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Civil Action2013

蔡雲裳及另二人 對 蔡思明

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[2024] HKCFI 186-EN-2024-01-24

CHOI WAN SHEUNG NANCY v. CHOI SI MING DANNY

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HCA 2336/2013

[2024] HKCFI 186

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2336 OF 2013

_____________

BETWEEN

 CHOI WAN SHEUNG NANCY (蔡雲裳)1st Plaintiff
 PIYATHAISERE CHOI HOW SHEUNG DAISY2nd Plaintiff
 (蔡巧裳) (discontinued)
 LUDTKE CHOI WOON SHEUNG WENDY3rd Plaintiff
 (蔡煥裳)(struck out)
 and 
 CHOI SI MING DANNY (蔡思明)Defendant
 and 
 CHOY KAM SHEUNG (蔡錦裳)Third Party

_____________

Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Court
Dates of Hearing: 24-26 July 2023 and 1 August 2023
Date of Judgment: 24 January 2024

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Background

1.  This action relates to a dispute amongst siblings who are beneficiaries of their mother’s estate, and their contest over the interests in the landed property which was registered in the name of their deceased mother, and the sale proceeds thereof.

2.  Flat F on 16th floor of Shung Lim House in Hung Hom, Kowloon (“HH Property”) was registered in the name of the late Madam Tsang Sew Ung (“Mother”). She died in May 2000, leaving all her property to her 5 children, in equal shares. The children are Choi How Sheung Daisy (“Daisy”), Choy Kam Sheung Ruby (“Ruby”), Choi Woon Sheung Wendy (“Wendy”), Choi Wan Sheung Nancy (“Nancy”) and Choi Si Ming Danny (“Danny”). Danny, the youngest and only son, was named as the executor under Mother’s will.

3.  Nancy is the 1st Plaintiff in these proceedings. Daisy, the eldest sibling, is the 2nd Plaintiff, whilst Wendy is the 3rd Plaintiff. Danny is the Defendant, and he joined Ruby as Third Party.

4.  Daisy and Danny have discontinued the proceedings between them. Wendy’s claims had been struck out in January 2018 after she failed to attend a Case Management Conference. She has not made any application to restore her claim. However, both Daisy and Wendy gave evidence for Nancy at trial.

5.  Ruby stated in her pleadings in the Third Party proceedings that she makes no claim against any of her siblings, and the trial of the action does not involve the trial of the third party proceedings. The trial is on the claims made by Nancy against Danny, and Danny’s counterclaim against her.

6.  Prolix pleadings have been filed and served by Danny, who was legally represented from July 2019 until 28 February 2023. Most of the original claims made and particulars set out in his pleadings have been deleted in 2020 as irrelevant. In gist, what remains of the claims and disputed matters relate to Danny’s sale of the HH Property in October 2007, and the acquisition of the property at Flat H, 7th floor, Po Wing Building, No 69 Lee Garden Road, Hong Kong (“PW Property”) and its assignment in December 2007, from Nancy’s sole name to the joint names of Nancy and Danny. Nancy claims that the interest in the PW Property is held on trust for each of the four sisters, whereas Danny claims that he is the sole beneficial owner of all the interests in the PW Property and that Nancy’s interest is held on trust for him. Nancy further claims that the HH Property had been sold by Danny at undervalue, and that she is entitled to damages caused by Danny’s breach of duty, willful default and/or negligence as executor of Mother’s will.

7.  According to the Statement of Claim, the HH Property was sold by Danny as executor and trustee of Mother’s estate (“Estate”) on 18 October 2007, at the price of $600,000, which was substantially below the then prevailing market value, estimated to be no less than $1 million. Nancy claims that Danny is liable to make good and to account for the losses suffered by each of the Plaintiffs, as a result of his negligence and/or breach of duty, which losses are the one-fifth share each of the deficiency in the sale price. Daisy and Wendy have not pursued their claim for damages to trial.

8.  As for the PW Property, there is no dispute that it was purchased by Nancy and her former husband in 1996, and registered in their joint names until 2006, when the PW Property was transferred into Nancy’s sole name upon her divorce from her husband. On 7 December 2007, the PW Property was assigned to Nancy and Danny as joint tenants for a consideration of $1.9 million (“Consideration”). According to Nancy, the Consideration was financed by: (1) the sale proceeds of the HH Property at $600,000 (in which she and her siblings each had one‑fifth share); (2) a mortgage loan of $1,260,000 from the Fubon Bank (“Mortgage”) which was taken out in the joint names of Nancy and Danny as purchasers of the PW Property; and (3) the balance of $40,000 (“Remainder”) being paid by Nancy and Danny in equal shares (of $20,000 each).

9.  In essence, Nancy claims that whereas initially, it had been agreed amongst Nancy, Ruby and Danny that they would jointly purchase the PW Property by utilizing the proceeds of the sale of the HH Property, procure a mortgage over the PW Property in order to raise funds to enable Nancy to pay off her own debts, and that Ruby (who was apparently the most well-off of the siblings) would be responsible for repaying the mortgage loan. It was part of this agreement that Danny was to move into the PW Property and reside there with Nancy. According to Nancy, she was informed by Ruby and Danny that there had to be a sale and purchase before any mortgage could be obtained for the purpose of raising funds for her, and she had believed and trusted Danny as he had been in the real estate agency business.

10.  Subsequently, however, Ruby reneged from the agreement to purchase the PW Property jointly, and she only paid $28,000 of the Mortgage loan, and it was Nancy who continued the monthly repayments under the Mortgage. Eventually, Nancy paid a total sum of $1,232,000 under the Mortgage. On Nancy’s calculations, Danny only contributed $20,000 (which was half of the Remainder) to the Consideration, and Nancy now seeks apportionment of the siblings’ beneficial interests in the PW Property according to their respective monetary contribution, her own share being 72.2105% ($1,372,000/$1,900,000).

11.  Although Daisy and Wendy have not pursued their claims to trial, the facts and assertions contained in the Statement of Claim, including the claim of their respective equal share in Mother’s Estate, represented the case and position of all the Plaintiffs. In their witness statements, Daisy and Wendy maintain that they each have one-fifth share in the Estate, represented by the proceeds of sale of the HH Property.

12.  On Danny’s case, the matter was much more complicated.

13.  According to the pleadings filed on behalf of Danny, he was already the beneficial owner of 60% of the interests in the HH Property before its sale. He denies the claim made in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim, that each of the siblings owned one-fifth share in the Estate. According to paragraph 3(a4)(5) of the final version of the Defence (“Defence”), he had already purchased 10% of each of his sisters’ share in the Estate, and that this was around February and March 2001 (“1st Acquisition”).

14.  Danny also claims in paragraph 3(a4)(10) of the Defence that he was subsequently informed by Ruby, in October 2007, that she had already acquired the 10% share of each of Daisy and Wendy, when they borrowed money from her, such that Ruby owned a total of 30% in the Estate. On Danny’s pleaded case, Ruby informed him that in order to give “urgent relief” to Nancy (who was allegedly in heavy debt at the material time), Ruby agreed with Danny that she would forfeit her 30% interest, and that Nancy would forfeit her 10% interest in the HH Property, which should be sold immediately to raise funds for Nancy. This was on about 4 October 2007, when Danny had received an offer of $600,000 for purchase of the HH Property. Danny considered that this offer was too low, as the HH Property was then worth $1 million on the market, but he reluctantly agreed to the sale of HH Property at $600,000 upon Ruby’s and Nancy’s insistence, and upon their confirmation of their forfeiture/surrender of all their interests in the HH Property. This was the “HH Property Oral Agreement” referred to in the Defence, as constituting an understanding reached and orally agreed amongst Danny, Ruby and Nancy.

15.  As a result of the HH Property Oral Agreement, Danny claims to be the sole owner of the HH Property and of 100% of the proceeds upon its sale, after Ruby and Nancy had waived their respective 30% and 10% interests in the property. The proceeds of sale of the HH Property were used for the purchase of the PW Property, and on Danny’s case, the Consideration less the Mortgage loan for the PW Property had all been paid by him, and Nancy’s subsequent monthly payments into the bank account for repayment to the bank represented her payment of rent, since she had been residing at the PW Property (which belonged to Danny, on his case).

16.  According to Danny, Nancy held the PW Property in name only and on trust for him. In the Defence, he relies on common intention constructive trust, and alternatively, resulting trust.

17.  In the Reply, the Plaintiffs admit that the sisters had agreed that the proceeds of sale of the HH Property would be used in the purchase of the KW Property. Daisy and Wendy confirmed in their evidence that they had agreed that the HH Property should be sold, and that the proceeds of sale should be used for the purchase of the PW Property in the joint names of Ruby, Nancy and Danny, in order to help out Nancy.

18.  As correctly summarized by Counsel for Nancy, there is no dispute on the face of the pleadings that the HH Property was sold at $600,000, when the then prevailing market price was $1 million.

19.  Danny claims that he had sold the HH Property at $600,000 at the insistence of Ruby and Nancy, and with their agreement, even though he considered the HH Property to be worth more on the market. Nancy denies the existence and effect of the HH Property Oral Agreement as alleged by Danny, claiming that she only learnt a short time before the commencement of these proceedings in November 2013 that the HH Property had been sold below the market price. She claimed in her witness statement that when Danny informed her that there was an offer to purchase the HH Property at $600,000, she had trusted and relied on Danny’s professional judgment and knowledge, and had agreed to the sale in the belief that $600,000 was the best price. Nancy denies that she and Ruby had known that the market price of the HH Property was $1 million at the time of the sale.

20.  On their part, Daisy and Wendy also claimed in their statements that they had put their trust in Danny, and had agreed to the sale of the HH Property in the belief that $600,000 was the market price.

21.  The key issue in dispute is whether Danny was the sole beneficial owner of the HH Property by the time of its sale in 2007, on the basis that (1) he had purchased 40% of his sisters’ interests in 2001; and (2) his sisters had agreed in 2007 to forfeit/surrender their remaining interests in the HH Property.

22.  In the determination of the issues in this case, I have to bear in mind that the disputed PW Property is registered in the joint names of Nancy and Danny as owners. As the Court explained in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432, it should be assumed that equity follows the law and that the beneficial interests reflect the legal interests in the property. Hence, as Baroness Hale made it clear in Stack, the onus is upon the person seeking to show that the beneficial ownership is different from the legal ownership, that the parties did intend the beneficial interests to be different from their legal interests, and in what way they are different. As Her Ladyship forewarned, it is not a task to be lightly embarked upon. In her judgment, Baroness Hale aptly observed that in family disputes where strong feelings are aroused, these often lead the parties, honestly but mistakenly, to reinterpret the past in self-exculpatory or vengeful terms.

The 1st Acquisition - Did Danny aquire the sisters’ 40% interest in the HH Property?

23.  In support of his assertion that he had purchased his sisters’ 40% interests in the HH Property in 2001, Danny relies on what he considered to be “iron-cast evidence”, in the form of four transanction receipts issued by HSBC, evidencing that Danny had on 13 March 2001 and on 28 March 2001 transferred 3 separate sums of $56,362 to Ruby’s bank account, and had on 23 February 2001 and 13 March 2001 transferred to Nancy’s bank account the respective sums of $30,000 and $11,362. Danny claims that he had also paid $15,000 in cash to Nancy on about 3 March 2001, making a total payment of $56,362 to Nancy. It is Danny’s case that the second amount of $56,362.70 which he had transferred to Ruby on 13 March 2001 was for payment to Daisy, and that the $56,362.70 transferred to Ruby’s account on 28 March 2001 was for Wendy.

24.  The transaction receipt in respect of the transfer of $56,362.70 to Ruby’s account on 28 March 2001 had Danny’s annotation in English, which reads:

“This fund is for Wendy Choi

CHOI KAM SHEUNG received this fund for and on behalf of Wendy Choi”

25.  The transaction receipt for Danny’s transfer of $30,000 to Nancy’s account on 23 February 2001 had the following annotation in English:

“$30,000 As Partial Cash estate distributed to Nancy Choi out of $56,362.70”

26.  The above notes are claimed to have been contemporaneously made by Danny, who described himself to be meticulous “to the nearest cent”. As Counsel for Nancy highlighted, Danny claimed in his witness statement that he had kept these transaction receipts in his safe deposit box for over 14 years, and that the record had been made by him for his own reference.

27.  The transfers made by Danny on 13 and 28 March 2001 were to Ruby’s account. Daisy and Wendy deny receiving same and claim to have no knowledge of Danny’s payment.

28.  Mr Chan, Counsel for Nancy, highlighted the fact that on Danny’s evidence given in cross-examination, he had sought to explain that the $15,000 which he had paid in cash to Nancy on 3 March 2001, which was part of the total payment of $56,362 which Danny had made to Nancy to purchase her share in the HH Property, came from the cash he had in hand, as he was at that material time in the process of renovating his own hi-fi shop or buying equipment for the shop, and had cash handy. This was to show that the $15,000 had been paid by him personally, to purchase Nancy’s interests in the HH Property, and that the money did not originate from the Estate.

29.  Although Danny claimed throughout his witness statements that he had since 2001 purchased, and had in 2007 completed his purchase of all his sisters’ interests in the HH Property, Danny’s testimony in cross-examination and his final submissions at trial made a surprising turn, when he claimed that throughout the entire time of his dealings with his sisters, he had only acted in the capacity of the executor of the Estate. This was to answer Counsel’s criticisms of the inconsistencies in Danny’s evidence as to the manner of his making payments to his sisters. Danny in fact maintained in Closing that the money which he had paid to his sisters, as evidenced by the transaction receipts which he had regarded as the iron-cast evidence of his purchase of the entire interests in the HH Property, actually came from the Estate, and was not his own money. He emphasized that this was only natural, since he was acting as executor when he made the payments. He claimed that he had never asserted in his evidence that the purchase had been made by him personally.

30.  As Counsel pointed out, this is clearly in contradiction to Danny’s pleadings, where the assertions made are that he had acquired and purchased the total of 80% of his sisters’ interests in and share of the Estate, including the interests in the HH Property, such that he was entitled to 100% of the proceeds of sale of the HH Property, and was in a position to decide on matters of the Estate.

31.  In Closing, Danny had emphatically refuted Counsel’s submission as to the inconsistencies in his evidence and pleadings, by purporting that he had never claimed in his witness statement (with reference to Nancy’s sale “to him” in paragraph 64 thereof) that he had ever been acting personally. He attempted to clarify that he had throughout been dealing with his sisters and acting in his capacity as executor of Mother’s Estate, and that he had never mentioned in his statement that he was at any time acting in a personal capacity when he dealt with his sisters.

32.  If that is indeed Danny’s position, then his defence to Nancy’s claims in this action is not understood.

33.  Nor is true that in his pleadings, Danny has not put forward any position that he had been acting in a personal capacity.

34.  It has to be borne in mind that it is not the function of the Court to speculate on the nature of a party’s case in the light of all the evidence put forward at trial, or to advise a party on how its case should be pleaded. The importance of pleadings has been well explained, particularly in the context of unrepresented litigants, in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Chan Kong v Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (HK) Ltd & ors CACV 161 of 2006, 11 September 2008, where Yuen JA said at paragraphs 15 to 17:

“15. Before we deal with the draft Re-Re-Amended statement of claim, we should say a word about the importance of pleadings. It is well-established that pleadings need to be clear - because pleadings are the foundations on which the rest of the action stand. The reason why parties to litigation must ensure that the real issues in dispute are defined in advance in the pleadings is so that there is an unambiguous framework for the many interlocutory steps that follow in an action, such as discovery of documents, interrogatories and witness statements, as well as for the conduct of the trial itself. A statement of claim should make it clear to the reader what the plaintiff’s cause of action is, and it should set out the material facts which provide the basis for him to pursue that cause of action. It is not adequate for a plaintiff just to set out his story extensively and then to allege a number of breaches of rights for which he claims relief. Put another way, it should not be left to the reader to guess how the dots should be connected.

16. The more complex the facts and the more complicated the claim, the more important it is for the pleader to get it right. That is because the more obtuse the pleading, the more capacity there is for genuine misunderstanding or specious opportunism. And the more blind alleys are left in a pleading, the more expensive and time-consuming the litigation will be.

17. Although an unrepresented litigant may not be expected to use legal terminology, that does not relieve him of the need to comply with the rule that pleadings have to be clear. A litigant in person cannot simply pour out his story and ask the court to sort out his legal rights because he himself is ignorant what rights may have been breached or how. A pleading cannot be like a set of instructions to the judge as if he were the unrepresented litigant’s counsel. That is not the function of the court in an adversarial system. Having said that, a court is entitled in the exercise of its discretion to be a little more lenient to an unrepresented litigant in giving him an opportunity to get things right.”

35.  Despite the fact that Danny is not legally represented by the time of trial, it is for each litigant to properly plead his case. Danny is bound by his own pleadings, which dictate the trial and the relevance and admissibility of the evidence. The pleadings dictate the case which Danny presents and which the Plaintiffs have come to meet at trial. The Court cannot decide on the basis of matters which are not pleaded and particularised in Danny’s Defence and Counterclaim.

36.  As can be seen from paragraph 3(a3)(1) of the Defence, Danny pleads that on about 3 October 2007, Ruby had suggested to him that since Danny had already (in 2001) purchased the 10% interest of each of the 4 sisters, Danny could receive 60% of the sale proceeds of the HH Property. It makes no sense if that is to be understood as Danny having purchased 30% as executor, or Danny being entitled to 60% of the sale proceeds as executor. Danny repeats, at paragraph 3(a4)(5) of the Defence, that he owned 60% of the HH Property, and was the decision maker on matters relating to the title of the HH Property, since he had already purchased the 10% interest of each of his 4 sisters in 2001. He went on to explain how the sum of $56,000 was calculated as the value of the 10% interest in the Estate.

37.  It is pertinent to note that on Danny’s case (as reflected in paragraph 3(a4)(5) of the Defence), the $56,362 paid to Nancy, Ruby, Daisy and Wendy in 2001 was arrived at by calculating the 5 siblings’ equal share of the funeral and Estate expenses which exceeded the cash and the money in the bank accounts and safe deposit box of Mother. The value of the HH Property as reflected in the Schedule of property disclosed to the Estate Duty Office on Mother’s death ($600,000) was used as the basis for calculating the value of the siblings’ 10% share in the HH Property, and for deducting the siblings’ share for the expenses from their share in the value of the HH Property.

38.  Danny referred to the HH Property Oral Agreement at paragraph 3(a4)(12) of the Defence, where he pleads that as a result thereof, Danny had agreed to sell the HH Property at $600,000 and to purchase the PW Property from Nancy at $1.9 million, with Ruby and the Plaintiffs all agreeing to forfeit/surrender their remaining interests of 30% and 10% respectively in the HH Property, and Danny being entitled to 100% of the proceeds of sale of the HH Property. Danny pleads at paragraph 3(a4)(13) that the parties’ respective share in the interests in the HH Property was as follows:

Date Daisy Ruby Wendy Nancy Danny Notes
1/5/2000 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% Date of Mother’s death
23/2/2001-28/3/2001 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 60.00% Danny purchased each sister’s 10% interest at their request
4/10/2007
as advised by Ruby
0 30.00% 0 10.00% 60.00% Ruby stated that she had purchased 10% from each of Daisy and Wendy
Oral agreement confirmed on 4/10/2007 0 Surrendered 30% market value 0 Surrendered 10% market value Sole owner of HH Property For urgent relief of Nancy, Nancy and Ruby surrendered total of 40% of the market value

39.  Consistent with the above pleading, Danny stated at paragraph 71 of his witness statement that since 28 March 2001, his ownership of the HH Property had increased from the original 20% to 60%, and that he had since then become the majority decision maker so far as property ownership was concerned.

40.  Earlier on at paragraph 64 of his statement, Danny had claimed that in February 2001, Nancy had requested to sell her interest in the HH Property to Danny, pursuant to which he had paid her $30,000 (ie on 23 February 2001). He further stated at paragraph 65 that on 3 March 2001, Nancy had asked him to make her a further payment of $15,000 in cash, and confirmed that she would sell more of her interest in the HH Property to Danny, and that he had accordingly paid her the $15,000 in cash the same day. He explained in cross-examination that this came from his own, personal money.

41.  If what Danny said in Closing is to be believed, then what he meant from all the above is that he had, as executor, bought the total 40% interests of his sisters, using money of the Estate. Danny as the remaining beneficiary was then entitled to 60% of the assets of the Estate, which should be represented by the proceeds of the HH Property, but Ruby and Nancy had further forfeited or surrendered their respective share of 30% and 10% of the proceeds since they wanted an urgent sale of the HH Property at $600,000 and did not want to wait. Danny has not explained how the Estate could in February and March 2001 pay $56,362 to “purchase” each of the sisters’ 10% share, without the need to look to anyone to finance the purchase. This was before the HH Property was sold. It is, in any event, not Danny’s pleaded case.

42.  What is actually pleaded in the Defence is that Danny had personally purchased his sisters’ beneficial 40% interest in the Estate in 2001, and that Ruby and Nancy had forfeited their respective 30% and 10% interests at the time of the sale of the HH Property and the PW Property in 2007.

43.  It is also not true, as Danny claims in Closing, that he had NOT asserted in his evidence that the payments to Nancy had been made by him personally.

44.  Leaving aside what is to be understood from the contents of his witness statement, in the course of his cross-examination on Day 2 of the trial, when Danny was asked about the $30,000 payment to Nancy on 23 February 2001, he first stated that the money was from his account, before saying that it was money from Mother’s Estate. When he was asked whether the cash of $15,000 had come from him personally, he also answered yes. Danny was then questioned how there could be cash or any payment from Mother’s Estate, when he had known and had repeatedly stated that the funeral and other expenses for the Estate had exceeded the income and the cash and bank account balances, and his answer was that although there was insufficient cash, the Estate included the HH Property, which was why he stated that the payment of $30,000 to Nancy originated from the Estate, and not from his personal funds. According to his evidence in cross-examination, the $56,362 was sourced from the HH Property/Estate. However, at the relevant time of the 1st Acquisition in 2001 as he pleaded, the HH Property had not been sold.

45.  Having considered the pleadings and the evidence as a whole, I have to agree with Counsel for Nancy, that Danny’s assertions are self-contradictory, inconsistent with the documentary evidence produced by him, and hence totally unreliable to be accepted.

46.  As Counsel pointed out, Danny’s claim of his having purchased his sisters’ interests in the HH Property is unbelievable.

47.  First, Danny’s own documentary evidence, in the form of the transaction receipts and his contemporaneous notes made thereon, do not support his allegation of a purchase of his sisters’ shares, and is more consistent with the payments made in February and March 2001 being in the nature of partial cash distributions to the sisters from the Estate (as Nancy claims in paragraph 26 of her witness statement). Danny’s own notes refer to the transfer of $30,000 to Nancy as “partial” payment of the “cash” distributed from the Estate to Nancy. Objectively and reasonably read, the notation on the transaction receipt for Nancy is understood as, and more consistent with, a partial distribution from the Estate of a contemplated sum of $56,362.70 as stated, which sum is consistent with the amounts paid to Ruby on 13 March 2001 and to Ruby on 13 and 28 March 2001 allegedly for Daisy and Wendy.

48.  On Nancy’s case, she had only received partial cash distribution of a total of $41,362.70, as she denies that there had been any cash payment of $15,000 made to her by Danny as he alleges.

49.  If the transaction receipts truly evidence Danny’s purchase of the 10% interests of each of Nancy, Daisy, Ruby and Wendy, it is not credible that he would not have so expressly stated and recorded this important fact, of the sale of the respective beneficiary’s interests in, and in turn Danny’s own entitlement to an additional 40% of, the Estate. As Counsel pointed out, this is totally inconsistent with the fact of Danny being meticulous to the nearest cent, as he himself admits.

50.  Secondly, the claim of Danny’s purchase of his sisters’ 10% interest under the 1st Acquisition in 2001 contradicts his testimony and admission in cross-examination, that he had not in fact personally paid for their share, since he claimed that the transfers to them had been made from the money in the Estate. That itself supports Nancy’s assertion, that the payments she had received in 2001 represented cash distributions from the Estate. On Danny’s own pleading, the $56,362 he calculated already took into account the sisters’ share of the funeral and Estate expenses. Having received money in partial distribution of the Estate property/assets does not mean that Nancy, or any of the sisters who had received any partial distribution, had foregone or would forego any further interests in or right to distribution of any remaining assets of the Estate.

51.  In summary, I reject Danny’s incongruous claim that he had in 2001 purchased his sisters’ 40% in the Estate and that he was consequently the owner of 60% of the HH Property comprising the Estate. This, and all the other claims which Danny has made and pursued at trial in this action are (as Lady Hale described in Stack v Dowden) his own reinterpretation of past events, to make out a case which is to his own advantage. I do not consider him to be a reliable or truthful witness at all.

Any agreement in 2007 for the forfeiture of the sisters’ 40% of the Estate?

52.  On Danny’s case, by the time of the sale of the HH Property in October 2007, Ruby owned 30% of the interests in the Estate, Nancy owned 10% and he owned the remaining 60% (by virtue of the 1st Acquisition). On his pleaded case and according to his evidence, this was because Ruby informed him in October 2007 that she already owned 30% because Daisy and Wendy had borrowed money from her, and the 10% interest which each of Daisy and Wendy owned in the Estate could be treated as their repayment to Ruby, and Danny could be “subrogated” to Ruby’s rights in the loan she had made to her sisters. Subrogation was the term Danny used in testimony when describing Ruby’s conversation with him, which is unnatural for laymen and smacks of embellishment after the event.

53.  No particulars had ever been provided by Danny as to how much Daisy and Wendy allegedly owed Ruby, when such loans had been made, and how Daisy, Wendy and Ruby had amongst themselves agreed that the loans would be discharged by setting them off against their 10% interests each in the Estate. On Danny’s evidence, he had wanted to call Daisy and Wendy to seek their confirmation, but Ruby had informed him that there was no such need, that Daisy and Wendy owed her money, and that if they should disagree, she would bear all responsibility. In cross-examination, Danny acknowledged that he never did seek confirmation from Daisy or Wendy as to whether they had sold their 10% interests each to Ruby, but he knew that his sisters all owed Ruby money. He also alleged that he was too busy, and that Ruby had claimed that there was no time to waste as Nancy needed the urgent relief proposed under the HH Property Oral Agreement. As Counsel for Nancy highlighted, Danny never contacted Wendy or Daisy to seek their confirmation, despite the fact there was an interim of 2 months between 4 October 2007 (the alleged time of the HH Property Oral Agreement) and the completion of the sale and purchase of the PW Property in December 2007.

54.  I have rejected Danny’s claim of the 1st Acquisition, finding that there was no purchase by him of his sisters’ 40% share in the Estate. I also find his evidence on Ruby’s assertion and representation of her entitlement to 30% of the Estate by virtue of Daisy’s and Wendy’s indebtedness to her, and the sisters’ waiver of their right to the market value of the HH Property, to be totally unsubstantiated and inherently improbable. There is simply no evidence to support any reasonable or purported reliance on Danny’s part in relation to Ruby’s alleged representations. Even if Ruby had at any time made any form of loans to her sisters, there was no basis for her to unilaterally authorise Danny to look to her sisters’ shares in the Estate for repayment. As Danny himself recognized and acknowledged, he was at all material times not merely one of the beneficiaries of Mother’s Estate, but the executor thereof. He had the duty to act in good faith, in the best interests of the beneficiaries and to exercise care in the administration of the Estate, and not to act for his own advantage, nor for the advantage of others to the detriment of the Estate or any of the beneficiaries. Before purporting to extinguish Wendy’s and Daisy’s interests in the Estate, including their interests in and right to the market value of the HH Property, Danny as executor had the duty to at least take reasonable steps to make inquiries with Wendy and Daisy, as to whether they had indeed agreed with Ruby to use their interests in the Estate to discharge or set-off their indebtedness to Ruby, and seek their confirmation to the sale of the HH Property below market value, and any waiver of their rights. Danny acknowledged that he had failed to contact Wendy and Daisy, but had simply accepted Ruby’s word (if indeed she had made the alleged representation), sold the HH Property at a price below what he considered to be the market price, and used the proceeds to acquire the PW Property from Nancy in their joint names.

55.  Danny’s assertions of the 1st Acquisition, and of the sisters’ alleged sale and/or surrender of their interests in the Estate in October 2007 are all denied by Nancy, Daisy, and Wendy in their pleadings and in their evidence, and by Ruby in her Defence to the Third Party Notice. In their evidence, Daisy and Wendy deny that they had sold their interests to either Ruby or Danny, at any time. It is noted that Ruby denies that she had purchased any of the interests of Daisy and Wendy, and further denies that she had sold any interest in the HH Property to Danny. She further denies that she had approved or consented to the sale of the HH Property below market value, as Danny alleged.

56.  Being put to strict proof of his assertions, Danny has simply failed to establish to my satisfaction his claim that he had in October 2007 acquired 100% of the interest in the Estate. Danny’s evidence on his discussion and understanding with Ruby was simply fabricated to build up his case of “subrogation”, on the basis of what may or may not have been existing loans between the sisters.

The beneficial interests in the PW Property

57.  The HH Property Oral Agreement is claimed by Danny to have been made amongst Nancy, Ruby and himself on 4 October 2007 for the acquisition of the PW Property from Nancy, and its transfer into the joint names of Nancy and Danny. According to Danny, the purpose was to raise a mortgage loan which Nancy can use to discharge her allegedly pressing and large debt (which is denied by Nancy, claiming that there was no urgency to settle the debts). There is no dispute that the proceeds of sale of the HH Property were agreed by all the sisters to be used for this purchase of the PW Property, and that Ruby had initially agreed to finance all the mortgage repayments. According to Daisy, the sisters agreed that the proceeds of the sale of the HH Property (in which they all had a share) would be used to buy the PW Property in the joint names of Ruby, Nancy and Danny, using a mortgage loan to finance the acquisition and to help Nancy out on her debts. As Danny’s income proof was used to obtain the Mortgage, his name was put in as one of the registered owners, but Ruby had agreed to pay for the Mortgage monthly repayments.

58.  When Ruby reneged and dropped out of the purchase, and paid only $28,000 for the monthly mortgage payments, Nancy claims that the rest of the Mortgage loan was financed by herself since Danny refused to pay, whereas Danny claims that he had personally financed the entire purchase, and that Nancy had agreed to hold her share on trust for him.

59.  On the authorities, it is for Danny to prove that that the beneficial ownership of the PW Property does not follow the legal ownership, which is in the joint names of Nancy and himself. On his case, Nancy had agreed to hold the PW Property on trust for him, since he had paid for the entire purchase price with the proceeds from the sale of the HH Property which he solely owned, as a result of the HH Property Oral Agreement. Although Nancy had, on the documentary evidence, been making monthly payments corresponding to the monthly Mortgage instalments due, Danny claims that these were only Nancy’s payment of rent to him.

60.  The PW Property was sold at $1,900,000 (“Consideration”) and transferred from Nancy’s sole name to the joint names of Danny and Nancy. The purchase was financed in part by the Mortgage loan of $1,260,000. Of the unfinanced balance of $640,000, $600,000 was from the sale of the HH Property, leaving the Remainder of $40,000, which was to be shared between Nancy and Danny. On the evidence, Nancy issued a cashier’s order to Danny for the sum of $51,780 on 11 December 2007. Nancy explained that the breakdown of this sum included the $20,000 as her half share of the $40,000, her half share of the legal costs incurred in the sale of the HH Property and the sale and purchase of the PW Property, and her half share of the mortgage and insurance expenses. It further included a repayment of a loan of $16,000 to Danny and the costs of acquiring furniture for the PW Property. According to Nancy, the breakdown of the legal and insurance expenses was in fact supplied to her by Danny himself. Nancy also produced in evidence her manuscript notes containing the relevant figures, including the name given by Danny for the purpose of purchasing the cashier order.

61.  It seems to be Danny’s case that the sum of $51,780 had indeed been received by him, but that it had been paid by Ruby. That remains a bare assertion on his part, without any substantiating evidence, from Ruby or otherwise. Ruby has made no claim to the PW Property, and has not been called as a witness. It is to be highlighted that this is not the trial of Danny’s claims made against Ruby in the Third Party Proceedings.

62.  There is clear documentary evidence to show that Nancy had made monthly payments for the Mortgage instalments, in the total sum of $1,372,000. Apart from the admitted sum of $28,000, there is no evidence to show that Ruby had made further contributions to the Mortgage repayments.

63.  On his part, Danny has produced no evidence in support of his bare assertion that the Consideration was paid for by him, apart from the claim that he was the beneficial owner of the proceeds of sale from the HH Property. He claimed that Nancy paid him $20,000 in December 2007, but he had no idea why she had made that payment and simply treated it as her repayment of a loan. He relied on evidence of his payment of the solicitors’ fees incurred in relation to the Mortgage and the purchase, but on Nancy’s evidence, she had paid her half share of these expenses, which was included in the cashier order for $51,780 issued to Danny. Danny highlighted the fact that the Mortgage had been obtained from the bank on the basis of his income proof, but this goes nowhere to showing that he had made financial contributions to the payment of the Mortgage loan.

64.  Danny does not dispute that Nancy had made monthly payments into his bank accounts, equivalent to the amount payable for the monthly Mortgage repayments, but his explanation is that these represented Nancy’s payment of rent for her occupation of the PW Property, and were not for repayment of the Mortgage loan.

65.  I find all of Danny’s assertions to be disingenuous.

66.  According to Danny, he had become the sole owner of the Estate property and was entitled to 100% of the proceeds of sale of the HH Property. His sisters therefore had no further beneficial interest in or claim to the $600,000 which was applied towards the Consideration for the purchase of the PW Property. Since he had financed the purchase of the PW Property entirely, Nancy had no right to remain or reside at the PW Property and was liable to pay him rent.

67.  Danny’s case is that after Ruby had backed out of the agreement to acquire the PW Property, he had intended to prepare an agreement for him to purchase the PW Property in his own sole name, but Nancy had beseeched him, and he had finally agreed, to retain Nancy’s name in the purchase on the basis that she was to hold the PW Property in name only, and on trust for him.

68.  I have found that Nancy, and the other sisters, had not surrendered or sold to Danny but retained their respective share in the Estate and the proceeds of sale of the HH Property. It follows that they are entitled to one-fifth share each in the interests in and ultimate proceeds of sale of the HH Property, namely $120,000 each. It also means that each of the sisters had contributed $120,000 to the purchase price of the PW Property.

69.  On my finding that Nancy had never agreed or offered to surrender her share in the Estate, there was no reason to agree and it is improbable that she would have agreed, either to hold her beneficial interest in the PW Property on trust for Danny; or to pay rent for the PW Property, which was (at the material time in October 2007) to be acquired with the sale proceeds from the Estate.

70.  Counsel for Nancy also pointed out the inherent inconsistency and improbability of Danny’s assertion that Nancy had agreed to hold the PW Property on trust. Counsel referred to the Defence, where Danny pleads at paragraph 3(a7)(6) that after Ruby had reneged on the joint purchase agreement, Nancy had (to the point of threatening suicide) beseeched him to give her “property right” (“權益”) in the PW Property to be acquired, rather than for Danny to purchase the PW Property in his sole name. If, as Danny alleged, Nancy had thus been pleading for property right or title in the PW Property, it was illogical and inherently improbable that she would have accepted and agreed to hold her interest on trust for Danny, as opposed to being given actual title and beneficial interest. There is persuasive force in Counsel’s argument.

71.  On the entirety of the factual evidence and on Danny’s own pleading, my conclusion is that there is simply no common intention constructive trust, or resulting trust, as Danny claims. It is not credible that Nancy would have had any intention in 2007 to hold the PW Property on trust for Danny.

The claim for rent

72.  For the purpose of his claim for rent, Danny seeks to rely on the evidence of his wife, Elsa. Elsa claimed in her testimony at trial that she had overheard Danny talking to Ruby/Nancy on the telephone, with the speaker on, and had heard Danny chasing Nancy for payment of rent, with figures of $15,000 and $8,000 mentioned. She claimed that this had happened during the time from May to September 2010. She explained that she could remember these dates because she started her relationship with Danny in May 2010, and then the “rent chasing incident” occurred, around Nancy’s birthday in September 2010.

73.  As Counsel for Nancy pointed out, this was the first time Elsa had mentioned rent in her evidence. In her witness statement dated 9 September 2015, Elsa had referred to various minute and irrelevant details, such as her own divorce in 2009, how she had met Danny in 2010, and her encounters with Ruby and Nancy in July and August 2010. However, she had made no mention whatsoever of the alleged telephone conversations on rent which she had overheard, despite the fact that the claim for rent had been made by Danny since the filing of the original Defence in December 2014, and was one of the key issues in dispute.

74.  Elsa’s testimony also contradicts the evidence contained in her own witness statement. At paragraph 7, Elsa had stated that in mid‑June 2010, she had not seen Danny talking to his 4 sisters on the telephone at all. At paragraph 21, Elsa further stated that Danny had not been in contact with Nancy and Ruby since September 2010.

75.  I agree that overall, Elsa’s evidence is more in the nature of tailored embellishment than actual facts, which I consider to be unreliable. Even Danny himself did not mention these alleged telephone calls of rent-chasing. In any event, any claim or demands made by Danny for rent is not equivalent to or evidence of Nancy having agreed to pay rent.

76.  Apart from Elsa’s testimony, there is no other evidence which can support Danny’s claim for rent. As co-owner, Nancy was entitled to share occupation of the PW Property with Danny, and there is no mention in either the pleadings or the witness statements of any agreement specifically reached between Danny and Nancy, that the latter would have to pay rent for residing at the PW Property, at $7,500 as Danny claims, or at any other amount.

77.  As Counsel rightly pointed out, the pleading at paragraph 3(a7)(5) of the Defence only stated Ruby’s request made to Danny, to let Nancy occupy half of the PW Property after their joint purchase, and that Danny had finally agreed. At paragraph 4(a)(8), Danny referred to the fact that Ruby had stopped paying for the Mortgage, whereupon he notified Nancy that she had to revert to her original agreement to pay $7,500 rent for occupying half of the PW Property. There was no plea of Nancy having initially agreed to pay rent of $7,500. In any event, Danny’s own pleading went on to state that Nancy had claimed that she was a joint owner and should not have to pay rent.

78.  Danny’s plea at paragraph 4(c) of the Defence is that he had notified Nancy to pay monthly rental of $15,000, but again, there is no plea of any agreement ever having been reached between Danny and Nancy. Eventually, Danny had moved out of the PW Property on his own accord, as he no longer wished to reside there with Nancy. It is not a case of Nancy evicting Danny and claiming possession to Danny’s exclusion.

79.  Accordingly, there is no case disclosed on the pleadings as to the existence of any agreement made between Danny and Nancy, whereby the latter had agreed that she would pay rent to Danny for her occupation of half of the PW Property, so as to entitle Danny to claim for the rent allegedly due.

80.  In any event, any counterclaim for rent before 3 June 2009 is time barred under section 4(1) of the Limitation Ordinance.

81.  Danny’s claim for rent/mesne profit is dismissed. I also reject all the other convoluted claims of conspiracy made against Nancy and Ruby, which have not been established. I fail to see what damage Danny has sustained as a result of any alleged conspiracy between Nancy and Ruby in relation to the issue of the cashier order, when he admits to having received the sum of $51,780. Nancy’s purpose for adducing evidence of the cashier order was to show that she had made payment to Danny of her share of the Remainder, of $20,000.

Apportionment of beneficial interest in PW Property

82.  I accept that the payment of the Consideration for the PW Property comprised and included in part the siblings’ contribution of their share in the proceeds of sale of the HH Property, of $120,000 each (“Contribution”). Hence, each sibling’s contribution to the Consideration is as follows:

(1)  Daisy’s Contribution = $120,000;

(2)  Ruby’s Contribution + $28,000 repayment of the Mortgage loan = $148,000;

(3)  Wendy’s Contribution = $120,000;

(4)  Nancy’s Contribution + repayment of the Mortgage loan and interest ($1,232,000) + $20,000 of the Remainder = $1,372,000;

(5)  Danny’s Contribution + $20,000 of the Remainder = $140,000.

83.  I accept the submissions made for Nancy, that the beneficial interest of each sibling should be in proportion to their respective contribution to the Consideration. On Counsel’s submissions, which I accept, Nancy’s beneficial interest on the basis of her total contribution is 72.2105% (1,372,000/1,900,000), and the beneficial interest of Danny, Wendy, Daisy and Ruby in the PW Property should be respectively: 7.3684%, 6.3158%, 6.3158% and 7.7895%.

Breach of trust

84.  Danny admits that the market price of the HH Property at the time of its sale was $1 million.

85.  I have already rejected his claim of the HH Property Oral Agreement, that the sisters would waive and forfeit their share in the HH Property comprising the Estate in return for a quick sale of the HH Property, and that they had agreed to waive the difference between the market price and the sale price of the HH Property. Even if, for the sake of argument, it was true that Ruby and Nancy had agreed to the quick sale and to waive any claim, it was incumbent on Danny as executor to make reasonable inquiries and to seek confirmation from Daisy and Wendy, as to whether it was true that they had sold their 10% share in the Estate to Ruby, and/or that Ruby was entitled to forfeit/surrender their share on their behalf. On Danny’s case, he had not done this and had simply accepted Ruby’s alleged assurance and representation.

86.  Daisy and Wendy have denied that they had disposed of or surrendered their respective interests in the Estate. Daisy, Wendy and Nancy deny knowledge of the market price of the HH Property being $1 million. Nancy claims that she had placed trust in Danny’s knowledge and experience in the market. Daisy and Wendy claim that they had throughout left matters relating to the Estate to Danny, particularly since they were not in Hong Kong. There is no satisfactory evidence adduced, that Danny had informed Daisy, Wendy or Nancy that the HH Property was worth more than $1 million on the market, and that $600,000 was below market value.

87.  None of the provisions of section 54(4), section 55, and section 57 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance cited by Danny is relevant to the issues raised in this action. The validity of the grant of probate and the powers of an executor are not in dispute. The question in issue is whether Danny, as executor, was in breach of his duties of care.

88.  In my judgment, there is no defence to the sisters’ claim, that Danny was in breach of his duty as executor to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries and to exercise skill and care in the discharge of his duties. If he had voluntarily assumed the risk of accepting Ruby’s assurance and representation of her ownership of 30% of the interests in the Estate, without taking any steps to verify her claim, he would have to bear the consequences if Ruby’s representation turned out to be false.

89.  I therefor allow Nancy’s claim that Danny should indemnify her for the loss she sustained as a result of Danny’s breach of duty. Such damages are assessed at 20% (her one-fifth share) of the difference between the market price of $1 million and the sale price of $600,000 for the HH Property, in the sum of $80,000.

Disposition

90.  The orders made on the claims between Nancy and Danny are:

(1)  Danny shall pay Nancy $80,000, as compensation for his breach of executor’s duty arising from the sale of the HH Property;

(2)  There be a declaration that Nancy and Danny hold the PW Property on trust for the benefit of its beneficial owners, in proportion to the owners’ respective contribution to the Consideration of $1,900,000, as follows: Nancy: 72.2105%; Danny: 7.3684%; Wendy: 6.3158%; Daisy: 6.3158%; Ruby: 7.7895%;

(3)  Danny shall execute an assignment at his own costs so that the legal title of PW Property would match that of (2) above;

(4)  There be liberty to apply for any further and necessary directions;

(5)  Danny’s counterclaim be dismissed;

(6)  Danny shall pay Nancy’s costs of this action, to be taxed if not agreed; and

(7)  Nancy’s own costs be taxed according to Legal Aid Regulations.

  (Mimmie Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Chan Shek-wah, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum (assigned by the Director of Legal Aid), for the 1st plaintiff

The defendant appeared in person

108701-CH-2017-03-20

蔡雲裳及另二人 對 蔡思明

HTML content

HCA 2336/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2013年第2336號

____________

第一原告人蔡雲裳(CHOI WAN SHEUNG NANCY) 
第二原告人蔡巧裳(PIYATHAISERE CHOI HOW SHEUNG DAISY) 
第三原告人蔡煥裳(LUDTKE WOON SHEUNG WENDY) 
 及 
被告人蔡思明(CHOI SI MING DANNY) 
 及 
第三方蔡錦裳(CHOY KAM SHEUNG) 

____________

主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官吳美玲內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2017年3月16日
頒下判案書日期: 2017年3月20日

判案書


1.  本席於2017年1月12日頒下判決書(下稱「該判決書」), 駁回被告人就高等法院司法常務官龍劍雲在2015年10月30日頒布的命令(下稱「30/10/15命令」) 而提出的上訴(下稱「30/10/15命令上訴」), 亦駁回被告人就高等法院聆案官周敏慧在2016年4月29日頒布的命令(下稱「29/4/16命令」) 而提出的上訴(下稱「29/4/16命令上訴」) ,並頒下暫准訟費命令, 判定被告人須支付給第1、第2及第3原告人(下稱「眾原告人」)30/10/15命令上訴及29/4/16命令上訴所涉及的訟費, 如果雙方未能同意訟費的款額, 則由訟費評定官即時評定(下稱「12/1/17命令」)。該暫准訟費命令現已成為絕對命令。

2.  本席的判決理由詳見於該判決書, 在此不贅。但為方便起見, 本席在本判案書採納該判決書所沿用的簡稱。

3.  被告人不服12/1/17命令, 並於2017年2月9日以掛郵方式將有關12/1/17命令的上訴通知書(下稱「該上訴通知書」)寄給眾原告人。

4.  於2017年1月25日, 被告人存檔傳票申請, 要求暫緩執行12/1/17命令第2段。於2017年2月13日, 本席就該傳票申請頒下命令及指示如下:

(1)   按下述第2及第3點寬免12/1/17命令第2段的懲罰條款, 即「被告人不得在本訟案存檔及送達第三次經修訂的抗辯書及反申索書」;

(2)   若被告人在2017年2月16日或之前存檔已送達眾原告人的該上訴通知書並取得上訴法庭給予的上訴案件編號, (i) 許可暫緩執行12/1/17命令第2段直至上訴法庭就該上訴案件作出判決後14天內(下稱「該限期」), 即除非被告人在該限期內將第三次經修訂的抗辯書及反申索書送交法庭存檔並送達眾原告人,否則被告人不得在本訟案存檔及送達第三次經修訂的抗辯書及反申索書, 及(ii) 該傳票的訟費歸於上訴案件中;及

(3)   若被告人未有在2017年2月16日或之前存檔已送達眾原告人的該上訴通知書而未取得上訴法庭給予的上訴案件編號, (i) 上述第(1)段的寬免即時終止, (ii) 12/1/17命令第2段仍然生效, 而(iii) 原告人須就該傳票支付訟費予第1原告人, 訟費數額評定為港幣200元, 但被告人與第2及第3原告人之間無訟費命令。

5.  於2017年2月15日, 被告人向上訴法庭存檔該上訴通知書, 並取得上訴法庭給予的上訴案件編號CACV36/2017。

6.  於2017年2月17日, 上訴法庭副庭長林文瀚頒下指示, 除非被告人在2017年2月24日或之前申請上訴許可, 否則CACV36/2017上訴案件在沒有進一步命令的情況下會被駁回, 理由是此乃非正審上訴, 被告人並沒有根據第4章《高等法院條例》第14AA條取得上訴許可, 但如果被告人申請許可, 上訴法庭須予擱置以待法庭就許可申請作出裁決。

7.  於2017年2月22日, 被告人去信上訴法庭指稱在2017年2月21日才收到上訴法庭的指示, 因此未有足夠時間完成有關文件在指定期限或之前申請上訴許可。被告人在信函中亦指出, 其上訴涉及「剔除申請」及「新增申請」, 應符合該規則第59號命令第21(2)(b)及(2)(i) 條的規定, 因此要求上訴法庭作出進一步指示其上訴性質所屬的上訴類別是否仍須申請上訴許可。

8.  於2017年2月28日, 林副庭長頒下指示, 該判决書撤銷被告人的剔除申請, 但訴訟仍然繼續, 所以不是該規則第59號命令第21(1) 或(2) 條的情況, 但鑑於被告人提出的情況, 上訴法庭延展2017年2月17日命令下容讓被告人提出上訴許可申請的時限至2017年3月10日, 若被告人不在該日期前提出申請, CACV36/2017上訴案件的上訴將自動被撤銷。

9.  於2017年3月9日, 被告人存檔傳票申請, 許可被告人就12/1/17命令提出上訴而批予上訴許可(下稱「9/3/17傳票」)。被告人亦於同日存檔其誓詞用以支持9/3/17傳票申請。9/3/17傳票於2017年3月16日在本席席前聆訊,被告人及第1原告人出席聆訊,而第2及第3原告人則缺席聆訊。

10.  被告人指稱, 該上訴通知書已提出多個具體法律程序丶理據及/或事實等等的爭論點以反對該判決書的判決, 而他相信其上訴有合理機會得直, 所以本席應批予上訴許可。第1原告人反對被告人的申請,認為司法常務官/聆案官和本席已撤銷或駁回被告人的「剔除申請」及「新增申請」,並肯定眾原告人的立場主張,被告人擬提出的上訴也是徒然之舉,不但浪費時間,亦阻礙本訟案盡快進行正式審訊。被告人反駁指出,本訟案相關法律程序的事歷清楚顯示是眾原告人而非被告人多番提出各項申請及多次修改其狀辭而令本訟案的進度有所延誤。被告人亦指稱,他不服12/1/17命令,他擬提出上訴的立場堅定,如果本席不給予上訴許可,他會再向上訴法庭申請上訴許可,這只會拖延時間,所以如果眾原告人真正希望加快本訟案的進度,眾原告人不應反對其申請。

11.  明顯地,第1原告人認為被告人擬提出的上訴毫無理據,其申請令本訟案停滯不前,但被告人認為其擬提出的上訴具勝訴機會,第1原告人的反對才是阻延行為。但是法庭應否批准上訴許可的考慮點,並非與訟各方如何主觀認為上訴會否影響訟案的進度,法庭亦不會因為其中與訟方指明法庭不批予上訴許可就定然再向上訴法庭提出申請而左右其裁決。

12.  第4章《高等法院條例》第14AA(4)條訂明,除非(1)有關上訴有合理機會得直;或(2)有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,否則不得批予上訴許可。條例所說合理得直機會,是指具有合理的勝算,雖然毋需是相當可能的勝算,但必須是超過不切實際的成功機會,僅僅證明上訴論點是可爭拗或並非不切實際,是不足夠的。[1]本席按照上述條款及法理的規定考慮被告人的上訴許可申請。

13.  該判決書涉及兩方面的裁決, 即駁回30/10/15命令上訴的判決及駁回29/4/16命令上訴的判決。就後者而言, 被告人在該上訴通知書提出多項理由, 但其實該等理據主要是重提他在本席席前提出的論據。雖此,本席的裁決涉及拒絕被告人提出新的申索或抗辯,而當中涉及法院司法管轄權、香港法院認可遺產管理人的權責、訴因是否因第347章《時效條例》已失效等法理問題。雖然被告人的上訴理由有些舊瓶新酒之嫌, 但本席認為其理據不可說是沒有合理得直的機會, 因此就駁回29/4/16命令上訴的裁決而言, 本席認為應許可被告人就該裁決提出上訴。

14.  至於本席駁回30/10/15命令的裁決, 被告人的30/10/15命令上訴明顯逾時提出。本席在該判決書已詳細分析及駁回被告人針對2015 年12月7日存檔的經第2次修改的申索陳述書只附有眾原告人代表律師的屬實申述而沒有眾原告人的屬實申述的投訴, 本席認為被告人在該上訴通知書就這方面的論據不足以構成可爭辯的上訴理由。至於被告人提出的「剔除申請」, 法庭只會在明顯和清晰的情況下才會剔除原訴令狀及/或狀書。本席細閱被告人的上訴理據, 但他只是重覆在本席席前的論據。本席已在該判決書詳述解釋,其論據涉及雙方事實方面的爭辯、證人的可信性及證人對文件證明的演繹, 這等爭辯完全適宜正式審訊處理。在考慮上述事宜及本訟案自從龍司法常務官頒下30/10/15命令後的進一步發展, 亦考慮30/10/15命令上訴是逾期提出, 而且申請人就「剔除申請」須達至的嚴謹標準, 本席認為無論在法理、事實及/或案件管理方面也不宜剔除眾原告人的申索。本席已在該判決書詳述判決理由, 再細閱被告人的上訴理由後, 本席仍然認為其理據沒有合理成功機會, 因此就30/10/15命令上訴的裁決, 本席不批准上訴許可。

15.  本席現頒下命令, 許可被告人就12/1/17命令第1及第3段只就29/4/16命令上訴的裁決向上訴法庭提出上訴。本席亦頒下命令, 撤銷被告人就12/1/17命令第1及第3段就30/10/15命令上訴的裁決所提出的上訴許可申請。

16.  本席頒下暫准訟費命令, 9/3/17傳票的一半訟費歸於上訴訟案中, 而9/3/17傳票的一半訟費須由被告人支付給第1原告人, 訟費數額評定為港幣200元, 但被告人與第2及第3原告人之間無訟費命令。

 ( 吳美玲 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

  

第一原告人:無律師代表, 親自出庭應訊。

第二及第三原告人:無律師代表, 缺席聆訊。

被告人:無律師代表, 親自出庭應訊。


[1]  見SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125第129頁及Ho Yuen Yi Winnie & anor v Ho Hung Sun Stanley & anor HCMP 1009/2009 (無彙報的案例,日期為2009 年8 月24日) 第16段

107618-CH-2017-01-12

蔡雲裳及另二人 對 蔡思明

HTML content

HCA 2336/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2013年第2336號

____________

第一原告人蔡雲裳
(CHOI WAN SHEUNG NANCY)
 
第二原告人蔡巧裳
(PIYATHAISERE CHOI HOW SHEUNG DAISY)
 
第三原告人蔡煥裳
(LUDTKE WOON SHEUNG WENDY)
 
及
被告人蔡思明
(CHOI SI MING DANNY)
 
及
第三方蔡錦裳
(CHOY KAM SHEUNG)
 

____________

主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官吳美玲內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2016年7月13日
頒下判決書日期: 2017年1月12日

判決書

序言

1.   於2013年11月29日,第1原告人(Choi Wan Sheung Nancy)以傳訊令狀起訴被告人(Choi Si Ming Danny)。於2014年11月11 日,第1原告人存檔申索陳述書。於2014年12月9日,被告人存檔其抗辯書及反申索書。於2014年12月17日,被告人存檔其經修改的抗辯書及反申索書。於2015年2月9日,第1原告人存檔及送達答覆書及反申索的抗辯書。

2.   於2015年5月15日,高等法院司法常務官龍劍雲頒下命令,(1)許可第2原告人(Piyathaisere Choi How Sheung Daisy)和第3原告人(Ludtke Woon Sheung Wendy)加入本訟案,(2)許可第1、第2及第3原告人(下稱「眾原告人」)修改其傳訊令狀及申索陳述書,(3) 許可眾原告人存檔及送達經修改的傳訊令狀及經修改的申索陳述書,(4)許可被告人存檔及送達經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,(5) 許可眾原告人存檔及送達經修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書。

3.   於2015年5月20日,眾原告人存檔及送達經修改的傳訊令狀及經修改的申索陳述書。於2015年6月3日,被告人存檔及送達經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書。

4.   於2015年6月15日,被告人存檔傳票申請(下稱「15/6/15傳票」),要求(1)剔除眾原告人於2015年5月20日存檔的經修改的申索陳述書及申索書,(2)就被告人於2015年6月3日存檔的經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書的反申索登錄判決,(3)將HCA896/2015與本訟案合併,(4)命令眾原告人支付本訟案(包括15/6/15傳票申請)之訟費,若各方未能就訟費數額達成協議,則數額留待法庭評定,及(5)法庭可能認為適合的進一步或其他必須或相應命令或指示。被告人於同日存檔支持15/6/15傳票的誓詞(下稱「被告15/6/15誓詞」)。於2015 年7 月15 日,眾原告人存檔第1原告人及第2原告人的誓詞(下稱「第1原告及第2原告15/7/15誓詞」)用以反對15/6/15傳票。

5.   於2015年7月27日,眾原告人存檔及送達經修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書。於2015年7月27日,眾原告人存檔及送達第 1及第2原告人就經修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書的屬實申述。於2015 年8月1日,眾原告人存檔及送達第3原告人就經修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書的屬實申述。

6.   於2015年10月30日,15/6/15傳票在龍司法常務官席前聆訊。於同日,龍司法常務官頒下命令(下稱「30/10/15命令」),(1)撤銷被告人剔除眾原告人於2015年5月20日存檔的經修改的申索陳述書及申索書的申請(下稱「撤銷剔除命令」),(2)撤銷被告人要求就2015 年6月3日存檔經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書的反申索登錄判決的申請(下稱「撤銷登錄判決命令」),及(3)被告人須於30/10/15命令日期起計14天內,支付眾原告人有關15/6/15傳票的訟費 (包括已保留的訟費及2015年10月30日聆訊的訟費) 共港幣40,000 元(下稱「30/10/15訟費命令」)。於同日,龍司法常務官頒下關於30/10/15命令的判決書(下稱「30/10/15判決書」)。

7.   於2015年12月9日,龍司法常務官頒下命令 (下稱「9/12/15命令」),(1) 許可眾原告人存檔及送達經第2次修改的申索陳述書,(2) 許可被告人存檔及送達經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,及(3) 許可眾原告人存檔及送達經第2次修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書。

8.   於2015年12月17日,眾原告人存檔及送達經第2次修改的申索陳述書。眾原告人存檔的經第2次修改的申索陳述書只更改第 13段所提及第1原告人代表律師致被告人的信函日期,由2013 年12 月5 日改為12月4日,而經第2次修改的申索陳述書附有眾原告人代表律師的屬實申述。依據9/12/15命令,被告人只可因應眾原告人在其經第2次修改的申索陳述書的上述修改在經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書作出相應的修改,而不得在未經法庭許可下作進一步的獨立修改。被告人指稱,9/12/15命令沒有註明被告人的修訂衹限於相關和相應的修改,但本席認為這是法理原則,根本毋須在命令中註明。其實,被告人應理解狀書的修改必須得到法庭的許可,如果被告人作出獨立而非相應的修訂,他焉能在未經法庭許可下利用眾原告人修改狀書之便而加入獨立的修訂。但是,被告人於2015 年12 月31 日存檔的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,在未經法庭許可下作出多處進一步的獨立修改。

9.   於2016年1月12日,眾原告人存檔傳票申請,要求下述的濟助:

(1) 拒准被告人於2015年12月31日存檔的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書中一切未經許可的修訂內容;

(2) 被告人於發出命令後起計7天內存檔及送達已刪除法庭拒准的修訂內容的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書;

(3) 眾原告人於隨後的28天內存檔及送達經第2次修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書;及

(4) 被告人須立即支付眾原告人此傳票申請的訟費及一切與此傳票申請有關的附帶訟費。

10.   於2016年1月29日,高等法院聆案官許家灝頒下命令,(1)被告人於2015年12月31日存檔的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書於法庭檔案之中剔除,(2)除非被告人於該命令日期起計14天內向法庭提出申請准許修改於2015年6月3日存檔的經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,否則被告人將被視作沒有作出此申請,及(3)被告人須向眾原告人支付該傳票申請的訟費,即時評定為800元。

11.   於2016年2月12日,被告人存檔傳票申請(下稱「12/2/16傳票」),要求下述的濟助:

(1) 許可被告人按照隨附的草擬本中紫色所示的形式修改於2015年6月3日存檔的經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書;

(2) 許可被告人於命令發出日期起計14天內存檔及送達經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書;

(3) 許可眾原告人修改其經修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書,而眾原告人須在隨後14天內存檔及送達經第2次修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書;及

(4) 12/2/16傳票不作訟費命令。

於同日,被告人存檔其誓詞用以支持12/2/16傳票(下稍「被告12/2/16誓詞」)。

12.   於2016年3月29日,眾原告人存檔譚偉才(眾原告人的代表律師)的第2份誓詞(下稱「譚偉才誓詞」)。於2016年4月18日,被告人存檔其誓詞用以支持12/2/16傳票(下稱「被告18/4/16誓詞」)。

13.   於2016年4月29日,12/2/16傳票在高等法院聆案官周敏慧席前聆訊。於同日,周聆案官頒下命令(下稱「29/4/16命令」): (1)許可被告人就12/2/16傳票申請第3次修改抗辯書及反申索書的草擬本的第3(b)(8)段、第4段、第4(f)(2)段、第13段及第16(a)段的紫色部份作出修訂,而被告人須於29/4/16命令頒下的日期起計21天內存檔及送達經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,(2)許可眾原告人於隨後21天內存檔及送達經第2次修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書,及(3)被告人須即時支付眾原告人有關12/2/16傳票的訟費,經簡易評定後為港幣39,425元(下稱「29/4/16訟費命令」)。雖然周聆案官沒有頒下書面判決書,2016年4月29日的當天聆訊法庭數碼錄音滕本可供參閱。

14.   被告人不服30/10/15及29/4/16命令,因此提出上訴。

15.   於2016年5月18日,被告人存檔向內庭聆訊的法官提交的上訴通知書,就30/10/15命令提出逾期上訴(下稱「30/10/15命令上訴」),並要求法庭頒下如下的濟助:

(1) 駁回有關眾原告人於2015年5月20日存檔的經修改申索陳述書內「申索第A及C項」的撤銷剔除命令;

(2) 駁回有關被告人於2015年6月3日存檔經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書內的「反申索第16(a)、(b)及(c)段」的撤銷登錄判決命令;

(3) 許可眾原告人於命令發出日期起計14天內存檔及送達經第2次或第3次修改 (視乎情況而定) 的申索陳述書及申索書(必需連同眾原告人的屬實申述);

(4) 許可被告人修改其經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,而被告人須在送達經第3次修改的申索陳述書及申索書後14天內,存檔及送達其經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書;

(5) 許可眾原告人修改其經修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書,而眾原告人須在隨後14天內存檔及送達經第2次修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書;

(6) 駁回30/10/15訟費命令;

(7) 15/6/15傳票的訟費由眾原告人付給被告人;

(8) 30/10/15命令上訴的訟費由眾原告人付給被告人;及

(9) 許可延展30/10/15命令上訴的時限,直至上訴聆訊之後。

16.   於2016年5月18日,被告人存檔向內庭聆訊的法官提交的上訴通知書,就29/4/16命令提出逾期上訴(下稱「29/4/16命令上訴」),並要求法庭頒下如下的濟助:

(1) 許可被告人就其第3次修改抗辯書及反申索書草擬本的4項新增修改(下稱「新增紫色部份」)修改其於2015年6月3日存檔的經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,即涉及(a)有關眾原告人、被告人及第三方(下稱「眾姊弟」)的先父蔡勝 (下稱「蔡父」)的「深圳物業」事宜,(b)於2009年蔡父骨灰入侵眾姊弟的先母曾小鶯(下稱「蔡母」)的墓碑及墓地事宜,(c) 第3原告人作為蔡父的遺產管理人管理他的18多萬元銀行存款遺產事宜,及(d)追討超支款項港幣21,440元的新增修改;

(2) 駁回29/4/16訟費命令;

(3) 12/2/16傳票申請下按照新增紫色部份的形式修訂經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書的訟費由眾原告人付給被告人;

(4) 29/4/16命令上訴的訟費由眾原告人付給被告人;

(5) 許可延展29/4/16命令上訴的時限,直至上訴聆訊之後。

17.   於同日,被告人存檔其誓詞用以支持30/10/15命令上訴及29/4/16命令上訴(下稱「上訴誓詞」)。

法理原則–源自聆案官的決定的上訴

18.   一般而言,向在內庭的法官提出源自聆案官的決定的上訴,實際上是對有關申請(即上訴處理的命令所源自的申請)重新進行聆訊,而法官會視有關事宜為首次出現在他席前。對聆案官早前的決定,法官會給予應有的比重,但不受其約束。[1]

19.   正如上述,原告人於2016年5月18日為30/10/15命令上訴及29/4/16命令上訴存檔其上訴誓詞,但根據第4章《高等法院規則》(下稱「該規則」)第 58號命令第 1(5)條,除非有特別理由,法庭聆訊此類上訴,不得收取進一步證據。所謂特別理由,早有定案,乃指以下條件: (1)即使採取合理步驟,也未能在原先聆訊時提供該些證據;(2)新證據雖然未必具決定性,但必須對案件結果,起著重要的影響和(3)新證據必須可信。[2] 但被告人在庭上表示,上訴誓詞用以支持其延展上訴時限的申請,但如果法庭同意延展時限,他不會就30/10/15命令上訴及/或29/4/16命令上訴採用上訴誓詞。

法理原則–逾期上訴

20.   依據該規則第58號命令第 1(3)條,除非法院另有命令,否則向在內庭的法官提出來自聆案官的上訴通知書必須在「遭上訴的判決、命令或裁定」作出後14天內發出,並必須在發出後5天內送達。據此,針對30/10/15命令的上訴期限已在2015年11月14日屆滿,但原告人在2016年5月18日才提出30/10/15命令上訴其實已逾期過於半年,原告人必須得到法庭許可才可逾期提出該上訴,而針對29/4/16命令的上訴期限亦在2016年5月13日屆滿,但原告人在2016 年5 月18 日才提出29/4/16命令上訴,原告人亦須得到法庭許可才可逾期提出該上訴。

21.   有關延誤/逾期上訴的法律基礎可見於PostwellLtd v Cheng Kap Sang,[3] 高等法院暫委法官黃仁龍確立,當法庭決定是否行使酌情權許可逾期提出上訴時,法庭會考慮以下事項:(1) 逾期時間的長短,(2)逾期上訴的理由,先考慮申請人未能依時申訴上訴的原因再考慮申請人未能及早作出延期申請的理由,(3) 如逾期上訴獲得許可,該上訴成功的機會,及 (4)如該申請獲得許可,會否使其他方蒙受不利。

逾期上訴

22.   被告人在上訴誓詞中指出,他諮詢遺產承辦處後在2015 年10 月30 日的聆訊向龍司法常務官指出,本港法庭無權審理「申索第C項」(即眾原告人指稱被告人賣了蔡父的「深圳物業」),所以應剔除「申索第C項」,但龍司法常務官不同意該說法,並頒下30/10/15命令。被告人「當庭指出[他] 不服[30/10/15命令]」。其後在2015 年11 月上旬,被告人再三考慮後,相信了龍司法常務官的說法,因此未有提出上訴,並於2016年2月12日存檔12/2/16傳票,申請在經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書加入新增紫色部份,包括新增第16(g)(1) 段「先父遺產「深圳物業」」對「申索第C項」提出爭論,以便法庭作出公平判決,而譚偉才誓詞亦已就12/2/16傳票有關被告人擬提出的新增反申索第16(g)(1) 段作出回應。被告人亦表示,他到了2016 年5 月16 日才能領取2016年4月29日聆訊的法庭數碼錄音謄本,而直至2015年5月18日仍未收到29/4/16命令的蓋印命令,所以被告人才於2016年5月18日急趕下存檔上訴通知書。

23.   就30/10/15命令上訴而言,被告人拖延了超逾半年才提出該上訴,本席認為這半年是冗長的時間,尤其是原告人已有向內庭的法官提出有關聆案官判決、命令或裁定的上訴經驗。[4]更重要的是,原告人未有提供任何或任何令人信服的原因解釋他為何未能依時申訴30/10/15命令上訴及/或未能及早作出延期申請。龍司法常務官於2015 年10 月30 日聆訊當天已頒下30/10/15判決書述明其判決理由,被告人亦即時表示不服龍司法常務官的判決,因此被告人作為收到不利判決的與訟人必須在上訴時限內作出相關的考慮及諮詢,分析對他不利的判決及相關判決理由是否犯了錯誤而構成上訴理據。被告人沒有提供令人信服的解釋他為何在2015年11月上旬指稱相信了龍司法常務官的說法,他亦沒有表示曾再向遺產承辦處及/或其他人士再作查詢。被告人顯然接受了30/10/15命令,但只是半年多後改變主意,本席認為被告人沒有合理地解釋其延誤。

24.   再者,龍司法常務官頒下30/10/15命令後,眾原告人在本訟案的申索得以保存待決,而原告人隨後亦依據9/12/15命令於2015年12月17日存檔及送達經第2次修改的申索陳述書。被告人於2015年12月31日在未經法庭許可下存檔經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,而當許聆案官於2016年1月29日將該狀書於法庭檔案之中剔除,被告人隨後在2016年2月12日存檔12/2/16傳票要求第3次修改其經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書。這些行動顯示眾原告人及被告人均已接受了30/10/15命令,眾原告人在本訟案的申索得以保存待決,而原被告雙方亦已基於30/10/15命令的裁決就其申索、抗辯及反申索採取進一步法律行動。本席看不到有任何有效的理由驅使法庭在沒有合理延誤理由下行使酌情權,許可被告人就30/10/15命令提出逾期上訴。本席亦考慮到,如果法庭准許被告人逾期提出30/10/15命令上訴,這代表准許被告人提出申請,將原被告雙方在逾期期間已採取的法律行動和所涉的時間及訟費作廢,但被告人並沒有就9/12/15命令提出上訴,亦沒有提出申請剔除經第2次修改的申索陳述書。

25.   至於29/4/16命令上訴,雖然被告人只是逾期數天而不可說是冗長的延誤,但本席亦認為被告人未能提供有力的延誤理據。被告人唯一的理由是他仍未收到2016年4月29日聆訊的法庭數碼錄音謄本及蓋印命令,但被告人親自出席該聆訊,因此被告人親身聆聽周聆案官的口頭命令及口頭判決理由,沒有理由不盡快提出上訴,本席認為被告人沒有合理地解釋其延誤。

26.   正如代表眾原告人的陳大律師所述,就算法庭接納被告人對29/4/16命令及與29/4/16命令相關部份的30/10/15命令(即撤銷剔除眾原告人的經修改的申索陳述書項下「申索第C項」決定) 的上訴逾期合理(但本席不同意),但就30/10/15命令的其他部份(即撤銷剔除眾原告人的經修改的申索陳述書的其他部份的決定) 的上訴而言,龍司法常務官既於聆訊當天頒下30/10/15判決書述明其判決理由,有關30/10/15命令的其他部份的上訴顯然嚴重逾期,而被告人沒有就此作出任何或任何合理解釋。

27.   但更重要的是,依據下述分析,龍司法常務官及周聆案官在頒下31/10/15及29/4/16命令時並沒有犯上錯誤,本席細心考慮各樣因素下不認同被告人的上訴理據,因此本席不批准被告人就31/10/15及29/4/16命令逾期提出上訴申請。

30/10/15命令上訴的上訴理據

28.   被告人在30/10/15命令上訴的上訴通知書指稱,於2015年12 月17 日存檔的經第2次修改的申索陳述書沒有眾原告人的屬實申述,而只有其代表律師的屬實申述,因此經第2次修改的申索陳述書理應被剔除或由眾原告人補回屬實申述。

29.   首先,上述的指稱與30/10/15上訴無關,因為龍司法常務官頒下30/10/15命令時,眾原告人根本仍未存檔其經第2次修改的申索陳述書,更談不上該狀書的相關屬實申述。被告人並沒有就9/12/15命令提出上訴,亦沒有存檔任何傳票申請要求剔除眾原告人於2015年12月17日存檔的經第2次修改的申索陳述書,因此(正如上述第24段所述),本席看不到被告人如何能逾期提出30/10/15上訴,越過眾原告人已遵照法庭命令而存檔的經第2次修改的申索陳述書,而提出上訴要求剔除已被修改的申索陳述書。

30.   第二,該規則第18號命令第20A(1) 條及第41A號命令第3(1)(b)(ii) 條述明,就狀書而言,屬實申述可由該與訟方的法律代表作出,因此被告人在上述第28段提及的理由並非有效的上訴理據。

31.   被告人於30/10/15命令上訴要求駁回龍司法常務官撤銷被告人剔除眾原告人於2015年5月20日存檔的經修改的申索陳述書及申索書的申請(即30/10/15命令),並要求登錄被告人的反申索勝訴的判決(見15/6/15傳票申請) 。

32.   被告人依據法庭的固有司法管轄權及該規則第18號命令第19(1) 條提出15/6/15傳票申請,他認為眾原告人的經修改的申索陳述書(1)並無披露合理的訴訟因由、(2) 屬於惡意中傷及無理纏擾丶(3) 可能會對有關訴訟的公平審訊造成損害、妨礙或延遲及/或(4) 是濫用法庭的法律程序。

33.   其實法庭只會在明顯和清晰的情況下(plain and obvious case)才會引用該規則第18號命令第19(1)條及法院的固有司法管轄權來剔除原訴令狀及/或狀書。[5]就該規則第18號命令第19(1)(a)條下有關「無合理的訴訟因由」的剔除理由,一個合理的訴訟因由是單純根據狀書內所提的指控(即不得接納任何證據),在法律上具有勝訴機會的訴因,[6]而就算與訟一方的案情薄弱,成功機會不大,他的訴訟因由亦算作一個合理的訴訟因由,申請人亦不能倚賴此理據剔除狀書。就該規則第18號命令第19(1)(b)條下有關「惡意中傷或無理纏擾」的剔除理由,如果「惡意中傷」的指控與訟案中的爭議點相關,無論指控有多嚴重,申請人也不能剔除該等指控,而「無理纏擾」的剔除理由,則是對對方構成欺壓。[7]就該規則第18號命令第19(1)(c)條下有關「可能會對有關訴訟的公平審訊造成損害、妨礙或延遲」的剔除理據,這是指「該狀書、註明或東西」(即狀書的內容)而非訟案中其他程序及/或事宜所構成對公平審訊的損害、妨礙或延遲。就該規則第18號命令第19(1)(d)條下有關「濫用法院的法律程序」的剔除理由,它意味著法院的程序,一定要以真心誠意和恰當地運用而不可濫用。[8]

34.   被告人認為經修改的申索陳述書及其經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書涉及4個組別的爭議:

(1) 有關「寶榮物業」的實益權益的問題;

(2) 以較低於市值出售「崇廉樓」的問題;

(3) 蔡父遺產的「深圳物業」的問題;

(4) 被告人反申索第16(c1)丶第16(c2)及第16(f) 段的問題。

35.   眾原告人則認為本訟案的爭議包括以下事宜:[9]

(1) 以港幣600,000元出售「崇廉樓」既然遠低於市價的港幣1,000,000元(被告人已承認這點),眾原告人是否同意以低於市值的價錢(即港幣600,000元)出售「崇廉樓」;

(2) 眾原告人及第三方(下稱「眾姊」)有否出售「崇廉樓」各10%權益(共40%)予被告人;

(3) 購買「寶榮物業」時有否動用出售「崇廉樓」所得的港幣600,000元作為首期;

(4) 各方有否協定被告人將擁有「寶榮物業」的全部業權;

(5) 被告人既然已承認每月償還富邦銀行的按揭貸款的款項乃是由第1原告人所提供,第1原告人與被告人之間,有否協定由第1原告人向被告人租用「寶榮物業」;及

(6) 被告人有否出售蔡父的「深圳物業」,並收取樓價款項。

36.   被告人指稱他有充份的證據及理據,反駁眾原告人在本訟案的各項虛假申索,並支持他對眾原告人的反申索,而他的反申索事項全部真確屬實,因此應剔除眾原告人的申索及登錄其反申索勝訴的判決。被告人更指稱,第三方與第1原告人串謀就本訟案提訴,這是對他的不合法及不適當的誣告及侵權行為,是惡意中傷他的無理纏擾。

37.   被告人在其論點綱要解釋有關上述第34段提及的4個組別爭議,並詳述其主張立場,亦援引雙方的證人陳述書內容及雙方披露的文件證據,以要求法庭接受其說法而剔除眾原告人的申索,並就反申索登錄判決。

38.   但是,眾原告人認為本訟案的法律程序已進展至完成披露文件及交換證人陳述書的階段,其實已準備就緒可進行正式審訊。原被告雙方在本訟案的狀書及證人陳述書所提及的物業及人物並非虛構,只是他們就相關的事宜有不同的主張及說法,因此不可單憑被告人的誓詞陳述或所謂文件證據,斷定眾原告人的案情虛假,未審先判。眾原告人認爲上述的事實爭議必須要透過審訊來處理,由主審法庭判定事實方面的是非真偽。

39.   龍司法常務官在30/10/15判決書第11-14段已述明相關的法理原則,本席認同該等法理原則,在此不贅。其實,一般訟案須經過正式審訊的法律程序處理及判決,因為在非正審的過程中,法庭在沒有證人作供及接受盤問的情況下,難以評估證人供詞的可信性及其他證據的比重份量,因此不能就與訟各方的立場主張作出全盤的分析及判斷。據此,法庭不會在非正審階段就事實方面的爭辯及/或案中文件和其他證據作出仔細分析及處理,更不會在非正審階段就事實方面的爭議作出是非曲直裁斷,而奪取正審法庭的審理權力。[10]在非正審階段,法庭只會剔除明顯地毫無理據而且不能補救的申索,而在剔除的申請過程中,法庭不應就申請人的誓詞作出事實審理,除非該事實是明顯不過或沒有爭議。[11]這亦解釋為何法庭在處理該規則第18號命令第19(1)(a) 的剔除申請(即申索無合理的訴訟因由) 時,只可考慮申索陳述書所述的訴因是否構成合理的訴訟因由,而不得接納任何證據(即不能把眾原告人的案情與被告人的案情作出比併),因為這是正審法庭的審理權力。

40.   本席已細閱被告人論點綱要有關30/10/15命令上訴的部份及他在庭上的口頭陳述,但基於上述的法理原則,本席無需深入探討被告人對眾原告人的案情的詳細指控,或仔細分析被告人用以支持其案情的全盤證據。本席同意陳大律師的陳述指稱,被告人的論點綱要和庭上陳述,可能適用於正式審訊後的結案陳詞,但未能就其剔除申請提供有力的理據。本席細心參閱經修改的申索述書所提及的各項申索,從該狀書所述的理據可見,該等申索是在法律上具有成功機會的訴因,無論眾原告人的案情是否薄弱或其成功機會是否不大,該等申索不能說是沒有成功機會的訴因。被告人只陳述指稱,眾原告人未能提供有力的證物文件支持其案情,而對比他本人的案情及他提供的證物文件,他認為眾原告人的案情是虛假誣告的謊言。但明顯地,被告人不只單靠文件證明,因為文件證明的作用是需要被告人作為證人作供演繹,這正是主審法庭在正式審訊時具有的審理權力,處理證人及證物文件的可信性,以決定是否接納任何證人的供詞及其對證物文件的解說,本席不能在現階段奪取主審法庭就這方面的審理權力。再者,雖然被告人指稱眾原告人沒有文件證據支持其案情,但是眾原告人已提供她們的證人陳述書,被告人雖說這全部都是空言,主審法庭將來在正式審訊時會否接納她們的證供在現階仍是未知之數。而且,各項爭議點也涉及事實的爭議,而事實的爭議必須透過正式審訊來處理。正如上述,原被告雙方已完成文件披露及交換證人陳述書的程序,該些證據須要經過審訊而判決事實方面的是非曲直,本席在非正審階段不能單靠被告的15/6/15誓詞或所謂文件證據,便武斷地裁定眾原告人的案情是失實陳述及/或其申索毫無理據而應被剔除,這是本末倒置的做法。

41.   被告人指稱,第三方與第1原告人互相串謀在本訟案對他提訴,這是不合法、不適當及故意傷害他的無理纏擾行為,而加入第2及第3原告人是全心拖延官司對他繼續無理纏擾以達至她們各人的得益。正如龍司法常務官在30/10/15判決書第16段指出,這是非常嚴重的指控,法庭必須在事實上作出審理然後才可以下判斷,非正審判決並非作爲審理這些事實爭議的合適程序。再者,眾原告人是依據龍司法常務官的2015年5月15日的命令加入第2及第3原告人為本案與訟人,並存檔經修改的傳訊令狀及經修改的申索陳述書,而被告人也遵照該命令存檔及送達經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書。被告人沒有就龍司法常務官的2015年5月15日命令提出上訴,本席看不到在法庭許可而被告人沒有上訴的情況下加入第2及第3原告人如何構成無理纏擾丶對本訟案的公平審訊造成損害、妨礙或延遲及/或是濫用法庭的法律程序。

42.   被告人在其論點大綱指稱,眾原告人於2013年11月29日在高等法院開展本訟案後多次濫用法庭的法律程序要求延期及重啟狀書程序,這構成對被告人的無理纏擾,亦對本訟案的公平審訊造成損害、妨礙或延遲。本席已在上述第41段解釋,第1原告人申請要求加入第2及第3原告人不足以構成無理纏擾丶對本訟案的公平審訊造成損害、妨礙或延遲及/或是濫用法庭的法律程序。本席亦已在上述第33段解釋,該規則第 18號命令第19(1)(c) 條是針對狀書而非與訟人在法律程序中的其他行為。但無論如何,雖然被告人指稱眾原告人延誤文件披露的程序,眾原告人其實已在2015年6月5日(即被告人存檔15/6/15傳票前) 存檔其文件清單。被告人又指稱眾原告人延遲存檔經修改的答覆書及反申索的抗辯書及延遲交換證人陳述書,但其實眾原告人已在2015 年7 月27日存檔經修改的答覆及反申索的抗辯書而在2015年9月9 日已跟被告人完成交換證人陳述書,因此上述法律程序已在2015 年10 月30 日的聆訊前完成。再者,眾原告人是得到法庭的許可延展交換證人陳述書,但被告人沒有就高等法院聆案官勞潔儀的2015 年7 月29 日命令提出上訴。基於上述分析,本席亦認為眾原告人的申索具有合理的訴訟因由,因此,本席完全看不到上述延遲如何構成無理纏擾及/或是濫用法庭的法律程序,或對本訟案的公平審訊造成損害、妨礙或延遲。

43.   如須考慮本訟案在30/10/15命令之後的法律程序,眾原告人亦已完成文件披露及交換證人陳述書,亦遵照龍司法常務官的9/12/15命令於2015年12月17日存檔經第2次修改的申索陳述書,本席看不到有何進一步的延誤。反之,被告人在2015年12月31 日存檔經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,但在未經法庭許可下提出多項進一步的獨立修改,而引致原告人需採取行動於2016年1月12 日存檔傳票申請,要求拒准被告人在上述狀書中一切未經許可的修改內容。被告人其後於2016年2月12日存檔12/2/16傳票,申請許可再次修改經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書而「重啟狀書程序」,隨後亦逾期提出30/10/15命令上訴及29/4/16命令上訴。 本席看不到上述的延誤是因眾原告人的行為所致,反而眾原告人的申索因被告人提出多項非正審申請而未能進入正審程序。

44.   基於上述的分析,本席認為被告人提出的上訴理由不成立,並同意龍司法常務官的判決,即被告人所提出的論點都是事實問題,不能在非正審的階段處理,而應交由主審法庭在正式審訊時審理。本席亦認為眾原告人的申索具有合理訴訟因由,亦非無理纏擾及/或是濫用法庭的法律程序,而眾原告人也沒有對本訟案的公平審訊造成損害、妨礙或延遲。因此,龍司法常務官頒下撤銷剔除命令完全正確。正如30/10/15判決書第23段所述,既然被告人不能撤銷眾原告人的申索,本訟案件應該交由法庭正式審理,被告人要求就其反申索登錄判決也不能成立,本席認為龍司法常務官頒下撤銷登錄判決命令亦完全正確。基於上述原因,龍司法常務官作出30/10/15訟費命令,命令被告人支付眾原告人相關的訟費(評定為港幣40,000元)亦是恰當的決定。

45.   總括而言,本席認為沒有充足的理由許可被告人逾期提出30/10/15命令上訴,因此本席撤銷30/10/15命令上訴。

29/4/16命令上訴的上訴理據

46.   至於29/4/16命令上訴,被告人指出眾原告人只採用譚偉才誓詞反對12/2/16傳票,而沒有存檔他們親自宣誓的誓詞,但本席認為這並無不妥。12/2/16傳票既非眾原告人的申請,其存檔的誓詞只是用以反駁被告人的申請,亦沒有特別提及事實指稱。譚偉才是眾原告人的代表律師,對狀書所提及的申索丶抗辯及反申索有一定的認知,由他解釋被告人提議的新增修訂在訴因及法理層面上如何不合適很恰當,被告人這方面的投訴不成立。

47.   被告人在上訴通知書指稱,龍司法常務官既沒有剔除「申索第C項」(即眾原告人指稱被告人賣了蔡父的「深圳物業」的問題),但周聆案官卻剔除被告人就其第3次修改抗辯書及反申索書草擬本有關「申索第C項」的新增紫色部份第16(g)(l) 段及相關段落,這兩項決定存在矛盾。被告人認為新增紫色部份第16(g)(l) 段及相關段落是其針對「申索第C項」有關蔡父遺產的「深圳物業」的抗辯及反申索,應予批准。

48.   除了有關「深圳物業」的事宜外,被告人就29/4/16命令上訴亦要求法庭駁回周聆案官拒絕被告人就經第3次修改抗辯書及反申索書的草擬本其中3個範疇的修訂的決定,而這3個範疇涉及於2009年蔡父骨灰入侵蔡母的墓碑及墓地事宜,第3原告人作為蔡父的遺產管理人管理他的18多萬元銀行存款遺產事宜,以及追討超支款項港幣21,440元的事宜。

49.   為方便起見,本席引用陳大律師的陳詞綱要第7(4) 段的撮要,周聆案官於2016年4月29日聆訊不批准有關上述4個範疇的新增紫色部份的相關段落如下:

爭議/內容要點 新增紫色部份的相關段落
蔡父的「深圳物業」事宜 第7-12, 14(3), 15(h)(7), 15(9)-(17), 16(g) 段及濟助2a段
於2009年蔡父骨灰入侵蔡母的墓碑及墓地事宜 第1A(6)<2>, 15(h)(6), 16(h) 段
第3原告人作為蔡父的遺產管理人管理他的18多萬元銀行存款遺產事宜 第16(g)(2) 段
追討超支款項港幣21,440元的事宜 第3(a4)<5a>及<5b>及第 16(el) 段

50.   至於有關蔡父的「深圳物業」事宜的新增紫色部份,本席同意陳大律師的陳述,認為30/10/15命令和29/4/16命令並不存在矛盾。被告人在上訴誓詞中指稱,他從遺產承辦處得知香港法庭不可審理中國國內遺產物業,並在2015年10月30日的聆訊中向龍司法常務官述明這一點,但龍司法常務官沒有接納他的說法。

51.   首先,被告人在庭上確認,上訴誓詞只用作支持他要求延展上訴時限的申請,而不會用作支持30/10/15命令上訴和29/4/16命令上訴的理據,因此本席在考慮被告人的上訴理由時,是不需要考慮被告人在上述第50段的指稱。但縱使本席須考慮該說法,依據下述的分析,該說法亦無助其上訴。

52.   第二,從30/10/15判決書及被告人就2015年10月30日聆訊而繳存的陳詞大綱可見,被告人並沒有就香港法院對「申索第C項」的司法管轄權提出爭議。但如果被告人有向龍司法常務官指出香港法院不能處理「申索第C項」而龍司法常官務官不接納他的說法,本席亦認為這並無不妥,因為香港法院具有司法管轄權審理「申索第C項」。

53.   第三,法院的司法管轄權是由法庭決定,不能只依賴遺產承辦處而得的諮詢資料而決定。但就算香港法庭不可審理中國國內遺產物業(而本席毋需就此項指稱作出裁斷) ,這亦不適用於經第2次修改的申索陳述書的「申索第C項」。「申索第C項」所要求的濟助是「a declaration that the Defendant has been holding the said sum of RMB2,500,000.00 or thereabout being the proceeds of sale of the Shenzhen Property upon trust in favour of the Beneficiaries in equal shares or alternatively in such shares as the Court shall determine or is otherwise liable to account and pay to the Beneficiaries the said proceeds of sale in equal shares or alternatively in such shares as the Court shall determine」。簡單來說,眾原告人要求法庭宣告被告人一直以來以信託形式為蔡父的遺產受益人(包括眾姊) 持有出售「深圳物業」所得的人民幣2,500,000.00元或者大約人民幣2,500,000.00元,而該所得收益須平均分配或按法庭決定的比例分配,或被告人須對其他受益人(眾姊) 就上述出售「深圳物業」所得收益作出交代和平均支付,或按法庭決定的比例支付上述出售所得收益給予受益人。由於「深圳物業」已出售而只剩下出售所得收益,「申索第C項」沒可能是針對房地產業權的申索,而上述的濟助清楚顯示眾原告人就「申索第C項」的訴因是針對被告人個人違反信託的申索。本席同意物業所在地的法院對相關物業的房地產業權爭議具有司法管轄權,但「申索第C項」的爭議點是被告人有否違反信託的爭議,因此「深圳物業」所在地的法院便沒有專屬的管轄權。被告人現在身在香港,所以香港法院享有審理有關被告人的「對人」訴訟的司法權力,而「申索第C項」正是「對人」的訴因,所以香港法院具有審理「申索第C項」的自然管轄權,審理因被告人個人行為引起但涉及出售境外物業的違反信託申索。本席認同陳大律師的陳述,認為香港的法院具有司法管轄權審理「申索第C項」的申索。

54.   第四,甚至「深圳物業」所在地的法院就「申索第C項」具有非專屬的司法管轄權(但本席毋需就此觀點作出結論),其實被告人亦早已自願接受香港法院的司法管轄權處理「申索第C項」的申索。依據該規則第12號命令第8條規定,被告人須在送達抗辯書的時限內,就法院在法律程序中的司法管轄權提出爭議。但一直以來,被告人不但未有就香港法院的司法管轄權提出爭議,他更在2014年12月9日丶2014年12月17日及2015年6月3日存檔抗辯書及反申索書丶經修改的抗辯書及反申索書和經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,就眾原告人的申索(包括「申索第C項」) 提出抗辯。被告人亦在本訟案存檔文件清單及交換證人陳述書,又主動提出各項傳票申請及上訴。被告人顯然已接受了香港法院就「申索第C項」的司法管轄權的管轄。

55.   因此,本席認為香港法院具有司法管轄權審理「申索第C項」的申索,龍司法常務官作出撤銷剔除命令完全正確。

56.   至於周聆案官拒絕有關蔡父的「深圳物業」事宜的相關新增紫色部份的修訂(即被告人的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書的草擬本第7-12,14(3),15(h)(7),15(9)-(17),16(g) 段及濟助第2a段) ,被告人在經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書已訴述指稱,他不知悉蔡父生前有否定立遺囑,他亦不是蔡父的遺產承辦人,而自從蔡父去世後亦從沒有收受過蔡父的動產及/或不動產的遺產,他亦否認蔡父的遺產包括「深圳物業」。被告人亦指稱,他從來沒有承繼蔡父的任何物業,亦否認及不理解眾原告人所指的中國承繼法。對於眾原告人指稱(1)依據中國承繼法蔡父遺產的受益人包括眾姊弟,而他們應可平均分配蔡父的遺產,(2)被告人以低於市值出售「深圳物業」而收取了人民幣2,500,000.00元或大約人民幣2,500,000.00元的收益,及(3)因此被告人應該(但至今仍未)向眾原告人作為其中受益人交代及分配他們每人應得的部份出售收益,被告人回應上述指稱他既沒有承繼過蔡父的任何物業,「沒有承繼過,可賣甚麼……可分甚麼」 。

57.   被告人欲依據在相關的新增紫色部份,提出修訂指稱從蔡父於2009年4月26日去世至2015年10月28日約6年半期間,眾姊沒有告訴他誰是蔡父的遺產執行人或管理人,但第三方曾跟他說蔡父在國內有很多地及屋(因此蔡父的遺產不只是深圳物業),但被告人不是蔡父的遺產承辦人,所以沒有承繼蔡父任何物業 。被告人欲在狀書加添指稱,其實他於2009年8月份曾倍同第3原告人和第1原告人回鄉諮詢辦理申領蔡父遺產的「深圳物業」手續,但第3原告人竟沒帶相關的房屋文件,她顯然沒有誠意,因此被告人向眾原告人表示如果她們要處理蔡父的遺產便找蔡父的遺產承辦人去辦理,不要再找及煩擾他。被告人在2015年10月29日才知悉第3原告人才是蔡父的遺產管理人,但第3原告人沒有在N.4.1款表格項寫蔡父的「深圳物業」,她顯然作假證供隱瞞遺產承辦處。被告人認為,第3原告人應當有法定責任確當真實地在表格上填寫蔡父的遺產,「並履行到國內有關部門承繼及/或賣出「深圳物業」」,亦必須分配「深圳物業」及蔡父的所有遺產給予所有遺產受益人,而被告人作為其中的遺產受益人應當收取他應得的一份有關蔡父的所有遺產。被告人認為,眾原告人對他隱瞞誰是蔡父的遺產承辦人/管理人,很可能是因為被第三方收買合謀隱暪蔡父的巨額遺產而逃稅,或為了少分一份巨額遺產給被告人。故此,被告人欲增添新的濟助,要求法庭命令第3原告人作為蔡父的遺產管理人向他作為蔡父的遺產受益人分配1/5有關第3原告人出售「深圳物業」的出售收益。

58.   從上述可見,被告人就「深圳物業」的新增紫色部份的訴因是建基於第3原告人是香港法院認可的蔡父遺產管理人,因此她負上責任分配遺產(包括「深圳物業」的出售收益) 給予遺產受益人(包括被告人) 。本席認為,這顯示被告人對香港遺產承辦的誤解。正如陳大律師所述,香港法院所頒布的遺產管理書,只會把死者離世時位於香港的物業歸屬遺產管理人,[12]因此蔡父的遺產管理書沒有亦不可能包括「深圳物業」,第3原告人作為香港法院所頒布的遺產管理書下的遺產管理人根本沒有責任處理「深圳物業」或就「深圳物業」事宜向被告人作出交代。再者,眾原告人指稱「深圳物業」位於國內而非在香港境內,應依據國內而非香港的繼承法處理,但被告人在其狀書中否認眾原告人在經第2次修改的申索陳述書第9-10段所提及的國內繼承法的條文及該繼承法下的順序繼承和分配份數,亦沒有在新增紫色部份述明他認為合適國內繼承法是怎樣運作繼承次序及分配,因此被告人沒有在擬提出的修訂建立有效的訴因及法律依據。本席認為,周聆案官拒絕有關「深圳物業」的新增紫色部份的修訂正確無誤。由於周聆案官在這方面的裁決是基於被告人並無合理的訴訟因由,這顯然與香港法院的司法管轄權無關,所以周聆案官在這方面的判決與龍司法常務官不剔除「申索第C項」並不存在矛盾。

59.   至於有關蔡父骨灰入侵蔡母的墓碑及墓地事宜的新增紫色部份(即被告人的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書的草擬本第1A(6)<2>,15(h)(6) 及16(h) 段及濟助第2a段),被告人欲提出修訂指稱,蔡父早年離棄家庭,而蔡母獨力養家,46年來與蔡父見面只有3 次,在生時更向被告人表示痛恨蔡父。蔡母於2000年去世,她去世前曾告訴被告人其購入的墓地只供她本人及眾姊弟的外祖母(下稱「先外婆」)二人安葬,而被告人作為蔡母的遺產承辦人已就此事辦妥。蔡父於2009年4月26日去世。約於2009年5月中(約蔡父出殯日前數天),第3原告人曾指稱第三方指派她並已經安排了將蔡父的骨灰放進蔡母墓地,被告人認為這違反蔡母遺願而強烈反對,雙方因此發生口角。經被告人其後查核發現,該墓地只准原葬者(先外婆) 及其直系親屬安葬,由於蔡父與蔡母已離異多年,蔡父去世時已不合格通過附葬在該墓地。雖然蔡父沒有宗教信仰,但第三方及/或第3原告人一意孤行,利用教會關係以借葬形式把蔡父的骨灰放進蔡母墓地,更新立墓碑以慈父之名把蔡父的名字刻在墓碑中間,並把蔡母及先外婆的名字擠在兩旁。因此,被告人欲在其反申索增添濟助,要求法庭頒下命令,讓被告人替蔡母還原墓碑及墓地(葬先外婆及蔡母),並指令第3原告人作為蔡父的遺產管理人負責接收蔡父的骨灰或遺體,而所有費用由第3原告人及/或第三方負責。

60.   被告人擬提出的訴因是侵權行為的訴因,依據第347章《時效條例》第4(1)(a) 條,侵權行為的訴訟於訴訟因由產生的日期起計滿6年後不得提出。蔡父的骨灰已於2009年放進蔡母的墓地,這便是侵權行為的訴訟因由產生日期,到了2015年該訴訟因由的6年時效期已屆滿,被告人不得在2016年2月12日以12/2/16傳票提出上述的侵權訴因,而第347章《時效條例》第26條的例外情況並不適用。再者,被告人沒有在相關的新增紫色部份交代該墓地是先外婆或蔡母的遺產,也沒有交代他是否先外婆的遺產承辦人/管理人,因此他欲提出此項申索的身份並不清楚。本席認為,被告人擬提出的這項反申索,無論在時效上及/或訴因上也存在問題,周聆案官拒絕這方面的修訂正確無誤。

61.   至於有關第3原告人作為蔡父的遺產管理人管理他的18 多萬元銀行存款遺產事宜的新增紫色部份 (即被告人的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書的草擬本第16(g)(2)段及濟助第2a段),被告人欲提出反申索要求第3原告人作為蔡父的遺產管理人向被告人作為蔡父遺產的其中受益人支付他應要分得一份有關蔡父現金遺產的餘款 。

62.   雖然蔡父的遺產管理書顯示其遺產只有他於2009年4 月26 日去世當天存在銀行的存款港幣161,626.32元、14,363.40元及10,000元(合共港幣185,989.72元),但蔡父的殮葬費用是其遺產的一項支出項目。被告人在其經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書第15(h)(1) 段已承認眾姊已口頭告知他用了蔡父的錢支付殮葬費約港幣180,000元,而他在相關的新增紫色部份並沒有撤回這說法或述明眾姊的說法有何不對,因此被告人追討這聲稱港幣18多萬元的銀行存款實在沒有合理的訴訟因由,所以周聆案官拒絕這方面的修訂正確無誤。

63.   至於追討超支款項港幣21,440元的事宜的新增紫色部份(即被告人的經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書的草擬本第3(a4)<5a>及<5b>及16(e1)段和濟助第1段),被告人於2015年6月3日存檔的經第2次修改的抗辯書及反申索書指稱他於2001年已買入眾姊各人在「崇廉樓」的10%業權。首先,第1原告人於2001年2月份要求從被告人(蔡母的遺產承辦人) 透過預支款項賣出「崇廉樓」部份業權給被告人,於3月份第1原告人協議以港幣600,000元的10%(即港幣60,000元) 賣出10%業權給被告人,而當時第1原告人要求售價為港幣600,000元是根據遺產承辦書內的稅務局遺產稅署評估「崇廉樓」之價值而發出的文件,但由於蔡母的殮葬費及律師費雜費已用完了蔡母的現金遺產港幣280,000多元,而被告人用凸了港幣10,000多元,所以眾姊弟各要責負港幣3,000元,因此「崇廉樓」10%業權的錢是港幣56,000元。其後,第三方和第2及第3原告人於3月份均要求賣出各人「崇廉樓」的10%業權給被告人,而被告人在她們的要求下買入各人的10%業權。因此,自從2001年3月被告人已擁有「崇廉樓」60%業權,他想保留蔡母的故居,因此不打算出售或出租「崇廉樓」,更告訴眾姊如果各人有需要時而他又有能力的話,他可讓各人有需要時入住本屬蔡母的「崇廉樓」,他亦可以在各人有需要時協議用市值價買入各人剩餘的10%業權,而被告人在買斷所有業權後才在有需要時出租「崇廉樓」。

64.   被告人擬就新增紫色部份增加新項的反申索。相關的新增紫色部份指稱,蔡母在2000年5月過身,在第三方要求及眾姊弟同意下,被告人辦理蔡母的殮葬費及律師費雜費共支付了港幣298,938 元,從蔡母銀行現金支付了港幣259,311.50元,而被告人支付了港幣39,626.50元,經眾姊要求和被告人同意,眾姊欠被告人的每份港幣7,925.30元在將來分配「崇廉樓」業權的錢對沖結算。其後,被告人從第1原告人購入「崇廉樓」10%業權,但第1原告人指稱蔡母銀行保險箱有眾姊弟可分的遺產物品價值共港幣21,440 元(每份港幣4,288元)尚未分配,並要求被告人將之歸立為現金遺產計算,有待將來分配保險箱的遺產物品後,用來分配「崇廉樓」最後10%業權的錢對沖扣除港幣4,288元,而「崇廉樓」首10%業權的錢的計算方法為蔡母的殮葬費及律師費雜費從蔡母銀行現金遺港幣259,311.50元加港幣21,440元(實數為港幣280,751.50元)支付,而以第 1原告人要求的計算方法下被告人支付了港幣18,186.50元,因此眾姊弟各人須負責港幣3,637.30元,因此被告人就購入第1原告人的「崇廉樓」10%業權支付第1原告人港幣56,362.70元。其後,被告人沿用同一計算方式購入第2及第3原告人和第三方各人的「崇廉樓」首10%業權,因此他擁有「崇廉樓」60%業權。但是,被告人於2002年8 月1 日在眾姊弟分配蔡母在保險箱的遺物時沒有分得任何東西,而在2007年第三方及第 1原告人以急售「崇廉樓」救助第1原告人為藉口要求被告人以港幣600,000元出售「崇廉樓」,眾姊因而放棄最後10%業權折讓街外買家,導致沒有最後10%業權可讓被告人來作對沖結算眾姊各人欠他的債項港幣5,360元(即港幣21,440.00/4) 。因此,被告人欲提出新增的反申索項目,向眾原告人追討她們各人欠他的債項港幣5,360元。

65.   其實,上述擬提出反申索的訴因早已失效。蔡母在2000 年過世,陳大律師認為有關事件在2002年發生,所以訴訟因由產生的相關時間為2002年,亦指出被告人在新增紫色部份沒有解釋為何沒有在較早時從第1原告人的還款中扣除港幣4,228元。但甚至依據被告人擬提出的新增紫色部份,被告人與眾姊於2001年達成對沖協議,但該協議因2007年出售「崇廉摟」救助第1原告人及眾姊放棄最後10%業權而遭破壞,該訴訟因由的產生時間最遲為2007 年,而依據第347章《時效條例》第4(1) 條,被告人向眾原告人追討她們各人欠他的債項港幣5,360元的訴因早已失效,他不得於2016 年2月12日提出增加此項反申索。本席認為,周聆案官拒絕這方面的修訂正確無誤。

66.   總括而言,本席認為雖然29/4/16命令上訴逾期沒多天,但被告人未能顯示有充足的上訴理由,因此本席拒准被告人逾期提出29/4/16命令上訴,亦撤銷29/4/16命令上訴。

總結

67.   本席現頒下命令,撤銷30/10/15命令上訴及29/4/16命令上訴。由於被告人仍未遵從29/4/16命令在該命令頒下日期起計21 天內存檔及送達經第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,本席現頒下命令,除非被告人在2017年1月26日下午4時或之前存檔於法庭及送達予眾原告人29/4/16命令許可的第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,被告人不得在本訟案存檔及送達上述第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書。本席現提醒被告人,當他遵照上述命令在時限內存檔及送達第3次修改的抗辯書及反申索書,該狀書的紫色修訂只可包含29/4/16命令下允許的修訂,而不得加添任何未經法庭許可的修訂。

68.   本席既駁回上述兩項上訴,因此本席亦頒下暫准訟費命令,判定被告人須支付給眾原告人30/10/15命令上訴及29/4/16命令上訴所涉及的訟費,如果雙方未能同意訟費的款額,則由訟費評定官即時評定。除非任何一方提出申請更改上述暫准訟費命令,否則上述暫准訟費命令在本判決書頒下後14 天即成為絕對命令。

 ( 吳美玲 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

薜馮鄺岑律師行轉聘陳碩樺大律師代表第一丶第二及第三原告人。

被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊



[1] 見《香港民事訴訟程序2017》第1冊第1084頁第58/1/2段

[2] 見Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1WLR 1489

[3] [2004] 2 HKLRD 355, 363

[4] 見蔡雲裳等人訴蔡思明及蔡錦裳(第三方)HCA2336/2013,高等法院暫委法官余啟肇(無彙報的案例,日期為2015年9月18日)

[5] 見《香港民事訴訟程序2017》第1冊第458-460頁第18/19/4段

[6] 見《香港民事訴訟程序2017》第1冊第461頁第18/19/6段及該規則第18號命令第19(2)條

[7] 見《香港民事訴訟程序2017》第1冊第462-463頁第18/19/8及18/19/9段

[8] 見《香港民事訴訟程序2017》第1冊第463頁第18/19/9段

[9] 見第1原告15/7/15誓詞第6段

[10] 見Hong Kong Niiroku Limited v Kyokuto Securities (Asia) Limited HCA4122/2000,高等法院法官施鈞年法官 (無彙報的案例,日期為2002年3月18日)第3和第25-26段

[11] 見Beijing Tong Gang Da Sheng Trade Co Ltd v Allen & Overy [2015] 3 HKLRD 247,  260-261

[12] 見Li Chok Hung v. Li Pui Choi [1911] HKLR12,24

101248-CH-2015-10-30

蔡雲裳及另二人 對 蔡思明

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HCA 2336/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事訴訟案件2013年第 2336 號

________________________

蔡雲裳
(Choi Wan Sheung Nancy)
第一原告人
蔡巧裳
(Piyathaisere Choi How Sheung Daisy)
第二原告人
蔡煥裳
(Ludtke Woon Sheung Wendy)
第三原告人
及
蔡思明
(Choi Si Ming Danny)
被告人
及
蔡錦裳
(Choy Kam Sheung)
第三方

________________________

主審法官 : 高等法院司法常務官龍劍雲內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2015年10月30日
判決書日期 :2015年10月30日

______________________

判決書
______________________

被告的申請及其理由

1.  被告人於2015 年6 月15日以傳票形式作出下列命令的申請:

一) 剔除第一、第二及第三原告人於2015年5月20日存檔之經修訂申索陳述書及申索書;

二) 要求命令登錄判決被告人於2015年6月3日存檔之第二次經修訂抗辯書及反申索書;

三) 將訴訟案HCA896/2015 跟HCA 2336/2013 合併;但是,這個申請不在本聆訊討論,這個項目是經已押後,在本次判決後才處理。

四) 第一、第二及第三原告人支付本訴訟(包括是次申請)之訟費,若各方未能就訟費數額達成協議, 則數額留待法庭評定;及

五) 法庭可能認為適合的進一步或其他必須或相應的命令或指示。

2.  在被告人之論點綱要中,被告人在第11段提出了更多的理由以支持其申請,包括:

一) 原告人無證據存在可披露合理的訴訟因由;

二) 原告人濫用法庭程序;

三) 原告人無法抗辯;及

四) 香港法例第347章《時效條例》第4(3) 條。

3.  本案原告人控告被告身為寳榮物業和崇廉樓的遺產執行人,違反信託人責任,私自處理遺產而損害受益人的利益。所牽涉的財產是:

一) 寳榮物業;

二) 崇廉樓;及

三) 深圳物業[1]

4.  被告聲稱有充分理据和證據,可以推翻原告的申索陳述書的申索及可支持被告的反申索。被告還說,他對原告的反申索事宜全部屬實,而原告的申索是虛假的。[2]

5.  被告在其結論說,這宗訴訟是第三人與原告串謀對他的不合法及不適當的,故意傷害他的無理纏繞侵權行爲。[3]

6.  原告方反對被告的申請,並由律師代表出席本聆訊[4]。

原告的反對理由

7.  原告反對被告申請的理由,主要是現階段本案已經完成文件披露及已交換證人陳述書,所爭議的物業及有關的人物並不是虛構的,實不可能單憑被告人一面之詞,斷定原告人的案情虛假,未審先判。

8.  原告指出,本案所涉及的爭議包括以下:

一) 以港幣60萬元出售崇廉樓既然遠低於市價的港幣100萬元(被告人已承認這點),第一、第二及第三原告人是否同意以低於市價的價錢即港幣60萬元出售崇廉樓;

二) 第一、第二、第三原告人及第三方有否出售各10%崇廉樓權益(共40%)予被告人;

三) 購買寶榮物業時有否動用出售崇廉樓所得的港幣60萬元作為首期;

四) 各方有否協定被告人將擁有寶榮物業的全部業權;

五) 被告人既然已承認每月償還富邦銀行的按揭貸款的款項乃是由第一原告人所提供,第一原告人與被告人之間,有否協定由第一原告人向被告人租用寶榮物業;

六) 被告人有否出售先父於廣東省寶安縣回戍鄉茶村的物業(下稱「深圳物業」),並收取樓價款項。[5]

9.  當然,被告是不同意原告上述的說法。原告認爲上述的事實爭議必須要透過審訊來處理。不可能單靠被告人的非宗教式誓詞或所謂文件證據,就斷定原告人作虛假陳述,而必須透過審訊,由法官判定事實的真偽。

有關申請的法律原則

10.  由於被告的申請是屬於非正審申請,所以必須依據相關的法律規定處理。

11.  根據上訴法庭在 Ha Francesca v Tsai Kut Kan (No.1) [1982] 1 HKC 382中指出,除非案件的狀書是明顯地差劣而且不能用修改的方法來補救,要是勉強進行,其成功勝訴的機會是沒有的;又或者是原告的狀書内並無披露合理的訴訟因由,或是瑣屑無聊或無理纏擾。這樣,法庭才會將其狀書剔除。

12.  根據霍兆剛大法官(當時官階)在The New China Hong Kong Group Ltd. (In Creditors' Voluntary Liquidation) & Another v Ng Kwai Kai, Kenneth & Others(HCA519/2010,2011年2月11日)第40段指出上述上訴法庭的判決在民事改革后的新法律規定依然有效。 換句話說,除非申索是明顯的無理據而且不能補救的話,否則法庭不應該把申索剔除。

13.  在非正審的過程,法庭不應該就案件的事實作出審理而判定事實的是與非的。也不應該以申請人的誓章作爲審理的依據。參看案例:Hong Kong Niroku Ltd v Kyokuto Securities (Asia) Ltd (unrep., HCA4122/2000, 18 March 2002);Sunchase International Group (China) Ltd & Others v Vincor Group of Companies (Investment) Ltd & Others [2004] 1 HKLRD 731 at 733D – E;Beijing Tong Gang Da Sheng Trade Co Ltd (as assignee of GreaterBeijing Region Expressways Ltd) v Allen & Overy (a firm) & Another (CACV 34/2014 & CACV 124/2014, Kwan JA 22 May 2015)。

14.  上述案例明確指出,在非正審的過程中,法庭不應該就事實的爭議詳細處理案中的文件和證據,否則,法庭在這個非正審階段就奪取了正審法庭的審理權力。這樣的做法是不恰當的,也是不容許的。Hong Kong Niroku Ltd 案中第25段[6]。上訴庭更指出,在剔除的申請程序中,法庭不應該就申請人的誓章作出事實的審理,除非該事實是明顯不過或沒有爭議的。Beijing Tong Gang Da Sheng Trade Co Ltd 案中第41段[7]。

討論

15.  根據上述法律原則,原告有理由反對被告的申請。

16.  被告自己指出,這宗訴訟是第三人與原告串謀對他的不合法及不適當的,故意傷害他的無理纏繞行爲。見上述第5段。這些行爲對原告是非常嚴重的指控,法庭必須在事實上作出審理然後才可以下判斷。非正審並非作爲審理這些事實的合適程序。這個決定處理了被告前面三個理由。

17.  被告也提出了原告違反了《高等法院規則》第4A章第18號命令第10條,偏離。然而,被告人並沒有詳細解釋這是什麽意思。

18.  据原告的説法,被告人指於2015年5月20日於法庭存檔的經修訂的申索陳述書中的有關崇廉樓的申索金額改為港幣40萬元違反《高等法院規則》第18號命令第10條。實際上,原告人已在2015年5月15日獲許可修改申索陳述書。此情況明顯是《高等法院規則》第18號命令第10(2)條規則的情況。本席同意原告的意見。被告提出這一點是不成立的。

19.  至於香港法例第347章《時效條例》第4(3) 條,被告指原告人有關「寶榮物業」及「崇廉樓」的申索是逾期提出。原告人認為該條文並不適用於本案有關的「寶榮物業」及「崇廉樓」,原因是該申索涉及信託財產及信託財產所得的收益,以及被告人作為信託人違反信託等。按《時效條例》第20條原告人的申索並未逾期,因訴訟權是在被告人拒絕將信託財產返還原告人才產生(即在2013年12月5日後)。

20.  被告不同意原告的說法,他說從來沒有收過上述12月5日的信件。他也不同意是該物業的信託人。被告人說,原告沒有證據支持其申索, 應該剔除原告的申請。

21.  本席同意原告的意見,上面所說的都是事實問題,不能在這個非正審的階段處理。無論如何,這點可以交由主審法官審理,在現階段不應該剔除原告的申索。

22.  根據上述理由,本席撤銷被告剔除第一、第二及第三原告人於2015年5月20日存檔之經修訂申索陳述書及申索書的申請。

23.  既然被告不能撤銷原告的申索,案件應該交由法庭正式審理,被告要求命令登錄判決被告人於2015年6月3日存檔之第二次經修訂抗辯書及反申索書的申請也不能成立,並且予以撤銷。

訟費和命令

24.  關於本次申請的訟費問題,被告反對支付本次聆訊的訟費,原因是他不同意本席的判決以及他說他沒有能力支付這賬單内的訟費。根據《高等法院規則》第62號命令第3項,原告是勝訴一方,應該得到本次申請和聆訊的訟費。既然被告人不提出對數額的反對,而且本席也考慮過原告的賬單,本席認爲其收費合理,所以本席批准原告申請的數額,總數是港幣40,000元。被告在今天起計,14天内支付。

25.  本席現在頒令如下:

一) 撤銷被告的剔除申請;

二) 撤銷被告要求命令登錄判決被告人於2015年6月3日存檔之第二次經修訂抗辯書及反申索書的申請;

三) 今次申請的訟費,包括保留的訟費和今天聆訊的訟費依照上面第24 段決定。

龍劍雲
高等法院司法常務官

原告人:由薛馮鄺岑律師行譚偉才律師代表

被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊


[1] 詳情見經修訂的申索陳述書第3-6及11段。

[2] 見書面陳述第5段。

[3] 見見書面陳述第12段

[4] 見判決的最後部分。

[5] 見大綱第15段

[6]‘25. It is useful to remember what Danckwerts L.J. said in Wenlock v Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238 at page 1244 :

“But this summary jurisdiction of the court was never intended to be exercised by a minute and protracted examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the plaintiff really has a cause of action. To do that is to usurp the position of the trial judge, and to produce a trial of the case in chambers, on affidavits only, without discovery and without oral evidence tested by cross-examination in the ordinary way. This seems to me to be an abuse of the inherent power of the court and not a proper exercise of that power.”’

[7]“41. It is trite law there should be no trial on affidavit in a strike out application and disputed facts are generally taken in favour of the party sought to be struck out. That does not mean disputed facts cannot be gone into in an appropriate situation. Where it is shown to be plain and obvious that the disputed assertion was made without evidence or any solid basis, a spurious action may be struck out (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015, vol 1, §§18/19/14 and 18/19/21).”

100571-CH-2015-09-18

蔡雲裳及另二人 對 蔡思明

HTML content

HCA 2336/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2013年第2336號

____________

第一原告人蔡雲裳
(Choi Wan Sheung Nancy)
 
第二原告人蔡巧裳
(Piyathaisere Choi How Sheung Daisy)
第三原告人蔡煥裳
(Ludtke Choi Woon Sheung Wendy)
 
 及 
被告人蔡思明
(Choi Si Ming Danny)
 
 及 
第三方蔡錦裳
(Choy Kam Sheung)
 

____________

主審法官 : 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官余啟肇
審訊日期 : 2015年8月4日
判決書日期 : 2015年9月18日

判決書

 

1.  被告人蔡先生於2015年7月17日就兩項命令提出上訴。第一項命令是高等法院司法常務官龍劍雲先生於2015年5 月15日就蔡先生於2015年5月13日存檔的傳票申請作出的命令。第二項命令是聆案官黎達祥先生於2015年6月17日就蔡先生於2015年6月15日存檔的傳票作出的命令。

2.  首先,正如原告人代表律師譚律師指出,蔡先生的上訴申請是超越了上訴聆案官決定的期限。但是由於逾期時間尚短,而且終歸法庭也須要考慮蔡先生的上訴理據,譚律師同意本席可以不用考慮蔡先生的上訴已經逾期,儘管蔡先生並不能夠提供良好的理由解釋為甚麼他的上訴申請在逾期後才作出。

3.  本席首先處理蔡先生對司法常務官的命令的投訴。蔡先生的傳票申請是剔除原告人對他的申索及就他的反索償的抗辯書要求法庭判令他勝訴。他的傳票是在案件管理會議中處理的。蔡先生投訴司法常務官在聆訊中用威嚇的手段逼使他撤銷申請。司法常務更命令蔡先生要支付原告人律師費共2,800元正。

4.  蔡先生對司法常務官作出的指控十分嚴重。可是在他的上訴通知書中,他並沒有交待任何具體細節,究竟司法常務官如何對他施行威嚇脅迫,以致使他撤回他的傳票。

5.  在上訴聆訊中,本席向蔡先生查詢,司法常務官如何威脅他。蔡先生回覆說,司法常務官說他無論如何也不會讓他的申請得以繼續,除非蔡先生走上他席前毆打他。所以,他覺得十分驚慌及無奈,最後他只好同意撤回他的傳票。

6.  本席立即在庭上播放有關聆訊的錄音帶,以查証蔡先生所說是否屬實。在錄音中,本席可以清晰聽見司法常務官如何耐心地向蔡先生解釋他的傳票申請的謬誤。蔡先生向司法常務官表示,他不願意繼續被官司纏繞,希望他的案件可以盡快審結。司法常務官便向蔡先生解釋,要在未經正審前剔除原告的申索,法庭有一些固定的確立的原則須要跟從。並不是純粹因為令到官司可盡快了結法庭便會剔除案件的。蔡先生便向法庭道歉,說他並不了解法律。所以司法常務官便向蔡先生進一步解釋,蔡先生其實不須要為他不適當的法律行動向法庭道歉,只不過他須要對其他與訟方付上法律責任,特別是堂費的責任。司法常務官向蔡先生指出,法庭是不會因為當事人沒有法律知識而被觸怒的,法庭是願意容忍的。但是容忍的並不包括暴力行為,諸如毆打法官等等。

7.  所以蔡先生的指控毫無根據的。他接納錄音中司法常務官並沒有用武力威脅他。他承認他可能沒有預計法官會提及「毆打」一詞,所以他十分驚慌而錯誤以為他是語帶威脅。本席並不接納他的解釋。本席認為他的指控純屬只虛烏有,毫無根據。無論如何,在錄音中本席完全不察覺司法常務官對蔡先生有作出任何威嚇的言詞,蔡先生接受撤回自己的傳票完全是他自願的。

8.  故此,本席不能接受蔡先生的這一個上訴理由。

9.  至於訟費方面,蔡先生撤回自己的傳票,自然地須要繳付對方的訟費。他的申請是有一份12頁紙的誓章支持,而就他的申請所花的法庭聆訊時間為10分鐘。司法常務官接納原告人律師每小時4,000元的收費,經簡易評核訟費為2,800元,實在是合情合理的。事實上,蔡先生也沒有就訟費金額上提出任何反對理由。

10.  本席達到的結論是蔡先生就司法常務官在2015年5月15日作出的命令的上訴毫無理據,必須被駁回。

聆案官黎達祥的命令

11.  聆案官黎達祥先生的命令是針對蔡先生在撤回他的剔除傳票後再發出的剔除原告人申索陳述書申請傳票作出的。

12.  聆案官作出的命令其實是一些十分普遍的指示,以使蔡先生的傳票的聆訊可以公平地進行。聆案官批准蔡先生及原告人存檔誓章後再另定日期由司法常務官龍劍雲席前審理,並預留3小時聆訊。譚律師向本席解釋他當時引用Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2010 Vol 1 18/19/11向常務司法官指出,基於司法常務官曾經處理過蔡先生相近的申請,蔡先生再次的剔除申請應該由同一名法官處理。

13.  他所引述的段落其實是一個英國案例中上訴庭指出若果與訟人有需要作出第二次同樣的非正審申請,為了杜絕選擇法官這陋習,盡可能第二次申請都應該由同一位法官處理。

14.  本席向蔡先生查問他就這項指示究意有甚麼不滿的地方。蔡先生指出,聆案官聽取譚律師引用案例之後,並沒有引導他發言回應,所以他覺得不公平。本席並不明白他的指控。蔡先生同意他沒有被禁止發言。他也沒有提出甚麼實質的反對由司法常務官處理他第二次的剔除申請。本席看不到有甚麼理由由司法常務官處理他的第二次剔除申請會對他構成任何不公平的情況。本席不能接受蔡先生的指控。

15.  另外,聆案官批准第三方即蔡錦嫦女士選擇是否出席有關她剔除原告人的申索的聆訊。蔡先生表示這樣是不公平的。蔡先生指出在另一個聆訊中,歐陽浩榮聆案官曾經指出第三方仍然須要繼續處理案件,所以聆案官不應該任由第三方自行決定是否出席他剔除原告人的申索的聆訊。

16.  蔡先生的投訴是於理不合的。他所指的聆訊是關乎第三方剔除他的第三方傳票的申請,跟他自己剔除原告人申索的申請傳票毫無關係。事實上他這傳票並不涉及第三方的,故此他沒有理由要求第三方出席他剔除原告人申索的申請聆訊。聆案官作出的命令合情合理,本席完全不認為聆案官是有偏袒第三方的情況。

17.  最後,蔡先生不滿聆案官無限期押後他的傳票的第三項申請直至蔡先生傳票中剔除原告人狀書的申請聆訊後才恢復聆訊。聆案官無限期押後的申請是有關HCA 2336/2013及HCA 896/2015的合併申請。在案件管理的層面來看,聆案官押後這合併申請,以待蔡先生剔除原告申索申請才處理是合情合理的,因為假使蔡先生的剔除申請成功,HCA 2336/2013便應該告終。所以,他的剔除申請是跟他的合併申請是有關的。故此,本席並不接納他這一項投訴。

結論

18.  本席認為蔡先生的上訴缺乏理據,必須被駁回。

19.  本席看不出有任何理由蔡先生不須要支付原告一方有關今次上訴的訟費,本席命令蔡先生支付原告所有有關他上訴的所有一切訟費。若雙方不能就訟費金額達成協議,則交由聆案官評定。至於第三方的訟費,本席認為蔡先生嘗試推翻涉及第三方的指示,所以他亦應該支付第三方所有有關他上訴的訟費。同樣地假若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議,則交由聆案官評定。

(余啟肇)
 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

原告人:由薛馮鄺岑律師行譚偉才律師代表

被告人:無律師代表,親自應訊

第三方:由柯伍陳律師事務所梁勉予律師代表