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Matrimonial Causes2014

崔 對 李

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Files (6)

[2021] HKFC 33-CH-2021-02-09

崔 對 李

HTML content

FCMC 17031/2014

[2021] HKFC 33

香港特別行政區

區域法院

婚姻訴訟編號2014年第17031號

________________________

有關  
 崔呈請人
 及 
 李答辯人

________________________

主審法官:區域法院法官歐陽浩榮內庭聆訊(書面處理)
書面陳述書日期:2020年12月9日
反對陳述書日期:2021年1月11日
判決書日期:2021年2月9日

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判決書

( 上訴許可)

-------------------------

前言

1. 本席在2020年11月27日頒下有關本案雙方的附屬濟助事宜的判決書(「該判決書」),下令出售他們的前婚姻居所,並且把總婚姻資產60%分配給予呈請人(「妻子」),40%分配給答辯人(「丈夫」)。

2. 妻子於2020年12月9日存檔傳票,申請上訴許可,以就該判決書提出上訴。

適用的法律原則

3. 法庭在決定是否批准發出上訴許可時,須考慮香港法例第336章《區域法院條例》第63A(2)條的規定。有關的條例節錄如下︰

「聆訊有關上訴許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭除非信納 –

(a) 有關上訴有合理機會得直; 或

(b) 有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,否則不得批予上訴許可。」

4. 顧名思義,「合理機會得直」的意思是指有關的勝訴機會只需是「合理的」: 既不應是「空想」(fanciful) 的,但亦不需要是「很有可能」(probable)的(參閱案例: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125; KNM v HTF (HCMP 288/2011, 未經輯錄, 2011年9月7日))。妻子須說服本席她欲提出的上訴是有合理的勝訴機會,或有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,本席才應批准發出上訴許可。

5. 換句話說,雖然妻子無需證明其上訴極有可能得直,但必須向法庭闡明: 她的上訴理據具有勝算的條件,因此需要開庭審理。

6. 倘若上訴牽涉原審法庭行使酌情權的判決,上訴法庭衹會在原審法官犯了原則性錯誤、錯誤理解或忽畧考慮相關證據或事情、錯誤考慮不相關事情、或作出超越合理行使酌情權範圍内的決定之情況下才會干預:譚訴黃 ([2019] HKCA 786,第18段)。故此,如妻子在本申請中所依賴的理據涉及本席行使酌情權的範疇,她便必須清楚指出本席的判決犯了上述錯誤當中的哪一類。

討論

妻子的上訴文件

7. 妻子在本申請中呈交了數份文件(「上訴文件」)。在這些文件中,部份內容是有明確指出妻子就該判決書的哪一些段落提出異議。本席在下文將會就這些內容逐一討論及處理。

8. 但是,除上述外,妻子在上訴文件中亦花了不少篇幅闡述婚姻期間的一些往事,指控丈夫在訴訟六年期間進行了很多不同的法律程序及不斷更換律師代表,甚至將部份本席在審訊時拒絕接納為供詞的陳述書(見下文第12段)再次呈交。上述內容都和本上訴無關,所以本席不予考慮。

9. 此外,她亦在上訴文件中,提出了一些和《婚姻法律程序與財產條例》(香港法例第192章)第7條所提及的事項有關的證供,並就丈夫的誓詞作出了回應。由於本案已經審結,故此,妻子在現階段才提出該些證供已經是太遲。除此之外,該些證供和回應所提及的事情都不是剛剛發生的,妻子本應在根據法庭於2020年4月3日及9月7日所作的命令存檔誓詞時便應把握機會將該些內容包括在內,但奈何她沒有這樣做。基於以上原因,本席不會考慮那些新的證供。本席亦認為,即使妻子在上訴時申請批准呈交新的證據,這申請亦沒有合理的成功機會。

該判決書第8 – 9段及12– 17段

10. 上述段落是有關妻子違反「除非令」的事宜。

11. 在妻子的「上訴理由擬本」中,她仍然堅持自己於2020年9月24日已經將她的「文件」於法庭存檔。她聲稱法庭只片面聆聽丈夫的大律師在法庭所作的報告。言下之意,她的上訴理據是法庭沒有理會她的解釋。

12. 就妻子是否有根據「除非令」[1]的要求,於2020年9月28日下午4時或之前於法庭存檔誓詞這問題,本席在該判決書第13段已經闡述:本席只是在本案的來往文件記錄(Correspondence)中,找到一份妻子的陳述書(「該陳述書」)。毫無疑問地,該文件(i) 並非一份誓詞; (ii) 沒有正式存檔; (iii) 沒有於限期前向丈夫一方送達[2]。換句話說,妻子違反「除非令」這結論,是本席在翻看法庭文件及檔案之後作出的,故此,並不存在妻子所稱法庭只考慮丈夫一方說法的情況。

13. 此外,正如本席於該判決書第13段指出,該陳述書的大部份內容,都和附屬濟助審訊沒有直接關係。她只是在該陳述書中抒發自己的一些情感、陳述一些和審訊需要處理的議題無關的陳年往事以及就案件多年來都未能審結表達不滿。至於和審訊有關係的部份,則是妻子就丈夫的資產提出了一些疑問,但她卻沒有提出任何證供。總括而言,妻子沒有在該陳述書中,根據法庭的要求,涵蓋所有她於審訊時就《婚姻法律程序與財產條例》(香港法例第192章)第7條所提及的事項欲提出的證供。就這點而言,妻子在本上訴許可申請中,並沒有質疑本席就該陳述書的內容的不足所作出的結論,亦沒有否認她沒有以誓詞方式呈交該陳述書及於限期後才向丈夫一方作出送達。故此,妻子在有關違反「除非令」這判決而言,並沒有任何可爭辯之處。

該判決書第26 – 28段

14. 本席在該判決書第28段解釋了法庭在考慮了什麼因素之後,決定在妻子自行離開法庭後繼續進行審訊。

15. 妻子在她的上訴理據中,並沒有提出任何理據否定該些因素,又或指出法庭在作出這涉及案件管理的決定時,犯了甚麼錯誤。妻子似乎只是指控法庭在她缺席的情況下並沒有繼續進行審訊,因為她指稱在她其後回到法庭的時候,審訊已經完結。

16. 妻子所稱法庭並沒有進行審訊便信納丈夫一方立場,並偏袒有大律師代表的一方這說法,明顯和事實不符,因為丈夫在事實上的確是有在妻子自行離開法庭後宣誓作供; 而本席於考慮本案的所有證據後,並沒有跟從丈夫一方的建議(丈夫建議只將出售前婚姻居所所得平分)。

17. 因此,這上訴論點並無事實基礎支持。

該判決書第43– 46段

18. 本席在該判決書第43 – 46段解釋了為何不接納妻子有兩筆總數為155,000元的債務。妻子不服這裁定,並在上訴文件中為這些債務及為何用私人公司股份證明書作為債務支持文件提供了解釋。如前所述,本席不應該亦不會接納妻子在現階段才提出的證據。

該判決書第47段

19. 妻子不同意法庭就丈夫的資產及負債的裁定,並指出丈夫所申報的保險單、退休金及公積金都不是真實的數目。

20. 本席在該判決書第47段就丈夫資產價值及負債的裁定,是基於丈夫所存檔的經濟狀況陳述書及其他置於本席席前的證據而作出。妻子在收到上述經濟狀況陳述書後,並沒有就丈夫所申報的資料提出任何質疑,亦未有就這些資產及負債要求存檔及送達問卷。故此,她是沒有理據在現階段才就丈夫的資產及負債提出疑問,並在沒有基礎的情況下指稱有關的資產價值「不是真實的數目」。

該判決書第63段

21. 本席在考慮妻子的經濟需要時,拒絕將妻子所報稱需要「幫助有困難的人」這項目計算在內。妻子不同意這決定,並在上訴文件中披露她以前曾經幫助別人的事蹟。首先,這是新的證供,所以本席不應該考慮這些事情。其次,雖然本席同意幫助別人是一種美德,但在原則上,這一項支出不應計算在經濟需要之內。

22. 因此,這上訴論點並無合理的勝訴機會。

該判決書第67段

23. 本席在作出附屬濟助命令決定的過程中,考慮了妻子並非完全沒有工作能力,不過可能需要一段時間才可以重新投身市場,賺取收入。

24. 妻子不同意這判決,但是她從來都沒有提出過任何專家證據證明自己的精神狀況。雖然本席接納她有情緒問題並需要服食精神科藥物,但單憑這一點,並不足以證明她是完全喪失了謀生能力。

25. 事實上,她自己亦承認,即使是在訴訟期間,她亦曾工作並且嘗試發展自己的生意。

26. 因此,這上訴論點並無合理的勝訴機會。

該判決書第70及73段

27. 該判決書第70及73段是有關本席就丈夫及兒子開支的裁定。妻子在其上訴文件中,回應了丈夫就審訊而存檔的誓詞在這方面的論述。本席在上文已經解釋,法庭在這階段不會考慮這些新的證供。

28. 此外,由於丈夫已經向法庭承諾: 在兒子完成職業訓練之前,將會承擔兒子的所有生活所需及支付兒子正在修讀的廚師訓練課程的學費,故此,妻子根本不需要就丈夫所申報的兒子開支提出質疑。

該判決書第68 – 69段及81– 85段

29. 在考慮所有相關情況後,本席在該判決書中下令將前婚姻居所出售,並將出售樓宇的淨收益及其他家庭資產分配予雙方: 妻子佔六成,而丈夫則佔四成。

30. 妻子認為法庭不應該令她的生活有任何變化。她又指出由於丈夫已經接近退休,他的工作能力和財力都不適合繼續負擔兩個家庭,所以她認為解決問題的唯一方法,就是不將前婚姻居所變賣,讓丈夫可以隨時搬回前婚姻居所居住。

31. 正如本席在該判決書指出,為了分割資產,經考慮家庭資產的淨值及組成元素後,唯一合理可行的方法就是將前婚姻居所出售,否則丈夫根本沒有其他資產足以在不影響兒子福祉的情況下將總婚姻資產六成分配給妻子。

32. 妻子在上訴文件中三番四次強調法庭應該維持她離婚前的生活水平。雖然這是法庭必須考量的因素之一,但這並非代表在離婚後雙方必定仍然能夠百分之百維持之前的生活水平。在本案中,丈夫已經清楚向法庭提出證據,證明自己的收入在過去數年有所下降,而本席在該判決書中亦已指出,丈夫已經年近六十,所以他在不會太遙遠的將來亦會退休。事實上妻子在上訴文件中亦承認這一點。

33. 此外,本席必須指出︰於雙方履行本席的判決內各項命令後,妻子將會收取總共超過590萬元[3]。倘若妻子能善用這筆款項,她的生活應該可以維持在合理的水平。

結論

34. 基於上述分析,本席認為妻子在她欲提出的上訴中沒有合理的勝訴機會,故此拒絕她的上訴許可的申請。

訟費

35. 由於妻子未能成功取得上訴許可,她理應向丈夫支付本申請的訟費。

36. 丈夫一方認為法庭應當按彌償基準來評定有關訟費。雖然本席駁回妻子的申請,但本席認為在本案中並沒有足夠的理據按此基準評定訟費。

37. 本席將丈夫在本申請的訟費經簡易評定為25,000元。此筆款項須在丈夫於向妻子支付出售前婚姻居所淨收益中扣除。

 (歐陽浩榮)
 區域法院法官

呈請人: 無律師代表,親自行事

答辯人: 由李定匡 黃皓駿律師事務所委聘麥晶晶大律師代表


[1] 於2020年9月7日發出

[2] 妻子於審訊時亦承認這一點

[3] 根據丈夫所提交專家報告內有關前婚姻居所的估值計算

[2020] HKFC 245-CH-2020-11-27

崔 對 李

HTML content

FCMC 17031/2014

[2020] HKFC 245

香港特別行政區

區域法院

婚姻訴訟編號2014年第17031號

________________________

有關  
 崔呈請人
 及 
 李答辯人

________________________

主審法官:區域法院法官歐陽浩榮內庭聆訊(非公開)
審訊日期:2020年10月27日
判決書日期:2020年11月27日

-------------------------

判決書

(附屬濟助)

-------------------------

本審訊

1. 這是有關呈請人(「妻子」)申請附屬濟助的審訊。

背景

2. 妻子現年44歲。她與答辯人(「丈夫」)於1998年結婚。根據她所提交的經濟狀況陳述書,她在2015年時曾經擔任兼職普通話導師,但她聲稱自己於2016年6月28日開始失業。她其後曾開設中醫診所[1],現在是一名家庭主婦。她現時仍然居住在前婚姻居所。

3. 丈夫現年59歲,職業是保險公司部門主管。他在妻子申請離婚後已經搬離前婚姻居所,並搬到自行租下的單位居住。

4. 丈夫和妻子婚後育有一名兒子,他剛滿20歲,正在修讀廚師課程。

5. 妻子於2014年12月27日存檔呈請書,以丈夫的「不合理行為」為基礎要求法庭頒令解除雙方的婚姻。丈夫其後於2015年3月6日存檔交相呈請書,以同樣的基礎要求法庭頒令離婚。法庭最終於2016年10月28日頒下暫准離婚判令。

6. 在其後兩年,雙方出席了數次關於子女的約見聆訊及首次約見聆訊,但一直未能就兒子及財務的安排達成共識。在案件押後期間,法庭在雙方同意的情況下,亦曾下令索取關於兒子精神狀況的專家報告。直至兒子於2018年11月年滿十八歲後,雙方才開始集中處理附屬濟助事宜。

7. 雙方其後於2019年7月18日出席了排解財務糾紛聆訊,可惜仍然未能達成和解。

8. 在2020年4月3日,法庭指示雙方於42天內(即2020年5月15日或之前)於法庭存檔及向對方送達經更新的經濟狀況陳述書及誓詞,並要求雙方須於該誓詞內涵蓋所有他/她於審訊時就《婚姻法律程序與財產條例》(香港法例第192章)第7條所提及的事項欲提出的證供,並將審訊日期定於2020年10月22日開始[2]。

9. 由於妻子並沒有根據上述指示存檔及送達經更新的經濟狀況陳述書或誓詞,法庭於是在2020年9月7日進行的審前覆核中向她發出「除非令」。此命令明確要求妻子必須於2020年9月28日下午4時或之前於法庭存檔及向對方送達上述文件,否則她便不得存檔上述文件。

審訊的進行

10. 案件在2020年10月27日開審。

11. 在雙方出庭作供前,本席先處理兩件事項:

(i) 首先,是有關代表丈夫的麥大律師向法庭報告,妻子並沒有根據上述「除非令」的要求依時存檔及送達經更新的經濟狀況陳述書及誓詞;

(ii) 其次,是有關丈夫所存檔就妻子所發出的問卷的回覆書。

妻子的誓詞

12. 根據法庭紀錄,妻子的確並沒有根據審前覆核的「除非令」存檔任何誓詞。丈夫的一方亦向法庭指出,代表丈夫的律師事務所是於2020年10月8日才經郵遞方式收到一份妻子的陳述書,但此份文件並非是用誓詞方式草擬,亦未經妻子宣誓確認內容的真確性。

13. 另一方面,妻子堅稱他在2020年9月24日已經將她的陳述書送交法庭,並質疑為何法庭沒有紀錄。本席其後於本案件的來往文件紀錄(Correspondence)中找到妻子的陳述書。這是一份未經宣誓的文件,未被正式存檔,內容亦並非根據上述「除非令」及2020年4月3日的命令之要求來準備。此陳述書的大部份內容都和本附屬濟助審訊沒有直接關係,而只是妻子的一些情感抒發、陳述一些和本審訊需要處理的議題無關的陳年往事以及就案件多年來都未能審結表達不滿。至於和本審訊有關係的部份,則是妻子就丈夫的資產提出了一些疑問。

14. 由於妻子是違反了「除非令」,故此,除非妻子作為失責的一方向法庭取得寬免,否則上述命令的懲罰條款便具有效力。根據《區域法院規則》第2號命令第5條規則的規定,如果妻子希望獲得寬免,她是必須向法庭提出申請,並輔以證據支持,但她並沒有這樣做。

15. 不過,即使妻子正式提出此項申請,本席亦不會寬免上述懲罰條款,理由如下:

(i) 妻子說她在2020年9月24日於家事法庭登記處呈交上述文件時,登記處職員並沒有要求她以誓詞方式準備文件,並說如果該職員沒有叫她這樣做,她是無從得知這要求。本席不接納這說法。首先,本席在2020年9月7日進行的審前覆核中,已經明確向妻子解釋法庭的要求。故此,她必定已經清楚她所需要呈交的是一份誓詞,亦知道違反「除非令」的後果。其次,正如代表丈夫的麥大律師指出,妻子在過去六年,即使是在她沒有法律代表期間,亦曾經存檔過很多份誓詞,因此,她是清楚知道如何根據有關程序行事。再者,遵照法庭指示行事是訴訟人自己的責任。妻子絕對不可以諉過於登記處職員。既然妻子所提交的文件是以「陳述書」作為標題,登記處職員不將這份文件正式存檔是無可厚非。妻子不應期望或要求登記處職員翻查法庭命令,核實妻子當時是根據法庭命令行事。

(ii) 就妻子沒有在「除非令」訂明的限期前將文件送達予丈夫的法律代表,她的解釋是她想給予丈夫一方多一點時間考慮和解。本席認為這理由是完全不合理。

(iii) 即使法庭批准妻子將她呈交的陳述書當作是她的證人供詞並在本審訊中使用,這份文件亦對她的附屬濟助申請毫無幫助。正如上文所述,這份陳述書的內容大多和本審訊需要處理的議題無關。至於妻子在陳述書中向丈夫提出了一些有關他的資產的疑問,本席認為這些問題應該在妻子的問卷中提出(事實上她亦已經有這樣做)。更重要的是,妻子並沒有在這份陳述書中就該些資產提出任何案情,而只是提出疑問,而這些疑問根本不可以被視為證據。

16. 雖然法庭一般而言都會對沒有法律代表的一方有多一點的忍耐和包容,希望親自行事的訴訟人不會因為對法律程序的不認識而導致利益受損,不過,這些忍耐和包容都必須是基於符合秉行公正的原則來給予的。法庭必須注意在忍耐和包容的同時,決不可反而對有法律代表的一方構成不公。

17. 基於以上原因,本席同意丈夫一方的陳詞,拒絕讓妻子在本審訊中依賴她的陳述書。

丈夫的回覆書

18. 妻子曾經於2019年4月2日就丈夫提交的經濟狀況陳述書發出了一份問卷。丈夫其後於2019年4月15日存檔了一份回覆書。奇怪的是這一份回覆書所引述及回答的問題卻並非完全是妻子所提出的問題。本席於審訊開始時,先向丈夫的一方提出這一情況,而麥大律師於索取指示後,雖然未能解釋為何會出現這情況,但她確認如有需要,丈夫可以在審訊當天立即提交另一份回覆書。

19. 本席其後轉而詢問妻子: 倘若丈夫在審訊當天把經更新的回覆書交給她,她大概需要多少時間作出考慮。雖然本席已經嘗試不斷重複將情況向妻子解釋,但她一直都沒有直接回答本席的問題。她一時說不需要丈夫再呈交任何回覆書; 一時又返回上述有關誓詞的議題上,並說如果法庭批准她使用上述陳述書,她便不需要丈夫再呈交任何回覆書; 一時又說丈夫必須要回答她在問卷中所提及的所有問題。

20. 由於妻子在聆訊期間變得情緒不穩,甚至一度意圖在庭上將物件扔向丈夫,故此法庭曾經休庭一段時間,讓妻子可以回復冷靜。不過,在下午重新開庭後,妻子仍然沒有就上述問題作出直接及確定的回應。她只是不斷重複指責法庭沒有盡早把本案審結,並拖延了六年時間。

21. 雖然本席已經不斷向妻子解釋,法庭需要知道妻子就丈夫的回覆書的立場,才能夠決定是否可以立即繼續審訊程序,但她的立場始終不斷搖擺不定,而最後更加自行離開法庭(見下文)。

22. 雖然妻子離開了法庭,但本席認為仍然需要考慮法庭是否應該下令丈夫存檔另一份回覆書。

23. 經詳細考慮後,本席認為不需要作出這命令,原因是雖然丈夫的回覆書並不是嚴格地根據妻子的問卷問題之次序來作答,但經細心考慮丈夫所提供的回覆以及他在第九份誓詞[3]所提供的證據,本席認為丈夫已經回答了妻子所提出所有他需要回答的問題。

24. 丈夫所沒有回答的只有三個問題:

(i) 第一個問題是有關丈夫所賣掉的深圳物業所得資金的去向。經翻查妻子存檔的抗辯書及交相呈請書的回覆書,本席發現這物業早於2007年已經被賣出,當時距離雙方分居的日期( 2014年12月[4])有最少7年時間。除非妻子能夠提出一些站得住腳的基礎,否則法庭一般不會要求訴訟另外一方披露年代那麼久遠的進一步資料。

(ii) 第二個問題是問丈夫為什麼將一些保單寫上兒子的名字。這顯然不是有關資產披露的要求。故此,丈夫根本無需作答。

(iii) 第三個問題是問關於雙方在調解期間丈夫所提及的一些承諾或陳述。由於該等承諾或陳述都是在不損害雙方利益的情況下提出,所以妻子是不應該在調解失敗後在法庭文件提及該些事宜。

25. 基於以上原因,本席認為即使不命令丈夫提交一份經更新的回覆書,本審訊亦得以公平公正地進行。

妻子於審訊期間的行為

26. 正如上文指出,妻子在審訊期間一直都沒有直接回答本席的問題。她的立場亦經常搖擺不定。為了確保她不會因為一時之間說錯話、表達不清、一時之氣或者因拿不定主意而導致自己的利益受損或被誤解,在妻子就法庭提出的問題給予了一個答案之後,本席一般都會重複她的答案並要求她確認。可惜,妻子很多時都只會自說自話。除了遷怒於丈夫之外,她又不斷怪責法庭不肯就她的申請立即開審和作出判決,並拖延了六年時間。縱使本席花了很多時間向她解釋法庭的要求以及她需要回答的問題,她很少會直接回答法庭所提出的問題; 即使有作出回答,當本席要求她確認自己所給予的答案時,她又會改變主意。雖然本席表明在處理完有關丈夫的回覆書的問題便會立即展開審訊,但妻子卻拒絕合作,結果浪費了法庭及丈夫一方不少時間。

27. 在審訊當天的早上,由於妻子情緒激動,本席曾經休庭,好讓她能夠平復心情。在下午恢復聆訊之後大約半小時,妻子突然在與本席對答期間說:「算啦,我唔想同你講,我走嘞⋯⋯」,並隨即將她帶來法庭的文件及物品全部放進她自己的行李篋內,然後便拖着行李篋離開了法庭。

28. 於考慮以下因素後,本席決定在妻子缺席的情況下繼續進行審訊:

(i) 妻子在審訊中途自行離開法庭,完全是她自己的決定。

(ii) 由於她已經將所有自己帶到法庭的物品帶離法庭,所以本席推論她是已經決定不會重返法庭參與審訊。

(iii) 即使本席將審訊押後至翌日,法庭亦無法將書面通知及時發送給妻子; 而事實上,即使可以用其他方法通知妻子,本席亦不知道妻子是否會出席該審訊。

(iv) 倘若法庭將審訊押後,並另定日子再進行審訊,由於法庭日誌已經編排了不少其他案件,這經押後的審訊最少都需要差不多半年後才可進行。這明顯會對丈夫構成不公,亦會耽誤案件的進度; 而事實上,即使審訊押後進行,本席亦不知道妻子是否會出席該審訊。

(v) 由於審訊是進度指標日期,所以法庭不應該隨便把審訊押後。

(vi) 本席注意到家事法庭另一位法官曾經於2019年8月30日指示法定代表律師考慮是否需要任命起訴監護人代表妻子。法定代表律師已經就此於2019年1月2日回覆法庭: 雖然法定代表律師認為妻子有足夠精神行為能力明白本婚姻訴訟的程序,但她亦證實妻子的確是被診斷為躁狂抑鬱症患者。不過本席認為即使如此,法庭亦不能因為妻子的病歷,而輕易將審訊押後。事實上,妻子的離去亦不一定和她的病情有關。經衡量雙方的利益及善用法庭資源的需要後,本席認為不應該把審訊押後。

妻子的要求

29. 妻子並沒有呈交任何公開建議書或開案陳詞。她曾經存檔過四份經濟狀況陳述書。在第一份表格E[5]中,她要求丈夫在離婚後兩個月內向她支付600萬元,並在其後每個月向她支付40,000元,其中30,000萬元作為她的贍養費,另外10,000元作為兒子的贍養費。在她的第三份表格E[6]中,她則要求丈夫轉移財產,同時收回他在深圳為婚姻第三者購買的房子。不過她並沒有說清楚所謂「轉移財產」是指甚麼財產。

丈夫的建議

30. 丈夫於審前覆核時,提交了一份爭議事項陳述書。當時他的立場是希望把前婚姻居所賣出,然後將賣樓淨收益平分予雙方。他的代表大律師在書面開案陳詞中仍然維持此建議。

31. 不過,麥大律師在開案陳詞階段回答法庭的提問時接受: 法庭在分配婚姻資產時,原則上不應該只分配出售前婚姻居所的淨收益,而應將丈夫的其他資產都同時作出分配。故此,她同意如果法庭接納丈夫平均分配資產的建議的話,丈夫除了需要將賣樓淨收益的一半支付給妻子之外,他亦需要額外再向妻子支付大約130萬元。

處理附屬濟助之法律原則

32. 在處理附屬濟助申請時,法庭首先要考慮香港法例第192章《婚姻法律程序與財產條例》(「該條例」)第7條的條文。就本案而言,法庭只須考慮該條例第7(1)及(2)條:

「7.法庭在決定根據第4、5及6條作出何種命令時須顧及的事宜

(1) 法庭在決定應否就婚姻的一方而根據第4、6或6A條行使權力,以及若行使該等權力則應採取何種方式時,有責任顧及婚姻雙方的行為和案件的所有情況,包括顧及下列事宜─

(a) 婚姻雙方各別擁有的或在可預見的將來相當可能擁有的收入、謀生能力、財產及其他經濟來源;

(b) 婚姻雙方各自面對的或在可預見的將來相當可能面對的經濟需要、負擔及責任;

(c) 該家庭在婚姻破裂前所享有的生活水平;

(d) 婚姻雙方各別的年齡和婚姻的持續期;

(e) 婚姻的任何一方在身體上或精神上的無能力;

(f) 婚姻雙方各別為家庭的福利而作出的貢獻,包括由於照料家庭或照顧家人而作出的貢獻;

(g) 如屬離婚或婚姻無效的法律程序,則顧及婚姻的任何一方因婚姻解除或廢止而將會喪失機會獲得的任何利益(例如退休金)的價值。

(2) 在不損害第(3)款的規定下,法庭在決定應否就家庭子女而根據第5、6或6A條行使權力,以及若行使該等權力則應採取何種方式時,有責任顧及案件的所有情況,包括顧及下列事宜─

(a) 該子女的經濟需要;

(b) 該子女的收入、謀生能力(如有的話)、財產及其他經濟來源;

(c) 該子女在身體上或精神上的無能力;

(d) 該家庭在婚姻破裂前所享有的生活水平;

(e) 該子女當時所受到的和婚姻雙方期望該子女所受到的教育方式;

並且有責任盡量在切實可行範圍內,以及在顧及第(1)(a)及(b)款所述有關婚姻雙方的考慮因素後在盡可能公正的情況下,行使該等權力,使該子女享有某程度的經濟狀況,而該經濟狀況是該婚姻若非破裂和該婚姻的雙方若能恰當履行對該子女的經濟負擔及責任,該子女本可享有者。」

33. 終審法院在LKW v DD (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537一案中,就應該如何考慮該條例第7(1)條的事宜,確立了4個基本原則和5個步驟的處理方法。該4個基本原則分別是:

(1) 該條例第7條所述各事項的隱含目的是要達至在雙方之間公平的資產分配;

(2) 法庭須排除一切性別或角色的歧視,例如不應偏袒賺錢養家的一方,而對持家和照顧子女的一方有偏見;

(3) 為了消除潛在的歧視和確保公平,法庭就如何分配資產有初步構想時,應該以「平均分割準則」檢查這些構想,並且必定要有充分和清楚表達的理由才應該不依從平均準則;及

(4) 法庭不應讓任何人試圖費錢耗時去審查某段失敗婚姻的往事。這樣的審查往往徒勞無功,且很可能大大消耗雙方(和法庭) 的資源,以及增加敵意和阻礙和解。

34. 終審法院定下的5個步驟依次序為:

(1) 確定資產 – 法庭首先要確定婚姻的每一方在聆訊時的經濟資源。根據該條例第7(1)(a)條,法庭必須顧及「雙方各別擁有的或在可預見的將來相當可能擁有的收入、謀生能力、財產及其他經濟來源」,目的是在考慮所有具關鍵性的負債後,計算出淨經濟資源。在這階段,法庭無須試圖區分婚姻財產和非婚姻財產(如有必要,該步驟最好是在考慮如何分配資產時才進行);

(2) 評估雙方的經濟需要 – 第二步是要評估雙方各自面對或在可預見的將來相當可能面對的經濟需要、負擔和責任。經濟需要是相對的,生活水平也是因人而異。評估經濟需要時,法庭應該「寬大地詮釋」有關需要,並考慮有關人士的年齡、健康情況和已習慣的生活水平。法庭考慮該條例第7條所述各事項時,通常到這一步便停止,因為總資產可能不夠使法庭進展到下一步,或者甚至不夠滿足雙方的需要。如果是這樣,便沒有條件運用任何分享原則,而「需要」便成為了決定性因素。在這情況下,雙方或許不可以有「清楚了斷」,而可能需要法庭作出定期付款命令;

(3) 決定運用分享原則– 如果在照顧雙方的需要之後會有剩餘資產,一般來說,下一步應該是法庭把分享原則運用於雙方的總資產,並把先前考慮過的「需要」問題按照這個原則處理。換言之,法庭不應即刻作出分配,而應該把雙方的需要連同以下第四步和第五步裡的所有其他重要因素一併處理;

(4) 考慮有沒有充分理由不作出平均分割 – 法庭須考慮在一件案件當中,有沒有足夠理據將天平從平均這一點移至別的一點。雖然該條例第7(1)條(a)段至(g)段的各事項中任何一項、雙方的行為及案件的所有情況,無論是個別一個還是合起來,都有可能導致法庭不作出平均分割,但即使法庭裁定這些因素之中有一個或多於一個適用於某案件,這亦並不必然代表法庭須不作出平均分割。由於每件案件的案情都有其獨特性,法庭決定是否平均分割時亦牽涉酌情權的運用,所以分享原則決不可機械式地被運用;

(5) 決定結果– 最後一步便是法庭在考慮各項有關的因素後,酌情決定對這些因素給予甚麼分量,並決定是否作出平均分割雙方資產。如果法庭不作出平均分割,便應該說明根據甚麼作此決定,因為說明理由有助於查核案件的結果是否公平。

35. 本席現根據上述原則及步驟處理妻子的申請。

確定資產

妻子的資產

36. 在本案中,妻子一共存檔了四份經濟狀況陳述書,首兩份於2015年存檔,而第三及第四份則分別在2018年3月及9月存檔。正如上文所述,妻子並沒有根據法庭的命令,於審訊前存檔一份更新的經濟狀況陳述書。在這情況下,本席只能根據妻子的最後一份表格E來考慮她的財務狀況。

37. 根據妻子於2018年9月26日存檔的的經濟狀況陳述書,她當時有銀行存款13,267元。

38. 丈夫一方根據妻子2018年9月份的銀行月結單結餘(23,503元)來批評妻子少報了銀行存款金額。本席不明白為何丈夫會這樣做。該份月結單只顯示妻子的銀行戶口直至2018年9月15日的情況。但是,根據銀行於2018年10月16日發出的月結單,妻子在2018年9月26日的儲蓄戶口結餘只剩下13,435.96元。連同她在往來戶口的67.04元結餘,她在存檔經濟狀況陳述書當天是只有13,503元結餘在銀行戶口內。雖然妻子的確是少報了236元,但這明顯是微不足道。

39. 無論如何,由於金額不多,妻子存檔最後一份經濟狀況陳述書的時候至今亦已超過兩年,再加上代表丈夫的麥大律師在結案陳詞中亦沒有將妻子的銀行存款計算作為家庭資產的一部份,故此,本席不會將此筆款項考慮在內。

40. 丈夫在其誓詞指出,在婚姻期間,妻子曾經強迫他購買金飾或貴重物品,但現在那些金飾全部都已經不知去向。丈夫曾就此於問卷中向妻子作出提問,妻子的答案是她已經將所有丈夫曾購買給她的珠寶、金飾及貴重物品全部送給親戚朋友或者被賣掉。

41. 雖然丈夫一方在結案陳詞時指出妻子的說法不可信,不過他在陳詞總結時同意: 法庭在計算家庭資產時,只計算丈夫一方的資產價值。故此,本席決定不將妻子曾經於第二及第三份經濟狀況陳述書申報的「鑽石戒指」計算在家庭資產內。

42. 除此之外,妻子在最後一份表格E第2.9部份列出有兩筆總數為155,000元的「尚未收回欠款」。不過她在第二部份的「資產及債務總結」中,卻將此筆款額列為「債務總值」,並因而申報自己的資產淨值為-141,733元。

43. 丈夫曾經以問卷方式要求妻子就上述欠款提供相關欠款日期、目的、收取借款方式及相關文件證據。妻子在回覆書內的解釋是她曾經在灣仔和深圳開設中醫診所,因而欠別人和家人的金錢。不過,她所提供的證據,卻是兩張由他人持有的私人公司股份證明書。其中一張證明書上的註冊股東名字和妻子聲稱的其中一位欠款人的名字的譯音相同,但欠款金額和證書上註明的股份價值卻不一樣;而另外一張股份證明書上的名字則和妻子聲稱的另一位債權人名字完全不同。

44. 此外,沒有證據證明此間私人公司和妻子所開設的中醫診所有甚麼關係。

45. 由於以上原因,上述兩張證明書並不足以成為證明妻子欠他人款項的證據。因此,本席不接受妻子有任何欠債。

46. 總括而言,本席在此審訊中會把妻子的淨資產當作0元來處理。

丈夫的資產

47. 丈夫在本案中申報的資產及負債如下:

資產:
前婚姻居所
7,311,497[7]元
銀行戶口存款
139,794元
股票
11,387元
保險單
2,515,754元
退休金 / 強制性公積金
745,981元
負債:
信用卡欠款
860,389元
9,864,024元
=========

48. 由於妻子在丈夫於法庭作供之前已經自行離開法庭,所以丈夫就他的資產問題並沒有接受妻子的盤問。

49. 經考慮丈夫所存檔的文件,本席接受他所申報的上述數額。

家庭總資產

50. 家庭總資產總值為9,864,024元。

雙方的經濟需要

妻子的經濟需要

51. 在妻子最後一份表格E中,並沒有申報任何一般開支。

52. 至於有關兒子的費用方面,妻子只填報了一項「午餐及零用錢」大約2,500元至3,000元。由於丈夫透過大律師向法庭承諾會繼續負擔有關兒子的費用,故此,本席將不考慮上述項目作為妻子支出的一部份。

53. 根據妻子的最後一份經濟狀況陳述書,她的每月個人開支如下:

外出膳食費用
6,000元
交通費
1,600元
服裝/ 鞋費
6,000元
個人儀容(包括理髮和化妝品)
5,000元
娛樂費/禮物
3,000元
醫療/ 牙齒護理費
800元
供養父母
4,000元
供養其他受養家屬
2,000元
幫助有困難的人
2,000元
總額
30,400元
 =======

外出膳食費用

54. 丈夫指出妻子的「外出膳食費用」在四份表格E中有不斷增加的情況。本席認為丈夫這說法有欠公允,因為在妻子的最後一份經濟狀況陳述書中,她並沒有填寫任何「食物開支」,故此,「外出膳食費用」已是妻子花費在食物上的所有開支。以一個月三十天來計算,妻子只是每天平均花費200元在一日三餐之上。本席認為這是一個合理的數額。

交通費

55. 本席認為妻子填報的每月1,600元交通費屬合理。

服裝/ 鞋費

56. 妻子的經濟狀況陳述書指她每個月需花費6,000元在服裝和鞋履上。沒有證據顯示丈夫在婚姻期間每月都會提供如此大額的金錢供妻子花費在這些項目上。妻子亦沒有存檔任何誓詞解釋為何每月都需要如此花費。故此,本席不接受妻子有此經濟需要。本席在此項目只會計算每月1,000元。

個人儀容

57. 上述有關服裝及鞋履使費的分析亦適用於個人儀容。本席在此項目只會計算每月1,000元。

娛樂費/ 禮物

58. 妻子在此項目所申報的金額為3,000元。同樣地,她並沒有存檔任何誓詞解釋如何得出3,000元這數額,以及她將這3,000元用在甚麼地方。本席認為合理的數額是每月1,000元。

醫療/ 牙齒護理費

59. 丈夫一方並沒有就妻子每月800元的預算提出反對,本席亦認為這是一個合理的數額。

供養父母

60. 在妻子最後一份經濟狀況陳述書中,填報供養父母的金額為每月4,000元。此金額比過往三份表格E中的數字為高[8]。不過,她並沒有解釋任何原因。本席會採納每月3,000元為供養父母數額。

供養其他受養家屬

61. 妻子並沒有存檔任何誓詞解釋她為甚麼需要供養其他家屬。故此,本席不會將此項開支計算在其個人開支內。

幫助有困難的人

62. 本席不同意這項開支屬妻子的經濟需要。故此,本席不會將此項開支計算在個人開支內。

總結

63. 綜上,本席採納以下數額來計算妻子每月所需的個人開支:

外出膳食費用
6,000元
交通費
1,600元
服裝/鞋費
1,000元
個人儀容(包括理髮和化妝品)
1,000元
娛樂費/禮物
1,000元
醫療/牙齒護理費
800元
供養父母
3,000元
供養其他受養家屬
0元
幫助有困難的人
0元
總額
14,400元
=======

妻子的收入及謀生能力

64. 妻子和丈夫於1998年在內地註冊結婚,婚後在深圳居住,直至2004年才搬到香港。妻子在婚後初時並沒有工作。根據丈夫的說法,妻子在2007年開始教授普通話,並且考取了導遊牌照。妻子於2019年4月2日存檔的回覆書亦確認,她在2008年6月考取了普通話證書,而在她於2015年10月15日存檔的經濟狀況陳述書,亦曾申報自己的職業是兼職普通話教師,月入3,000元。不過,她在於2019年4月2日存檔的回覆書聲稱她已經在2016年6月28日開始失業。

65. 妻子在停止教授普通話之後,曾經報讀並取得香港大學進修學院的中醫物理治療養生文憑,並在其後於中環及灣仔開設中醫診所。不過她說這盤生意令她虧掉了自己全部的積蓄和保險金。

66. 妻子現年只有44歲。雖然她在過去二十多年大部份時間都沒有工作,但本席認為,她仍然有謀生能力,大前提是她的精神狀態有所好轉。本席相信這取決於妻子願意接受治療並且按照醫生的指示服藥。事實上,根據法定代表律師於2019年1月2日向法庭發出的函件,法定代表律師曾經和妻子通話,當時她的情緒穩定,對答亦有條理。本席寄望在婚姻訴訟完結之後,妻子不再受官司的纏繞,這會對她的病情帶來正面的影響。

67. 本席明白妻子的情況並非是一朝一夕可以改變,所以在考慮妻子的謀生能力時,會假設妻子在未來兩年仍然未能賺取任何收入。事實上,即使妻子重新投身市場,亦需要一段時間才會成功累積一定數量的學生。不過,在這段時間過後,只要妻子能有效控制病情,她應該有能力每月賺取不少於8,000元的收入,而隨着學生數量的累積,她應該有能力賺取更高的收入。

68. 根據上文的結論,妻子的每月個人支出是14,400元。按此計算,妻子在未來兩年的經濟需要是345,600元(14,400元x 24),其後她每月需要6,400元(14,400元– 8,000元)。但是,如前所述,她的收入有可能會隨年月有所增長。

69. 不過,倘若法庭根據丈夫的要求下令將前婚姻居所出售,妻子便需要另覓居所並繳付租金,她亦需要支付居所的其他相關開支(例如公共設施雜費)。粗略估計,妻子的經濟需要會每月增加大約20,000元。

丈夫的經濟需要

70. 丈夫在經濟狀況陳述書中所填報的開支如下:

一般開支
租金
15,500元
按揭供款(前婚姻居所)
35,257元
公共設施雜費
(前婚姻居所及丈夫自己的居所)
4,500元
管理費(前婚姻居所)
1,835元
食物開支
1,500元
雜項家用開支
1,000元
保險費(前婚姻居所)
800元
總額
60,392元
 =======
 
個人開支
外出膳食費用
5,000元
交通費
2,500元
服裝/ 鞋費
300元
個人儀容
300元
娛樂費/ 禮物
500元
稅款
6,503元
保險費
6,151元
中期贍養費
15,500元
寵物
300元
法律費用
10,000元
總額
47,054元
 =======
 
子女開支
學費
5,303元
上學交通費(包括校車)
1,000元
醫療/ 牙齒護理費
350元
課外活動費
400元
娛樂費/ 禮物
400元
假期消費
500元
服裝費/ 鞋費
800元
午餐及零用錢
2,800元
健身補充品/ 手機
500元
總額
12,053元
 =======

71. 在一般開支方面,倘若法庭接納丈夫的要求,下令將前婚姻居所出售,丈夫每月便可省回和前婚姻居所有關的按揭供款、管理費及保險費。他的每月一般開支將會下降至20,250元(15,500元+ 2,250元[9]+ 1,500元+ 1,000元)。

72. 個人開支方面,本席認為丈夫所填報的金額合理。扣除中期贍養費及法律費用,他的每月個人開支是21,554元。

73. 子女開支方面,丈夫指出他現時完全負擔兒子的所有生活所需及支付兒子正在修讀的廚師訓練課程的學費。丈夫承諾在兒子完成職業訓練之前將會繼續承擔上述費用。不過,由於兒子在明年便會完成職業訓練,所以丈夫在這方面的負擔相信會在來年終結。

74. 換句話說,即使在兒子完成訓練之前的這一年,丈夫每月的總支出亦不過是53,857元。在兒子畢業之後,丈夫的每月支出會進一步下降至41,804元。

丈夫的收入及謀生能力

75. 丈夫現年59歲,是一間保險公司的部門主管,月薪67,459元,另外亦會有公司酌情決定之花紅。在2019年4月1日至2020年3月31日這財政年度,他的平均每月收入為84,576元。

76. 丈夫在誓詞中表示香港大部份企業也會要求員工在60歲時退休,就算員工可以在60歲後繼續獲聘,也只會是以每年合約制方式被聘用。他亦說在明年他自己的年齡也接近大部份企業定下來的60歲退休年齡界限,如果不幸未能獲得續約機會,即使他能找到另一份工作,待遇亦很可能會只是現在的三分之一。

77. 首先,本席對於香港大部份企業是否真的以60歲為退休年齡有保留。其次,丈夫在誓詞中侃侃而談所謂「香港大部份企業」的員工退休年齡,但卻沒有說清楚他現在受僱的保險公司是否也是以60歲為退休年齡,更沒有呈交他的僱主的任何文件(例如僱員手册)以證明公司的政策。

78. 在上述情況下,本席不接受丈夫將會在兩年內到達退休年齡這説法。

79. 本席認為,丈夫應該最少都可以再工作5至6年。在這段期間,他的財政狀況應該會相當充裕。不過,本席同意丈夫在其後未必會繼續有謀生能力。

決定運用分享原則

80. 家庭的資產總凈值是9,864,024元。在考慮雙方的經濟需要後,本席認為仍有空間分配資產。

考慮是否平均分割資產及決定結果

81. 由雙方於1998年結婚直至2014年分居,前後經歷16年時間,屬於一段頗長的婚姻。

82. 雖然本席認為妻子是有可能賺取一定的收入,但畢竟這最終亦取決於妻子的精神狀況是否會有所好轉。在現階段而言,這存在一定的不確定性。

83. 另一方面,丈夫的謀生能力明顯比妻子高。不過,本席認為不容忽視的一點,是丈夫已經年近六十。雖然他不至於需要在一至兩年內退休,但總有一天他會停止工作,而這一天亦不會是太遙遠的事。

84. 於平衡雙方的經濟需要後,本席不接受麥大律師平分資產的建議。妻子可分得的資產百分比應略比丈夫為高。本席認為妻子應獲家庭資產的60%,而丈夫則獲40%。

85. 經考慮家庭資產的淨值及組成元素後,本席認為唯一合理可行的方法是將前婚姻居所出售,並將出售樓宇的淨收益分配予雙方。

86. 丈夫除了前婚姻居所外,大部份的資產都來自保險單,而其中數份保險單的受保人為兒子。為免丈夫或兒子的利益受損,本席將下令丈夫在出售婚姻居所後,才需要向妻子支付大部份她應得的款項。

87. 不過,由於妻子現正居住在前婚姻居所,為方便丈夫把樓宇出售,妻子須預早搬離前婚姻居所,並另覓新居。為確保妻子有足夠金錢支付新居的按金、租金、公共設施雜費及雜項家用開支,本席將下令丈夫先向妻子繳付30萬元,並在售樓交易完成後,才支付餘款。

88. 此外,由於法庭受該條例第25(1)(b)條所限,本席將頒下之售樓令須於法庭發出絕對離婚判令之後才能生效,另外本席亦需要給予丈夫一段合理的時間出售前婚姻居所,故此妻子仍然需要等待一段時間才能收到售樓淨收益。為保障妻子的生活,本席將下令法庭於2016年3月11日發出的訟案待決期間贍養費命令繼續維持有效,直至法庭發出絕對離婚判令為止。不過,基於本席於上述判詞中就妻子每月支出的判決,丈夫需要向妻子支付的訟案待決期間贍養費金額將減至每月$14,400。

命令

89. 本席現下令:

(1) 將法庭於2016年3月11日發出的訟案待決期間贍養費命令由2020年12月10日開始更改為每月14,400元,此命令有效期直至法庭發出絕對離婚判令為止;

(2) 丈夫須於絕對離婚判令發出後21天內向妻子支付港幣300,000元;

(3) 妻子須於絕對離婚判令發出後3個月內搬離前婚姻居所,並將該物業的空置管有權交予丈夫;

(4) 丈夫須於絕對離婚判令發出後6個月內在公開市場以市價出售前婚姻居所;

(5) 丈夫須於出售前婚姻居所之交易完成後14天內向妻子支付:

(i) 售樓淨收益(即售價扣除一切合理費用(包括律師費及地產代理佣金)及其他開支(包括欠下的差餉及地租))的60%;

(ii) 1,231,516.20元[10];

(6) 雙方可就執行本命令事宜提出進一步申請。

訟費

90. 由於沒有一方可以說是在本審訊中完全成功的一方,故此,本席認為合適的訟費命令是不作任何訟費命令(包括所有保留待決的訟費)。

91. 上述命令屬暫准性質,若在14天內沒有任何一方向法庭要求更改此訟費命令,此命令將隨即成為絕對命令。

第18條聲明

92. 最後,本席按《婚姻法律程序與財產條例》第18(1)(a)條發出聲明。

 (歐陽浩榮)
 區域法院法官

呈請人: 無律師代表,親自行事

答辯人: 由李定匡 黃皓駿律師事務所委聘麥晶晶大律師代表


[1] 參閲妻子於2019年4月2日存檔有關答辯人的問卷之回覆書

[2] 有關日期其後被更改為2020年10月27日

[3] 此份誓詞乃根據法庭於2020年4月3日發出的命令而存檔

[4] 根據雙方存檔的經濟狀況陳述書

[5] 於2015年1月6日存檔

[6] 於2018年3月21日存檔

[7] 根據專家報告,前婚姻居所的估值為10,270,000;按揭欠款為$2,958,503

[8] 在上述三份表格E中,妻子填報的金額分別為2,000元、3,500元及2,000元。不過妻子在第三份表格E中有清楚說明由於當時「資金不允許」,故此開支數字「暫時不準確」。

[9] 兩個居所平均計算

[10] 除前婚姻居所外的淨資產(139,794元 + 11,387元 + 2,515,754元 + 745,981元 – 860,389元) x 60% - 300,000元

106793-EN-2016-10-28

CKF v. LHL

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FCMC No.17031/2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 17031 OF 2014

____________

BETWEEN
 CKF Petitioner
and
 LHL Respondent

____________

Before: Deputy District Judge G. Own in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 23 August 2016
Date of Decision: 28 October 2016

_____________

D E C I S I O N
(Restoration of Injunction Summons/Committal Proceedings)

_____________


Introduction

1.  The Petitioner is the Wife (“Wife”) and the Respondent is the Husband (“Husband”).

2.  On 16 January 2015, the Husband applied ex parte for various injunctive reliefs against the Wife.   Upon the Undertaking to file and serve an Inter-Partes Summons on 20 January 2015 (“InjunctionSummons”), the Court granted an interim Order in the terms of the reliefs sought (with amendments) and scheduled a returnable date of 6 February 2015 for the Injunction Summons. 

3.  At the adjourned hearing on 6 February 2015, the Wife was represented by Messrs. Cheung & Liu, Solicitors.  Undertakings were given by the Wife in those terms identical to the injunctive reliefs sought and, accordingly and as in most cases, the Injunction Summons was adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.   As a matter of fact, there is another Undertaking given by the Wife (which does not form the Husband’s complaint in his Injunction Summons) not to discuss, talk about or inform the child of the family any matters in these divorce proceedings.   

4.  On 18 December 2015, the Husband filed his 4th Affirmation as an ex parte application seeking leave to issue Committal Proceedings against the Wife under Order 52 rule 2 of the Rules of the District Court, Cap.336H (“RDC”), for breach of those Undertakings given by her to the Court on 6 February 2015.   

5.  Whilst leave of the Court for issuing Committal Proceedings was pending, the Husband issued a further Summons (“Restoration Summons”) on 11 February 2016 seeking leave to restore the Injunction Summons.   The Restoration Summons was heard on 22 February 2016 and then adjourned to 18 April 2016 with directions as to the filing of affirmations from both parties.  

6.  On the 16 February 2016 (which is 5 days later), ex parte leave was granted to the Husband to issue Committal Proceedings. Pursuant to such leave, the Husband issued a Summons for Committal on 17 February 2016 (“Committal Summons”) with a returnable date of 18 April 2016, which coincides with the adjourned hearing of the Restoration Summons.

The Husband’s 2 Summonses

7.  Today’s hearing was scheduled for the trial of the Husband’s Restoration Summons and the Committal Summon with 2 days reserved.

8.  In light of the fact that the Wife has engaged lawyers and filed her Summons dated 17 August 2016 (“Setting Aside Summons”) and also returnable today, Husband’s Counsel Mr. Enzo Chow fairly agreed that the Wife’s Setting Aside Summons should first be disposed of prior to the trial of the Husband’s 2 Summonses.

The Wife’s “Setting Aside Summons”

9.  The terms of the Wife’s Setting Aside Summons are as follows :-

“1. The ex parte order for leave for the Respondent to make an application for an order of committal against the Petitioner dated 16February 2016 be set aside;

2. The Respondent’s inter parte originating summons dated 16 February 2016 (filed on 17 February 2016) be dismissed;

3. The hearing of the Respondent’s inter partes originating summons dated 16 February 2016 scheduled to be heard before Deputy District Judge George Own on 23 August 2016 and 24 August 2016 be vacated;

4. Costs of and incidental to this application be paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner;

5. Service of this Summons be abridged.”

The Wife’s application

10.  Counsel Miss Lareina J Chan (“Miss Chan”) appeared for the Wife.

11.  As to the Restoration Summons, Miss Chan’s submissions are that it should be dismissed.  Since it has been rightly conceded by Husband’s Counsel Mr. Chow that breach of an undertaking given to the Court is tentamount to a breach of an injunction (see §7 and 17 of Mr. Chow’s written submissions), the Husband is effectively seeking ‘double protection’ by issuing the Restoration Summons. Enforcement of Undertakings through restoration of the Injunction Summons under which the Undertakings were given is an abuse of process.

12.  The reason put forward by the Husband that the Wife could not be trusted to comply with her Undertakings or the Undertakings already given serve no meaningful purpose (see §21 and 23 of Mr. Chow’s written submissions), when considered against the Husband’s concession that breaches of undertakings and injunctions are synonymous, simply could not stand.   

13.  As to the Committal Summons, Miss Chan submitted that the committal proceedings are rendered a nullity and that it should be dismissed also.   The leave for issuing the committal proceedings should not have been granted at the outset for 2 reasons.   First, there are serious procedural deficiencies in the Husband’s application.    Secondly, any such procedural deficiencies constitute fundamental flaw in the committal proceedings which could not be cured or rectified.

14.  The Husband’s 4th Affirmation was filed on 18 December 2015 to seek leave to commence committal proceedings.   There was produced as an exhibit marked “LHL-25” which is an audio disc containing different files of dialogue between the Husband and the Wife on 2 November 2015, stored under file numbers WA0011, WA0013, WA0015, WA0016 and WA0025.  Transcripts for those telephone dialogues were also produced.    Within his 4th Affirmation, the Husband also referred to another exhibit “LHL-15” produced by him in his earlier Affirmation.   This exhibit “LHL-15” contained quotes of various SMS text messages allegedly sent by the Wife to the Husband in October 2015.    It was submitted that those recordings are deliberately out of context and carefully cherry-picked to paint a particular picture which, at best or at most, only reveal half of the real picture.   The Husband had failed in providing full and frank disclosure in his 4th Affirmation.

15.  Further, as so required by Order 52 rule 2(2) of the RDC, the Husband produced the requisite Statement (“Husband’s Statement”).

16.  The Wife’s challenges the Husband’s Statement in that it failed to provide sufficient particulars as to what exactly the Wife had done which constitutes the contempt so that the Wife could be able to know exactly what charges she has to meet.   There is simply no pleaded case in the Husband’s Statement except a wholly unparticularised reference to ‘repeated harassment and nuisance’ (多番騷擾和滋擾).

17.  Moreover, the Committal Summons issued pursuant to the leave granted also does not state the grounds in respect of which leave for making the ex part application has been granted. 

18.  Still further, the Husband could only be confined to his pleaded case in the Husband’s Statement and cannot go beyond it to rely on matters which had not been pleaded in the Husband’s Statement. There was no reference in the Husband’s Statement as to when, where, how the alleged repeated harassment and nuisance had happened.   Given the fact that there is no pleaded case in the Husband’s Statement save and except the only reference to ‘repeated harassment and nuisance’, he could not rely upon affidavit evidence to then supplement or provide details of the alleged harassment and nuisance in order to cure or rectify the fundamental flaw or defect in the Husband’s Statement.   The Husband’s Statement is, so submitted by Counsel Miss Chan, defective. 

19.  Since defects in the contents of the Statement under Order 52 rule 2 and/or the Committal Summons so issued are fundamentally flawed which cannot be cured by the supporting affirmation, the entire committal proceedings commenced would then be an irregular one and any orders made therein would be improperly obtained. 

The Husband’s opposition

20.  Counsel Mr. Enzo Chow (“Mr. Chow”) appeared for the Husband.

21.  Reference was made to the contumacious acts of the Wife as stated in the Husband’s 4th Affirmation.   At paragraph 10 of Counsel Mr. Chow’s written submissions, he narrated the 4 incidents complained of by the Husband. 

22.  Reference was also made to the absence of denial by the Wife, at any stage in the committal proceedings, of those matters being complained of by the Husband.   The Wife has had sufficient opportunity to file and serve affirmation in opposition to the Husband’s 2 Summonses and presented her case.   The Wife has, however, only filed an Affirmation dated 1 March 2016 which does not contain any matters relevant to the Husband’s 2 Summonses or revealed her case of opposition.

23.  Besides, the Wife also had never complained about the quality of the evidence produced by the Husband.  She and/her legal representatives could have raised the issue well in advance and far before the trial today.

24.  Finally, Mr. Chow also made a quick reference to Order 2 rule 2 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure as to the effects of non-compliance of the procedural rules.

The Applicable Law and Rules of Procedure

25.  First of all, there is no issue as to the applicable rules, in so far as the committal proceedings are concerned, are contained in Order 52 rules 2 and 3 of the Rules of the District Court, Cap.336H (“RDC”).

26.  Order 52 rule 2 provides :-

“(1) No application for an order of committal against any person may be made unless leave to make such an application has been granted in accordance with this rule.

(2) An application for such leave must be made ex parte to a judge, and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the name, description and address of the person sought to be committed and the grounds on which his committal is sought, and by an affidavit, to be filed before the application is made, verifying the facts relied on.

(3) The applicant must give notice of the application for leave not later than the preceding day to the Registrar and must at the same time lodge with the Registrar copies of the statement and affidavit.

(4) The judge may determine the application for leave without a hearing, unless a hearing is requested in the notice of application, and need not sit in open court; and in any case the Registrar shall serve a copy of the judge’s order on the applicant.

(5) Where an application for leave is refused by a judge or is granted on terms, the applicant may appeal against the jduge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 10 days after such order.

(6) Without prejudice to the powers conferred by Order 20, rule 8, the judge hearing an application for leave may allow the applicant’s statement to be amended on such terms, if any, as the judge thinks fit.

(7) If the judge grants leave he may impose such terms as to costs and as to giving of security as he thinks fit.”

27.   Order 52 rule 3 provides :-

“(1) When leave has been granted to make an application for an order of committal, the application shall be made by originating summons to a judge and unless the Court granting leave has otherwise directed, there must be at least 8 clear days between the service of the originating summons and the day named therein for the hearing.

(1A) The originating summons shall state the grounds in respect of which leave for making an application for an order of committal has been granted.

(2) Unless within 14 days after such leave was granted the originating summons is entered for hearing the leave shall lapse.

(3) The originating summons, accompanied by a copy of the statement and affidavit in support of the application for leave under rule 2, must be served personally on the person sought to be committed.

(4) Without prejudice to the powers of the Court under Order 65, rule 4, the Court may dispense with service of the originating summons under this rule if it thinks fit to do so.”

The Court’s Views

28.   I will deal with the Restoration Summons first.

29.   The necessity of issuing the Restoration Summons, as given by the Husband, is that the Wife could no longer be trusted with her words, or put it the other way, she would not comply with or abide by the Undertakings that she had given.    Those repeated threats and harassments set forth in the Husband’s 6th Affirmation were caused by the Wife which are contumacious and in breach of the terms of the Undertakings that she had given. It is the Husband’s position that the Undertakings will not serve any meaningful purpose at all.    The Wife will not be stopped by her own Undertakings unless she is penalised by a means which is commensurate to her acts, i.e. being committed to prison (§21 of Mr. Chow’s written submissions).

30.   Counsel Mr. Chow fairly recited the legal position in so far as Undertakings are concerned in the context of matrimonial proceedings.   Citing Roberts v. Roberts [1990] 2 FLR 111 where Butler-Sloss LJ said :

“It is important for parties in matrimonial disputes to appreciate that an undertaking has all the force of an injunction. It is equally as important as an injunction, and it has the same penalties for the failure to abide by it as an injunction. It is all too easy for people to promise and all too easy for them to break that promise. Then they, quite rightly, have to face the wrath of the court for having made promises which were not worth the paper which they have signed.”

31.   In my view, undertakings voluntarily given by a party against whom injunctions are sought operate in a way that that party has agreed to abide by his or her Undertakings in return for (myemphasis) the Court’s indulgence not to make injunction orders to either compel performance (mandatory injunctions) or to restrain him or her from doing certain acts (prohibitive injunctions).   The precise wordings of the Undertakings and those terms being sought for in the injunction summons are thus of importance.    It could always happen that the terms in the Undertakings are less restrictive, more or less similar or even identical to the terms drafted in the related injunction summons against which the Undertakings were proffered.  

32.   Once Undertakings are given and accepted, the injunction summons would then be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.   This is the prevailing practice all along.   The question which follows next, as in the present case, is when and under what circumstances should the injunction summons be restored ?   

33.   Unfortunately, I have not been assisted by both parties’ Counsel on this particular issue, either on submissions or authorities.   In my view, whenever there is non-compliance with the Undertakings given, the other party whose injunction summons was adjourned sine die would have 2 alternative options open, one way or the other rather than both simultaneously.  

34.   First, he may wish to cite the defiant party for contempt for breach of Undertakings through issuing committal proceedings.  The defiant party would then have to provide justification for the alleged breach or to seek to purge the contempt arising from the breaches and; failing which, appropriate sanctions or punitive consequences may follow.  

35.   The other alternative option is for the party whose injunction summons was adjourned sine die, whilst reserving his or her rights on the non-compliance, to ‘revive’ the matter by going back to the Court through restoring the injunction summons.    Such option would provide him or her a chance to put before the Court the events that had happened which constituted the breaches of or non-compliance with the Undertakings. Having given consideration to any explanation proffered by the defiant party, the Court would then have to consider whether the Undertakings need to be modified or fine-tuned in order to cater for those situations that had happened leading to the breaches which may not have been anticipated at the time when the Undertakings were given.  

36.   Apparently, the former is a process for punitive sanctions against the defiant party whereas the latter is a process for obtaining remedial reliefs through a ‘review with hindsight’ exercise.    Whichever option is better and appropriate and which would yield fruitful results to better serve justice varies from case to case.

37.   In the present case, the Husband’s Restoration Summons (which does not require leave to do so) was filed on 11 February 2016.  This was after the Husband had filed his 4th Affirmation on 17 December 2015 seeking leave to commence committal proceedings.    Although such leave was only granted on 16 February 2016 (which is 5 days after the Restoration Summons was filed), the Husband decided to issue the Committal Summons the following day on 17 February 2016 whilst keeping his earlier Restoration Summons alive and ongoing.    These 2 Summonses were then listed for trial together by the Husband.

38.   Given full consideration to Husband’s Counsel Mr. Chow’s written submissions, it is clear that the Husband wishes to pursue the first option which I have outlined above, namely, seeking punitive sanctions against the Wife who should be penalised by a means commensurate to her acts, that is, being committed to prison (see §21 of Counsel Mr. Chow’s written submissions).  

39.   For my observations under paragraphs 31 to 36 above, I agree with Wife’s Counsel that the continuation of the Restoration Summons is in effect seeking what Miss Chan called it “double protection” in her written submissions.   The issuance of and continuation with the Committal Summons for punitive sanctions on the one hand and, restoring the Injunction Summons for remedial reliefs on the other hand, as I have so found in paragraphs 33 and 36 above, simply does not sit happily together.

40.   For all these reasons, I will dismiss the Restoration Summons.

41.   I will now deal with the CommittalSummons.

42.   The Wife’s contentions turned upon the legal and procedural aspects of the committal proceedings rather than upon any factual issues.   The Wife’s Counsel Miss Chan has rightly and succinctly set out in her written submissions the procedural requirements for issuing committal proceedings under Order 52 rules 2 and 3 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016.    No issue was taken by the Husband’s Counsel Mr. Chow on the procedural requirement.

43.   The authorities referred to by Counsel Miss Chan include AXA China Region Insurance Company Ltd v. AXA China Region Insurance Company (Bermuda) Ltd (unreported, CACV 217/2002); LPK v. HSH [2012] 2 HKLRD 1031; The Incorporated Owners of United Building v.Ng Yuk Ming (unreported, HCA No.4157/1993); Aqua-Leisure Industries v. Aqua Splash Ltd (unreported, HCA 18928/1998); and Yau Chiu Wah v.Gold Chief Investment Ltd (unreported, HCA 807/2001).

44.   Counsel Mr. Enzo Chow for the Husband referred to the case of Kao, Lee & Yip v. Donald Koo Hoi Yan & Ors (2009) 12 HKCFAR 830.  Counsel submitted that the justification for so doing was necessitated by the repetitive contumacious acts of the Wife which had been fully set out in the Husband’s 4th Affirmation.   The Wife had not denied those acts were hers in her Affirmation dated 1 March 2016.   Common sense tells that those acts would not have been committed by the Wife inadvertently.  The only reasonable conclusion which can be drawn is that the Wife did commit the acts consciously with desire to pose threats and harassments to the Husband. 

45.   In the decision of this Court in LPK v. HSH (supra) where the nature, importance and contents of the requisite Statement filed under Order 52 rule 2 have been fully set out.   At paragraph 32 of the Judgment where this Court had said :

“32. The importance of the statement under O.52 r.2(2) has been discussed in the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012 Vol.1, p.954-955 para. 52/3/6 as follows :

‘The statement in support of the application is to be treated in a similar manner as an indictment in criminal proceedings having regard to the penal nature of the sanctions for contempt. At the substantial hearing the applicant cannot (except with the leave of the court) rely on any grounds not stated in the originating summons, being grounds in respect of which leave for making the application for an order of committal has been granted. The statement should state all the factual elements which, if proved, are sufficient to establish the contempt, but not the evidence in support. Great care therefore must be exercised in drafting the statement...........’

46. At page 954 para.52/2/6 the learned editors went on to say :

‘The following should be included (r.2(2)):

(a) The name and the description of the applicant;

(b) The name, the description and the address of the person sought to be committed....

(c) The relief sought, i.e. an order for committal and/or fine (and/or sequestration if appropriate) and costs;

(d) Particulars of the order or the undertaking alleged to have been breached;

(e) In case of civil contempt, the personal service thereof on the alleged contemnor (see para.52/2/8) (if personal service is unnecessary for some reason, the statement should state why : Chou Yi Feng v. Chow Yi Chen (unrep. HCA 4393/2001, [2002] HKEC 1437) para.44, Chung J);

(f) How and in what manner is it alleged the order or undertaking has been breached, with sufficient particularity to enable the alleged contemnor to defend himself..... The test for the sufficiency of the statement is : “Does it give the person alleged to be in contempt enough information to enable him to meet the charge ?” (Chiltern DC v. Keane [1985] 1 WLR 619 CA at 622, per Sir John Donaldson MR,.....)’

47. Moreover, at paragraph 36 of the same Judgment in LPK, this Court said :

“36.   However, in my view, if there exists any fundamental flaw in the proceedings, it has to be addressed or resolved before any other issues are to be considered.  This is important for otherwise the entire proceedings may be irregular and orders made therein would be improperly obtained.  The fact of such fundamental flaw not being raised as an issue or preliminary issue or having been noticed by the parties in the litigation would not prevent the Court’s intervention.  This is especially important of the proceedings involve the liberty of the subject such as the present proceedings.”

48. This Court’s decision in LPK had not been taken further on to appeal. I am minded to say this is the correct legal position in terms of the Statement filed under Order 52 rule 2 of the RDC in committal proceedings.

49. No issue was taken by Counsel Mr. Chow that the Husband’sStatement lacks the requisite particulars under Order 52 rule 2, the issue as I can see rather rests upon whether the alleged repetitive nuisance and harassments set forth in the Husband’s 4th Affirmation, coupled with the lack of denial or traverse by the Wife when she has had ample opportunity to do so, when considered collectively, could ground a case of committal against the Wife for breach of Undertakings.

50. In the absence of any cases and authorities to the contrary, I believe the legal position as to the requisite particulars that must be clearly included in the Statement filed for committal proceedings remain the same as in the case of The Incorporated Owners of United Building v. Ng Yuk Ming (supra) where Hon Yam J citing the judgment of Sir John Donaldson M.R. in Chiltern D.C. v. Keane [1985] 1 WLR 621where it was said :

“.....where the liberty of the subject is involved, this court has time again asserted that the procedural.....the statement itself which required to state the ground.......to list out what undertaking they have done and what breach of the undertaking they have made and all material fact upon which they ......

.......It has been said in many cases that what is required is that the person alleged to be in contempt ......have done or omitted to do which constitutes a contempt of court.

The particular undertakings and injunctions in this case cover a wide range of activities. Mr. Keane was entitled to know whether it was said by the council that he was in breach of every single requirement of those orders or only some, and if so which, of them and the notice failed to give him that information.

Every notice of application to commit must be looked at against its own background.  The test, as I have said, is : does it give the person alleged to be in contempt enough information to enable him to meet the charge ?  If, for example, a defendant is subject to an injunction to leave a stated house not later than a particular time on a particular day, then it would be sufficient to say that he had failed to comply with that order, because it only permits of one breach, namely failure to leave the house by the time stated.  But where the order is not in such a simply form and it is possible for the defendant to be in doubt as to what breach is alleged, then the notice is defective.”

51.   Thus, it was decided by this Court in LPK v. HSH (supra) that the Statement is essentially the equivalent of a charge sheet or indictment in criminal proceedings (see §30 of the Judgment).    As to the strictness in compliance with providing all the requisite information in the Statement, Hon Yeung J (as he then was) in the case of Aqua-Leisure IndustriesInc v. Aqua Splash Ltd (supra) had said :

“On this particular issue I feel bound by the authorities referred to this court, namely, the case of Chiltern District Council v. Keane [1985] 1 WLR 619 and Harmsworth v. Harmsworth [1987] 1 WLR 1676, in particular, the judgment of Nicholls LJ in the case of Harmsworth v.Harmsworth at page 1683.

I am not persuaded that the difference in the wordings of the English Rules and those of the Hong Kong Rules should make any difference in the approach that the court should adopt on an application of this nature. The “grounds” stipulated in Order 52 rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court must contain detailed allegations of the alleged breach in support of the application for leave. After all, as often said, contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings with serious consequences. I quote from the Hong Kong Civil Procedure, page 721 :

“The statement in support of an application is to be treated in   similar manner as an indictment in criminal proceedings, having regard to the criminal nature of the sanctions for contempt.”

It cannot be said that in a criminal case the defect in the indictment can be cured by the contents of the summary of facts in support of the indictment, or the statements of the prosecution witnesses.

I appreciate that the approach that I have just mentioned is indeed a very strict approach to the application.  But I am persuaded that such a strict approach is required in an application for a committal for contempt of court, which, as I keep saying, has a serious and far-reaching effect.  Iam firmly of the view that strict compliance with the requisite rules mustbe observed (my emphasis).

52.   At the end, His Lordship dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for an order of committal against the defendant and its directors although on grounds of technicality for failure to comply with the Rules of the High Court.   This in fact also had happened in the case of LPK v. HSH (supra).

53.   In the present case, it is beyond any dispute that the Husband’s Statement referred to no more than a general reference to ‘repeated harassment and nuisance’ (多番騷擾和滋擾).   In my decision, the Husband’s Statement fell short of the requisite information under Order 52 rule 2 of the RDC which, according to the cases and authorities cited, could not be cured or rectified by his 4th Affirmation.    As rightly submitted by Counsel Miss Chan which I also agree, there is simply no pleaded case in the Husband’s Statement for the Husband to verify by way of his 4th Affirmation.    The requisite Affirmation so filed in support is to verify those pleaded cases in the Statement rather than, if I may use the phrase, ‘feedingin’ materials to try to support a case of contempt.    Considering the matter from the criminal law perspective, the Brief Facts in the prosecution case could not supplement the Charge Sheet or Indictment which would, if circumstances arise, need to be amended however trivial was the defect. 

54.   The Husband made no attempts at any stage, even as at this hearing, to seek amendment of the Husband’s Statement although any such application would no doubt be strongly contested by the Wife.    In any event, the orthodox approach in a case of a defective Statement filed in committal proceedings was to have it set aside rather than by way of amendment.   In the case of  The Incorporated Owners of United Building v. Ng Yuk Ming (supra) where His Lordship said at the concluding paragraph as follows :

“The next thing I have to consider is whether I should set aside the leave granted to the plaintiff to apply for an order of committal against the defendant or should I allow the plaintiff to amend the Statement. I think it is better to set it aside than allow the plaintiff to start again since there is no amendment put before me, and it is for the applicant to make good their application. When a Statement is set aside for irregularity, the plaintiff can always apply again. In setting aside the Statement, the Notice of Motion issued thereunder must also be dismissed.”

55.   As for the submissions that the Husband having failed in full and frank disclosure, I find such issue could only be explored at the stage of trial of the Committal Summons.   At present, the Wife could not come up with solid evidence that all those telephone dialogues and SMS text messages were cherry picked to paint a particular picture.    Thus, I do not accept such contention of the Wife.

56.   For all the above reasons and in line with the cases and authorities, I am bound to find the Husband’s Statement fundamentally flawed and defective. I decided that the leave to issue committal proceedings granted upon the Husband’s Statement must be set aside.    This follows the Committal Summons issued are irregular and should be dismissed.

Costs

57.   Given careful consideration to all the above, I find no reasons for departure from the normal rule on costs and I will so order accordingly.

58.   Also given careful consideration to the parties’ contentions, I am not convinced that there are difficult questions of law or complex issues of fact to justify me granting Certificate for Counsel. 

Orders

59.   I now make the following Orders :-

(1)The Respondent’s (Husband’s) Restoration Summons dated 11 February 2016 be dismissed;

(2)The Respondent’s (Husband’s) Injunction Summons dated 16 February 2016 be dismissed;

(3)The Respondent (Husband) do pay the Petitioner’s (Wife’s) costs of the said 2 Summonses, including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed.

60.   This is a Costs Order Nisi which will become absolute if no application to vary the same is filed within 21 days of this Decision.

61.   And lastly, I wish to thank Counsel for their assistance.



 (George Own)
Deputy District Judge

Miss Lareina J Chan instructed by Messrs. Chan, Wong & Lam., Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. Enzo Chow instructed by Messrs. K. B. Chau & Co., Solicitors for the Respondent

106792-EN-2016-10-28

CKF v. LHL

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FCMC No.17031/2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 17031 OF 2014

____________

BETWEEN
 CKF Petitioner
 and
 LHLRespondent

____________

Before: Deputy District Judge G. Own in Court
Date of Hearing: 20, 21, 22 April and 30 May 2016
Date of Written Final Submissions : 20 June 2016
Date of Decision: 28 October 2016

_____________

D E C I S I O N

(Defended Petition : Unreasonable Behaviour/
Cross Petition : Unreasonable Behaviour)

_____________


Introduction

1.  This is the trial of the Wife’s Petition and the Husband’s Cross Petition where both parties accused of the other’s unreasonable behaviour which had led to their 16 years’ marriage irretrievably broken down.   There is one child of the family born in 2000 who is now living with his mother (that is, the Petitioner).  

2.  The parties separated in 2014.  The parties are at difference as to the exact date of separation.   The Wife said it was 1 December 2014 in her Financial Statement (Form E).  The Husband said it was 30 December 2014.

3.  There had been suggestion more than once from the Husband that since the parties’ separation had exceeded one year and that both of them, by the conduct of filing the Petition and Cross Petition, had agreed that the marriage had been irretrievably broken down, the marriage should be dissolved by way of a consensual divorce (that is, one year separation) rather than spending the time and resources for litigating upon the parties’ respective allegations against each other.   Nowadays, this is indeed the orthodox way of dissolving a marriage which had irretrievably been broken down.    The Wife, however, disagreed and insisted on having her case of divorce fought in a court of law.   The Husband, on the other hand, also disagreed with the Wife’s allegations of reasonable behaviour and decided also to have his time in court to present evidence on his Cross Petition for divorce.   It is unfortunate that the trial which was estimated to last for 3 days had eventually overrun to 4 days.

4.  It is fair to say that as at the date of trial of the divorce, there were 2 Summonses taken out by the Husband seeking restoration of his injunction summons which was adjourned sine die and also a committal summons against the Wife for breach of undertakings given at the hearing of the injunction summons.  These 2 Summonses were listed for trial together on 23 and 24 August 2016. 

The statutory provisions

5.  Part III of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap.179 (“MCO”) provides, inter alia, as follows :-

“11.Ground for divorce, etc.

The sole ground for presenting or making a petition or application for divorce shall be that the marriage has broken down irretrievable and proceedings for divorce shall be instituted either –

(a) by a petition for divorce; or

(b) by an application for divorce.

11A. Proof of ground for petition

(1) A petition for divorce may be presented to the court by either party to a marriage.

(2) The court hearing a petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the court of one or more of the following facts –

(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent;

(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent;

(c) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of at least 1 year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and the respondent consents to a decree being granted;

(d) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of at least 2 years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;

(e)    that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least 1 year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.”

6.  Thus, there is only one ground for divorce in Hong Kong, namely, that the marriage has broken down irretrievably (my emphasis) which can be proved by one or more of the five facts stated in Section 11A of the MCO.   The parties here are both relying upon the fact under Section 11A(2)(b) of the MCO though with the common views that the marriage had been irretrievably broken down.   Apparently the parties are asking the Court to determine who is the “culprit”, so to speak.

7.  Moreover, Section 15A (4) of the MCO provides :-

“(4) Where the petitioner alleged that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with him, but the parties to the marriage have lived with each other for a period or periods after the date of the occurrence of the final incident relied on by the petitioner and held by the court to support his allegation, that fact shall be disregarded in determining for the purposes of section 11A(2)(b), whether the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent if the length of that period or of those periods together is 6 months or less.”

The case law

8.  In the case of PKWP v. TTS [2011] 2 HKC where Her Honour Judge Melloy at paragraph 11 of the Judgment had said -

“11. So what is meant by that ? The appropriate test was originally formulated in the case of Livingstone-Stallard v.Livingstone Stallard [1974] 2 All ER 766. In that case the Judge posed the following question :

‘Would any right thinking person come to the conclusion that this husband has behaved in such a way that his wife cannot reasonably be expected to live with him, taking into account the whole of the circumstances and the character and the personalities of the parties.’

12. It is then both a subjective and an objective test.  The issue is not so much whether one spouses actions are unreasonable per se (although they may be), but rather whether this particular spouse found the other’s actions unreasonable.  On that basis the court will determine whether or not the one can be reasonably expected to live with the other.   The test has been approved in a number of cases since, including O’Neill v. O’Neill [1975] 3 All ER 289 which was cited with approval in the Hong Kong case Lindsay v. Lindsay [1983] 2 HKC 302, FCMC 1569/1982 referred to below.”

9.  Moreover, in the latter case of KJA v. KYSH formerly knownas YSH, FCMC No.4456/2013, the learned Judge restated and applied the same test in her Judgment on the husband’s petition upon the wife’s unreasonable behaviour.  

10.  In the English cardinal case of Grenfell v. Grenfell [1978] Fam 128 where Ormrod LJ had said :-

“There is no point, as I see it, in a case like this of conducting an inquiry into behaviour merely to satisfy feelings, however genuinely and sincerely held by one or other of the parties. To do so would be a waste of time of the court and, in any event, would be running, as I think, counter to the general policy or philosophy of the divorce legislation as it stands today. The purpose of Parliament was to ensure that where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, it should be dissolved as quickly and as painlessly as possible under the Act, and attempts to recriminate in the manner in which the wife in this case appears to wish to do should be, in my judgment, firmly discouraged.”

11.  In the Grenfell case, the wife petitioned for divorce based on the husband’s unreasonable behaviour.   The husband in his answer, whilst agreeing that the marriage had irretrievably broken down but denied that was attributed to his behaviour, cross petitioned for a decree based on the parties’ having separated for five years.    The wife, in her reply, agreed that the parties had separated for five years but alleged that the grant of a decree would result in grave hardship to her in that as a practising Christian, her conscience would be affronted if the marriage was to be dissolved otherwise than on grounds of substance.  The wife’s reply was struck out and it was decided that the court should first determine whether the husband’s case of five years separation was established, and if so, whether the court should receive evidence from the wife in support of her prayer for dissolution.    The wife appealed the striking out decision and lost.

The Wife’s Petition  

12.  At paragraph 9 of the Wife’s Petition, she provided details of the Husband’s unreasonable behaviour as follows :-

“李xx有婚外情,他與另外一個女人有關係,大概12年令崔xx飽受精神壓力,甚至要睇醫生,兩人為此經常吵架,令崔xx無法容忍。”

The Husband’s Cross Petition

13.  In the Husband’s Cross Petition attached with his Answer to the Wife’s Petition, the alleged unreasonable behaviour against the Wife are as follows :-

“ 交相呈請書

5. 因呈請人的行為而實在無法合理期望答辯人與其共 同生活 :

有關行為的詳細資料

6. 呈請人對答辯人缺乏關心及愛護,令答辯人感到非 常困擾及傷痛。

7. 呈請人的性格急進而暴躁,常常因為事情未有按照她的意願發生而發怒。

8. 呈請人的態度是咄咄逼人,經常因答辯人在工作期間不能馬上在公司接聽她的來電而發怒,並在短時間內不停致電答辯人的手機號碼及答辯人的公司電話號碼,要求交待答辯人的行縱及正在做什麽,令答辯人感到十分苦惱及為難。

9. 呈請人在婚姻期間曾多次在語言上及身體上虐待答辯人,常常用粗言不斷辱罵答辯人及使用暴力。在2014年,呈請人多次襲擊答辯人,並對答辯人造成不同程度身體上的傷害,包括曾經襲擊答辯人並在手腕及手臂位置引致紅印及抓傷及利用熨斗板大力拍打答辯人背部。

10. 呈請人曾對答辯人作出恐嚇並需要警方介入。在婚姻期間,呈請人與答辯人在婚姻居所內吵架時,曾經多次對答辯人作出威脅表示她要玩死答辯人,甚至威脅要殺死答辯人。

11. 呈請人對答辯人金錢的要求常常不合理並胡亂消費。在2014年12月22日,呈請人在沒有獲得答辯 人的同意下私自盜取答辯人的 HSBC 信用卡並用該信用卡私自從答辯人户口提取 HK$20,000 及以 EPS 方式胡亂購買金器,聲稱要將龍鳳鐲送給家庭兒子及呈請人在內地的母親。

12.     呈請人對家庭及金錢價值觀與答辯人的不同,雙方因而常常吵架,令答辯人感到非常悲傷及失望。由於上述原因,答辯人實在無法合理期望與呈請人繼續共同生活,而上述婚姻已破裂至無可挽救。”

14.  The Wife acted in person throughout this trial of the divorce suit which was bitterly fought.   The Husband was legally represented and engaged Counsel Mr. Enzo Chow.    Both parties have not called any other witnesses and simply relied upon their own testimonies and documents.

The Parties’ “Unreasonable Behaviour”

15.  In a gist, the Wife’s pleaded case is that the Husband’s extra marital relationship for some 12 years had caused the breakdown of their 16-year marriage.   Throughout the trial, the Wife was quite emotional and repeatedly accused the Husband’s affairs with another woman, so called “包二奶”.    I must say that from time to time the Wife had become almost uncontrollable that this Court had to stand down the trial in order for her to calm down.    To a certain extent, the trial was unnecessarily prolonged and disrupted.   Admittedly, the Wife has been suffering from mania which might have been the reason for such demeanour in Court. 

16.  The Wife, whilst unrepresented for this trial, filed different lengthy affirmations all handwritten in Chinese setting out her unpleasant experiences in the past which include the Husband accused her of having psychiatric problem; forcefully sent her to a psychiatric hospital in Mainland China; drove her out from the matrimonial home in Shenzhen PRC when she was made completely naked which she described as : “把我一絲不掛推出屋外 !”; the Husband’s discreet travel with the mistress during Christmas; reference to various text and whatsapp messages with the Husband; reference to some receipts and invoices of purchase and travel allegedly were made by the Husband for the mistress.    

17.  On the other hand, the Husband’s Cross Petition principally focused upon the Wife’s abusive character and mentality, causing all sorts of harassment and nuisance, assaults, and causing bodily injuries on him, differences in money values and opinion which he cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Wife.

18.  Both parties, apart from leading evidence to support their own case of unreasonable behaviour against the other party, also had had the chance to respond and bring in any evidence in rebuttal to the allegations that they face.    No matter which way the evidence goes on each side, the undisputed fact is that both parties’ are of the same view that their marriage had already been irretrievably broken down which must be dissolved by the Court.   

Analysis and Discussion

19.  I do not intend to venture into each and every allegation or answer of the parties nor, in my view, am I required to do so after given careful consideration to the Judgment of Hon Cheung JA in the case of SJH v. RJH (divorce: answer) [2012] 4 HKLRD 308 at 317 paragraph 11(7) where His Lordship was said :-

“(7) In any event, even if the without prejudice proposals should not be placed before the Judge and this Court should ignore the husband’s proposal, the fact is that the wife had on 21 September 2011 made an open offer to the husband seeking a divorce based on the identified mild behaviour grounds. As both parties are now of the same view that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the Court in exercising its divorce jurisdiction in a modern setting, will be loathe to allow the parties to use valuable court time to litigate a matter which has no impact whatsoever on the divorce itself and which should be dissolved as quickly and painlessly as possible (my emphasis). As Ormrod LH observed in Grenfell v. Grenfell [1978] 1 All ER 561…..”

20.  Further, at paragraph 11(8)(c) of the same Judgment in SJH where his Lordship continued :

“(8)(c) While it is true that in Grenfell v. Grenfell there was common ground that the parties had been separated for five years, which is not the situation here if the proposal by the husband is to be ignored, the discussion by Ormrod LJ on the underlying principle of a modern divorce is instructive andapposite, if not more so, 35 years after that decision to modern Hong Kong (my emphasis).”

21.  Furthermore, under Order 1A rule 1 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016 (“HKCP”), where it provides :

“1. The underlying objectives of these rules are –

(a) To increase the cost-effectiveness of any practice and procedure to be followed in relation to proceedings before the Court;

(b) To ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable;

(c) To promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings;

(d) To ensure fairness between the parties;

(e) To facilitate the settlement of disputes; and

(f)    To ensure that the resources of the Court are distributed fairly.”

22.  Having said, I am minded to say that nowadays after the Civil Justice Reform, courts should exercise their case management powers to achieve a speedy resolution of the parties’ dispute and ensure justice was done.     In my decision, parties who choose to insist upon their rights to litigate over matters which could, or indeed should, otherwise be resolved without a bitterly fought battle in a court of law would find himself or herself doing so at his or her own expense.

23.  In the present case the Wife, apparently without the benefit of legal advice and acting in person, had blatantly rejected the Husband’s proposals of having a consensual divorce.   Faced with such a situation, the Husband, legally represented throughout, also decided to go for a full trial of his Cross Petition and also defending the Wife’s case against him.  

24.  The parties’ Petition and Cross Petition are supported by their respective Statement of Truth on the factual contents stated therein which, amongst other accusations, include the common fact, or if I may use the word ‘consensus’, that their marriage has been irretrievably broken down.    As a matter of law, such a fact is the only ground upon which the Court in its divorce jurisdiction should grant a decree nisi to end the marital relationship ‘quickly and painlessly’ with expedition.    In such a case, any finding of fact on whoever’s accusations against the other is no more than an inquiry into behaviour to satisfy feelings even though they are genuinely and sincerely held by one or other of the parties.    To do so would be a waste of time of the court and counter to the general policy or philosophy of divorce legislation today (see Grenfell v.Grenfell, supra).    Whoever is the ‘winner’ or scores the most amongst the various allegations would not affect the ‘consensus’ that the marriage has been irretrievably broken down and that a decree nisi is being prayed for by both of them.   In my view, asking the court to put a ‘tick or cross’ on each of the allegations serves no legitimate and meaningful purposes save and except to promote parties’ grievances and animosity.   This also runs against the spirit of the Civil Justice Reform under Order 1A rule 1 of the HKCP which I have outlined above.

25.   For these reasons and on all fairness and practicality, I grant a decree nisi for dissolution of the parties’ marriage upon the parties’ ‘consensus’ that their marriage had been irretrievably broken down which was affirmatively stated in the Petition and the Cross Petition.

Costs

26.  Given careful consideration to all the above, I find it is fair and reasonable not to grant any costs order.   For otherwise, the court would be encouraging parties to have their days in court under the misapprehension or hoping that it would be at the expense of the other party to resolve disputes which could have been completely avoided if either or both parties adopt a sensible and pragmatic approach.    

Orders

27.  I now make the following Orders :-

(1)There be a Decree Nisi on the Petitioner’s Petition and the  Respondent’s Cross Petition; and

(2)There be no Order as to costs, including all costs reserved.

28.   This is a Costs Order Nisi which will become absolute if no application to vary the same is filed within 21 days of this Decision.

1st Appointment

29.   I also direct the parties to arrange with the Listing Officer for a hearing of the 1st Appointment within 14 days from this Decision.

  

  

 (George Own)
Deputy District Judge

Petitioner being unrepresented, appearing in person

Mr. Enzo Chow instructed by Messrs. K. B. Chau & Co., Solicitors for the Respondent

106681-CH-2016-06-08

崔 對 李

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FCMC 17031 / 2014

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號 2014 年第 17031 宗   

 ———————————————— 
 崔呈請人

及

 李答辯人
 ———————————————— 
主審法官 : 區域法院暫委法官翁喬奇內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 : 2016年 6 月 6日
判決書日期 : 2016年 6 月8日

____________________

判 案 書
(上 訴 許 可 申 請)

____________________

前言

1. 本案之呈請人為女方,答辯人為男方。

2. 於2016年3月11日,法庭就女方早前提出的訟案期間贍養費申請頒下書面裁斷,命令男方須向女方支付每月 HK$15,500之訟案期間贍養費,自2016年4月10日開始,及後每月之10日或之前直至另作命令為止。同時法庭決定不頒發無訟費命令,包括此項申請早前之任何保留待決的訟費。

3. 於2016年3月24日,女方發出本傳票,針對法庭2016年3月11日的判決提出申請上訴許可,女方存檔她的一份確認書支持申請,當中附上16頁的論點及一些單據及發票。

4. 女方沒有法律代表,自行處理早前的訟案期間贍養費審訊及這次的上訴許可聆訊。

女方的申請

5. 女方的傳票内容,原文覆述如下 :

“就2016年3月11日的裁決書的以下事項申請上訴許可:

(1)  法官的判決偏離了本人申請離婚前的生活水準。”

6. 女方的確認書内容,原文覆述如下 :

“希望法官重新以離婚前的生活狀態來判決,不可以剝奪本人對母親的孝順和做公益的熱誠 ! 孩子的學習處於緊張的階段,不可以停止他的補習老師。”

7. 女方的16頁論點,可歸納如下 :

“第1至5頁 : 申述她的宗教信仰; 離婚前出外用膳開支並非 $200至 $300元,甚至達到 $1,000; 男方向她提供一張附屬咭供給她購買生活用品,每月$5,000 至$6,000; 購買知名品牌物品並非她的 意思,而是男方的虛榮心要把她打扮成花瓶; 離婚前男方和她曾親自購買衣物、保養品、手飾給予她在國內父母; 沒有清楚說明持有一張AEON 信用卡在表格 E 是誤以為不如滙豐銀行的信用卡相提並論 ,並解釋在婚姻中的 $2,000 調升至 $3,000是包括生活費、手飾和保養品; 國內大姐天生殘缺,身體經常生病,她每次回老家均會給大姐一些錢; 男方在16年的婚姻的善心支持她無限的包容、忍讓才走到今天,男方在離婚前也和她參與善事; 男方對待她及她的親人、公益事務、她的各樣高級消費從不吝嗇,亦幫她報考駕駛學院,承諾送價值 $400,000的汽車。

第6至7頁 : 質疑男方的每月工作收入,要求出示證明; 質疑男方曾說婚姻居所已供完按揭貸款,但現時聲稱須償還按揭供款; 質疑男方現時租住的翔龍灣居所沒有必要,指男方在21/12/2014、24至25/12/2014明目張膽與另一女子過夜; 指男方須要出示一些公屋條例下所作出的申請的證明文件; 質疑男方的汽車開支、汽車借貸供款,曾在一年半時間更換高達100萬的汽車,要求男方出示出售第一部車輛的證據; 要求男方出示保險費單據; 質疑男方把狗隻寵物放在狗酒店及所說每月相關費用花費 $400 之真實性。

第8頁 : 申述在離婚前,孩子的費用全部是男方支付。在離婚期間男方對兒子不理不睬,包括兒子在學校練習球技時從高處摔下受傷、在大年初二腸胃發炎等,兒子得不到父親以前的疼愛。兒子的衣物、補習費等男方不願支付,引致發生衝突。自2016年2月開始,男方拒絕支付兒子補習費,現希望法庭把兒子補習費判給她由她作分配。

第9至10頁 : 女方列出 (a) 至 (l) 合共12項婚前知名品牌的高銷費物品,並指出當中一些牌子因時間太長,單據已經模糊不清。另一些周大福黄金已經賣掉,單據已經回收。還有很多裝飾和手飾衣物、化裝品單據在男方的信用卡可以顯示出來。

第11至12頁 : 女方申述她沒有在開展離婚時提出申請待訟期間贍養費,是因為對法律程序一無所知,也不想為着無法挽救的婚姻花大量律師費互相指責,直至現在才醒悟自己的想法是大錯特錯。女方指男方用法律的武器,她卻以淚洗面,抓住她各種情緒上的弱點,想置她於死地,在家事法庭不斷發出禁制令,而且還要她在刑事法庭上得到應有的懲罰。

此外,女方指在離婚前男方除了給她 $12,000外,亦給她一張附屬卡,除了一天的三餐費用,其他的消費是男方在週末時購買。在這文字段落的末端,女方說: 「表面上多麽體面,多麽正義的工作,中間的公道,中立只不過是幫助强大勢力,幫助迫壞者,絕不是受害者,沉默只是鼓勵了繪子手,而不是犧牲者,從來沒有為受害者    說出更有力的言詞。」

 第13頁 : 女方指男方在離婚期間加大他的個人開支,和不必要的開支。男方每月實際消費為 $28,159.25。

 第14頁 : 女方列出她現在的正常開支為 $33,676.33。

 第15至16頁 : 女方指判決偏差甚大,判決只給予她最基本的生活,但是她的家庭並非像香港比較貧困的生活。善待他人是她從小就具備的,男方亦很鼓勵她繼續憐憫貧窮有需要幫助的人,法庭沒有權剝奪她的精神思想。她希望法庭不要站在自己的立場上考慮問題,以男方的工作能力,支付每月 $30,176.33完全不成問題。最後女方說到2016年2月2日,户口經已透支 $4,421.55元,必須補回 $355,144.95 到2016年4月10日。”

男方的立場

8. 代表男方的周偉雄大律師呈示陳詞大綱,指出女方除了重複自己早前已提的說法外,亦加入一些具煽情色彩但是毫不相關的言詞。因此,請求法庭撤銷女方的上訴許可申請,並支付予男方是次申請的訟費。

適用的法律原則

9. 申請上訴許可的法例條文為區域法院條例第336章第63A條,原文覆述 :-

“(1) 根據第63條批予的上訴許可,可-

(a)就在有關的判決、命令或決定中出現的某個爭論點而批予;

及

(b)在聆訉該許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭認為為使有關上訴得到公正、迅速及合乎經濟原則的處置而需要的條件的規限下批予。

(2) 聆訉有關上訴許可申請的法官 、聆案官或上訴法庭除非信納 –

(a) 有關上訴有合理機會得直;或

(b) 有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訉,

否則不得批予上訴許可。”

10. 扼要而言,法庭須要考慮的標準是上訴是否有實際或合理的勝訴機會 (realistic or reasonable prospect of success) ,或是否存在有利於秉行公正的理由,因此而須要給予上訴許可。

11. 再者,根據Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489案所定下的原則 ,倘若申請的一方要求法庭在上訴時接納新證據,該一方必須要先符合以下的條件:

(1) 當事人曾採用了合理的方法努力尋找,但不能在原審時知悉該些證據存在,故不能在原審時向法庭提交;

(2) 有關證據不但須要與案件有關,更須對案件的結果有重大影響,雖然不一定是決定性的影響;及

(3) 有關的證據雖不至於是無爭議的,但必需要是可信的。

12. 法庭必須要嚴格執行上述採納新証據的法律原則,避免民事訴訟沒完沒了,否則不符合公眾利益。

討論

13. 首先 ,女方在她的16頁紙內的大部份申述及論點,確實在早前的審訊時曾經提出,法庭在作出判決前亦經已全面考慮,在現階段重複確實不能成為支持申請上訴許可的理據。更甚者的是當中亦涉及一些早前在審訊時並無交待的新文件及新說法,例如男方幫她報考駕駛學院一事及文件、向她承諾贈送她一部價值 $400,000的汽車 (前述的第1至5頁); 男方更換了高達100萬的汽車等等 (前述的第6至7頁); 以及一些與申請上訴許可完全無關的論點,例如列出在婚前的知名品牌的高銷費物品 (第9至10頁) 。對於該等新文件及新說法,亦並不符合上述Ladd vMarshall案的第 (1) 個條件促使本席在現階段須給予考慮。

14. 其次,在她存檔的確認書及16頁的各項論點,均完全沒有指出法庭如何引用了錯誤的法律原則作出判決,或是法庭在行使酌情權時存在任何明顯及嚴重的原則性錯誤,因此而令她的上訴具備有實際或合理的勝訴機會。本席相信女方應該是不理解,亦不願意面對法律程序及要求,憑籍她個人的主觀看法評定法庭判決,認為得不到法庭判予她所要求的全數則屬於對她不公正、不合理、法庭不中立及感到自己遭到迫害,否則不會出現她在自己個人論點第12頁末端的說法。

15. 有關女方在她的論點第8頁說,男方拒絕支付兒子的補習費,但於今天聆訊則提出男方取消兒子補習老師,男方自行安排補習給兒子。本席在判案書第40段經已清楚說明,法庭的訟案期間贍養費命令,並不取代、影嚮或改變男方須要支付兒子的種種開支,原文覆述 :

“40. 法庭須要重申,這項訟案期間贍養費的判令,是給予女方個人的生活開支,並不取代、影嚮或改變男方現時支付兒子方面的種種費用及開支 (包括每週之零用錢) 。同時亦並不取代、影嚮或改變男方現時支付前婚姻居所之每月按揭供款、管理費、差餉及地租等等。”

16. 事實上女方亦未能說服法庭,不把兒子補習費判給她由她分配,在法律上是錯誤因此而須要給予她上訴許可。

17. 儘管女方如何理解 (或不理解) 、接受 (或不接受) 、面對 (或不面對) 法律程序,她所提出的種種說法,不論是記載在確認書、16頁的論點,或是在此次聆訊內她的口述陳詞等,本席亦經已小心考慮,同時亦再翻閱2016年3月11日的書面判決內容,女方均未能成功說服法庭她具備有實際或合理的上訴勝訴機會,如前述,這是法庭批予上訴許可的首要基本條件。

其他秉行公正的理由?

18. 綜觀女方的申請,本席看不到任何有利於秉行公正的理由應給予她上訴許可。

總結

19. 按照上述理由,女方的上訴許可申請不被接納 ,予以撤銷。

訟費

20. 縱使女方不理解種種法律程序及要求是事實,但這並不能成為任何特殊理由 (special reasons) 使法庭可以偏離訴訟訟費的一般原則,女方在這項申請未能得到上訴許可的情況下,她須要支付男方的訟費,但本席將不頒發大律師證書。倘若雙方未能於本判決頒令日起21天內達成訟費金額的協議,須交由區域法院聆案官評定訟費金額。

命令

21. 現本席頒令如下:

(1) 女方2016年3月24日的傳票申請上訴許可被撤銷;

(2) 女方須支付男方的訟費,倘若雙方未能於本判決頒令日起21天內達成訟費金額的協議,須交由區域法院聆案官評定訟費金額。

22. 此訟費命令是一項暫准命令,如在本判案書日起14天內沒有任何申請,將轉為絕對命令。

( 翁喬奇 )
區域法院暫委法官

呈請人: 無律師代表,親自應訊。

答辯人:由周啓邦律師行轉聘周偉雄大律師代表出席。

103562-CH-2016-03-11

崔 對 李

HTML content

FCMC17031/ 2014

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號2014年第17031宗

————————————————

 崔呈請人

及

 李答辯人

————————————————

主審法官 :  區域法院暫委法官翁喬奇內庭聆訊 (非公開)
聆訊日期 :  2016 年1月29日
判決日期 :  2016年 3月 11日

-----------------------------------------

判 案 書

-----------------------------------------

前言

1. 本案之呈請人為妻子(簡稱“女方”),答辯人為丈夫(簡稱“男方”)。

2. 這是一宗訟案期間贍養費的申請,女方向男方要求每月$30,000贍養費,同時向男方追討自離婚呈請日起,計算至提出此項申請期間 (合共11個月) 之贍養費差額合共$231,000,女方以每月$21,000差額計算($21,000 x 11 = $231,000),她用這公式計算是因為男方自她提出離婚呈請開始,每月向她支付$9,000贍養費,直至早前法庭指令男方須要按照雙方分開前所支付女方之金額,即每月 $12,000 為臨時的訟案期間贍養費。因此 ,自2015年11月10日開始,男方便向女方支付每月$12,000。

3. 女方存檔了一份支持申請的誓章(日期:8/10/2015),亦存檔她的第二份表格E(日期:15/10/2015)。男方存檔反對誓章(日期:31/10/2015),並附上10份文件證物(“LHL-7”至“LHL-16)。其後女方亦存檔她的回覆誓章(日期:27/11/2015),附上一份共90頁及分為15項的 “目錄”,內容分類及頁碼如下 :-

“ 目錄
1. 婚史簡介 1
2. 做公益的收據和圖片6
3. 答辯人是個顧家的好主人 10
4. 答辯人的性情變化12
5. 呈請人受離婚的精神打擊  21
6. 胡亂花費的收據 27
7. 呈請人瞻養親人情況 38
8. 對答辯人的勸告 47
9. 孩子在父母離婚期間的變化51”

背景

4.  雙方於1998年11月在中國大連註冊結婚,婚後育有一名兒子,現年15歲(簡稱“兒子”),就讀中二及與女方在前婚姻居所居住。男方現年54歲,現任職保險總監。女方現年39歲,任職兼職普通話教師,但於本聆訊日她聲稱已辭去了工作。

5.  於2014年12月27日,女方發出離婚呈請,以男方不合理行為作事實基礎,要求法庭頒令離婚。

6.  於2015年3月5日,男方向女方發出交相呈請書(cross petition),同樣以女方不合理行為作事實基礎,要求法庭頒發離婚

令。雙方的離婚呈請及交相呈請已安排在2016年4月20日進行審訊,預計需時3天。

女方的現況

7.  女方與兒子現時居住在九龍長沙灣荔枝角道的私人住宅單位,這是雙方的前婚姻居所,是以男方的個人名義購買,每月之按揭供款約為$34,000,一向以來直至現在均是由男方個人全數支付。

8.  女方在她的第二份經濟狀況陳述書(表格E)(日期:15/10/2015)填寫職業為兼職普通話教師,每月工作入息$3,000。在本申請聆訊日,她聲稱已辭去工作,現時是一名家庭主婦,她在第二份表格E內申報自己患有躁狂症。

女方的經濟需要

9. 女方在她支持這次申請的誓章說 :

“申請原因 : 從2014年12日27號提出離婚開始 ,答辯人李xx每月只提供 $9,000的生活費,使呈請人崔xx和兒子的生活水準降低。在沒有提出離婚之前,生活費是 $12,000,在平時衣服,護膚品,幫助母親保健品,以及做一些善事的錢都是李xx支付,所以崔xx要求法庭作出以下命令,李xx向崔xx支付每月 $30,000的待訟期間的瞻養費,同時補回過去11個月的生活費共 $231,000.”

10. 在本離婚訴訟展開後,女方先後存檔兩份表格E ,日期分別為6/1/2015(A:3-25)及15/10/2015(B:215-236)。在比較兩份表格E所申報的每月開支,在短短的10個月內 ,每月總開支(4.1 + 4.2 +4.3)由 $23,800大幅度躍升至 $51,400。值得留意的地方是女方的第二份表格E(15/10/2015)是在提出本訟案期間贍養費的傳票申請後的7天存檔。

11. 下列為女方在兩份表格 E內所申報的每月開支對比 :-


“
4.1   一般開支
 

第1份表格E
6/1/2015

第2份表格E
15/10/2015
 

項目

金額

金額

租金

0

 

按揭供款

0

 

公共設施雜費(電費、氣體燃料費、差餉、電話費、水費)

0

 

管理費

0

 

食物開支

5,000

6,000

雜項家用開支

0

3,000

汽車開支

0

 

保險費

2,500

2,500

家庭傭工

0

 

其他(請說明)

0

 

家庭每月開支總額

港幣$7,500

港幣$11,500


4.2   個人開支

 

 

項目

金額

金額

外出膳食費用

2,000

4,000

交通費

800

1,000

服裝/鞋費

1,000

3,000

個人儀容(包括理髮和化妝品)

3,000

4,000

娛樂費/禮物

1,000

3,000

假期消費

3,000

3,000

醫療/牙齒護理費

0

1,500

稅款

0

 

保險費

2,500

2,500

中期贍養費

0

 

供養父母

2,000

3,500

供養其他受養家屬

1,000

2,000

其他(請說明)

0

2,000

個人每月開支總額

港幣$16,300

港幣$29,500


4.3   子女

 

 

項目

金額

金額

學費

0

500

額外補習費

0

2,500

學校書簿及文具

0

700

上學交通費(包括校車)

0

 

醫療/牙齒護理費

0

300

課外活動費

0

1,000

娛樂費/禮物

0

800

假期消費

0

400

服裝費/鞋費

0

1,000

保險費

0

 

午餐及零用錢

0

3,000

其他交通費

0

100

子女看顧費

0

 

校服費

0

100

其他(請說明)

0

 

子女每月開支總額

港幣$0

港幣10,400

每月開支總額 (4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3)

港幣$23,800

港幣$51,400

男方的經濟能力

12. 男方現職保險總監,每月工作收入平均為$112,634 (B:245)。

13. 他現時獨自租住位於九龍土瓜灣區的翔龍灣私人住宅單位,月租 $15,000。在雙方未分開前,他每月給予女方 $12,000作為家庭日常開支,包括購買星期一至星期五供應一家三人晚飯的食物費用,按照他的計算,每晚三人份量的食物開支大約是$50至$60,每週的星期六及日,他和女方及兒子三人會到婚姻居所的商塲用餐,午、晚餐費用大約只不過是$200至$300,所付給女方每月之 $12,000如有剩餘者,則歸女方擁有。

14. 男方現時之每月經濟開支,大致上可分為他個人及負責前婚姻居所兩方面,同時他每月向女方支付臨時訟案期間贍養費 $12,000及支付兒子的零用錢,現列出如下 :-

(a) 前婚姻居所費用:


項目

 

港幣

樓宇按揭供款

23.10.2015起

34,843.00

差餉及地租

2015年10月至12月為港幣3,945元(平均每月港幣1,315元)

1,315.00

每月管理費
 

1,512.00

電費

07.06.2015 - 08.08.2015為港幣1,287元 (每月約為港幣650元)

650.00

煤氣費

8月至9月的煤氣費為港幣810元 (每月約為港幣405元)

405.00

水費

23.07.2015的帳單為港幣73.00 (每月約為港幣18.25元)

18.25

家居固網電話及上網費
 

208.00
 
   合共:

38,951.25


(b)他租用翔龍灣的居住費用:
 

項目
 
港幣

租金
 

15,000.00

電費

7月至8月的電費為港幣143元 (每月約為港幣71.5元)

71.50

煤氣費

8月至9月的煤氣費為港幣607元 (每月約為港幣303.5元)

303.50
 
合共:

15,375


(c)個人開支
 

項目

 

港幣

家居固網電話
 

36.00

手提電話費
 

478.00

兒子手提電話費
 

227.00

保險費
 

6,268.00

個人貸款(稅)
 

7,635.00

汽車開支
 

7,300.00

汽車貸款
 

8,921.00

寵物(得得)的醫療費及其他費用

醫療費:
3月: 1,256元
8月: 1,134元
(平均每月400元)

400.00

狗糧
 

300.00
 

  合共:

31,565
 


(d)支付女方的每月生活費

(自10.11.2015開始)

12,000.00


(e)
支付兒子的 零用錢

每星期650.00 x 4

2,600.00
 
合共(a+b+c+d+e):

100,491.25

相關法例及法律原則

15. 相關之法律條文為 『婚姻法律程序與財產條例』第192章第3條 :-

“就 –

(a) 離婚的呈請或共同申請; 或

(b) 婚姻無效或裁判分居的申請,

法庭可命令婚姻的任可一方在法庭認為合理的期間內,向另一方作出法庭認為合理的定期付款作為贍養費, 但該段期間開始之日不得早於提交呈請書或提出申請的日期,並須於該訟案裁定當日結束。”

16. 法庭在處理訟案期間贍養費的法律原則十分清晰,法庭只會以概況的形式 (broad brush approach) 作出一般性的審視。在這階段法庭無需要作出仔細入微的經濟審查,但須兼顧雙方的因素,在每件案件中最顯要的兩件事情,是雙方的生活水平,以及被要求支付一方

的經濟能力,從而作出一個法庭認為公平及俱合理性的判決。儘管結果如何,所判決的金額會在日後之附屬濟助審訊時并納考慮。

17. 在C v F(FCMC 1701/2000)一案,陳忠基法官闡述了相關的法律原則:

“Although the sole statutory guideline in considering  maintenance pending suit is that the award shall be “reasonable”, the court will nevertheless bear in mind all the factors drawn to its attention relating to the marriage and the parties to it, and perhaps the two most outstanding matters in every case, as in this one, are the standard of living of the parties, and the ability of the husband to pay.”

“As it is intended that the award will operate for a relatively short period, several months as is anticipated in this case, it would not be appropriate for the court to make a detailed investigation of the financial position of the parties when considering whether to grant maintenance   pending suit……..”

法庭的看法

18. 首先,女方在她存檔的兩份表格 E,均沒有全面出示文件或單據供法庭查閱表格 E內所申報的每一項開支,但女方在她其後的回覆誓章(見上文第3段)內的 “目錄” 中,出示了一批個人之消費單據 (“目錄” 中第57至81頁) ,亦包括一些信用咭簽帳及EPS回條 ,供法庭查閱作為支持她在經濟上的需要為每月 $30,000。

19. 從女方的支持申請誓章及證供可見,不爭議的事實包括 :

(a)  在她沒有提出離婚前,男方每月給她 $12,000, 在她提出離婚後,男方每月仍然給她 $9,000 之生活費;

(b)在男方搬離開前婚姻居所後,男方仍然負責支付按揭供款全數,管理費及差餉、地租等,讓她和兒子倆人繼續居住,她無須承擔任何居住上的開支;

(c)  在男方搬離開前婚姻居所後,男方仍然有向兒子支付零用錢。

20. 女方在第二份表格 E 申報的個人開支每月 $29,500,與現時要求的每月 $30,000 訟案期間贍養費在數目上大致相約,但相比她的第一份表格 E 內申報的同樣開支項目,在某些項目則有明顯差別 。法庭留意到在兩份表格 E 的日期 ,她仍然是在前婚姻居所居住,男方仍然繼續支付她在居住上的需要,包括每月按揭供款及與物業相關的開支,如差餉、地租、管理費等等。對於日常的生活情況方面,可見的不同地方是自從男方離開後,女方個人及兒子在週末及週日的開支 (包括購物消費及膳食等) ,均沒有男方在場支付,男方在他的誓章內亦同意在雙方分開前,這方面的開支是由他支付,但銀碼並非龐大。如是者,在盡量不影嚮雙方在婚姻破裂前的生活質素的法律原則為前題,就本案之事實背景而言,法庭須要從女方交待現時的生活情況及任何相關文件証據,作出客觀評審,並以概況形式 (broad brush approach) 而非深入的調查 ,來決定合理的訟案期間贍養費數目。

21. 對於男方聲稱他須要支付現時租住的翔龍灣單位,在每月開支上有負擔,女方不予置否,她著眼的事情可從上述回覆誓章的15項 “目錄” 中清楚可見,當中包括指控男方的「婚外情」問題。法庭須要重申,任何行為上的指控或不是,須要在日後的離婚主案的爭訟審訊時查証,而並不是在現階段作出考慮及用作為評定訟案期間贍養費的合理數目。

22. 男方在他的第二份誓章反對女方的要求 ,指女方的申報不單止沒有單據證明,亦有誇大之謙。這說法可以理解,因為女方只是在男方存檔他的反對誓章後,在存檔回覆誓章的時候才附上一批消費單據。

23. 經查閱女方的消費單據,當中包括一些知名的品牌店高消費物品,現在列舉部份如下 :-

(a)  Jessica  (10/12/2014)$2,072(“目錄” 第57頁);
(b)  Calvin Klein (22/12/2014)$1,188(“目錄” 第59頁);
(c)  Beauty Avenue (9/10/2015)$2,417(“目錄” 第60頁);
(d)  Beauty Avenue (9/10/2014)$2,484(“目錄” 第61頁);
(e)  Luk Fook Jewellery$25,147(“目錄” 第61頁);
(f)  Baby Face (1/12/2014) $2,000(“目錄” 第62頁);
(g)  Burberry (2/12/2014)$18,000(“目錄” 第64頁);
(h)  Christian Dior (27/9/2015)$710(“目錄” 第69頁).

24. 法庭認為這些消費單據可以反映女方在雙方分開前/後的生活模式及質素,周大律師代表男方於聆訊回覆陳詞階段,提出爭議 女方聲稱之種種經濟開支,並非必需或急切性及/或存有誇大之謙。法庭認為恰當的處理方法,是從女方的第二份表格 E中各項申報開支作出探討,在合適時參閱她所存檔的單據,同時考慮女方解釋某些項目與第一份表格 E 差距 (如有者) 的原因,從而確定該項目的合理數字。在法律程序上,在處理訟案期間贍養費的申請時,法庭是賦有酌情權決定那些項目可以列入申請。

25. 首先,在食物開支方面,在第4.1段 (一般開支) 早前申報 $5,000但調升至 $6,000, 在第4.2段 (個人開支) 早前申報 $2,000但調升至 $4,000。女方不爭議男方在離開前婚姻居所前,男方每月給她 $12,000作為家庭開支 ,當中包括購買一家三口之膳食費用,如是者,按比例粗略計算,每人約為 $4,000 ($12,000 x 1/3)。法庭理解日常家庭膳食費用的開支一般是沒有準確文件證明,但離不開的客觀事實是現時女方確實無須要購買男方的膳食,只是她及兒子倆人,按一般情況而言,法庭相信以比例計算每月 $8,000供給倆人的食物開支是合理及足夠,並予以頒令。

26. 在保險費項目,在兩份的表格 E的第4.1段 (一般開支) 均申報 $2,500, 在第4.2段 (個人開支) 同樣申報 $2,500 ,合共 $5,000 。女方出示的相關文件為 “目錄” 中第83至85頁,分別為 HSBC的「聚全保8」產品的保單年結通知書 (Policy Annual Statement),開始生效日期為4/7/2007,保單週年日為4/7/2015,但沒有顯示每月供款多少,亦沒有顯示是否仍然生效。另一份同樣是 HSBC的產品,名為「摯全保」,開始生效日期同樣為4/7/2007,但保單到期日則為4/7/2074,保費金額為港元11,500並以年繳方式支付,如是者每月只是 $958.33 ($11,500 x 1/12 = $958.33),存檔的相關文件第84至85頁同樣看不到月供 $2,500之記載。因此,法庭只能頒令 $958.33為保險費項目的支出。

27. 在交通費項目早前申報 $800但調升至 $1,000,法庭接納$1,000是合理的數字,予以頒令。

28. 在服裝/鞋費項目早前申報 $1,000但調升至 $3,000,縱使女方曾經購買品牌的產品,但法庭認為每月花費$3,000屬偏高,畢竟女方曾任兼職普通話教師時,她的每月入息亦不過只是$3,000。因此,法庭只頒令 $1, 000。

29. 在個人儀容費項目早前申報 $3,000但調升至 $4,000,女方補充說當中包括美容護膚品的開支,以往均是男方購買,以客觀評審此項開支,法庭認為平均每月 $1,500 是合理的數字,予以頒令。

30. 在娛樂/禮物費項目早前申報 $1,000但調升至 $3,000,法庭認為平均每月 $1,000 是合理的數字,予以頒令。

31. 在假期消費項目的 $3,000,法庭認為平均每月 $1,000 是合理的數字,予以頒令。

32. 在供養父母項目早前申報 $2,000但調升至 $3,500,女方被指出她的父親早於2007年經已離世時,女方同意只是供養母親,並說在婚姻期間定時給予母親每月$2,000,現時調升至 $3,500是因為須要購買補品給予母親,女方在她呈交的 “目錄” 中第44至45頁之間夾了一張余仁生店鋪之 $5,940 AEON 信用咭咭號: 6224 93xx xxxx 3806的銷售記錄。法庭留意到女方在她的兩份表格 E 均沒有披露她持有 AEON 信用咭,這份文件記錄亦看不見女方或持咭人姓名,因此法庭不能接納為女方購買補品給予母親的証據,再者這份文件亦沒有記載何種補品。法庭理解供養父母為子女應有的孝道及責任,但女方向男方索取每月 $3,500為她個人的訟案期間贍養費的一部份,有商榷之餘亦屬偏高。因此,法庭只頒令 $1,000。

33. 在供養其他受養家屬項目 $1,000,女方解釋是她要供養在國內的大家姐,現年48歲及天生殘疾 。首先,女方在她所呈交的 “目錄” 中第38至44頁,是她個人的申述而並非任何俱說服力的支持文件; 其次, 如屬實者,她未能令法庭接納在現在的離婚階段,男方除了須要供養她個人及兒子,為何仍然須要供養她的大家姐 ? 因此,法庭不予頒令此項目。

34. 女方在第二份表格 E 的 “其他 (請說明)” 一項填上 $2,000,她的解釋是一些慈善公益捐獻,在她呈交的 “目錄” 中第6至9頁出示了收據及感謝函等作証明文件。這項目的要求,縱使在婚姻期間存在,但從法律觀點及角度而言,不能被視作為女方生活上之必需或是缺乏者影嚮她的生活質素。因此,法庭不予頒令此項目。

總結

35. 綜合以上理由,法庭裁定女方可得到的訟案期間贍養費為每月 $15,458.33 (即 $8,000 (上文第25段) + $958.33 (上文第26段) + $1,000 (上文第27段) + $1,000 (上文第28段) + $1,500 (上文第29段) + $1,000 (上文第30段) + $1,000 (上文第31段) + $1,000 (上文第32段)。

36. 為方便計算,訟案期間贍養費將定為每月 $15,500。

37. 法庭現裁定之每月 $15,500相比早前之臨時訟案期間贍養費 $12,000,每月增加了 $3,500 (即$15,500 - $12,000 = $3,500) 。男方現時工作平均收入為 $112,634 (上文第12段) ,扣減他現時之種種開支 $100,491.25 (上文第14段) ,男方之剩餘數為 $12,142.75,足以應付增加了的每月 $3,500。

追溯差額之申索

38. 對於女方要求訟案期間贍養費追溯至離婚呈請書當天開始計算, 即追溯11個月, 女方沒有交待理由為何她不在展開離婚訴訟時申請, 倘若當男方將早前每月 $12,000下調至 $9,000時出現入不敷支, 理應提出申請經濟濟助或是要求補回少付的每月 $3,000。

39. 因此 ,法庭不批准在現階段追溯訟案期間贍養費自離婚呈請書當天或是提出本申請之日期開始計算,判決的訟案期間贍養費將於本判決後的一個月生效,即2016年4月10日開始直至另作命令為止,並取代早前的臨時訟案期間贍養命令。

40. 法庭須要重申,這項訟案期間贍養費的判令,是給予女方個人的生活開支,並不取代、影嚮或改變男方現時支付兒子方面的種種費用及開支 (包括每週之零用錢) 。同時亦並不取代、影嚮或改變男方現時支付前婚姻居所之每月按揭供款、管理費、差餉及地租等等。

命令

41. 本席現頒令如下 :

(a)  男方須向女方支付訟案期間贍養,每月$15,500並自2016年4月10日開始 ,及後每月之10日或之前直至另作命令為止; 及

(b)  無訟費命令,包括任何保留待決的訟費。 此訟費命令為暫準命令,於本判案書頒發日起計14天內,如任何一方沒有提出申請,將成為絶對命令。

( 翁喬奇 )
區域法院暫委法官

呈請人 :無律師代表,親自應訊

答辯人 :由周啓邦律師行轉聘周偉雄大律師代表出席