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Civil Action2019

DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LTD v. EXCELLENT ACCOUNTING AND SECRETARIAL LTD AND ANOTHER

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Files (3)

[2025] HKDC 877-CH-2025-05-23

星展銀行(香港)有限公司 對 卓能會計及秘書有限公司及另一人

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DCCJ 3085/2019

[2025] HKDC 877

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2019年第3085號

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原告人DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITED 
 (星展銀行(香港)有限公司) 
 及 
第一被告人EXCELLENT ACCOUNTING AND SECRETARIAL LIMITED 
 (卓能會計及秘書有限公司) 
第二被告人LO HOI YAN HELEN(盧愷欣) 

(原訴訟)

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原告人LO HOI YAN HELEN(盧愷欣) 
 及 
第一被告人DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITED 
 (星展銀行(香港)有限公司) 
第二被告人YIM CHUN WAI(嚴俊偉) 

(反申索)

------------------------------------

主審法官: 區域法院暫委法官汪祖耀以書面方式處理
第二被告人(反申索)書面陳詞日期: 2025年3月10日
原告人(反申索)書面陳詞日期: 2025年4月9日
判決書日期: 2025年5月23日

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判決書

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前言

1.  本案經審訊後,本席於2024年12月27日頒下判案書,原告人(反申索)(下稱「原告人」) 獲判勝訴。根據本席判決,第二被告人(反申索)(下稱「第二被告人」) 須就原告人根據法庭於2023年1月19日作出的判決須賠償本案的原申索原告人,即星展銀行(香港)有限公司之金額作出彌償。本案的相關事實及本席判決的原因已詳列於上述判案書之中,本席不在此重複。

2.  第二被告人於2025年1月23日發出傳票(「該傳票」),就本席上述於2024年12月27日所頒下的判決申請上訴許可。

3.  法庭就該傳票於2025年2月27日作出了以下指示:

(1)  第二被告人於2025年1月23日存檔的上訴許可傳票申請(“該傳票” )將由區域法院暫委法官汪祖耀以書面形式處理;

(2)  第二被告人須於2025年 3月11日或之前向法庭呈交及送達予原告人其書面陳詞及案例典據列表(如有案例典據列表的話);

(3)  原告人須於2025年3月25日或之前向法庭呈交及送達予第二被告人其書面陳詞及案例典據列表(如有案例典據列表的話);

(4)  第二被告人須於2025年4月1日或之前向法庭呈交及送達予原告人其書面回應陳詞(如有的話)及補充案例典據列表(如有補充案例典據列表的話);

(5)  除非法庭另有命令,訴訟各方不能呈交進一步的書面陳詞;

(6)  如法庭認為有需要澄清所呈交之書面陳詞,將於徵詢訴訟各方日誌後另定日期舉行聆訊;

(7)  如毋需要舉行上述聆訊,法庭將於2025年4月22日下午4 時30分於香港灣仔政府大樓區域法院12字樓第45號法庭頒下書面判決。

4.  雙方其後存檔了其書面陳詞。期間,由於第二被告人申請法律援助,法庭因此押後了就該傳票作出判決的日期。

適用的法律原則

上訴許可申請

5.  根據《區域法院條例》(第336章)第63(1)條:

「除第(3)款另有規定外,在有法官或上訴法庭許可的情況下,可就法官在任何民事訟案或事宜中作出的每項判決、命令或決定,向上訴法庭提出上訴。」

6.  就上訴許可申請而言,《區域法院規則》(第336H章)第58號命令第2條規定:

「(4) 上訴許可的申請必須在下述限期屆滿前,向法官或(如屬 根據第(2)款提出的上訴)向聆案官提出 –

…

(b) (如屬針對非正審判決、命令或決定以外的判決、命令或決定的上訴)由有關判決、命令或決定的日期起計28天;

…

(10) 區域法院或上訴法庭可於任何時間將提出要求批予上訴許可的申請時限延展,即使提出要求批予上訴許可的申請時限已屆滿亦然。」

7.  另外,根據《區域法院條例》第63A(2)條:

「(2) 聆訊有關上訴許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭除非信納—

(a) 有關上訴有合理機會得直;或

(b) 有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,

否則不得批予上訴許可。」

8.  於SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125,第17段,上訴庭指出:

「第63A(2)(a)條中的『有合理機會得直』,是指上訴得直的機會必須為『合理』,擬提出的上訴不能是『毫無理據』的,但無須達致『相當可能』得直。」

9.  於莊裕安 對 安達人壽保險有限公司及另一人[2022] HKCA 1593,第17段,上訴庭指出:

「上訴不是就案件進行重新審訊。上訴機制的用意是要求上訴人應該針對原審法官的判案書,指出哪些地方犯錯,和扼要地提出是根據甚麼理由指稱原審法官犯錯。若上訴的理據只是再次提出及重覆曾經提出而被原審法官否決的論點,而沒有針對原審法官否決的理由提出反駁的理據,這些理據並不能被視為有效的上訴理據:見李智慧 及 昆士蘭保險(香港)有限公司[2021] HKCA 984第11段。」

10.  在秦錦釗 對 香港特別行政區[2018] HKCA 167一案,上訴法庭法官關淑馨(當時官階)在第8段指出:

「上訴人對上訴法庭重新論述在下級法庭提出過的論點,是沒有意義的,這也不是上訴機制的用意。在上訴通知書所載的上訴理由,應該針對原審法官的判案書,指出哪些地方犯錯,和扼要地提出是根據甚麼理由指稱原審法官犯錯。曾經提出而被原審法官否決的論點,在上訴時只是再次提出,沒有針對原審法官否決的理由提出反駁的理據,是沒有作用的。」

11.  根據確立已久的基本原則,上訴法庭不會輕易干預或推翻原審法官有關事實方面的裁斷,包括對證人誠信及證據是否可信的評估,擬上訴一方必須顯示原審法官的事實裁斷有明顯錯誤,包括原審法官忽略考慮關鍵性的證據、誤解證據、作出沒有證據支持的事實裁定、或作出任何一位法官在理性判斷下都不可能作出的裁斷。這是十分高的門檻,上訴人不可以單單因為法官不接納他的證據或說法,便指裁決是明顯錯誤的:China Gold Finance Ltd v CIL Holdings Ltd and others, CACV 11/2015,2015年11月27日的判案書第11至20段;及鄧 對 陳[2021] HKCA 1659第22段。

新證據申請

12.  倘若第二被告人欲於上訴程序中提出新的證據, 他必須符合Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489訂立的下述三項條件:

(i)  申請人雖然盡了合理努力,仍然未能取得有關的證據在原審時引用;

(ii)  如果採納有關證據,對案件的結果會有重要影響,雖然不一定是決定性的影響;及

(iii)  有關證據須是表面上可信,雖然不一定是無可置疑的。

討論

13.  第二被告人於該傳票中,指本席錯誤相信原告人是一個可信的人。他亦指他從沒收到原告人更改索償所提供給法庭的證據和供詞。另外,他亦指他在開審前申請用中文聆訊,但過程中卻夾雜了英文詞語。

14.  第二被告人指判案書第 40-41 段提及有關原告人曾經說沒簽過任何有關的銀行文件,期後卻改稱忘記簽過什麼文件,明顯並不可信。另外,她起初說對星展銀行的有關貸款並不知情,但後來又改說為知情。第二被告人續指原告人在其陳述中稱從未挪用過有關貸款,但在盤問下卻承認曾經轉帳給家人及自己。因此,第二被告人指原告人實不可信。

15.  經考慮第二被告人的以上陳詞,本席認為他的論點已在審訊中提出及已被法庭考慮,第二被告人只是重新提出這些論點,並沒有指出本席如何明顯犯錯。因此,本席並不接納上述論點為有效的上訴理由。

16.  第二被告人亦指原告人隱瞞在第一筆貸款後曾多次向星展銀行申請加大貸款額,以及透過他本人向私人及其他機構集資。但此說法只是第二被告人現在才提出的指稱,並沒有任何證據支持。即使第二被告人現欲提出申請呈上新證據,他亦沒有提出符合上述有關提出新證據的法律原則的任何論點,包括為何有關證據未能於審訊期間呈上法庭,因此本席亦不會批准。

17.  本席亦不接納第二被告人所提出有關沒有收到有關二人透過短訊對話及有關戶口紀錄的證據,及於審訊中曾用上英文詞語的說法。

18.  首先,第二被告人並沒有於審訊中提出上述所聲稱的問題,而他亦沒有於2024年5月16日的審前覆核聆訊中指出他沒有收到索償的有關證據。事實上,根據法庭於2024年5月16日作出的命令,雙方亦擬備了審訊文件,其中已包括一切有關本案的文件證據。因此,本席認為第二被告人的說法並不成立。

19.  另外,有關審訊中曾用上英文詞語的說法亦不能成立。審訊中整體上是以中文進行,倘若過程中曾提出一些英文詞語,第二被告人並沒有清楚指出有關部份如何導致審訊不公平,亦沒有於審訊進行期間提出反對或要求澄清。因此,本席亦不接納這點。

20.  第二被告人於其支持該傳票的誓詞中,進一步提出他曾透過律師行處理此案,但直至2023年,因他本人在經濟上再沒法負擔訴訟費用,所以停止聘請律師。期間,他在通訊上曾經出現混亂,導致他缺席了一次的聆訊。就此而言,本席認為這並不構成上訴理由。首先,第二被告人是否聘請律師對本席所作之判決並沒有任何影響。另外,事實上第二被告人亦有出席本案審訊,因此本席認為他曾經缺席某一次的聆訊並沒有對本席的判決有任何影響。

判決

21.  基於上述原因,本席認為第二被告人並沒有提出有效的上訴理由,令法庭認為有關上訴有合理機會得直,或是有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊。

22.  因此,本席撤銷該傳票,並命令第二被告人須支付原告人有關該傳票的訟費,若雙方未能協定金額,則由法庭評定。

  ( 汪祖耀 )
區域法院暫委法官

原告人(反申索):沒有律師代表,並親自行事

第二被告人(反申索):沒有律師代表,並親自行事

[2024] HKDC 2153-EN-2024-12-27

DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LTD v. EXCELLENT ACCOUNTING AND SECRETARIAL LTD AND ANOTHER

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DCCJ 3085/2019

[2024] HKDC 2153

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 3085 OF 2019

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BETWEEN

 DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITED Plaintiff
 (星展銀行 (香港) 有限公司) 
 and 
 EXCELLENT ACCOUNTING AND SECRETARIAL LIMITED1st Defendant
 (卓能會計及秘書有限公司) 
 LO HOI YAN HELEN(盧愷欣)2nd Defendant

(By original action)

AND BETWEEN

 LO HOI YAN HELEN(盧愷欣)Plaintiff
 and 
 DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITED1st Defendant
 (星展銀行 (香港) 有限公司) 
 YIM CHUN WAI(嚴俊偉)2nd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

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Before: Deputy District Judge Joseph Vaughan in Court
Date of Hearing: 4 July 2024
Date of Judgment: 27 December 2024

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JUDGMENT

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Introduction

1.  By the Original Action herein, DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (“the Bank”) claimed against Excellent Accounting and Secretarial Limited (“EAS”) as the 1st Defendant, and Lo Hoi Yan Helen (“Lo”) as the 2nd Defendant for the outstanding overdraft loan and instalment loan together with interest thereon in the total sum of HK$2,452,091.90 under a facility letter dated 13 July 2017 (“Facility Letter”) and a General Commercial Agreement dated 21 July 2017[1].

2.  EAS did not file any notice of intention to defend, as a result of which the Bank obtained default judgment against EAS on 31 July 2019.

3.  The claim by the Bank against Lo was based on a Guarantee and Indemnity dated 21 July 2017 (“the Guarantee”) executed by her as security for the indebtedness of EAS together with other security or supporting documents purportedly signed by her as follows (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Security Documents”):

(1)  Mandate of EAS dated 21 July 2017 signed by Lo on behalf of EAS;

(2)  General Commercial Agreement dated 21 July 2017 signed by Lo on behalf of EAS;

(3)  The Guarantee;

(4)  Notice (to individual third party security provider) dated 21 July 2017;

(5)  Extract of board minutes of EAS dated 21 July 2017; and

(6)  2 sets of “HKMC SME Financing Guarantee Scheme Application Form” signed by Lo on behalf of EAS.

4.  It is Lo’s pleaded case and part of her defence against the claim by the Bank that the Security Documents were not signed by her and her signatures on the same were forged[2]. On 19 January 2023, after hearing the parties, Deputy District Judge Phillis Loh (as she then was) gave summary judgment against Lo for the sum of $2,445,692.11 outstanding under the aforesaid loan facilities granted to EAS, together with interest (“the Judgment Sum against Lo”). It would appear that at that stage, Lo has withdrawn her allegation of forgery of her signatures on the Security Documents. Her position concerning her purported signatures on the Security Documents was that although the purported signatures did look like hers, she has no recollection of the circumstances which necessitated her to sign on them.

5.  Against this backdrop, this is now the trial of Lo’s counterclaim against Yim Chun Wai (“Yim”), the 2nd Defendant by her counterclaim for (i) an order that Yim shall indemnify her of any sum found to be payable by her to the Bank; and (ii) damages for misrepresentation so as to extinguish any sum that Lo is found due to the Bank under the Security Documents.

Lo’s case against Yim

6.  It is Lo’s case that in about January 2016, she, who has been working in the marketing industry, became acquainted with Yim through an online networking platform and they started a romantic relationship shortly thereafter. According to Lo, she was given to understand that Yim was an experienced businessman with strong business connections.

7.  There is no dispute that EAS was incorporated in Hong Kong in November 2008, carrying on investment consultation business at that time. In around late 2016, one Paul Fong Si Chun (“Paul”), who used to be a director of EAS, injected HK$500,000 into EAS and invited Yim and one Michael Yuen (“Michael”) to manage the business. Paul also introduced his girlfriend, one Louisa Maria Lee, also known as Donna (“Donna”) to act as the sole director of EAS such that Yim and Michael could provide guidance to her in running the business of EAS.

8.  It is Lo’s case that Yim and Michael gradually became discontented with the performance of Donna in running the business, and often complained about her. In about May 2017, Yim proposed that a new director of his choice, namely Lo, should be appointed as the sole director instead. According to Lo, this proposal was accepted by Paul.

9.  Lo further pleaded[3] that in fact, from around the end of 2016 when Yim started to get involved in the operation of the business, until June 2018, Yim has been the de facto controller and directing mind behind the operation of the business of EAS. During the time, Yim had wanted to procure EAS to apply for a bank loan from the Bank. The loan was intended to be used to extend the business of EAS in mainland, China, and to facilitate its property investments in Hong Kong. Yim also wanted to start a restaurant business to be run by another company, which later transpired to be one Boil Limited, running a restaurant by the name of The Boil Restaurant & Bar.

10.  It is Lo’s case that for the purpose of obtaining the bank loan, she was asked to sign on an account opening letter and a consent form related to sharing of credit data of EAS. Further, Lo’s case is that in or about May 2017, Yim made the following representations to her (“the Representations”):

(1)  Yim shall procure EAS and/or cause funds to be injected into EAS to repay the loan in full;

(2)  Lo shall not be made as a party in her personal capacity to any of the security documents;

(3)  She shall not be personally liable for any default in repayment of the loan. In case of default, EAS would be wound up and the Bank would only recover the debt from the government as guarantor (apparently referring to the SME Financing Guarantee Scheme launched by The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited since 2011).

11.  Lo also says that in the course of making the Representations to her, Yim had assured her and agreed that he would be liable for any sum due under the loan and that he would indemnify her of the same (“the Indemnity Agreement”). As a result of the Representations and the Indemnity Agreement, Lo agreed to act as Yim’s nominee director of EAS and would act according to Yim’s wishes. If she had signed any of the Security Documents, it was only as a result of the Indemnity Agreement and the Representations made to her.

Yim’s case in defence of Lo’s counterclaim

12.  It is Yim’s pleaded case that he in fact came to know Lo for a number of years before they started a romantic relationship in about 2015. They eventually broke up in 2019. During the time, Yim was also in a relationship with one Hilda Cheng (“Hilda”) who was a Vice-President of the Bank. Yim and Hilda were cohabitees with a daughter.

13.  It is Yim’s case that in 2015, Lo mentioned to him that she wanted to do some business apart from her employed work. Meanwhile, Yim knew from Paul that Donna was also interested in doing some business. It was then through his introduction that Lo and Donna came together to operate the business of EAS. As for Michael, he was Yim’s friend who agreed to work for Lo and Donna as a freelance accountant for the company.

14.  Around a year since Lo and Donna started the business, Michael left the company for the reason that there had been constant quarrels between the three of them. Since then, EAS carried on marketing business instead of providing accounting and secretarial service.

15.  In about mid-2017, Lo mentioned to Yim that she intended to procure EAS to apply for a loan as she planned to open an office in mainland China. She then consulted Hilda who referred the application to the Bank. Yim’s case is that he was not involved in the process and he did not make the Representations to Lo. Further, the company named Boil Limited and the restaurant business of that company were unrelated to the loan.

16.  It is Yim’s case that it was Lo and Donna who had been running the business. Lo therefore has knowledge of the corporate structure, financial position and operation of EAS all along.

17.  Notwithstanding his pleaded case set out above, by the Order of Master Rita So dated 29 December 2020, Yim has, through his then solicitors confirmed with the court that he has elected not to adduce any evidence as to facts as well as expert evidence. Yim has not filed any witness statement in this case.

18.  Further, by the Order of Master Maurice Lam dated 12 June 2023, Yim had obtained leave to file and serve his Amended Defence to Counterclaim within 28 days from service of Lo’s Amended Defence and Counterclaim. However, Yim did not do so, and had during the case management hearing before Master Maurice Lam on 22 September 2023 confirmed with the court he had elected not to amend his defence to the counterclaim by Lo.

19.  In the circumstances, at the trial before me, although Yim was present, he did not testify, nor did he seek leave to call any other witness. In any event, I would not have allowed such an application.

The applicable legal principles

20.  Firstly, the law of misrepresentation is trite. The important considerations have been summarised by Au-Yeung J in Re Allan Yap, HCB 7289 of 2019, 7 August 2020; [2020] HKCFI 1946 at paragraph 11:

“11. The core elements of the law of misrepresentation are as follows:

(1) Generally, an actionable misrepresentation requires a false statement of past or present fact, as distinct from a statement of opinion or intention; though a statement of opinion/intention or as to the future may entail an implied statement of fact.

(2) Where there is a dispute as to the meaning conveyed, the Court interprets the relevant words or conduct. The approach is objective, viewing the communication from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the representee. The test is whether: (i) the words or conduct in fact led the representee to believe the alleged false fact; and (ii) it was reasonable for the representee to believe it from the words or conduct as he perceived them. In applying the test, the characteristics of the representee, including level of sophistication, are taken into account.

(3) Where an implied representation is alleged, the question is what a reasonable person would have inferred was being impliedly represented by the representor’s words and conduct in their context.

(4) The statement must have the character of one upon which the representee was intended and entitled to rely.

(5) The representee must have in fact relied on the statement; though this can sometimes be inferred. The representation need not be the only or main cause of the decision to contract. It is generally sufficient that it be a cause (in other words, a material inducement).

See Joytex Development Ltd v Super Homes Ltd, HCA 18/2012 (unreported, 10 October 2018), §77, DHCJ Stock SC; Misrepresentation Ordinance (Cap 284), section 2;Unconscionable Contracts Ordinance (Cap 458), section 5.”

21.  As for a duty to indemnify, this may arise from contract, expressed or implied, but may also arise from the relation between the parties in law or in equity – see Super Cruise Ltd v Cosimo Borrelli and Others, HCA 1460 of 2013, 10 August 2018; [2018] HKCFI 1854 where DHCJ Keith Yeung SC (as he then was) at paragraph 39 referred to Eastern Shipping Co v Quah Beng Kee [1924] AC 177 (HL) where Lord Wrenbury stated at pp.182-183:

“A right to indemnity generally arises from contract express or implied, but it is not confined to cases of contract. A right to indemnity exists where the relation between the parties is such that either in law or in equity there is an obligation upon the one party to indemnify the other. There are, for instance, cases in which the state of circumstances is such that the law attaches a legal or equitable duty to indemnify arising from an assumed promise by a person to do that which, under the circumstances, he ought to do. The right to indemnity need not arise by contract; it may (to give other instances) arise by statute; it may arise upon the notion of a request made under circumstances from which the law implies that the common intention is that the party requested shall be indemnified by the party requesting him; it may arise (to use Lord Eldon's words in Waring v. Ward 7 Ves. 332, 336; a case of vendor and purchaser) in cases in which the Court will ‘independent of contract raise upon his (the purchaser’s) conscience an obligation to indemnify the vendor against the personal obligation’ of the vendor.”

The Court’s approach to evidence of witnesses

22.  The Court's approach to considering the evidence given by witnesses can be found in Hui Cheung Fai & Anor v Daiwa Development Limited and Others, HCA 1734 of 2009, 8 April 2014, in which DHCJ Eugene Fung SC said:

"77. Generally speaking, contemporaneous written documents and documents which came into existence before the problems in question emerged are of the greatest importance in assessing credibility: Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403 at 431 (Lord Pearce) ......

78. In deciding whether to accept a witness' account, importance should also be attached to the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of an event having happened, or the apparent logic of events: eg Lam Rogerio Sou Fung v Tan Soon Gin George (unreported, HCA 2576/2005, 5 May 2011) §39 (Chu J).

79. In determining a witness' credibility, I have also attached importance to the consistency of the witness' evidence with undisputed or indisputable evidence, and the internal consistency of the witness' evidence. The latter type of consistency is often tested by a comparison between the witness' oral testimony and his or her witness statement.

80. I have cautioned myself against the dangers of too readily drawing conclusions about truthfulness and reliability solely or mainly from the appearance of witnesses (Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336 at §§36-37 (Bokhary PJ)), or from the assessment of the witnesses' character (Esquire (Electronics) Ltd v HSBC [2007] 3 HKLRD 439 at §135 (Stock JA))."

23.  In Lee Fu Wing and Another v Yan Paul Po Ting and Another [2009] 5 HKLRD 513, DHCJ Au (as he then was) summarised the principles as follows:

"53. In assessing the credibility of a party's case on a particular issue, I accept the submissions of [counsel] that the Court should take into considerations the following:

(1) Whether the party's case is inherently plausible or implausible.

(2) Whether the party's case is, in a material way, contradicted by other evidence (documentary or otherwise) which is undisputed or indisputable.

(3) Where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has given evidence using the above tests. This is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility.

(4) The demeanour of the witnesses."

24.  The principles set out in Northampton Borough Council v Cardoza and others [2019] EWHC 26 (Ch) were cited and applied by DHCJ Paul Lam SC in Taishin International Bank Co Ltd v QFI Ltd[2020] HKCFI 2116 (see paragraph 13).

25.  In addition to demeanour, the Court should also place weight on the contemporaneous documents and inherent probabilities: Mansion Place Ltd v Fox Industrial Services Ltd (No 2) (2021) 199 ConLR 177 at paragraph 55.

26.  I shall bear in mind the above principles when considering the evidence.

Lo’s evidence

27.  Lo was the only witness who gave evidence during the trial. She adopted her case as set out above. She told the court that when their courtship started, Yim always invited her to spend time in a club in Wanchai, and she was introduced to Hilda during such time. As soon as she realised that Hilda was in a relationship with Yim, Lo became infuriated, but Yim comforted her by saying that he would end the relationship with Hilda but that would take some years, because of their daughter.

28.  Lo said it was through Yim that she came to know Paul and his girlfriend Donna, and Michael during social gatherings at the club in Wanchai.

29.  Yim told Lo that he had injected money into EAS, and Paul would join EAS if Donna would be its director. Eventually, Donna was appointed as director of EAS on 29 June 2015. She would be responsible for administrative work such as filling up forms to be submitted to the Companies Registry and other paper work. Lo said Donna received a monthly salary of HK$15,000 to HK$20,000 at that time.

30.  Subsequently, she realised that Yim was dissatisfied with Donna’s performance in running the business. In around May 2017, Yim indicated to Lo that a new director of his choice should be appointed in place of Donna such that he could have more control over EAS, and asked if Lo was interested in joining as a director. She was told she did not need to be responsible for the operation of the company or spend much time on its business. As she was interested in learning how to do business, and wanted broaden her network, Lo accepted the invitation and became the director of EAS on 7 July 2017 whereas Donna ceased to be a director shortly thereafter on 14 July 2017.

31.  Lo said she spent less than a day each week on the business of EAS, and her duties were trivial in nature, which included simple bookkeeping and office administration. She never received any remuneration for her directorship.

32.  Although she was a director, she never made any commercial decision for EAS, nor was she invited to attend any meetings concerning its business, whereas Yim and Michael would regularly meet to discuss the business of the company and would make commercial decisions.

33.  Lo said after she became the director of EAS, Yim obtained control of the company and did what he planned in order to expand his business. He told Lo that he wanted to apply for a small and medium sized enterprises (“SME”) loan from the Bank and Hilda would provide assistance all along so that the loan application could be proceeded with and approved expeditiously. For this purpose, she recalled that she had signed an account opening letter and a consent form for sharing customer credit data on behalf of EAS, applying also the company chop of EAS.

34.  It was during that time that Yim made the Representations to her and also made the Indemnity Agreement with her, assuring her that she would not be liable for repaying any of the loans to be extended by the Bank to EAS in case of default. According to her, however, when the Guarantee was allegedly made, she had no idea about the material details of the loan, including the size of the same, the repayment schedule, the interest payable and whether the guarantee was actually required by the Bank. She said she had reposed absolute trust on Yim at that time as he was her boyfriend, and he had solid, successful business and investment experience with a wide social network.

35.  She said after signing the forms, apart from subsequent repayment records and bank reminders for repayment, neither Yim, Michael nor Paul had mentioned anything about the SME loan to her.

36.  Since about September 2017, as mentioned above, Yim operated the restaurant named The Boil Restaurant & Bar through another company, and enlisted the help of Lo as well. Although the two broke up by the end of December 2017, Lo had continued to assist in the restaurant business as well as the business of EAS.

37.  Lo said subsequently in about April 2018, Yim wanted to procure EAS to apply for further loans to finance the operation of the restaurant business. She was asked to liaise with two bankers referred by Hilda. During the course of the communicating with the bankers, one of them told Lo that it was common practice that an applicant must have a director or shareholder for at least 3 years. Lo was surprised at this information, and wondered how the subject loan from the Bank was granted originally, as she was only appointed as a director of EAS at the material time shortly before the loan was applied for. She passed on this information by email to Hilda, but when Yim found out about this, he blamed Lo for sending the email to Hilda, and asserted that Lo had in fact been a director or shareholder for 3 years at the material time. This caused Lo to suspect there was something wrong about the loan with the Bank. She thus instructed her then solicitors to seek copies of all relevant documents from the Bank.

38.  According to Lo, it was not until she received a letter from the Bank’s solicitors dated 8 November 2018 that she realised her purported signatures appeared on the Security Documents, including the Guarantee. She said she had never been explained the contents of the documents. In particular, she highlighted the fact that in the Confirmation and Acknowledgement dated 21 July 2017 allegedly signed by her, judging from the face of the document, she had not indicated as to whether she decided to seek legal advice as set out in the attached Notice (to individual third party security provider) dated 21 July 2017 purportedly signed by her.

39.  In her evidence, worse still was the fact she also discovered upon further company searches that her signatures on the Amended Annual Returns of EAS for the years 2014 to 2017 were not hers. To her surprise, she was recorded as a shareholder of EAS since 2014 holding 7,000 shares out of 10,000, whereas she never in fact held any shares in the company. She then reported the matter to the police.

40.  In her cross-examination, she accepted that based on handwriting expert evidence adduced by the Bank in these proceedings, the signatures on the Security Documents and the Guarantee were hers, but she could not recall the exact circumstances under which her signatures came onto the documents. In any event, she said she had never personally used any part of the SME loan obtained from the Bank. She also said that she only knew that the loan was applied for and was approved, but she was not privy to the details of the application.

41.  Having considered Lo’s evidence, I find her to be a reliable witness. She was candid when answering questions, and even accepted that the signatures on the Security Documents, including the Guarantee, could have been hers in light of the handwriting expert evidence. However, she further explained that she could not recall the circumstances under which the documents were signed. I do not find anything in her evidence that could be said to be inherently improbable.

42.  I accept the evidence of Lo that she could not have been a shareholder of EAS since 2014 as recorded, as on her evidence, she had not even come to be acquainted with Yim. Her evidence, which I accept, is that she only started to know Yim on the online social platform in about January 2016. This certainly casts considerable doubt on the authenticity of the aforesaid Amended Annual Returns of EAS, at least with regard to the records of her being a shareholder.

43.  I also accept that the Representations had been made to her by Yim, and that Yim and Lo had made the Indemnity Agreement orally in circumstances as described by her.

Other documentary evidence

44.  From the contemporary records of online mobile “Whatsapp” messages passed between Lo and Yim from April 2017 to June 2018, it can be discerned that there had been a common intention between the two of them that Yim was the one who had been in control of the business of EAS, whilst using the name of Lo as the facet, including signing on loan documents. Yim has not questioned the correctness of such records when he was cross-examining Lo. I do not find anything that would cast doubt on the reliability of such records.

45.  It would also appear from such records, as well as accounts personally kept and produced by Lo, that Yim is personally indebted to her for various items (e.g. payments made by Lo on his behalf in respect of the restaurant business, and payments made to cover the instalment loan for a private car) totalling a sum over HK$1 million. These have not been disputed when Yim cross-examined Lo. In any event, these items do not form part of Lo’s counterclaim here.

Conclusion

46.  As I have accepted the evidence of Lo, it would still fall on the court to decide whether her evidence would lead to liability in terms of damages for misrepresentation, or arising out of a duty to indemnify.

47.  In light of the principles concerning the law of misrepresentation set out in paragraph 20 above, I am of the view that the Representations given by Yim constituted statements of intention, rather than facts (i.e. that he shall cause funds to be injected into EAS to repay the loans, and that Lo shall not be made a party to the security documents or be liable for any outstanding loans owed to the Bank in the event of default).

48.  Further, the evidence of Lo, which I have accepted, is that she cannot recall the circumstances under which she had signed the Security Documents including the Guarantee. In such case, there would be a difficulty on her part to establish any reliance on and inducement by the Representations. The court simply has scant evidence in this regard. I do not find that Lo has established a case of misrepresentation against Yim.

49.  However, as I have accepted the evidence of Lo, including her evidence of the Indemnity Agreement, I find that Yim is liable to indemnify her against the sum found due to the Bank under this action. Such a duty to indemnify is a contractual one in the circumstances, but if I were required to rule on whether there existed any such duty in equity, I would also so rule. In my view, the fact that Yim was the ultimate controller of EAS, that Lo was only used as a nominee, and that Yim had made the assurances to Lo with regard to the liability owed to the Bank, would lead one to conclude that the “law implies [in such circumstances] that the common intention is that the party requested shall be indemnified by the party requesting” (see Eastern Shipping Co above, at pp.182-183).

Judgment

50.  In the circumstances and for the reasons given above, I give judgment for Lo against Yim in her counterclaim against him, and adjudge that Yim shall indemnify Lo against the Judgment Sum against Lo and any other amounts due under the Judgment dated 19 January 2023. In this regard, I would highlight to the parties what Deputy High Court Judge Hartmann (as he then was) said in 823 Investment Limited v Richly Bright International Limited, HCA 1452 of 2010, 26 September 2013 at paragraph 25:

“As I see it, therefore, as the law now stands, an indemnified party may seek a remedy in terms of which he is able to call upon his indemnifier to pay an amount on the basis only that he is now himself liable to pay it and wishes it to be paid on his behalf or even paid direct to him. Once the indemnifier has made the payment he is no longer concerned with the matter.”

51.  I also make an order that Yim shall pay the costs of this action to Lo, to be taxed if not agreed.

  ( Joseph Vaughan )
Deputy District Judge

Ms Lo Hoi Yan, Helen, the 2nd Defendant (by original action) and the Plaintiff (by counterclaim), appeared in person

Mr Yim Chun Wai, the 2nd Defendant (by counterclaim), appeared in person



[1]  See Statement of Claim in the Original Action, at paragraphs 12 and 13.

[2]  See paragraph 17 of her Amended Defence and Counterclaim dated 28 June 2023.

[3]  See paragraph 4(f) of her Amended Defence and Counterclaim.

[2023] HKDC 83-EN-2023-01-19

DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LTD v. EXCELLENT ACCOUNTING AND SECRETARIAL LTD AND ANOTHER

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DCCJ 3085/2019

[2023] HKDC 83

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 3085 OF 2019

--------------------

BETWEEN

 DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITEDPlaintiff
 (星展銀行(香港)有限公司) 
 and 
 EXCELLENT ACCOUNTING AND SECRETARIAL LIMITED1st Defendant
 (卓能會計及秘書有限公司) 
 LO HOI YAN HELEN (盧愷欣)2nd Defendant

(By Original Action)

BETWEEN

 LO HOI YAN HELEN (盧愷欣)Plaintiff
 and 
 DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITED1st Defendant
 (星展銀行(香港)有限公司) 
 YIM CHUN WAI (嚴俊偉)2nd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

--------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge Phillis Loh in Chambers (open to public)
Date of Hearing: 2 December 2022
Date of Decision: 19 January 2023

---------------------

DECISION

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1.  By a summons filed on 28 June 2022 (“the Summons”), the plaintiff (“the Bank”) seeks summary judgment against the 2nd defendant (“D2”) under Order 14 of the Rules of the District Court.

2.  D2 opposes this application.

Background

3.  The Bank’s case is simple and straightforward. Its claim against D2 arises out of a written Guarantee and Indemnity dated 21 July 2017 (“the Guarantee”) executed by D2 in her personal capacity in respect of a business loan owed by the 1st defendant (“the Company”) to the Bank.

4.  The Company is a private limited company incorporated in Hong Kong. At all material times, D2 was its sole director and majority shareholder.

5.  Pursuant to a Facility Letter dated 13 July 2017 (“the Facility Letter”) and a General Commercial Agreement dated 21 July 2017, the Bank granted to the Company general banking facilities in the amount of HK$3,000,000 (“the Loan”) (comprising Overdraft up to HK$1,000,000 and Installment Loan of HK$2,000,000).

6.  D2 provided personal security for the Loan by executing the Guarantee in favour of the Bank.

7.  The Company has utilized the Loan and defaulted repayment later on.

8.  On 31 July 2019, Final Judgment was entered for the Bank against the Company in default of defence in respect of outstanding indebtedness as at 9 June 2019 and claimed at HK$2,452,091.09 with interest on (i) HK$1,018,737.24 at the rate of 14.375% per annum; and (ii) HK$1,426,954.87 at the rate of 11.375% per annum from 10 June 2019 to the date of judgment, and thereafter at judgment rate until payment; and costs.

The Law: Order 14 summary judgment

9.  The legal principle on Order 14 summary judgment are trite. The underlying policy of the summary procedure is to prevent a defendant from delaying the plaintiff from obtaining judgment in a case in which the defendant clearly has no defence to the plaintiff's claim: Man Earn Ltd v Wing Ting Fong [1996] 1 HKC 225. It enables plaintiffs in those cases to obtain expeditious summary judgment to avoid unnecessary delay.

10.  Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie sustainable case against the defendant, both procedurally and substantively, the burden will be on the defendant to satisfy the court that there is a triable issue and summary judgment should not be granted against him. See §14/4/1 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023.

11.  The defendant will have to show, with evidence in support, an arguable defence, or that there is some other reason for trial. His affidavit must “condescend upon particulars”, and should, as far as possible, deal specifically with the plaintiff’s claim and affidavit, and state clearly and concisely what the defence is, and what facts are relied on to support it. If the defence relied on is fraud, the affidavit should state the particulars of the fraud. A mere vague general allegation of fraud is useless. See §14/4/4 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023.

12.  The plaintiff has long been permitted to answer the defendant’s evidence. The court is not bound to require documentary evidence from the plaintiff, if by his affidavit in reply he can show that there is no issue to try but if the plaintiff can demonstrate (e.g. by exhibiting contemporary documents) that the evidence of the defendant is not reasonably capable of belief this will prevent leave to defend being given. See §14/4/6 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023.

13.  On the other hand, the court must not embark on a mini trial on affidavits. Unless it is obvious that the defence put forward by the defendant is “frivolous and practically moonshine”, Order 14 ought not to be applied. See §14/4/9 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023.

14.  In order to obtain leave to defend, the defendant must show that there are triable issues, or satisfy the court that he has a “real or bona fide defence” or “a fair probability or reasonable grounds that a bona fide defence exists”. If he makes an allegation, it must be credible or believable in the light of the evidence placed before the court. Whether the defendant’s assertions are believable is a question to be answered not by taking those assertions in isolation but rather by taking them in the context of so much of the background as is either undisputed or beyond reasonable dispute.

15.  In considering whether there are triable issues the court will, of course, not take the alleged defence on its face value but test it against the evidence disclosed in the affidavits including matters such as contemporaneous documents, whether the alleged defence is inconsistent with the defence previously put forward or whether the defence is only recently raised despite opportunity being give to the defendant to respond earlier. See §14/4/9A of Hong Kong Civil Procedures 2023.

16.  In Ng Shou Chun v Hung Chun San [1994] 1 HKC 155, Godfrey J noted it was not appropriate to embark on a mini-trial of the action on affidavit evidence. The court should ask itself the question whether what the defendant says is credible or believable. If so, he must have leave to defend; if not, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgement.

Prima facie case against D2

17.  The Bank has adduced documentary evidence of, inter alia,: the Facility Letter signed by D2 for and on behalf of the Company and in her personal capacity, the Guarantee signed by D2, company documents showing that D2 was the sole director and majority shareholder of the Company, board resolution authorizing the Company to take out the Loan, and D2’s personal bank mortgage documents for proof of her own financial status in support of the Company’s application for the Loan.

18.  It is provided in the Facility Letter that the due execution by D2 of the Guarantee for an unlimited amount shall be a condition precedent for the provision of the Loan by the Bank to the Company.

19.  It is trite that at common law, no attestation is required in order to prove due execution of a deed. See: Champhon Industrial Limited v Hight Projects Industrial Limited (HCMP 3631/1992, 29 December 1992) [para. 2 on p.3] By signing the Facility Letter, the Guarantee and other related documents of the Loan, D2 shall be bound by the terms thereof.

20.  Having read the statement of claim and the affirmations filed by the Bank in support of the Summons, I am satisfied that the Bank has raised a plausible and prima facie sustainable case against D2. I proceed to consider whether D2 has raised any triable issue in respect of the Bank’s claim.

The defences

21.  D2 raises the following defences:

(1)  She never executed the documents in relation to the Loan and the Guarantee, and her signatures were forged;

(2)  She had acted upon the assurances/misrepresentation of one Mr Yim Chun Wai (“Yim”) with whom she had a previous romantic relationship in agreeing to be the director of the Company and signing the bank account opening and related documents in the application by the Company for the Loan from the Bank. Yim was at all material times the boyfriend and cohabitee of Ms Hilda Cheng Wai Ki (“Hilda”), a Vice President of the Bank who handled the Loan; and/or

(3)  Non est factum.

22.  On that basis, D2 lodged a counterclaim:

(1)  against the Bank (as the first defendant by counterclaim) for a declaration that the Guarantee and other security documents vis-à-vis D2 be rescinded and/or set aside and/or unenforceable; and

(2)  against Yim (as the second defendant by counterclaim) for damages for misrepresentation.

23.  In opposing the Bank’s Order 14 application, D2’s counsel argues that there are at least the following triable issues:

(1)  Under what circumstances D2 had, if at all, put her signatures on the Loan documents and the Guarantee;

(2)  Whether D2 had in fact put her signatures on those documents (including the Guarantee) as requested by the Bank in the circumstances as purported thereon (including that they were witnessed by Hilda);

(3)  Whether D2 had in fact put her signatures on the Loan documents knowing what she in fact was signing for (i.e. what she was entering into); and

(4)  Whether Hilda knew of Yim’s assurances/misrepresentation, and if so, whether her knowledge has been imputed to the Bank.

The evidence

24.  The evidence as stated in D2’s witness statement and Affirmation is that she is a corporate communications manager with work experience in the marketing industry for over 20 years. She can read English.

25.  She had previous experience in making bank loan applications such as her personal mortgage loan with HSBC.

26.  D2’s case in defence is that she became a nominee director (of Yim) of the Company upon the request of Yim who had the actual and overwhelming control of the Company. She was not responsible for the Company’s operation and never made any commercial decision. She never received any remuneration for directorship.

27.  She denies that she had any shareholding in the Company and argues that the shareholding documents were forged.

28.  She signed the account opening and related documents for Yim to proceed with the Loan application with the Bank upon Yim’s assurances that he would deal with repayment of the Loan, and that D2 would under no circumstances be personally liable for any default in repayment (ie the misrepresentation by Yim).

29.  Yim further told D2 that Hilda, the girlfriend and cohabitee of Yim at the time, knew about the fact that D2 was merely a nominee director and of his assurances (that under no circumstances would D2 become personally liable for default or repayment of the Loan). Hilda was the Vice President of the Bank who handled the Loan for the Bank, and was a witness to D2’s signatures on the Facility Letter and the Guarantee.

30.  D2 alleges knowledge and involvement of Hilda in relation to the assurances/misrepresentation made by Yim, leading to the execution by D2 of the Loan and Guarantee. She has adduced in evidence exchange of two emails between Hilda and herself: one on 21 May 2018 from Hilda to D2 attaching a copy of the (signed) Facility Letter, and the other one from D2 to Hilda on 29 May 2018 informing the latter of the policy of another bank of a minimum requirement of directorship for 3 years in loan application review.

31.  In light of D2’s defence, as supported by her witness statement dated 7 January 2021, that her signatures in the Loan and the Guarantee documents were all forged, the Bank has in these proceedings adduced (not without difficulty as D2 had at one point refused to cooperate in providing her own control signatures) hand-writing expert evidence in a Forensic Hand-writing Report dated 22 March 2022 from Dr. Daniel Wong In Jea. It was concluded that the signatures on the Guarantee and all other documentary evidence relied upon by the Bank belong to D2.

32.  D2 has elected not to adduce hand-writing expert evidence in rebuttal or challenge of that of Dr. Wong.

33.  In her recent Affirmation dated 5 October 2022 in opposing the Summons, D2 changed her evidence and withdrew the allegations that her signatures were forged. She states, in paragraphs 26 to 30 of her Affirmation, “…One of the reasons being that I have taken repeated looks at those alleged signatures on the relevant documents, and they in fact do somewhat look like my signatures…I do not recall having signed on … anything in similar form (of a guarantee, warning notice, commercial agreement, etc). I can read English and would definitely recall if I did sign so… I definitely would have recollection if I in fact did signed (sic) loan documents of this sort … Till this day, I still do not know how my signatures ended up on those WS 35 Docs. As I explained above, though those signatures do somewhat like my signatures, I cannot recall and do not recall any context or circumstances necessitating me having the need to sign those WS 35 Docs. Suffice it to say that if those were in fact my signatures, I did not have any intention to execute these documents at all.”

34.  After execution of the Loan documents in July 2017, the Company utilised the Loan.

35.  Evidence shows that shortly thereafter during the period between 14 August 2017 and 1 June 2018, the Company had issued 9 cheques, all signed by D2 as the sole signatory for and on behalf of the Company, totalling HK$619,629.05 payable to herself. There was also a cheque dated 18 September 2017 signed by D2 for the sum of HK$150,000 made payable by the Company to one Mansan Food Limited, of which D2 was the sole director and shareholder.

36.  It is also D2’s evidence that she kept a key to the safe in the office of the Company; the safe contained the Company chop together with bank cheques and e-token (ie security device) of the Company’s account with the Bank.

Analysis

37.  D2’s original defence of forged signatures to the Facility Letter and the Guarantee and other Loan documents, later abandoned upon the Bank adducing hand-writing expert evidence (concluding that those signatures belong to her), is a non-starter.

38.  It is a mere allegation devoid of any particulars or evidence in support. This court takes the view that the serious allegation of fraud, so lightly made and withdrawn by D2 subsequently, coupled with the significant change of case without good explanation, impugns her credibility and manifests a lack of bona fide defence.

39.  The arguments of D2 being a nominee director of Yim and the alleged assurances/misrepresentation made by Yim, denied by Yim in the Defence to Counterclaim, are also bare allegations not supported by any evidence of e.g. trust documents, agreements or records of communication such as WhatsApp, WeChat or email. They are on the other hand contradicted by the circumstantial evidence that D2 had access to and custody of the key to the Company safe containing the Company chop, cheque books and bank account security device, and the fact that she had signed cheques as the sole signatory drawing substantial amounts of money from the Company’s bank account and paying herself.

40.  Even if Yim had made those assurances/misrepresentation as alleged by D2, there is no evidence and it is denied by the Bank that he was acting at any time as the agent of the Bank.

41.  Nor is there evidence, as confirmed by counsel for D2 when specifically asked by this court at the hearing, showing that such assurances/ misrepresentation by Yim (even made) had been made known to Hilda and that such knowledge would impute to the Bank.

42.  The two emails exchanged between D2 and Hilda are the only evidence of their direct communication. The fact that Hilda had sent the email to D2 attaching a copy of the signed Facility Letter is inconsistent with D2’s arguments that Hilda had knowledge of the assurances/ misrepresentation allegedly made by Yim to D2, as in which case she would more likely have tried to hide from D2 the Facility Letter which sets out clearly the latter’s personal legal liability upon the Guarantee and Loan.

43.  To conclude, the alleged misrepresentation by Yim is not established by the evidence. D2 is not able to discharge the burden of showing a “real or bona fide defence” based on misrepresentation.

44.  D2 argues that there are other triable issues such as under what circumstances and whether D2 had put her signatures on the Guarantee and Loan documents, and if she had in fact done so, whether she had knowledge as to what she was signing for. D2 also criticizes the Bank’s failure to call Hilda as a witness to deal with D2’s allegations regarding Hilda’s involvement and knowledge of the assurances made by Yim nil discussion between Hilda and D2 about the Loan, and the lack of personal knowledge of the Bank’s witness Yeung Poon Lap Stanley as to the circumstances under which the Guarantee documents were actually signed.

45.  This is a wrong approach and is no more than putting the Bank to proof of the circumstances prior to the signing of the Guarantee and Loan documents and their validity and enforceability.

46.  In arguing that the Bank should call Hilda as a witness, D2 is trying to shift the burden to the Bank of disproving the defences raised by D2 – this is again a wholly wrong approach causing confusion and without assistance to the court.

47.  While it is the burden of the Bank as the plaintiff to prove its case, I am satisfied and have found that the Bank has raised a prima facie case by adducing in evidence the Guarantee and Loan documents signed by D2. In this application for summary judgment, it remains the burden of D2 to condescend to particulars in her defence and to raise triable issues. See Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited v Hui Yan Moon & Another (HCA 1441/2017, 28 February 2019 (paras 47,64,65)

48.  It is not entirely clear what D2’s defence is, when she now retracts the forged signatures allegation, but says that she cannot recall having signed any document looking like a guarantee and does not know how her signatures ended on those documents, and if those were her signatures, she did not have any intention to execute these documents at all (as quoted in paragraph 33 hereinabove).

49.  She denies having knowledge of the details and terms of the Guarantee and the Loan.

50.  The burden of proof lies on D2, but she has not provided particulars as to how and under what circumstances she had/might have put her signatures on the Guarantee and the Loan documents (now that she no longer argues that her signatures were forged) that would constitute vitiating factors at common law such as misrepresentation and non est factum now maintained in her defence.

51.  In considering D2’s arguments on the proposed triable issues that she had no knowledge of the Guarantee and the Loan details nor the intention to sign the Loan documents, reference is made to the legal principles stated in the authorities.

52.  In Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd v Fung Chin Kan (2002) 5 HKCFAR 515 at 533, Litton NPJ acknowledged:

“…..the fundamental principle that, generally speaking, when a person signs a legal document, he or she is bound by the act of signature: As a matter of general law, it is no defence to say that he or she did not understand the contents of a legal document; that person takes the chance of being bound by its terms, as he or she can take the simple precaution of not signing until its contents have been fully explained and understood.”

53.  In Parker v South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416, Mellish LJ stressed that in the absence of a vitiating factor (his Lordship specified fraud in this case), the contention that the person signing does not know its contents is “wholly immaterial”:

“In an ordinary case, where an action is brought on a written agreement which is signed by the defendant, the agreement is proved by proving his signature, and, in the absence of fraud, it is wholly immaterial that he has not read the agreement and does not know its contents.” (421)

54.  In Wing Hang Bank v Liu Kam Ying and Others (HCMP 2519/2001, 6 March 2002), Ma J (as he then was) said at [14]:-

“….the 5th defendant is a man of full age and capacity. There is no reason at all why he should not be bound by the terms of the Guarantee which clearly states his liability on a personal basis. If he did no read the terms, this was negligence on his part and the defence of non est factum is unavailable in these circumstances.”

55.  In the present case, D2 is a woman of full age and capacity; she had over 20 years business work experience in the marketing industry. She can read English.

56.  Applying the abovcited principles to the present case, I come to the conclusion that the defence of non est factum is not open to D2. There is no reason why she should not be bound by the terms of the Guarantee signed by her, which documents state clearly her liability on a personal basis.

57.  Considering the entirety of the pleadings and affirmation evidence, the overall evidence does not in my view provide sufficient facts and particulars to show that there are any triable issues as argued by D2. What she says about misrepresentation by Yim, her lack of intention to sign the Guarantee and lack of knowledge of the terms and legal consequences of signing the Guarantee is not credible or believable.

58.  I am not satisfied that D2 has raised any triable issue or arguable defence. The Bank is entitled to summary judgment sought in the Summons.

The counterclaim

59.  Upon a summary judgment (founded on the Guarantee signed by D2) being entered for the Bank against D2 in the original action, the counterclaim by D2 against the Bank, namely for a declaration that the Guarantee and other security documents vis-à-vis D2 be rescinded and/or set aside and/or unenforceable, must fail.

60.  Counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for D2 both agree that in the event of a summary judgment being granted as sought in the Summons, this Court may strike out the counterclaim by D2 against the Bank.

61.  This court considers it appropriate to exercise the inherent jurisdiction to do so of its own motion under Order 18 rule 19 and the case management powers under Order 1A.

Conclusion

62.  I therefore grant summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff (by original action) against the 2nd defendant (by original action) for the full amount of the plaintiff’s claim, confirmed by the plaintiff’s counsel to be in the sum of HK$2,445,692.11, together with interest on the sums of (i) HK$1,018,737.24 at the rate of 14.375% per annum; and (ii) HK$1,426,954.87 at the rate of 11.375% per annum, both from 10 June 2019 to the date of judgment herein and thereafter at judgment rate until payment.

63.  There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I make a costs order nisi that the 2nd defendant (by original action) do pay the costs of the plaintiff (by original actin) of the summary judgment application, with certificate for counsel, and of the action (including all costs reserved, if any), to be taxed if not agreed.

64.  The counterclaim by the plaintiff (by counterclaim) against the 1st defendant (by counterclaim) be struck out also with a costs order nisi that the plaintiff (by counterclaim) do pay the costs of the counterclaim (including all costs reserved, if any) to the 1st defendant (by counterclaim) with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

65.  I thank counsel for their assistance.

  (Phillis Loh)
Deputy District Judge

Ms Michelle Chan, instructed by Chu & Lau, for the plaintiff

Mr Stony Chan, instructed by Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam, for the 2nd defendant