Case Detail

DCCJ 3937/2020

[2022] HKDC 17

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3937 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

	ALUHOUSE COMPANY LIMITED 鋁遊家有限公司	Plaintiff
and
	SUCCESS LANE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED	Defendant

-------------------------

Before:

His Honour Judge MK Liu (Paper Disposal)

Dates of the Defendant’s Written Submissions:	3 and 31 December 2021
Date of the Plaintiff’s Written Submissions:	17 December 2021
Date of Decision:	7 January 2022

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DECISION

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1. On 23 September 2021, I dismissed D’s appeal against a decision made by Master Jocelyn Leung on 15 June 2021. On 27 September 2021, I handed down reasons for dismissing the appeal (“the Reasons”)[1]. D intends to take the matter to the Court of Appeal, and seeks leave to appeal by a summons dated 6 October 2021 (“the summons”). This decision should be read together with the Reasons. For ease of reference, the abbreviations used in the Reasons are adopted herein.

2. I have directed that the summons be determined on paper without an oral hearing. The parties have lodged written submissions pursuant to those directions. All the written submissions have been duly considered by me.

3. Subsequent to my decision made on 23 September 2021, on 28 September 2021, the Registrar made an order to consolidate DCCJ 3937/2020 and DCCJ 4051/2020, and gave directions concerning, inter alia, the pleadings in the consolidated action. For avoidance of doubt, the summons would be determined by reference to the pleadings before the court in DCCJ 3937/2020 at the hearing on 23 September 2021.

THE PRINCIPLES

4. The principles concerning leave to appeal are well known. Leave to appeal from this court to the Court of Appeal can only be granted if the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard^{^[2]}. Reasonable prospects of success involve the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be reasonable and therefore more than fanciful, without having to be probable^{^[3]}.

5. In respect of admission of new evidence in an appeal, the Ladd and Marshall^{^[4]} conditions apply^{^[5]}. Further evidence is admissible on an appeal only where such evidence:-

(1) could not have been obtained at the trial or at the hearing with reasonable diligence;
(2) would or might, if believed, have a very important effect on the mind of the court; and
(3) is of a sort which inherently is not improbable.

NO NEW EVIDENCE

6. D is trying to introduce new evidence in the appeal. D has filed the affirmation of Madam Yung Mei Chun (“Madam Yung”) dated 6 October 2021 (“the affirmation”) in support of the summons. Exhibit 1 to the affirmation is a list of projects obtained from P’s official website (“the list of projects”). The list of projects is not evidence in the hearing before the Master nor evidence before me in the hearing on 23 September 2021. That list cannot be evidence in the intended appeal to the Court of Appeal for the following reasons:-

(1) There has not been any explanation as to why the list of projects could not be obtained by D with reasonable diligence prior to the hearing before the Master.
(2) Further, it cannot be said that the list of projects would have a material impact on the outcome of the appeal. There is no evidence showing that any project mentioned in the said list was contracted by P during the term of the Consultancy Agreement.

7. In my view, D is not entitled to introduce the said new evidence in the intended appeal.

GROUNDS OF THE INTENDED APPEAL

8. The affirmation and D’s written submissions are prolix. It is not easy to distil the proper grounds of appeal from those documents. What D should do is to set out the concise grounds which are reasonably arguable in a draft notice of appeal. However, this has not been done by D. What D has done is contrary to the guidance repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal. As said by Lam VP in Gotland Enterprises Limited v Kwok Chi Yau^{^[6]}:-

“70. A notice of appeal should only set out grounds which in counsel’s view are reasonably arguable. The practice of lodging an appeal with ill-considered and unsatisfactory grounds of appeal, particularly those that provide no more than a lengthy critique of the judgment rather identify a justifiable basis for the Court of Appeal interfering in the decision of the judge below, is not acceptable. In future, the court will exercise tighter case management of the appeal process and the Registrar may bring such illegitimate notices of appeal to the attention of a judge for striking out consideration. In modern litigation ethos, appeals brought without proper grounds are regarded as abuse of process.”

See also Lam VP’s dictum in Yap Sui Kong v Yip Fong Tim^{^[7]}.

9. I am grateful to the summary prepared by Mr Alexsander Wong for P[8], in which Mr Wong has fairly summarized the grounds of appeal which can be seen from the papers filed by D. Those grounds are as follows:-

(1) this court erred in partially and selectively discussed the circumstances in the pleadings in respect of the dispute over the effective termination date;
(2) this court erred in holding that D’s pleaded case is limited to projects contracted during the term of the Consultancy Agreement, and this court ought to hold that D’s pleaded case covers projects contracted after the termination of the Consultancy Agreement;
(3) this court erred in concluding that there is no sufficient evidence showing that apart from the 5 pleaded projects, P has contracted any other project during the Consultancy Period;
(4) this court erred in concluding that the disclosure ordered for item 4 should be limited to the 5 named projects in the pleadings;
(5) this court erred in refusing Item 5;
(6) this court erred in finding that Item 6 is irrelevant to D’s entitlement for commission under the Consultancy Agreement;
(7) D’s grounds for seeking discovery of Items 7 and 23 are the same as those under Items 4 and 5, and this court erred in not allowing discovery of these items;
(8) this court erred in handling the irregularity in relation to the obtaining of the Amended Order by P;
(9) this court erred in finding that the hearing before me is not an appropriate occasion to deal with D’s complaint of the format of the Management Accounts disclosed by P pursuant to the Master’s order; and
(10) this court erred in awarding costs, including giving a certificate for counsel, to P.

NO REASONABLE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS

10. In my view, none of the grounds put forward by D is reasonably arguable.

Ground 1

11. In [11(2)] of the Reasons, I have summarized the parties’ respective pleaded cases concerning the effective termination date of the Consultancy Agreement. It cannot be said that I have erred in any aspect in this summary. Further, the disclosure order made by the Master is made on the assumption that the effective termination date as suggested by D (i.e. 12 July 2020) is correct. That is why documents relating to Penny’s Bay Phase 2 (contracted between 15 June 2020 and 12 July 2020) have been ordered to be disclosed.

12. I do not see in what way this ground may assist D in the intended appeal. There is no merit in Ground 1.

Ground 2

13. In [14] of the Reasons, I said:-

“14. P pleaded that D is only entitled to commissions based on projects “contracted during the terms of the Consultancy Agreement” (“the Consultancy Period”). This is not disputed by D.”

14. D now says that it is D’s pleaded case that D should also be entitled to commissions from post-termination projects. With respect, this is not the case.

(1) At [22] of the statement of claim, P has pleaded that D is only entitled to commissions based on projects “contracted during the terms of the Consultancy Agreement”, in line with Appendix A of the Consultancy Agreement.
(2) At [33] of the defence, D is referring to its entitlement of projects contracted during the term of the Consultancy Agreement. Nowhere in the pleadings did D advance a case that it is also entitled to post-termination project’s commissions.

15. Ground 2 is plainly wrong.

Ground 3

16. As to why I said that there is no sufficient evidence showing that P had contracted the Other Projects during the Consultancy Period, I have set out my analysis in [25(2)] of the Reasons. I am not persuaded that I have erred in that analysis. Ground 3 is not reasonably arguable.

Ground 4

17. The only submission put forward by D under this ground is that the “proviso” in the pleadings that “Exact number of projects and contract sums to be verified/discovered from P”[9] is sufficient for the court to order disclosure of the documents relating to some other projects. As submitted by Mr Wong, in the absence of evidence showing the existence of the Other Projects and that P is in possession of the documents relating to the Other Projects, both the Existence and Possession Requirements are not satisfied. In accordance with the established principles, disclosure should not be ordered in these circumstances. Furthermore, the pleading of the “proviso” is no substitute for particularizing the claim. Disclosure cannot be ordered on the basis of a wholly-unparticularized claim.

Ground 5

18. My reasons for refusing Item 5 have been set out in [25] and [26] of the Reasons. I am not persuaded that I have erred in any aspect in the analysis. Ground 5 is not reasonably arguable.

Ground 6

19. D’s pleaded case is that commissions are based upon the contract sums. I have explained why I refused Items 6 in [28] to [30] of the Reasons. I do not think that D has put forward any argument which shows that I may have erred in my analysis. There is no merit in Ground 6.

Ground 7

20. The reasons for refusing Items 7 and 23 are the same as those for refusing Items 4 and 5. For the reasons set out in the above, Ground 7 is also not reasonably arguable.

Ground 8

21. My comments on the Amended Order as set out in [4] to [6] of the Reasons are irrelevant for the purpose of assessing the merits of D’s intended appeal. Simply, Ground 8 cannot be a ground in support of D’s intended appeal.

Ground 9

22. Similarly, my comments on the format of management accounts disclosed by P as set out in [7] of the Reasons are irrelevant for the purpose of assessing the merits of D’s intended appeal. Ground 9 cannot be a ground of appeal at all.

Ground 10

23. The Court of Appeal will not interfere with the exercise of a judge’s discretion in the award of costs unless it was shown that he failed to exercise the discretion, or exercised it upon a false principle, or did not exercise it judicially or the exercise of discretion was demonstrably flawed.[10]

24. The general rule is that costs should follow the event. Having dismissed D’s appeal against the Master’s order, following the general rule, D should pay costs of the appeal to P. Although I have not required Mr Wong to elaborate his submissions orally in the hearing of the appeal on 23 September 2021, that does not mean engagement of counsel is not necessary or not appropriate. In fact, before the hearing of the appeal, counsel has prepared detailed written submissions, and by which counsel has provided me very helpful assistance. With all these in mind, I made the costs order as set out in [34] of the Reasons.

25. There is no merit in Ground 10.

No other reason

26. For the sake of completeness, I have also considered whether there is any other reason why the appeal should be heard in the interests of justice. In my view, there is no such reason.

Disposition

27. I dismiss the summons. Costs of the summons should follow the event and be to P, with a certificate for counsel. Those costs are summarily assessed at HK$35,000 and payable forthwith.

28. Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for the helpful assistance rendered to the court.

	( MK Liu )
	District Judge

Mr Alexander Wong, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for the plaintiff

The defendant acting in person

[1] [2021] HKDC 1221

[2] District Court Ordinance, s. 63A(2)

[3] SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125, at [17]

[4] [1954] 1 WLR 1489

[5] Rules of the High Court, Order 59 rule 10(2); Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022, Volume 1, §59/10/8

[6] CACV 260/2014, 19 January 2016

[7] [2018] 4 HKLRD 791, [18]

[8] P’s written submissions dated 17 December 2021, [8]. I disagree with D that P has tried to mislead the court in any way in this summary.

[9] D’s Defence,[16], note 1

[10] Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022, Volume 1, §62/2/11.

DCCJ 3937/2020

[2021] HKDC 1221

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3937 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN

	ALUHOUSE COMPANY LIMITED 鋁遊家有限公司	Plaintiff
	and
	SUCCESS LANE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED	Defendant

________________________

Before: His Honour Judge MK Liu in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing: 23 September 2021

Date of Decision: 23 September 2021

Date of Reasons for Decision: 27 September 2021

________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________

1. By a summons dated 12 November 2020 (“the summons”), the defendant (“D”) sought specific discovery of 23 categories of documents from the plaintiff (“P”). The application was heard by Master Jocelyn Leung on 15 June 2021. By the time of the hearing, D only pursued its application in relation to Items 4, 5, 6, 7 and 23 set out in the summons. After hearing the parties, the Master ordered that:-

(1)  P do provide and file “Management Accounts of the Plaintiff for the year 2020/2021 to October 2020” in relation to the following 5 projects pleaded in paragraph 16b of the Defence and Counterclaim (“the 5 Projects”)  within 7 days:-
(a)  DSD Shek Wu Hui Project Group
(b)  Kai Tak Project
(c)  The China Harbour Project at Cha Kwo Ling
(d)  Penny’s Bay Phase 1A
(e)  Penny’s Bay Phase 2
(2)  Application for discovery of Items 5, 6, 7 and 23 be dismissed.
(3)  1/3 of the costs of the application be paid by D to P, to be taxed if not agreed.

2. On 23 June 2021, D lodged an appeal against the Master’s decision. On 23 September 2021, after hearing submissions, I dismissed the appeal with costs. These are my reasons.

Preliminary matters

3. Before going to the merits of the appeal, I would briefly mention two complaints raised by D, namely:-

(1) Amendments to the Order dated 15 June 2021 made by the Master on 21 July 2021 (“the Amended Order”); and
(2) Format of the management accounts disclosed by P.

4. In my view, these matters are not relevant to the merits of the appeal.

5. Events relating to the Amended Order are as follows:-

(1) In the hearing on 15 June 2021, the Master made an order that the discovery in relation to Item 4 in the summons is limited to the 5 Projects (“the Limitation”). D does not dispute that the Master did make this order in the hearing on 15 June 2021.[1]
(2) However, the Limitation has not been set out in the order sealed on 29 June 2021. P then made an ex parte application to rectify the clerical error. On 21 July 2021, the Master granted the application and amended the sealed order to truly reflect the order made by her in the hearing on 15 June 2021.

6. D complained that P should not make an ex parte order to amend the order sealed on 29 June 2021 and D should be given notice of the application. In my view, it would be more proper for P to seek amendments to the order sealed on 29 June 2021 by an inter partes application. However, D has not been prejudiced by this irregularity in any way. The simple indisputable fact is that the order made by the Master in the hearing on 15 June 2021 is the one now set out in the Amended Order.

7. Pursuant to the order made by the Master, P has disclosed the management accounts relating to the 5 Projects on 17 September 2021. D complained that the management accounts disclosed by P are not in correct format and P has not complied with the order made by the Master. I make no comment on the merit of this complaint. The appeal is not an appropriate occasion to deal with this complaint.

The principles

8. An appeal hearing under Order 58 of the Rules of the District Court is a de novo hearing. The hearing before me is an actual rehearing as if the application came before me for the first time[2].

9. The principles governing specific discovery have been set out by Coleman J in Delco Participation BV v HWH Holdings Limited[3], which are as follows:-

(1)  The court should first consider whether there is “jurisdiction” to make an order for specific discovery, and where there is jurisdiction, to go on to consider whether the discretion should be exercised.
(2)  In considering the question of jurisdiction, 3 requirements need to be satisfied:-
(a)  There is sufficient evidence that the documents exist (“the Existence Requirement”);
(b)  The documents are relevant to the matters in issue, which is determined by reference to the pleadings (“the Relevance Requirement”); and
(c)  There is sufficient evidence that the documents are in the possession, custody or power of the other party (“the Possession Requirement”).
(3)  Even if jurisdiction is satisfied, the court retains a discretion whether or not to order disclosure.
(4)  Any order must identify with precision the document or documents or categories of documents which are required to be disclosed.
(5)  Discovery should be sensibly controlled and should not be allowed to be used as an oppressive weapon. The court ought to have in mind the objectives of costs effectiveness, proportionality, procedural economy and ensure fairness between the parties.
(6)  “Fishing” – being the search for material in the hope of being able to raise allegations of facts, as opposed to the solicitation of evidence to support allegations of fact which have already been bona fide raise with adequate particulars – is not allowed.

Issues defined by the pleadings

10. The major difference between the parties is whether the Relevance Requirement has been satisfied. In order to investigate this matter, it would be necessary to first set out the issues defined by the pleadings.

11. The issues defined by the pleadings are as follows:-

(1)  By a consultancy agreement entered into by P and D on 16 September 2019 (“the Consultancy Agreement”), P engaged D to provide consultancy services on terms as stipulated in the Consultancy Agreement.
(2)  On 12 June 2020, P served on D a notice to terminate the Consultancy Agreement (“the Notice”)  where P sought to terminate the Consultancy Agreement effectively on 15 June 2020. By an email dated 15 June 2020, D acknowledged the termination and endorsed the Notice by signing in return. In the email, D issued an invoice for notice in lieu of 1-month termination period, acknowledging effective early termination. However, in these proceedings, D sought to advance a case that the effective termination date was 12 July 2020.
(3)  Upon termination of the Consultancy Agreement, a dispute arose as to the amount of fees payable by P to D:-
(a)  P’s case is that D is only entitled to:-
(i)  HK$38,000 as service fees from 16 May 2020 to 15 June 2020;
(ii)  HK$34,200 as payment in lieu of notice of termination (i.e. the period between 15 June to 12 July 2020); and
(iii)  HK$242,522.60 as commissions in accordance with the terms of the Consultancy Agreement.
(b)  On the other hand, D is claiming for the following:
(i)  HK$336,000 as retainer/service fees; and
(ii)  HK$1,549,358.89 as commissions.

12. D’s application for specific discovery is concerned largely with the dispute as to the amount of commissions payable (“the Commission Dispute”).

13. Appendix A of the Consultancy Agreement contained a provision as to a 0.5% commissions payable to D, which is as follows:-

“Commissions – [D] shall be eligible for a commission on those Hong Kong projects based on the amount of work value of these projects contracted by the [P] during the term of this Agreement.”

14. P pleaded that D is only entitled to commissions based on projects “contracted during the terms of the Consultancy Agreement” (“the Consultancy Period”). This is not disputed by D.

15. The real dispute arises from Clause V of the Consultancy Agreement containing provisions regarding termination. Clause V(2) provides:-

“Upon termination, [D] shall be entitled to the monthly retainer fee on a pro-rata basis and commission in accordance with the work completed up to the time of termination.”

16. P’s pleaded case is that commission is payable on termination for (a) projects contracted by P during the Consultancy Period and (b) based on the value of work completed by P in respect of these projects.

17. In the pleadings, although D does not dispute that commission is payable for projects contracted during the Consultancy Period, D denies that commissions should be calculated based on value of work completed by P. D’s pleaded case is that commission should be based on the full contract sum rather than work value completed at the time of termination.

18. This is a matter of contractual interpretation. The Commission Dispute is the main dispute defined in the pleadings.

Item 4 – Management Accounts of P

19. D contends that the Limitation imposed by the Master concerning documents in Item 4 should be removed. D also seeks to expand the scope of Item 4 to include “audited financial statements”.

20. Item 4 in the summons is “Management Account of [P] for the year 2020/21 to October 2020”. “Audited financial statements” have not been mentioned in the summons at all. D is not entitled to seek discovery of these in the appeal.

21. While I agree that the documents in Item 4 relating to the 5 Projects are documents relevant to the issues in dispute as defined by the pleadings, the documents not relating to the 5 Projects are clearly not relevant. Plainly, the Limitation is necessary and appropriate.

22. D seeks to enlarge the scope of Item 4 as ordered by the Master by saying that D may be entitled to have commission in relation to projects contracted by P after the Consultancy Period. With respect, this is not a point pleaded by D. In the Defence and Counterclaim, D has not put forward a case that it is entitled to commission in relation to projects contracted by P outside the Consultancy Period.

23. Approaching the matter as if the same came before me for the first time, I would order discovery of the documents in Item 4 subject to the Limitation. I would affirm the Master’s decision on this point.

Item 5 – Copy of all job references of P in Hong Kong since its incorporation

24. D contends that the job references are relevant for showing:-

(1)  the number of projects contracted during the Consultancy Period;
(2)  the work-in-progress for projects contracted after the termination of the Consultancy Agreement; and
(3)  P’s track record.

25. In my view, there is no merit in these submissions.

(1)  In [16] of the Defence, D has set out that the projects contracted by P during the Consultancy Period are the 5 Projects, but at the same time expressly said that “Exact number of projects … to be verified/discovered from [P]”. Hence, D refuses to accept that the projects contracted by P during the Consultancy Period are the 5 Projects only.
(2)  In the hearing, D said that during the Consultancy Period, apart from the 5 Projects, P had contracted some other projects (“the Other Projects”). In my view, there is no sufficient evidence showing that apart from the 5 Projects, P has contracted any other project during the Consultancy Period. The Existence Requirement has not been satisfied.
(a)  D said that P had admitted in P’s official    website that P had contracted the Other Projects   during the Consultancy Period. However, D has   not produced any documentary evidence    showing the alleged admission made by P in its    official website.
(b)  D heavily relied upon an email from D to P sent    at 11:50 pm on 30 January 2021 (“D’s Email”), in which D mentioned 5 other projects. On 5   February 2021, P’s solicitors have given a written reply to this email (“P’s Reply”). Having    examined D’s email and P’s Reply, I am of the    view that these exchanges do not constitute    sufficient evidence showing that during the   Consultancy Period, P has contracted some other    projects.
(c)  In D’s Email, D said:
“Please provide a list of projects contracted during the consultancy period.
Please also provide the contract dates of the projects per the attached files.” (Emphasis added)
The names of 5 other projects were attached at the end of this email.
(d)  The plain meaning of D’s Email is not saying that the 5 other projects were contracted during the Consultancy Period. D was merely requesting for the contract dates of the 5 other projects mentioned in the email.
(e)  In P’s Reply, while P has given some comments on D’s request concerning the 5 other projects, P has not said that the 5 other projects were contracted during the Consultancy Period.
(f)  A fair and reasonable reading of D’s Email and P’s Reply cannot lead to the conclusion that these exchanges show the existence of some other projects contracted by P during the Consultancy Period.
(3)  As to any project contracted by P after the Consultancy Period, this would not be relevant. See [22] above.
(4)  The purpose of obtaining P’s track record is trying to show that D had assisted P to increase its turnover. However, whether D has assisted P to increase its turnover would not affect D’s entitlement under the Consultancy Agreement. As such, the discovery of the track record would not be relevant to the dispute in these proceedings.

26. I also agree with P that the documents sought to be disclosed under Item 5:-

(1)  Do not affect interpretation of the Consultancy Agreement;
(2)  Do not affect the likelihood or otherwise of the parties entering into variations to the Consultancy Agreement; and
(3)  Do not affect the circumstances of termination.

27. For the reasons above, Item 5 should be refused.

Item 6 – Copies of certificates of qualified technical competent persons employed by P

28. D submits that:-

(1)  The disclosure of certificates of qualified technical competent persons is required to resolve the disputes as to what extent D had completed its work at the time of termination of the Consultancy Agreement.
(2)  This shows whether P understood the quality supervision requirement under the Buildings Ordinance.
(3)  Copies of certificates of qualified technical competent persons can show that P in fact did not have a proven track record and did not have a competent management team in handling complexity of the Penny’s Bay Phase 1 Project.

29. There is no valid basis in support of the application seeking discovery of the documents in Item 6.

(1)  It is not P’s case that D had not completed D’s work. P’s pleaded case is simply that the terms of the Consultancy Agreement is such that commission should be calculated on the basis “work value completed by P” at the time of termination of the Consultancy Agreement. D’s pleaded case is that the commission is based upon the contract sums. D is not saying that its entitlement for commission is linked to the extent of its own work. No party is suggesting D had not performed its own work. The dispute is simply to determine what is D’s entitlement under the terms of the Consultancy Agreement.
(2)  P’s knowledge of the Buildings Ordinance would not affect D’s entitlement under the Consultancy Agreement.
(3)  P’s track record would also not affect D’s entitlement under the Consultancy Agreement.

30. Item 6 must be refused.

Item 7 – All job references and projects in progress with the start and completion dates for the year 2019 to 2020

31. D’s grounds for seeking discovery of this item are the same as those under Items 4 and 5. For the reasons set out in the above, Item 7 cannot be allowed.

Item 23 – Copies of Letter of Awards of all MiC Offices in Hong Kong for other clients from 2019 to 2020

32. D’s grounds for seeking discovery of this Item are the same as those under Items 4, 5 and 7. For the reasons set out in the above, Item 23 must also be refused.

Disposition

33. For the reasons mentioned in the above, I am of the view that the Master’s decision is entirely correct. The appeal must be dismissed.

34. Costs should follow the event. I order that costs of the appeal be paid by D to P forthwith, with a certificate for counsel. Those costs be summarily assessed at HK$50,000.

35. I thank the parties for the assistance rendered to the court.

	(MK Liu)
	District Judge

Mr Alexsander Wong, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for the plaintiff

The defendant appeared in person

[1] See D’s Written Submissions dated 17 September 2021, [11(b)]

[2] Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021, Volume 1, §58/1/2

[3] [2021] HKCFI 869

ALUHOUSE CO LTD v. SUCCESS LANE DEVELOPMENT LTD

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