CHEUNG KA FAI 對 FONG CHOW WO t/a SHING CHEONG RESTAURANT及另三人

DCEC 859/2019

[2024] HKDC 237

香港特別行政區

區域法院

僱員補償案件2019年第859號

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判決書

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1.  在本案中，申請人（“張先生”）根據《僱員補償條例》第9、10及10A條就一宗於2018年4月7日發生的意外申索僱員補償。本席在日期為2023年9月26日的判案書評定第三答辯人（“馮先生”）為張先生的僱主並須支付張先生僱員補償合共港幣157,017元連同利息。除另有說明，本判決書的字詞及表述之含義與本案日期為2023年9月26日的判案書（“該判案書”）使用的字詞及表述的含義相同。

2.  張先生於2023年10月12日發出傳票（“該訟費申請”），申請更改該判案書第52段的暫准訟費命令如下：

(1)  馮先生需支付張先生就本僱傭補償申請向第一答辯人（“方先生”）追討而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(2)  馮先生需支付方先生就本僱傭補償申請作出抗辯而產生之訟費，若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(3)  馮先生需支付張先生就本僱傭補償申請向第四答辯人（“陳先生”）追討而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(4)  馮先生需支付陳先生就本僱傭補償申請作出抗辯而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

以下第 (5) 及 (6) 段為上述第 (3) 及 (4) 段的交替（“交替申請”）：

(5)  方先生需支付張先生就本僱傭補償申請向陳先生追討而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(6)  方先生需支付陳先生就本僱傭補償申請作出抗辯而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定。

3.  方先生和陳先生均反對該訟費申請。

有關法律原則

4.  法庭在考慮是否需要由非成功被告人支付成功被告人訟費（及Bullock Order或Sanderson Order）的時候，首要考慮原告人以交替形式向多個被告人提出訴訟的行為是否合理。（China Everbright Finance Ltd & Anor v Chan Yung & Anor [2006] 4 HKLRD L2，第4段）

5.  在Leung Lai Ha & Anor v Hon Sau Ling & Anor [1993] 1 HKLR 86（第 89 頁），上訴庭引用Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Company [1903] 2 KB 533的判決，指若有關訟費是合理應該產生的，在現代的處理模式中，應避免沿用迂迴的方法，應由不成功的被告人直接支付成功抗辯的被告人的訟費：

“The costs so recovered by the plaintiff are in no true sense damages, but are ordered to be paid by the unsuccessful defendant, on the ground that such an action as I am considering those costs have been reasonably and properly incurred by the plaintiff as between him and the last-named defendant… The modern practice, in order to avoid circuity, has been in such cases, where there has been no jury, to order the unsuccessful defendant to pay directly to the successful defendant his costs.… But of course a judge has jurisdiction to follow the old practice if he thinks fit to do so.”（重點後加）

6.  包華禮法官在Fung Chun Man v Hospital Authority & Anor [2012] 1 HKC 531第6段，指出當一名被告人歸咎其他被告人需要為原告人的損失負上責任，那便是一個典型的 Sanderson/‌Bullock Order的案件，而除了各被告人之間互相指責的情況外，如果不成功的被告人否認責任，原告人面對真正的風險不能從其身上獲得補償，而原告人針對成功被告人的證據並不薄弱，其加入成功被告人及繼續有關訴訟是合理的情況下，法庭處理訟費時亦可考慮 Sanderson/‌Bullock Order：

“The classic case where a Sanderson or Bullock order is made is where the unsuccessful defendant blames the successful defendant and causes the plaintiff either to join the successful defendant or to continue the proceedings against the successful defendant. However, even absent such circumstances, it may be reasonable for the plaintiff to join the successful defendant, in cases where the plaintiff is faced with a denial of liability by the unsuccessful defendant and the real risk that the unsuccessful defendant may either be absolved from liability or unable to satisfy any judgment that may be obtained against him. In such circumstances, if the plaintiff is in possession of evidence that can implicate the successful defendant, evidence that is neither tenuous nor speculative nor far-fetched, it would be reasonable for the plaintiff to join or to proceed against the successful defendant and the court, at the conclusion of such a case, may, in the exercise of its discretion over costs, make a Sanderson or Bullock order.”

7.  因此，根據有關法律原則，本席首先需要考慮張先生以交替形式向多個答辯人（包括方先生和陳先生）進行訴訟的行為是否合理；同時亦要考慮《區域法院規則》第62號命令第5條列明的各項因素。

張先生對方先生的訴訟行為是否合理

8.  代表張先生的鍾大律師提出以下理據，指張先生對方先生的訴訟是合理：

(1)  馮先生在張先生與方先生初次見面時介紹方先生是成昌飯店的東主。本案的文件證據亦支持這一說法：

(a)  成昌就其三個舖位申請了三個商業登記，其中一個鋪位的商業登記顯示開業日期為2000年4月10日（意外發生前），另外的開業日期為2018年11月1日（意外發生後）。所有商業登記均顯示方先生為成昌的獨資擁有人。審訊時，方先生亦作供指當時將有關商業登記在鋪面擺放展示。

(b)  方先生與馮先生和陳先生安排簽署公眾街市檔位登記助手承諾書，並將有關承諾書呈交給食環署。承諾書內容清楚列明馮先生和陳先生是被僱用作為登記助手，而馮先生和陳先生在承諾書中亦註明其身份為僱員，表示並非成昌的擁有人，未持有成昌的任何權益。

(c)  從食環署發出的信件可見，食環署就與成昌有關的事宜一直都是致函方先生。

(2)  如區域法院法官羅雪梅於2021年12月15日把馮先生和陳先生加入本案作為答辯人的判詞指出，沒有任何人就有關成昌的轉讓通知商業登記處或更新商業登記。方先生一直對食環署隱瞞成昌轉讓一事（見該判案書第29段）。因此張先生在展開本訴訟前無法得知方先生已將成昌轉讓給馮先生，直到方先生在本案存檔回覆書時，張先生才得知成昌轉讓的說法。

(3)  方先生所述的業務轉讓方法與食環署網頁中就固定攤位小販牌照所發佈的資料不符。方先生在審訊作供時亦作供承認，在現行的制度下，如果他不再經營成昌，他是須要交出牌照，食環署是不容許他轉讓牌照。

(4)  方先生自己披露的證據難以令人信服。例如判案書第29(1) 段提到，方先生提供的「流水帳」中多次將電費、水費及租金，從馮先生的欠款中扣除。這方面的證據顯示他仍然需負上支付那些電費、水費及租金的責任，與他在本案中就轉讓成昌業務說法不盡相同。

(5)  方先生亦安排自己的家庭傭工到成昌工作。就此方面，他的行為與成昌東主或作為張先生僱主的身份吻合（Poon Chau Nam v Yim Siu Cheung t/a Yat Cheung Airconditioning & Electric Co [2007] 1 HKLRD 951）。雖然方先生後來解釋家庭傭工在成昌工作的工資是由馮先生支付，但這方面安排並非張先生認知範圍之事。

(6)  雖然方先生在其回覆書中提出已將成昌業務轉讓予馮先生的說法，張先生也不能不考慮馮先生的案情及證據。馮先生在日期為2021年6月22日的反對將其加入作為本案答辯人誓章中指，方先生並未把成昌業務轉讓給他，而方先生仍是成昌的獨資擁有人，仍然繼續營運成昌的業務，而他只是方先生的助手。馮先生給予勞工處的信件亦是類似的說法。張先生亦曾就此事向馮先生發信查詢，馮先生沒有作出書面回覆，只是透過電話重複上述說法。

(7)  陳先生對於成昌東主身份的立場，亦令有關問題更加模糊。陳先生在日期分別為2022年2月4日和2022年5月23日的誓章均指在成昌工作時，他和馮先生均是方先生的助手，他和馮先生是同事。但陳先生被加入本案為答辯人後，在他存檔的回覆書中，他改變先前的說法，並指馮先生才是成昌的東主，而自己是受僱於馮先生。

9.  鍾大律師指出，綜合上述因素，傾向證明方先生為僱主的證據並不薄弱（參照Fung Chun Man第6段）。尤其考慮到方先生、馮先生及陳先生在這個問題上各有不同說法，而本案很大程度上取決於證人的可信性，張先生就此問題上難以就法庭在此方面的裁決在審訊前作出揣測。這種情況與 Chong Ngan Seng v China Harbour Engineering Company Limited & Others（CACV 54/2012，2013年9月25日）和Lau Foon Wing v Cheuk Lau Shek t/a Kamtorry Industrial Co & Anor（unrep，DCEC 757/2007，2008年9月29日）的情況類似，法庭在考慮原告人行為的合理性時亦不應忘記訴訟初期或審訊前的各種不確定性。再者，這種答辯人間互相指責的行為，已被法庭一貫視為頒布Sanderson/‌Bullock Order的一種重要元素Chong Ngan Seng，第22-23段，Fung Chun Man第6-7段，Hodgson v Guardall Ltd [1991] 3 All ER 823（第829d-f頁及830d-g頁）。

10.  本席同意鍾大律師的陳詞，本席認為，考慮到上述因素，張先生加入方先生為答辯人並繼續向方先生申索的行為是合理。

張先生和陳先生之間的訟費問題

11.  鍾大律師指，張先生（向陳先生作出追討而衍生的訟費）及陳先生（抗辯引致的訟費）的訟費，均應由馮先生負責，因為張先生對陳先生的訴訟行為是合理的：

(1)  張先生在訴訟期間加入陳先生作為答辯人，原因是方先生的證人劉柏雄在其證人陳述書中指稱方先生在2017年11月把成昌飯店的生意轉讓給馮先生和他拍檔陳先生，自此，成昌的老闆變為馮先生/陳先生。張先生因此而加入陳先生為答辯人的行為是合理的，這方面亦得到羅雪梅法官的肯定。

(2)  方先生本人在其證人陳述書及接受鍾大律師盤問時亦對陳先生積極提出指控，指陳先生並非只是僱員，而是馮先生的拍檔，兩人都是成昌的老闆。

12.  就此問題，方先生的立場是，張先生應在不同階段經考慮証據後決定是否繼續控告案中答辯人，不可在針對方先生及陳先生的申索敗訴後便把責任推缷給方先生或馮先生：

(1)  方先生沒有建議馮先生加告陳先生，張先生在提出加告陳先生前亦不曾詢問方先生的意見。方先生只是在張先生提出加告陳先生的申請後，透過律師去信表示沒有反對張先生加入陳先生為答辯人的申請。

(2)  劉柏雄在其證人陳述書裏並沒有明確的表明陳先生和馮先生同是老闆，他只是說出自己的觀察及猜測。張先生不應把劉柏雄的證供視為方先生的証據或要方先生承受其責任。張先生亦可在審訊前向劉作出質詢（interrogatories）以澄清他的證供。

(3)  張先生承認馮先生曾向他表示馮先生打算承接方先生成昌的生意。張先生大可以向馮先生跟進及澄清他是否已承讓成昌飯店的生意。但張先生沒有這樣做。

(4)  根據張先生的案情，他是成昌的員工。成昌是一間熟食巿場內的大排檔，只有幾名員工，張先生不難確認誰是雇主。

(5)  張先生承認，他加告或繼續針對陳先生申索，是因他擔心如果他漏告了任何答辯人及/或對任何一個答辯人撤銷申索，最後法庭判定答辯人均不是他的僱主，僱員補償援助基金管理局將不會支付賠償。這顧慮並不是方先生引起的。

13.  代表陳先生的徐大律師亦指，張先生沒有實質的證據指稱陳先生為僱主，相關的文件證據（包括提交給食環署的助手承諾書、食環署的信函、方先生與馮先生之間的WhatsApp對話紀錄及方先生的對數紀錄）僅支持方先生只將業務頂手給馮先生，並不涉及陳先生，而劉柏雄的證人陳述書對陳先生是否僱主只屬猜測。

14.  本席認為，考慮到本案審訊前披露的文件證據、各方存檔的誓章及證人陳述書（包括鍾大律師提及的因素），張先生加入陳先生為答辯人並繼續對其訴訟的行為是合理。無可爭議的一點是，方先生本人在其證人陳述書中及在審訊時仍然指稱陳先生與馮先生是拍檔，同為成昌的老闆。既然如此，張先生怎可能在審訊前了解到陳先生和馮先生的真正關係呢？在此情況下，張先生對因漏吿陳先生而得不到補償的顧慮至少有部分是方先生引起的。

15.  基於上述提及的案例及法律宗旨，由於張先生加入陳先生為答辯人並繼續對其訴訟的行為是合理的，張先生與陳先生之間的訴訟而引致的訟費，也是合理衍生的。因此，本席認為有關訟費應由敗訴的答辯人馮先生支付。

16.  鑑於以上結論，本席不需要考慮交替申請。為完整起見，本席認為，在張先生合理加入並繼續對陳先生訴訟的前提下，由敗訴的答辯人馮先生負擔訟費顯然比由方先生負擔該部分訟費合理；雖然方先生的行為部分引致了張先生對陳先生的訴訟，但未有證據顯示方先生關於陳先生角色的證供是故意誤導張先生或法庭的意圖，而各方就本申請提交的案例亦未有要求勝訴的被告人支付其他勝訴的被告人的訟費的先例。正如方先生的代表律師指出，在Hodgson v Guardall一案中，法庭只是討論被告人在互相指責時可能面對的訟費責任，並沒有命令勝訴的被告人須支付其他勝訴的被告人的訟費。

Sanderson Order或Bullock Order？

17.  就Sanderson Order或Bullock Order何者更合適，霍兆剛法官在Chong Ngan Seng（第31-33段）解釋法庭在處理訟費的時候需要考慮實質的後果，Sanderson Order比Bullock Order更能公平地將未能向失敗被告人收取訟費的風險，在原告人及其他成功的被告人之間攤分：

“31. The English Court of Appeal in Michael Irvine v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Ors. Approved (at §15) the trial judge’s comments that (i) the question of liability for costs should be considered as a matter of principle and (ii) ‘… whether or not there is any practical consequence of making one order or another in terms of amounts to be paid is a subsidiary point and is not one that should weigh heavily with the court in considering whether as a matter of principle one party should be liable for another party’s costs or not.’

32. We accept and acknowledge the need to adhere to a principled approach. However, whilst the practical consequence may not weigh heavily, it seems to us that it is a matter which can be taken into account. Note 62/1/6 of the White Book...includes the statement that:

‘A trial judge was entitled, without infringing the requirement that costs should generally follow the event to make a Sanderson order rather than a Bullock order where the judgment was given against a co-defendant who was insolvent; because a Sanderson order would spread the hardship caused by the co-defendant’s insolvency and consequent inability to meet the costs more fairly between the plaintiff and the other defendant, both of whom were innocent parties, than would a Bullock order. The choice between a Bullock order and a Sanderson order in such circumstances was a matter for the judge’s discretion.’

33. In the present case, there is no certainty that the 2^nd to 4^th defendants will all be impecunious so that the 1^st defendant would not be able to recover its costs from one or other of them. On the other hand, the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff in the present case was the sum of HK305,115.55 with interest and these damages would be very likely significant eroded if the plaintiff were to be liable for the 1^st defendant’s costs but unable to recover them from the other defendants.”（重點後加）

18.  方先生主張Bullock Order較為合適，張先生應先向方先生支付訟費，再向馮先生追討相關訟費，原因是如果馮先生須支付張先生針對方先生的訟費及方先生的抗辯訟費，則方先生很大機會不能從馮先生身上取回訟費。

19.  陳先生的立場是法庭不應頒布Sanderson Order，代表陳先生的徐大律師沒有就法庭是否Sanderson Order或Bullock Order何者更合適作出進一步陳詞。

20.  鍾大律師指Sanderson Order更為合適：

(1)  張先生是由法律援助署代表。根據 Jiang Zhong v Yeung Chun Leung & Ors，DCPI 2407/2011，2016年4月18日（第36段），當原告人是由法律援助署代表，一般來說，如果原告人的行為是合理的，都是應以Sanderson Order方式處理，已由失敗的被告人直接支付成功被告人的訟費，而原告人不應附上其他被告人訟費的責任。

(2)  張先生應獲的補償金為港幣157,017。由於張先生是由法律援助署代表，如果以Bullock Order形式處理他和方先生及陳先生之間的訟費問題，而馮先生未能向張先生支付這些訟費的話，這些訟費亦會從張先生的補償金扣除；這情形與 Chong Ngan Seng 案（同樣涉及原告人由法援進行代表）相似，亦會導致張先生所獲的補償金近乎完全被扣除。若因為方先生與馮先生就成昌飯店的轉讓的隱瞞，導致張先生不能確定其僱主的有關身份，又因此實際上剝奪張先生的補償金，這會對張先生帶來嚴重不公的後果及困難，亦不能達到 Chong Ngan Seng攤分訟費風險的目的。

(3)  另外，在本案中，方先生直至審訊前均有法援代表，並無證據顯示他需要自行負擔訴訟費用。

(4)  Bullock Order牽涉法庭兩次不同的訟費評估程序，而 Sanderson Order 只會牽涉一次性的評估。前者比後者更浪費時間及資源。

21.  本席同意鍾大律師的陳詞。綜合以上考慮，本席認為Sanderson Order明顯比Bullock Order合理。

22.  本席更改暫准訟費命令，並作出絕對訟費命令如下：

(1)  第三答辯人須支付申請人就本僱員補償申請及該訟費申請向第一答辯人追討而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(2)  第三答辯人須支付第一答辯人就本僱員補償申請及該訟費申請作出抗辯而產生之訟費，若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(3)  第三答辯人須支付申請人就本僱員補償申請及該訟費申請向第四答辯人追討而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(4)  第三答辯人該支付第四答辯人就本僱傭補償申請及該訟費申請作出抗辯而產生之訟費（包括大律師證書），若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定。

23.  最後，本席感謝各位大律師/律師的協助。

申請人：由法律援助署延聘鍾加康大律師代表

第一答辯人：由梁鳳慈律師行陳慧齡律師代表

第三答辯人：沒有律師代表，並缺席聆訊

第四答辯人：由鄧耀榮律師行延聘徐國基大律師代表

DCEC 859/2019

[2023] HKDC 1165

香港特別行政區

區域法院

僱員補償案件2019年第859號

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判案書

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1.  在本案中，申請人（“張先生”）根據《僱員補償條例》第9、10及10A條就一宗於2018年4月7日發生的意外申索僱員補償。

2.  張先生的案情指，2018年4月7日大約下午2時，在位於九龍長沙灣長順街熟食中心的成昌飯店（“成昌”），他被指派用手推機切割一塊木板，當時手推機突然停頓、不能向前推並反彈向後，從而割傷他的左手。（“該意外”）

3.  各方均不爭議以下事項：

(1)  第一答辯人（“方先生”）是成昌商業登記及食環署牌照登記的東主及負責人；

(2)  根據食環署的紀錄，第三答辯人（“馮先生”）及第四答辯人（“陳先生”）是方先生在成昌的登記助手。

4.  方先生指他從2017年11月19日起便已將成昌的業務已全部轉讓給馮先生和陳先生，他否認自己為張先生的僱主。

5.  陳先生指他只是成昌的一名僱員，受馮先生邀請加入成昌，他否認自己為張先生的僱主。陳先生和方先生均不承認張先生是受僱在成昌工作或在成昌工作時受傷。

6.  馮先生沒有呈交任何《回答書》及證人陳述書，根據早前的法庭命令，他不能在此案再提交《回答書》，作供或傳召證人。馮先生沒有出席正審。

7.  僱員補償援助基金管理局於2020年5月29日獲法庭頒令批准加入本案成為第二答辯人，但在2022年12月2日停止為訴訟一方。

8.  在正審中出庭作證的除了張先生、方先生、和陳先生，還有由方先生傳召的證人劉柏雄先生（“劉先生”）。劉先生於2015年至2018年初曾在成昌工作。

9.  在方先生的第五份增補證人陳述書中，方先生嘗試引入馮先生在反對被加入為本案答辯方時存檔的一份誓章，試圖藉此證明馮先生曾反駁張先生為成昌僱員的說法以及馮先生曾承認在2017年11月曾向受讓成昌的生意。代表張先生的鍾大律師對此做法表示反對，理由如下：

(1)  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023，第1冊，第38/2/1段，作者在引用Blackburn Union v Brooks [1878] 7 Ch D 68時指出即使某一誓章曾於非正審聆訊中使用過不等同法庭可命令該誓章於正審時使用；

(2)  馮先生沒有在法庭規定期限內呈交任何《回答書》及證人陳述書，根據早前的法庭命令，他不能在此案再提交《回答書》，作供或傳召證人，因此無法就誓章內容接受盤問。在此情況下，把馮先生的誓章引入為本案證據，對張先生造成嚴重不公。

10.  本席認同鍾大律師的說法。本案很大程度上取決於證人的可信性，在馮先生沒有出庭接受盤問的情況下引入馮先生的誓章為本案證據對張先生並不公平。

11.  再者，即使本席允許引入馮先生的誓章作為證據，這亦僅仍屬傳聞證供，在馮先生未接受盤問的情況下，證案價值有限，本席亦難以予任何比重。

12.  在考慮證人是否誠實和可信方面，高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官馮庭碩資深大律師在Hui Cheung Fai v Daiwa Development Ltd，HCA 1734/2009，2014年4月8日，第76 – 83段中列出了相關的原則：

(1)  一般來說，與關鍵事件同時期存在的文件對評估證人的可信性至關重要；

(2)  證人的說法的固有可能性，或是否符合明顯的邏輯，也是重要的指標；

(3)  法庭亦可考慮證人的口供是否前後一致，或是否與不能爭議的證據相符，或是否存在矛盾；

(4)  法庭應謹記證供的真實性不能單憑證人的外表或作供時的神態決定；

(5)  總括而言，法庭可考慮客觀證據、證人的動機，及整體證據的可能性。

A.  張先生受傷經過

13.  就受傷的經過，張先生指，2018年4月7日大約下午2時，他在成昌受馮先生指示用手推機切割一塊木板。當他進行該工序時，手推機突然停頓、不能向前推並反彈向後，從而割傷他的左手。

14.  就該意外發生的情況：

(1)  張先生提供了救護車當天出勤紀錄以及相關的醫療報告，均顯示他一直表示他的左拇指是在當天下午工作時被手推機割傷；

(2)  劉先生也指他記得曾目睹救護員進入成昌範圍進行救援，但指他不知道是誰人受傷；

(3)  張先生提供了一張相片，顯示他在成昌，且周圍有救護員。他指相片是由他的朋友、當時在成昌任職的莊偉強廚師拍攝並傳送給他的。本席留意到，在張先生填寫的日期為2018年6月4日給勞工處的聲明書中提到莊偉強廚師當時目睹了意外發生經過；

(4)  陳先生雖然否認他在該意外現場，但承認有聽說該意外發生；

(5)  醫療紀錄顯示，張先生的傷勢是3釐米深的裂傷以及左拇指遠指節指骨骨折的創傷，與其聲稱的被手推機割傷的受傷模式吻合。

15.  方先生以及陳先生對以上情況沒有提供相反的證據。本席在衡量相對可能性的標準下，裁定張先生是在成昌使用手推機切割木板的時候割傷左手。

B.  張先生是受僱或自僱人士

16.  有關訴訟雙方之間是否存有僱傭關係，特別是涉及臨時工人的情況，在終審法院案件Poon Chan Nam v Yim Siu Cheung [2007] 10 HKCFAR 156經已訂明法庭需要考慮的因素。終審庭說明，法庭應考慮涉案關係的所有特徵，以從總體印象決定該等關係是否屬於僱傭關係。

17.  Tang Chau Yuet v Fu Kin Po [2011] 1 HKLRD 519案中，總結11項因素如下：–

(1)  被指稱為僱主者是否對指稱為僱員者的工作，有僱主應有的控制權？

(2)  被指稱為僱員者，是否自備工作所需工具？

(3)  被指稱為僱員者，是否自聘工作所需幫工？

(4)  被指稱為僱員者，是否須附上財政的風險，及其性質與程度？

(5)  被指稱為僱員者，是否可從他優秀的管理中，獲得利潤？

(6)  被指稱為僱員者，是否須負上投資及管理的責任，及其性質與程度？

(7)  被指稱為僱員者，可否正確地被識別為指稱為僱主者的商業組織一份子？

(8)  被指稱為僱主者，對被指稱為僱員者是否須負上保險及稅務責任？

(9)  被指稱為僱員者，有否在有關方面營商？

(10)  雙方對這關係的個人看法和印象？

(11)  這行業或專業的傳統結構及慣例，會否有助理解？

18.  就上述情況而言，張先生的證供如下：

(1)  張先生自2017年11月起在成昌工作，在工作大約7至8天後，馮先生便告知他不用再回來。張先生在第一份證人陳述書中指其後在2018年3月24日起以1,200元的日薪在成昌工作，直至意外當天即2018年4月7日。但他在第二份補充證人陳述書中更正前述說法，指是在2018年初農曆新年期間，馮先生再請他回成昌飯店工作，而他其後便一直在成昌飯店工作至意外當天，期間所進行過的工序包括拆除成昌第18號檔用磚砌的爐具、安裝電燈、電視機架，熱水爐、鋪泥水英泥地台等。他接受盤問時再次確認第二份補充證人陳述書中的說法。

(2)  就控制程度而言，張先生每天的工作均由馮先生安排，按馮先生指定的時間和期間上/下班及放午膳。

(3)  就提供設備而言：

(a)  張先生指他在成昌使用的工具都是按指示從成昌飯店28號檔口處所擺放的一架鐵車中借取，而該鐵車內存不少小型工具（如錘、電鑽、士巴拿、喉鉗等）。而該意外發生時所使用的手推機也是馮先生托張先生墊支購買，事後向馮先生報銷。張先生提供了一張收據，指是當時購買手推機的收據。日期為2018年3月13日，與張先生所稱在成昌工作的期間相吻合。

(b)  就工作需要使用的材料，張先生會向馮先生提出要求，由馮先生安排購買。雖然陳先生沒有直接指示他工作，陳先生曾幾次外出購買及向他提供工作所需要的工具和材料，包括英泥沙、電掣箱、灰池和泥料等，而這些工具和材料費用都不是由張先生承擔。

(4)  就盈利或虧損而言，張先生指他的日薪為HK$1,200，而成昌飯店也會提供膳食。除此之外，他再沒有任何其他獲利的機會。

(5)  張先生是根據工作日數賺取薪金的，沒有任何僱員或其他人幫他工作，也沒有為自己的業務辦理商業登記或開立自僱人士的強積金戶口。

(6)  就當事人對雙方關係的看法而言，到成昌工作的首天，馮先生曾向他表示自己是方先生的助手及方先生才是成昌的東主。馮先生曾在2017年12月向張先生提到他有意頂手成昌，但他不清楚具體細節。

19.  方先生以及代表陳先生的徐大律師在對張先生的盤問過程中，就其在成昌工作的情況作出了以下質疑：

(1)  成昌不可能聘用一名裝修工人，因為張先生指稱他做的工作會產生木屑或灰塵，而現場也有風扇，對飯店食客及生意造成影響。對此，張先生承認切割木板會產生木屑，但不至於到處飛揚影響食客，而修理或更換電製不會產生大量灰塵，可在成昌營業的時間，例如3 – 4時或5 – 6時的時候拖了電線進行，熄部分電製而不是所有電製。具體工作時間是由馮先生指定，例如他在成昌的28 – 29號舖做地台，也是馮先生要求他在年初五9時開工。因為成昌當天沒有營業，因此不影響營業。

(2)  張先生在盤問下承認對成昌被人淋紅油的事情並不知情。但是淋紅油是發生在2018年2月25日，根據張先生的證供，他當天並沒有去成昌上班，因此不知情亦不足為奇。

(3)  陳先生在他的證供中否認有為張先生買過任何材料，亦否認見過張先生在成昌工作，並指他只見過張先生在成昌吃早餐。

(4)  就意外發生時使用的手推機，徐大律師批評收據模糊、沒有顯示購買的是什麼器材。

20.  但是，本席留意到以下支持或吻合張先生說法的證據：

(1)  就張先生所稱其進行的工作，方先生在其第二份證人陳述書中進行了回應，除了少部分相片他不能辨認拍攝的地點是否在成昌或是否有作出改動，他承認大部分項目都是在馮先生接手後成昌後新作的改動或翻新工程。

(2)  陳先生沒有確認或否認成昌有張先生所稱進行的工程。他承認知道張先生從事裝修工作，以及張先生“經常出入成昌飯店”。

(3)  方先生提供的與馮先生的WhatsApp紀錄中也顯示成昌2018年年初五沒有營業，和張先生的說法相吻合。

21.  本席在衡量相對可能性的標準下，信納張先生的確在馮先生的指示下進行這些工程：

(1)  成昌確有進行一些工程。方先生對於就張先生指其所做的工程，除了對小部分項目不能確定以外，就大部分項目並無爭議；

(2)  張先生本業為一名裝修工人/電工，在此期間經常出入成昌；

(3)  如果張先生沒有進行這些工程，亦難以鉅細無遺地列舉成昌改動過的地方；

(4)  沒有任何證據顯示這些工程是由其他人做的；

(5)  成昌所作的改動不是少數，張先生不可能在未經馮先生指示或允許下進行這些工程；

(6)  張先生是一名裝修工人，就常理而言不會是成昌的長工。但張先生只是做散工，他提到為成昌進行工程的時間正是馮先生接手成昌的初期（見以下第28段），因此馮先生在此期間進行一些工程也不足為奇。

22.  陳先生的證供指，他在成昌的工作時間是早上8時至下午4時，每週工作4至6日。成昌在此期間的改動不屬於少數，陳先生在成昌工作的時間不短，不可能沒有留意到這些改動。他亦沒有提過成昌的工程是由其他人進行。而陳先生留意到張先生經常出入成昌、在成昌吃早餐而竟然完全沒有留意到張先生在成昌做這些工作，並不合常理，讓人難以置信。張先生本業為一名裝修工人/電工，怎會無緣無故經常出入成昌？本席認為陳先生只是為了推搪責任而否認張先生在成昌工作或曾經為張先生夠購買材料，他這方面的證供並不可信。

23.  馮先生在與方先生的WhatsApp對話紀錄中顯示，2018年5月12日，馮先生就勞工處就張先生事件的處理和方先生討論買勞工保險的事宜，亦顯示馮先生心目中認為張先生為其僱員、本來有需要購買勞工保險。

24.  區域法院法官李樹旭在Wong Kin v Him Kee Food Distribution Co Ltd [2016] 2 HKLRD 665 (24/03/2016, DCEC 1771/2012) §115 指，不作強積金供款及不購買勞工保險等逃避僱主責行的行為並不能阻止法庭深究當中的關係性質。

25.  綜合以上情況，本席在衡量相對可能性的標準下，裁定張先生是以散工形式受馮先生僱用，而非自僱人士。

C.  方先生是否張先生的僱主

26.  張先生指稱方先生是他的僱主的主要根據如下：

(1)  在張先生到成昌飯店工作的首天（即2017年11月），馮先生便向他介紹方先生是成昌飯店的東主，並說自己是方先生的助手。

(2)  商業登記紀錄顯示，方先生一直都是成昌飯店的業務擁有人，這與馮先生對張先生指方先生是成昌飯店的東主的說法一致。

(3)  馮先生和陳先生均曾向食環署呈交兩份公眾街市檔位登記助手承諾書，而二人均對食環署聲稱他們在成昌飯店的身份只是僱員。

27.  方先生並不爭議他是商業登記上的擁有人，也負責就成昌的事務和食環交涉。他的案情是：

(1)  他從2017年11月19日起便已將成昌飯店的業務已全部轉讓給馮先生和陳先生。他向馮先生收取港幣1,500的日租作為頂手費。

(2)  轉手後，馮先生負責食材、員工、檔口營運的支出，馮先生可得到生意收益，也承擔虧損的責任。

(3)  在轉手前，方先生向每位員工派發遣散費，告知每位員工轉手的情況，並由員工自行決定是否受僱馮先生。

(4)  轉手後，方先生有一段時間受僱於馮先生，負責餐廳的水吧，日薪為港幣850元。

28.  雖然方先生仍是商業登記上的擁有人，也負責和食環署交涉，但以下證據顯示馮先生至少從2017年12月左右已經是成昌的主要負責人：

(1)  馮先生和方先生的WhatsApp對話紀錄中有以下內容和方先生所指把成昌轉手給馮先生的說法吻合：

(a)  2017年12月18日，馮先生給方先生的訊息提到“提提你唔好搞亂我運作呀”。

(b)  在對話紀錄中，雙方主要談論的問題是方先生向馮先生收租、處理水電費等金錢問題及和食環署交涉的事宜。雖然方先生有時會提出一些建議，但從來未向馮先生就成昌的經營作出任何指示，馮先生亦從來未向方先生作出任何請示。

(c)  就和食環署交涉的情況，方先生只是向馮先生轉達食環署的意見和信息，要求馮先生進行處理，以避免牌照被收回。如果方先生仍是成昌的東主或有部分控制權，方先生應可自己進行處理，毋須通過馮先生。

(d)  2018年8月31日的對話中，方先生指他有碰到很多以前的客人沒有再幫襯成昌，指“你作為老細，生意跌廚房好大責任，你一定要有要求，唔好任人亂舞…”，馮先生回答“生意冇人有我咁緊張，不過天算不如人算”、“好多謝你都緊張同比意見。有做得好我就改改啦”。

(e)  2019年6月21日的對話中，馮先生提到“做咗成昌周身債、有排番唔到身”、“做得年多，如果一早同我講，唔洗搞到咁”。

(2)  沒有任何證據顯示除了日租及人工以外，方先生可從成昌的經營利潤中分成。

(3)  劉先生的證供亦提到，方先生告知其已經把成昌轉手給馮先生，在轉手前也有和劉先生結算轉手前的工資，馮先生接手後也有僱用新的員工，後來劉先生因為與新員工意見不合，向馮先生辭職。就劉先生這方面的證供，各方沒有大的質疑。

(4)  方先生有時會安排自己的家庭傭工去成昌上班，根據方先生的證供，是由馮先生直接支薪。這也與方先生和馮先生同期的WhatsApp訊息紀錄相吻合。

29.  如代表張先生的鍾大律師指出，方先生對轉讓成昌生意的條件或情況明顯有隱瞞：

(1)  方先生指是食環署推出這個「助手牌」的方法好讓登記經營者能將攤檔的生意轉讓給該些「助手」。但根據食環署網頁中就固定攤位小販牌照所發佈的資料，方先生如需要將牌照轉讓給他人，須向食環署提出可接受的理由及交還牌照註銷，而並非單從僱用助手便可完成。而助手「除持牌人外出用膳、進貨、因病小休等合理原因外，不得在持牌人不在攤位時從事販賣活動…」。因此，方先生的說法顯然是有違法理，不合邏輯。

(2)  事實上，食環署在2018年7月20日接納馮先生和陳先生為登記助手後，仍在2018年8月21日發信給方先生指他有把攤檔分租的情況，並要求他提供攤檔所有權的文件、登記助手的僱傭紀錄，其後又在2018年9月6日發信要求會見方先生。方先生承認2018年10月8日就上述情況會見食環署，並指他當時告知食環署轉讓生意給馮先生的情況。

(3)  根據方先生和馮先生之間的對話紀錄，方先生2018年11月20日給馮先生的訊息指“中午來收租及俾番br你，已報員工薪酬給食環，你同亞樂750一天，牛800一天，[純]粹交差數目，不牽涉交稅”。方先生在盤問下承認，訊息中提到的提交給食環署的文件中表述馮先生及陳先生均為其僱員，日薪為750元。既然如此，方先生所指其於2018年10月8日就上述情況會見食環署，並指他當時告知食環署轉讓生意給馮先生的情況的說法並不可信。方先生顯然對食環署隱瞞了頂手的情況。

(4)  方先生和馮先生的WhatsApp對話紀錄以及方先生提供的手寫結算表均顯示是，方先生收取日租1,500元，但成昌的水費、電費和食環署租金如由馮先生墊交，則可從日租中扣除，這一點也與方先生就轉讓條件的說法有出入。

(5)  方先生提供了2017年11月至12月以及2018年5月至6月的手寫結算表，但沒有提供2018年1月至4月的紀錄。

30.  另外，本席留意到，方先生和馮先生的WhatsApp對話紀錄有提到方先生準備好轉讓合約給馮先生簽署，但方先生在本案中沒有提供任何其中提及合約或合約草擬的副本。

31.  鍾大律師在書面結案陳詞中指以下情況足以證明方先生仍然是成昌的擁有人或其中一個擁有人，本席就這些情況分析如下：

(1)  2017年12月17日，馮先生向方先生說“平心靜氣，大家做好成昌”。但根據方先生的說法，此時仍然處於成昌轉手的過渡期，而方先生以850元日薪受僱馮先生，負責水吧，因此馮先生所指“大家做好成昌”亦可能是和方先生的說法吻合。而在第二日即2017年12月18日，馮先生給方先生的訊息是“提提你唔好搞亂我運作呀”，“上星期已經搞亂咗”。這顯示馮先生當時應已經是成昌運作的主要負責人。

(2)  2018年2月26日，就成昌被淋紅油的事件，方先生向馮先生說“報紙有報導，相信好多客會問，你照直講，要保持自己無辜受害者形象，呢下好緊要，另食環會來了解，你千萬別說頂手，你是大股東，方生因病，做小股東，你幫手打理，費事節外生枝，我每日都有返嚟巡舖就OK…”但本席認為，這不能證明方先生仍然是成昌實際負責人，反而凸顯了方先生已經轉讓成昌生意給馮先生，但因為知道這是違反食環規定而叮囑馮先生該如何應對食環的查詢。

(3)  2018年10月15日，方先生對馮先生說“你要開始俾全租啦，原定十月就要結數今日係月中了”。對此方先生解釋是因為馮先生一直拖欠他的錢，俾全租的意思只是要求馮先生要付足全部。本席留意到，2018年10月18日，馮先生說“今日比住四千先”，2018年10月24日，方先生說“一日推一日條數好大”。觀察前文後理，本席認為，方先生的解釋並非不合理。

(4)  方先生不但保留29號舖位的商業登記，更在2018年11月1日申請18號及28號檔的商業登記，不但向食環署和公眾展示其為成昌的獨資經營者，更因此承擔向成昌報稅和繳稅的責任。根據方先生的證供，成昌每月營運額為28萬左右，因此應繳稅款可能不菲。對此，方先生解釋商業登記是為了應付食環。但無論如何成昌經營必然需要商業登記，由於食環署不允許轉讓牌照，商業登記只能在方先生名下，而繳交稅款多少應與總營業額掛鉤，按理增加新的商業登記並不會增加應繳稅款的總額。因此方先生的解釋並非不可信。

(5)  方先生有時會安排自己的家庭傭工去成昌上班。這與方先生所指其作為僱員的身份不符。就這一點而言，方先生的證供指家庭傭工是由馮先生直接支薪，而這個說法也與方先生和馮先生同期的WhatsApp信息相吻合。

32.  綜上所述，雖然方先生的證供不盡可靠，但本席認為，根據Poon Chau Nam列出的原則，綜合各方面的特徵，就總體印象而言，本案的證據並不足以證明方先生是張先生的僱主。本席主要考慮到以下因素：

(1)  如第28段所提及，馮先生至少從2017年12月左右已經是成昌的主要負責人；

(2)  沒有任何證據顯示除了日租及人工以外，方先生可從成昌的經營利潤中分成。雖然方先生和馮先生的WhatsApp對話紀錄以及方先生提供的手寫結算表均顯示馮先生可從方先生收取的日租1,500元中扣除馮先生墊交的成昌的水電費和食環署租金，但這些款項均是較相對較固定的金額。單就此而言，沒有證據證明方先生向馮先生收取的淨金額中存在從經營利潤中分成的因素。

(3)  雖然張先生指方先生仍然經常在成昌出現，但他承認方先生從來沒對他作出過任何指示。張先生亦沒有提到方先生有為其購買/提供工具或材料。

33.  綜合以上情況，本席認為在衡量相對可能性的標準下，張先生未能證明方先生是他的僱主。為免疑義，本席只是就張先生和方先生是否存在僱傭關係作出裁決，並未對方先生轉讓成昌生意給馮先生的合法性或有效性作出判斷。

D.  陳先生是否張先生的僱主

34.  陳先生的證供如下：

(1)  陳先生於2017年11月受僱馮先生到成昌工作，他指自己工作是由馮先生指派，並應馮先生要求簽署了〈公眾街市檔位登記助手承諾書〉。

(2)  馮先生負責管理成昌的工作和各項食物。陳先生認為方先生是東主，但他不清楚馮先生和方先生的關係，亦沒有深究。

(3)  陳先生的職責包括水吧、打雜及送外賣。他每週工作4至6天，由早上8時至下午4時，日薪為650港幣。他亦有按馮先生指示處理成昌的金錢，包括提取成昌的現金，以支付供應商帳單、員工薪金及自己的薪金。

(4)  陳先生曾見過張先生在成昌存放裝修工具，但沒有指派他做任何工作，亦沒有向其支薪。陳先生否認曾經購買張先生所需要的工具或材料。

35.  鍾大律師指以下證據可證明陳先生亦是張先生的僱主：

(1)  根據劉先生的證人陳述書，陳先生在馮先生接手成昌後便經常出入成昌，而在他繼續為馮先生工作期間，他的薪酬也是由馮先生或陳先生所支付。因此，他相信陳先生是他的老闆之一，也是陳先生的拍檔。

(2)  張先生的證供指，陳先生在他工作期間便曾向他支薪及替他購買工作所需工具和材料。

(3)  方先生的證供亦由提到其經常看到陳先生指點員工工作及出糧給員工，其他員工都會聽他指揮，並指陳先生是馮先生的拍檔，都是老闆。具體而言，方先生指他有見到陳先生吩咐員工清潔、管理食物出品的緩急先後及食物質素，並曾經對方先生本人作出指示。方先生又指馮先生曾駕車載陳先生到方先生樓下，馮先生與方先生就欠款問題討論時陳先生是在場。

36.  以上情況無疑可證明馮先生非常信任陳先生，而陳先生在成昌的身份並非一般員工，而至少是屬於管理層面的人員。但這本身並不足以證明陳先生是成昌東主之一，或是張先生的僱主。

37.  相反，以下情況顯示陳先生在成昌是受馮先生指示行事：

(1)  在盤問之下，劉先生指店裡的事務主要是問馮先生，新的員工亦是馮先生請回來。他沒有深究馮先生和陳先生之間是合夥還是僱用關係。

(2)  方先生的證供以及他提供的WhatsApp對話紀錄均顯示，他一直是和馮先生商討成昌的事務和欠款以及和食環署交涉的情況，他從來沒有和陳先生討論過這些事項，而馮先生也從來沒有在這些對話紀錄裡提到過他有任何事宜需要和陳先生商討後才作決定。

(3)  方先生指馮先生與方先生就欠款問題討論時陳先生是在場，但陳先生沒有參與討論。

(4)  方先生在盤問中，同意他認為陳先生是馮先生的助手。方先生曾經在成昌聽到馮先生叫陳先生從成昌取錢。

(5)  張先生沒有指陳先生曾經就工作向他作出任何指示或作出任何安排。張先生的說法是他的工作一直都是由馮先生作出指示和安排。雖然張先生指陳先生有購買他工作需要的材料，亦有向其支薪，但就購買材料而言，張先生的說法是他會向馮先生提出要求，而由陳先生安排購買。如果陳先生只是按照馮先生的指示為張先生購買材料或向其支薪，這並不能證明陳先生為張先生的僱主，而更印證了陳先生是馮先生助手這一說法。

(6)  沒有任何證據證明陳先生可在成昌的利潤分成或承擔損失的風險。

38.  根據Poon Chau Nam列出的原則，綜合各方面的特徵，就總體印象而言，本席認為在衡量相對可能性的標準下，張先生未能證明陳先生是他的僱主。

E.  張先生應獲的僱員補償金額

E1.  張先生的每月收入

39.  《僱員補償條例》（“該條例”）第11(1) 條訂定：–

“(1) 除本條另有規定外，為施行本條例，僱員在意外發生時的每月收入須按以下方法計算 ——

(a) 以緊接意外發生日期的上一個月的收入為準；或

(b) 如在以往的12個月，僱員一直由同一僱主僱用，則按最能顯示該段期間僱員的每月報酬額的方法計算，但如並非如此，而僱員受僱於同一僱主的期間較短，則按最能顯示該段較短期間僱員的每月報酬額的方法計算，

兩種計算方法以對僱員較有利者為準。”

40.  張先生的申索是第11(1)(a)，以在2018年3月（即緊接意外發生日期的上一個月）的收入以日薪港幣1,200 × 11天計算，以港幣13,200作為計算其月收入的基礎。

41.  就日薪的金額而言，張先生所指的日薪數額與2018年香港公營領域電工的平均日薪相若，而其他各方沒有提出相反的證據。本席認為港幣1,200的日薪計算是合理。

42.  就工作的天數，張先生前後有兩個不同的說法：

(1)  張先生在第一份證人陳述書中指其在2018年3月24日起以1,200元的日薪在成昌工作，直至意外當天即2018年4月7日。根據此說法，他在意外前一個月即2018年3月工作的天數為8天。

(2)  在其第二份補充證人陳述書中又指其工作天數應為2018年2月20 – 24日、26 – 28日（共8天），3月5 – 7日、12 – 15日、20 – 23日（11天）以及4月1 – 7日（共7天）。張先生在盤問下堅持這一說法。對於為何更改說法，張先生在盤問之下指他有一本記事簿記錄了工作天數，在準備第一份證人陳述書的時候沒有參考，後來參考了記事簿後作出更正。

43.  本席認為，以下證據證明張先生在2018年有在成昌工作：

(1)  張先生在第一份證人陳述書中已經提到他在成昌做的工程包括舖泥水英泥地台，並提供相片。他在盤問下指這項工程是農曆年初五的時候進行，以免影響食客。本席認為張先生的說法言之成理。

(2)  根據陳先生的證供，他在成昌每週工作4至6天，由早上8時至下午4時。證據顯示他亦是深受馮先生信任管理成昌事務。如果張先生沒有進行舖地台的工程，或進行工程的事件不是農曆年間，陳先生應可明確指出，甚至提供相反的證據。但陳先生在其證供中對張先生做該項工作的事實或日期均沒有提出相反的證據。

(3)  劉先生在盤問下亦承認記得可能有人做地台，但他不知道是誰做的工程。

44.  本席認為在衡量相對可能性的標準下，應採納張先生在其第二份補充證人陳述書中關於工作天數的說法，即他在2018年3月工作11天，以此計算，他的月收入為港幣13,200。

E2.  第9條的補償

45.  張先生意外時60歲。因此，該條例第9條的補償額是以一筆相等於48個月收入的款項為基礎做計算（第7(1)(a) 條）。僱員補償（普通評估）委員會評定張先生的由於受傷而引致永久喪失賺取收入能力被為5%（表格9）。

46.  因此，以港幣13,200元作為張先生的收入來計算，第9條的補償額是港幣13,200元 × 48 × 5% = 港幣31,680元。

E3.  第10條的補償

47.  僱員補償（普通評估）委員會亦接納的張先生由於受傷而需缺勤的期間為2018年4月7日至2019年3月7日（表格9），共335天。

48.  因此，以港幣13,200元作為張先生的收入來計算，第10條的補償額是港幣13,200元 × 335/30 × 4/5 = 港幣117,920元。

E4.  第10A條的補償

49.  張先生指他支付了醫療費用共港幣7,417元，並提供了費用列表。對此，其他各方並未作出質疑。本席評定第10A條的補償額為港幣7,417元。

50.  綜上所述，張先生應得僱員補償如下：

	金額（港幣）
第9條的補償	31,680
第10條的補償	117,920
第10A條的補償	7,417
總計：	157,017

F.  結論

51.  馮先生須支付張先生僱員補償合共港幣157,017元連同利息。由工傷發生當日（即2018年4月7日）起至判決日之利息，以判定利率一半計算；判決日後至付款日期利息則以判定利率計算。

52.  本席作以下暫准訟費命令：

(1)  就馮先生和張先生之間，馮先生須支付張先生就本申請產生之訟費(包括大律師証書)，若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(2)  就方先生和張先生之間，張先生應支付方先生就本申請產生之訟費，若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(3)  就陳先生和張先生之間，張先生應支付陳先生就本申請產生之訟費(包括大律師証書)，若雙方未能就訟費金額達成協議，則由法庭評定；

(4)  張先生本身的訟費須按《法律援助規例》評定；

(5)  方先生本身在有法律援助期間產生的訟費須按《法律援助規例》評定；

(6)  就上述暫准訟費命令，任何一方可以在本判案書日期21天內以傳票申請更改，逾期後上述的訟費令將會成為絕對的命令。

53.  最後，本席感謝鍾大律師和徐大律師的協助。

申請人：由法律援助署延聘鍾加康大律師代表

第一答辯人：沒有律師代表，並親自應訊

第二答辯人：由胡百全律師事務所代表，豁免出席審訊

第三答辯人：沒有律師代表，並缺席審訊

第四答辯人：由鄧耀榮律師行延聘徐國基大律師代表

DCEC 859/2019

[2022] HKDC 605

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 859 OF 2019

________________________

________________________

________________________

DECISION

________________________

A.  Introduction

1.  In an earlier joinder application to join the 3^rd Respondent heard by this court, I set out in my decision (“Earlier Decision”)[1] the background of these proceedings as follows:-

“[1] On 15 April 2019, the Legally-Aided Applicant filed an Application for employees’ compensation (“Application”)  pursuant to the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance[2] against his alleged employer, Fong Chow Wo (“Fong”)  trading as Shing Cheong Restaurant (“Restaurant”), the 1^st Respondent.  In the Application, it was averred that he met an accident on 7 April 2018 while working for the 1^st Respondent at stall 29 of the Restaurant.

[2] … The 1^st Respondent’s non-participation in the proceedings led to an application by the Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board (“ECAFB”)  to intervene in the proceedings. …the court granted leave to the ECAFB to be joined as the 2^nd Respondent.

[3] …the 1^st Respondent alleged that at the time of the alleged accident, the business of the Restaurant had already been transferred to a Fung Yuen Chiu (“Fung”), who was the Applicant’s friend.

[4] The 1^st Respondent’s alluding to Fung as the sole-proprietor of the Restaurant led to the issuance of this summons (“Summons”)  on 25 February 2021 for leave to join Fung as the 3^rd Respondent in these proceedings out of time.”

2.  Before this court granted leave to the Applicant to join Fung as the 3^rd Respondent, the Applicant issued another joinder application by summons (“Joinder Summons”)  on 5 November 2021 for leave to join Chan Wing Lok (transliteration)  (陳永樂)  (“Chan”)  as the 4^th Respondent out of time.

3.  Chan, who was unrepresented until after the adjournment of a substantive hearing on 16 May 2022 to enable him to file further affirmation evidence, opposed the Joinder Summons.  In his opposition, Chan altogether filed two affirmations – one was prepared by himself in Chinese, and a later one drafted in English by his solicitors, Messrs Ivan Tang & Co.

4.  At the resumed hearing on 7 June 2022, the Applicant was represented by the same Legal Aid counsel, Mr Chong, who had appeared in the earlier joinder application, and Chan by counsel, Mr Fong.

B. The grounds in support of the Joinder Summons

5.  The grounds in support of the Joinder Summons are stated in the Applicant’s 3^rd Affirmation filed on 5 November 2021 (“Supporting Affirmation”).  The evidence against Chan is mainly based on a witness of the 1^st Respondent, Lau Pak Hung (transliteration)  劉柏雄 (“Lau”).

6.  In Lau’s witness statement dated 2 June 2021 (at §§3 & 7), it was averred that since 2015 before the business of the Restaurant was transferred to Fung, he was already employed by the 1^st Respondent as a daily-wage dish washing worker/miscellaneous worker.  His wages were paid weekly in cash.

7.  Lau alleged that after the business of the Restaurant was transferred to Fung and his partner, Chan, in November 2017, Fung/Chan were the boss(es)  of the Restaurant, and he was employed by Fung. Later, Lau noticed that Chan came to the Restaurant frequently, and he learnt that Chan was Fung’s partner.  They continued to pay him wages in the same way as the 1^st Respondent.

8.  Referring to the above averments contained in Lau’s witness statement, the Applicant suggested in the Supporting Affirmation (§9)  that “Chan (together with Fung as partners)  may be the employer at the time of the accident.  Alternatively, Fung and Chan may only be agents of the 1^st Respondent who is [his] employer at the Restaurant.  There is also a possibility that the 1^st Respondent, Fung and Chan may be business partners and all three of them were [his] employer.”

9.  As for the reason for the 19 months’ delay to apply to join Chan, the Applicant attributed it to his complete lack of knowledge of Chan’s alleged relationship with the Restaurant until he had read the contents of Lau’s witness statement after the exchange of the witness statements with the 1^st Respondent on 4 June 2021.

10.  Despite the lack of direct evidence against Chan, Mr Chong submitted that the Applicant’s intended claim against Chan is not bound to fail.  It was submitted that since Lau is an independent witness, his allegations that Chan was one of the owners of the Restaurant should provide sufficient factual basis for joining Chan in these proceedings.  Mr Chong cited the same Court of Appeal decision of Ng Chiu Wing v Yip Hoi Ching and anor[3] that he had already referred to when applying to join Fung as the 3^rd Respondent and submitted at joinder stage, that an applicant should be allowed to choose the person to sue.

C. The Opposition: no prima facie case against Chan

11.  Chan’s principal objection is primarily that the Applicant’s intended claim lacks merits.  It was contended that not only has the Applicant no direct evidence against him, the indirect evidence contained in Lau’s witness statement that the Applicant solely relied on was so tenuous and contradictory that the Applicant will be unlikely to be able to establish a prima facie case against him.

12.  In his opposing affirmations, Chan denied the allegations in Lau’s witness statement.  It was averred that Fung introduced him to work for the 1^st Respondent as an employee, working as “a barista or bartender, cashier and courier”[4] from December 2017 until his resignation in around May 2019.  Chan stated that he knew nothing about the alleged transfer of the business of the Restaurant to Fung, who appeared to him to have a managerial role. 

13.  Chan specifically denied Lau’s allegation of having paid Lau salaries in the capacity of a partner of Fung.  It was elaborated that Lau’s said perception might have been due to the work that Chan did as a cashier.  In the past, when Fung asked Chan to pay wages to employees, Chan had used the cash from the till to pay wages.

14.  Chan argued that as the Applicant’s intended claim on the basis of Lau’s bare allegations is devoid of merits, it followed that the Applicant’s “reasonable excuse for the delay” should also be untenable and not be accepted. Chan contended that this Joinder Summers is improper and fundamentally wrong, and that he will also suffer prejudice by the unnecessary incurring of costs should he be joined.

D. Discussion

15.  The legal principles governing an out-of-time application to join a party were already discussed in the Earlier Decision (at Section B), and they are equally applicable to this Joinder Summons. 

16.  There is little dispute that the Applicant only learnt of Chan’s alleged relationship with the business of the Restaurant from Lau’s witness statement after the exchange of witness statements on 4 June 2021.  As a consequence of Fung’s application for Legal Aid, these proceedings were further delayed by the statutory Legal Aid stay of 42 days from 30 August to 11 October 2021.  Before the Applicant issued the Joinder Summons, the legal aid counsel on behalf of the Applicant had on 15 October 2021 written to Chan to ask him to confirm if he was the boss of the Restaurant.  When no response was received, the Applicant issued the present Joinder Summons. 

17.  From the chronology of events outlined in the preceding paragraph, I’m inclined to accept that the Applicant’s reason for the delay is reasonable.  In fact, I do not think that Chan has seriously challenged the Applicant’s explanation for the delay. 

18.  Chan’s primary objection is his contention that the evidence the Applicant seeks to rely on in applying to join him in these proceedings is of such poor quality that it lacks merits. 

19.  Insofar as the contention on merits is concerned, it is important to bear in mind that this court should not embark on a mini trial when examining the merits of the Applicant’s intended claim.  No matter how tenuous Lau’s evidence may seem to be at this stage, this court is unable to resolve any factual disputes merely on Chan’s affirmation evidence.  The credibility of witnesses will have to be determined by a trial process of live evidence and cross-examination.

20.  In principle, unless a court “takes the view that the intended claim against the person sought to be joined is bound to fail or unless there are other special circumstances, the court should normally allow the plaintiff to choose his defendant”: see Ng Chiu Wing (supra.) at §15.

21.  From the evidence filed in these proceedings, I am under the broad impression that Chan’s relationship with the Restaurant might not have been as a mere employee as Chan asserted.

22.  According to Fong’s witness statement (§31), the stall (“Stall”)  where the accident allegedly happened was a market stall subject to the regulations of the Public Markets Regulation (Cap 132BO).  Fong, as the tenant of the Stall, was bound by the letting conditions of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (“FEHD”). He averred that after the business of the Restaurant was transferred to Fung, he no longer went to the Stall.  Due to his absence from the Stall, FEHD issued to him a warning letter telling him that he was found to have been in breach of

s 5(1)[5] of the Cap 132BO Regulation.  To satisfy the statutory requirements, Fong therefore caused Fung and Chan each to give a signed standard-form undertaking (“Undertaking”)  to the Director of FEHD.  In the signed Undertaking, Chan (and Fung)  confirmed that he was the registered assistant (登記助手)[6] of the Stall.  Fong stated that in fact that was not the case.  Chan and Fung were not his employees nor his assistants.

23.  The Undertakings signed by Chan and Fung exhibited to Fong’s witness statement were identical and they did not appear to have been properly completed.  The name of the tenant, the stall number and the date were all left blank.  Nonetheless, on the face of Fong’s allegation and the Undertakings each signed by Chan and Fung, it suggests that the signed Undertakings by Chan and Fung did not genuinely represent the true arrangement between Fong and Fung on the one hand, and Fung and Chan on the other.  Rather, the Undertakings were prepared for the sole purpose of satisfying the statutory requirements.

24.  The evidence discussed above in relation to the Undertakings will undoubtedly form part and parcel of Fong’s allegation against Fung, and to a certain extent Chan as well.  However, it is noted that when Fung filed his affirmation in opposition to the Applicant’s joinder application against him, Fung was completely silent in relation to the matter concerning his signed Undertaking.  Similarly, Chan has chosen not to adduce any evidence in relation to Fong’s allegations in relation to the Undertakings.

25.  In this case, there was no written employment agreement.  Neither was there any documentary evidence in relation to the alleged transfer of business of the Restaurant from Fong to Fung.  In the circumstances, it is reasonable for the Applicant to rely on the evidence of Lau’s witness statement to formulate his claim against Chan.

26.  At the trial, the Applicant will be required to prove his claim against Chan on the balance of probabilities, and in this Joinder Summons, to satisfy this court of the reasonable merits.  Thus the credibility of Lau would be a crucial issue at trial, which however cannot be determined at this interlocutory stage.  Although this court does not think that Lau was an independent witness as Mr Chong submitted, I believe that if his evidence is accepted by the court, it will likely be sufficient for a trial judge to find that Chan together with Fung were partners of the business of the Restaurant at the time of the accident.  In such case, Chan would likely be found jointly and severally liable together with Fung for paying the Applicant’s employees’ compensation.

27.  Notably, despite having been given an opportunity to file a second affirmation, Chan has not condescended to specificity.  Apart from his silence in relation to the Undertaking (see §24 above), Chan also appears to be evasive about the person who had paid him daily wages when it was averred at §12 of the 2^nd Affirmation that he “was just an employee of the Restaurant”.

28.  After having considered the evidence very carefully, I accept Mr Chong’s submissions that the intended claim is not bound to fail.  I am satisfied that it is reasonable to join Chan so that his true role can be resolved at the trial.

29.  Lastly, I also do not think that Chan’s complaint of the unnecessary incurring of costs will prejudice him because he will likely be awarded costs should the Applicant fail to prove his case against him.  Hence, I reject the prejudice argument.

E. Conclusion

30.  In conclusion, I am satisfied that the Applicant has provided reasonable excuse for the delay in seeking to join Chan in these proceedings.  I therefore grant leave to the Applicant to join Chan out of time as the 4^th Respondent.  There shall be a costs order nisi that the costs of the Joinder Summons be costs in the cause, which shall become an absolute order unless an application by summons to vary is issued within 14 days of the handing down of this Decision.  The Applicant’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

31.  I further direct the Applicant to write to this court within 14 days of the handing down of this Decision to seek consequential directions including the fixing of a date for a directions hearing.

32.  Lastly, I wish to thank Mr Chong and Mr Fong for their helpful submissions and assistance.

Mr Nic Chong, Legal Aid Counsel of the Legal Aid Department, for the applicant

Winnie Leung & Co, for the 1^st respondent, excused from participating

P C Woo & Co, for the 2^nd respondent, excused from participating

The 3^rd respondent is not represented, excused from participating

Mr Immanuel Fong, instructed by Ivan Tang & Co, for the intended 4^th respondent

DCEC 859/2019

[2021] HKDC 1549

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 859 OF 2019

--------------------------------------

--------------------------------------

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DECISION

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  On 15 April 2019, the Legally-Aided Applicant filed an Application for employees’ compensation (“Application”) pursuant to the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance[1] against his alleged employer, Fong Chow Wo (“Fong”) trading as Shing Cheong Restaurant (“Restaurant”), the 1^st Respondent.  In the Application, it was averred that he met an accident on 7 April 2018 while working for the 1^st Respondent at stall 29 of the Restaurant.

2.  At the first directions hearing on 4 October 2019, the 1^st Respondent was absent.  The 1^st Respondent’s non-participation in the proceedings led to an application by the Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board (“ECAFB”) to intervene in the proceedings.  On 29 May 2020, the court granted leave to the ECAFB to be joined as the 2^nd Respondent.

3.  It was only until 5 November 2020 that the 1^st Respondent was legally represented, and on 7 December 2020 it filed an answer denying that the Applicant was the former’s employee.  Significantly, the 1^st Respondent alleged that at the time of the alleged accident, the business of the Restaurant had already been transferred to a Fung Yuen Chiu (“Fung”), who was the Applicant’s friend.

4.  The 1^st Respondent’s alluding to Fung as the sole-proprietor of the Restaurant led to the issuance of this summons (“Summons”) on 25 February 2021 for leave to join Fung as the 3^rd Respondent in these proceedings out of time.  Fung opposed the Summons, and his former solicitors had prepared and filed an affirmation in opposition (“Fung’s Affirmation”) before Fung acted in person after the Applicant filed his 2^nd affirmation in reply to Fung’s Affirmation.

5.  The 1^st and the 2^nd Respondents having taken a neutral stance, this court ordered paper disposal of the Summons and directed the Applicant and Fung to lodge skeleton submissions.

6.  Since Fung became a litigant in person, he has not participated in the proceedings.  No skeleton submissions were lodged by Fung.  Hence, only the written submissions and the table of chronology were submitted by the Applicant’s Legal Aid counsel, Mr Chong.

B. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE

7.  This out-of-time joinder application was issued in pursuance of s 14(4), which empowers this court to grant leave to the Applicant to join Fung out of time if it is satisfied that there was reasonable excuse for the delay.

8.  The criteria for the determination as to what constitutes  “reasonable excuse” are authoritatively laid down in the Court of Appeal decision of Tsang LoiFatv Sun Fook Kong (formerly known as Sung Foo Kee Ltd)[2]. The relevant criteria are:-

(a)  The reasons for delay;

(b)  The length of delay;

(c)  Whether there is sufficient ground to support an award; and

(d)  Prejudice to a Respondent.

C. THE GROUNDS OF OPPOSITION

9.  Four grounds of opposition can be found in Fung’s Affirmation, namely:-

10.  First, there was insufficient evidence to prove Fung’s liability.

11.  Apart from denying the existence of any employment relationship and the occurrence of any accident, Fung denied that he had any legal liability for the reason of his admitted purchase of the chattels of the Restaurant from Fong on or about 19 November 2017.  This was because there was no transfer of the ownership of the business of the Restaurant.  Fong is still the registered sole-proprietor of the Restaurant.

12.  Fung further averred that the Applicant was a retired self-employed person, and was not his employee but his friend who had previously helped him do some repair and renovation work. As an expression of gratitude, Fung would buy him meals or give him some money.

13.  Second, there was no reasonable excuse for the delay.

14.  Fung stated that since the Applicant already knew of him before the alleged date of the accident; and that he has been legally represented all along, there was no reasonable excuse for him to only issue the Summons 10 months after the limitation period had expired.

15.  It was suggested that since the Applicant / his legal advisers had had ample time before the expiry of the limitation period to do the necessary inquiries to ascertain his relationship with the Applicant, the delay was inexplicable.

16.  Third, joining him to the existing proceedings is procedurally improper.

17.  It was suggested that the Applicant should have issued fresh proceedings against him instead of seeking to join him in the existing proceedings. He complained that by seeking to join him in the same proceedings, the Applicant is effectively denying him time bar and estoppel defenses.  Further, the adding of an additional party would escalate costs and prolong the case brought about by the amendments needed to be made to the Application.

18.  Fourth, Fung alleged that once he is joined in the proceedings, the costs and time that he would be required to spend would cause him prejudice.

D. DISCUSSION

D.1 Sufficient evidence to connect Fung

19.  Fung’s main ground of opposition is based on his assertion that the Applicant’s intended claim against him lacks merits as he was not the registered sole proprietor or a partner of the business of the Restaurant.

20.  According to the Business Registration records between the period of March 2019 and May 2020 of the business of the Restaurant exhibited as “CKF-1” to the Applicant’s supporting affirmation, Fong is the registered owner of stalls 18, 28 and 29 of the Restaurant.  The business commencement date for stalls 18 and 28, according to these records, was stated to be 1 November 2018, which was after the date of the alleged accident.

21.  However, it is pertinent to note that the commencement date of stall 29, where the alleged accident occurred, was 10 April 2000, which was before the date of the alleged accident.  Thus, in spite of the undisputable evidence that Fong was the registered owner of the business of the Restaurant at the time of the alleged accident and that there was an alleged transfer of the business between Fong and Fung[3], Fong appears to still be the registered sole-proprietor of the business of the Restaurant.  Based on all the available evidence, I consider that there is sufficient evidence to materially implicate Fung on liability despite the lack of documentary evidence that links Fung to the business of the Restaurant.

22.  At the joinder stage, as the Court of Appeal in Ng Chiu Wing v Yip Hoi Ching and another[4] has held in §15 that unless a court “takes the view that the intended claim against the person sought to be joined is bound to fail or unless there are other special circumstances, the court should normally allow the plaintiff to choose his defendant”.  The Court of Appeal further elaborated that:-

“…a plaintiff is entitled to choose the person against whom to proceed. It is for the plaintiff to decide whom he wishes to sue. He may or may not be successful in his claim. The fact that the court allows a plaintiff to join a person as an additional defendant does not mean that the court takes the view that the plaintiff is bound to succeed against that additional defendant. That is a matter for trial.”

23.  In the circumstances, I consider that the Applicant has provided sufficient grounds to show that Fung might likely be the actual owner of the Restaurant, and the employer of the Applicant.  Pertinently, it is noted that Fung’s allegations were entirely unsupported.  I do not consider that the intended claim against Fung is bound to fail.

D.2 Good reason shown

24.  After having looked at the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that the Applicant has shown reasonable excuse for the 10 months’ delay.  From the chronology of events and the business registration records of the Restaurant, I accept the Applicant’s explanation that it was only after the 1^st Respondent had filed the answer averring an alleged transfer of the business of the Restaurant to Fung did the Applicant have knowledge of the alleged transfer of business.  Despite the alleged transfer of the catering business of the Restaurant from Fong to Fung in November 2017, neither party has notified the Business Registration Office of the alleged transfer or updated the relevant business registration certificate.

25.  In the circumstances, I accept Mr Chong’s submissions that the Applicant had no way to find out that there was an alleged transfer of business to Fung when he commenced the present proceedings.

26.  In a similar out-of-time joinder application in Kaur Paramjit v Li On Na T/A新長發快餐& Ors[5] heard by this court, there was a delay of 3 years and 10 months.  The reason given for the delay was the Applicant’s ignorance of the alleged change of ownership of the restaurant where she worked.  I acceded to the Applicant’s joinder application and accepted her reason for the delay in the joinder application.

27.  A joinder application is undoubtedly fact-sensitive.  A previous decision has very little probative value.  However, Mr Chong’s reference to the above case, in my view, helps to show that the delay of 10 months in the present case, when viewed in context, is relatively short by comparison.

28.  I am satisfied that that the Applicant’s issuance of the Summons within two months after new materials were disclosed by the 1^st Respondent’s averments in the answer was done with reasonable promptitude.  In the circumstances, I am satisfied the Applicant has provided good and reasonable excuse.

29.  Since I am satisfied that the Applicant has provided reasonable excuse for his delay, I should allow the joinder application unless I am persuaded by Fung’s arguments of procedural impropriety and prejudice against the exercise of discretion.

30.  The prejudice argument is a short point, and I can dispose of it quickly.  I am not persuaded that Fung has suffered any prejudice as alleged.  I do not think that Fung has suffered any additional costs and delay by the joinder.  He will be subject to the same litigation burden as a normal respondent.

31.  Neither do I find that Fung’s objection on procedural impropriety has any merits.  In the case of Hong Chun Tak v Yip Kan Kee Contracting Company Limited & Anor[6], this court has rejected similar arguments by an intended respondent that commencing a fresh action was a better course.  At §48, I stated that:-

“The institution of a fresh action is, in my view, not only inconsistent with the spirit of the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reforms of saving costs and of promoting procedural economy if a new party could be joined in the same proceedings, it is, more importantly, not in line with the spirit of the ECO regime of informality and simplicity so that employees’ compensation proceedings can be resolved speedily.”

32.  Hence, I reject this ground of opposition.

E. CONCLUSION

33.  For the reasons stated above, I grant an order in terms of §§1 to 4, 6 to 8, and 11 of the Summons.  There shall be a costs order nisi in terms of §10, which shall become an absolute order unless an application by summons to vary is issued within 14 days of the handing down of this Decision.

34.  A directions hearing be held on 25 January 2022 at 3:00 p.m. at Court No. 26 of the District Court.

35.  Lastly, I wish to think Mr Chong for his assistance.

36.  If Fung requires interpretation of this Decision, he should contact my clerk to make the arrangement.