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Matrimonial Causes2017

JRMW v. NAV

Related cases with same parties

  • CAMP131/2018JRMW v. NAV
  • FCMC4191/2012NAV v. JTMW

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[2022] HKFC 46-EN-2022-03-07

JTMW v. NAV

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FCMC 8504/2017

[2022] HKFC 46

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NO. 8504 OF 2017

____________________

BETWEEN   
 JTMW  The Petitioner
 and 
 NAV The Respondent 

____________________

Coram:   His Honour Judge I Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public) 

Dates of Hearing:   22, 23 and 25 (half-day) November 2021 

Date of Judgment:  7 March 2022 

__________________

J U D G M E N T

( Ancillary Relief )

__________________

1.  This is a high conflict case lasting for about 9 years.  There has been a total breakdown of trust and communication between the parties.  There have not been any reasonable or sensible compromises in respect of any matters and all differences, big or small, have ended in court.  During the course of these years, I have given no less than 11 written judgments and numerous ex tempore judgments. It is hopeful that this judgment is the final chapter of this saga. 

2.  In this Judgment, for the ease of reference, I shall refer to the petitioner as “the husband” and the respondent “the wife”.  Their two children, both boys, are referred to as “L” and “B”.  L is nearly 15 years old and B is 12. I shall also continue to refer to the husband’s partner as “V”.

Background

3.  The husband is Danish and the wife Australian.

4.  The parties met in Sweden in 2002 when the wife was travelling there.  According to her, they soon started cohabitation in June 2002.  They gave birth to L in Sweden in April 2007 and were married in February 2008. 

5.  The husband is a professional pilot.  In June 2008 he secured a job in Hong Kong and so the whole family moved here.  B was born in Hong Kong in February 2010.

6.  It is unfortunate that marital discord soon developed; that led to their separation in November, 2011.  On 26 March 2012, the wife petitioned for divorce on the ground of the husband’s unreasonable behaviour (under FCMC 4191/2012).

7.  At the beginning, the parties were able to come to terms through mediation settling all the ancillary relief and children matters.  Insofar as the ancillary relief is concerned, the wife said according to the settlement the husband agreed to pay her $4,500,000. 

8.  Conflicts, however, soon developed.  It is fair to say that at that time their conflicts centred much on the care and control arrangement of the boys.  Sadly, it turned out that starting from early 2014 the parties’ relationship had deteriorated to a point where they argued on essentially all issues arising from the divorce proceedings.  There was a series of litigations seeking non-removal orders, non-molestation orders, application for relocation to Australia, temporary removal orders, maintenance pending suit, directions on expert reports together with assorted appeals and other less important orders.

9.  On the court’s own motion, the Official Solicitor was brought in to represent the boys. 

10.  After a 5-day trial, by a Judgment dated 23 February 2017 (“the Custody Judgment”),[1] the custody, care and control of the boys was given to the husband.  The wife was given access by way of emails, limited to 2 emails per week, to the boys.  This has been so arranged up to this day because of the boys’ estrangement due to the wife’s conducts.  She was accused of hitting the boys and was convicted of ill treatment or neglect of L under section 27(1) of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance (Cap 212).  Supervised face-to-face and FaceTime access were proved to be futile as a result of which email access has been implemented upon the recommendation of the Official Solicitor and the social investigation officer. 

11.  In view of the reluctance on the part of the wife to obtain a decree nisi in her own divorce petition, on 4 July 2017 the husband took out the present proceeding on the ground of 2 years’ separation.

12.  Decree nisi was granted on 20 November 2017.

13.  Even by the time of the decree nisi, the parties were not ready to deal with their ancillary relief matter.  That was due to the husband’s 2 applications for relocation to Denmark.  The 1st application went through a 4 ½ day-trial and was dismissed by this court on 16 April 2018 (“the 1st Relocation Judgment”) with an order that the husband was to pay the wife’s costs.  The husband’s application for leave to appeal was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 November 2018: see JRMW v NAV[2018] HKCA 883, CAMP 131/2018.

14.  The husband made a 2nd application and succeeded this time, at the expense of a 5-day trial: JTMW v NAV[2020] HKFC 244, FCMC 8504/2017 (date: 3 December 2020).  I shall refer to this Judgment as “the 2nd Relocation Judgment”. 

15.  The husband and the boys have since December 2020 relocated to Denmark.

Current Situation of the Parties

The Husband and the Boys

16.  At the time of the husband’s 2nd application for relocation, his plan was to have his reporting port transferred to his employer’s base in London so that he might live in Denmark while reporting duty at Heathrow, London.  The husband managed to have him so transferred but unfortunately, the Covid-19 pandemic continued to hit the travel industry, as a result of which the London base had to be closed. The husband was given two options. The first was to have him relocated back to Hong Kong with lower remuneration and much reduced fringe benefits. The second was to have his employment terminated on the ground of redundancy. The husband chose the latter.  His employment was terminated in October 2021.

17.  The husband and the boys have settled in a town in Denmark and are living in a house bought by the husband in February 2021 for about $3,783,000.  That was made possible by utilizing the husband’s provident fund in Hong Kong as a down-payment.  V is staying with the husband and the boys but has not been granted a residency visa yet. 

18.  The husband is not working now for the reason that he has since 30 August 2021 pursued full-time education for a law degree at a university there.  The boys, said the husband, have been settling well in school and are enjoying their new lives in Denmark.

The Wife

19.  The wife’s personal circumstances have not changed since the 2nd application for relocation.  She continues to live on her own in a rented village flat in Mui Wo of Lantau and continues to work as a private English tutor and face-painter.

The Former Matrimonial Home

20.  Following the breakdown of the marriage, the former matrimonial home in Lantau was sold in January 2013, resulting in $4,645,997 being liquidated.  Much of these monies have been evaporated or, to be more accurate, turned to legal costs.  What remained so far is a modest sum of $928,000 (“the Net Proceeds”), having been paid into court pending the determination of the ancillary relief.

Parties’ Open Offer

21.  Both parties set their eyes on the Net Proceeds. 

22.  The husband seeks the entire Net Proceeds.  In return, he is prepared (1) not to enforce the costs orders granted in his favour in the previous interlocutory proceedings; and (2) not to seek any maintenance for the benefit of the boys.

23.  As regards the wife, she seeks a lump sum of $4,500,000.  This is the sum that ought to have been paid to her under the settlement agreement.  She recognises that in reality the only asset on the table is the Net Proceeds and so she is seeking the entire sum.  Any remaining balance would have to be met by the husband by way of periodical payments until full payment.

The Law and Legal Principles

24.  The jurisdiction of the court in granting financial provision for a party is governed by section 4 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap 192) (“MPPO”).  Pursuant to sections 6 and 6A of the same legislation, the court has the power to grant orders for transfer, settlement or sale of properties. 

25.  The principles upon which this case is to be considered are the conventional ones, namely those set out in section 7 of MPPO which confers a broad discretion on judges dealing with ancillary relief.  That said, these principles are to be interpreted in the light of the Court of Final Appeal judgment in LKW v DD (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537.  In that case, Riberio PJ referred to the four principles which are applicable to all ancillary relief proceeding, viz, (1) the objective of fairness: [56], (2) rejection of discrimination: [57], (3) the yardstick of equal division: [58] – [61] and (4) avoidance of ‘minute retrospective investigation’: [62] – [69].

26.  Ribeiro PJ further set out the steps to be taken by the courts in undertaking the exercise.  In brief, they are:

(1)  The ascertainment of the financial resources of each of the parties calculated as at the date of the hearing: [71] to [73];

(2)  The assessment of the parties’ financial needs.  If the total resources are not enough to meet the parties’ needs, the s.7 exercise should stop at this step and there is no room to apply any sharing principle: [74] to [79];

(3)  If surplus assets would remain after the parties’ needs have been catered for, the next step should normally be for the court to apply the sharing principle to the parties’ total assets, with a yardstick of equal division as part of that principle.  This means that the total assets should be divided equally between the parties unless there is good reason for departing from an equal division: [80] to [82];

(4)  In considering whether good reasons exist for departing from equal division, the answer is to be found in the terms of s.7 and the implicit objective of a fair distribution of the assets.  Factors like source of the assets, conduct, financial needs, duration of the marriage, contribution to the family and compensation are all material considerations: [83] to [130]; and

(5)  The weight to be given to each of the factors is a matter of discretion for the court: [131].

27.  Lastly, I do bear in mind the reminder given by Thorpe LJ in Parra v Parra [2003] 1 FLR 942 at [22] that the proper judicial task of the court is to exercise a singularly broad judgment that obviates the need for the investigation of minute detail. 

Identification of Assets

28.  I have already mentioned the Net Proceeds.  The other items and their quantum are largely undisputed.  Where the items are in Danish Krones (DDK), I shall adopt an exchange rate of DDK 1: HK$1.18. 

29.  According to the husband’s Form E dated 25 June 2018, his Hong Kong provident fund was about $1,780,000.  He made use of about $1,285,000 as down-payment for his house in Denmark.  The total consideration paid was about $3,783,000 with a mortgage finance.  I reckon that, net of mortgage standing at $2,478,000, the house should be worth about $1,305,000.  The remaining part of the Hong Kong provident fund was used for expenses and outgoings.  He currently has about $24,000.

30.  Prior to coming to Hong Kong the husband had worked for some years in Norway.  That part of the retirement fund is currently about $154,000 which cannot be liquidated until he retires. 

31.  The wife is the sole-proprietor of a business through which she delivers her teaching and face-painting services.  No value has been assigned to this business in the husband’s Lists of Assets and Liabilities.

32.  The parties’ assets are set out below.

Schedule of Assets

Item No. Assets Jointly Owned In  the Husband’s Name In the Wife s Name Amount (HK$) Total Amount (HK$) 
1. Net proceeds of the former matrimonial home  928,000 
Sub-total:       928,000 
2. Cash/Deposit 24,000    
3. Property at Denmark 1,305,000    
4. Car in Denmark 63,000    
5. Norwegian retirement fund 154,000    
Item nos. 2 to 5                                                               Sub-total: 1,546,000 
6. Cash/Deposit  263,000   
7. MPF  5,140   
Item nos 6 to 7                                                                Sub-total: 268,140 
Total :      $2,742,140 

Liabilities

33.  The husband said he is mired in debt. 

34.  The husband’s last Form H of 24 November 2021 reported his costs incurred with his current solicitors for the children’s matter are $426,500.  These are costs incurred after his 1st application for relocation was rejected by this court.  As for the costs for ancillary relief, the Form H stated $453,500.  Taking the two figures together the husband would have to pay about $880,000.  The husbands testified that he has already paid $200,000, which came from the loans from his father and a friend in Hong Kong.  These legal costs and loans are not family liabilities.

35.  As for the wife, she is essentially debt-free.

The Husband’s Earning Capacity

36.  The husband is 47 years old; he has been a commercial pilot since 2004.

37.  Before the pandemic, the husband’s basic salary in Hong Kong was $95,000, plus housing and education allowance of about $63,000 and other allowances around $5,000 to $10,000, so a total of $160,000 to $168,000.  At the London base and during furlough, his salary was cut half and was about $43,270.

38.  The husband was made redundant in October 2021.  As part of the redundancy package, the husband is entitled to receive salary for 8 months, this would end in June 2022.

39.  The husband said he would need 3 years to complete his bachelor degree and another 2 years for a masters’ degree in order to be qualified as a lawyer.  He added that law graduates normally start working after obtaining a bachelor degree.

40.  He is in receipt of student grant of about DDK6,500 (or about HK$8,000) net from the Danish government.  He will try to get a job as a law intern in the second year of his study. 

41.  The husband admitted it is imperative for him to secure a job before the summer of 2022.  He said due to the Covid-19 pandemic, inter-continental flights have not rebounded.  The labour market is not favourable.  A recent recruitment exercise by a start-up airline with a small fleet of 5 planes attracted as many as 2,800 applicants. Nevertheless, he assured that he would keep trying and would not miss any opportunity of flying inter-continental jets.

42.  We all know that the aviation industry has been suffering a setback for the time being because of the Covid-19 pandemic.  This happens to other trades and businesses, too. Yet, the objective fact is, as I see it, the husband is highly qualified and has impressive flying experience behind his back.  From what I gathered as the docket judge throughout these years, he is qualified to fly at least the Boeing 747 and Airbus 350 or Boeing 777.[2] The husband has huge earning potential as a commercial pilot. I acknowledge that I do not have a crystal ball informing me when the pandemic is going to end.  Yet, I am sure when the pandemic is debilitated, he serves a very good chance of flying inter-continental jets again.

43.  I have not forgotten the husband’s partner, V.  The husband agreed that V would be able to get employment when she is granted the Family Reunification Visa.  This apart, V is available for taking care of the boys with whom she is no doubt in close relationship.  Her presence would definitely be of great assistance to the husband by releasing some of his time for making a living. 

The Financial Needs of the Husband and the Boys

44.  The husband said because of the stringent financial situation, he has had to economise by spending less and even cutting some items.  He gave some new figures at trial. His general expenses and personal expenses are $30,020 (inclusive mortgage instalments $8,330) and $9,660 respectively and the boys’ expenses are $9,000, totalling $48,680. 

45.  The wife pointed out that the husband, as a full-time law student, is entitled to the Danish Educations Grant and Support (“Statens Uddannelsesstotte”) like all students in Denmark, including higher thresholds for having two children under 18 at home and there should be other kickbacks and discounts from being a student.  The husband denied having been in receipt of any of these benefits.

46.  The wife also pointed out that the boys are entitled to some allowances or tax benefits from the Danish government.  When being questioned by the wife on this matter, the husband said there was a change in the rules.  For the reason that the boys left the country for more than 6 years out of 10 years, they were not in receipt of any allowance and mentioned vaguely about the need to accumulate the time staying in Denmark.  In view of the fact that the boys have already relocated to Denmark since December 2020, when being questioned by the court as to whether the boys have been in receipt of any allowance, the husband replied he had to check.  With the leave of the court, he checked and confirmed that DDK375 of Child Support was received on 20 November 2021; and DKK478 of “Children and Young Support” covering the period between 1 October 2021 to 31 December 2021 was also received.  The Child Support Allowance would be increased on a scale every 6 months.  B would be entitled to the full sum upon the age of 17 years but L would cease to be entitled to it upon the age of 18.

47.  All in all, it is not entirely clear as regards the exact amount of allowance to which the boys are entitled.  The husband said he only has cash of about $24,000 at the time of his evidence and admitted that he is running on a deficit.  He has been relying on the redundancy payment which would end by June 2022.  His financial situation is acute.  He said he must be able to find a job after the winter in order to keep the family afloat.  In my view, if the husband has been in such a tight financial situation, he should have highly concerned about when and how much allowance would be available for his use but seemingly this was not the case.

48.  The husband emphasized he needs to pay full-time attention to his study; yet at the same time he recognized he has to find a job after the winter.  He also assured that he would not miss any opportunity of returning to inter-continental flying.  I must say I have difficulty in understanding how he could have all these worked out.

49.  It has to be recalled that during the husband’s relocation applications, it was repeatedly emphasized by him that he would be able to provide a better life there for the boys, on a lower salary than in Hong Kong.  He said the schooling, food, medical care and housing were cheap or even free because of the Danish social model. When the husband was seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of his 1st Relocation Judgment, his counsel Mr Clough even urged the court to take judicial notice of the fact that Denmark has one of the most advanced systems of social support from “cradle to grave” in the world. [3]

50.  I conclude the husband is not transparent regarding the State benefits he and the boys are entitled to.  The parties have appeared numerous times before me during the last 9 years.  The husband impressed me as a highly conscientious, loving and caring father.  He always places his boys a top priority.  The change of his home base to London and the relocation to Denmark were all for the boys.  The purchase of the new house was to provide a stable and comfortable home for them.  He is also a man with prudence and with an eye to the future.  I am sure every move he took was well thought-out, calculated with the best interest of his boys in mind.  It would be entirely out of his character for the husband to venture into full-time study without having the financial needs of the boys being at the forefront of his mind.  I am sure the husband must have fully taken all possible financial eventualities into consideration when venturing into full-time study as he did. 

51.  On the above analysis, I arrive at a conclusion that the husband is able to make ends meet.  This is made possible from the earnings of the husband and V and from the State’s benefits.

The Wife’s Earning Capacity and Financial Needs

52.  The wife said since the resumption of school after lockdown and for various reasons, her income has dropped from $21,000 to $18,500. In any event, there are ups and downs in the business.  As I shall explain at [57] below, I have some doubts over these figures.

53.  I acknowledge that the wife does not have a degree and her career potential is further hampered by her criminal record, which apparently deprives her from working in schools or learning centres.  I accept that at the age of 43 she is limited to freelance, private teaching, where she would be able to get work through word of mouth.

54.  The wife acknowledged that returning to Australia is an option but at the moment she has not considered this option.  She is a permanent resident of Hong Kong and has renewed her tenancy for another 2 years. 

55.  I accept she will be staying in Hong Kong in the foreseeable future.  Her work opportunity as a private native English tutor would be very limited in Australia when compared to what she has had in Hong Kong. 

56.  Over all these years the wife has been able to sustain on her own.  She reported she needs about $26,685 per month.  This has not been met with challenge by Mr Hotten.  With about 27,000 per month, her lifestyle is apparently rather basic, if not frugal.  She is living in a village flat at an affordable rental of $12,000 per month.  Except on one occasion when she supported a trip to the Mainland some years ago, the wife has not been paying any financial support for the boys. 

57.  I accept she needs about $27,000 per month.  However, this figure does not sit well with the level of income reported by her.  If the wife has been earning around $18,500 to $21,000, she would have been in the red but the fact is, as I said, she is essentially debt-free. The irresistible conclusion is that either she understated her earnings or she had other financial resources, or both (maybe in the region of a few thousand dollars).  I find the wife is able to maintain herself.

Deciding to Apply the Sharing Principle

58.  I have come to the conclusion that the parties should be able to meet their daily needs.  There are still assets of very modest value available for division.  The court generally decides, at this stage, that the sharing principle applies to the total assets, so that they should be divided equally between the parties unless good reason exists to the contrary: WLK v TMC (2010) 13 HKCFAR 618, at [82]

Whether there are Good Reasons for Departing from Equal Division?

Duration of the Marriage

59.  The wife raised the issue as to when the parties started cohabitation. She adduced her travel records as shown on her passports and the permanent residency papers issued by the Swedish authorities to show she started to cohabit with the husband since 2002.  The wife relied upon the husband’s denial to demonstrate that his evidence should not be believed. 

60.  The husband accepted that they met in Sweden in 2002 but it was not until 2006 that they started cohabitation. Yet he admitted he applied for residency permit in Sweden in 2002 for the wife on the basis that they were in a relationship and that from 2002 to 2006 the wife was staying at his house and was able to work there because of his sponsorship for the residency permit.  When being cross-examined by the wife on matters regarding their relationship during that period of time, the husband was not forthcoming in this regard and conveniently gave replies that he had no recollection.  In my view, the application papers for the Swedish residency should carry weight.  On the evidence before me, I find they started to cohabite with each other at least since June 2002.  Hence, inclusive of the period of cohabitation up to November 2011 when they separated this is a 9-year relationship. This is not a short period of time by today’s standard and what is more, the parties have raised two children.  As a starting point, equal division should apply.

The Husband’s Grounds for Departure

61.  Mr Hotten, for the husband, relied upon two grounds to justify a departure from equal division.  The first ground is the litigation misconduct of the wife.  He submitted that the wife bears much of the responsibility for the dissipation of the matrimonial assets as legal costs.  The second ground is that the wife has had financial resources from her family.  Mr Hotten is specifically relying upon the principles laid down by the Court of Final Appeal in KEWS v NCHC, (2013) 16 HKCFAR 1, [2013] 2 HKLRD 314, FACV 18/2012.

Litigation Misconduct

62.  Mr Hotten submitted that the wife previously raised unmeritorious applications of which most, if not all, were dismissed with adverse costs orders against her.  Specifically, he referred to the wife’s application for maintenance pending suit which was dismissed by this court on 8 July 2014 and the alleged physical abuse on the boys that led to the immense difficulty in facilitating access and eventually the estrangement of the boys towards their mother.  The wife, so submitted by Mr Hotten, must surely have been aware, and no doubt properly advised, that such behaviour would not only cause further distress and pressure on both parties and to the boys but likely financially ruinous.  He suggested that the wife’s litigation was being funded by her family.  The husband had no alternative but to spend enormous time and costs in defending the wife’s applications, inter alia, in the best interests of the children.  The husband was finally given the sole custody, care and control of the boys under the Custody Judgment.

63.  It is on this basis that Mr Hotten argued the husband should be given the entire Net Proceeds in order to meet his legal costs.  This would relieve some of his financial burden and in turn be of benefit to the boys, particularly when he is not seeking any contribution from the wife for the maintenance of the boys.  The $928,000 could assist in an immediate, if small way, in placing the husband and the boys on a more secure financial footing at least for the next 12 months.  It could provide a stopgap for the husband, to get himself back on his feet whether as a pilot, a law intern or some other job paying regular income before his redundancy payment is exhausted by summer 2022.

64.  The wife is also pointing her finger against the husband for these marathon legal proceedings resulting in the evaporation of family assets.  The end result, submitted by wife, has been more for the lawyers and less for the parties, not to mention the stress caused to them.

Legal Principles

65.  Apart from LKW v DD (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537, I was not referred to any further judicial authority.  It has come to my attention from a separate matter that Moylan LJ of the English Court of Appeal recently considered this issue in Rothschild v De Souza [2020] EWCA Civ 1215, [2020] 3 FCR 664 (also reported as TT v CDS [2021] 1 FLR 996) where, similar to this case, there was a highly acrimonious divorce and destructive litigation on a massive scale. 

66.  Moylan LJ agreed that litigation conduct could be taken into account under s 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (Hong Kong’s equivalence is section 7(1), MPPO).  The learned judge reviewed the authorities[4] and helpfully set out the legal framework with respect the correct approach to the issue of litigation conduct.  The general approach is that litigation conduct within the financial remedy proceedings will be reflected, if appropriate, in a costs order. However, there are cases in which the court has determined that one party’s litigation conduct has been such that it should be taken into account when the court is determining its award.  The depletion of matrimonial assets through litigation misconduct will plainly not always be remedied by an order for costs.  Such an order simply reallocates the remaining assets between the parties and does not necessarily remedy the effect of there being less wealth to be distributed between the parties.  What is important is that, whether by taking the effect of the conduct into account when determining the distribution of the parties’ financial resources (both income and capital) and/or by making an order for costs, the outcome which is achieved is a fair outcome which properly reflects all the relevant circumstances: see [65] & [78]. 

67.  Reference was made by Moylan LJ to two classes of litigation misconduct: misconduct within the financial remedy proceedings and misconduct in relation to other litigation. In my view, reference was so made because of the specific provision under Rule 28.3 of the English Family Procedure Rules 2010 (“FPR 2010”) that, in the context of financial remedy proceedings, as a general rule the court will not make an order requiring one party to pay the costs of another party except where it considers it appropriate to do so because of the conduct of a party in relation to the proceedings (whether before or during them): see Rule 28.3(6), FPR 2010.  Hong Kong does not have a similar rule. As a matter of law, costs are in the court’s discretion: Order 62, rule 3, Rules of the High Court.  In my view, the apparent difference in the legal provision of the 2 jurisdictions is immaterial.  It is clear that Moylan LJ took the view that where litigation misconduct is at issue, whether it is within the financial remedy proceedings or in relation to other litigation, ultimately the outcome must be a fair one: [76] to [[78].

68.  It is recognised by Moylan LJ that in some rare cases awarding costs in favour of the victims may not provide for full compensation.  The court should ensure that ‘the litigant responsible bears the costs of waste in full’: at [70], citing Clark v Clark [1999] 2 FLR 498 at 509.

69.  Further, Moylan LJ also agreed with Moor J in R v B and Others [2017] EWFC 33that misconduct is a relevant factor to be considered even in a “needs” case.  At [80] he said,

[80]   … I agree with Moor J in R v B when he said that, if required to achieve a fair outcome, the court ‘must be entitled to prioritise the [needs of the] party who has not been guilty of such conduct’. It is clear from the outcomes in M v M and B v B, as referred to above, that the financial consequences of the litigation misconduct, perhaps combined with other factors, might be such that it is fair that the innocent party is awarded all the matrimonial assets. In this respect, I also agree with Moor J’s observation that an order can be made which does not meet needs because to exclude that option ‘would be to give a licence … to litigate entirely unreasonably’.

Discussion

70.  It is clear that Mr Hotten is referring to the incidents at the early stage of the proceedings where the parties were litigating mainly on the care arrangement of the boys before the Custody Judgment of 23 February 2017.

71.  As I have already set out in details how the conflicts evolved and the interlocutory applications made by the parties leading to the trial on the custody issue at paras [7] to [57] of the Custody Judgment, I do not propose to repeat them here.  Suffice to say is that during that period of time the arrangement of the boys was at the centre stage of the dispute.  Briefly stated, both fought for the responsibility for taking care of the boys and hence made his / her own applications for custody, care and control.  Both took out his / her own application for non-molestation and for various directions, such as for expert reports and temporary non-removal orders.  It is unnecessary to conduct an audit or a stock-taking exercise.  By and large, it is clear that in terms of applications, there were more applications taken out by the wife than those of the husband.  Perhaps this is the reason for Mr Hotten’s submission that the wife bears “much” of the responsibility rather than the “sole” responsibility for the dissipation of the matrimonial assets as legal costs.

72.  The wife is criticised for being unreasonable.  Hale J (as she then was) once made the celebrated remark in R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95 at 98B that all parents are expected to be unreasonable in the attitude towards their children. When assessing whether a party’s conduct has been unreasonable, what should be considered is unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation.

73.  Where an unrepresented litigant is found to have been unreasonable in the attitude to the litigation, he or she would be given a degree of generosity but would not be given a license to litigate entirely unreasonably: see Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250, at 252 G; and at Rothschild v De Souza, supra, at [77].

74.  It is to be remembered that in the present case when the wife was faced with the criminal charge regarding the abuse of the boys, she withdrew her application for relocation to Australia and for interim care and control: see [40] of the Custody Judgment.  When the custody matter came to trial, she agreed to the care and control of the boys be remained with the husband for the time being, with a clear path towards returning to shared care and control.  Before this was realized, she sought regular and defined access: see [80] of the Custody Judgment.  I commented at [86] that the wife had taken the correct approach by focusing on ways to improve her relationship with the boys rather than labouring on custody, care and control issues.

75.  The Custody Judgment disposed of all the parties’ summonses relating to the arrangement of the boys and the outstanding costs issues at that time.  In respect of the costs issues, I referred to the relevant authorities at [131] to [154] of the Custody Judgment. [5]

76.  As far as the wife’s own application for relocation was concerned, I found she was an expatriate and came to Hong Kong because of the husband’s job.  Her application for relocation could not be said to have been an unreasonable or a hopeless application, though the same was overtaken by subsequent events: see [142] of the Custody Judgment.

77.  As for the parties’ respective applications for custody, care and control and other relating summonses dealing with the boys, I did not find the wife’s conduct could be regarded as reprehensible in the proceeding nor did I find any unusual circumstances that warranted a departure from the usual no order as to costs: see [147] to [154] of the Custody Judgment.

78.  There was also the wife’s application for a non-molestation order against the husband on the basis of some allegations that the husband had spied and stalked her via some spywares installed in her computer.  This application was never argued because it was compromised by way of a mutual undertaking from each other not to hack or spy on the other’s computer.  This court held that each party was to bear his or her own costs: see [129] of the Custody Judgment. 

79.  I have not lost sight of the fact that there are matters on which costs orders were made against the wife.  There were 3 substantial costs orders.[6]

80.  The first was the husband’s application for an order to remove or redact certain parts of the wife’s affirmation that made reference to the husband’s communications with his former lawyers in Denmark on the ground that the communications were privileged and confidential.  The wife subsequently agreed to the application before the substantive argument was heard but the parties were not able to agree on how the costs issue was to be disposed of.  It was after a full argument that, by way of a Judgment dated 10 February 2014, this court awarded the husband one-third of his costs.  The reason being, as stated in para [45], there were ways that the wife could have dealt with the matter expeditiously and to save costs if she did not wish to argue on the summons.  Significantly, I took the view that the wife’s inclusion of these materials in her affidavit could not be said to be improper conduct that attracted the proceedings. 

81.  The second was the wife’s application for maintenance pending suit which was dismissed with costs in favour of the husband on 8 July 2014.  I shall return to this MPS application below when I deal with the issue of whether or not the wife has been in receipt of financial assistance from her family.

82.  The third was the wife’s application for single joint experts on two areas namely, (1) a psychologist and (2) an immigration expert.  Her application was dismissed on 23 October 2014 and by a Judgment dated 30 June 2015 she had to pay 2/3 of the husband’s costs: see NAV v JTMW, FCMC 4191/2012 (date of Judgment: 30 June 2015).

83.  The above narrative is all about matters well before the trial on the custody, care and control of the boys.  That was the focus Mr Hotten tried to draw the court’s attention to. 

84.  The court’s records show that during this earlier stage of the proceedings outlined above both parties were on and off represented by specialized family law firms. 

85.  On the part of the wife, she was so represented on various time intervals between 26 March 2012 and 30 July 2015.  The latter date being shortly after she had costs awarded against her in respect of the application for single joint experts. 

86.  As for the husband, he was so represented for a slightly longer period, from 10 April 2012 to 27 April 2016. 

87.  As mentioned at [20] above, the former matrimonial home was liquidated for $4,645,997.  Since then $2,327,998 and $1,390,000 were released to the husband and to the wife respectively.  I was told the husband made use of all the monies in settling his legal costs.  As for the wife, she accepted that she spent about $2,400,000. 

88.  It is significant to note that by the time of the custody, care and control came to trial in November 2016 (still under FCMC 4191/2012), both parties were already unrepresented with the Official Solicitor appearing for the boys. 

89.  Mr Hotten made no submissions regarding the wife’s litigation misconduct post-Custody Judgment.  As I see it, he was not able to do so because there was none.  At the same time, what happened after the Custody Judgment should not be forgotten.  In this regard, the husband’s 1st application for relocation (under the present case reference) immediately comes to my mind. The husband was found to have fabricated his case as a result of which had costs awarded against him.  I specifically mentioned at [116] of the 1st Relocation Judgment that the husband’s conduct was nothing but a reprehensible litigation conduct. 

90.  It was after the husband’s 1st application for relocation had been dismissed by this court that he started to instruct solicitors and counsel to represent him again.  This has been the situation up to this day.  The husband’s application for leave to appeal against the 1st Relocation Judgment failed not only before this court [7] but also before the Court of Appeal, too.  The Court of Appeal criticised the husband’s application as totally without merit and awarded costs in favour of the wife. [8]

91.  It was submitted by Mr Hotten that the costs payable by the wife under various costs orders amount to about $800,000.  This figure was obtained from the husband’s former solicitors but I was not taken to any documents or correspondences in support.  It seems clear that the relevant bills (not even the skeleton bills) have not been prepared.  There were not any ballpark figures as to the party-and-party costs and the solicitor-and-client costs.  Given that out of the 3 adverse costs orders, 2 were for part of the costs only, I am not satisfied that the costs to be payable by the wife are as much as $800,000.  In the present case, prima facie, the previous litigation conduct, whether within the children proceeding or not, have been reflected in the costs orders made by this court. 

92.  Mr Hotten also accused the wife of engaging a top family law firm. The objective fact is, both engaged specialist law firms, which no doubt caused them a fortune.  The animosity and high level of conflicts between the parties cannot be attributed to the wrongdoings of one side; after all, “it takes two to tango”. 

93.  The wife said in evidence that she has chosen not to be represented because she does not have the means.  I agree with the wife that it was a choice on the part of the parties whether or not to be represented.  The husband could have chosen to conduct the 2nd application for relocation and the ancillary relief proceeding on his own if he was constrained by his means.  There is no assumption that the legal costs would, as a matter of course, be paid out from the Net Proceeds at the expense of the other party. 

94.  On the above analysis, I am not convinced that the wife is guilty of litigation misconduct that warrants a departure from equal division.

Financial Assistance from the Wife’s Family

95.  Mr Hotten placed much emphasis on the fact that the wife comes from a wealthy family.  Her parents are dentists and have a dentistry practice in Australia and her 2 younger sisters are globally renowned entertainers.  He submitted that the wife has not made a full and frank disclosure of her assets and in particular, the support from her family.  The wife is a general beneficiary under her family’s trust fund, as can be seen in the Trust Deed produced by her mother.  Under the Trust Deed, the trustee may at any time apply for part of the trust fund to be set aside for the purpose of the general beneficiaries.

96.  In response, the wife said her parents are well-off but not super-wealthy.  She earns her own living and does not rely on anyone.  There has been some support from her parents but it is not on regular basis.  Except some used clothes and bags, she received nothing from her sisters.  Her sisters have their own families and children; their wealth has nothing to do with her.  She has her pride.  That said, she agreed that if she is utterly destitute or in emergency, she could ask her family for help.

97.  The wife admitted she is one of the beneficiaries under the trust.  The trust was established in 1970’s for paying mortgages, the children’s school fees and for tax planning. She has never received any payments or incomes from the trust.

The Law

98.  In KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314, Mr Chief Justice Ma clarified the approach that the court should take.  He said as follow,

E.2   The identification of the parties’ financial resources

33.   Section 7(1)(a) is stated in wide terms.  Two points are of note:-

(1)  The court is not restricted to taking into account only those assets which in law represent the property of either spouse.  Section 7(1)(a) is widely drafted to include “other financial resources” of the parties.  These resources will therefore include those assets or resources to which the relevant spouse has or is likely to have access but to which he or she may not have a legal entitlement.

(2)  Nor is the court constrained to look only at the present position.  The court looks into the financial resources which a party actually has (or should have) at present or which that party is likely to have in the foreseeable future.

E.3   Treatment of financial assistance from third parties under s 7(1)(a)

34.   The width of the wording of s 7(1)(a) of the MPPO will include financial assistance made by third parties to the parties to a marriage.  Accordingly, such assistance made by a third party to the husband or wife may be taken into account in the computation of that party’s overall financial resources.

35.   As stated in para 2 above, such third party assistance may take various forms.  The authorities, to which I shall presently turn, show commonly trust situations or where relatives have provided financial assistance.  There are of course other factual situations.

36.   In every case where third party assistance is involved, there are two critical evidential questions for the court to consider:-

(1)  What is the extent of the financial assistance provided by the third party to the husband or wife?

(2)  What is the likelihood of such financial assistance continuing in the foreseeable future?

37.   It goes without saying that in the fact finding exercise, the court must look at the reality of the situation and have regard to matters of substance and not just form.  In looking at reality, the court can take into account not only what a party actually has, but also what might reasonably be made available to him or her if a request for assistance were to be made.  In O’D v O’D [1976] Fam 83, which involved the court taking into account the financial support given to the husband by his father, Ormrod LJ said at 90 D-E “In making this assessment the Court is concerned with the reality of the husband’s resources, using that word in a broad sense to include not only what he is shown to have, but also what could reasonably be made available to him if he so wished”.

38.   In addition, in looking at what may occur in the foreseeable future, past conduct is often a useful guide: see SR v CR(Ancillary Relief: Family Trusts) [2009] 2 FLR 1083, at 1091 (para 27).

39.   Having ascertained the extent of the financial assistance provided by the third party and then finding on the evidence on a balance of probabilities that there is a likelihood of the continuation of such financial assistance in the foreseeable future, the court is then in a position in law first to take this into account in the identification of the financial resources of the parties and secondly, in determining the appropriate ancillary relief to be granted.  This is an approach that is entirely consistent with the court’s duty under s 7(1) of the MPPO.  Needless to say, the outcome in any given case is inevitably fact-sensitive.

99.  Thus, the court needs to ascertain the extent of the parents’ financial assistance to the wife and the likelihood of such assistance continuing in the foreseeable future.  In doing so, the court needs to look at the reality of the situation and has regard to matters of substance and not just form.  The court could take into account not only what the wife actually had, but what might reasonably be made available to her if a request for assistance were to be made.

What is the extent of the financial assistance provided by the parents to the wife?

100.  Mr Hotten in his opening submissions drew my attention to the affidavit evidence filed at the earlier stage of the proceedings.

101.  In her affidavit of 12 September 2014 in support of the wife’s application for relocation to Australia, the wife’s mother confirmed she and her husband had provided their children financial support over the years, while these could not be said to be extravagant support.  They were in the form of cash gifts of several thousand Australian dollars during special occasions.  In the same affidavit, the grandmother also confirmed that AUD9,500 was distributed from the family trust for the renovation of the parties’ kitchen in Hong Kong.

102.  Similarly, in her 6th Affidavit of 15 September 2014 when she applied for maintenance pending suit from the husband, the wife also acknowledged that some of her deposits could be attributed to gifts and loans from her family as well as disbursements from her parents’ family trust.

103.  Mr Hotten relied upon the conclusion that I made in the Judgment when the wife’s application for maintenance pending suit was refused.[9] There I found the wife had other sources of income and that she failed to give a full and frank disclosure of her financial situation.  Mr Hotten highlighted what I said at [38]:

38.  I agree with Ms Irving that the (wife) does not give any information on the sums received from third parties.  She gives no details and identifies no sums of money that are gifts, loans or disbursements of her parents’ family trust.  She has produced no evidence whatsoever of any debts that she alleges exist, and no details at all of her earnings.  She has not referred to a single transaction where she earned some money from ‘up-selling’ as alleged.  The ability to borrow is also a financial resource but there is a dearth of particulars and supporting evidence.  To me, all these explanations are mere say-so on her part.  I agree with Ms Irving’s submissions that the (wife’s) alleged earnings are inconsistent with her financial position.

104.  Mr Hotten did not probe into this issue further in his cross-examination.  The overall impression is that the husband was not serious about this issue. Anyway, the above evidence is apparently inconsistent with what the wife testified in court, saying that she has never received any money from the trust.

105.  Mr Hotten accepted that there is no direct evidence on the wife’s actual income and expenses to infer her living standard.  It is also unclear as to how many landed properties in the family trust are. The husband said there are 6 and the wife said there are 2 only, viz, her parents’ home and the dentistry practice.  Nevertheless, it is the husband’s stance that the wife has sufficient financial resources to maintain her living standard. 

106.  The evidence is that at least back in 2014 there was some financial assistance from the wife’s parents.  As for the present situation, I found at [57] above that the wife’s monthly needs do not sit well with the level of income reported by her; there is a difference of a few thousand dollars.  The inference that can be drawn is that the wife has been in receipt of some financial assistance from Australia. For these reasons, I agree with the husband that the wife is able to maintain her living standard.  That said, the extent of such financial assistance has to be seen in light of the wife’s lifestyle which, as I found, is rather basic. 

107.  On the evidence before me, I conclude that the extent of financial assistance should not be substantial and are likely to be occasional.

What is the likelihood of such financial assistance continuing in the foreseeable future?

108.  I am sure the financial assistance has been given to the wife out of her parents’ love for her.  This is entirely understandable.  There is nothing special at all.  As has been observed by Ma CJ, past conduct is always a useful guide: KEWS v NCHC, supra, at [38].  On the evidence before me, there is no reason why the occasional financial assistance would not continue.

109.  Given that the extent of financial assistance, as I found, is not substantial and it is seemingly for the maintenance of the wife, I am driven to the tentative conclusion that these financial assistances should carry little weight in the distributive exercise.

Discussion

110.  I have determined that litigation misconduct is not a factor that needs to be taken into account and that the financial assistance of the wife’s parents should carry little weight.  Considering that the parties spent most of the sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home on litigation, I enquired at trial whether they would consider giving the Net Proceeds for the benefit of the boys.  However, both were not in favour of the proposal.  After having reviewed all the circumstances of this case, I also consider that this is not the most ideal solution.  There are, in my view, the following factors that I need to consider in this exercise.

111.  First, the husband is a professional commercial pilot.  The wife supported the husband’s flying career by giving up her opportunities and accompanying him to Hong Kong.  Before the breakdown of the marriage, the husband was the breadwinner of the family while the wife was until December 2010 a full-time mother.  There was in the past always a large disparity in the earning capacity between the husband and the wife.  The husband has huge earning potential as a pilot and has also taken up the opportunity of equipping himself with a law degree.  In mid-and-longer term, the husband should be in a better position to improve in terms of living standard and savings.

112.  In contrast to the husband, the wife does not have a degree, does not speak the local dialect, and it was after the breakdown of the marriage that she had to be serious about her business.  In many ways her employment opportunities in Hong Kong are rather limited. I am sure this is something that I have to bear in mind.

113.  Second, I should give weight to the fact that the husband has been and will be solely responsible for the maintenance of the boys.  The wife could at most pay some insignificant figure for the benefit of the boys.  The husband obviously recognises this is the reality and so he is not seeking any contribution from the wife. 

114.  Third, I am persuaded by the wife in her Closing that if she is given the Net Proceeds she would be in a position to send some pocket monies from time to time to the boys – a small step to mend their relationship.

115.  Fourth, the husband made use of his Hong Kong MPF to secure a home in Denmark to meet his and the boys’ housing needs.  This is something the wife does not have.  The MPF was the fruit of the husband’s 12 years’ service in Hong Kong out of which the first 4 years were during their relationship.  I accept that much proportion of it was post-separation.  In any event, the wife agrees to keep the house intact for the benefit of the boys.  This is a sensible approach; hence I would exclude the Danish house for distribution.  With the Danish house being excluded, the matrimonial assets would reduce to $1,437,140 ($2,742,140 - $1,305,000).

116.  Fifth, while it can be argued that the Danish home is mostly non-matrimonial, this cannot be so said for the Net Proceeds.  Out of the proceeds of sale that have already been paid out, the husband obtained $2,327,998 while the wife obtained $1,390,000 only. In other words, the husband obtained $937,998 more than the wife. 

117.  Finally, I recognise that the Norwegian retirement fund cannot be liquidated until the husband reaches retirement age. 

118.  Hence, some of these factors are in favour of the husband and the others in favour of the wife.  Obviously, some factors should carry more weight in the balancing exercise.  Considering all these factors in the round and taking a broad-brush approach, it seems to me that equal division of the matrimonial asset is a fair solution.

Deciding the Overall Outcome

119.  I have come to the final stage of the exercise. At this stage, the court is required to give an examination of the overall picture.

120.  The matrimonial assets are worth $1,437,140 (with the Danish house excluded), half of them are $718,570 ($1,437,140 ÷ 2).  If the assets are to be shared equally, since the wife is already in possession of $268,140 worth of the assets, she would be entitled to $450,430.  As for the husband, he is in possession of $241,000.  He would have the balance of $477,570 or thereabout to be paid out to him. 

121.  This is in reality a relationship lasting for 9 years, I am persuaded that the wife should not walk out from this marriage empty-handed.  I recognise the fact that the husband has taken the entire Hong Kong MPF but at the same time he has been taking care of the boys and will do so in the future.  I am satisfied that this is a fair financial outcome.  The distribution is to achieve a clean break for the ancillary relief as between the husband and the wife.

122.  I realize that both parties may have a true conviction that he or she should be entitled to the entire Net Proceeds and are not be happy with the outcome.  Be that as it may, it is hopeful that the proceeding may finally draw to a close; and it remains to be my wish that one day the relationship between the wife and her boys may be restored.

Order

123.  For the reasons aforesaid, I make the following orders:

1.  Within 14 days upon the grant of the decree absolute, a sum of $450,430 be paid out from the payments into court to the wife; and

2.  The balance be paid out to the husband.

Costs

124.  As neither party is successful in his or her claim, it seems to me the appropriate costs order in the circumstance is no order as to costs of the ancillary relief (including all costs reserved) and I so order by way of an order nisi.

Section 18 Declaration

125.  Lastly, I am satisfied that the arrangements made in respect of the children of the family to whom section 18 of MPPO applies for their welfare are satisfactory or are the best that can be devised in the circumstances and I accordingly make a declaration to this effect.

126.  The petitioner’s solicitors do draw up, file and serve these orders.

 (Ivan Wong)
 District Judge

Mr Keith Hotten, instructed by Ho & Ip, Solicitors, appeared for the Petitioner

The Respondent appeared in person


[1]NAV v JTMW, FCMC 4191/2012 (date of judgment; 23 February 2017)

[2] See JTMW v NAV[2020] HKFC 244, at [33]

[3]JRMW v NAV[2018] HKFC 140, at [27]

[4]M v M (Financial Provision: Party Incurring Excessive Costs) [1995] 3 FCR 321, Beach v Beach [1995] 2 FLR 160, Clark v Clark [1999] 2 FLR 498, B v B (Financial Provision: Welfare of Children and Conduct) [2002] 1 FLR 555, R v B and Others [2017] EWFC 33, [2017] All ER (D) 224 (Mar), Martin v Martin [1976] Fam 335, [1976] 3 WLR 580, and Vaughan v Vaughan [2007] EWCA Civ 1085, [2008] 1 FLR 1108

[5] They are: R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95, Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250, H v H, CACV 42/2002 (date of judgment: 6 September 2002), Keller v Keller and Legal Aid Board [1995] 1 FLR 259, Re T (Care Proceedings: Costs) [2012] UKSC 36, [2012] 1 WLR 2281, and Re S (A Child) [2015] UKSC 20, [2015] 1 WLR 1631

[6] There was also a minor order dated 27 February 2015 under which the wife was to pay the costs for her application for extension of time to exchange submissions. 

[7]JRMW v NAV[2018] HKFC 140, FCMC 8504 of 2017; date of Judgment: 21 August 2018

[8]JRMW v NAV[2018] HKCA 883, CAMP 131/2018 (date of Judgment: 23 November 2018), at [5.5] and [5.6].

[9]NAV v JTMW, FCMC 4191/2012 (date of judgment: 8 July 2014)

[2021] HKFC 65-EN-2021-03-29

JTMW v. NAV

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FCMC 8504/2017

[2021] HKFC 65

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8504 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 JTMWPetitioner

and

 NAVRespondent

---------------------------

Coram: His Honour Judge I Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of the Respondent’s Submissions: 31 December 2020

Date of the Petitioner’s Submissions: 20 January 2021

Date of Judgment: 29 March 2021

__________________

J U D G M E N T

( Leave to Appeal )

( Paper Disposal )

__________________

1.  By a judgment handed down on 3 December 2020,[1] leave was granted for the petitioner father to relocate the two children of the family, both boys, to Denmark, his home-country.  This was a decision made after a 5-day trial.  I shall call this judgment “the Relocation Judgment”. 

2.  Dissatisfied with the outcome, the respondent mother applied for leave to appeal on 31 December 2020.

3.  In this Ruling, I shall continue to refer to the petitioner and the respondent as “the father” and “the mother”.  I shall also adopt the same abbreviations and nomenclatures used in the Relocation Judgment.

4.  As I have already set out the parties’ case and the finding of facts in the Relocation Judgment, I do not propose to repeat them here.  Reference to the relevant parts of the Relocation Judgment will be made as and when necessary. 

The Legal Principles

5.  The relevant test governing applications for leave to appeal from the District Court is provided in section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336) (“DCO”):

“Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that –

(a) The appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) There is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.” [emphasis added]

6.  The Court of Appeal discussed the application of s 63A(2) of the DCO in Sunny Tadjudin v Bank of America, National Association, HCMP No 691 of 2012, unreported, 29 June 2012 at [9]:

“9. Reasonable prospect of success involves the notion that the prospect of succeeding must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable” (SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 para 17). Furthermore, it is pertinent to bear in mind that even if there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal, the court still retains a discretion whether to grant leave to appeal, although the fact that there is, ex hypothesi, a reasonable prospect of success would heavily influence the court’s exercise of discretion (Ho Yuen Ki Winnie & Ors v Ho Hung Sun Stanley & Anr. HCA 391/2006, 25 May 2009, A Cheung J para 3; and HCMP 1009/2009, 24 August 2009, para 22).”

7.  Recently, the Court of Appeal in ZJ v XWN[2018] HKCA 436, CAMP 67/2018, (date of judgment: 25 July 2018) stated, at [64], that application for leave to appeal should be a filtering process and should be conducted summarily and proportionately.

The Father’s Submissions

8.  The father’s original response was an 8-page submissions which was longer than that allowed under the “New Arrangement for Application for Leave to Appeal in the Family Court”.   Since the mother is acting in person and in view of the animosity of the parties, any impression or feeling that she has been unfairly prejudiced or disadvantaged should be avoided, I therefore directed the father to adhere to the requirement by re-lodging a 5-page submissions.

9.  As for the Official Solicitor, the court was informed on 18 February 2021 that no submissions would be made on behalf of the boys.

The Mother’s Intended Grounds of Appeal

10.  I now turn to the mother’s intended Grounds of Appeal.  Whilst I shall deal with the grounds below, I must say, by way of an overview, that many of the mother’s submissions made in support of this application are in fact a repeat of those she already made at trial.  She tries to repeat these submissions to argue that I erred in some primary finding of facts or that I wrongly exercised the discretion to allow the boys to leave, or both. I was of course well aware of these submissions when I considered whether to allow the boys to leave.   It has been reiterated by higher courts that it is not helpful if litigants merely repeat their submissions already advanced and considered at trial; it is not the role of an appellate court to reconsider the submissions.   On the role of an appellate court, Hon Lam VP said the following in China Gold Finance Limited v CIL Holdings Limited & Ors, CACV 11/2015 (unreported, 27 November 2015),

11.  It is well settled that in respect of findings of fact, this court can only intervene when we are satisfied that the findings by the primary judge is plainly wrong: Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336 is often cited and applied in this court.

12.   Regrettably, there are still cases coming before us in which counsel (including experienced and senior counsel) apparently failed to have regard to the proper role of the Court of Appeal in an appeal of this nature.  Thus, from time to time, we can find judgments from this court reiterating the fundamental principles in this respect: Chinachem Charitable Foundation Ltd v Chan Chun Chuen CACV 101 of 2010, 14 February 2011 para 26; Welltus Ltd v Fornton Knitting Co Ltd [2013] 5 HKC 106; Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd v Tsang Sheung Bun [2013] 5 HKLRD 62; Pang Ketian Sally v Tam Yuk Hung Annie CACV 147 of 2013, 25 April 2014; To Pui Kui v Ng Kwok Piu CACV 281 of 2012, 21 August 2014; Ageas Insurance Co Ltd v Lam Hau Wah Inneo CACV 65 of 2014, 9 January 2015 are some recent examples.

13.   Mr Lam also referred us to the recent judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court on the same topic: Carlyle v Royal Bank of Scotland [2015] UKSC 13 in which references were made to McGraddie v McGraddie [2014] UKSC 12; Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600 and the judgment of the Privy Council in Beacon Insurance Co Ltd v Maharaj Bookstore Ltd [2014] UKPC 21.

14.  These authorities explained the limits of an appellate court in reversing the findings of fact of the primary judge.  We used the expression “primary judge” because it emphasizes the primary role of the first instance judge in the assessment of evidence and making of relevant findings of fact.  In our judicial system, the appellate process is not designed to give a litigant (or his counsel) a platform for regurgitating his closing submissions on the evidence and factual aspects of the case again with the hope that the appellate judges may come to a different view to that of the primary judge.  It is thus, as we said above, a misuse of the appellate process to place before this court submissions which, in substance, are (or should be) submissions advanced by way of closing submissions at the trial after the judge has heard all the evidence.

15.  In an appeal, the court of appeal should focus on the question whether the primary judge has fallen in palpable errors which could give rise to grounds for intervention by the appellate court.  As explained in the cases, it is not germane that judges in this court may reach a different conclusion from that of the judge.  There are many areas, particularly those in relation to findings of fact, where judges can reasonably reach different conclusions from each other. That would not be a ground for intervention.

16.   Thus, in an appeal, it is not helpful if counsel and litigant (acted in person) only repeat submissions already advanced and considered by the primary judge at the trial. The starting point should be the judgment of the primary judge and the identification of palpable errors (which must be errors of such nature which warrants intervention from this court) in the judgment.  The mere assertion that the finding of the judge is against the weight of the evidence or that the judge should have reached another conclusion because of points advanced in the closing submissions below are not errors coming within that category. 

11.  On appeals against the exercise of discretion, The Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2021) has the following discussion at §59/0/54,

Appeals against exercise of discretion—There are many authorities for the proposition that an appeal will not be entertained from an order which it was within the discretion of the judge to make, unless it be shown that he exercised his discretion under a mistake of law ( Evans v. Bartlam [1937] A.C. 473 ) or in disregard of principle ( Young v. Thomas [1892] 2 Ch. 134 ) or under a misapprehension as to the facts (ibid.); or that he took into account irrelevant matters ( Egerton v. Jones [1939] 3 All E.R. 889 at 892, CA) or failed to exercise his discretion (Crowther v. Elgood (1887) 34 Ch D 691 at 697) or the conclusion which the judge reached in the exercise of his discretion was “outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible” ( G. v. G. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 647 ; [1985] 2 All E.R. 225 , HL). See also Banque Nationale de Paris v. Chan U Tong [1968] H.K.L.R. 151 , and Fung Tin Keung v. Hong Kong Wah Yuen Investment Co. & Another [1967] H.K.L.R. 650 , and Re SY Engineering Co. Ltd (unrep., CACV 1896/2001; [2002] H.K.E.C. 241 , CA) (appeal against a winding up order)…

…

The limitations on the power of the Court of Appeal to interfere with the exercise of a discretion conferred on the judge in the court below apply to residence or contact orders in child cases or any other decisions concerning the welfare of children: G. v. G. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 647 ; [1985] 2 All E.R. 225 , HL. The Court of Appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion in child cases unless it can be shown that the discretion was not exercised at all, or that the Judge made some error of law in its exercise, or that the decision was plainly wrong ( TAC v. VDC (unrep., HCMP 2198/2012, [2012] H.K.E.C. 1681 ))…    (emphasis added)

12.  Therefore, in order to challenge the primary findings of facts made by me or the correctness of exercise of the discretion to allow the boys to relocate, the mother must be able to point out how the conclusion on the facts was plainly wrong; and she must also be able to demonstrate there is an arguable case that the discretion was not exercised at all or that I made some error of law in its exercise, or that the decision was plainly wrong.

13.  In her 5-page submissions, the mother advances 7 intended Grounds of Appeal (ie paragraphs 4(a) to (g) of her submissions). Except for a few paragraphs, she, however, has not specified in the ensuring paragraphs which paragraph is for which ground.  In the circumstance, I tried to categorize her submissions into a particular ground according to my understanding so as to give a structured response here.

Ground 1 – Has erred on points of law, and understanding of facts

14.  The mother seemed to be saying that I applied the wrong legal principles.

15.  I have already set out a comprehensive clear summary of the legal principles and the approach to be adopted. At [55] and [56] of the Relocation Judgment, I said,

55.  The Court of Appeal emphasized that the guidance in Payne or SMM v TWM or the welfare checklist are simply tools to assist a Family Judge in making the multifactorial assessment to reach a result which is in the best interest of the child after taking account of the potential impact on the parents: at [30].

See also B, A v B, L (Child Relocation), [2019] 4 HKLRD 23, [2019] HKCA 822.

56.  Therefore, I would have to conduct a holistic balancing exercise and in doing so, I would make use of the Payne approach and the “welfare checklist’ as an aide-memoire tools.

16.  The mother has failed to set out how I erred on points of law; so this ground must fail.

17.  As regards the assertion that I erred in the understanding of facts, the mother purports to rely upon an “Advice” from a senior captain of the father’s employer to say that the father tried to mislead the court on the issue of whether he would be required to arrange alternative accommodation if he is to travel from Denmark to Heathrow.  Leaving the issue of whether the mother would be allowed to adduce further evidence under the Ladd v Marshall rule [2] aside, it is significant to note that I disagreed with the father on this issue.  I clearly said, at [65], that a plain reading of the employer’s Policy is that the father is required to arrange alternative accommodation.  According to the mother, the senior captain agrees with my view.  If that is the case, I fail to see how I have misunderstood the facts.

Ground 2 – The court has been actively misled as to facts by counsel of the father

18.  I begin by saying this is a serious allegation; as such, it should not be lightly made.  In any event, except on the point in respect of Parental Alienation Syndrome which I shall deal with in Ground 6 below, the mother has not been able to pinpoint the particular facts that Mr Clough tried to mislead the court. 

Ground 3 – The court has been actively misled as to facts by the father and his witnesses and

Ground 4 – The court has chosen to ignore the mistruths told under oath both written and verbally by the father and his witnesses

19.  The mother is essentially complaining that the court chose to accept the father’s case and his and his witnesses’ evidence but not hers.  She labels the father as a liar and she repeats what she said at trial about (a) the father’s insecurity in the UK due to post Brexit visa changes; (b) potential closure/reduction of the Heathrow base; (c) the father’s plans to commute between Denmark and Heathrow; (d) the grandparents’ animosity and unsuitability as carers for the boys; and (e) V’s unlikely chances of attaining a Family Reunification Visa.

20.  As I referred to above, it is not helpful for the mother to have repeated her submissions or assertions as to facts. Similarly, it does not help anyone reading this Ruling if the analyses of evidence and the findings of facts are repeated here.  Suffice to say is that I was well aware of the parties’ case as regards these issues and I dealt with them by giving careful consideration to the evidence adduced before me.  Again, the mother has failed to point out how I erred in accepting one’s evidence but not the other’s or which of the conclusion of facts made by me was plainly wrong.

Ground 5 – The court has made the assumption that evidence given by the father was factually correct, workable and given in good faith

21.  The mother says I wrongly believed in the father when he claimed to support a relationship between the boys and her sisters. She relies upon the fact that after the Relocation Judgment the father removed himself from the chat groups her sisters had made for the purpose of communicating with the boys and blocked contact from them.  In support, the mother tries to adduce some screenshots of the group chat conversations exchanged between her sisters and the father after the Relocation Judgment.

22.  I said the following in the Relocation Judgment when I considered the extent of detriment to the mother and her future relationship with the boys if the application were granted,

109.  I agree with Mr Lee that the mother-children relationship could not become worse if relocation is allowed.  On the contrary, there may be a chance for improvement in their relationship if the boys could relocate because it is hopeful with the passage of time there would be less resentment towards the mother. The boys are willing to meet their maternal aunts and have done so in the past, though it would appear that currently the boys have some reluctance to see their maternal grandmother, who is living in Australia.  With all these behind their backs, it is hopeful that starting from meeting their maternal aunts, then their maternal grandmother, in times, they would be able to re-connect with their mother.  I recognise there is no guarantee that this would happen. In the event that this does not, I would quote what Mr Lee said in his closing submission,

“54. If the relationship between the mother and (the boys) shall unfortunately become unrepairable, it is indeed the consequence which all the professionals have forewarned the mother. It is regrettable that the mother is the author of her own misfortune.”

23.  I do not know whether this ‘after-the-judgment’ evidence is truth or not.  Mr Clough’s responses are that there is no application to admit new evidence and that none of the assertions impact on the decision as to relocation but he has not given a head-on reply to the alleged events.

24.  Assuming for one moment that this is what happened, for all the reasons I have said in the Relocation Judgment and bearing in mind whether the boys should be allowed to leave is an issue that requires the court to conduct a holistic balancing exercise by taking all matters relevant to the boys’ welfare into consideration with their best interest as the first and paramount consideration, I do not consider this event, even if true, could enable the mother to elevate this to a point that could tip the balance in her favour.

25.  It should not be forgotten that section 18 Declaration has not been granted and the parties would still have to return to court to deal with the ancillary relief matters.  Where necessary, the issue of communications between the aunts and the boys can be addressed. 

Ground 6 – Ignored the High Court practice given in C v S [2020] HKCFI 937, HCMP 929/2017, citing Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568, [2020] 2 FLR 263

26.  In advancing this ground, the mother refers to Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568, [2020] 2 FLR 263, where Peter Jackson LJ discussed the law concerning parental alienation.  She argues that this court failed to address and assess the impact of parental alienation of the boys as a form of Pathogenic Parenting in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition.  In so saying, the mother admits that she erred by simply referring to “Parental Alienation Syndrome” at trial, and not its correct clinical name.  At the same time, she seemed to have put the blame on Mr Clough, who according to the mother, actively misled the court by omitting to refer to Pathogenic Parenting and not distinguishing it from Parental Alienation Syndrome.  I regard it as a most unfair point to make.  Parental Alienation Syndrome was a case put forward and pressed on by the mother at trial.  I do not see anything wrong for Mr Clough to have given a response to this very allegation in the way it was.  Most importantly, apart from the mother’s own assertions, there was a dearth of factual or expert evidence in support.  On the contrary, it has been the views of all the professionals involved in helping this family that the boys were estranged by their mother’s own conduct: see [59], and [98] to [109] of the Relocation Judgment.

27.  The mother also alleges that I failed to exhaust all and any necessary steps to help her to reconnect with the boys. The relocation would erase all hope of achieving what should be achieved by way of therapeutic intervention.

28.  The mother’s proposal regarding access before the boys’ departure was considered at trial. At [101] of the Relocation Judgment, I said,

[101] …However, I agree with Ms Cheng that what we are dealing with are the mother’s own children - not the children that she works with in her job. I do not think it is helpful if the boys are forced by a court order to see their mother. I agree with Ms Cheng that the key is how to make the boys to be willing to see their mother. It is important to let the boys know their mother listens to them and are supportive of the things they want. When the boys see such changes they may be willing to see their mother. By then, she would have the opportunity to use the skill that she has acquired.

29.  And at [105] of the Relocation Judgment, I commented that the mother continued to insist things to happen in the way she dictated. 

30.  Hence, if the mother missed any opportunity for therapeutic intervention, it was due to her own decision.

Ground 7 – The court confused the boys’ loyalty and affection for their father thus influencing their expressed wishes, with what would be their real wishes if properly explored with qualified professionals

31.  The mother submits that I took the boys’ expressed wishes at face value without any proper inquiry, failed to properly ascertain the authentic and true wishes of the boys given their age, and failed to take into account the alienation by the father.

32.  The evidence, by way of oral testimony of Ms Cheng (the social welfare officer) and various reports, is that (and I accepted) the boys were able to voice their views freely to Ms Cheng and to Mr Lee of the Official Solicitor.  In order to succeed the mother must be able to demonstrate how the I erred in accepting the evidence but she failed to do so.

Conclusion &Order

33.  For the reasons aforesaid, I have no doubt that the mother’s application is unmeritorious.  There is simply no reasonable prospect of success nor is there some other reason in the interests of justice so that the appeal should be heard.  The mother’s application should be dismissed and I so order.

Costs

34.  This is a children proceeding.  I consistently take the view it is / was due to the mother’s fears that she would lose the boys forever that has made her objection to the application for relocation.  This is not reprehensive conduct that warrants a costs order against her.  I make the usual no order as to costs order.

(I. Wong)
District Judge

Mr Neal Clough, instructed by Ho & Ip, Solicitors, for Mr JTMW, the petitioner

Ms NAV, the respondent, in person

Mr Lee Tak-lei, Ted, solicitor, for the Official Solicitor


[1]JTMW v NAV (Relocation) [2020] HKFLR 784, [2020] HKFC 244

[2]Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489

[2020] HKFC 244-EN-2020-12-03

JTMW v. NAV

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FCMC 8504/2017

[2020] HKFC 244

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8504 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 JTMWPetitioner

and

 NAVRespondent

----------------------------

Coram:  His Honour Judge I Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Dates of Hearing:  5, 10, 11 & 12 December 2019 and 18 September 2020

Date of the Petitioner’s Closing Submissions:  30 September 2020

Date of the Official Solicitor’s Closing Submissions: 30 September 2020

Date of the Respondent’s Closing Submissions:  5 October 2020

Date of Judgment: 3 December 2020

__________________

J U D G M E N T

( Relocation)

__________________

Introduction

1.  This is the petitioner’s second application for relocation in these marathon matrimonial proceedings.

2.  In this judgment I shall, for ease of reference, refer to the petitioner and the respondent as “the father” and “the mother”.  I will continue to refer to the boys as “L” and “B”.  L is now 13 ½ years old and B is nearly 11.

3.  I say these are marathon proceedings because the parties started their divorce proceedings back in 2012 (under FCMC 4191/2012) and so far, regrettably, only two achievements are made: the first is that, after a 5-day trial, the custody, care and control of L and B were granted to the father on 23 February 2017; and the second is that the decree nisi was granted on 20 November 2017.  The judgment of 23 February 2017 on the custody of the boys is referred to as “the Custody Judgment”. 

4.  As regards the financial matter, it has never been seriously dealt with; the reason being that this matter was hijacked not once but twice by the father’s applications for relocation.  The first was on 17 July 2017 when he made his first application for relocation of the boys back to Denmark, his home-country (“the 1st Application for Relocation”).  There was a hearing long-fixed to be heard on 18 July 2017 to deal with the financial matters but because of this application, that hearing and subsequently, all the attention of the parties was drawn to the 1st Application for Relocation.

5.  The father’s case in that application, in a nutshell, was that he had secured a position with a budget airline in Europe which enabled him to return to Denmark and his domestic helper V had become his partner.  V had agreed to emigrate to Denmark with him as a family and therefore, the boys could continue to be taken care of by him and V.

6.  In the parties’ usual fashion, it was after a bitter trial that by a Judgment dated 16 April 2018 (“the 1st Relocation Judgment”), the father’s 1st application for relocation was rejected by this court. It is unnecessary for me to set out the reasons for refusal in any detail here. Suffice to say is that I was not satisfied with the veracity of the alleged husband-and-wife relationship between the father and V: see [78].  On that basis, the father’s very foundation of his childcare plan vanished: see [89].

7.  The father application for leave to appeal against the 1st Relocation Judgment was refused by this court in JRMW v NAV[2018] HKFC 140 (date of Judgment: 21 August 2018) and by the Court of Appeal in JRMV v NAV[2018] HKCA 883 (date of judgment: 23 November 2018).

8.  This is against the above background that the father on 24 April 2019 took out this 2nd application for relocation.  When the father took out this application, the court had already scheduled the trial of the ancillary relief matter to take place in September 2019 but once again the ancillary relief matter gave way to this relocation application. 

9.  Before I turn to the next part, it has to be mentioned that shortly before the trial, on 26 November 2019 the mother took out an inter-parte summons for, inter alia, a joint custody order and for a framework and timeline to be provided by the court for restoration of her relationship with the boys with the assistance of the Social Welfare Department.

10.  As I indicated at the trial, the mother’s summons would be dealt with together with the father’s present application.

11.  The final day of trial was originally scheduled for 15 April 2020 but unfortunately it had to be adjourned to 10 June 2020 and further re-fixed to 18 September 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

12.  On 15 September 2020 the mother took out an application (and on 16 September 2020 an amended application) to have the father’s application dismissed due to the rapidly developing situation occasioned by the pandemic, the post-Brexit as from 31 December 2020, the impending restructuring of the father’s employer and the changes in immigration requirements of Denmark.  Alternatively, she sought leave for the parties to update the court about their situation. 

13.  Both Mr Clough, who appeared for the father and Mr Lee of the Official Solicitor were not supportive of the mother’s application.  In particular, Mr Lee made the observation that if the mother’s path was followed, nothing could be done and in the meantime the boys would continue to be trapped in Hong Kong against their wishes.

14.  As I said in my oral ruling of 18 September 2020, this is a reality that family cases are dynamic.  Family members’ situation especially that of the children would change as they grow. Another reality is that the world is now facing the COVID 19 pandemic.  The pandemic is moving, and moving rapidly in some of the days, but it does not mean that the court should wait until the end of it or when the post-Brexit situation is clear.  What the court should do is to consider the father’s application on the facts and materials before it now and come to a decision the best it can.  The mother’s application for dismissal was therefore rejected. Nevertheless, I allowed the father to update his situation which he had already done so by way of an affirmation, and I allowed the mother to further cross-examine him.

The Parties’ Background

15.  As the background of the parties have been set out in the Custody Judgment and the 1st Relocation Judgment, it is unnecessary for me to repeat them here.  In brief, their background is as follows.

16.  The father is Danish and the mother Australian.

17.  The parties met in Sweden when the mother was travelling there.  According to the mother, they soon started cohabitation and were married in Sweden in February 2008.  They soon gave birth to L in Sweden in 2007.

18.  The father is a professional pilot.  In June 2008 he secured a job as a pilot in Hong Kong and so the whole family moved here.  B was born in Hong Kong.

19.  Sadly, the relationship did not last long.  In March 2012, the mother petitioned for divorce on the ground of the father’s unreasonable behaviour under FCMC 4191/2012.  What followed was a series of litigations seeking non-removal orders, non-molestation orders, temporary removal orders, maintenance pending suit, directions on expert reports and other less important orders and finally, culminating in a trial on the custody, care and control of the boys as a result of which the Custody Judgment referred to in [3] above was given. 

20.  The mother was given access by way of emails, limited to 2 emails per week, to the boys.  This has been so arranged because of the boys’ estrangement due to the mother’s conducts.  She was accused of hitting the boys and was charged with and convicted of ill treatment or neglect of L under section 27(1) of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance (Cap 212).  Supervised face-to-face and FaceTime access were proved to be futile as a result of which email access has been implemented upon the recommendation of the Official Solicitor and the social investigation officer. 

21.  Plainly, in dealing with the present application the chequered history of these proceedings and how they have evolved to the present stage have to be borne in mind. 

The Parties’ Present Situation

22.  There have not been much changes since the 1st Relocation Judgment.  The father has been taking care of the boys with the assistance of V since 2014.

23.  According to the father, he has since the 1st Relocation Judgment informed the boys of his relationship with V.  He is now living with the boys and V in a 1,900 ft2 leased apartment in Lantau.  This apartment is not the one that the father and the boys were staying at the time of the 1st Relocation Judgment and is assessed by Ms Cheng, the social investigation officer, to be much better, neatly kept and spacious.  The father and V are sharing a bedroom with a double bed while L and B have their own bedroom.

24.  L is attending Form 3 in a secondary school in Lantau and B is attending Primary 6 at an international school on the Island.

25.  It seems it is not in dispute that L has had a hard time in his school. He used to have some issues with his English teacher, has been bullied by non-Caucasian students and has not been able to make friends.  The situation has improved somewhat after the father’s intervention.

26.  B is clearly in a much better shape.  It is reported by Ms Cheng that B was assessed to be able to manage his subjects comfortably and was competent on various subjects. He was commented to be a lively and popular student in class and have had improvement in keeping more stable social interactions with peers. 

27.  As far as the email access is concerned, there has not been much change since the 1st Relocation Judgment. According to Mr Lee and Ms Cheng, L has not read the mother’s emails while B has read some. 

The Mother

28.  The mother broke up with her cohabitant, the French gentleman referred to in [14] of the 1st Relocation Judgment, in April 2019.  She continues to live in the same leased apartment in another district of Lantau.  She is working as a part-time English tutor for young children.

29.  Ms Cheng reported that the mother attended a session with Dr Poon, a clinical psychologist of the Social Welfare Department.  It was assessed by Dr Poon that no further psychological follow-up was required as there was no sign of emotional disorders.

The Father’s Proposed Plan

30.  Same as in the 1st Relocation Application, the father wants to start a new life with the boys and therefore is determined to return to his home country. 

31.  There are, he said, two reasons for the application.

32.  The first is in relation to his career.  The father is still serving his employer. However, he has obtained approval from his employer to transfer to their base in London.  This would enable him to live in Denmark while reporting duty at Heathrow, London.  In order for him to report duty from Denmark, he would be flying from City B or City C Airport to Heathrow.  He said this plan is both workable and allowed by his employer. He is expected to start this new position as soon as leave from the court is given for the relocation of the boys and the Covid-19 furlough in UK ends.

33.  The father sees this an opportunity he cannot afford to miss.  This is important in terms of his long-term future.  It would give him the opportunity to return to Scandinavia as he has always planned to without changing his employment and losing his hard-earned seniority.  He would also be able to move back to passenger fleet and leave the inferior cargo feet, which is very disruptive to his roster stability and care ability for the boys. There would be more job satisfaction too since he would be flying a modern jet (Airbus 350 or Boeing 777) rather than the old Boeing 747 in the cargo fleet. He will be based in London, but mainly operating out of one of the European destinations and fly directly to Hong Kong and back again.  This will offer much better roster stability and more days off together with the boys.  He has completed the required training.

34.  The second reason relates to the upbringing of the boys, in particular L who has had some adjustment problems in the school.  As mentioned above, L has been subject to bully and has not been able to adopt to the school’s culture. The current school is simply unsuitable for L and does not fit his character. The father said L feels very disillusioned with the situation but due to financial constraints he has not been able to afford changing to an international school.

35.  The father plans to return to City H, the hometown where he grew up, where his divorced parents, their respective partners, his younger brother, step-sister and friends are and where the boys are also familiar with.  He will rent a house of about 2,000 ft2 upon arrival and then start looking for a house near to the boys’ school to purchase.

36.  He and V will continue to be the caregivers of the boys with the assistance of his parents who live close by.  V has agreed to move to Denmark and they plan to get married once the decree absolute is granted.

37.  In the event V should fail to obtain the necessary residency visa, the father said the paternal grandfather “G” and his partner “W” are willing to provide childcare assistance to him when he has to be absent from work.  The boys have a good relationship with their grandparents and their partners.  Lastly, hiring a nanny or an Au Pair (similar to a domestic helper in Hong Kong) could also be an option.

38.  He has also identified 2 suitable schools for the boys; both are close to their intended neighbourhood.

The Mother’s Stance

39.  The mother said the boys have never lived in Denmark.  L was born in Sweden and was living there before coming to Hong Kong and B was born here.  Denmark is not, and never has been, the boys’ home. 

40.  As recorded by Ms Cheng in her report, the mother accepted that although there are flaws in the father’s plan, the current one is a better plan.  However, the mother is fearful that if the father’s application is granted, this would signify the end of any chance for her to reconnect with the boys.  She therefore strenuously opposes to the application. It is emphasized by the mother that the father has once again hijacked the proceedings and tried to create a fait accompli designed to pressure the court to submit to his demands; and this is an abuse of the process.  The facts presented by the father are ‘substantive mistruths’ and so his application should meet with a refusal.

41.  The mother proposes that if the removal application is refused, the court should immediately put in place steps to be taken for her to reconnect with the boys with the assistance of the Social Welfare Department.  The court should as a start restore her access to B and, depending on the progress, followed by her access to L.

42.  If the removal application is allowed, the mother submits that nevertheless the boys’ departure must be delayed until there is strong evidence that face to face and electronic communication between the boys and her have been solidly re-established.  She has a timeframe of 24 months in mind but concedes that the period may be reduced to as little as 6 months if good progress is shown.

43.  The father does not find this proposal workable.

The Social Investigation Reports

44.  Ms Cheng is the newly assigned handling officer for this family.  She has been involved in the matter since April 2018.  She has prepared 2 reports. The first is one dated 23 January 2019 on the progress of access and the second one, a 21-page report dated 4 September 2019, is on the father’s application.

45.  Ms Cheng is supportive of the father’s application. She considers that the father’s application is genuine in the sense that it is not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the mother from the boys’ lives. She also considers that the father’s application realistic and is founded on practical proposals both well researched and investigated.

The Official Solicitor’s Report

46.  Mr Lee is supportive of the father’s application too.  This conclusion is arrived at after having interviewed the boys and after having the matter considered with reference to the approach set out in Payne v Payne [2001] Fam 473 and with the best interests of the boys as the first and paramount consideration in mind.  The Official Solicitor’s stance remains unchanged after the conclusion of trial. Where necessary, I shall return to the Official Solicitor’s view in relation to Payne v Payne in later part of this Judgment.

47.  Same as in the 1st Relocation Application, the court has not been assisted by any International Social Investigation Report due to the absence of such service.

48.  At trial, in addition to the father and the mother, the following persons gave evidence in court:

1.  Ms Cheng, the social investigation officer;

2.  Mr G, the paternal grandfather;

3.  Ms W, Mr G’s partner; and

4.  Ms V, the father’s partner.

The Legal Principles

49.  Section 3(1) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13) (“GMO”) provides:

“(1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property-

(a) in any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court-

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to-

(A) the views of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing; and

(ii) shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father;

(b) …, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal and be exercisable by either without the other;

50.  On relocation cases, the Court of Appeal, in SMM v. TWM (Child:  Relocation) [2010] 4 HKLRD 37, followed the approach enunciated by Thorpe LJ in the English Court of Appeal case of Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166, [2001] 1 FLR 1052.  Cheung JA said the following:

“The principles

19.   The parties agreed that the applicable principles governing relocation application are based on the Payne v. Payne [2001] Fam 473 line of cases.  They are English Court of Appeal cases.  There is no House of Lords’ decision on this issue.  These principles have been applied in Hong Kong, for example, in M v. B (Removal of children from the Jurisdiction) [2009] HKFLR 349, by Judge Bruno Chan although there has not been any Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision on relocation applications.

20.   Payne is based on the earlier decision of Poel v. Poel [1970] 1 WLR 1469.  In Re G. (Leave to remove) [2008] 1 FLR 1587 the English Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principles in Payne.

21.  The principles in Payne can be summarised as follows :

(a)  The distinct features of a relocation application are first, the applicant is invariably the mother and the primary carer; second, generally the motivation for the move arises out of her remarriage or her urge to return home; and third, the father’s opposition is commonly founded on a resultant reduction in contact and influence. (per Thorpe LJ at paragraph 27)

(b)  The two propositions that have been consistently applied by the Courts are, first, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration; and second, refusing the primary carer’s reasonable proposals for the relocation of her family life is likely to impact detrimentally on the welfare of her dependent children.  Therefore her application to relocate will be granted unless the Court concludes that it is incompatible with the welfare of the children. (per Thorpe LJ at paragraph 26)

(c)  The application should be approached as follows :

(i) Is the mother’s application genuine in the sense that it is not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the father from the child’s life?  Then ask, is the mother’s application realistic, i.e. founded on practical proposals both well researched and investigated?  If the application fails either of these tests, refusal will inevitably follow.

(ii) If, however, the application passes these tests then there must be a careful appraisal of the father’s opposition: is it motivated by genuine concern for the future of the child’s welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive? What would be the extent of the detriment to him and his future relationship with the child were the application granted?  To what extent would that be offset by extension of the child’s relationships with the maternal family and homeland?

(iii) What would be the impact on the mother, either as the single parent or as a new wife, of a refusal of her realistic proposal?

(iv) The outcome of the second and third appraisals must then be brought into an overriding review of the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration, directed by the statutory checklist in so far as appropriate. (per Thorpe LJ at paragraph 40)

(d)  In short, the relevant factors are :

(i) The welfare of the child is always paramount.

(ii) There is no presumption created by section 13(1)(b) of the English Children Act 1989 in favour of the applicant parent.

(iii) The reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing to live abroad carry great weight.

(iv) Consequently the proposals have to be scrutinised with care and the Court needs to be satisfied that there is a genuine motivation for the move and not the intention to bring contact between the child and the other parent to an end.

(v) The effect upon the applicant parent and the new family of the child of a refusal of leave is very important.

(vi) The effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the other parent and in some cases his family is very important.

(vii) The opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the parent left behind may be very significant. (per Butler-Sloss P at paragraph 85)

51.  There were some debates in the UK on whether the guidance set out by Thorpe LJ in para 40 of Payne v Payne applies only to cases where the applicant is the primary carer or whether there is a covert presumption in favour of the primary carer.  In Re TC and JC (Children: Relocation) [2013] EWHC 292 (Fam), [2013] 2 FLR 484, Mostyn J said the following:

“10. The foundation of the jurisprudence in this field is the well-known case of Poel v Poel [1970] 1 WLR 1469. Although there were many other subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeal the next major milestone was the case of Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166, [2001] Fam 473, [2001] 1 FLR 1052, where Thorpe LJ set out his memorable "discipline" in para 40. That decision was controversial, at least in some quarters, for arguably perpetuating a covert presumption in favour of location, at least where the application was made by the child's primary carer. It was reconsidered in 2011 in the case of K v K(Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction) [2011] EWCA Civ 793, [2012] Fam 134, …”

52.  Recently, in ZJ v XWN (Leave to Appeal: Child Relocation) [2018] 3 HKLRD 644, [2018] HKCA 436, CAMP 67/2018, the Court of Appeal, after having reviewed K v K (Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction) [2011] EWCA Civ 793, [2012] Fam 134 and Re C (A Child) (Internal Relocation) [2016] Fam 253, confirmed that the only principle of law enunciated in Payne is that the best interests of the child is paramount and the rests is guidance and that Cheung JA’s comments in SMM v TWM should be read in that light: at [18] and [23].  The Payne guidance should not be regarded as a prescriptive blueprint: at [22].

53.  The Court of Appeal endorsed what Vos LJ said in Re C (A Child) (Internal Relocation) at [82] and [83],

82.  I add a few words in an attempt to summarise the position that has now been reached. As counsel before us agreed, in cases concerning either external or internal relocation the only test that the court applies is the paramount principle as to the welfare of the child. The application of that test involves a holistic balancing exercise undertaken with the assistance, by analogy, of the welfare checklist, even where it is not statutorily applicable. The exercise is not a linear one. It involves balancing all the relevant factors, which may vary hugely from case to case, weighing one against the other, with the objective of determining which of the available options best meets the requirement to afford paramount consideration to the welfare of the child. It is no part of this exercise to regard a decision in favour or against any particular available option as exceptional.

83.  One of the most difficult aspects of this case has been to establish in the light of previous authority what use, if any, should be made in the process we have just described of the 4 “disciplines” identified by Thorpe LJ at paragraph 40 of his judgment in Payne v. Payne ([2001] EWCA Civ 166, [2001] 1 FLR 1052) (the “ Payne factors”). In my judgment, one of the valid concerns about the Payne factors is that they do not adequately reflect the gender-neutral approach to these problems that the court will now adopt in every case. Whilst the Payne factors may still be of some utility in some cases, they are no part of the applicable test or the applicable principles. In some circumstances, the judge may find them useful. In others, the judge may not. If the judge finds them a useful guide to some of the factors that he should consider, he will be doing so only as part of the multi-factorial balancing exercise that is required.                     (emphasis added)

54.  The Court of Appeal also dealt with the use of the “welfare checklist” in the balancing exercise.  The “welfare checklist’ is only an aide-memoire.  A judge is not required to mechanically list every factor to demonstrate that he has considered the same. 

55.  The Court of Appeal emphasized that the guidance in Payne or SMM v TWM or the welfare checklist are simply tools to assist a Family Judge in making the multifactorial assessment to reach a result which is in the best interest of the child after taking account of the potential impact on the parents: at [30].

See also B, A v B, L (Child Relocation), [2019] 4 HKLRD 23, [2019] HKCA 822.

56.  Therefore, I would have to conduct a holistic balancing exercise and in doing so, I would make use of the Payne approach and the “welfare checklist’ as an aide-memoire tools.

Is the father’s application genuine in the sense that it is not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the mother from the boys’ lives?

57.  The family came to Hong Kong to enable the father to pursue his flying career.  I am sure this was the main, if not the only, purpose of coming to Hong Kong.  As said, he was assigned to fly the old Boeing cargo plane; an arrangement that the father was not happy about.  I accept the move to the London base would allow him to fly a modern jet which, on that view, is a career advancement for the father.

58.  Another undisputed fact is that the father and the boys (and in recent years V as well) have been returning to Denmark for summer breaks since at least 2015 and according to the mother, the father has been keeping a BMW car for his use there.  I accept the father has a genuine intention to return to his hometown where his extended family and friends are.  The father sees that relocation would allow him to obtain timely support from his family and for the boys to stay away from all the unpleasant experience and disturbances to their normal living in Hong Kong. 

59.  The mother sees the father’s relocation is a means to further alienate her from the boys.  However, the mother is currently having indirect access to the boys by way of emails only.  As I said in the 1st Relocation Judgment, it was the mother, who by her own conduct, excluded herself from the boy’s lives. There is simply no need for the father to exclude her. 

60.  I accept the father’s application is genuine; this is also the view taken by Mr Lee and Ms Cheng.

Is the father’s application realistic, ie founded on practical proposals both well researched and investigate?

61.  As I said in VE (nee KE) v VRJ (Relocation, Custody, Care and Control and Access), FCMC 7676/2011 (date of judgment: 4 June 2015) at [156],

“Same for any relocation case, there are bound to be uncertainties in what lies before the parties. Indeed, this happens not just to relocation cases. It is the reality that, to a greater or lesser extent, one has to face. Thus, the question is not one of uncertainty; the question is whether the relocation is well planned and considered so that the major adverse uncertainties are foreseen, avoided or eradicated as much as possible.

62.  The father’s plan that he is going to work and live in two different countries has been subject to scrutiny. There are two concerns. The first is one of feasibility: whether his employer would allow the father to live in Denmark while at the same time he has to report duty in Heathrow, UK. The second is whether the father could work in the UK in light of the post-Brexit.

Whether the Father’s Employer would allow him to take Heathrow as his base if he is to live in Denmark

63.  At trial, the father was subject to examination on this issue. According to Paragraph 9 of his employer’s Policy,

When normal Travelling Time from home to the departure airport is in excess of one and a half (1.5) hours, the Officer will make arrangements for alternative accommodation nearer to the departure airport. In such case, the maximum permissible Travelling Time from home to the departure airport under normal circumstances becomes four (4) hours. An Officer must make optimum use of the opportunities and facilities for rest, both at home and at the alternative accommodation. In accordance with the AFTLS, the responsibility for being sufficiently rested before undertaking a flying Duty remains entirely with the Officer.

64.  A plain reading of this paragraph would mean that literally an officer would be required to arrange his alternative accommodation if his travelling time from home to the departure airport is more than 1 ½ hours and under no circumstances his travelling time should exceed 4 hours.

65.  It is common ground that the best possible travelling time from his proposed home in Denmark to Heathrow by way of direct flight from City B, the airport nearest to his home, to Heathrow, is 3 hours 20 minutes. As such, literally according to the said paragraph 9, the father would be required to make arrangement for alternative accommodation. The father admitted that if he is assigned to fly the first flight that departs at 11:00 am from Heathrow back to Hong Kong, he would have to leave home the night before and stay at one of Heathrow’s airport hotels for the night so as make himself available for duty the next morning, but he said he would not have to leave the day before if he is assigned to fly, for instance, a flight that departs in the afternoon. He could just leave home in the morning. He explained the paragraph is intended to ensure that an officer would have adequate rest within 12 hours before the duty and as long as he is able to demonstrate that he would be able to report duty within 4 hours, he would be legible for the roster to which this paragraph 9 applies. What he meant is that he does not have to make alternative accommodation in each and every case. I must confess I have some difficulty in understanding the father’s interpretation of this paragraph. As I said, a plain reading of this paragraph is that the father is required to arrange alternative accommodation. That said, the father conceded that if my reading of this paragraph is correct, he is willing to make the arrangement. As I see it, the key is whether his employer is aware of his situation and approves of his plan. The father’s evidence is that he has to inform his employer that he lives in Denmark and he has to present his employer a plan showing that he is able to comply with the requirement. I accept what the father said. The alternative accommodation could easily be arranged at an airport hotel. There is nothing for me to doubt the father would not be able to do so.

66.  The father gave an update on the final day of trial that in early September 2020 his employer extended the job retention programme on the London base until the end of 2020; this indicated confidence in the Heathrow base. It appears that the father was not affected by the recent retrenchment of his employer that was announced a few weeks ago.

Whether the father could work in the UK in light of the Post-Brexit?

67.  The UK left the European Union on 31 January 2020. Following this is a transition period when trade, travel and freedom of movement remain largely unchanged but it will end on 31 December 2020. As to what would the arrangement be after 31 December 2020, negotiations between the UK government and the EU are still going on.

68.  The mother raised her concern regarding whether the father is able to work in UK after the transition period. At the present moment, EU citizens enjoy the rights to enter and remain in UK freely. For the reasons that the father has not taken up his London base yet and that due to the Covid-19 furlough in UK until 31 December 2020, there are doubts as to whether he is entitled to this “grandfather rights”. The transition period will expire before the father is able to take up the posting. Further, the mother raised the concern whether the father will be paying Danish tax and not UK tax in order to make himself legible as a Danish resident.

69.  In response, the father maintained that he is entitled to take the benefit of the “grandfather rights” as he will report duty as soon as leave is given by the court. Further, according to the current arrangement, he will be legible to become a Danish resident.

70.  In my view, the outcome of the post-Brexit negotiations is anyone’s guess. What I should do is to deal with the matter to the best of the court’s ability according to the evidence before it. I would take the current position that the father, as a Danish and EU citizen, is entitled to work in UK. This allows him to take up the new posting.

71.  Other issues raised at trial are (1) whether V could join the father in Denmark and (2) whether the grandparents are available to assist in the care of the boys.

Whether V could join the father in Denmark?

72.  The evidence is that the father’s relationship with V has now been made known to his family members in Denmark. It is reported by Ms Cheng that the mother believes the father and V are in a relationship. Yet it is purely developed out of the special family circumstances. It is therefore significant to note that the mother did not launch her challenge on the ground that the father and V are not a couple now and no questions were put to the father and V as regards their relationship when the mother was cross-examining them. I accept there is nothing to suggest they are not a couple.

73.  At the time of trial in December 2019, V was holding a Multiple Entry Schengen Visa as the father’s partner. Due the lapse of time, this visa expired in May 2020. V’s application for a Family Reunification Visa (“FRV”) back in November 2018 was declined. The father said they have lodged an appeal and the result is pending. I take it that in any event a fresh application may be made.

74.  The mother criticised V for not being able to speak any Danish nor has she ever taken any course on that. She doubted whether V would be able to obtain the FRV because she would not be able to pass the stringent language proficiency requirement and the requirement for having an understanding of the Danish community and that, since the father would not be paying tax in Denmark, he could not be an ordinary resident in Denmark. Significantly, it is to be noted that the mother did not say V would not be able to obtain the FRV because she is not the partner or spouse of the father.

75.  The mother also raised the point that due to the Covid-19 pandemic, V, an Indonesian passport holder, has to apply for a business visa 6 months in advance for gaining entry into Denmark; so it is virtually impossible for V to get there.

76.  The mother stressed that if the father’s application is allowed, it would mean the boys would be mostly living with their grandparents, their father would be outside of Denmark 20 days per month and V may at best be allowed to be in Denmark of a maximum of 180 days per year, or at the other end of the spectrum, barred from entry into the EU.

77.  The father did not agree that a business visa is required; V could obtain another Multiple Entry Schengen Visa as his partner before the granting of FRV. He could be a Danish resident even if he works in London.

78.  There is not a crystal ball before me. Whether or not V would be able to obtain any visa for entry into Denmark is entirely a matter for the Danish government. Despite the mother’s criticism on V over her ability or lack of general competence (which I do not think this has been made out), the reality is as of now, and in the past when the father was at work, V is the only person available in Hong Kong for taking care of the boys. In my assessment, V is an intelligent person. She speaks English well, an ability that she has required during her work in Hong Kong and I was told she speaks Cantonese, too. Again, this ability must have been acquired through work. Given that V is the father’s spouse or partner, on balance I should consider the father’s application on the basis that sooner or later V should be able to join the family in Denmark.

Whether the grandparents are available for the care of the boys

79.  G, now 69 years old, divorced his wife “E” (the father’s mother) in 2003 and married W.

80.  G and W are running a small builder business from their home in City H. Their evidence is that their working hours are flexible enough to take care of the boys and to take them for activities when needed. The boys would have their own bedrooms if they are to stay.

81.  G acknowledged that he is now aware of the relationship of the father with V and he gladly welcomed V into the family.

82.  E (ie the father’s mother), now aged 66, also expressed to Ms Cheng that if needed she and her partner are able to offer assistance in caring the boys.

83.  The mother said the father’s extended paternal family is terribly dysfunctional. G virtually has had no communication with E and his brother (ie the father’s uncle). The father’s younger brother is severely mentally handicapped and there is simply no chance for him to have any meaningful relationship with the boys. In short, in the eyes of the mother, the father’ s extended family is trashy.

84.  The mother tried to undermine the integrity of G and W by suggesting that they had an affair during G’s marriage with E and this led to E’s depression and alcoholism. E has been receiving disability partial pension due to ill health and hence, E and her partner, who is much older than her, would not be able to assist.

85.  The mother laid much emphasis on G’s past fidelity issues, all kinds of shortcomings in the family to say that they might not be able to provide the best quality of nurturing to the boys; specifically, G is not a person of good character, morals and ethics and a poor role model for the boys. Lastly, G has no idea how to care for the boys.

86.  It has to be remembered that we are not living in a perfect world. At times, there are broken relationship within a family. The cruel reality is that broken families and torn relationships are a commonplace. This is the reality that one has to face in modern times. The present case where the mother’s relationship with the boys has completely broken down is a stark example.

87.  The present case must be seen in its context. After having heard G, it is clear that he does not have a good relationship with E and his brother. G conceded that he only communicates with E when it is necessary. I consider this is rather normal for a divorced couple. The objective evidence is that while the boys were in Denmark, they were spending their times with G and E alternately, so it suggests that at that level there are workable communications between them. Right now the boys have not one extended family member in Hong Kong. On that view, any change occasioned by their move to Denmark would seemingly have no adverse consequence to the boys.

88.  The undisputed evidence is that the father frequently returned to Denmark with the boys and in recent years with V as well. The boys were also frequent visitors to their grandparents when they were in Denmark. Meanwhile, G and W visited the father and the boys in Hong Kong at least once before the present application. All the reports produced by the social welfare officers pointed to the positive relationship between the boys and G and W.

89.  I have seen and heard G and W in evidence. They, having travelled all their way to Hong Kong in order to give evidence, are apparently in good health. G is adamant that he and his wife are willing and able to take care of the boys. W, in evidence, even went so far as to say that she is willing to come to Hong Kong to assist.

90.  Taking all the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that G and W are ready, willing and able to take care of the boys if for whatever reason V is not allowed to stay in Denmark or even when V is in Denmark, in times of contingency, though I do not think W really meant it when she said she is willing to come to Hong Kong.

91.  On whether an applicant’s plan is realistic or practical, it was commented by Thorpe LJ in Re F and H (Children: Relocation) [2007] EWCA Civ 692, [2008] 2 FLR 1667 that the bar as to practicalities varies widely depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. At [9] His Lordship said,

“… the bar as to practicalities that must be jumped by the relocation applicant is set at a wide variety of heights depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. In this commonplace category of cross-border family creation, where the primary carer is returning to a completely familiar environment, the bar is obviously set considerably lower than in the case of an applicant who, in pursuit of some dream or ambition, is proposing to take the children to an unknown and untried environment. The bar is set particularly low where the primary carer is returning to the completely familiar home life after such a brief absence. In this instance the mother had only been in this country for 6 years in total.”

92.  In that case, the father was English and the mother Texan. When their marriage broke down the mother sought to return to Texas, the United States together with 2 children, the younger one being born by her and the father. Despite the fact that there was no clear information about the younger child’s school, about the home the children would be going to, or about the mother’s employment or earning capacity, leave was granted for the mother.

93.  On appeal, the father’s complaint that the trial judge was plainly wrong to accept the adequacy of the mother’s practical proposals was rejected. The English Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to have found the mother was resourceful and she put the children first and she would ensure that there is a proper home with proper schooling and that she would provide finances for them and for herself: at [10].

94.  Similarly, in SMM v TWM (Child: Relocation) [2010] 4 HKLRD 37, a Hong Kong case, both the father and the mother are Americans. When their marriage broke down, the mother sought leave to return to the United States with their son. Her application was refused at the first instance. One of the reasons for refusal was that the trial judge was not satisfied with the plan proposed by the mother. The mother was criticised for being uncertain and lacking in detail of her plan regarding her training in veterinary medicine and accommodation. The Court of Appeal disagreed, and emphasized it is necessary to bear in mind that,

“The mother is not taking the child to an entirely new environment but is returning to her home country where she has family members and where the father also has family members.  The mother wishes to be with her extended family with whom she is close.  If the child is allowed to return, he will be able to see more of his extended family rather than simply be with his parents’ friends and his friends which is the typical lifestyle of an expatriate family in Hong Kong”: [32(a)]

95.  On whether the mother’s plan in that case was simply too uncertain and therefore unsatisfactory, Hartmann JA (as he then was) took the view that because the mother was still in Hong Kong the plan was bound to contain uncertainties. The learned judge said,

82. For my part, the need for a set of rational relocation proposals is to ensure that the parent is not simply seeking to flee without concern for practicalities and thereby putting the interests of the child at risk. In the present case, when matters are considered in the round, it is apparent, I believe, that the mother is not simply seeking to flee without heed of practicality. She is seeking to relocate to that part of the United States from which both she and her husband originate, where both have families, where both grew up. In that respect, she is seeking to return ‘home’, to the shelter and care of both her extended family and, in so far as may be necessary in the interests of the child, to the shelter and care of the father’s extended family. There is no suggestion that she will be without funds. In respect of capital, that is not yet available to her for the purposes of buying a home, not until court proceedings are finalised. But the mother does have a plan to stay with her own mother, initially at least while she is looking for employment. There are schools in the area which are able to take the child even if the child has not yet been booked into one of them. They are educational institutions of different complexions but there is no suggestion that the mother, in consultation with the father, will not be able to choose one that is appropriate. In this regard it is to be remembered that both parents are highly qualified and clearly understand the importance of education. If the mother finds a job at some distance it may be necessary to move the child but that of itself is not critical. There is nothing to suggest that the child is not an average robustness and will not adjust.

83. The mother’s relocation proposals, it seems to me, are entirely acceptable. She will be returning ‘home’ in the sense that I have described. Initially, while she seeks employment, she will be staying with family. During that time, the child will have schooling available as well as the benefit of spending time with extended family. When the mother has found employment, if it is necessary to move to a new place, there is no reason to think that she will not do so in an entirely rational and planned manner, making sure that the child’s best interests are secured. There is nothing in the mother’s history to suggest that she acts with blatant irresponsibility in respect of the child.

84. In respect of relocation applications generally, there will, of course, be many occasions when the court is obliged to look carefully to the specific details of a plan to relocate and a lack of specific detail will be fatal. Each case is unique, each must be determined according to its own circumstances. In the present case, however, looking to all matters in the round, including the proven character of the mother as a responsible parent, I believe that the judge regrettably fell into error in looking too much to the lack of detail and too little to the broader imperatives which show the plan to be entirely understandable, rational and one that will protect the interests of the child. (emphasis added)

96.  Although it is axiomatic that the facts of every case are different, with the above observations in mind, the father’s plan in the present case is no doubt a well thought-out one and is practical. The father is clearly very resourceful in seeking assistance from his family members. He is not only seeking to return to his home country, but is seeking to return to his hometown as well where his extended family members and friends are. Denmark is not an alien land for the boys. Likewise, G, W and E are no strangers. The boys have been spending their summer breaks there and meeting these extended family members in the past years.

Is the mother’s opposition motivated by genuine concern for the future of the boys’ welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive?

97.  Both Mr Clough and Mr Lee agreed that the mother’s opposition is motivated by her genuine concern for the future of the boys. The mother wants to re-establish her relationship with the boys before they depart for Denmark. This is the main reason for her objection. She fears that if the boys are to leave Hong Kong without any solid basis on which their relationship could be built upon, she would lose the boys forever.

What would be the extent of the detriment to the mother and her future relationship with the boys were the application granted?

98.  The mother repeatedly complained that the current email access is simply not a viable method to rebuild the relationship. She continued to run the theme that the boys are victims of parental alienation engineered by the father. The only materials she relied upon are just some literature attached to her affirmations to say that the boys have Parental Alienation Syndrome. I must say this assertion is never supported by any expert evidence. Quite to the contrary, it has been the views of all the professionals involved in helping this family that the boys were estranged by their mother’s own conducts.

99.  The mother relied upon Dr Poon’s report to say that she has had significant improvement in her emotion, that there are no signs of psychological or emotional disturbance and that she does not need any service. I accept that according to Dr Poon, the mother currently does not have any emotional and psychological problem but as Ms Cheng rightly pointed out in court, what the mother needs are more on how she reflects as a parent and how she could improve herself as a parent.

100.  The mother further relied upon the training that she received, specifically the “Thomas Gordon Parenting Effectiveness Techniques” and her past employment history to say she has adequate knowledge and skill in communications. She is well commented by the parents of children that she teaches. She is ready and able to meet the boys again.

101.  All these may be true. The mother may have excellent skills in relating to and communication with children. However, I agree with Ms Cheng that what we are dealing with are the mother’s own children - not the children that she works with in her job. I do not think it is helpful if the boys are forced by a court order to see their mother. I agree with Ms Cheng that the key is how to make the boys to be willing to see their mother. It is important to let the boys know their mother listens to them and are supportive of the things they want. When the boys see such changes they may be willing to see their mother. By then, she would have the opportunity to use the skill that she has acquired.

102.  Ms Cheng took the view there is a chance for the boys to reconnect with their mother if she supports the application. The boys would see that the mother understand and respect what they want. The boys need reassurance from her so that they can trust their mother and they need an indication from their mother that she has changed.

103.  It is reported by Ms Cheng that B agreed to meet his mother yearly and maintain contacts with her if she would agree to the relocation. As opined by Ms Cheng, if trust with B is rebuilt and L could also witness it, there could be possibilities for increased contact and relationship could be changed.

104.  It is also reported that at one stage L agreed to meet his mother for 2 to 3 hours if she supported the application. At another stage, L would only agree to see his mother if she was willing to apologise for what she did. Ms Cheng conceded that it would not be sufficient for healing the relationship but it could be a start.

105.  Regrettably, the mother did not take up the offers. She saw these offers as conditions being imposed upon her by the boys. The mother continued to insist things to happen in the way she dictated. Instead of accepting the offers, the mother proposed to allow the boys’ relocation on the condition that this is to take place 24 months the latest, if the boys agree to weekly face-to-face supervised access. When a more solid relationship foundation is established, ie when more natural interaction and free communication can be achieved, a more detailed exit plan and access plan upon relocation should be agreed and the relocation could then be effective anytime.

106.  I agree with Ms Cheng that it is because of the boys’ feelings and past experiences with their mother but not physical distance that the boys reject to have any contact with her and that the key to improving the relationship between the mother and the boys would be for the mother to take a step backward – to listen to the boys and allow them to go to Denmark. But sadly, the mother never did. The mother failed to listen to the boys that their past experience with their mother had been very hurtful. She failed to reflect upon her own relationship with the boys and how what she did in the past have influenced that relationship. For instance, notwithstanding the mother repeatedly said she takes full responsibility and decisions in the past, she did not apologise to the boys. The mother continued to maintain that she was wrongly convicted of the ill-treatment offence because of the father’s evidence. And the way in which L gave his evidence was influenced by his father. She continued to accuse it was the father’s lies that had caused her to unfairly be burdened with a record of a crime she had not committed. She gave the excuse that she was intensely stressful at that time, that she was only ‘shouty’ but not abusive. There was no direct answer from the mother when she was asked by Mr Clough on whether she regretted any of her conduct towards the boys.

107.  Thus, it does not come as a surprise to me when Ms Cheng in her report of 4 September 2019 said the resentment of the boys towards their mother has increased over time, particularly on the part of L.

108.  L is reported to have mentioned to Mr Lee that he thinks his mother does not care about their feelings; she just drags things on as long as possible and makes life difficult. He even takes the view that the present email arrangement should discontinue. B apparently takes a less drastic view but he is reported to have said that if he is to talk to the mother he would just tell her that he hates her as she does not agree to the relocation.

109.  I agree with Mr Lee that the mother-children relationship could not become worse if relocation is allowed. On the contrary, there may be a chance for improvement in their relationship if the boys could relocate because it is hopeful with the passage of time there would be less resentment towards the mother. The boys are willing to meet their maternal aunts and have done so in the past, though it would appear that currently the boys have some reluctance to see their maternal grandmother, who is living in Australia. With all these behind their backs, it is hopeful that starting from meeting their maternal aunts, then their maternal grandmother, in times, they would be able to re-connect with their mother. I recognise there is no guarantee that this would happen. In the event that this does not, I would quote what Mr Lee said in his closing submission,

“54.  If the relationship between the mother and (the boys) shall unfortunately become unrepairable, it is indeed the consequence which all the professionals have forewarned the mother.  It is regrettable that the mother is the author of her own misfortune.”

To what extent would that detriment be offset by an extension of the boys’ relationships with the paternal family and homeland?

110.  The boys have no extended family from either the paternal or maternal side in Hong Kong. As said, Denmark is not an alien land and the boys are familiar with the people there. If they move to Denmark, their paternal grandparents would be around and close by to give them love and care.

What would be the impact on the father of a refusal of his realistic proposal?

111.  Decided authorities have consistently attached importance to the emotional and psychological wellbeing of the primary carer. In any evaluation of the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration great weight must be given to this factor: Payne v Payne, supra, [41].

112.  The father would be based in Heathrow in any event. This would mean a reduction in his monthly salary and the termination of his expatriate package with housing and education allowances. If the boys are to continue to stay in Hong Kong and the father is to work from London, practically speaking, it would mean less time for the father to be with the boys and on the financial side, it would mean less take-home income (which the mother also accepted) and lower standard of living. As for the boys, they, especially L, would continue to suffer at schools. I agree with Mr Lee that if this second application is refused it would be a heavy blow to both the father and the boys.

Overall what would be in the best interests of the boys?

113.  I am required to conduct a holistic balancing exercise in the determination of the father’s application. Apart from the above considerations, the following considerations are also pertinent, viz, (1) the views of the boys; (2) their relationship with V; (3) the Covid-19 pandemic and (4) education opportunities.

The Boys’ Views

114.  Same as before, the boys have consistently expressed to Mr Lee and Ms Cheng their strong desire to relocate to Denmark.

The Official Solicitor’s Report

115.  In his report dated 3 September 2019, Mr Lee said the boys continued to maintain their clear and strong desire to relocate to Denmark. Mr Lee considered there is no evidence to suggest the boys have been coached or indoctrinated to give their answers.

The Social Investigation Report

116.  L informed Ms Cheng that he wanted to live in Denmark because he wanted to be with his family. By this, he was referring to his grandfather and grandmother. He described Denmark as his homeland.

117.  B, in the same vein, informed Ms Cheng that he always wanted to go to Denmark because he wanted to be with his family.

118.  Both L and B said they enjoyed spending time with friends and family members there.

119.  On the part of the mother she agreed the boys wish to settle in Denmark but their wish is being influenced by their father.

120.  However, both Mr Lee and Ms Cheng found the boys responded spontaneously and freely and their views were genuine. As the docket judge who has been overseeing this case for the last 8 years, these observations about the boys are consistent with the previous observations made by other professionals involved.

121.  AS v CPW [2020] 4 WLR 127 is an English case concerning whether a boy, aged 14 ½ years old, ought to be ordered to return to the UK from Sierra Leone upon the application of his father. The son categorically wished to remain at Sierra Leone until the conclusion of his GCSE education. Mostyn J found the boy’s wishes were not objectively foolish or unreasonable and he refused the father’s application. In coming to his decision, Mostyn J stated that the wishes of a Gillick-competent child (see: Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, HK (E)) on a particular issue, where they are not objectively foolish or unreasonable, should normally be given effect: at [22].

122.  My assessment is that the boys’ views are not objectively foolish or unreasonable. Whilst I am conscious that they are not quite as old as the boy in AS v CPW, supra, they are old enough to speak their minds on which weight should be given. The decision of course rests with the court.

Relationship between the boys and V

123.  The boys were observed by Ms Cheng to have had lots of interactions with V during the home visit. L told Ms Cheng that he had good relationship with V and he would love her to join them in Denmark as a family.

124.  Ms Cheng also reported that according to L’s English teacher and Art teacher, L had mentioned to them that V was like his mother and he loved her very much.

125.  At trial, these observations have not been subject to challenge. I accept V mingles well with the family and she is not in the role of a domestic helper; there is a loving relationship between the boys and V.

The Covid-19 Pandemic

126.  The mother worried that Denmark is a dangerous place to go; it has been having far more Covid-19 cases than Hong Kong. She even raised the point that the father, who travelled extensively, and the boys are more likely to be carriers of the disease. The grandparents and their partners are older persons; as such, they could be easily inflected and are more susceptible to death if contracting the virus.

127.  Denmark and Hong Kong, and for that matter, the world, have been facing the challenge posed by Covid-19 pandemic. In different countries and at different times there have been waves of surges of cases. At some of the time Hong Kong has met with success and the same can be said for other countries. Things should not be mired in stalemate simply because of the pandemic. I am sure what I have in mind should be the long term best interest of the boys and attention should not be focused on the infection rates alone.

Education Opportunities

128.  Speaking of the long term interest of the boys brings me to the education opportunities open for them, which is one of the considerations raised by the father. I accept this is a valid consideration, in particular in respect of L, who feels marginalized at school and has become withdrawn from his peers.

Other Points

129.  Before I come to the final decision, it is necessary to dispose of some of the points raised by the mother.

130.  The mother complained that the father secured the change in base before obtaining the approval of the court, as such, he engineered a fait accompli, putting the “cart before the horse”.

131.  In my view, the difference between creating a fait accompli and making a realistic and practical proposal is a fine one. If an applicant has secured some assurances before his application, he would be accused of putting the “cart before the horse” but if there is nothing in place, he would be accused of failing to have a realistic plan and is venturing into uncertainties.

132.  When I said in the 1st Relocation Judgment that the father was jumping the gun, trying to create a fait accompli, I was particularly referring to the fact that at that time the boys were already in Denmark and the father sought leave for them to stay and commence schooling there. On that occasion leave had been given by this court for the boys to go to Denmark for holiday only and was not meant for the purpose of permanent removal. I therefore ordered the father to return the boys to Hong Kong and that they were not to be removed from Hong Kong unless with the leave of the Court: see [9].

133.  In the present case, given the time constraint within which the father had to make his application for the transfer, I think it is quite justified for him to make his application and secure the transfer pending the outcome of this application.

134.  The mother raised the issue as to when the parties started cohabitation. She adduced her travel records as shown on her passports and the permanent resident papers issued by the Swedish authorities to show that she started to cohabit with the father since 2002. The mother tried to rely upon the father’s denial to demonstrate that his evidence should not be believed.

135.  The father accepted that they met in Sweden in 2002 but it was not until 2006 that they started cohabitation. Yet he admitted he applied for residency permit in Sweden for the mother on the basis that they were in a relationship and that from 2002 to 2006 the mother was staying at his house and was able to work there because of his sponsorship for the residency permit.

136.  In my view, given that this happened years ago wherever the truth lies is of marginal relevance.

137.  The mother also referred the fact that City H is an isolated small town in Denmark and the father and the boys are blind to the beauty and opportunities in Hong Kong. In so saying, she seemed to have forgotten that the father was from the very same City that he now wants to return. The fact that the father was being brought up in an isolated city, as so described by the mother, did not prevent him from establishing a flying career or from coming to Hong Kong.

Conclusion

138.  The father chose to come to Hong Kong to pursue a flying career (and the mother, as his wife then, followed suit). I accept he has not had any plan of making Hong Kong his permanent home. Now 12 years down the road the father wishes to return to his home country.

139.  The fact is V has been taking care of the boys while the father is on duty for a number of years now. The bleak reality is that V is the only person that the father can count on in his absence. Relocation allows the father to obtain timely support from his family and for the boys to stay away from all the unpleasant experience and disturbances to their normal living in Hong Kong. It is optimistic that the boys could have a normal family life surrounded by extended family members while at the same time they would be brought up in their own culture. This would be a much better situation for the boys when compared to the current one.

140.  Hong Kong, and for that matter, the world, have been experiencing financial hardships due to the Covid-19 pandemic. There is no guarantee that things would change for the better in the near future. If the father’s application is refused, in the event that the father loses his job due to any further entrenchment, it is highly doubtful how the father would be able to sustain his living in Hong Kong.

141.  The conclusion is that, on the above analysis, it is to the best interest of the boys for them to be relocated to Denmark. The father’s application therefore ought to be granted.

Access

142.  According to Ms Cheng, L remained firm in rejecting making contact with his mother.

143.  The father agrees to facilitate access of the maternal family to the boys. He is also willing to facilitate the mother’s access if the boys agree to it. He has no objection that the current email access be continued. The mother may send the boys gifts as long as the boys are not obliged to response.

144.  I have already set out the current situation about the email access above; it is unnecessary to repeat here. It is quite clear that due to the mother’s opposition to the relocation application, there have been setbacks in mending the relationship between the boys and their mother. I am sure access should continue for the sake of the boys’ long term interest, although I must say the options we have in this case are very limited. I agree with Mr Lee that FaceTime session is plainly unrealistic and untenable, as the evidence clearly shows the boys are not ready to have any communication with the mother yet. I accept Mr Lee’s proposal in his 9th Report (on Permanent Relocation) that the current email access should continue. I see no reason why the father should not continue to provide the boys’ school hand-books, notices and reports to the mother on a monthly basis. The mother is urged to continue with her efforts which hopefully would turn fruition in time. At the same time, the father is encouraged to continue to give proper guidance to the boys with a view to re-connect with their mother. I shall be very pleased to see the boys could “forgive and forget” and their mother return to be a positive figure in their life-journey.

Orders

145.  For these reasons, the existing custody, care and control and access arrangement should continue. As the current order was made under the previous case FCMC 4191/2012, for the sake of convenience for the parties, the same set of orders are re-granted under the present proceedings. I make the following orders:

1. Sole custody, care and control of the boys be granted to the father;

2. Leave for the father to remove the boys from the jurisdiction of Hong Kong to Denmark for the purpose of relocation;

3. The mother is granted access to the boys by way of emails, limited to 2 emails per week from her. The mother may also send an electronic card during Christmas and on the occasion of the boys’ birthdays. The boys are not obliged to give a reply; and

4. The father is to provide the boys’ school hand-books, notices and reports, if any, on monthly basis.

Costs

146.  This is a children proceeding; I will adopt the usual approach of no order as to costs. I make an order nisi that there be no order as to costs both between the parties and between the parties and the Official Solicitor (including all costs reserved), with counsel certificate.

Financial Matters

147.  There should be closure of these divorce proceedings as soon as possible. Parties should approach the Listing Clerk for fixing a First Appointment hearing.

148.  Finally, I would like to thank Mr Clough and Mr Lee for their assistance.

(I. Wong)
District Judge

Mr Neal Clough, instructed by Ho & Ip, Solicitors, appeared for Mr JTMW, the petitioner

Ms NAV, the respondent, appeared in person

Mr Lee Tak-lei, Ted, solicitor, appeared for the Official Solicitor

[2018] HKFC 140-EN-2018-08-21

JRMW v. NAV

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FCMC 8504 / 2017

[2018] HKFC 140

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8504 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 JRMWPetitioner

and

 NAVRespondent

---------------------------

Coram: His Honour Judge I Wong in Chambers (Not open to Public)
Date of Judgement: 21 August 2018

__________________

Judgment

(Leave to Appeal)
(Paper Disposal)

__________________

Introduction

1.  By a summons taken out on 11 May 2018, the petitioner father applied for leave to appeal against my decision refusing his application for relocation of the 2 children of the family to Denmark.  My reasons are set out in a judgment dated 16 April 2018 which for convenience I shall refer it as the “Relocation Judgment”.

2.  The summons was originally fixed to be heard on 17 July 2018.  In the hearing of 1 June 2018 when I dealt with the petitioner’s application for taking the children away for summer vacation,[1] I indicated that this leave to appeal matter is apt to be dealt with by way of paper disposal.  I therefore gave directions for the parties to exchange their submissions and vacated the hearing of 17 July 2018.

3.  I shall continue to refer the petitioner father as “F”, the respondent mother “M”, the domestic helper/father’s partner “V” and the 2 children (both boys) as “L” and “B”.

4.  As I have already set out the background to F’s application, the parties’ arguments and my reasoning in the Relocation Judgment, I am not going to repeat the same here.  This Judgment has to be read together with the Relocation Judgment. 

5.  F was initially unrepresented.  He filed his summons together with his homemade Grounds of Appeal by way of an affidavit on 11 May 2018.  These followed by submissions from the Official Solicitor and from M on 13 July 2018 and 30 July 2018 respectively.  The most recent development is that F is now being represented by Mr Clough of counsel who has lodged new Grounds of Appeal in substitution for the homemade grounds and written submissions on 20 July and 26 July 2018 respectively.

6.  At this juncture, I need to mention that in his submissions of 26 July 2018, Mr Clough makes the following proposal:

1. The application for leave to appeal is to be adjourned sine die;

2. F is directed to file a fresh application for relocation on or before 3 August 2018;

3. The court directs that the fresh application is given an expedited hearing and that the evidence heard in the trial shall stand as if it had been given in the new application;

4. The court directs that F shall exhibit the new evidence to his affirmation in support of the fresh application;

5. M shall have liberty to file her affidavit in reply within 7 days; and

6. The new application for relocation shall be listed for 1 day on an urgent basis.

7.  I do not consider the proposal workable.

8.  First, notwithstanding the fresh application is clothed as a ‘new application’, it appears that F is seeking a re-trial.  In other words, he is seeking ‘two bites of the cherry’.  There is no basis for him to do so.  My view is if there is a fresh application, it has to be dealt with properly.

9.  Secondly, I have already rejected F’s childcare plan in his original application, whether or not the new application can be dealt with merely by way of adducing some new evidence as suggested by Mr Clough and whether or not the trial can be disposed of in just one day must of course depend on F’s childcare plan and the issues in dispute.  Further, Mr Clough seems to have suggested that the court may dispense with the assistance of the social welfare officer.  Without a sight of F’s new plan, I am not satisfied that in the event of a fresh application it is unnecessary for the court to hear what the social welfare officer may have to say.  It has to be borne in mind that the court shall give due consideration to any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing: s 3(1)(a)(i)(B) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13 (“GMO”).

10.  Lastly, I need to mention that as a matter of fact, in the hearing of 1 June 2018 when I dealt with F’s application for temporary removal, I had already mentioned that either party could make fresh application for relocation where the situation warranted and I urged F to consider carefully how he wanted to move forward.  It is unfortunate that so far F’s new plan is not in sight.

11.  For the above reasons, there is simply no basis for me to give such directions suggested by Mr Clough.

Legal Principles

12.  The relevant test governing applications for leave to appeal from the District Court is provided in section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336) (“DCO”):

“Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that –

(a) The appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) There is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.” [emphasis added]

13.  The Court of Appeal discussed the application of s 63A(2) of DCO in Sunny Tadjudin v Bank of America, National Association, HCMP No 691 of 2012, unreported, 29 June 2012 at [9]:

“9. Reasonable prospect of success involves the notion that the prospect of succeeding must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable” (SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 para 17). Furthermore, it is pertinent to bear in mind that even if there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal, the court still retains a discretion whether to grant leave to appeal, although the fact that there is, ex hypothesi, a reasonable prospect of success would heavily influence the court’s exercise of discretion (Ho Yuen Ki Winnie & Ors v Ho Hung Sun Stanley & Anr. HCA 391/2006, 25 May 2009, A Cheung J para 3; and HCMP 1009/2009, 24 August 2009, para 22).”

14.  Mr Clough also refers me to §59/2A/4 of The Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2018) on the proper approach,

For leave to appeal in cases, where the threshold test is not provided in the relevant statute, the general test which the court applies in deciding whether or not to grant leave to appeal is this: leave will normally be granted unless the grounds of appeal have no realistic prospects of success (Smith v. Cosworth Casting Processes Ltd (Practice Note) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1538 ; [1997] 4 All E.R. 840, CA).

15.  Recently, the Court of Appeal in ZJ v XWN, CAMP 67/2018, [2018] HKCA 436 (date of judgment: 25 July 2018) stated, in [64], that application for leave to appeal should be a filtering process and should be conducted summarily and proportionately.

Reasons for Rejecting F’s Application

16.  Before I come to the Grounds of Appeal, I think it is useful to recap the reason why F’s application was refused.

17.  F’s childcare plan after relocation to Denmark is that it would be the same as that in Hong Kong.  The boys would continue to be taken care of by V while he is flying.  V has become his partner (not his maid anymore) and has agreed to emigrate to Denmark together with them as a family. He would apply for a family reunification visa for V: [20]. This was the backbone of his relocation application: [60].  Accordingly, the issue of whether or not F and V had become husband and wife fell to be determined in trial.  After having heard the evidence, I found against F and held that the alleged relationship was a fake one.  It was fabricated for convenience so that V might be able to join the family in Denmark.  Significantly, Mr Lee, who appeared on behalf of the Official Solicitor, likewise had great doubts over the genuineness of the relationship: [39].  At the end of the trial, the Official Solicitor withdrew his support for the application.  He was concerned that there were uncertainties in the caring arrangement in Denmark due to first, the uncertain reaction of the boys to the change of V’s role and secondly, the extent of involvement of the grandfather in the taking care of the boys: [39]. I have already set out the relevant evidence and my findings in [63] to [78] of the Relocation Judgment.  I do not propose to repeat them here.   It has to be stressed that it was for this reason that I found the very foundation of F’s childcare plan vanished and accordingly it was unrealistic and had little hope of success: [89] & [91].

18.  I now turn to F’s Grounds of Appeal

Grounds of Appeal

19.  Mr Clough advances a total of 12 grounds with a number of sub-grounds under each, leaving no stone unturned.  He is essentially arguing that I erred in each and every respect.   I consider it is unnecessary to deal with each and every ground / sub-ground.  I propose to deal with them in batches.  In doing so, though I may not be referring to each and every paragraph, it does not mean that I have ignored any of them. 

Grounds 1 and 2

20.  It is submitted by Mr Clough that I erred in law in refusing to allow the application when relocation is plainly in the boys’ bests interests.  He draws on the facts that M does not have direct access to the boys, the favourable opinions expressed by the Social Welfare Officer and the Official Solicitor in their reports and the strong views of the boys.  He specifically contends that I erred in failing to pay sufficient regard to the strong views expressed by the boys.

Discussion

21.  As can be seen in the Relocation Judgment, I was fully conscious of the firm and open views expressed by the boys: [30(7)], [34], [35], [101] & [120].  I too was fully aware of the facts that M does not have direct access to the boys: [3] and the favourable opinions expressed by the Social Welfare Officer and the Official Solicitor in their reports: [29] to [31] and [33] to [37].  I accept that under s 3(1)(a)(i)(A) of GMO, the court is enjoined to give due consideration to the views of the children.  Yet, the ultimate guiding principle is the court shall regard the best interests of the child as the first and paramount consideration: s 3(1)(a)(i) of GMO.

22.  Plainly, these grounds are directed at the exercise of its discretion by this Court.  On appeals against the exercise of discretion, The Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2018) has the following discussion in §59/0/54,

Appeals against exercise of discretion—There are many authorities for the proposition that an appeal will not be entertained from an order which it was within the discretion of the judge to make, unless it be shown that he exercised his discretion under a mistake of law ( Evans v. Bartlam [1937] A.C. 473 ) or in disregard of principle ( Young v. Thomas [1892] 2 Ch. 134 ) or under a misapprehension as to the facts (ibid.); or that he took into account irrelevant matters ( Egerton v. Jones [1939] 3 All E.R. 889 at 892, CA) or failed to exercise his discretion ( Crowther v. Elgood (1887) 34 Ch D 691 at 697) or the conclusion which the judge reached in the exercise of his discretion was “outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible” ( G. v. G. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 647 ; [1985] 2 All E.R. 225 , HL). See also Banque Nationale de Paris v. Chan U Tong [1968] H.K.L.R. 151 , and Fung Tin Keung v. Hong Kong Wah Yuen Investment Co. & Another [1967] H.K.L.R. 650 , and Re SY Engineering Co. Ltd (unrep., CACV 1896/2001; [2002] H.K.E.C. 241 , CA) (appeal against a winding up order)…

…

The limitations on the power of the Court of Appeal to interfere with the exercise of a discretion conferred on the judge in the court below apply to residence or contact orders in child cases or any other decisions concerning the welfare of children: G. v. G. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 647 ; [1985] 2 All E.R. 225 , HL. The Court of Appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion in child cases unless it can be shown that the discretion was not exercised at all, or that the Judge made some error of law in its exercise, or that the decision was plainly wrong ( TAC v. VDC (unrep., HCMP 2198/2012, [2012] H.K.E.C. 1681 ))…

23.  The problem with these 2 grounds is - and this is what Mr Clough has not addressed - if the childcare plan is unrealistic and accordingly there would be a risk that the boys would be left ‘home alone’ for a few days at a time when their father is on duty, how could this be to the best interests of the boys?   I do not think Mr Clough has been able to demonstrate that there is an arguable case that the discretion was not exercised at all or that I made some error of law in its exercise, or that the decision was plainly wrong.

Ground 3

24.  Mr Clough submits that “The learned Judge erred as aforesaid in the premises that he was aware of the long-standing estrangement between M and the Children and of the circumstances of the alienation”.  He then highlights various incidents leading to the estranged situation that we have now including M’s conviction of ill-treatment of L in October 2016.   I must confess that I do not quite understand this ground.  I take it to mean that although I was aware of the long standing estrangement between M and the boys for which M is responsible, I erred in failing to give sufficient regard to this situation.  If I had given sufficient regard to it, I would have allowed the application.

Discussion

25.  In my view, again, this ground has fallen into the same fallacy as Grounds 1 and 2.  The problem is not with the estrangement.  The problem lies with F – his plan is a fake one.  His very own plot has led to his application being rejected.  It has nothing to do with M.

Grounds 4, 5 and 7

26.  It is submitted by Mr Clough that I called for the Social Investigation Reports and for the boys to be represented by the Official Solicitor to assist the court in its inquisitorial role.  However, the role of the Official Solicitor was not to engage in adversarial advocacy but to assist in the inquisitorial role by investigating into “how the boys’ interests are best served’.  Mr Clough argues to the extent that I facilitated or permitted the Official Solicitor to engage in adversarial advocacy I erred in so doing and the consequence was procedurally unfair and prejudicial to both F and the boys.

27.  As regards the prejudice that F has suffered, Mr Clough submits that, given that Denmark did not have the facility for an International Social Investigation Report: [32], what I should have done was to request the Official Solicitor to furnish the court with sufficient information as to schooling and child services in Denmark or take judicial notice of the fact that Denmark has one of the most advanced systems of social support from cradle to grave in the world.  I erred for having failed to do so.

28.  It is also submitted that I was factually wrong when I described the place which F planned to relocate as a “countryside village”.

Discussion

29.  Mr Clough has not drawn my attention to any authorities on the role of the Official Solicitor in support of his contention.  In the circumstances, the best I can do is to restate what I said in [41],

“The role of the Official Solicitor as a child’s separate representative is twofold: as an officer of the court the Official Solicitor investigates how the child’s interests are best served while simultaneously representing the child’s views as his solicitor in the proceedings: Practice Direction PDSL 6 – Guidance on Separate Representation for Children in Matrimonial and Family Proceedings, at §11…”

30.  As far as representing the boys’ views is concerned, it should be noted that given the nature of the present proceedings, though the Official Solicitor, as the guardian ad litem, is to represent the boys’ interests, such interests may not always accord with the boys’ views: see §5, Practice Direction PDSL 6 – Guidance on Separate Representation for Children in Matrimonial and Family Proceedings.

31.  In re G (minors) (wardship: costs) [1982] 2 All ER 32, [1982] 1 WLR 438, it was opined by the English Court of Appeal that,

In custody cases the Official Solicitor is much more than a mere guardian ad litem. He is at once an amicus curiae, an independent solicitor acting for the children, an investigator, an adviser, and sometimes a supervisor. Perhaps the nearest analogy is that of counsel to a tribunal of inquiry, a relatively new office but a valuable one. This, however, is not a new role for the Official Solicitor, as is borne out by the notes in paragraph 3452A of The Supreme Court Practice (1982) where the following passage is to be found:

“The Official Solicitor is a servant of the court and may at any time be called upon by a judge to carry out an investigation or to assist the court to see that justice is done between the parties (see In re Harbin and Masterman [1896] 1 Ch. 351, per A. L. Smith L.J., at p. 368, and per Rigby L.J. at p. 371). He is appointed to act where, if this were not done, there would be either a denial or miscarriage of justice.”

[emphasis added]

32.  In trial, Mr Lee of the Official Solicitor conducted examination on both F and M and made submissions to the court.  Given the authorities cited above, I do not think it was improper or an error in law in permitting Mr Lee to engage in our adversarial proceedings.  Quite to the contrary, the ends of having the assistance of the Official Solicitor would have been defeated if Mr Lee was not allowed to participate in the manner it was.

33.  As regards the point made by Mr Clough regarding obtaining further information as to the schools, facilities, services and other relevant matters by the Official Solicitor, Mr Clough seems to have forgotten what I said in [87],

87.   I accept that from the evidence adduced by F the shopping areas and the school are only of walking or cycling distance and the initial rented accommodation in Silkeborg is only about 5 to 6 km away from the school.  To that extent, the plan is practical.  I also accept what F said about the education system, the health and dental care system and the natural environment in Denmark.

34.  The short answer to Mr Clough’s point is that even allowing for one moment that the Official Solicitor should have been requested to obtain the information F was not prejudiced by the absence of the same.  In trial, it was not F’s case that there would be social services available for taking care of the boys in substitution for V when he is away for duties nor is it Mr Clough’s suggestion now.

35.  In any event, as Mr Lee rightly points out in his submissions, the fact that the Official Solicitor has been appointed to separately represent the boys in these proceedings should not alter the basic principle that it remains the onus of the parties to adduce evidence to substantiate their own case and/or to rebut the opponent’s case.  Although an international social investigation report was not available, should F consider that the information from the Danish authorities were pertinent or crucial to his application for relocation, the onus was on him to obtain such information and adduce to the court for consideration.  The Official Solicitor does not consider it appropriate to shift the burden to adduce evidence to him.

36.  Finally, as regards the point that I was factually wrong regarding the location where F proposed to settle, I believe Mr Clough has misunderstood what I said in [25]. In [25] I merely set out M’s stance.  I fail to see how it could reasonably be argued that it was a finding of fact by me.

Ground 6

37.  Mr Clough argues that whilst I took into account the Social Investigation Reports as to relocation and other evidence and concluded that F’s application is genuine: [59], I erred in refusing the application on the basis that I was not satisfied as to the care arrangements F proposed.

Discussion

38.  Mr Clough has not made any elaboration on this point.  In the circumstances, I think I only need to refer to what I said in [91]:

As said by Thorpe LJ in Payne v Payne, supra, and approved by our Court of Appeal in SMM v TWM (Child: Relocation), supra, if the application fails either of the tests of (1) whether the application is genuine or (2) whether the application is realistic, refusal will inevitably follow.  At the same time, I do bear in mind that what is ultimately determinative of this application is the best interests of the boys.  Their welfare is the paramount consideration.  With this guidance, F’s application appears to have little hope.  I believe this could never be to the boys’ interests if they are being left ‘home alone’ for a few days at a time when their father is on duty.

39.  In an appeal against a primary finding of facts, the Court of Appeal has to be satisfied that the conclusion on the facts made by the trial judge was plainly wrong: Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen & Others (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336; see also The Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2018), at §59/0/53.  In the present case, there is no challenge on the relevant findings of facts (ie the alleged husband-and-wife relationship was a fake one) which led to the conclusion that the application was unrealistic.

Grounds 8, 9 and 10

40.  These grounds deal with the alleged relationship between F and V which, as found by me, was a fake one.

41.  Mr Clough submits that I confused the detail of F’s relationship with V (as to when they first had sexual intercourse and other details as to their physical life) and other relationship issues as being relevant directly to F’s care arrangements; and the only questions relevant to the care arrangements was as to whether V would be available to assist F in taking care of the boys and, if not, whether there were alternative satisfactory arrangements within F’s care arrangements plan: Grounds 8 & 9.

42.  It is expounded by Mr Clough that it is irrelevant as to whether F and V are husband and wife, what is relevant is that V is available to assist F in taking care of the boys.   The latest position is that V would be allowed to remain in Denmark pending the Family Reunification application and V has been granted a Schengen Visa valid up to 31 May 2020.  It has been accepted by the Danish Immigration Service that V is regarded as a family member of an EU-citizen. Mr Clough mentions that F will make a Ladd v Marshall application to adduce this as further evidence in the appeal in the event that leave is granted.

43.  Mr Clough also argues I erred in coming to the conclusion that the alleged husband-and-wife relationship is not genuine and accordingly there is a real risk that F and V may be liable for prosecution and penalty: Ground 10.

Discussion

44.  As I mentioned in [60], the backbone of F’s application was that F and V had become husband and wife and it was this very basis that placed F in a position where he might apply for a Family Reunification visa for V.  There was never any suggestion in trial that F would be able to apply for a Family Reunification visa for his domestic helper.  Certainly, I believe it is not his suggestion now since Mr Clough has not sought to assert that a Family Reunification Visa could be issued to a domestic helper.  In the circumstances, I fail to see how the relationship between F and V as husband and wife is irrelevant to the care arrangements. 

45.  As for the availability of alternative satisfactory arrangements, I only need to mention that in trial F’s stance had always been that he and V would be the main carers of the boys.  The other care options were brought up in the middle of the trial when probably F realized the possibility that V might drop out of the picture.  That said, he maintained his original childcare plan even up to the final stage of the trial when he made his final submissions.  The court’s role in these proceedings is inquisitorial but I am sure it does not mean that the court had to find an alternative childcare plan for F when he did not even find it necessary to have one.  I fail to see how I could have erred in this respect.

46.  As regards the finding made by me that the husband-and-wife relationship was not genuine, Mr Clough has not sought to elaborate on how my findings are plainly wrong: see Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen & Others, supra. 

47.  As regards the new evidence to be adduced, it is unnecessary for me to express any views since there is no application before me (not even a draft one) and I have not had a sight of this evidence.

Grounds 11 & 12

48.  Mr Clough submits that I erred in failing to pay regard to the evidence that: -

1. F’s priority was the boys and that took precedence over all other aspects of his life,

2. F’s family were supportive of the application, and

3. the relationship between the boys and the grandfather was spontaneous and harmonious, the grandfather was willing to help in taking care of the boys.

49.  I also erred in finding that the boys would be left ‘home alone’ for a few days at a time or “face the risk that they may have to take care of themselves when their father is on duty.”

50.  It is said that I failed take account of the fact that Denmark has social welfare support for single working parents and a child support mechanism that would not permit minor children to be left unattended.

51.  Lastly, I failed to permit F to adduce the statement for his father as to the support that he and his wife would offer.

Discussion

52.  Again, Mr Clough has not sought to expound how or in which respect I erred in coming to these conclusions. As such, with respect, the submissions are no more than bare assertions.  In the circumstances, I need to say no more other than referring to the reasons that I set out in the Relocation Judgment.  As regards the support of F’s extended family and the relationship between the boys and the grandfather, I have set them out in [84]; on the ‘home alone’ conclusion, I have set it out in [91]; and on the refusal of F’s application to adduce further evidence, it is in [89].  At the end of the day, the problem with these grounds is that it was never F’s plan that V would be unavailable for the care of the boys. 

53.  On the point that Denmark has social welfare support for single working parents and a child support mechanism that would not permit minor children to be left unattended, it was never F’s alternative case that he would be a single working parent.  His case was always that he and V was a couple.  I fail to see how this could assist him.

Leave to appeal on costs

54.  There is also an application for leave to appeal against the costs order I made against F.  Mr Clough submits that I erred in awarding costs to M when the application for relocation was genuine and it was F’s case that V would assist him in care arrangements.   He argues that I failed to consider the appropriate costs order in light of the Court of Appeal judgment as to the proper approach to costs in children cases in TPL v WYY formerly known as WYY, CACV 61/2014 (date of judgment: 15 December 2014). 

Discussion

55.  Again, with respect, this ground is no more than a bare assertion.  Mr Clough has not particularised how I erred in the approach adopted.  As I see it, the approach adopted by me was the same as stated by our Court of Appeal in [14.1] to [15.4] of the said TPL v WYY formerly known as WYY, supra.  Significantly, it should be noted that the Court of Appeal in that case endorsed the trial judge’s disapproval over the deliberate non-disclosure on the part of the father of the fact that the children would be sharing the matrimonial home with his girlfriend and their new baby.  The Court of Appeal agreed that this was a reprehensible conduct and consequently, the father met with an adverse costs order.  Though it is axiomatic to say each case depends on its own facts, if the father in that case should be penalized with costs for a deliberate non-disclosure of some material information, I consider it should be more so for F in this case for having fabricated the entire basis of his application.

Order

56.  In conclusion, F has failed to show that he has an arguable case on any of the grounds.  The intended appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.  For this reason, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed and I so order.

Costs

57.  I see no reason why F should not be responsible for the costs of this application.  I give an order nisi that F do pay M the costs of this application, including costs reserved, to be summarily assessed.

58.  There be no order as to costs between the Official Solicitor and F and M.  This is also by way of an order nisi.

( I. Wong )
District Judge

  

Mr Neal Clough instructed by Ho & Ip, Solicitors, for JRMW, the petitioner

NAV, the respondent, in person

Mr Lee Tak-lei, Ted of the Official Solicitor for the children


[1] See Judgment dated 5 June 2018, [2018] HKFC 90

[2018] HKFC 90-EN-2018-06-05

JRMW v. NAV

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FCMC 8504 / 2017

[2018] HKFC 90

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8504 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 JRMWPetitioner
and
 NAVRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: His Honour Judge I Wong in Chambers (Not open to Public)

Date of Hearing: 1 June 2018

Date of Judgment: 5 June 2018

__________________

Judgment
(Temporary Removal)

__________________


The Application

1.  Subsequent to my judgment dated 16 April 2018 (“the Relocation Judgment”) dismissing the petitioner father’s application for permanent relocation of the two children of the family, L and B, to Denmark, the petitioner now applies, by way of a summons on 30 April 2018, to vary the order that I gave on 18 July 2017 prohibiting the children from leaving Hong Kong (“the Stop Order”) and for having various costs orders granted in his favour to be summarily assessed.

2.  In addition, by a separate summons the petitioner also applies for leave to appeal against the Relocation Judgment.

3.  The application for variation of the Stop Order contains various limbs.  The one that requires immediate attention is the one for the petitioner to take the two children out of Hong Kong from 1 July 2018 to 31 August 2018 for the purpose of holidays and/or family visits.  The petitioner said he and the children are going to stay mainly in Denmark during the summer vacation. 

4.  The hearing is fixed for 15 minutes only.  Given the constraint in time, I indicated that I would only be able to deal with the petitioner’s application for leave to remove the children out of Hong Kong during the summer vacation. The other matters have to be adjourned to a further date, with the remaining limbs of his application for variation of the Stop Order to be dealt with after the determination of his application for leave to appeal against the Relocation Judgment. 

The petitioner’s grounds

5.  The petitioner’s grounds are simple and straight-forward – the status quo ought to be restored.  The relocation trial is now over and all the parties including the children should be allowed to resume their normal life.  The children are devastated that they are not allowed to return to Denmark.  It would help them if they could have a good holiday there in the summer.  It is not in the children’s best interest to continue to be denied overseas holidays and their ability to visit their paternal family and friends in Denmark.

The respondent’s opposition

6.  In her usual fashion, the respondent opposes everything being applied for. She referred to the event happened last year when the children, with the leave of the court, were out of Hong Kong enjoying their summer vacation in Denmark the petitioner applied for permanent relocation in the middle of the vacation and sought to keep the children to remain in Denmark until the conclusion of his application, hence trying to create a fait accompli.  She described it as the petitioner’s secret scheme to permanently remove the children from Hong Kong. The Stop Order is the result of the petitioner’s action last year.  His action alone has caused this situation. The relocation trial has proved that the petitioner is willing to lie in order to gain unfair advantage over her. The petitioner can no longer be taken for his word.

7.  The respondent relied on what the petitioner said in his grounds of appeal where he continuously stated that “Hong Kong is a prison’, ‘we are under house arrest’, and ‘we want to return home’.  It is the petitioner’s own words, stated repeatedly, that give cause to concern that given the opportunity to leave Hong Kong, there is a significant risk that the petitioner will permanently abscond with the children.  She drew my attention to the petitioner’s situation, as stated in his grounds of appeal, that he is on indefinite sick leave and will no longer receive any income after October 2018.  These create multiple factors for risk that the petitioner could attempt to abscond with the children.

8.  The respondent also stressed that, as can be seen in his grounds of appeal, the petitioner is emotional and irrational.  She doubted the stability of his mental state.

9.  If the children are to stay in Hong Kong for the summer, this serves an excellent opportunity for her to reconnect with them.  There will also be time to have a psychological evaluation on the petitioner.

The Official Solicitor’s Stance

10.  The Official Solicitor has no objection to the application.  In his Note dated 24 May 2018, the Official Solicitor agreed that the relocation trial is now over and all the parties including the children should resume their normal lives. It means that for the best interests of the children, they should be allowed to travel and take their holidays as they did in the past.

11.  Whilst the Official Solicitor acknowledged the petitioner was found to have fabricated his intimate relationship with his domestic helper, he took the view that there is no other evidence to suggest that the petitioner will ignore and/or breach any court order if permission for temporary removal is granted. 

12.  The Official Solicitor assessed that the risk for the petitioner to abscond with the children is remote.  His reasons are:

1.  There are outstanding legal proceedings yet to be determined.  They are:-

(i) the question of ancillary relief;

(ii) the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal; and

(iii) the petitioner’s claim for costs against the respondent.

2.  Though the petitioner is on indefinite sick leave now and will stop receiving any salary after October 2018, there is no indication that his employment will be terminated.

13.  The Official Solicitor concluded that with all these unfinished businesses, the chance for the petitioner to abscond is low.  The Official Solicitor therefore has no objection to the petitioner’s application.  

Discussion

14.  To begin with, contrary to what the petitioner says, the relocation trial is not over yet.  The petitioner has applied for leave to appeal and this is due to be dealt with.

15.  In addition to what I have mentioned in paragraph 7 above, the petitioner said the Relocation Judgment has had a devastating impact on him.  He will soon have no income.  He complained that in spite of the facts that he has the sole custody of the children, the children’s clear wishes and there is no physical access for the respondent, they are confined and are not even allowed to go home on holiday, unless with leave from the court.  The children’s wishes to relocate to Denmark have been totally ignored by the Official Solicitor, the judge and their own mother.  Their resentment towards their mother, the judge, their solicitor (ie the Official Solicitor) and Hong Kong itself is unavoidable.  He also mentioned that he does not expect that he can return to fly the cargo roster again as he has to prioritise L and B’s well-being.

16.  I agree with the respondent that what the petitioner said in his application for leave to appeal is quite alarming.  During argument, I asked the petitioner how he could persuade the court that he would return the children to Hong Kong after the summer vacation.  He referred to what he did last year.  Upon being so directed by the court, he swiftly arranged their return within the time frame.  He also expressed his understanding that Denmark is a state party of the 1980 Hague Convention.  Apart from the usual undertaking from him to return the children, he is willing to acknowledge that Hong Kong is the children’s habitual residence and to pay a security of $100,000 into court within 14 days.  He produced an admission letter from an international school in Hong Kong and proof of payment of deposit to show that L is due to commence his secondary school in Hong Kong in this coming September.

17.  Mr Chiu, acting on behalf of the Official Solicitor, confirmed that the Official Solicitor is aware of what the petitioner said in his grounds of appeal when the Note was prepared.  He agreed that, from what the petitioner said, there is a risk of flight but, for the reasons set out in the Note, the Official Solicitor’s stance remains unchanged.  I take what he means is that after having considered the grounds of appeal together with all the matters before him, the Official Solicitor still has come to a conclusion that the risk of flight is remote and he has no objection to the application.

18.  I must say whether or not to allow the children to have their summer vacation out of Hong Kong is not an easy decision to make.  Ultimately, the question is to be resolved in accordance with the principles set out in section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13).  In short, the law enjoins the court shall regard the best interests of the child as the first and paramount consideration.  I believe the petitioner was very upset and emotional when he prepared his grounds of appeal.  In the present case, the risk of flight is certainly one of the factors, or even a significant one, that the court needs to consider in the balancing exercise.  In my view, on the one hand, the risk is certainly not so remote (as the Official Solicitor has put it) that the court may disregard it entirely but on the other, it is not as high as the respondent might have wish to put it.  In coming to this conclusion, I have taken into consideration the facts that there are still outstanding matters in the legal proceedings, that he complied with the order to return last year, that he has committed a school place for L, and that he is willing to pay a sum of $100,000 as security.

19.  The children should not be penalized for the faults of their father.  They were allowed to enjoy their time during the summer in Denmark in the past years.  It is simply too much a suffering for them if they are to stay in Hong Kong this year with not much to do during the summer.  Given the present state of the matter it is virtually unrealistic for the respondent to think of making use of the summer vacation to reconnect with the children.

20.  Considering all the factors in a round, on balance, I come to the view that it is to the best interest of L and B that they are allowed to leave Hong Kong for the summer. L’s new school has a Summer Bridging Course from 20 August to 31 August 2018 so he has to be back to Hong Kong before 20 August 2018.  I will give an order that L may leave Hong Kong from 1 July 2018 to 19 August 2018.  As for B, he may leave Hong Kong from 1 July 2018 to 31 August 2018.   

Orders

21.  For the above reasons, I give the following orders:

1.  The Order dated 18 May 2017 be varied to the extent that:

(i) Leave for the petitioner to remove the child of the family “L” out of the jurisdiction of Hong Kong from 1 July 2018 to 19 August 2018 for the purpose of holidays and/or family visits in Denmark;

(ii) The petitioner shall return the child of the family “L” to Hong Kong on or before 19 August 2018;

(iii) Leave for the petitioner to remove the child of the family “B” out of the jurisdiction of Hong Kong from 1 July 2018 to 31 August 2018 for the purpose of holidays and/or family visits in Denmark;

(iv) The petitioner shall return the child of the family “B” to Hong Kong on or before 31 August 2018;

2.  Penal notice be endorsed on the order. Personal service of the order on the parties be dispensed with.

3.  Costs are reserved.

22.  I would request the Official Solicitor to draw up, file and serve this order.

23.  The above orders are given –

(1)  upon the petitioner’s usual undertaking to return the children of the family and his undertaking that the children will stay mainly in the addresses of the petitioner’s parents as set out in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit dated 30 April 2018;

(2)  upon the petitioner’s acknowledgment that the children of the family L and B’s habitual residence is Hong Kong for the purpose of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction at The Hague on 25 October 1980; and

(3)  upon the payment of $100,000 into court by the petitioner within 14 days of this order as security for the return of the children of the family in accordance with the order.

24.  The above paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) should form part of the order given under this Judgment.  In addition, the petitioner should file a separate undertaking to return within 14 days.

 (I. Wong)
 District Judge

Mr JTMW, the petitioner, appeared in person

Ms NAV, the respondent, appeared in person

Mr Chiu, solicitor, appeared for the Official Solicitor

[2018] HKFC 51-EN-2018-04-16

JRMW v. NAV

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