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LEE CHICK CHOI v. BEST SPIRITS CO LTD

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109906-EN-2017-06-12

LEE CHICK CHOI v. BEST SPIRITS CO LTD

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CACV 138/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 138 OF 2015

(ON APPEAL FROM HCB NO 1128 OF 2015)

_______________

BETWEEN
 LEE CHICK CHOIAppellant
and
 BEST SPIRITS COMPANY LIMITEDRespondent

_______________

Before:Hon Yuen, Hon Kwan and Hon Poon JJA in Court
Date of Written Submissions: 16 May 2017
Date of Judgment: 12 June 2017

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Hon Poon JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

1.  By a judgment handed down on 24 February 2017, we, having dismissed the appellant’s appeal and disposed of his summons dated 1 February 2017, ordered him to pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis to be summarily assessed on paper.  By an order dated 18 April 2017 (“Costs Order”), we summarily assessed the respondent’s costs at HK$100,000.00, after considering the respondent’s statement of costs and the appellant’s statement of objection.

2.  By a notice of motion dated 4 May 2017, the appellant applied for leave to appeal against the Costs Order to the Court of Final Appeal.  The respondent’s solicitors wrote to the court on 16 May 2017, stating that since the application was wholly unmeritorious and was an abuse of process, they would not file any skeleton submission in opposition.  Having considered the notice of motion and the appellant’s affirmation and documents filed in support, we come to the view that the application can be disposed of on paper without an oral hearing.  We now hand down our judgment.

3.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  The grounds of appeal attached to the notice of appeal have failed completely (a) to identify the error we had supposedly made in our summary assessment of the respondent’s costs as per the Costs Order; and (b) to state any ground to satisfy either threshold in section 22(1)(b) for the grant of leave of appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  In the circumstances, we refuse to give the appellant leave to appeal and dismiss his notice of motion.  Since the respondent has not filed any written submissions in opposition, we will make no order as to costs.

  

  

(Maria Yuen)
Justice of Appeal
(Susan Kwan)
Justice of Appeal
(Jeremy Poon)
Justice of Appeal

  

The Appellant, unrepresented, acted in person

Messrs Hobson & Ma, for the Respondent

109747-EN-2017-05-31

LEE CHICK CHOI v. BEST SPIRITS CO LTD

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CACV 138/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 138 OF 2015

(ON APPEAL FROM HCB NO 1128 OF 2015)

_______________

BETWEEN
 LEE CHICK CHOIAppellant
and
 BEST SPIRITS COMPANY LIMITEDRespondent

_______________

Before: Hon Yuen, Hon Kwan and Hon Poon JJA in Court

Dates of Written Submissions: 7, 8 and 28 April 2017

Date of Judgment: 31 May 2017

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________


Hon Poon JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

1.  By a judgment dated 24 February 2017, we dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the bankruptcy order made against him by L Chan J on 18 May 2015.  At the hearing on 14 February 2017, we had already dismissed the Recusal Application in his summons dated 1 February 2017.   By the same judgment, we dismissed the remainder of his summons, namely, the Discharge Application and the New Evidence Application.

2.  By a notice of motion dated 24 March 2017, the appellant applied for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  He filed three skeleton submissions on 7, 8 and 28 April 2017. The respondent’s solicitors wrote to the Court on 25 April 2017, stating that, to save costs, they would not file any skeleton submissions in opposition as the notice of motion should simply be dismissed as it is an abuse of process.

3.  Having considered the appellant’s submissions, we take the view that the matter can be disposed of on paper without an oral hearing.  We now hand down our judgment.

4.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal against any judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court for decision.

5.  On the great general or public importance limb, none of the questions involved in our judgment that the appellant sought to appeal from concerns any great general or public importance.  And we fail to see how on the facts of the present case, the “otherwise” limb could be invoked.

6.  We therefore refuse to give the appellant leave to appeal and dismiss his notice of motion.  The respondent’ solicitors had not filed any skeleton submissions.  In the letter of 25 April 2017, they did not ask for costs should we dismiss the appellant’s notice of motion.  In the circumstances, we will make no order as to costs.

(Maria Yuen)
Justice of Appeal
(Susan Kwan)
Justice of Appeal
(Jeremy Poon)
Justice of Appeal

The Appellant, unrepresented, acted in person

Messrs Hobson & Ma, for the Respondent

108397-EN-2017-02-24

LEE CHICK CHOI v. BEST SPIRITS CO LTD

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CACV 138/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 138 OF 2015

(ON APPEAL FROM HCB NO 1128 OF 2015)

_______________

BETWEEN
 LEE CHICK CHOIAppellant
and
 BEST SPIRITS COMPANY LIMITEDRespondent

_______________

Before: Hon Yuen, Hon Kwan and Hon Poon JJA in Court
Date of Hearing: 14 February 2017
Date of Judgment: 24 February 2017

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Hon Poon JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

A.   Introduction

1.  By a notice of appeal dated 15 June 2015, the appellant sought to appeal against the bankruptcy order made against him by L Chan J on 18 May 2015 (“the Bankruptcy Order”).  By a summons dated 1 February 2017 (“the Summons”), the appellant applied for :

(1)   a discharge of the Bankruptcy Order or leave to commence fresh proceedings to claim injury to feelings in the sum of HK$14,475,849.00 under section 66 of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Cap 486 and service fee in the sum of HK$143,548.00 in DCCJ 4962/2014 (“Discharge Application”);

(2)   leave to adduce new evidence on appeal (“New Evidence Application”); and

(3)   to disqualify Kwan JA from hearing this appeal (“Recusal Application”).

2.  At the hearing on 14 February 2017, after hearing the appellant, we dismissed the Recusal Application for reasons to be given in our written judgment to be handed down on the appeal proper.  We indicated that we would receive the new evidence de bene esse.  We then reserved judgment on the appeal, the Discharge Application and the New Evidence Application.  We now hand down our judgment on them.

B.   Background

B1.   The Statutory Demand

3.  The appellant was previously employed by the respondent as a general manager under a contract of employment dated 4 July 2006.  After the termination of the employment, the appellant commenced proceedings in the Labour Tribunal under LBTC 588/2011, claiming against the respondent for, among other things, unfair dismissal.  On 10 October 2011, the Deputy Presiding Officer dismissed all the appellant’s claims.  She further ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs in the sum of HK$130,353.00 forthwith (“the Costs Order”).

4.  On 28 October 2011, the Deputy Presiding Officer handed down the Reasons for Decision and refused the appellant’s application for stay of execution of the Costs Order.

5.  When the appellant failed to pay the respondent its costs pursuant to the Costs Order, it served a statutory demand on the appellant on 7 November 2011.  On 11 November 2011, the appellant applied to set aside the statutory demand in HCSD 38/2011.

6.  However, the hearing and determination of HCSD 38/2011 was derailed by the numerous steps taken by the appellant at various levels of the court.

B2.   In respect of the Costs Order

7.  The appellant first applied for leave to appeal against the decision of the Deputy Presiding Officer in HCLA 29/2011. Leave was however refused by Mimmie Chan J on 6 June 2013.

8.  On 6 August 2013, the appellant applied to the Labour Tribunal for review of the Costs Order out of time.  The application was refused on 16 August 2013.  On 28 August 2013, he applied to the High Court for leave to vary the Costs Order out of time.  The master granted him time extension to file an application for leave to appeal against the order of refusal made by the Labour Tribunal in August 2013, which he subsequently did.  But that leave application was eventually dismissed on 18 November 2014 by Deputy High Court Judge B Chu in HCLA 19/2013.

9.  On 15 January 2014, the appellant applied to the High Court in HCLA 19/2013 for stay of the Costs Order.  The application was dismissed by Deputy High Court Judge B Chu on 21 October 2014.  The appellant then applied for leave to appeal against her order, which was refused by the judge on 11 February 2015 and the Court of Appeal (Lam VP and Barma JA with Lam VP giving the judgment) in HCMP 401/2015 on 10 April 2015 respectively.  On 14 April 2015, the appellant filed a notice of motion asking for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, which was dismissed on 24 July 2015.

B3.   HCA 2045/2012

10.  On 2 November 2012, the appellant commenced HCA 2045/2012 against the respondent claiming, among other things, compensation for loss of income by reason of unreasonable and unlawful dismissal in the sum of HK$14,475,849.00.

11.  On 1 December 2014, Deputy High Court Judge Yee struck out the appellant’s statement of claim in HCA 2045/2012 and dismissed the action with costs.  On 12 February 2015, the appellant applied in HCMP 371/2015 for leave to appeal against the Deputy Judge’s order out of time.  On 21 May 2015, the Court of Appeal (Kwan and Chu JJA with Kwan JA giving the judgment of the Court) dismissed the application.

B4.   DCCJ 4962/2014

12.  On 22 December 2014, the appellant commenced DCCJ 4962/2014 against the respondent, claiming for service fee in the sum of HK$143,548.00 between 5 November and 23 December 2010.  That action was subsequently adjourned sine die with liberty to restore because of the appellant’s bankruptcy.

B5.   Determination in HCSD 38/2011

13.  Eventually the appellant’s setting aside application was heard by Anthony Chan J on 7 January 2015.  The judge handed down judgment on 21 January 2015, dismissing the setting aside application and granting the respondent leave to issue and serve the bankruptcy petition.

14.  On 2 February 2015, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in CACV 25/2015 against the judge’s judgment.  The appeal was however stayed as a result of the appellant’s bankruptcy.

C.   HCB 1128/2015

15.  On 9 February 2015, the respondent commenced HCB 1128/2015 based on the outstanding indebtedness with interest under the Costs Order.  The bankruptcy petition was heard by L Chan J (“the Judge”) on 18 May 2015.

16.  The appellant opposed the bankruptcy petition on the ground that he was claiming against the respondent for HK$143,548.00 in DCCJ 4962/2014.  The Judge however noted that the same claim had already been dismissed by the Labour Tribunal in LBTC 588/2011 and the appellant’s application for leave to appeal was also dismissed by Mimmie Chan J in HCLA 29/2011 on 6 June 2013.  The Judge further pointed out that the appellant made the same claim in HCA 2045/2012 but that action had already been struck out by Deputy Judge Yee on 1 December 2014.  The Judge then referred to the judgment of Anthony Chan J in dismissing the appellant’s application to set aside the statutory demand.  Like Anthony Chan J, the Judge found the appellant’s ground of opposition based on that claim unmeritorious.  He accordingly made the Bankruptcy Order against the appellant.

17.  We now turn to the Summons.

D.   The Summons

18.  As said, the Summons contained the Discharge Application, the New Evidence Application and the Recusal Application.

D1.   The Recusal Application

19.  At the hearing we first disposed of the Recusal Application as it might impact on the rest of the matters before us. We dismissed the Recusal Application for this simple reason.  The appellant complained that Kwan JA had maliciously and intentionally delayed in delivering judgment in HCMP 371/2015 on 21 May 2015.  There is no substance whatsoever in this entirely groundless allegation.  And there existed no actual or apparent bias on Kwan JA’s part which would disqualify her from hearing the appeal.

D2.   The New Evidence Application

20.  It is trite that further evidence is admissible on appeal only where the applicant satisfies the Court of Appeal that such evidence :

(1)   could not have been obtained at the proceedings below with reasonable diligence;

(2)   would or might, if believed, have a very important effect on the mind of the tribunal; and

(3)   is of a sort which inherently is not improbable.

See Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489.

21.  We need not go into detail of the new documents that the appellant sought to adduce before us.  Such documents include those which are in connection with HCMP 401/2015, HCMP 371/2015 and CACV 25/2015; correspondence between 28 May and 11 August 2015; pleadings in DCCJ 4962/2014; the statement of affairs filed in HCB 1128/2015; and correspondence between the appellant and the respondent’s solicitors, Messrs Hobson & Ma dated 12 January 2016 and the Law Society dated 25 January 2016.

22.  For those documents which pre-dated the hearing before the Judge on 18 May 2015, the appellant could have with reasonable diligence produced them to the Judge.  And in any event, all the documents are irrelevant to this appeal.  The appellant has therefore failed to satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Ladd v Marshall for leave to be granted to allow him to adduce the new evidence on appeal.  We accordingly dismiss the New Evidence Application.

D3.   The Discharge Application

23.  We dismiss the Discharge Application because the Court of Appeal is simply not the proper forum for the appellant to bring such application.  Even if we were to be seized of the matter, we would have dismissed it anyway as it is wholly unmeritorious.

D4.   Dismissing the Summons

24.  For the above reasons, we dismiss the Summons in its entirety.

25.  We now come to the appeal proper.

E.   Appeal

26.  The appellant raised two grounds of appeal in the notice of appeal.

27.  First, he complained that Lam VP, Kwan JA, and Chu JA and the Judge were involved in an offence of perverting the course of justice with the respondent’s solicitors.  This complaint is entirely groundless and must be firmly rejected.

28.  Second, the appellant complained that there were errors committed by the respondent and the Judge.  He took a number of points.

29.  He said that by a letter dated 15 May 2015, the Judge requested a set of the pleadings filed in DCCJ 4962/2014.  But he only received the letter in the evening of 18 May 2015.  However, when he actually received the letter is beside the point.  For the respondents’ solicitors did provide a copy of the pleadings to the Judge on 15 May 2015.  And the Judge was fully aware of the nature and amount of the appellant’s claim in DCCJ 4962/2014 when he heard the parties on 18 May 2015.

30.  The appellant then complained that the Judge had ignored “the grace period of 7 days” for the payment of the petitioning debt, which was said to have been granted by the respondent. However, this is entirely misconceived.  For when the respondent appeared before the Judge, it sought as an alternative to a bankruptcy order an unless order for the payment of the petitioning debt.  It had not granted any grace period as contended.

31.  The appellant further complained that the respondent had the malicious intention to exclude certain exhibits of his attached to his affirmation in opposition from the hearing bundle for the hearing before the Judge.  It is true that those exhibits were not included in the hearing bundle below.  However, on 15 May 2015, the respondent’s solicitors wrote to the clerk to the Judge, stating that those exhibits were voluminous and would not be included in the hearing but if necessary reference could be made to the court file and the respondent’s solicitors would bring along the exhibits to the court.  And at the hearing below, neither party found it necessary to refer to those exhibits.  In the circumstances, this complaint does not take the appellant’s case any further.

32.  The appellant next complained that the Judge had not read his skeleton argument lodged with the court on 16 May 2015 (Saturday) as according to the Judge, it had not arrived at his desk before the hearing on 18 May 2015 (Monday).  However, the Judge was fully aware of the appellant’s case and had in fact given him the full opportunity to address the court before making the Bankruptcy Order.  There is no substance in this complaint.

33.  The appellant asked that he should be given additional time to make payment of the petitioning debt.  However, this point was not raised before the Judge.  In any event, as rightly pointed out by its counsel, Mr Kok, the respondent is not obliged to accept it.  Indeed, we could see no reason why the respondent should accept it.  Having regard to the history of the proceedings and the appellant’s conduct, it is but a hollow promise which, if accepted, would only lead to further delay and obstruction to the effective enforcement of the Costs Order and recovery of the petitioning debt.

34.  Lastly, the appellant raised some other minor points.  We have considered them all and find them to be wholly irrelevant to this appeal.  In order not to over-burden this judgment, we do not propose to discuss them.

35.  For the above reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

F.   Costs

36.  The parties agreed that costs should follow the event.  Mr Kok asked for indemnity costs.  The appellant opposed the request.  In our view, this appeal is wholly unmeritorious.  It is an abuse of process, deployed by the appellant to defy the Costs Order and to resist payment of the costs.  He should be visited with indemnity costs.  We therefore order the appellant to pay the respondent costs of the appeal on an indemnity basis to be summarily assessed on paper.  We further direct the respondent to file and serve a statement of costs (limited to 2 pages with no exhibits or attachments) within 14 days from the date of this judgment, and the appellant to file and serve a statement of objection (limited to 2 pages with no exhibits or attachments) within 14 days thereafter.  We will then assess the respondent’s costs on paper.

(Maria Yuen)
Justice of Appeal
(Susan Kwan)
Justice of Appeal
(Jeremy Poon)
Justice of Appeal

The Appellant appeared in person

Mr Martin Kok, instructed by Messrs Hobson & Ma, for the Respondent

105041-EN-2016-07-26

LEE CHICK CHOI v. BEST SPIRITS CO LTD

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CACV 138/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 138 OF 2015

(ON APPEAL FROM HCB NO 1128 OF 2015)

_______________________

BETWEEN

 LEE CHICK CHOIAppellant
 and 
 BEST SPIRITS COMPANY LIMITEDRespondent

_______________________

Before :  Hon Lam VP and Kwan JA in Court
Date of Judgment:  26 July 2016

_________________

JUDGMENT

_________________

Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1. This is an appeal against a bankruptcy order of 18 May 2015 made by L Chan J against the appellant. By a revised summons of 23 May 2016, the appellant sought to withdraw his application to fix a date for hearing of the appeal. According to his summons, the reason for so doing was to conduct out of court settlement negotiations. He also requested the summons to be heard in December 2016 as he would apply for legal aid “pending an outcome of investigation taken or to be taken by the Law Society of Hong Kong against Messrs Hobson & Ma”.

2. The summons is opposed.

3. The application is an interlocutory application and pursuant to Order 59 Rule 14A the court can direct the matter be determined on the basis of written submissions only. 

4. Having regard to the lack of complexity and the issues raised, this court considered that for the expeditious, fair and cost-effective disposal of the matter, it would be in line with the underlying objectives in Order 1A to direct this summons to be determined on paper without any oral hearing.  Directions were given on 26 May 2016 accordingly.

5. Notwithstanding the submissions, this court sees no reason why Lam VP should be recused from dealing with the summons.  The mere fact that Lam VP had been involved in refusing leave to appeal in another matter is not a ground for seeking recusal.

6. We have read the submissions of the parties.  In effect, the appellant is seeking to delay the listing of the appeal.  We agree with the submission of the solicitors for the respondent that this should not allowed on account of the appellant’s desire to conduct global settlement negotiation.  Though the appellant is appealing against the bankruptcy order, he is a bankrupt at present.  His estate is therefore vested in the trustee in bankruptcy and there is no suggestion that the trustee is minded to conduct any negotiations.  The respondent can therefore legitimately take the view that, as things stand, there is not much point in negotiating with him.

7. In any event, there is nothing to prevent the appellant to conduct whatever negotiations he wishes to conduct with the relevant parties between now (if not earlier) and the hearing of the appeal.

8. For obvious reasons, bankruptcy appeals should be processed promptly.  The trustee in bankruptcy needs to proceed with his works in relation to the affairs of a bankrupt.  There is a statutory period of 4 years for the discharge of the bankrupt.  By now, more than one year has lapsed since the making of the bankruptcy order.

9. There is thus no reason why the summons should be deferred to December 2016.

10. In the circumstances, we dismiss the summons and direct the appeal be referred to the Registrar of Civil Appeal to give further directions to facilitate the early listing of the appeal.  We also order the appellant to pay the costs of the respondent in respect of the summons.  Having regard to the works undertaken by solicitor for the respondent on the summons, we propose to fix such costs by way of gross sum assessment at $10,000.  If any party wishes to vary the amount of gross sum assessment, this can be done by writing to the court within 7 days.

(M H Lam)
Vice President
(Susan Kwan)
Justice of Appeal

The appellant acting in person

Hobson & Ma, for the respondent