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Civil Action2022

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (Former Name: QUE WENBIN) AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • CAMP163/2018DING YONG 對 SONG LIHUA及另四人
  • HCCT111/2022SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN)
  • HCMP314/2024LEE CHEE HON v. SONG LIHUA

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[2024] HKCFI 1111-EN-2024-04-23

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (Former Name: QUE WENBIN) AND ANOTHER

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HCA 1747/2022

[2024] HKCFI 1111

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1747 OF 2022

________________________

BETWEEN

 Song Lihua (宋丽华)Plaintiff
 and
 Lee Chee Hon (李子瀚)
(Former Name: Que Wenbin (阙文彬))
1st Defendant
 Que Mike F2nd Defendant

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge KC Chan in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 17 April 2024
Date of Decision: 17 April 2024
Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision: 23 April 2024

________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________

1.  On 19 September 2023, this Court ordered, among others, (a)  an interim stay of proceedings pending and until the determination of the Plaintiff’s intended appeal in HCCT 111/2022 and (b)  an adjournment of the pending applications sine die with liberty to restore after the expiry of the interim stay, and that the stay and adjournment be conditional upon the Plaintiff paying into Court on or before 10 October 2023 security for the costs of the 1st and 2nd  Defendants at HK$200,000 each, and further that in default of such payment in, the Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment by her summons dated 24 March 2023 be dismissed automatically with costs.

2.  The relevant background of this action (and the reasons for my said orders)  was set out in the Reasons for Decision dated 25 September 2023 [2023] HKCFI 2429, which I will not repeat here.  I will also adopt the same abbreviations used in that Reasons for Decision.

3.  Since then, P failed to comply with the condition of paying into court the said amounts in time or at all.  The interim stay therefore did not take effect and P’s application for summary judgment was dismissed with costs without further order.

4.  Moreover, on 14 November 2023, Madam Justice Mimmie Chan dismissed P’s application in HCCT 111/2022 for leave to appeal against her Ladyship’s Order dated 24 August 2023 setting aside the Leave to enforce the Award in Hong Kong.  P has not renewed her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal within time, nor was there any indication from her that she has applied or would be applying for such leave out of time.

5.  The following 3 applications therefore were restored for substantive hearing or disposal before me together with another recent application by D2:

a.  D2’s summons taken out on 15 February 2023 applying for security for costs up to the Case Management Conference to be provided by P;

b.  D1’s summons taken out on 4 September 2023 for leave to file his 2nd affirmation in opposition to P’s application for summary judgment (“D1’s Evidence Summons”);

c.  D1’s summons taken out on 18 September 2023 applying for security for costs up to the Case Management Conference to be provided by P; and

d.  D2’s summons taken out on 6 February 2024 for the following 2 further consequential orders be provided upon the default of P in giving the security for costs in case such security is ordered (“the Consequential Orders” and “D2’s Consequential Order Application”):

  i.  The sum of HK$4,240,000 paid in Court by D2 on 23 December 2022 under the terms of the Mareva Injunction Order granted herein by Deputy High Court Judge Winnie Tsui on 16 December 2022 be paid out to D2 forthwith; and

  ii.  The registration in the Land Registry of the Writ in this action by memorial number 23010401890074 as against the Property be vacated forthwith.

6.  At the hearing, D1 and D2 were respectively represented by Mr David Chen and Ms Kinsey Kang, both of counsel. P’s solicitors attended but informed the Court that they have no instructions to act for P and that indeed they have applied for, but not yet been granted, an order to cease to act.

7.  At the conclusion of the hearing, I made no order on D1’s Evidence Summons and acceded to the applications of D1 and D2 for security for costs and to D2’s Consequential Order Application and ordered P to provide security for the costs of D1 and D2 in the respective amounts of HK$1,000,000 and HK$1,500,000 on or before 4pm on 22 May 2024, and in default of giving the security this action be dismissed with costs, and in respect of the dismissal as against D2, also with the Consequential Orders, and that the costs of all 4 applications be paid by P to be taxed if not agreed.

8.  These are my reasons.

D1’s Evidence Summons

9.  As this application has been overtaken by the fact that P’s application for summary judgment has been dismissed in the circumstances set out above, I accept Mr Chen’s proposal to make no order on D1’s Evidence Summons.

10.  Regarding costs, the draft 2nd affirmation of D1 was intended to be filed in answer to P’s 3rd affirmation filed on 3 August 2023 (“P’s 3rd”).  P’s 3rd was supposed to be filed in reply to D1’s 1st affirmation and D2’s affirmation both filed on 24 May 2023.  However, the whole of P’s 3rd essentially deposed further about the “Insolvency of the 1st Defendant” and therein P further produced by exhibit “SLH-14” 29 judgments and decisions in relation to D1 issued by various Mainland Courts totalling 351 pages.  However, this topic of “Insolvency of the 1st Defendant” was already extensively covered in §§20 to 30 of P’s 2nd affirmation filed earlier on 11 April 2023 (“P’s 2nd”). 

11.  In the circumstances, I take the view that D1 should be allowed to file affirmation in reply to these further and new matters raised in P’s 3rd.  The draft 2nd affirmation of D1 intended to do precisely that and further deposed to certain new developments in HCCT 111/2022 that have since occurred.

12.  Therefore, D1’s Evidence Summons would have been granted had it been necessary to hear it substantively.  Thus, I ordered costs of D1’s Evidence Summons be paid by P.

The Security for Costs Applications by D1 and D2

13.  The principles governing the exercise of discretion in granting security for costs are well settled.  In respect of a plaintiff who is resident out of the jurisdiction with no assets within, the court would usually exercise its discretion to order security, as it is ordinarily just to do so, and would refuse to so order if there are circumstances making it unjust to do so.  One such circumstance would be that the foreign plaintiff has strong merits, in which case, the foreign plaintiff need to show, without embarking upon a detailed analysis of the merits, that he has a high probability of success.  (see for instance: PT Graha Multimulia Cemerlang v Silver Tech Enterprise Limited HCCW 883/2004, unrep., 1 March 2005, Kwan J (as she then was); The National Trust Limited v Tahoe Investment Group Co., Limited and Others HCMP 2301/2023, unrep., 30 August 2021, K Yeung J).

14.  In the present case, there is no dispute that P is ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction.  Her respective address given in the Writ herein, in P’s 2nd, P’s 3rd and her 2nd affirmation filed in HCCT 111/2022 was the same one, which was an address in the Liaoning Province (遼寧省)  in the Mainland.

15.  Moreover, as pointed out by Mr Chen, which I accept, P in her affirmations never even said that she has any asset in Hong Kong, not to mention having identified any.

16.  I accept and find that P is still in default of payment of the costs of her summary judgment application that this Court has summarily assessed by its Order dated 15 November 2023 - HK$320,000 to D1 and HK$800,000 to D2.  Moreover, P refused or was unable to pay the total sum of HK$400,000 into Court as a condition for the said interim stay and adjournment.  I am also informed by D1 and D2 that P has not responded at all to various letters sent by their solicitors to P’s solicitors since late November 2023 in relation to various arrangements concerning the restoration of the applications for substantive hearing[1].

17.  On the aforementioned matters, I am satisfied that there is a real risk that P would refuse or be unable to pay the costs of D1 and D2 should such be later awarded to them.

18.  Though P in P’s 2nd contended that she has a strong case and Ms Kang in her written submissions engaged P in some rather detailed contentions against P’s such stance, I do not see the need, nor think it appropriate, to delve into them by way of a detail analysis.

19.  I accept as Mr Chen submitted and am satisfied that considering the following matter alone, it can be readily shown that P does not have strong merits in her present claim.

20.  In this action, P’s only claim is to set aside the Transaction as void pursuant to section 60 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance Cap 219, which provides:

“60. Voidability of dispositions to defraud creditors

(1)  Subject to subsections (2)  and (3), every disposition of property made, whether before or after the commencement of this section, with intent to defraud creditors, shall be voidable, at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced.

(2)  This section does not affect the law of bankruptcy for the time being in force.

(3)  This section does not extend to any estate or interest in property disposed of for valuable consideration and in good faith or upon good consideration and in good faith to any person not having, at the time of the disposition, notice of the intent to defraud creditors. (Amended 31 of 1988 s. 22)”.

21.  The section provides that such dispositions to defraud creditors shall be voidable at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced.

22.  P’s pleaded averment making her a “person thereby prejudiced” within the meaning of section 60 and therefore giving her the locus to engage the section is that she is a creditor of D1 pursuant to the Award which remains unsatisfied.  As the Leave has now been set aside as aforesaid, and that has become final as there is no pending appeal, P’s such averment, which is the essential foundation of her claim, has crumpled.

23.  In the premises, the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of ordering the security to be provided by P.

24.  I turn next to consider quantum, on which the parties do not dispute the Court has an unfettered discretion.

25.  D1, by his skeleton bill, estimated that the costs up to the Case Management Conference and including costs already awarded, would amount to some HK$2.1 million.  D2, on his part, estimated his such costs would be some HK$3.1 million.

26.  As is trite, such security ordered to be provided is not meant to be a complete security fully covering all the costs of the opposing party and that the skeleton bills submitted, if need be, would be critically evaluated from the perspective of how likely the receiving party would successfully tax such level of costs on party and party basis.

27.  On the particular facts of this case, I also consider this following matter pertinent.  As accepted by Mr Chen and Ms Kang at the hearing, there are no potential or actual conflict of interest between D1 and D2 (who are father and son)  in their defence against P’s claim, therefore there is no strict need for them to be separately represented.  Such being the case and for the purpose of exercising this discretion, I take the view that I should lower the total costs estimates of D1 and D2 such as to bring the amount of total costs closer to the amount that would have been estimated had they both been represented by the same team of lawyers.

28.  I take note that even though this action is still in an early stage, there have been quite a number of applications, including a rather substantial application for Mareva Injunction.  Moreover, P has been pursuing this action aggressively including countering D2’s application for security for costs by an application for summary judgment (even though serious allegations of fraud and dishonest conducts are involved)  and, as mentioned, P has filed extensive evidence and voluminous exhibits in an attempt, it seems to me, to show that D1 is a man of low commercial probity and credit worthiness, which attracted, if not necessitated, Ds’ vigorous response.

29.  Considering the contents of the skeleton bills and the above matters in the round, I fixed the amount of security to be provided by P in respect of D1’s such costs at HK$1 million and in respect of D2’s costs at HK$1.5 million.

D2’s Consequential Order Application

30.  Evidently, if P’s action as against D2 were to be dismissed upon P’s default in providing the ordered security, the action would no longer be pending, and the Writ herein registered in the Land Registry as lis pendens against the Property, which is registered in D2’s name, should be vacated forthwith in that event.  Likewise, the HK$4,240,000 paid into Court by D2 in place of, and to discharge, the Mareva Injunction granted herein against him should be paid out to him forthwith should P default in providing the security and the action against D2 be dismissed thereby.

31.  Accordingly, I acceded to D2’s application and make provision for the Consequential Orders in the event that this action against D2 were to be so dismissed as aforesaid.

Costs

32.  There is no reason why costs should not follow the event, I therefore ordered the costs of the security for costs applications by D1 and D2 and the costs of D2’s Consequential Order Application be paid by P.  The costs of D1’s Evidence Summons were ordered to be paid by P for the reasons already expressed above.

33.  Lastly, this Court thanks Mr Chen and Ms Kang for their assistance.

 ( KC Chan )
 Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Mei YU of Messrs Grandall Zimmern Law Firm for the Plaintiff

Mr David CHEN, instructed by Messrs D.S. Cheung & Co. for the 1st Defendant Ms Kinsey KANG, instructed by Messrs Kwan & Chow for the 2nd Defendant



[1] 3 letters, P.300 to 306 of the Supplemental Bundle for this hearing

[2023] HKCFI 2429-EN-2023-09-25

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (Former Name: QUE WENBIN) AND ANOTHER

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HCA 1747/2022

[2023] HKCFI 2429

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1747 OF 2022

________________________

BETWEEN

 Song Lihua (宋丽华)Plaintiff
 and 
 Lee Chee Hon (李子瀚)1st Defendant
 (Former Name: Que Wenbin (阙文彬) 
 Que Mike F2nd Defendant

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge KC Chan in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 19 September 2023
Date of Decision: 19 September 2023
Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision: 25 September 2023

________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________________

1.  Before me was the summons issued by the Plaintiff on 6 September 2023 seeking an interim stay of all further proceedings in this action, and particularly, vacating the substantive hearing scheduled on 27 September 2023 before me and adjourning the matters to be heard sine die until the expiry of the stay with liberty to restore thereafter (“the Stay Application”).

2.  At the conclusion of the hearing, I made an order (a) in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the summons with minor changes in wording staying all further proceedings pending and until the determination of the Plaintiff’s intended appeal in HCCT 111/2022, vacating the hearing on 27 September 2023 and adjourning the hearing of the 4 applications mentioned below with liberty to restore (b) imposing a term for the stay and adjournment that the Plaintiff do pay into court on or before 10 October 2023 security for the costs of the 1st and 2nd Defendants at HK$200,000 each (which will be without prejudice to the security for costs presently applied for by them), failing which the Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment will be automatically dismissed with costs to be summarily assessed forthwith, (c) directing that the 4 applications be heard together if and when they are restored, and (d) that the costs of the Stay Application be in the cause.

3.  I said reasons will be provided, which I now do.

4.  The Stay Application arose from the following circumstances.

5.  This action was commenced by the Plaintiff (“P”) on 13 December 2022 to seek to declare as void under section 60 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance Cap 219 the conveyance by assignment executed on 30 November 2022 by the 1st Defendant (“D1”) in favour of his son, the 2nd Defendant (“D2”), of the property known as Flat A, 32nd Floor, Tower 8, and Carpark No. 190, Residence Bel-Air, Hong Kong (“the Property”), as being a deposition made with intent to defraud creditors.

6.  P sues as a creditor by virtue of an arbitral award of the Chengdu Arbitration Commission dated 11 October 2021 whereby D1 is to pay to P a sum of RMB 337,222,219.90 with interest and costs (“the Award”), which remains completely unsettled.

7.  One day before the issuance of the Writ herein, P obtained ex-parte a Mareva injunction against D2 up to the alleged full value of the Property at HK$42,640,000. Later, on 23 December 2022 and pursuant to the revised terms of the Mareva injunction as continued and granted on 16 December 2022, D2 paid into court HK$4,240,000 to discharge the Mareva injunction, D1 having earlier on paid HK$38,400,000 into court in HCCT 111/2022.

8.  On 12 January 2023, leave to enforce the Award in Hong Kong was granted by Madam Justice Mimmie Chan in HCCT 111/2022 upon P’s ex-parte application (“the Leave”).

9.  On 26 January 2023, D1 issued a summons in HCCT 111/2022 applying to set aside the Leave.

10.  In the meantime, steps were taken in this action. Notably, D2 issued a summons on 15 February 2023 applying for security for costs to be provided by the Plaintiff (“D2’s Security Application”). Shortly after on 24 March 2023, the Plaintiff issued a summons applying for summary judgment against both defendants (“the Summary Judgment Application”). The Summary Judgment Application was made apparently in response to D2’s Security Application as P indicated to the Master at the call-over hearing of D2’s Security Application on 24 February 2023 that she intended to apply for summary judgment.

11.  These 2 applications were then directed to proceed together. They were then scheduled to be heard before me substantively on 27 September 2023.

12.  However, on 24 August 2023 and after a contested hearing in HCCT 111/2022, Madam Justice Mimmie Chan set aside the Leave with reasons to be provided later. Application for leave to appeal against that decision was filed by P on 6 September 2023 (“P’s Appeal”).

13.  Consequently and also on 6 September 2023, P issued the Stay Application.

14.  Meanwhile, 2 new applications both made by D1 were also listed to be heard before me on 27 September 2023. They are:

a.  His summons dated 4 September 2023 to file his 2nd affirmation; and

b.  His summons issued yesterday, ie 18 September 2023, for security for his costs to be provided by the Plaintiff.

15.  This hearing of the Stay Application was listed as a 3-minutes call-over hearing.

16.  D2 has lodged his Skeleton Submissions by Ms Kang, his counsel, stating his position that D2 did not oppose to the interim stay of all further proceedings or the adjournment of the hearing of the Summary Judgment Application pending the outcome of P’s Appeal but opposed the adjournment of the hearing of D2’s Security Application. D2 set out his contentions there and proposed that the Stay Application, insofar as it concerned D2’s Security Application, be heard substantively on 27 September 2023 together with D2’s Security Application.

17.  P and D1 did not lodge any written submissions but appeared by counsel - respectively Mr Chiu and Mr Chen. At the hearing, P indicated that it would like to seek an order in terms if the court was minded to hear the matter substantively, while D1 advocated the same position and proposal as D2.

18.  Ms Kang referred this court to the approach as held by Madam Justice Kwan (as the V-P then was) in Re Chime Corporation Ltd (HCMP 4146/2001, unrep., 11 March 2005), which was not disputed by Mr Chiu or Mr Chen, and which I accept as correct and apposite:

“14. The correct approach, … , in an application for a temporary stay of proceedings is ‘to consider the balance of convenience and fairness as between the parties’ (Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd. v. Unex Corporation Ltd. (1994) 70 BLR 26 at 45C to D, per Glidewell LJ; applied in Clinton Engineering Ltd. v. B-Tech (Holdings) Ltd. [2001] HKCU 1002 at para. 9 and SWE Ltd. v. Chong Lai Fun, HCA No. 1064 of 2004, 28 October 2004, Reyes J, pages 5 and 6; see also Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, Vol. 5(2), footnote 7 to para. [90.0938]) and the court should exercise its discretion in such a manner ‘to ensure that its procedures are used in a logical, fair and cost-efficient manner’ (SWE Ltd., page 5). The question at hand is not a question of deprivation of the right of a litigant to proceed altogether, but a question of case management.” (my emphasis)

19.  Bearing in mind the considerations and the approach above elucidated, I did not find D1’s and D2’s proposal to hear the remaining part of the Stay Application substantively on 27 September 2023 at all attractive, as the parties would be required to expend time and costs to prepare to argue the security for costs applications substantively, if not actually arguing it, on 27 September 2023.

20.  Upon the invitation of the court and after a short adjournment to consider, the parties, in my view very sensibly, agreed to have the remaining part of the Stay Application heard at the hearing.

21.  Having heard their submissions, I took the view that D1’s and D2’s Security Applications should also be stayed and their hearing adjourned with liberty to restore until after the determination of P’s Appeal, upon the following considerations:

a.  As parties agreed that otherwise an interim stay ought to be imposed pending the outcome of P’s Appeal, there would be no other costs to be expended by D1 and D2 during the stay period, for which they need the protection of security. There is thus little detriment to D1 and D2 if the hearing of their Security Applications is put off until after the determination of P’s Appeal.

b.  If P’s Appeal turned out to be unsuccessful, then the time and costs expended to argue the security for costs applications as well as the judicial resources to hear and determine it would be completely wasted, as by then the substratum of this action would have crumbled and D1 and D2 could very well proceed to seek, and then enforce, costs orders against P.

c.  Both D1 and D2 submitted that the scenario mentioned in (b) above might not necessarily follow, as Mr Chiu has indicated at the hearing that P might amend her pleading substantially to rely on matters other than the Award to sustain her status as a creditor. If that would happen, then all the more reason why the Security Applications would be better timed to be heard after the outcome of P’s Appeal (and after P’s application to amend pleading) so that the court could then have all these new matters (if any) in view, and the amount of security revised to reflect them.

d.  As the strength of the merits of parties’ respective case, or lack thereof, would potentially be a consideration, even a weighty consideration, concerning whether to grant security for costs, just hearing the security for costs applications while adjourning the Summary Judgment Application would thus be rather unsatisfactory. On the other hand, if P’s Appeal were successful, then the Summary Judgment Application and D1’s and D2’s Security Applications would be heard together.

e.  D1 and D2 expressed eagerness to obtain the security early and both intimated that it might prove to be a means to end this action early if the sanction against failure of payment of security was the dismissal of the action. With respect, stifling a party from his claim is not the aim, nor the consideration, for ordering security. I therefore did not consider this matter relevant.

22.  Weighing these matters, I thus was of the clear view that adjourning the hearing of the Security Applications, as opposing to hearing them on 27 September 2023, would much better balance the fairness between the parties and ensure that this case and the pending applications are managed in a logical, fair and cost-efficient manner.

23.  In terms of fairness, at the hearing Mr Chen and Ms Kang asked that a term be imposed for granting the interim stay and adjournment requiring P to pay into court some costs as security because :

a.  P knew that D1 has on 26 January 2023 lodged a substantial challenge to the Leave in HCCT 111/2022; while P then has already had the subject matter of this action secured through registering the Writ as a lis pendens and D1’s and D2’s respective payment into court.

b.  Yet, P disregarded or took the risk that the Leave might be set aside upon D1’s successful challenge (in which case the substratum of this action might crumble) and P peddled full-gas in this action, particularly in countering D2’s Security Application aggressively with the Summary Judgment Application, even though central to P’s case is the serious allegation of an intention to defraud, which usually is not suitable for summary determination but much more suitable to be tried.

c.  To support the Summary Judgment Application and again disregarding or taking the risk, P has filed very substantial affirmations alleging a width of matters, which necessitated D1 and D2 to expend much costs to rebut and defend.

d.  Yet, once D1 successfully set aside the Leave, P made a hasty application to put everything on hold to minimize her costs exposure.

e.  The unfairness was accentuated when considering the fact that D1 and D2 had to made very substantial payments into court to discharge the Mareva injunction over a claim which, as it turned out, was crumbling.

24.  I agreed with D1 and D2 that there was a measure of unfairness as so adulated by them (though I note that D2 has the cross-undertaking given by P to protect him insofar as the Mareva injunction is concerned, and D1 probably has it too). D1 and D2 impressed upon this court that as a matter of principle, even if the amount might not be much, such a term should be imposed. Though Mr Chiu has tried his best to submit that the Summary Judgment Application was a natural or necessary response to D2’s Security Application, I was not persuaded it was so.

25.  In the round, I think it appropriate and just to impose a term of paying into court some security for costs as a condition for granting the stay and adjournment. Having heard parties rather extensively, I took the view and it was not seriously disputed that (a) the appropriate part of costs that the security should cover were the costs D1 and D2 spent in preparing their affirmation evidence to oppose the Summary Judgment Application, (b) the quantum would necessarily be assessed in a very broad-brush manner and would not be meant to provide full security, and (c) in the circumstances, the usual consequence imposed upon failure to make the payment – further proceedings be stayed – would not be an effective means to ensure compliance; rather and in the circumstances, the automatic dismissal of the Summary Judgment Application with costs would be the most apt. Thus, I fixed the security at HK$200,000 each for D1 and D2.

26.  In respect of the costs of the Stay Applications, parties were agreed that they should be costs in the cause.

27.  For these reasons, I granted the stay and adjournment and made the order set out in summary in paragraph 2 above.

28.  I thank all counsel for their valuable assistance.

  (KC Chan)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Byron Chiu, instructed by M/s Grandall Zimmern Law Firm, for the Plaintiff

Mr David Chen, instructed by M/s D.S. Cheung & Co, for the 1st Defendant

Ms Kinsey Kang, instructed by M/s Kwan & Chow, for the 2nd Defendant