Case Detail

DCMP 4781/2022

[2026] HKDC 181

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 4781 OF 2022

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BETWEEN
	KONEW CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED	Plaintiff
	and
	WONG KONG HEUNG (黃港香) formerly known as WONG KWONG HEUNG CANDY (黃廣香)	Defendant

--------------------------------------

Before:

Deputy District Judge Damian Wong in Chambers (Open to public)

Date of Hearing:	19 December 2025
Date of Decision:	3 February 2026

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DECISION

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INTRODUCTION

1. By the Decision dated 7 May 2025[1] (“Discovery Decision”), I dismissed the Defendant’s application for discovery dated 19 February 2025 (“DiscoveryApplication”). This is the Defendant’s application dated 22 September 2025 for leave to appeal against the Discovery Decision out of time (“Leave Application”).

BACKGROUND

2. I have set out the background of the present case in the Discovery Decision. For easy reference, I will restate the background here with an update on events which have occurred since the Discovery Decision.

3. The Plaintiff (“P”) is a licensed moneylender in Hong Kong and the Defendant (“D”) was its customer.

4. On 13 January 2021, P lent to D a principal sum of HK$2,000,000 (“1^st Loan”) to be repaid by 180 monthly instalments, at interest rate of 16.80% per annum, pursuant to a loan agreement in Chinese (“1^st Loan Agreement”).

5. On 8 December 2021, P lent to D another principal sum of HK$400,000 (“2^nd Loan”), to be repaid by 60 monthly instalments, also at 16.80% per annum, pursuant to another loan agreement in Chinese (“2^nd Loan Agreement”).

6. The 1^st Loan Agreement and the 2^nd Loan Agreement (collectively referred to as “Loan Agreements”) were secured by mortgages in favour of P and granted by D over a property beneficially owned by D (“Property”).

7. D defaulted in repaying the monthly instalments of the 1^st Loan on 10 August 2022 (i.e. the 19^th instalment) and of the 2^nd Loan on 5 August 2022 (i.e. the 8^th instalment). Accordingly, by reason of terms of the Loan Agreements, the whole balance of the 1^st Loan and the 2^nd Loan and all accrued interest became immediately due and payable.

8. Despite repeated requests and demands by P, D had failed and/or refused to pay to P the outstanding balance.

9. P commenced the present action on 15 December 2022.

10. In D’s affirmations, D claims that she has a valid defence to P’s claim, on the basis that:-

(a)  P did not keep its alleged promise to cancel the registration of a mortgage dated 23 December 2029 over D’s Property prior to D’s entry into the 1^st Loan Agreement;
(b)  D was misleadingly persuaded by a staff member of P to enter into the Loan Agreements with P, such that D commercially lost out as she had to pay extra interest compared to another potential loan agreement with another finance company and the financing structure of the Loan Agreements affected her future borrowing power; and
(c)  The Loan Agreements were illegal for charging payment of compound interest.

11. D counterclaims HK$10,000,000 for alleged financial hardship caused by P’s alleged actions.

12. By the summons dated 15 December 2022, P applied for summary judgment against D. The application was heard by Master Andrea Yu on 23 September 2024 (“Master Hearing”).

13. In the Decision dated 28 October 2024[2] (“Master Decision”), Master Yu found that there was no merit in D’s defence:-

(a)  The non-cancellation of the original mortgage bears no relation at all to D’s current liability under the Loan Agreements;
(b)  D’s allegation of P’s misrepresentation is not believable, with doubt that the facts relied upon by D constitute any valid ground for misrepresentation, when D did not dispute that she could read English, was commercially experienced in taking out loans and had signed the Loan Agreements; and
(c)  Factually, no compound interest was charged.

14. Thus, Master Yu entered money judgment against D. D appealed against the Master Decision.

15. Before the hearing of D’s appeal against the Master Decision, D took out the Discovery Application on 19 February 2025 for discovery of documents for the purpose of appeal.

16. By the Discovery Decision dated 7 May 2025, I dismissed the Discovery Application but I allowed D to obtain the audio recording of the Master Hearing upon payment of the necessary fee.[3]

17. D’s appeal against the Master Decision was heard by Deputy District Judge Alan Ng on 23 July 2025 but D was absent at the hearing. D alleges that she was admitted to hospital on 21 July 2025 and was only discharged in the afternoon of 23 July 2025.

18. The hearing of D’s appeal proceeded in D’s absence. After hearing the submissions from P’s Counsel Mr. Tommy Cheung, the learned Deputy District Judge agreed with the Master Decision and dismissed D’s appeal against it.

19. On 22 September 2025, which is about 4.5 months after the handing down of the Discovery Decision, D took out the Leave Application seeking leave to appeal against the Discovery Decision out of time.

20. On 5 November 2025, D applied for leave to “set aside” the decision of Deputy District Judge Alan Ng out of time.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

21. The relevant legal principles are well-settled. I would adopt the following summary helpfully set out by Mr. Cheung in his submissions:-

(a)  For interlocutory appeals, leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard; Jose Miranda Da Costa Junior v Lorenzo Yih, HCA 156/2010, 28 April 2014 at §8; Yan Yu Ying v Leung Wing Hei [2025] HKCA 971 at §15;
(b)  When the decision under challenge is an exercise of discretion and a case management decision, the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless the Judge “misunderstood the law or the evidence or the exercise of his discretion was plainly wrong such that it was outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible”; Yan Yu Ying at §16;
(c)  As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeal has emphasised more than once that “an appeal against a case management decision should not be lightly brought”, as it is “contrary to a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy promoted as one of the underlying objectives in Order 1A rule 1 of the RHC, not to mention that the resources of the court must be distributed fairly such that the appeal court should not be concerned with unmeritorious appeals against the exercise of judicial discretion”. In this regard, the appellant faces a “very high hurdle”; West Coast International Trading Ltd v Chelesa Art Co Ltd, HCMP 1228/2014, 3 September 2014 at §5; K&L Gates v Navin Kumar Aggarwal [2019] HKCA 350 at §15;
(d)  In considering whether to grant an extension of time for leave to appeal, the Court will consider the following factors: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) whether there were any satisfactory reasons for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended appeal; and (iv) whether the other party will suffer any prejudice if an extension is given (although the absence of any prejudice does not mean that an extension should be granted); Chow Kin Hang Ali v Secretary for Justice for and on behalf of Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1814 at §17.

DELAY

22. The application for leave for an interlocutory appeal should be made within 14 days after the decision. In other words, there is a delay of 4 months in the Leave Application which is not insubstantial.

23. D confirms that she received a copy of the Discovery Decision a few days after handing down and knew that the Discovery Application was dismissed.

24. Despite knowing the outcome of the Discovery Application, D did not apply for leave to appeal but instead proceeded to prepare for the Appeal Hearing. Pursuant to the directions given at §21 of the Discovery Decision, on 23 June 2025, D sent the transcript of the selective part of the audio recording of the Master Hearing to P for agreement.

25. D explains that she did not immediately apply for leave to appeal because she did not realize that audio recording of the Master Hearing was “incomplete”. According to D, the said audio recording does not include the conversation between Mr. Cheung and his instructing solicitor Ms. Chan about the cheque given by Da Sing Bank’s solicitors to P’s solicitors, representing the net sale proceeds of the Property. D says that, as the Master Hearing was conducted in English, it took her a long time to understand the content and find that such part was missing and made the decision to appeal.

26. With respect, I am unable to understand D’s explanation.

27. Firstly, the audio recording of the Master Hearing was provided by the Judiciary and there is nothing to show that it had been tampered with. The so-called “missing part” concerns the conversation between Mr. Cheung and Ms. Chan at the Master Hearing. This conversation is privileged and D is not entitled to obtain it even if it was recorded.

28. More importantly, it is difficult to see the causal relationship between the alleged incompleteness of the audio recording of the Master Hearing and D’s decision whether to appeal against the Discovery Decision or not. If D considered that I was wrong in dismissing the Discovery Application, she should apply for leave to appeal regardless of whether the audio recording of the Master Hearing was incomplete or not. If her concern was only on the content of the audio recording, she should seek clarification or assistance from the Judiciary, rather than bringing the Leave Application.

29. In any event, D’s explanation accounts only for the delay from the handing down of the Discovery Decision to 23 June 2025. As indicated above, D sent the transcript of the selected part of the audio recording to P’s solicitors for their agreement on 23 June 2025. By that time, she must have reviewed the audio recording and realized the alleged incompleteness of the same. There is no explanation on this 3 months’ delay from 23 June 2025 to 22 September 2025.

30. Having considered D’s explanation, I agree with Mr. Cheung that there is no good reason for the delay and her present application for leave to appeal out of time can be dismissed on this ground alone.

MERIT

31. In addition to the lack of reasonable explanation for delay, I am of the view that leave should not be granted as D’s intended appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.

32. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Cheung, the Discovery Decision is a case management decision involving the exercise of discretion and it is well established that the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless the judge misunderstood the law or the evidence or the exercise of his discretion was plainly wrong such that it was outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible; Yan Yu Ying §16; K&L Gates §15.

33. In D’s submissions, she simply repeated the same arguments advanced at the hearing of the Discovery Application and failed to explain why the Discovery Decision was plainly wrong.

34. In the supporting affirmation filed on 22 September 2025, D made numerous serious allegations against the Judges, Mr. Cheung and Ms. Chan:-

(a)  At §9, D alleges that “this is the individual case where the Judges prejudiced against [Mr. Cheung] (sic), because they are all in the same professional field as legal sector”[4];
(b)  At §18, D alleges that “I deeply realize a judge wanted to protect another judge’s own interests, can go to great lengths to tamper with evidence and hand it over to the [P], which is extremely unfair and disrespectful behaviour to [D]”;
(c)  At §19, D alleges that “Mr. Cheung, and Ms. Chan presented false testimonies in court, therefore, The Judge wanted to protect the dignity of the court and the criminal suspicions of the lawyers, thus erasing the related parts of evidence [of] the audio recording”;
(d)  At §40, D alleges that “Judges’ intention is solely to assist the plaintiff in winning this case, preserving the Dignity of the barrister while sacrificing fairness” and “It is extremely unfair, cruel, and tyrannical, and it also oppresses a defendant who has no legal representation. Their actions, aside from being illegal, also represent a tremendous disgrace to the judicial system”.

35. These are very serious allegations but D has failed to provide any evidence, let alone cogent and compelling evidence, in support. The allegations are speculative and totally unfound. I have no hesitation to reject them.

36. I wish to point out that Mr. Cheung conducted the two hearings before me with upmost fairness to D. Despite D was acting in person, Mr. Cheung never took any advantage of the situation and I failed to see any sign of oppression over D as alleged.

37. In the recent case of Norman Guy Donald v Li Pak Heun[2025] HKCA 898, Chow JA firmly stated at §59 that the making of “serious allegations against the Administrators and the Judge by [the 3^rd defendant] without the slightest of foundation is reprehensible”.

38. Similar strong comments were made by To J in Park Young Sook v Melloy [2010] 5 HKC 329 as follows:-

“26. Ms Park also inferred a conspiracy from the fact that HH Judge Bebe Chu had worked in the same law firm as Mr Chu before she joined the Family Court and Ms Park suspected they are related as they have the same surname. She produced photographs depicting Judge Chu in a dinner reception with Mr Chu. Through that connection, she inferred that Judge Melloy had colluded with Mr Chu. That is speculation to the extreme and can hardly justify the very serious allegation against two judges acting in the performance of their judicial function.” (emphasis added)

39. In my view, these serious but unfound allegations should not have been made by D.

CONCLUSION

40. By reasons of the aforesaid, I have no hesitation to dismiss the Leave Application for the reasons that there is no explanation for the substantial delay and the application itself is wholly unmeritorious. There is also no reason in the interest of justice why an appeal against the Discovery Decision should be heard.

41. Costs should follow the event. I therefore order that D shall forthwith pay P’s costs of the Leave Application with certificate for counsel, to be summarily assessed. I direct that P shall file and serve the Statement of Costs within 7 days from the date of this Decision and, D shall file and serve the Statement of Objections, if any, within 7 days thereafter. The assessment of costs will be made on papers without a hearing.

42. Lastly, I thank Mr. Cheung for his very helpful assistance to the Court.

( Damian Wong )
Deputy District Judge

Mr. Tommy Cheung, instructed by Foo & Li, for the Plaintiff

The defendant was not represented and was acting in person

[1] [2025] HKDC 712

[2] [2024] HKDC 1801

[3] Discovery Decision §§19-20

[4] It is clear that what D meant to say is that the Judges favoured Mr. Cheung because they are in the same profession

DCMP 4781/2022

[2025] HKDC 712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 4781 OF 2022

--------------------------------------

BETWEEN
	KONEW CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED	Plaintiff
	and
	WONG KONG HEUNG (黃港香) formerly known as WONG KWONG HEUNG CANDY (黃廣香)	Defendant

--------------------------------------

Before:

Deputy District Judge Damian Wong in Chambers (Open to public)

Date of Hearing:	16 April 2025
Date of Decision:	07 May 2025

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DECISION

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INTRODUCTION

1. This is the Defendant’s application dated 19^th February 2025 for discovery of the following (“Application”):-

(a)  The transcript of the hearing on 23 September 2024 before Master Andrea Yu (“Master Hearing”);
(b)  The copies of the audio records for the conversion between Miss Tong, the staff of the Plaintiff (“P”) and the Defendant (“D”) at P’s office on the following dates:-
(i)  11 December 2020 for the loan of HK$2,000,000;
(ii)  11 December 2020 for the loan of HK$1,600,000;
(iii)  13 January 2021 for the loan of HK$2,000,000;
(iv)  8 November 2021 for the loan of HK$200,000;
(v)  8 November 2021 for the loan of HK$400,000;
(c)  Either P’s physical cheque which is issued by Foo and Li on or after 6 September 2024 for HK$1,635,126.74; or P’s bank statement transaction from 6 September 2024 to present which shows the transaction amount of HK$1,635,126.74;
(d)  P’s written confirmation to confirm the deduction for HK$100,000 from D’s loan for extra interest charge for 111 days being the late reply to D’s first affirmation;
(e)  P’s written confirmation to confirm the maximum loan outstanding repayment amount for HK$3,000,000 to be included the HK$1,635,126.74 or not; and
(f)  P’s written confirmation to confirm the decision making for the additional 30% of the loan outstanding charge by the 3^rd party debt collection.

BACKGROUND

2. The background of this case has been helpfully set out in the skeleton submissions of Mr. Cheung for P as follows.

3. P is a licensed moneylender in Hong Kong and D was its customer.

8. Despite repeated requests and demands by P, D had failed and/or refused to pay to P the outstanding balance.

9. P commenced the present action on 15 December 2022.

10. In D’s affirmations, D claims that she has a valid defence to P’s claim, on the basis that:-

(a)  P did not keep its alleged promise to cancel the registration of a mortgage dated 23 December 2029 over D’s Property prior to D’s entry into the 1^st Loan Agreement;
(b)  D was misleadingly persuaded by a staff member of P to enter into the Loan Agreements with P, such that D commercially lost out as she had to pay extra interest compared to another potential loan agreement with another finance company and the financing structure of the Loan Agreements affected her future borrowing power; and
(c)  The Loan Agreements were illegal for charging payment of compound interest.

11. D counterclaims HK$10,000,000 for alleged financial hardship caused by P’s alleged actions.

12. By the summons dated 15 December 2022, P applied for summary judgment against D. The application was heard by Master Andrea Yu on 23 September 2024.

13. In the Decision dated 28 October 2024, the learned Master found that there was no merit in D’s defence:-

(a)  The non-cancellation of the original mortgage bears no relation at all to D’s current liability under the Loan Agreements;
(b)  D’s allegation of P’s misrepresentation is not believable, with doubt that the facts relied upon by D constitute any valid ground for misrepresentation, when D did not dispute that she could read English, was commercially experienced in taking out loans and had signed the Loan Agreements;
(c)  Factually, no compound interest was charged.

14. Thus, the learned Master entered money judgment against D.

15. D appeals against the Decision and the hearing of D’s appeal will take place on 23 July 2025 (“Appeal Hearing”).

16. On 19 February 2025, D took out the present Application for discovery of documents for the purpose of her appeal.

GROUND OF OBJECTIONS

17. Save for item (a), Mr. Cheung objected to the Application on the following ground:-

(a)  Firstly, D already loses the present proceedings as Master Andrea Yu has substantively determined the entirety of the same against D, such that there is no scope for any further “discovery” as sought by D;
(b)  Secondly, even assuming that D is entitled to belatedly take out an application for discovery, discovery should not be granted because clearly D’s application is part and parcel of her fishing expedition;
(c)  Thirdly, if D’s real intention were to adduce further evidence for the Appeal Hearing, D’s Summons fails to cross the high threshold of Ladd v Marshall, applied in the context of an appeal from a Master to Judge in chambers; and
(d)  Fourthly, it has been confirmed by P by way of affirmation that items (d), (e) and (f) do not exist.

18. For item (a), Mr. Cheung submitted that the application for transcript should be made to the Court, instead of in the Application. Having said that, Mr. Cheung maintained a neutral stance on item (a).

DISCUSSIONS

Item (a)

19. At the hearing, D changed to ask for the audio recording of the Master Hearing and agreed to pay the necessary fee.

20. Given the neutral stance of Mr. Cheung, I would allow D to obtain the audio recording of the Master Hearing upon payment of the necessary fee.

21. To avoid any unnecessary argument at the Appeal Hearing, I have made the direction that, if D intends to rely on any part of the audio recording of the Master Hearing at the Appeal Hearing, she shall on or before 25 June 2025 provide the typed-up transcript of the relevant part (with reference to time), together with the said audio recording, to P’s solicitors for agreement of the accuracy of the typed-up transcript, failing which D would be debarred from relying on the said audio recording at the Appeal Hearing.

Item (b)

22. D submitted that item (b) is necessary for the fair disposal of her appeal because it is a “strong proof that Miss Tong [of P] misrepresented me borrowing the loan from the Plaintiff and Ms. Wu [of P] did not follow the general principle of lending”.

23. I agree with Mr. Cheung that it is rare for the Court to allow an application for discovery for the purpose of appeal. The Court of Appeal firmly ruled against a belated discovery application in Tsang Tak Wai v Building Authority [2018] 1 HKLRD 137, wherein Chu JA (as Chu VP then was) stressed at §10 as follows:

“ … as stated above, the collection and production of evidence should be carried out at trial, and it is inappropriate to collect evidence or request discovery only at the appeal …”

24. Although the case of Tsang Tak Wai concerned an application for discovery after trial, I am of the view that, by analogy and/or by extension, the same principle shall apply to the present case. Collection and production of evidence should have been carried out before the Master Hearing. Otherwise, D would have a second bite of the cherry by abusing the de novo hearing arrangement.

25. I also agree with Mr. Cheung that, even assuming that D is entitled to take out this belated Application, D still needs to satisfy the requirements laid down in Ladd v Mashsall before she is allowed to adduce the newly discovered documents at the Appeal Hearing, particularly the first requirement, i.e. the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing below.

26. At the hearing, D explained that she did not know she should have applied for discovery before the Master Hearing.

27. As confirmed by Mr. Cheung, D had never asked P to provide item (b) and the first time D mentioned the discovery of item (b) was in her skeleton submission at the Master Hearing where she submitted at paragraph 33 that “I am pleased to apply for approval from the Court to order [P] submitting the audio records to the Court for the judgment”.

28. I am unable to accept D’s explanation. If item (b) was so important to D’s defence as alleged, it was a matter of common sense that she should have asked P to provide the same as early as possible. D’s failure to obtain item (b) before the Master Appeal cannot be explained away by the alleged ignorance of law.

29. By reasons of the aforesaid, I refuse D’s application for item (b).

Item (c)

30. For item (c), D informed the Court that the Property had been sold by Da Sing Bank and the sum HK$1,635,126.74 was the net sale proceeds (“Sale Proceeds”) which had been given by Da Sing Bank’s solicitors (i.e. Messrs. Foo & Li) to P’s solicitors.

31. After taking instructions, Mr. Cheung confirmed that P had received the Sale Proceeds by way of cheque on or about 16 September 2024 (i.e. a few days before the Master Hearing) and the said cheque had not been cashed in at the time of the Master Hearing. Mr. Cheung further confirmed that P would give credit to the Sale Proceeds and amend the total indebtedness either at the Appeal Hearing or in the enforcement.

32. Despite Mr. Cheung’s confirmation, D insisted on having item (c).

33. Given Mr. Cheung’s confirmation, I do not see the necessity of item (c) and would refuse D’s application for the said item.

Items (d), (e) and (f)

34. D’s application for items (d), (e) and (f) is wholly misconceived. The purpose of discovery of documents is for parties to disclose documents that it possesses related to the proceedings. It is not for one party to request the other party to give “written confirmation” on any issue involved in the proceedings.

35. In any event, P has confirmed by the 3^rd Affirmation of Tsang Tak Wah that items (d), (e) and (f) do not exist.

36. Despite P’s confirmation, D insisted that P should provide the “written confirmation”.

37. It is trite law that “the oath of the party giving discovery is conclusive, unless the court can be satisfied – not on a conflict of affidavits, but either from the documents produced or from anything in the affidavit made by [that party], or by any admission by him in the pleadings, or necessarily from the circumstances of the case – that the affidavit does not truly state that which it ought to state”; Grand Planet Ltd v The Incorporated Owners of Lucky Commercial Centre[2021] HKDC 198 at §15.

38. By reasons of the aforesaid, I would refuse D’s application on items (d), (e) and (f).

CONCLUSION

39. Although I allow D to obtain the audio recording of the Master Hearing, D cannot be regarded as successful in respect of item (a) as audio recording is not the item that D asked for in her summons. In any event, as noted above, the application for transcript or audio recording of the Master Hearing should be made to the Court directly, instead of in the Application.

40. By reasons of the aforesaid, I am of the view that the Application is wholly unmeritorious and I dismiss the Application.

41. Costs should follow the event. I am of the view that P’s costs of HK$14,942 is very modest and I would allow it in full. I therefore order that D do pay P’s costs of the Application forthwith summarily assessed at HK$14,942.

42. I thanks Mr. Cheung for his assistance to the Court.

( Damian Wong )
Deputy District Judge

Mr. Tommy Cheung, instructed by Foo & Li, for the plaintiff

The defendant was not represented and was acting in person

DCMP 4781/2022

[2024] HKDC 1801

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 4781 OF 2022

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	IN THE MATTER of the property known as ALL THAT 1/2,094^th part or share of and in the Remaining Portion of Section A of Shau Kei Wan Inland Lot No.738 and the Remaining Portion of Shau Kei Wan Inland Lot No. 738 [Flat No.2610 on 26^th Floor, Tai On Building, Nos.57/87 Shau Kei Wan Road, Hong Kong] (“the Property”)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of a Second Mortgage dated 23^rd December 2019 and registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No.20121401740017, a Third Mortgage dated 11^th December 2020 and registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No.20121401740023 and a Fourth Mortgage dated 8^th November 2021 and registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No.21110901340014
	and
	IN THE MATTER of Order 88 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap.336H)

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BETWEEN
	KONEW CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED	Plaintiff
	and
	WONG KONG HEUNG (黃港香) formerly known as WONG KWONG HEUNG CANDY (黃廣香)	Defendant

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Before:

Master Andrea Yu in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:	23 September 2024
Date of Decision:	28 October 2024

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DECISION

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1. This is an application by the Plaintiff by Originating Summons dated 15 December 2022 to enter default judgment against the Defendant pursuant to Order 83A rule 4 and Order 88 rule 4 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 33H) (“RDC”). The Plaintiff seeks to summarily dispose of the action before this Court pursuant to Order 28 rules 3 and 4 RDC.

2. At the hearing before the Court on 23 September 2024, the Plaintiff confirms with the Court that it no longer pursues a claim for delivery for possession under Order 88 RDC and would only seek summary determination of the monetary claim under Order 83A RDC against the Defendant.

3. The Plaintiff also confirms that it will waive the excess of the claim beyond $3,000,000 so as to bring the claim within the jurisdictional limit of this Court. Subsequent to the hearing, the Plaintiff has supplied to the Court a confirmation in writing of the same.

A. Background

4. The Plaintiff is a licensed money lender in Hong Kong. The Defendant was a repeat borrower and customer of the Plaintiff. The Defendant is the registered owner of Flat No 2610 on 26^th Floor, Tai On Building, Nos 57/87 Shau Kei Wan Road, Hong Kong (the “Property”).

5. On 13 January 2021, the Plaintiff lent a principal sum of HK$2,000,000 (“1^st Loan”) to be repaid by 180 monthly instalments, at interest rate of 16.80% per annum, pursuant to a loan agreement in Chinese (“1^st Loan Agreement”). On 8 December 2021, the Plaintiff lent to the Defendant another principal sum of HK$400,000 (“2^nd Loan”), to be repaid by 60 monthly instalments, also at 16.80% per annum, pursuant to another loan agreement in Chinese (“2^nd Loan Agreement”).

6. The 1^st and 2^nd Loan Agreements were secured by mortgages in favour of the Plaintiff granted by the Defendant over the Property, which was beneficially owned by the Defendant. The mortgages included a second mortgage dated 23 December 2019; a third mortgage dated 11 December 2020, and a fourth mortgage dated 8 November 2021.

7. According to the Plaintiff’s case, the Defendant defaulted in repaying the monthly instalments of the 1^st Loan on 10 August 2022 (the 19^th installment) and of the 2^nd Loan on 5 August 2022 (the 8^th installment). Accordingly, by reason of inter alia clause 8(a) of the 1^st Loan Agreement and 2^nd Loan Agreement, the whole balance of the 1^st Loan and the 2^nd Loan and all accrued interests became immediately due and payable.

8. Despite repeated requests and demands by the Plaintiff including a demand letter from the Plaintiff’s solicitors, Messrs Foo and Li, to the Defendant dated 15 November 2022, the Defendant has still failed and/or refused to pay to the Plaintiff the whole outstanding balance of the 1^st Loan and the 2^nd Loan and the accrued interests thereon.

9. The Plaintiff filed the Originating Summons on 15 December 2022. The Defendant filed an Acknowledgement on 3 January 2023 expressing her intention to contest the case. She did not file any Notice of Intention to Defend.

10. By her affirmations, the Defendant claims that she has a valid Defence to the Plaintiff’s claim, on the basis that:

(1)  The Plaintiff did not keep its alleged promise to cancel the registration of the original mortgage dated 23 December 2019 (ie prior to the Defendant’s entry into the 1^st Loan Agreement);
(2)  The Defendant was misleadingly persuaded by a staff of the Plaintiff to enter the 1^st and 2^nd Loan Agreements with the Plaintiff, such that the Defendant commercially lost out as: (i) she had to pay extra interest compared to another potential loan agreement with another finance company; and (ii) the financing structure of the Loan Agreements affected her future borrowing power; and
(3)  The Loan Agreements were illegal for charging payment of compound interest.

11. The Defendant also relies on an alleged counterclaim of HK$10,000,000, representing alleged financial hardship as a result of the Plaintiff’s alleged actions.

B. Discussion

12. Based on the documents placed before me, I am satisfied that the court documents in relation to this action were duly served on the Defendant.

13. I have considered the documents filed before me and I am satisfied that the requirements of sections 18(1) and 18(2) of the Money Lenders Ordinance Cap 163 (“MLO”) have been complied with.

14. I am satisfied that the interest rate charged under the Loan Agreements are not in contravention of section 24(1)-(2) of the MLO nor section 25 of the MLO.

15. I am also satisfied that the procedural requirements under Order 83A RDC have been complied with.

16. An action by originating summons may be disposed of summarily under Order 28 rule 4 RDC where the court is satisfied that there are no triable issues: see Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd v Twin Profit Ltd [2010] 2 HKLRD 1065 at §§6-8.

17. I am satisfied that there is no merit in the Defendant’s defence. In particular:

(1)  The non-cancellation of the original mortgage bears no relation at all to the Defendant’s current liability under the two Loan Agreements.
(2)  I do not find the Defendant’s allegation of the Plaintiff’s misrepresentation believable. I also doubt that the facts relied on by the Defendant constitute any valid ground for misrepresentation. The Defendant does not dispute that she is able to read English, is commercially experienced in taking out loans and has signed the 1^st and 2^nd Loan Agreements.
(3)  There was no contravention of section 24(1)-(2) of the MLO nor section 25 of the MLO. No compound interest is charged. The Plaintiff is entitled to charge simple interest on the outstanding interest under section 22 of the MLO.

18. There is also no substance in the Defendant’s counterclaim, which is unparticularized and unsupported by law.

19. In the premises, there is no triable issue. The Plaintiff is entitled to the monetary judgment against the Defendant as claimed.

C. Disposition

20. The outstanding indebtedness due from the Defendant to the Plaintiff as at 23 September 2024 was HK$3,222,412.64, being the total outstanding principal, interest and default interest due and owing by the Defendant under the 1^st and 2^nd Loan Agreements calculated as at 23 September 2024.

21. By letter dated 26 September 2024, the Plaintiff confirms that it will only claim against the Defendant the judgment debt of HK$3,000,000, together with:

(1)  In relation to the 1^st Loan Agreement:
(i)  Interest on the sum of HK$1,948,941.38 at the rate of 16.80% per annum (ie daily interest of HK$897.05) from the date of order until full payment; and
(ii)  Default interest on the sum of HK$108,890 at the rate of 16.80% per annum (ie daily interest of HK$50.12) from the date of order until full payment; and
(2)  In relation to the 2^nd Loan Agreement:
(i)  Interest on the sum of HK$368,276.52 at the rate of 16.80% per annum (ie daily interest of HK$169.51) from the date of order until full payment; and
(ii)  Default interest on the sum of HK$20,243 at 16.80% per annum (ie daily interest of HK$9.32) from the date of order until payment.

22. I am satisfied that the terms of the revised draft order is in line with the usual orders made in proceedings of the present nature. I shall therefore make an order in terms of the revised draft order.

23. On the issue of costs, the plaintiff seeks, and I allow, costs against the Defendant on a full indemnity basis under clause 14 of the 1^st Loan Agreement and 2^nd Loan Agreement, summarily assessed at HK$145,000.

( Andrea Yu )
Master, District Court

Mr Tommy Cheung, instructed by Foo & Li, for the Plaintiff

The Defendant appeared in person

KONEW CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. WONG KONG HEUNG formerly known as WONG KWONG HEUNG CANDY

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