined as ‘a person suffering from or appearing to be suffering from mental disorder’.

Mental disorder is in term defined as:

‘ (a) mental illness;

(b)   a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which amounts to a significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning which is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the person concerned;

(c)   psychopathic disorder; or

(d)   any other disorder or disability of mind which does not amount to mental handicap.’

7.  In view of the opinions of Dr Poon and Dr Wong the applicant comes within the category of a person under disability.  The applicant disputed the two doctors’ description of her as a mentally incapacitated person and we have granted her time to adduce medical evidence to challenge Dr Poon and Dr Wong’s opinion.  However, to date she has not been able to do so.

8.  As the applicant is unable to successfully challenge the medical opinions, the only course open to this Court is to stay the proceedings in these three cases until such time as she is no longer a person under disability or when she is represented by a next friend or guardian ad litem.

Hon Chu JA:

9.  I agree with the reasons given by Cheung JA and the order proposed in paragraph 8 above.

Hon Poon JA:

10.  I agree.

The applicant appeared in person in CACV 88/2011, CACV 111/2012 & HCMP 839/2015

Mr Victor Gidwani, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the 3^rd respondent in CACV 111/2012

Ms Evelyn Tsao GC, of Department of Justice, for the 1^st putative respondent in HCMP 839/2015

CACV 88/2011

香港特別行政區

高等法院上訴法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事上訴2011年第88號

(原本案件編號：高等法院憲法及行政訴訟2010年116號)

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判 案 書

上訴法庭法官潘兆初頒發上訴庭判案書：

1.  2010年11月4日，上訴人開展HCAL 116/2010一案，申請許可以司法覆核尋求以下的濟助：

「 要求法庭頒發第一項履行義務：要職訓局糾正2009.02.20常委會（莫須有）錯誤，宣告申請人未曾中斷過VTC僱員身份，所以符合資格，通過職工會選舉程序可以繼續做HKDI教師會會長。」

2.  2011年5月4日，原訟法庭法官區慶祥頒下判決書，拒絕給予上訴人許可申請司法覆核。

3.  上訴人不服，現上訴於本庭。

4.  本案的背景見區法官的判決書，本庭在此不贅。

5.  區法官拒絕給予上訴人許可申請司法覆核，原因是上訴人和職業訓練局的僱傭糾紛純屬勞資的私人合約糾紛，並不在公法的範圍之內。區法官的觀點在法理上完全正確，有上訴法庭的判例支持：見Chik Po Yee v Vocational Training Council & Another  ，CACV 78/2006，未經彙報，25 April 2007，第59、第69及74段。本庭認同區法官的決定。

6.  無論是書面陳詞或口頭陳述，上訴人都未能提出任何理由，說服本庭區法官的決定有任何錯誤的地方。在口頭陳述時，申請人說她依賴《香港人權法案》第10條，並投訴答辯人解僱她時沒有給予她公平聆訊的機會。可是，申請人在表格86和86A中完全沒有提及此理據，以支持其司法覆核許可申請。再者，上訴人申請司法覆核2009年2月20日的決定，是逾時超過一年才於2010年11月4日提出。除非有極其特殊的情況，本庭不會容許申請人在上訴時才提出新的理由以支持其司法覆核許可的申請。在本案中，上訴人未能提出任何特殊的情況，可以令本庭批准她在上訴階段才依賴《香港人權法案》第10條。

7.  基於上述原因，本庭駁回上訴人的上訴。至於上訴人在不同時間在上訴程序中存檔法庭的所有傳票，因為這上訴已經駁回，而無論如何它們都是毫無理據的或是和本上訴無關，所以本庭把它們全部撤銷。