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Construction and Arbitration Proceedings2022

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN)

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[2023] HKCFI 2959-EN-2023-11-14

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN)

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HCCT 111/2022

[2023] HKCFI 2959

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 111 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN  
 SONG LIHUA (宋丽华)Applicant
 and 
 LEE CHEE HON (李子瀚)Respondent
  (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN (阙文彬)) 

____________________

Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers
Dates of Written Submissions:19 October 2023, 2 November 2023 and
 9 November 2023
Date of Decision: 14 November 2023

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  This is an application made for leave to appeal against this Court’s decision of 24 August 2023 (“Decision”), with reasons handed down on 5 October 2023 (“Reasons”), whereby enforcement of an arbitral award was refused.

2.  The nomenclature used in the Reasons are adopted.

3.  The principles for granting leave to appeal against the exercise of the Court’s discretion are not disputed and need not be repeated here.  Song as applicant must show that the Court had taken into account irrelevant matters, or failed to consider relevant matters, or had made an error of law, and was plainly wrong. It is trite, that in an appeal against the court’s exercise of discretion, the fact that the appellate court might have exercised its discretion differently is not a ground to interfere. It has to be shown that the decision was outside the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.

4.  In the more recent case of DP World Djibouti FZCO and ors v China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited[2022] HKCA 84, the Court of Appeal highlighted again the fact that an appellate court adopts a cautious approach in relation to the weight given by the judge to facts taken into account when exercising its discretion. The fact that the appellate court would have given more weight than the judge to one of the many factors to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion is not a ground for interfering.  At paragraph 22 of the judgment, the Court noted:

“22. The judge’s refusal of a stay of proceedings on forum non conveniens involves an exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeal may only interfere with the exercise of the judge’s discretion in limited circumstances, in accordance with the well-established principles in Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191 at 220B to E (SPH v SA at §65). As stated in Bright Shipping Ltd v Changhong Group (HK) Ltd (No 2) [2019] 5 HKLRD 30 at §§5 to 7:

‘5. Hence, the grounds on which an appellate court is entitled to interfere with this exercise of discretion are limited and it cannot interfere merely because it would have reached a different conclusion had it been hearing the application at first instance. It can only interfere in three cases: (1) where the judge has misdirected himself with regard to the principles in accordance with which his discretion had to be exercised; (2) where the judge, in exercising his discretion, has taken into account matters which he ought not to have done or failed to take into account matters which he ought to have done; or (3) where his decision is plainly wrong. See The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398, 420B–C, per Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, which has been followed in a number of cases in Hong Kong, such as ChinaConstruction Bank (Asia) Corp Ltd v Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co Ltd (CACV 14/2016, [2017] HKEC 171, 3 February 2017) at §7.13.

6. An appellate court should adopt a cautious approach regarding the weight given by the judge to facts taken into account when exercising the discretion. The fact that the appellate court would have given more weight than the judge to one of the many factors to be taken into account in exercising the discretion is not a ground for interfering with the exercise of his discretion, for as stated by Lord Templeman in The Spiliada at 465C, “the factors which the court is entitled to take into account in considering whether one forum is more appropriate are legion” (Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004, 1021E–F, per Lord Hoffmann).

7. Further, as noted in two decisions of the Court of Appeal (China Construction Bank (Asia) Corp Ltd v Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co Ltd at §7.15, per Cheung JA; and Melvin Waxman v Li Fei Yu (CACV 157/2014, [2016] HKEC 956, 20 April 2016) at §17.2, per Yuen JA), it is appropriate to bear in mind these words of caution of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545, 1556E–F:

“This is a field in which different conclusions can be reached by different tribunals without either being susceptible to legal challenge. The jurisdiction to stay is liable to be perverted if parties litigate the issue at different levels of the judicial hierarchy in the hope of persuading a higher court to strike a different balance in the factors pointing for and against a foreign forum.”’ ”

5.  Song claims that the Court had taken into account Q’s conduct after the actual conclusion of the hearing, the hearing having concluded approximately 6 minutes after the 2nd half of the hearing, at 1 hour 42 minutes after its commencement.

6.  I disagree that irrelevant matters had been taken into consideration.

7.  What the Court took into consideration in reaching its Decision was Q’s conduct of the 2nd Hearing as a whole. The matters identified at paragraphs 40 and 42 of the Reasons represented Q’s conduct, which showed to a reasonable objective observer his lack of attention to and focus on the 2nd Hearing and what transpired during the hearing. Any matter relating to his conduct after he had left the premises, and was in the vehicle, demonstrated and supported the observation made by the Court, that Q had not in fact heard what had transpired or what was said in the course of the 2nd Hearing. To an objective observer, he was apparently oblivious to the fact that the hearing had concluded.

8.  As for Song’s claim that Q’s misconduct had no material impact on the arbitral process or the unanimous decision of the tribunal, and that there is no evidence to suggest that Q had not properly reviewed the evidence, submissions and transcript of the 2nd Hearing, this fails to take into account the nature of the misconduct and irregularity as found, and the reason why enforcement of the Award was refused.

9.  This case does not concern the content or substance of the unanimous decision made in the Award. At paragraph 43 of the Reasons, the Court already pointed out that Q may claim, and it may even be the case, that he had in fact heard the entirety of the proceedings of the 2nd Hearing throughout. Q may claim, as Song now does, that he had reviewed the submissions and was aware of and alert to the arguments made, and the evidence presented at the 2nd Hearing. However, what the Reasons sought to explain and highlight is that it is a basic and important principle of natural justice that not only must there be justice and fairness in the process of a trial or hearing, but it is essential that justice and fairness must be seen to have been present, and that it must be apparent to an objective and reasonable third-party observer that Lee had been given a fair and proper trial, and been given the opportunity to be heard by an independent arbitrator who had not prejudged his case.

10.  It should be clear from the Reasons, and paragraph 51 in particular, that by reason of Q’s conduct, there are reasonable and legitimate doubts in the eyes of the reasonable objective observer that a fundamental and basic principle of natural justice as recognized in Hong Kong has been breached in this case, and that Lee has been deprived of the aforesaid basic and fundamental right to be heard in a fair process.

11.  On behalf of Song, it was argued that the Court had failed to take into account, or was wrong in not giving heed to recognized concepts of deference, comity and finality.  Essentially, it was argued that the supervisory court had refused to set aside the Award in this case on the basis of Q’s conduct, and it would require a very strong policy consideration before the enforcement court should refuse enforcement, as public policy favors the finality of awards and due deference should be given to the supervisory court and its decision to uphold the award.

12.  Finality of awards and concepts of comity and due deference have always been in the consideration of the Court.  However, the application to resist enforcement and the Decision to refuse enforcement in this case was based on the ground of public policy. It is indisputable, that public policy means the relevant public policy of Hong Kong, where enforcement of the Award is sought. It is trite, and the Reasons make it clear that enforcement was refused on the ground that it offends the basic notions of morality and justice of the Hong Kong forum (paragraphs 53, 57 and 61 of the Reasons). The Court of Final Appeal in Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd (1999) 2 HKCFAR 111 made it clear that it would be inconsistent with the principles of the New York Convention to hold that the refusal by a court of supervisory jurisdiction to set aside an award should debar an unsuccessful applicant from resisting enforcement of the award in the courts of enforcement, and particularly in a case where enforcement is resisted on the ground of the domestic public policy of the forum of enforcement. This is not inconsistent with comity or finality.

13.  According to Song, this Court must give due weight to the decision of the Mainland Court which had rejected Lee’s complaint regarding Q’s conduct. Whilst the Mainland supervisory court decided to uphold the Award, public policy was not raised, and if raised or considered, it was the public policy of the Mainland, and not the public policy of Hong Kong - which is the relevant policy for consideration by this Court for purposes of enforcement of this Award in this jurisdiction. This has been made patently clear in Hebei.

14.  In Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings Ltd (in liq) (No 1) [2012] 4 HKLRD 1, Tang VP observed (in the context of inability to present one’s case) that where the conduct complained of is so serious or egregious, to the extent that one could say that a party has been denied due process, an award would be set aside even though the results could not have been different. By reason of what I have found, I cannot see how it can be said that Lee has suffered no prejudice or injustice when his fundamental right to a fair hearing and to be properly heard has been deprived. The fact that Song was not at fault does not mean that there is no injustice to Lee.

15.  With regret, this is one such case in which I have found that the conduct of the arbitrator in the course of the hearing is so egregious, that Lee has been denied due process and deprived of his right to a fair hearing. Even if there had been any waiver by his lawyer of the irregularity, to enforce the Award was (as reflected in the Reasons) shocking to the conscience of the Court and contrary to the basic notions of justice in Hong Kong.

16.  Where there has been substantial injustice arising out of an award and enforcement would be shocking to the court’s conscience, to render enforcement of such award repugnant, it would be difficult and in practice extremely rare for the Court to exercise its residual discretion to permit enforcement (see Hebei, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ’s judgment at page 138E).

17.  For all the above reasons, I consider that there are no reasonable prospects of success on the intended appeal. Leave is refused, with costs to be paid by Song to Lee on indemnity basis, with certificate for Counsel.

 (Mimmie Chan)
  Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court
Mr Rimsky Yuen SC and Mr Byron Chiu, instructed by Grandall Zimmern
     Law Firm, for the applicant
Mr Douglas Lam SC and Mr David Chen, instructed by DS Cheung & Co,
     for the respondent

         

[2023] HKCFI 2578-EN-2023-10-06

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN)

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HCCT 111/2022

[2023] HKCFI 2578

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 111 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN

 SONG LIHUA (宋丽华)Applicant

and

 LEE CHEE HON (李子瀚)
(FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN (阙文彬))
Respondent

____________________

Before:Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers
Dates of Written Submissions:21, 22 and 25 September 2023
Date of Decision:6 October 2023

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  On 21 September 2023, this Court directed the application made by the Respondent (“Lee”) by his summons of 30 August 2023 (“Summons”) to be dealt with on the papers, and for written submissions to be filed and served by Lee and the Applicant in these proceedings (“Song”).

2.  The Summons is for payment out to Lee of a sum of HK$38,400,000 which he had paid into court on 23 December 2022. The payment made was for the discharge of a Mareva injunction made by the Court on 12 December 2022, on Song’s application in these proceedings, which injunction applied to Lee’s assets in Hong Kong. These proceedings were commenced by Song on 9 December 2022, seeking leave to enforce an arbitral award made by the Chengdu Arbitration Commission on 11 October 2021 (“Award”). The Award was for Lee’s payment to Song of approximately RMB 337 million, with interest and costs. On 12 January 2023, this Court granted leave to Song, on ex parte basis, to enforce the Award as a judgment of the Court (“Enforcement Order”), with leave granted to Lee to apply to set aside the Enforcement Order within 14 days.

3.  The setting aside application was made by Lee on 26 January 2023, and was heard on 24 August 2023. At the end of the hearing, this Court discharged the Enforcement Order, with reasons to be handed down (“Setting Aside Order”). The Reasons were duly handed down on 5 October 2023.

4.  In the interim between 24 August 2023 and 5 October 2023, Lee issued the Summons for payment out, and on her part, Song applied on 6 September 2023 for leave to appeal against the Setting Aside Order.

5.  The Summons is opposed by Song on 3 grounds. First, it was claimed that reasons had yet to be handed down for the Setting Aside Order, and it would be inappropriate or unnecessary to make an order for payment out before that.

6.  Secondly, it is claimed that there is a pending application for leave to appeal against the Setting Aside Order, and the merits of the application for leave and the consequent appeal, if leave is granted, would have impact on whether orders should be made for payment out to Lee. It is contended that Song should be able to consider the reasons for the Setting Aside Order, in deciding how to respond to the Summons.

7.  Thirdly, Song contends that she has not had the fair and proper opportunity to make full submissions on the basis of evidence which she intends to file in opposition to the Summons.

8.  Substantively, Song argued that the payment into court was made by Lee, in order to be released from the Mareva injunction, which injunction was granted by the Court on the basis that there was a risk of dissipation on the part of Lee, to avoid the consequences of the Award. Song referred to the evidence she had filed in support of the Mareva injunction, including the fact that Lee had been put on the List of Dishonest Judgment Directors on the Mainland since 2018, was involved in numerous court cases, and there has been a significant number of instances where enforcement by creditors on the Mainland against Lee has failed. Song contends that Lee is of low commercial morality with a tendency to dissipate his assets in order to frustrate her recovery efforts under the Award.

9.  The reasons advanced by Song as to why the Summons should not be determined at this stage are rejected.

10.  I cannot see how or why Song would not be able to respond to the Summons before the reasons for the Setting Aside Decision are handed down. The Reasons for the Setting Aside Order are relevant only for the purposes of her intended appeal. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that the Enforcement Order has been set aside, and enforcement of the Award in Hong Kong has been refused by this Court. The grounds for the setting aside, now indicated in the Reasons, are that it would be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong to enforce the Award.

11.  There is no need to file factual evidence for determination of the Summons. In this case, whether payment out should be made to Lee at this stage is decided on questions of law and matters which can be dealt with by submissions. Song has been given the opportunity to file submissions in opposition to the Summons, which she has done through her lawyers, and I see no injustice as contended. The case of Dunbar Assets Pie v Dorcas Holdings Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 864 cited by Counsel for Song is totally distinguishable, as it refers to the need for the Court to invite and to hear submissions on a claim before summary disposal without a trial. Written submissions have been filed by Counsel for both parties in this case for the Summons. In Counsel’s submissions for Song, reference has been made to the evidence filed by her in support of the Mareva injunction, as to Lee’s lack of commercial morality and the risk of dissipation of his assets. I have, for the purpose of determining the Summons, considered these affirmations and assumed the facts stated therein to be true, and in favor of Song.

12.  To the extent that the merits of the intended application for leave to appeal are relevant to determination of the Summons, the Setting Aside Decision is one on the exercise of the Court’s discretion. The threshold for obtaining leave to appeal against such a decision is high. It must be shown that the exercise of discretion was made under a mistake of law, or under a misapprehension as to the facts, or that the judge had taken into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant matters, such that the conclusion reached was outside the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. The appellate court may disagree with the conclusion, but that does not mean that the decision of the 1st instance judge is wrong and can be set aside. I am not satisfied that there are reasonable prospects of success in Song’s application for leave to appeal against the Setting Aside Order, or that the merits are so strong that they would have an impact on the determination of the Summons.

13.  The fact that there is an appeal does not operate as a stay of any decision or judgment, or the effect of such decision or judgment. Even if there was a pending appeal against the Setting Aside Award, the fact remains that the Enforcement Order has been set aside, and enforcement of the Award has been refused in Hong Kong.

14.  The payment into court was made for the discharge of the Mareva injunction. The Mareva injunction was in support of the claim for enforcement of the Award in Hong Kong. It was granted on the basis that there was a good arguable case that Song would be able to obtain leave to enforce the Award as a judgment in Hong Kong. With the Enforcement Order set aside since 24 August 2023, there is simply no basis and no cause to support the Mareva injunction if it had been continued (Essilor Manufacturing (Thailand) Co Ltd v G Doulatram and Sons (HK) Ltd [2021] HKCI 30). The payment into court made under and for the purpose of discharging the Mareva injunction likewise ceases to have support, and there is no reason not to permit repayment of the money to Lee.

15.  On behalf of Song, it was argued that the Award has not been set aside on the Mainland, and that it would somehow be unfair if Lee’s assets in Hong Kong should be released from the Mareva injunction granted by the Hong Kong Court in respect of his assets and funds in Hong Kong. There is no merit in this contention. The fact that there is an award which may be enforced on the Mainland, or elsewhere, does not mean that Lee’s assets in Hong Kong should be subject to an injunction in Hong Kong, where the Award is unenforceable. Song will simply have to look to other assets of Lee, on the Mainland or outside Hong Kong, for recovery under the Award. There is no injustice. An award does not guarantee successful recovery.

16.  For all the above reasons, I accede to the Summons and make the orders sought therein. As correctly pointed out by Counsel for Lee, the Enforcement Order made on the Originating Summons has been set aside, and enforcement of the Award has been refused. For completeness, an order can be made to dismiss the Originating Summons. The sum of HK$38,400,000 paid into court on 23 December 2022, with interest accrued, should be paid out to Lee through his solicitors. The summons issued by Song for payment to her of the money paid into court should be dismissed.

17.  An order nisi will be made, that the costs of the Summons and of the dismissal of Song’s application for payment of the funds to her (made prematurely on 14 June 2023) are to be paid by Song to Lee, with certificate for counsel. Such order shall be made absolute unless application for variation is made within 14 days.

 (Mimmie Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Byron Chiu, instructed by Grandall Zimmern Law Firm, for the applicant

Mr David Chen, instructed by DS Cheung & Co, for the respondent

[2023] HKCFI 2540-EN-2023-10-05

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN)

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HCCT 111/2022

[2023] HKCFI 2540

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 111 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN

 SONG LIHUA (宋丽华)Applicant

and

 LEE CHEE HON (李子瀚)
(FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN (阙文彬))
Respondent

____________________

Before:Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:24 August 2023
Date of Decision:24 August 2023
Date of Reasons for Decision:5 October 2023

_________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________

Background

1.  On 9 December 2022, the Applicant (“Song”) applied by her Originating Summons for leave to enforce an arbitral award dated 11 October 2021 (“Award”) made by the tribunal in an arbitration by the Chengdu Arbitration Commission (“Commission”) on the Mainland (“Arbitration”). The Award was for the payment by the Respondent (“Lee”) of the sum of RMB 337,222,219.90, interest and costs, found to be due and payable to Song under a contract made between Lee and Song on 7 July 2014 (“Contract”). Under the Contract, Song had agreed to purchase shares for RMB 210 million, undertaking not to transfer such shares for a “lockup period” of 36 months, upon Lee’s guarantee of a rate of return for the shares of not less than RMB 630 million for the lockup period.

2.  An order was made by the Court on 12 January 2023, granting leave to Song to enforce the Award as a judgment of the Court (“Enforcement Order”).

3.  Before that, on 12 December 2022, Song had applied for and obtained from the Court an injunction, whereby Lee was restrained from removing his assets from Hong Kong, and from disposing of or diminishing the value of any of his assets, up to the sum of HK $38,400,000 (“Mareva Injunction”).

4.  On 16 December 2022, the Court continued the Mareva Injunction, but the order provided that Lee shall be released from the Mareva Injunction, which shall be discharged, upon Lee’s payment into Court of the sum of HK $38,400,000. On 23 December 2022, the sum of HK $38,400,000 was paid into court by Lee, and the Mareva Injunction was discharged.

5.  On 26 January 2023, Lee applied to set aside the Enforcement Order under section 95 of the Arbitration Ordinance Cap 609 (“Ordinance”), on the stated grounds that the arbitration agreement was not valid, Lee was unable to present his case in the Arbitration, the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement, and/or that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the Award in Hong Kong (“Setting Aside Application”).

6.  The Setting Aside Application was heard on 24 August 2023. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court granted the application, set aside the Enforcement Order with costs, and indicated that the reasons for the decision would be handed down. The following sets out my reasons for the decision.

Basic first principles

7.  Hong Kong courts adopt a pro-arbitration and pro-enforcement approach, endeavoring to uphold parties’ agreement to submit their disputes to arbitration, recognize and enforce arbitral awards, and interfere in the arbitration of the dispute only as expressly provided for in the Ordinance. This is in accordance with the object and principles of the Ordinance, as set out in section 3, to facilitate the fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration. However, as the court has highlighted in the authorities, its recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is underpinned by the fundamental principle that the award is made as a result of due process, and that recognized rules of natural justice have been observed in the arbitration.

8.  In this case, Song places much reliance on the fact that the Mainland Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over the Arbitration, has ruled that the Award is valid and has dismissed Lee’s application to set aside the Award on the ground (inter alia) of the manner in which the Arbitration was conducted. For this reason, it is perhaps helpful to repeat some basic, fundamental principles.

9.  As explained as early as in the case of Paklito Investment Limited v Klockner East Asia Limited [1993] 2 HKLRD 39 as a matter of general principle, there is nothing in the New York Convention which specifies that a defendant is obliged to apply to set aside an award in the jurisdiction where it was made, as a condition of opposing enforcement elsewhere. The Court explained the “choice of remedies” at page 48 of the reported judgment, as follows:

“… a party faced with a Convention award against him has two options. Firstly, he can apply to the courts of the country where the award was made to seek the setting aside of the award. If the award is set aside then this becomes a ground in itself for opposing enforcement under the Convention.

Secondly, the unsuccessful party can decide to take no steps to set aside the award but wait until enforcement is sought and attempt to establish a Convention ground of opposition.”

10.  This was confirmed by the Court of Final Appeal in Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd (1992) 2 HKCFAR 111. At page 136 of the reported judgment of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, the following observations were made:

“Under the Ordinance and the New York Convention, the primary supervisory function in respect of arbitrations rests with the court of supervisory jurisdiction as distinct from the enforcement court (see Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341) s 44 (5); New York Convention, art VI; Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 770 at p 808). But this does not mean that the enforcement court will necessarily defer to the court of supervisory jurisdiction.

The Convention distinguishes between proceedings to set aside an award in the court of supervisory jurisdiction (arts VI and VI (e)) and proceedings in the court of enforcement (art VI). Proceedings to set aside are governed by the law under which the award was made or the law of the place where it was made, while proceedings in the court of enforcement are governed by the law of that forum. The Convention, in providing that enforcement of an award may be resisted on certain specified grounds, recognizes that, although an award may be valid by the law of the place where it is made, its making may be attended by such a grave departure from basic concepts of justice as applied by the court of enforcement that the award should not be enforced.

It follows, in my view, that it would be inconsistent with the principles on which the Convention is based to hold that the refusal by a court of supervisory jurisdiction to set aside an award debars an unsuccessful party from resisting enforcement of the award in the court of enforcement.”

11.  Referring to the decision of Kaplan J in Paklito Investment Ltd, and the two options open to the unsuccessful party, Sir Anthony Mason further pointed out that such a party is not bound to elect between the two remedies, at any rate when, in the court of enforcement, he seeks to rely on the public policy ground. His Lordship also explained that a failure to raise the public policy ground in proceedings to set aside an award cannot operate to preclude a party from resisting on that ground the enforcement of the award in the enforcing court in another jurisdiction, because each jurisdiction has its own public policy.

12.  Nothing in the Ordinance, and the scheme for recognition of Mainland awards thereunder, alters the general principles stated in the authorities above.

13.  It is clear from the authorities that where public policy is relied upon as a ground to resist enforcement of an award, it is the domestic public policy of the relevant court of enforcement which is relevant. Whereas an award may be recognized in one jurisdiction, its enforcement may be refused if it would be contrary to the public policy of another jurisdiction to enforce it.

14.  “Contrary to public policy” has been held by the Court of Final Appeal to mean “contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice” of the forum (Hebei Import & Export Corp). In A v R (Arbitration: Enforcement) [2009] 3 HKLRD 389, the Court explained (at para 23) that if the public policy ground is to be raised, there must be “a substantial injustice arising out of an award which is so shocking to the court’s conscience as to render enforcement repugnant”.

15.  In Hong Kong, audi alteram partem is a fundamental principle of natural justice which is recognized and enforced. This means that no person shall be judged without a fair hearing in which each party is given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against it, and to be heard on its case.

16.  Under the Ordinance, the parties to an arbitration must be treated with equality (section 46(2)). When conducting arbitral proceedings, the tribunal is expressly required to be independent, and to act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving them a reasonable opportunity to present their cases and to deal with the cases of their opponents.

17.  The application of the above principles and statutory provisions means that not only must these rules be applied, but they must be seen by the objective reasonable observer to have been applied. The established and well-known rule is that not only must justice be done, but it must also be seen to be done. This is borne out by the case cited by Lee in this case, Cesan v R (2008) 236 CLR 358, where French CJ observed:

“There are elements of the judicial process which can be said, at least in a metaphorical way, to play a part in maintaining public confidence in the courts irrespective of their relationship to the actual outcome of the process. The appearance of impartiality is one such. In North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley the joint judgment quoted with approval the observation by Gaudron J in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy: ‘Impartiality and the appearance of impartiality are necessary for the maintenance of public confidence in the judicial system.’The somewhat elusive criterion of ‘public confidence’ is in some cases, such as the appearance of bias, subsumed in what a fair and reasonable observer would think. The courts nevertheless depend in a real sense upon public confidence in the judicial system to maintain their authority. The maintenance of that authority depends, inter alia, upon that element of the judicial process which requires that parties before the court be given and be seen to be given a fair hearing. It is necessary to a fair hearing that the court be attentive to the evidence presented by the parties and to the submissions which they make. The appearance of unfairness in the trial can constitute a ‘miscarriage of justice’ within the ordinary meaning of that term.” (Emphases added)

18.  Needless to say, the arbitrator is carrying out a quasi-judicial role (see this Court’s earlier Decision in this case, [2023] 4 HKLRD 162) and has duties to conduct the arbitral proceedings and decide the case before him with appropriate care, skill and professional integrity (see para 13.04, International Commercial Arbitration (Born, 3rd edition).

19.  As the courts have emphasized in the cases, it is only where the fair and reasonable observer can perceive due process in the arbitration, that public confidence can be maintained and the courts can give effect to that confidence by enforcing an award as a judgment of the court.

20.  The facts of the present case and of the challenge made to the arbitral process are considered in the light of the principles set out above.

The matters complained of by the Respondent

21.  As summarized by Counsel for Song, Lee relied upon 6 grounds for his Setting Aside Application. First, it is alleged that in breach of her duty of good faith, Song had failed to disclose to the tribunal Lee’s contact methods as known to Song, which led to Lee not being given proper notice of the Arbitration (“Contact Methods Complaint”). Secondly, Lee claims that he had not been properly served with notice of the Arbitration (“Service Complaint”), which led to his being deprived of the opportunity to nominate an arbitrator to the tribunal - which formed a further ground of complaint (“Nomination Complaint”). Fourthly, Lee claims that the conduct of the Arbitration by one of the arbitrators (“Q”) deprived him of the opportunity to present his case, and of the right to a fair hearing, which is contrary to public policy (“Arbitrator Complaint”). Fifthly, Lee claims that he was not given a copy of the Supplemental Submissions which were filed by Song after the hearing of the arbitration, such that he was not able to address the matters raised in the submissions (“Supplemental Submissions Complaint”). Lastly, it is Lee’s claim that the underlying Contract and the arbitration agreement contained therein is invalid and unenforceable under Mainland law (“Invalidity Complaint”).

22.  On 28 December 2022, Lee had applied to the Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court to resist Song’s application to enforce the Award. On 16 March 2023, the Mainland Court rejected his application, in essence finding that there was no illegality in the Contract, that Q’s conduct in the arbitration caused a defect in the procedure, but did not have any actual impact on the 2nd Hearing. The notice and documents in the Arbitration had been validly served on Lee, and Lee’s lawyer had not raised any objection to either the constitution of the tribunal or to the arbitral procedure.

23.  Under section 95(2) of the Ordinance, enforcement of a Mainland award may be refused if the person against whom it is invoked proves one or more of the grounds set out in the subsection. The burden of proof is on Lee, and enforcement may be refused if any one of the grounds is established – subject always to the discretion of the Court to permit enforcement notwithstanding any defect found in the process. Based on the matters raised in Lee’s evidence, the relevant grounds of the Setting Aside Application are those set out in section 95(2)(b) (for the Invalidity Complaint), section 95(2)(c)(i) (for the Service Complaint), section 95(2)(c) (for the Arbitrator Complaint and the Supplemental Submissions Complaint), section 95(2)(e) (for the Nomination Complaint), and section 95(3), for the claim that by virtue of his complaints, enforcement of the Award in Hong Kong would be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong.

The Contact Methods Complaint, the Service Complaint and the Nomination Complaint

24.  These complaints can be dealt with together, and briefly.

25.  Lee claims that it was insufficient and an act of bad faith on Song’s part to have only disclosed to the tribunal Lee’s former address, and the telephone number of Lee’s assistant, without disclosing Lee’s other telephone number and other contact methods of Lee’s assistant. Lee claims he had never received any documents which had been served at his old address, from which he had moved and which he had in fact sold. On Song’s evidence, she herself had not been able to contact Lee at Lee’s telephone number, and she had only been able to reach Lee by calling his assistant’s telephone number. She had given to the Commission the last known address of Lee, and the means by which she had been able to contact Lee (ie the telephone number of his assistant). She apparently also gave to the Commission the email address of Lee’s assistant.

26.  I am not satisfied that it has been established that Song had acted in breach of any duty of good faith, when on her evidence, she had supplied to the Commission the methods of contacting Lee, as known to her. The Commission was in fact ultimately able to contact Lee through his assistant, by communicating with the assistant by the email address furnished by Song.

27.  According to the Award, the notice and documents of the commencement of the Arbitration had been served on Lee at the address indicated in his identity registration record on the Mainland (ie his Mainland identity card) and as specified in the underlying Contract. The tribunal accepted the address so indicated as Lee’s usual or habitual address. The applicable rules of the Chengdu Arbitration Commission (“CAC Rules”) provide for deemed service of documents on the party served, when documents relating to the Arbitration are sent by registered post or courier to the usual or habitual address of the party, and if such cannot be found, the CAC Rules provide that they shall be deemed to have been duly served if sent to the habitual or usual residence or other addresses last known of the party to be served.

28.  Lee’s claim is that he had not received notice of the commencement of the Arbitration sent to his former address, and it was only after the first hearing of the Arbitration which had taken place on 26 March 2021 (“1st Hearing”), that he was informed by his assistant of the Arbitration. The Commission had sent an email to Lee’s assistant on 2 April 2021, with the intention of informing Lee of the 1st Hearing held, and to invite Lee to contact the Commission and to attend the next hearing of the Arbitration. Lee then instructed his lawyers, who received certain documents relating to the Arbitration on 21 April 2021, and attended the second hearing of the Arbitration on 26 May 2021 (“2nd Hearing”). By then, the tribunal had already been empaneled, despite there being no nomination by Lee. The tribunal pointed out in the Award that the Commission is empowered by Article 12 of the PRC Arbitration Law to designate an arbitrator when a party to the arbitration has defaulted in choosing an arbitrator within the time designated.

29.  Lee participated in the 2nd Hearing through his lawyer, Cai.

30.  The service of documents relating to the Arbitration to the last known and usual place of address of Lee is deemed valid under the CAC Rules. Even if the deemed service was not effective, Lee had participated in the Arbitration through his lawyer without any protest, and without any application to adjourn the 2nd Hearing. If the notice of the Arbitration had been validly served by operation of the CAC Rules, then the Commission and the tribunal were entitled to complete the appointment to the tribunal pursuant to and in accordance with the applicable rules and the Arbitration Law.

31.  It can also be said that Lee had waived any irregularity concerning the service of the notice and documents of the Arbitration, and any irregularity in the constitution of the tribunal. He had knowledge of the composition of the tribunal by the time of the 2nd Hearing, at the latest, but no objection had been raised on Lee’s behalf. In this context, Counsel for Song has highlighted the fact that at the conclusion of the 2nd Hearing, Lee’s lawyer had, at the request of the tribunal, confirmed that there was no objection to any procedural defect in the Arbitration. I accept that the nomination and empaneling of the tribunal is a procedural matter, which can be and was waived by Lee.

The Arbitrator Complaint

32.  This is the most serious complaint made.

33.  The background of Lee’s complaint is that he had not received any notice of or documents relating to the Arbitration which had been sent to his former address, and by the time he was informed of the Arbitration, the 1st Hearing had already taken place and he could only instruct his lawyer to attend the 2nd Hearing.

34.  Also by way of background, it was only after Lee had applied to the Mainland Court to set aside the Award, and while he was preparing for his opposition to Song’s application to enforce the Award on the Mainland and in Hong Kong, that Lee’s lawyers were able on 4 January 2023 to conduct a search of the Commission’s files of the arbitral proceedings, and obtained copies of the notice of arbitration, transcripts of the 1st Hearing and of the 2nd Hearing, and two sets of submissions filed on behalf of Song, dated 9 April 2021 and 31 May 2021. The April submissions had been filed by Song after the 1st Hearing, which Lee had never received before his participation in the Arbitration. The May submissions were filed by Song after the 2nd Hearing (as directed by the tribunal at the hearing), but had never been served on or received by Lee or his lawyers.

35.  Lee’s lawyers had asked for a copy of the video recording of the entire arbitral proceedings. This request was not acceded to by the Commission, but eventually, on 29 January 2023, Lee’s lawyers were able to arrange with the Commission to view the video recording of the 2nd Hearing. They were also able to obtain screen shot captures of the video.

36.  There is no dispute that whereas the parties’ lawyers, and two of the three arbitrators, had attended the 2nd Hearing in person, the third arbitrator Q had attended by video conferencing facilities.

37.  As summarized by Lee’s Counsel, the proceedings of the 2nd Hearing can be broadly divided into 5 parts. The first part of the hearing dealt with housekeeping and administrative matters. The second part concerned the presentation of Lee’s case by his lawyer. The third part was for adducing and challenging the evidence adduced by both parties. There was a fourth part for questions from the tribunal, and the last part was for the parties’ debate and submissions to the tribunal.

38.  In gist, Lee’s complaint is that Q had not meaningfully participated in the 2nd Hearing of the Arbitration. For at least the second half of the hearing, Q was moving from one location to another, indoors and outdoors, and had eventually left his premises, and traveled in a car, without giving his undivided attention to the hearing. He was off-line for periods of time from the second half, and obviously could not hear what was being said by the parties’ lawyers or by the other members of the tribunal.

39.  At the hearing before this Court on 24 August 2023, excerpts of the entire video recording of the 2nd Hearing (“Video”) (which had been obtained by Lee after the Award) was played.

40.  Having carefully reviewed the entire Video (which lasted 2 hours 17 minutes until the end of the recording), and the excerpts thereof of the second half of the 2nd Hearing (“Excerpt”) (which Excerpt lasted approximately 12 minutes), it is quite obvious that essentially for the second half of the hearing, commencing approximately 1 hour 36 minutes after the start of the 2nd Hearing, Q had scarcely been stationary for more than 1 minute (apart from the last part of the Video when he was inside a car). The Video clearly showed the background of Q’s various locations, and it could be observed that he had moved from one room of the premises to another, at times talking to and/or gesturing to others in the room. Q could also be seen to be looking into the distance frequently, instead of watching the screen and the video of the proceedings.

41.  References below are, for ease of my identification, made to the timing of the Excerpt, but the Excerpt is itself extracted from the full Video which I have examined in detail. Counsel for Lee have, in their skeleton submissions, referred to the exact timing of the Video itself.

42.  Approximately 6 minutes from the commencement of the Excerpt of the Video, Q could be seen walking out of the main door of the premises into an open public area. He remained standing there for a short period of time, and then went off-line at around 7:50 minutes after the commencement of the Excerpt. Q went online again at approximately 8:20 minutes, before going off-line again at around 8:28, and again at 9:14. When Q appeared online again at 9:56 minutes, he was seen inside a vehicle which appeared to be a private car as he was sitting in the front seat and adjusting his seatbelt. The video image froze again at 10:35 minutes of the Excerpt, and when Q appeared online at 10:58, the chairman of the tribunal could be heard asking if Q could hear him but there was no response whatsoever from Q for some time. At 11:25 minutes of the Excerpt, Q spoke for the first time to state that he had no reception as he was on or proceeding to the high-speed railway. The manner of Q’s attendance of the 2nd Hearing, by going outdoors where reception was poor, was obviously disruptive of the proceedings, to say the least.

43.  It may well be Q’s claim that he had in fact heard the entirety of the proceedings of the 2nd Hearing throughout. It should be pointed out, however, that it does not appear from the Video that Q was using a headphone or any earpiece, so it can be inferred that he was only relying on the speaker of his mobile telephone or other handheld device. It can also be observed from the Excerpt that on at least 2 occasions when members of the tribunal or the secretary of the tribunal attending the hearing had spoken to ask if Q could hear them, or was online, Q had made no answer at all, nor had he made any indication or gesture that he had heard the questions. Neither did Q give any explanation for the times when he was disconnected, as to whether he had heard the proceedings, or otherwise.

44.  During the time when Q was seen wandering around in the manner described above, Lee’s lawyer, and then Song’s lawyers, were addressing the tribunal. Significantly, as Counsel for Lee pointed out, Q’s movements took place during the time when the parties’ lawyers were adducing and challenging the evidence produced, and when members of the tribunal were asking questions as to the evidence and the parties’ respective case.

45.  Paragraphs 15 to 17 above of my Decision set out fundamental and important principles of natural justice observed by the Hong Kong courts. As Counsel for Lee submitted, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance guarantees equality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing (section 8). In the case of Lau Siu Lai v Kwok Wai Fun Franco (Returning Officer) (2020) 23 HKCFAR 338, Cheung PJ (as the Chief Justice then was) pointed out (at paragraph 13 of the judgment) that the right to be heard is an important procedural right under the rules of natural justice going directly to the question of fairness. On behalf of Lee, it was argued that such right to be heard encompasses not only the litigant’s right of access to the courts, but also the court actually hearing the litigant.

46.  The case of Stansbury v Datapulse plc and anor [2003] EWCA Civ 1951 concerned a more extreme case of the improper conduct of a member of the employment tribunal, who appeared to have fallen asleep during a hearing. The applicant had made no complaint during the course of the hearing before the employment tribunal, where he was legally represented. The English Court of Appeal held that a hearing should be by a tribunal each member of which was concentrating on the case before him or her, and that a hearing might be held to be unfair if a member of a tribunal did not appear to be alert as to what was being said in the course of the hearing, or by reason of a member’s inability to give his full attention to the hearing. Peter Gibson LJ referred to the decision of Whitehart v Rayman Thompson Ltd (unreported) 11 September 1984, and the observation made by Popplewell J in the case:

“It is axiomatic that all members of a tribunal must hear all the evidence and to have a trial in which one member of the tribunal is asleep even for a short part of the time, cannot be categorized as a proper trial. Justice does not appear to have been done.” (Emphasis added)

47.  In Stansbury, Peter Gibson LJ also referred to the opinion of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2003] ICR 856, and the following observation of Lord Steyn:

“What the public was content to accept many years ago is not necessarily acceptable in the world of today. The indispensable requirement of public confidence in the administration of justice requires higher standards today than was the case even a decade or two ago.”

48.  In Cesan v R (2008) 236 CLR 358, the Court stated the important principles of appearance of impartiality, as being essential to the maintenance of public confidence in the judicial system. These can be found at paragraph 71 of the judgment, cited at paragraph 17 above.

49.  The above authorities all highlight that it is not only important for there to be justice and fairness in the process of a trial or a hearing, but that it is just as, if not more, essential that an objective and reasonable third-party observer should see that there was fairness and impartiality in the process. Only then can there be confidence in and respect for the system whereby a party and his case is judged.

50.  It is the duty of an arbitrator to decide the dispute submitted to him, after giving to the parties the reasonable opportunity to present their case, and after hearing the parties. In fact, it can be said that the first role of the judge and the arbitrator is to preside and hear the case. A hearing takes place to inform the judge and tribunal of the material required for the determination called for.

51.  If Q was not concentrating on or not hearing the submissions made by the lawyers, an objective observer would have reasonable doubts as to firstly, whether Q had already made up his mind as to the dispute before or without hearing the parties, and was not interested in what the parties had to say on the evidence or on the law. Secondly, the observer would have reasonable doubts as to whether Q’s decision in the case can be actually supported by the evidence, when he had not properly focused on the parties’ submissions at the 2nd Hearing. A hearing is for the finding of facts and for a fair consideration of contrary argument, and if the arbitrator is not focused on or does not appear to be interested in that, confidence in his judgment can be impaired and a party can fairly doubt if his case has been truly heard and considered at all.

52.  In my judgment, there is no apparent justice and fairness, when a member of the decision-making tribunal was not hearing and focused on hearing the parties in the course of the trial.

53.  Song placed reliance on the fact that the supervisory court on the Mainland has not set the Award aside and has permitted its enforcement on the Mainland, despite the complaint made by Lee as to the manner of Q’s conduct of the proceedings. However, Hong Kong as the enforcement court has to apply its own standards and law when deciding whether it would be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong to enforce the Award. Having considered the facts of this case, and for the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs, I take the view that the conduct of the 2nd Hearing lacked due process and falls short of the high standards expected by the Hong Kong courts for a fair and impartial hearing, which gives recognition to the parties’ fundamental and basic rights. It would be shocking to the conscience of the Court to give recognition to the Award.

54.  Song argued that Lee’s lawyer who attended the 2nd Hearing had waived any irregularities of the 2nd Hearing, by failing to raise objection to the tribunal with regard to Q. Cai in fact confirmed to the tribunal, when asked at the end of the hearing, that he had no objection to the procedures of the Arbitration.

55.  First, it can be expected that an advocate at a hearing would be focused on presenting his case, on the submissions being made by his opponent, and on the papers and materials being presented, rather than to focus on observing the image of the arbitrator on the screen - unless the arbitrator was asking questions or making a comment. From experience, it can be appreciated that Cai may not have observed and noted all the activities of Q on the screen, such that his confirmation of no objection at the end of the 2nd Hearing cannot fairly be considered to be a full waiver of the serious irregularities on Q’s part. Cai has claimed in this case that he had not in fact noticed during the 2nd Hearing that Q had been moving from place to place.

56.  Even if Cai had failed to raise any objection at the 2nd Hearing, the ground of public policy can be raised and relied upon by the Court, if it appears to the Court, under section 95(3) of the Ordinance, that it would be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong to enforce the Award.

57.  My clear conclusion on the evidence is that enforcement of the Award in Hong Kong would violate the most basic notions of justice in our forum and should be refused under section 95(3) of the Ordinance.

Supplemental Submissions Complaint and other complaints

58.  It is Lee’s complaint that he had not received the Supplemental Submissions which Song’s lawyers had sent to the tribunal after the 2nd Hearing, and was not able to present Lee’s case on issues which had not been orally addressed at the 2nd Hearing but had been raised in the submissions filed at the 1st Hearing, and in the Supplemental Submissions filed after the 2nd Hearing (pursuant to the directions of the tribunal). They are issues identified by Lee’s counsel as being relevant to the validity of the Contract.

59.  It may be said that looking at the history of the Arbitration as a whole, bearing in mind that Lee had been absent at the 1st Hearing, it was somewhat surprising if the tribunal had not, at the 2nd Hearing, inquired as to whether the submissions filed by Song’s lawyers at the 1st Hearing had been received by Lee. It may also be said that it was the fault of Lee and his own lawyers, that they had not conducted a search of the Commission’s file on the Arbitration, or otherwise made inquiries with the tribunal or Song’s lawyers, before the 2nd Hearing, to obtain copies of the documents and submissions which had been filed with the tribunal at the 1st Hearing, or subsequent thereto but before the 2nd Hearing, and/or to seek an adjournment to review such documents. Further, no evidence has been adduced, and no submissions have been made before this Court, as to the directions made at the conclusion of the 2nd Hearing for the manner of service of the Supplemental Submissions.

60.  Having found that enforcement of the Award would be contrary to public policy, such that the Enforcement Order should be set aside, it is not necessary to make further findings on these issues, as to whether Lee had been unable to present his case on the points raised in the Supplemental Submissions, or at the 1st Hearing, as to the alleged illegality of the Contract. On the illegality ground, the Mainland Court has found, under Mainland law, that the Contract is valid and Counsel for Lee accepts that the enforcement Court should pay due heed to such a finding at least on the alleged defence of illegality.

61.  Suffices it to say that the manner of the conduct of the 2nd Hearing is sufficiently egregious to warrant the Enforcement Order to be set aside, on the ground of public policy.

Disposition

62.  The Enforcement Order is set aside, and enforcement of the Award is refused. The order made on 24 August 2023 was that the costs of the summons of 26 January 2023 are to be paid by Song to Lee, with certificate for 2 Counsel, on indemnity basis.

 (Mimmie Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Byron Chiu, instructed by Grandall Zimmern Law Firm, for the applicant

Mr Douglas Lam SC and Mr. David Chen, instructed by DS Cheung & Co, for the respondent

[2023] HKCFI 1954-EN-2023-07-31

SONG LIHUA v. LEE CHEE HON (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN)

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HCCT 111/2022

[2023] HKCFI 1954

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 111 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN

 SONG LIHUA (宋丽华)Applicant
 and 
 LEE CHEE HON (李子瀚)Respondent
 (FORMER NAME: QUE WENBIN (阙文彬)) 

____________________

Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers
Dates of Written Submissions: 13, 20 and 27 June 2023
Dates of Further Written Submissions: 6, 13 and 18 July 2023
Date of Decision: 31 July 2023

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

Background

1.  On 12 January 2023, this Court granted leave to the Applicant to enforce in Hong Kong an arbitral award of the Chengdu Arbitration Commission (“Commission”) dated 11 October 2021 (“Award”). Under the Award, the Respondent (“Lee”) is to pay to the Applicant a sum of RMB 337,222, 219.90, interest and costs.

2.  On 26 January 2023, the Respondent applied to set aside the order of 12 January 2023 (“Enforcement Order”), on the ground that the arbitration agreement relied upon by the Applicant was not valid, the Respondent was unable to present his case in the Mainland arbitration (“Arbitration”), the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement, and/or it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the Award (“Setting Aside Application”). In support of the Setting Aside Application, the Respondent filed his 2nd affirmation made on 26 January 2023 (“Lee 2”), in which he claimed (inter alia) that he had not been validly served with documents in the Arbitration, was not given the opportunity to nominate an arbitrator of his choice, that he could only appoint a lawyer to attend the second (but not the first) hearing of the Arbitration on 26 May 2021, and that submissions had been made on behalf of the Applicant and submitted to the tribunal, which had not been served on him nor produced at the hearing. He claimed that he had already applied to the Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court to set aside the Award.

3.  Lee also claimed in his 4th affirmation, made on 16 February 2023 (“Lee 4”) and filed for the Setting Aside Application, that for the purpose of the Setting Aside Application, his Mainland lawyers had made requests to the Commission for materials relating to the Arbitration, and had been able to conduct a search of the files of the arbitral proceedings and to view a video recording of the second hearing of the Arbitration which took place on 26 May 2021 (“2nd Hearing”). As a result of the Commission’s refusal to provide a soft copy of the video recording of the entire arbitral proceedings, and having viewed the recording of the 2nd Hearing, Lee applied to the Mainland Court on 1 February 2023 to obtain the video recording of the entire arbitral proceedings, the resumes of the 3 arbitrators, and information relating to and reasons for the physical absence of one of the arbitrators (“QF”) from the 2nd Hearing.

4.  In Lee 4, Lee claims that the materials he sought to be produced by the Commission are highly relevant and important to the Setting Aside Application in Hong Kong. According to the inspection of the files of the arbitral proceedings and the materials Lee have so far obtained, QF was not physically present at the 2nd Hearing and had been attending the hearing remotely, but he was seen moving from place to place throughout the proceedings, in public, and using only his mobile telephone without any earphones. It is claimed that these facts are relevant to Lee’s application to set aside the Enforcement Order, on the ground that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the Award, when the proceedings were conducted in such a manner.

5.  The hearing of the Setting Aside Application is scheduled for 24 August 2023.

6.  On 22 March 2023, the Respondent applied to this Court by separate summons (“Summons”), under the Arrangement on Mutual Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters between the Courts of the Mainland and the HKSAR (“Arrangement”), for a letter of request to be issued to the Mainland judicial authority (“Request”), to obtain testimonies from QF, and from the secretary to the tribunal (“Y”). The order sought in the Summons was, first, for QF to be examined (“訊問”): as to his location and movements at the time of the 2nd Hearing, from approximately 2 PM to 3:50 PM (“Hearing”), the duration of his stay at each location, the electronic equipment or facility utilized by QF (including video and audio equipment/facility) in his participation at the Hearing, and how he participated in the Hearing to ensure compliance with the principles of confidentiality and to ensure the integrity of the Arbitration.

7.  Secondly, the Summons seeks an order for Y to be examined: as to the location of QF at the time he was electronically linked with the tribunal, the identities of the people around QF, whether QF had participated in the questioning and examination at the Hearing; the entity or tribunal approving the manner of QF’s participation in the Hearing; the communication facilities utilized by QF at the time when he was electronically linked, and whether any security measures had been put in place in respect of the communication facilities at the time when he was linked to the Hearing.

8.  The Summons seeks further orders that the testimony of QF and Y be recorded in writing and to be sent to the Hong Kong Court, and for Lee to be notified as to the time and location for the evidence to be obtained from these witnesses.

9.  The Applicant raised objections to the Summons and the orders sought thereunder, pointing out that the Arrangement does not provide for the Hong Kong Court to seek the taking of evidence by “examination of witnesses” (“詢問證人”), as Articles 6 of the Arrangement only enables the Hong Kong Court to seek the Mainland Courts’ assistance to “obtain statements” (“取得當事人的陳述及證人證言”) from the parties concerned as to their testimonies, and for the provision of documentary evidence. Only the Mainland Court can, under Article 6, seek assistance from the Hong Kong Court by “examination of witnesses”.

10.  As a result of these objections, Lee amended the orders sought in the Summons, to seek only that the Mainland Court should “obtain statements” from the witnesses concerned.

11.  As the Summons and the Request are for evidence to be taken for consideration in and for the purpose of the Setting Aside Application, this Court directed the Summons to be dealt with on the papers, before the substantive hearing of the Setting Aside Application on 24 August 2023. Written submissions were accordingly filed on behalf of the parties in June 2023, in support of and in opposition to the Summons.

12.  On 29 June 2023, this Court issued further directions, for the parties to file further written submissions to address the question whether an arbitrator can be compelled to give evidence on a challenge to the award (“Question”), as neither parties had dealt with the Question in their submissions filed for the Summons.

13.  Submissions on the Question were thereafter filed in July 2023.

14.  This is my ruling on the Summons.

The nature of the Setting Aside Application for which the Request is made

15.  It is pertinent that the evidence sought to be obtained under the Request to be issued is to be used in and for the purpose of the Setting Aside Application. This is an application made to the Hong Kong Court to refuse enforcement of the Mainland Award on the grounds set out in section 95 of the Arbitration Ordinance (“Ordinance”). The Setting Aside Application is to be determined, at the enforcement stage, by the Hong Kong Court, under Hong Kong law. On the facts of this case, the evidence sought under the Request and the matters relied upon as to the conduct of QF are relevant as to whether the procedures of the Arbitration were in accordance with the parties’ arbitration agreement, or in accordance with the procedural law governing the Arbitration, and whether it would be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong to enforce the Award by reason of any serious irregularity or lack of due process in the conduct of the Arbitration. The parties’ underlying contract for the acquisition of shares is governed by PRC law, which may also govern the parties’ arbitration agreement and the procedure of the Arbitration itself. However, the hearing of the Setting Aside Application is governed by Hong Kong law so far as it relates to procedure and the admissibility of evidence. Needless to say, the Ordinance and the public policy of Hong Kong are other determining matters affecting the consideration of the Setting Aside Application.

16.  It is therefore erroneous for Lee’s Counsel to rely simply on PRC law or authorities on the power of the Mainland courts, in answering the Question. The fact that the Mainland Court may have power, as Lee claims, to direct an arbitrator or the secretary of the tribunal to provide evidence to the Mainland Court in Mainland proceedings does not mean that the Hong Kong Court has power to compel QF as one of the arbitrators to give evidence for the purposes of the Setting Aside Application before the Hong Kong Court. The provision relied upon by Counsel for Lee, as to the power of the Mainland Court to require the tribunal to provide statements or documents to the Mainland Court, when the latter is considering whether to refuse enforcement of an arbitral award, only governs proceedings before the Mainland Court, for the purposes stated in the article.

17.  The fact that the PRC law expert of the Applicant did not dispute or challenge the views of Lee’s expert on PRC law does not mean that the Court is bound to accept the position, that QF may be ordered by the Hong Kong Court to give evidence. Put simply, this is a matter of Hong Kong law, on which the PRC law experts have no qualification to express any opinion.

18.  The fact that the Arrangement does not set out the circumstances when the Hong Kong Court may request assistance from the Mainland Court does not mean that the Hong Kong Court can or should make the request for assistance in any case without consideration of the relevance or admissibility of the evidence. It is against common sense, and a waste of costs and resources, for the Court to issue a request to obtain evidence, simply because the request can be made on or within the terms of the Arrangement, if the evidence is not admissible in the Setting Aside Application to be determined by the Hong Kong Court.

19.  As Lee himself has pointed out, his application to the Mainland Court for the Commission to provide the video recording of the entire arbitral proceedings and the other materials relating to the 2nd Hearing has now been determined by the Mainland Court, and dismissed (paragraph 7 of Lee 5 made on 29 March 2023). The Applicant further pointed out that Lee’s application to the Mainland Court to refuse enforcement of the Award, on the ground of QF’s conduct, was also rejected by the Mainland Court after consideration of the relevant Mainland law. It is the Applicant’s case that Lee’s Summons is an abuse of process, when the Mainland Court has already decided not to order the evidence to be given at Lee’s request.

20.  The decisions of the Mainland Court may be relevant to the Court’s consideration of the Setting Aside Application. However, whether evidence is relevant to and admissible for the Setting Aside Application is a matter for determination by the Hong Kong Court, and the mere fact that the Mainland Court has declined the admission of evidence for the proceedings before the Mainland Court does not by itself mean that Lee is not entitled to refer to or admit such evidence in the Hong Kong proceedings.

Whether QF can be ordered under Hong Kong law to give evidence for admission in the Setting Aside Application

21.  The Question was directed to be answered by the parties, since the effect of the Request is to compel QF, the arbitrator, to give evidence for use in the Setting Aside Application when his Award is challenged as being irregular and against public policy.

22.  There is no suggestion that QF had been approached by Lee, and had agreed to give the evidence sought by Lee as to the Hearing. As Lee has acknowledged, the Commission has permitted his lawyers to search the files of the arbitral proceedings, and to view the video recording of the 2nd Hearing.

23.  The competence of an arbitrator to give evidence does not mean that he can be compelled to give evidence. Counsel for Lee has not cited any authority to support the proposition that an arbitrator can be compelled to give evidence in proceedings to challenge his award.

24.  The older authorities referred to by Counsel for the Applicant suggest that an arbitrator may give evidence and be called as witnesses on certain matters. Phipson on Evidence (20th edition) (at para 25-28) cited Duke of Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works (1872) LR 5HL 418 in support of the proposition that “arbitrators may give evidence as to what transpired in an arbitration and to state what matters were included in the submissions, but they must not be asked questions about the reason for their award”. In Buccleuch itself, the umpire in question did not make any objection to give evidence when he was called as a witness, and he was asked questions as to how the sum named in his award had been made up. The question for the Court on appeal was whether the evidence given by the umpire was admissible, and it was held that the umpire was a competent witness, and that he may be questioned as to the subject of the claim put forward and considered by him. In his judgment, Baron Cleasby observed:

“With respect to those who fill the office of Judge it has been felt that there are grave objections to their conduct being made the subject of cross-examination and comment (to which hardly any limit could be put) in relation to proceedings before them; and, as everything which they can properly prove can be proved by others, the Courts of law discountenance, and I think I may say prevent them being examined. But those objections do not apply at all to a person selected as arbitrator for the particular occasion by the parties, and he comes within the general obligation of being bound to give evidence.”

The Court nevertheless considered that it would not be permissible to examine the umpire for the purpose of showing what he had intended to be included in the award, how it was arrived at, what items were included or excluded, and the meaning intended to be given to the award.

25.  In Warren v Warren [1997] QB 488, where a party sought to summon a judge to tender evidence as to the extent of an undertaking given by another party to the court, it was held that a judge was not a compellable witness in relation to his judicial functions. The Court affirmed the rationale identified above, in Baron Cleasby’s judgement in Duke of Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works.

26.  Mr Chen, Counsel for Lee, highlighted the fact that in Buccleuch, the judgment of Baron Cleasby had referred specifically to arbitrators, and stated that the objections to judges being cross-examined in relation to proceedings before them did not apply to a person selected as arbitrator, and that such arbitrator comes within the general obligation of being bound to give evidence. Baron Cleasy went on to observe that “being competent generally, it follows that (the arbitrator) may be questioned as to what took place before him, so as to show over what subject matter that he was exercising jurisdiction”, for the purpose of enabling the Court to judge whether the arbitrator was acting within his jurisdiction, or not. Counsel further argued that these are only examples of matters on which the arbitrator can be examined, as he is “competent generally” to give evidence relating to the arbitration. Mr Chen argued that this appeared to be supported by the judgment of the Court in Ward v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd [1952] 1 KB 280.

27.  Since the decisions in Duke of Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works (in 1872), Ward v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd (in 1952) and Warren v Warren (in 1997), there has in the last three decades been a rapid and substantial growth in the popularity of arbitrations and an increase in parties’ choice of arbitration as an option for dispute resolution. Arbitrations are now a common form of resolution of disputes, and internationally, courts have generally adopted a pro-arbitration approach and policy in the context of recognition and enforcement of both arbitration agreements and arbitral awards as judgments of the court.

28.  Arbitrators appointed under the parties’ agreement are appointed to decide on their formulated dispute which has arisen, in lieu of having the matter litigated before the courts. Arbitrators decide the parties’ dispute on facts and on law, on the evidence presented to them and after hearing submissions and arguments made by and for the parties. The arbitration is conducted in accordance with rules of procedure agreed to by the parties, and arbitrators have the duty to act impartially and fairly. Their awards have to be reasoned to enable the parties to understand why the award was made against them. The parties agreed that such an award will be final and binding.

29.  It is accordingly widely recognized that arbitrators perform and exercise a judicial or quasi-judicial function, and that arbitrators’ decision‑making and judgments are comparable in nature and process to those of judges, such that there is a need to protect the course of their independent judgment from threats of suit as well as from collateral attacks.

30.  The Court’s policy of encouraging and aiding arbitrations, and of upholding parties’ choice of arbitration as the manner of final resolution of their disputes is reflected in the Ordinance, and encapsulated in section 3 of the Ordinance. This refers to the facilitation of the fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expense, and to the Court’s non‑interference in arbitrations save as expressly provided for in the Ordinance.

31.  In this overall context, my judgment is that arbitrators should be entitled to the same immunity available to judges in respect of their decision- making in the process of arbitration, absent fraud or bad faith. The purpose and rationale for such immunity is the protection of the discretionary and independent decision-making process of the arbitrator who performs a judicial function. It is also in line with the public policy and the Court’s interest in encouraging private dispute arbitration and to protect the autonomy of the arbitral process. Such arbitral immunity and autonomy will be illusory if the Court is to compel, or enable the parties to compel, an arbitrator to give evidence as to his decision-making, which includes the arbitrator’s exercise of his powers and discretion in the arbitral process, or to explain and justify the manner of exercise of such powers and discretion.

32.  It is not conducive to the policy of arbitral autonomy, and contrary to the objectives of procedural and costs economy, to define areas or matters on which an arbitrator can be compelled to give evidence, such as on the matters which had been included in the submission to arbitration, for the purpose of deciding on the jurisdiction of the tribunal, or as to what had taken place before the arbitrator (the vagueness of such a generalization being an invitation to satellite litigation). These are matters which can be ascertained from the documents served in the arbitration, and from the award itself, and it will be totally unnecessary to call evidence from the arbitrator. This is particularly so in terms of how arbitrations are conducted in the modern age.

33.  No other cases have been cited to me, but the approach described in the preceding paragraphs on arbitral immunity is reflected in decisions of the Canadian Courts, with a line of authorities such as Sport Maska Inc v Zittrer [1988] 1 SCR 564, Flock v Beattie 2010 ABQB 193 and Alexander v Neville [2014] OJ No 969 (ONSC). In both Flock v Beattie and Alexander v Neville, the Canadian court struck out claims made in proceedings against arbitrators acting in the course of their adjudicative function and duties as arbitrators, on the ground that they are entitled to arbitral immunity and are immune from civil liability in the absence of fraud and bad faith. The judgment in Flock v Beattie referred to the earlier decision in Sport Maska Inc v Zittrer, where the Court of Appeal referred to arbitral immunity as follows:

“As such an arbitrator, who is called on to settle or prevent a dispute, is given certain immunities. These are governed by the rules of public and not private law because of the similarity of arbitration to the judicial function, even when the conclusion of a submission to arbitration is contained in a private contract, when the law does not require recourse to this method of settling disputes. In the absence of fraud or bad faith, an arbitrator enjoys the immunity from civil liability suggested for him by Counsel.”

34.  The rationale for judicial immunity, and its close relationship with immunity from being compelled to give evidence, is explained in Credit Transit Inc v Chartrand 2021 QCCS 4329. In that case, the Quebec Supreme Court quashed a summons to compel a judge to give evidence relating to an application to disqualify him on the ground of bias. The court pointed out that judicial immunity safeguards judicial independence, and also protects judges from being compelled as witnesses in relation to the exercise of their judicial functions. Judicial immunity is invoked to defeat liability claims against judges, which means that they are immune for any act committed in the exercise of their judicial functions, and such immunity protects a judge from being compelled to testify as a witness in relation to the exercise of their judicial functions.

35.  The extension of judicial immunity to arbitrators means that an arbitrator is likewise immune from being compelled to testify in relation to how he or she exercised his/her functions in the arbitration. Such immunity is an essential foundation for judicial and arbitral integrity and independence, to ensure that arbitrators and judges can make their decisions on the right result without fear or distractions as to whether they could be made liable for claims of any party.

36.  In the present case, it is within the power and discretion of the tribunal, which includes QF, to decide whether to allow the 2nd Hearing to take place remotely, with QF participating by video and audio link, and how the 2nd Hearing should be conducted. It is part of the tribunal’s decision- making process and its control of the proceedings before it. If Lee contends that the manner in which QF had participated in the 2nd Hearing was unfair or had affected due process, or was in breach of the agreed arbitral procedure, it was open to Lee to make the proper objection to the tribunal at the relevant time. It is also open to Lee to challenge the Award on the grounds set out in section 95 of the Ordinance, as he has now done, but it is not open to him to compel QF as the arbitrator to justify or explain or to give evidence generally on his conduct of the process of the 2nd Hearing, or of how and why he exercised his power and discretion to proceed with the 2nd Hearing in the manner in which it was held. The arbitrator’s discretionary powers have to be exercised judicially, and in making the decision and exercising his power in conducting the 2nd Hearing in the way he did, QF was performing his function as an arbitrator. As such, he is entitled to immunity and cannot be compelled to give evidence on these matters.

37.  Accordingly, I decline to issue a Request for evidence to be obtained from QF.

38.  In any event, the evidence as to QF’s conduct and the manner of his participation in the Hearing is already apparent from the materials inspected by Lee’s Mainland lawyers and now in Lee’s possession. He should be able to establish his case on the information and materials available to him, even without the testimony sought from QF.

The Request as against Y

39.  As against Y, the Request seeks statements and documents from her as to QF’s location at the time of the Hearing, whether he had participated in the questioning at the Hearing, information on the entity or tribunal which had approved QF’s manner of participation, particulars of the electronic facilities employed by QF and whether there were security measures adopted in respect of such facilities.

40.  Before the Court issues the Request on Lee’s application, the Court should be satisfied as to the relevance, necessity and probative value of the evidence sought. Otherwise, it will be a total or disproportionate waste of time and costs, which is neither conducive to the underlying objectives of the CJR nor consistent with the principles and object set out in section 3 of the Ordinance.

41.  Lee has not disclosed whether he has ascertained if Y is or was at any relevant time in possession of the information sought from her and whether she or the Commission would consent to releasing any of the particulars sought by Lee. Applying common sense, Y would only be able to give evidence as to QF’s location and the persons around him by viewing the video of the Hearing which shows QF’s participation. This can just as effectively be done by Lee himself, by those advising or assisting him, and if necessary by the Court at the hearing of the Setting Aside Application (since screen captures of the video have been produced by Lee). Lee and his advisers who had attended the 2nd Hearing have information as to whether QF had asked questions or voiced opinions at the Hearing, without Y’s further evidence. They also have information and knowledge as to whether there were disruptions in the communication at the Hearing.

42.  Having taken all the above matters into account, I consider that it would be totally disproportionate to issue the Request for the limited evidence which Y may provide, and decline to issue the Request for the purpose of the determination of the Setting Aside Application. I do not consider that the interests of justice would be defeated by declining the application for the issue of the Request.

Disposition

43.  For all the above reasons, the Summons is dismissed, with an order nisi that Lee should pay to the Applicant the costs of and occasioned by the Summons, including any costs reserved, with certificate for counsel. The order nisi shall become absolute unless application for variation is made within 14 days.

  (Mimmie Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Byron Chiu, instructed by Grandall Zimmern Law Firm, for the applicant

Mr David Chen, instructed by DS Cheung & Co, for the respondent