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HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LTD v. HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LTD

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99192-EN-2015-06-26

HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LTD v. HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LTD

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HCA 9172/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO. 9172 OF 2000

________________________

BETWEEN

 HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LIMITEDDefendant
________________________
Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Leung in chambers
Date of Hearing: 3 June 2015
Date of Decision:  26 June 2015

________________________

DECISION
________________________

 

1. The defendant (“HKCTV”) applied to strike out the claim of the plaintiff (“HKBN”). HKBN responded with a similar application to strike out the counterclaim. On 12 May 2015, I handed down my decision dismissing both the claim and the counterclaim on the ground of delay and abuse of process (“the Decision”). I made nisi costs order. HKCTV now applies to vary it.

THE APPLICATION

2. I gave the parties 14 days to apply to vary the nisi costs order.  Within time, by summons filed on 26 May 2015, HKCTV applies for leave to appeal instead.  According to the written submission on its behalf[1], one of the contentions of HKCTV is that costs should be ordered otherwise than as per the nisi order, even on the basis of what were set out in the Decision.  In the circumstances, I asked the parties to consider, and the parties did consent to, proceeding with this application as one for the variation of the nisi costs order.

3. I did so for a reason.  The court gives the parties the chance to formally argue costs, if any of them is not satisfied with the tentative order. Especially when in any event, any challenge will be one in respect of costs only, the formal argument and the decision of the first instance on costs will have duel bearing.  First, the decision will have a bearing on whether and, if yes, how the appealing party may want to take the matter further.  Second, if the matter is taken further, the appellate court will know the reasons for the court’s exercise of discretion on costs after full argument.  I do not think it is wise to bypass the formal argument on costs on the basis of the Decision.  To avoid doubt, the right to appeal against the Decision is not taken to have been abandoned.

4. I would not repeat the discussion in respect of the parties’ respective responsibilities in the Decision (at §§41-76).  As to costs, I said (at §79):

“Both parties are to blame for shelving the action. In the circumstances, it is only fair that the parties should bear their own costs of the action and the application to strike out (including any costs reserved but without prejudice to the costs orders previously made in this action).”

5. HKCTV is seeking to vary the nisi costs order to become that the costs of the action (including any costs reserved but without prejudice to the costs orders previously made in this action) be to HKCTV, and the costs of the counterclaim (if any) be to HKBN; and that the costs of the summonses for striking out taken by the parties respectively be all paid by HKBN to HKCTV.  Costs shall be taxed, if not agreed.

DISCUSSION

6. The starting point is costs follow the event.  O.62, r.3 provides:

“(2) If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to any proceedings (other than interlocutory proceedings), the Court shall, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event, except when it appears to the Court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.

(3) If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to any interlocutory proceedings, it may, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event or make such other order as it sees fit.”

Costs of the claim and counterclaim

7. Mr Beresford for HKCTV submits that an order for costs to follow the event in the present case should be an order that the costs of the action be to HKCTV and the costs of the counterclaim be to HKBN.  The finding that both parties are to blame[2] would not justify the nisi costs order, which will have the consequence of imposing a more substantial costs burden on one party.  The nisi costs order is said to be imbalanced and unfair in the circumstances of the case.

8. Mr Lee for HKBN, when asked, would not say that the order proposed by Mr Beresford is wrong in principle, in view of the outcome of the hearing.  But he submits that this is HKBN’s burden to show that the nisi costs order is wrong before the order should be varied.

9. This is not an appeal but the hearing of the parties’ formal arguments before deciding whether the nisi costs order ought to be made absolute.

10. I shall not repeat the chronology of the steps taken by the parties respectively in respect of the claim and the counterclaim set out in the Decision (at §§2-34).  Upon revisiting those steps and the documents filed by the parties at the request of Mr Beresford, I agree that I should not rule out the potential imbalance of justice if the parties are not to recover their respective costs of defending the claim and the counterclaim following the event of their respective striking out applications.  The broad brush order that the parties bear their own costs, as made, should give way to this countervailing consideration in the circumstances.

Costs of the summonses

11. By the nisi order, the parties are also to bear their own costs of the summonses for striking out.  HKBN asks to vary it so that HKCTV shall pay the costs of both summonses.

12. HKBN is prima facie entitled to the costs of and incidental to its summons to strike out the counterclaim, which was successful.  Now HKCTV asks not only to deprive HKBN of such costs, but HKBN should also pay HKCTV’s costs occasioned by such application.  The only basis for that is that it was improper or unnecessary for HKBN to take out its summons on 19 December 2012 for striking out the counterclaim, notwithstanding its ultimate success.

13. HKCTV took out its summons to strike out the claim on 29 March 2012.  It first proposed by affirmation filed on 26 October 2012 that in the event that the claim was struck out, it would be agreeable to the dismissal of the counterclaim but with no order as to costs (presumably of the counterclaim).  The question is whether it was unreasonable for HKBN to refuse to dispose of the counterclaim in terms as proposed by HKCTV.

14. HKBN’s stance was that in the event that the claim was found to be liable to be struck out, the counterclaim should also be struck out with costs for HKCTV was also to blame for the inaction.  HKCTV did not concede that.  The decision of this court reflects that HKBN’s argument was accepted.  Even the consequential costs order now proposed by HKCTV reflects that.

15. In the circumstances, I do not agree that HKBN should be made to bear HKCTV’s costs of and incidental to HKBN’s summons to strike out the counterclaim.

Conclusion

16. In line with the above discussion, I would vary the nisi costs order so that:

(1) subject to (2) below, HKBN shall pay HKCTV’s costs of and occasioned by this action as well as its summons for striking out filed on 29 March 2012;

(2) HKCTV shall pay HKBN’s costs of and occasioned by the counterclaim as well as its summons for striking out filed on 19 December 2012;

(3) costs include costs reserved but without prejudice to the costs orders previously made in the action; and

(4) all costs shall be taxed, if not agreed.

COSTS OF THIS APPLICATION

17. Except for the costs of HKBN’s summons to strike out the counterclaim, HKCTV succeeds in the present application.  To reflect that, which did not occupy much of the parties’ argument, I would order that HKCTV shall have 80% of its costs of and incidental to the present application, to be taxed, if not agreed.

ORDER

18. Upon the parties by consent having proceeded with the hearing of HKCTV’s summons as one for variation of the nisi costs order, I vary the nisi costs order in terms of paragraph 16 above.  As to the costs of this application, I make a nisi order in terms of paragraph 17 above; and the parties have 14 days to apply to vary such nisi order or the same will become absolute.

19. I thank counsel for their assistance.

(Simon Leung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr LEE Tung Ming, instructed by Messrs Anthony Siu & Co for the plaintiff

Mr Roger BERESFORD, instructed by Messrs Deacons for the defendant



[1] §11 in particular, which will be discussed below.

[2] It should be noted that this court never said in the decision that the parties are equally to blame for the situation, as Mr Beresford seems to suggest at one stage.

98392-EN-2015-05-12

HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LTD v. HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LTD

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HCA 9172/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO. 9172 OF 2000

________________________

BETWEEN

 HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LIMITEDDefendant

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in chambers
Date of Hearing: 4 June 2013
Date of Decision: 12 May 2015

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

1. The defendant (“HKCTV”) applies to strike out the claim of the plaintiff (“HKBN”) and to dismiss the action. HKBN responds with a similar application to strike out the counterclaim.

BACKGROUND

2. The background of this case was set out in detail by the previous written decision of Cheung J (as he then was) on the determination of the continuation of the interlocutory injunction on 24 November 2000.  I hope I would be excused for borrowing from His Lordship’s illustration in setting out the background below.

3. HKBN is a company providing broadband internet access to its customers then pursuant to a Fixed Telecommunication Network Service Licence issued by the Telecommunications Authority in 2000.

4. HKCTV is a cable television company, which was first issued with licence back in 90s.  HKCTV also provides broadband internet access to its customers.

5. In most multi‑storey buildings in Hong Kong, there is a public television broadcast network.  The network extended to each floor of the building and was connected to a cable, the drop‑in cable, which led to individual units by a 3‑way or 4‑way tap output of the public network on the individual floors of the building.

6. HKCTV built its own cable network in multi‑storey buildings in order to supply cable television to the occupants.  Since HKCTV’s network also transmitted television signals, in order to enable the user receiving both television signal and cable television service, HKCTV would switch the drop‑in cable of each unit from the tap output of the public network to the 3‑way or 4‑way tap output of HKCTV’s network.

7. In order to supply the broadband internet service to the units in multi‑storey buildings, HKBN built its own coaxial cable network in these buildings.  The method of connecting HKBN’s network to the individual units of each floor was this: HKBN installed a device called a 2‑way tap and redirect the drop‑in cable of the unit to the 2‑way tap which is connected to both HKBN’s network and the existing 3‑way or 4‑way tap output of the public network.  Inside the unit, the user would be given a modem to connect the drop‑in cable in order to receive the broadband internet access.  By means of the 2‑way tap, the individual units were able to receive both the television signals and also HKBN’s broadband access.

8. In cases where HKCTV’s cable customer (whose drop‑in cable was already connected to the 3‑way or 4‑way tap of HKCTV) subsequently subscribed to HKBN’s service, HKBN would connect the drop‑in cable to its 2‑way tap in which HKCTV’s 3‑way or 4‑way tap output and HKBN’s network output were connected.  In order to do so, HKCTV’s 3‑way or 4‑way tap output would have to be disconnected from the drop‑in cable and then immediately reconnected to the 2‑way tap of HKBN.

9. The construction of HKBN’s network and installation were carried out pursuant to agreements between it and the incorporated owners of the multi‑storey buildings and also between it and the individual owners.  In public estates, HKBN entered the agreement with the Housing Authority.

10. In March, June and August 2000, HKBN discovered that a number of its customers were off‑line.  Technicians dispatched there discovered that the drop‑in cables of the customers were disconnected from HKBN’s 2‑way taps and were connected to HKCTV’s 3‑way or 4‑way taps.  The disconnection caused disruption to HKBN’s service until its technician reconnected its network to the customers.  In late September 2000, HKBN discovered that their installations in eight estates covering 22 blocks of building had been disconnected by HKCTV.

11. By two letters dated 7 July 2000 and 29 August 2000, HKCTV’s then solicitors admitted that HKCTV’s employees had disconnected HKBN’s installation.

12. For alleged interference, tampering and trespass by HKCTV with its installations and connections made at various buildings in Hong Kong, HKBN commenced the present action.  On 23 September 2000, HKBN obtained the ex parte injunction against HKCTV restraining HKCTV from further interfering with its installations.

13. In October 2000, HKBN filed its amended statement of claim.  Besides the original cause of action for trespass and claim for injunctive relief, HKBN added the causes against HKCTV for interference with its business and its contracts with customers with intent to injure as well as claim for compensatory and exemplary damages.

14. In the same month, HKCTV filed the defence and counterclaim.  HKCTV admitted that the disconnections complained of were carried out by its employees.  But it contended that it was HKBN which had disconnected and re-connected HKCTV’s taps to the drop-in cables to fit in HKBN's taps in the first place, and thus constituting unauthorized interconnections and trespass of HKCTV's property and network.  HKCTV complained that HKBN’s connections resulted in a drop in signal strength adversely affecting the level of HKCTV's cable television services to its customers.

15. HKCTV counterclaimed, among other things, for damages and for an injunction requiring HKBN to remove and disconnect all unauthorized interconnections as well as for an order that HKBN do provide to HKCTV a list of all flats, units, estates, buildings or other locations in Hong Kong where HKBN had interfered with and/or made connection to HKCTV's taps and/or cables.

16. In November 2000, HKBN filed its reply and defence to counterclaim.

17. As mentioned, the ex parte injunction was continued until trial by Cheung J (as he then was) on 24 November 2000, when his Lordship also directed that there should be a speedy trial of the action. 

18. In February 2001, the Registrar gave directions for the further conduct of the case, including the time table for discovery, service of witness statements and expert reports as well as supplemental/reply expert reports, the last of them to be carried out in 84 days from the date of the order.

19. In March 2001, HKCTV made discovery of documents.

20. On 3 April 2001, Cheung J gave his ruling on the application for variation of the costs order made upon continuing the ex parte injunction.

21. Nothing had since developed.

22. 2 years and 7 months later, HKBN filed a notice of intention to proceed in early November 2003.  Another 6 months later, HKBN made discovery of documents.  More than 9 months later, in January 2005, the parties exchanged witness statements.

23. In the same year (2005), HKCTV had taken out various applications.  There was the application for variation of the injunction, and order for that was granted by consent in October 2005.  The time table for further experts reports and witness statements previously directed by the Registrar were all extended. There was also the application for further and better particulars of HKBN’s pleading as well as specific discovery; the order for that was made on 5 December 2005.  HKBN was to comply with the latest directions within period of 7 to 21 days.

24. In mid-December 2005, the parties filed their respective expert reports.  By consent, the parties further extended the time for compliance with the order dated 5 December 2005 mentioned above to 8 February 2006, and for the service of the supplemental/reply expert reports mentioned above to 8 March 2006.  They also agreed that there would be leave to serve supplemental witness statements within 4 weeks thereafter.

25. HKBN eventually complied with the order for specific discovery and further and better particulars, albeit just beyond the extended deadline mentioned above.

26. At the same time, in early February 2006, HKCTV applied for leave to amend the defence and counterclaim, which was granted in late November 2006.  The amended defence and counterclaim was filed accordingly.

27. By the amendments, further details of the allegations of facts and rights are now pleaded in defence.  Insofar as HKCTV had disconnected HKBN’s interconnections, it allegedly did so no more than what was necessary to remove the unlawful interconnections and HKBN’s properties which were said to be trespassing HKCTV’s taps and/or networks.

28. As to the counterclaim, HKCTV contends that the unlawful interconnections created a false representation to the customers of HKCTV that HKCTV was responsible for the affected quality of signal consequential upon the interconnections, and that was calculated to injure the goodwill and reputation of HKCTV.  HKCTV counterclaims for damages, being the cost of rectification and loss of profits for the alleged trespass and conversion as well as inquiry as to damages or account of profits for passing off on the part of HKBN.  The claim for injunctive relief remains.

29. HKBN’s reply and defence to counterclaim followed in January 2007.

30. Nothing much happened afterwards, except for the taxation of the costs pursuant to the costs order made on 5 December 2005.  This brings us to mid-2007.

31. The action has since lied dormant.

32. By letter dated 20 January 2012, HKCTV through solicitors requested HKBN to proceed with or to abandon the action.  This was 5 years since HKBN filed its last pleading, and more than 4 years and 7 months since the allocatur was issued in respect of the taxation of costs mentioned above.

33. Hearing nothing from HKBN, HKCTV filed its summons to strike out on 29 March 2012.

34. On 19 December 2012, HKBN responded by its summons to strike out the counterclaim as well, if the claim is struck out.

THE SUMMONSES

35. By its summons, HKCTV asks for the following:

(1) The claim should be struck out as it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action[1], or it is otherwise an abuse of process of the court[2].

(2) Alternatively, if the claim remains, the injunction against it should be discharged.

36. HKBN’s application proceeds in the event that HKCTV’s summons is allowed and the claim is struck out. HKBN asks that HKCTV’s counterclaim should also be struck out on the same grounds mentioned above.

37. Whilst denying delay and abuse of process on its part, HKCTV indicates no objection to striking out HKBN’s claim on terms that HKCTV’s counterclaim is also struck out.  In other words, HKCTV does not seek to proceed with its counterclaim, if the claim is struck out.

THE PRINCIPLES

38. HKCTV argues that HKBN is guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay in proceeding with the action and thus causing (i) a substantial risk that a fair trial becomes impossible (the so-called Birkett v James[3] limb) and (ii) other prejudice to HKCTV (the so-called injunction limb).  HKCTV also argues that the claim is liable to be struck out because of the absence of any intention on the part of HKBN to proceed with the action (the so-called Grovit v Doctor[4] limb).

39. Both sides refer to the principles restated by the Chief Justice in Wing Fai Construction Co Ltd (in liq) v Yip Kwong Robert [2012] 1 HKLRD 589.  Wing Fai was a case commenced and where the application to strike out for delay was taken out and first heard prior to the CJR coming into effect.  The Chief Justice (with whom other members of the final court agreed) restated (at§75) the principles that ought to be borne in mind in most of this kind of applications.  The principles were applied in the subsequent case of China Nonferrous Metals (Hong Kong) Finance Co Ltd (in liq) v South-East Asia Investment Holding Co Ltd, CACV 253/2012 (16 May 2013), which was a case commenced prior to the CJR and the application to strike out for want of prosecution being taken out after the CJR.  The appellate court (at §17) summarised the restated principles to the extent relevant for the purpose of determining that case.

40. The principles include:

(1) It remains that striking out is a remedy granted only in plain and obvious case.

(2) Abuse of the process of the court is the foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction to strike out for delay.  Mere delay would not suffice, and abuse must be shown.

(3) Abuse could take many forms.  Inordinate and inexcusable delay causing real prejudice to a defendant would be an abuse.

(4) For contumelious conduct of the plaintiff which is shown to have amounted to clear abuse, proceedings could be struck out even where prejudice could not be shown.

(5) In the majority of the cases, however, prejudice would often be an extremely relevant factor.  The most compelling form of prejudice as a result of inordinate and inexcusable delay would be the substantial risk that a fair trial becomes impossible (Birkett v James).  Delay might also aggravate the prejudice caused by the existence of an interim injunction pending trial.

(6) Warehousing of claims with no intention of bringing the proceedings to a conclusion or wholesome disregard of the rules or court orders also amounts to abuse, which justifies the striking out (Grovit v Doctor).

(7) The conduct of the parties remains relevant to the question of abuse and the overall justice of the case.  Post-CJR rules on case management and their underlying objectives apply to existing proceedings.  All parties to the proceedings had the obligation to prosecute the proceedings and assist the court in furthering the underlying objectives, and therefore it would be highly relevant to consider any failure on the part of the parties.  There is no place anymore for the defendant to adopt the attitude of “letting the sleeping dogs lie”.  If it is sought to be argued that time has dimmed the memories of witnesses, the court will usually expect to know what steps the defendant has taken to take instructions or proof or to locate the witnesses.  The court would assess the extent of the prejudice with reference to the nature of the defence.

(8) Besides looking at the matter from the parties’ perspectives, the court would also take a proper regard to the administration of justice after the implementation of the CJR in furtherance of the underlying objectives of ensuring fair distribution of court resources.  Along the same line, the non-expiry of the limitation period should no longer militate against an order for striking out, abuse is clearly demonstrated.

DELAY

41. No doubt the direction for a speedy trial made in November 2000 was soon frustrated. Then came the first period of delay, which lasted for 2 years and 7 months between April 2001 and November 2003.  After the notice of intention to proceed, it took HKBN another 6 months to file its list of documents.  Nevertheless the parties had since acted in progress of the proceedings until they filed their respective expert reports in mid-December 2005.

42. Further time had also been taken by consent.  In late December 2005, the parties agreed to extend the time for HKBN to comply with the order against it made in December 2005 for, among other things, specific discovery to early February 2006 and to extend the time for the parties to serve the reply expert reports to early March 2006.  The parties also agreed to leave to serve supplemental witness statements in 4 weeks thereafter.

43. HKBN points out that some of the time taken and extended were initiated or occasioned by HKCTV.  In early February 2006, some 5 years after the filing of its defence and counterclaim, HKCTV also sought to amend its pleading.  Leave to do so was granted and complied with only in late November 2006.  HKBN’s consequential amended pleading followed in January 2007.

44. In the circumstances, it is fair to say that the time up to the beginning of 2007 was very much taken by both parties.

45. The period of delay that requires a closer look was that which lasted between 2007 and 2012.  It was 5 years, if counting from the filing of the last pleading of HKBN, and over 4.5 years, if counting from the issuing of the allocatur as mentioned. The delay was inordinate.  There is no material that could excuse such delay either.

ABUSE

46. HKCTV argues that it was an abuse when HKBN has obtained the protection of an interim injunction and then showed no interest in proceeding with the claim.  HKCTV argues that HKBN has no intention to continue the action.

47. HKCTV itself expresses lack of commercial incentive to continue the action, and it suggests the same is true in the case of HKBN.  The suggestion is made because the technology based on which the interim injunction was said to be necessary and obtained has by now been superseded.  HKBN no longer requires the injunction to protect its operation.  HKBN’s purpose has largely been served by the interim injunction.

48. Essentially the interim injunction restrains HKCTV from tampering with the connections to HKBN’s coaxial cable network installed in the estates and buildings.  When granting the continuation of the injunction, the court was acutely aware of minimising its resultant impact on the operation of HKCTV.  Hence the direction for a speedy trial.

49. Speedy trial soon became out of the question, in view of how the parties have chosen to conduct the case subsequently.  In doing so, HKCTV applied for and the parties eventually consented to variation of the injunction so that access to the installations for specific purposes of inspection and observations upon prior notice to HKBN was granted to HKCTV.  Now HKBN’s coaxial networks in the estates and the buildings are no longer in use, and there would be no connection to HKBN’s coaxial cable network that HKCTV could tamper with any further.

50. HKBN argues that the injunction now exists on paper only and cannot cause any prejudice to HKCTV.  There is indeed no evidence of what HKCTV would have been able to do, which it could not do because of the injunction in place (albeit HKBN no longer carried out the connections that would concern HKCTV).  However HKBN accepts that the purpose of the interim injunction has been served and could be discharged, even if the action continues.

51. The permanent injunctive relief appears to be no longer necessary.  But HKBN stresses that there is still its claim for loss and damage as well as the costs (said to be in the region of HK$3 million).  HKBN maintains such claim, unless the parties otherwise resolve the matter amicably.

52. The undeniable fact is that HKBN has not proceeded with its claim for the past years. The present verbal assertion of belief in the merits of HKBN’s claim for damages and costs apparently has not manifested itself in any motivation to act.  Even when HKCTV’s solicitors wrote in January 2013, HKBN did not respond. Hence HKCTV’s application.  There is no suggestion or evidence of any consideration during this period with a view to bringing the dispute to closure.  HKBN has effectively shelved the claim, whichever way one looks at it.

53. That HKBN did so, while leaving the interim injunction in place notwithstanding the subsequent material change in circumstances, is tantamount to abuse.  This is so, irrespective of whether the interim injunction is demonstrated to have aggravated the prejudice of the delay caused to HKCTV.

54. However this is not the full picture.

55. The period of delay between 2007 and 2012 straddled across the pre-CJR and post-CJR regime.  HKCTV argues that only after the CJR did both sides to the proceedings become under the obligations to prosecute the proceedings introduced by the reform.

56. I hold nothing against that, if one is referring merely to the new rules.  However, HKCTV has in place a related counterclaim, which it would have been expected to prosecute without inexcusable delay even during the pre-CJR regime in the absence of the new rules.  This was particularly so, when the court actually directed for a speedy trial.

57. HKCTV also argues that it is only after the re-statement of the principles in Wing Fai could a defendant be said to be on notice of the court’s post-CJR view of the “letting the sleeping dogs lie” approach.  Therefore, as a matter of principle, a defendant who “lets sleeping dogs lie” prior to the date of the decision in Wing Fai could not be said to have acquiesced the plaintiff’s delay.

58. I do not agree.  HKCTV’s argument is premised on the change of the law only by the decision in Wing Fai.  But the fact was that the change took place upon the CJR coming into effect.  With the CJR and the new (case management) rules coming into effect, which apply to existing proceedings, the parties to the proceedings may not claim unawareness of the change in approach until there happened to be the case of Wing Fai that went to final appeal.

59. The argument also does not align with the principle that the conduct of the parties is relevant to the issue of abuse and overall justice of the case.  In stating such principle, the Chief Justice in Wing Fai did not limit the relevance of the conduct of the parties by reference to whether it was prior to or after the CJR coming into effect, let alone after the CJR but before the decision.

60. One should perhaps return to the order of the court dated 27 November 2006.  By consent, leave was given to HKCTV to amend its defence and counterclaim.  This HKCTV did.  The consent order also provided for the timetable for the filing of the amended reply and defence to counterclaim, exchange of supplementary/reply expert reports and supplemental witness statements.

61. Subsequently HKBN obtained extension of time twice for filing the amended reply and defence to counterclaim.  Both were granted upon HKCTV’s consent.  As mentioned, HKBN filed its last pleading eventually on 12 January 2007.  The directions in respect of further expert reports and witness statements made on 26 November 2006 were never carried out.  The obligation to comply with the directions was mutual.  The inaction was likewise mutual.

62. As far as HKCTV is concerned, it has a counterclaim which exists and is for HKCTV to prosecute.  Whether or not it might have chosen to wait and see for any practical considerations is immaterial, as far as the progress of the action is concerned from the case management perspective.  Nor is it an acceptable suggestion that the counterclaim, albeit related to the claim, is primarily defensive, a suggestion which I anyway do not agree as a matter of fact.  Whichever way one looks at it, HKCTV has also effectively shelved its counterclaim.

IMPOSSIBILILTY OF FAIR TRIAL

63. HKCTV argues that due to the delay, it has suffered prejudice in that a fair trial of the claim and the counterclaim has become impossible.  HKCTV specifically refers to the issues of intent on its part that HKBN raised in the amended statement of claim[5] and the alleged discarding of HKBN’s taps by HKCTV’s employees[6].  It is said that it has become impossible to try these issues fairly.

64. What HKCTV refers to is HKBN’s contention that HKCTV committed the alleged wrongful acts (of disconnecting HKBN’s network from its customers’ drop-in cables and damaging HKBN’s taps) with intent to injure or interfere with the business of HKBN as its competitor in the same trade of provision of broadband internet access services.

65. As far as the disconnection is concerned, this has always been admitted by HKCTV[7], only that this was said to be no more than necessary to rectify what HKBN had wrongfully done to HKCTV in the first place.  The question of intent to injure HKCTV as competitor will be a matter of inference to be drawn from the all the circumstances as proved.

66. As far proof of the alleged wrongful act is concerned, HKCTV argues that the delay on the part of HKBN has caused it prejudice in the form of dimming of memories and loss of witnesses.  As mentioned, when prejudice is suggested in the form of loss of memories or contract of witnesses, the court will need to know what steps have been taken by the complaining party to take instructions or proof or to locate the witnesses.  This is particularly relevant in the present case when HKCTV has the counterclaim, albeit related to the claim, to prosecute.

67. To begin with, and contrary to the directions with a view to speedy trial, the parties exchanged witness statements only in January 2005.  No problem as to witness memory or locating witness was indicated, though it was already 5 years after the commencement of action and 4 years after the direction first given in February 2001.  The witnesses managed to give substantial statements with reference to contemporaneous documents.  They serve to refresh memory, if necessary.

68. In February 2006, HKCTV was still seeking to amend its pleading.  This was allowed and filed in November 2006.  That the pleading was amended with the additional factual particulars and cause of claim.  They had to be added as a result of instructions obtained from the person(s) who managed to tell then.  The court gave directions at the same time, which imposed on both parties equally positive obligations to prepare their further expert reports and witness statements in support of their respective cases.  Not only was there no indication of problem as to memory or locating of the relevant witnesses to testify in respect of what was pleaded, but the directions were then given by consent of the parties.

69. Now HKCTV complains that a witness, Mr Lam, has a dimmed memory of the events while another witness, Mr Shao, could not be located.  Neither of them has served their statements.  If the idea of calling them arose not earlier than the directions of the court last given in November 2006, HKCTV would have had to take the witnesses as they then were.  Insofar as their then state of memories of the events is concerned, HKBN cannot be to blame.

70. If the suggestion is that the witness’ memory has dimmed only since then, HKCTV has contributed towards that state of affairs for it has failed to obtain proof of evidence from the witness in discharge of its positive obligation pursuant to the directions last given by the court.

71. As to the loss of Mr Shao as a witness, whether the idea of calling him arose prior to or after the directions last given by the court in November 2006, it would have been HKCTV’s concern to maintain contact with the witness.  It should be noted that Mr Shao is said to have left HKCTV only in 2009 and moved to New York in the following year.  That was years after November 2006.  The fact that HKBN has no doubt delayed in prosecuting the claim did not absolve HKCTV from its own concern and obligation to secure Mr Shao as a potential witness prior to his departure.  There is no suggestion that this should not and could not have been done.

72. Even assuming prejudice in terms of the alleged impossibility of a fair trial is substantiated, I do not find the argument to attribute the blame to HKBN’s delay to be impressive.

OTHER PREJUDICE

73. HKCTV also complains about other prejudice cause by the delay in the form of the costs incurred in keeping this litigation on the books.  Such costs include legal costs for periodical review of the case by its legal representatives.

74. In my view, this must fall short of substantial prejudice as a result of the delay and, in any event, if accepted as a ground for striking out the claim, will not serve the overall justice of the case.  To begin with, HKCTV is not keeping this action on the books passively because of the claim but also of the counterclaim.  Incidental to that, both parties have incurred and will incur costs.  The amount of the costs so incurred by HKCTV is unknown but unlikely to be so substantial as to outweigh the significance of bringing these proceedings to a conclusion.

THE SCENARIO

75. Because of the related claim and counterclaim, as well as the positive obligation on both parties to proceed with their respective claims, it would not serve the overall justice of the case to strike out the claim on the grounds proposed without prejudice to the related counterclaim: Winpo Development Limited v Wong Kar Fu, HCA 3541/1993 (8 February 2011) at §§57; 62; Winpo Development Limited v Wong Kar Fu, CACV 39/2011 (22 July 2011) at §§18; 20; and Zimmer Orthopaedic Ltd v Zimmer Manufacturing Co Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1349.

76. HKCTV must realise that, and hence its indication that should HKBN’s claim be dismissed, its counterclaim should also be dismissed.  The circumstances of the present case are such that both parties have simply shelved their respective claims with no evidence of consideration about bringing the action to closure for years.  This is a clear case of abuse from the court’s perspective.  Both the claim and the related counterclaim are liable to be struck out on that ground.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

77. The claim is struck out; and so is the counterclaim.  The action is dismissed and the interim injunction abovementioned falls to be discharged.

78. As to costs, I should mention that HKCTV argues, but only in court, that the costs order made absolute by Cheung J on 3 April 2001 upon the continuation of the interim injunction on 24 November 2000 should somehow be varied (if HKCTV succeeds in its application).  This is not covered by its summons.  This will also be an attempt to impeach the costs order under the illegitimate disguise of setting aside of the court’s previous order.

79. Both parties are to blame for shelving the action.  In the circumstances, it is only fair that the parties should bear their own costs of the action and the application to strike out (including any costs reserved but without prejudice to the costs orders previously made in this action).  I make a nisi costs order in these terms.  In the absence of application in 14 days to vary, the order shall become absolute.

80. I thank counsel for their assistance.

(Simon Leung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr LEE Tung Ming, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co for the plaintiff

Mr Roger BERESFORD, instructed by Fitzgerald Lawyers for the defendant



[1] Pursuant to O.18, r.19(c) of the Rules of the High Court.

[2] Pursuant to O.18, r.19(d).

[3] [1978] AC 297.

[4] [1997] 1 WLR 640.

[5] At §§18, 19 and 20.

[6] At §§13(2) and 16.

[7] Amended defence and counterclaim at §§9(3)-(5), 12, 14 and 15(1)-(3).

47216-EN-2005-12-05

HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LTD v. HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LTD

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HCA 9172/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 9172 OF 2000

____________

BETWEEN

HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LIMITEDPlaintiff
and
HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LIMITEDDefendant

____________

 

Before: Mr Recorder B Yu, SC in Chambers (open to the public)

Date of Hearing:  28 November 2005

Date of Judgment:  5 December 2005

 

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

Introduction

1.  This is an appeal by the Defendant against the decision of the Master on 30 September 2005 whereby he dismissed the Defendant's summons for specific discovery and two summonses for further and better particulars.

2.  The plaintiff and the defendant are competitors in the supply of broadband internet service.  The defendant is also the provider of cable television service.  The plaintiff's case against the defendant is in trespass, conversion and wrongful interference with business or contracts.  What the plaintiff alleges is that the defendant has, on divers occasions, disconnected what are called "drop-in cables" from the plaintiff's 2-way taps installed in some 11 housing estates or buildings.  The drop-in cables are cables which connect individual units of a building to the public network installed in multi-storeyed buildings.  2-way taps are devices which the plaintiff installs for its customers to receive simultaneous television broadcast and broadband internet access services provided by the plaintiff.  One of those taps was installed inside the flat or unit of a consumer whilst another tap was installed outside the flat or unit.  The plaintiff further claims exemplary damages on the basis that the wrongful disconnections were allegedly committed by the defendant with a contumelious or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights to connect to the drop-in cables of their customers and to provide services to their customers, having calculated that the gain to be made by such wrongful disconnections will probably exceed the damages it probably has to pay.

3.  The defendant has filed a defence and counterclaim.  The defendant admits that the disconnections complained of were carried out by its employees.  Its main contention is that the plaintiff's previous conduct in disconnecting and re-connecting the defendant's taps to the drop-in cables to fit in the plaintiff's taps amounted to "unauthorized interconnections" and to trespass of the defendant's property and network.  The defendant complains that the plaintiff's connections resulted in a drop in signal strength adversely affecting the level of defendant's cable television services to its customers.  The defendant counterclaims for damages and for an injunction requiring the plaintiff to remove and disconnect all "unauthorized interconnections" and for an order that the plaintiff do provide to the defendant a list of all flats, units, estates, buildings or other locations in Hong Kong where the plaintiff has interfered with and/or made connection to the defendant's taps and/or cables.

4.  This action was commenced some 5 years ago in September 2000.  At the time, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte injunction against the defendant, which injunction has been continued inter partes.  There was an order for speedy trial.  Notwithstanding this order, the action has gone dormant for a period of some 3 years between February 2001 when the defendant filed its list of documents and April 2004 when the plaintiff filed its list.

Discovery

5.  The defendant's summons of 9 March 2005 originally sought discovery of the following:

(1)     All Broadband Network Service Plan Registration Forms completed by Common Customers since May 2000

(2)     All Broadband Network Service Installation Order Forms completed by Common Customers since May 2000

(3)     All further documents relating to, recording or evidencing any agreement between any Common Customer and the Plaintiff for the provision of the Plaintiff's broadband services entered into since June 2000 or the termination of such agreement or services.

The summons provides a definition of "Common Customer" as follows:

“Common Customer means a cable television services customer or former customer of the Defendant or other householder at an estate listed in the Amended Statement of Claim herein who, any time between May 2000 and the present, became a customer of the Plaintiff for broadband services delivered via co-axial cable and the drop cable of whose flat was, immediately prior to becoming such a customer of the Plaintiff, connected to the Defendant's cable television network.”

6.  When the parties appeared before the Master, the defendant modified its summons to ask for the following differently worded relief.  That is now the subject of an amended summons before me:

“1.     All agreements or contracts or, where there is no agreement in writing, all documents evidencing agreement, between the Plaintiff and individual users referred to in paragraphs 7 and 18 of the Amended Statement of Claim.

2.      All agreements or contracts or, where there is no agreement in writing, all documents evidencing agreement, between the Plaintiff and individual users for the termination of any agreement referred to in 1 above.”

7.  Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim pleads as follows:

“The constructions of the Plaintiff's network and the installation works were carried out pursuant to agreements made between the Plaintiff and the Incorporated Owners of the users' Buildings and Estates and agreements between the Plaintiff and the individual users.  In cases where the buildings were government estates, the Plaintiff would enter into such agreements with the Housing Authority.”

8.  There is no dispute between the parties as to the principles which apply to the determination of this summons.  The only issue which divides the parties now is whether the documents "relate to one or more of the matters in question in the cause or matter" within the meaning of Order 24 rule 7(3) of the Rules of the High Court.

9.  As for the cause of action in trespass and conversion, Mr Beresford submitted that the documents sought were relevant in a number of ways.

(1)    Quantum of the plaintiff's loss

The defendant wishes to know how many disconnections do the plaintiff complains about and what their value to the plaintiff is.  Mr Beresford pointed out that the standard form agreement between the plaintiff and its customers has 3 different service plans.  He contended that information as to which service plan each particular customer subscribed to was crucial information relating to the plaintiff's claim for loss of profit and goodwill pleaded in paragraphs 15, 16 and 18 of the Statement of Claim.  The defendant also seeks discovery of documents relevant to the termination of the service.  This is to enable the defendant to ascertain the duration of the plaintiff's service to the customer, a matter which Mr Beresford says is relevant to quantum.

(2)    The issue of wrongful interference with the defendant's system and the quantum of the defendant's loss as claimed in the counterclaim

It is said that information as to the service addresses would enable the defendant to find out whether the defendant's cable television signals have been interfered with.  The defendant also wants to take steps to find out whether at the time of the plaintiff's original connection with the system, the plaintiff had used a model of 2-way tap (DM-02) which was accepted to be likely to generate more interference than another model (DM-22).

(3)    The issue of whether the 2-way taps were in the possession of the plaintiff

It is said that information as to service addresses would also enable the defendant to conduct inquiries as to whether the 2-way taps were chattels for which the plaintiff can claim an immediate right to possession or whether they were fixtures.

(4)    The issue of whether there has been disconnection

Mr Beresford submitted that without the discovery sought, the defendant would be prevented from arming itself with evidence that particular interconnections were not disconnected by the defendant as alleged by the plaintiff.

10.  As to the cause of action for wrongful interference with business, Mr Beresford contends that the defendant is entitled to see the actual agreements which the plaintiff claims is the subject of wrongful interference.  He argued that the terms of the agreement are relevant to the issue whether the defendant did interfere with the performance of the agreements.

11.  In resisting the discovery application, Mr Leong for the plaintiff emphasized that the battle lines drawn when the parties filed their pleadings and fought an interlocutory injunction application in the year 2000 were very different from those urged upon me by Mr Beresford.  Mr Leong pointed out that the Defence plainly admitted disconnections in the 11 housing estates or buildings.  Mr Leong's arguments amount to this: that the defendant has not, in its defence or counterclaim, raised any issue which required identification of the particular flat or unit where the disconnection occur or whether DM-02 or DM-22 was used.  He argued that the defendant is not prejudiced by non discovery of the plaintiff's agreements with its customers.  As to Mr Beresford's point that the defendant wanted to know the service address in order to carry out investigations and testings, Mr Leong submitted that it would be unrealistic for the defendant to expect to obtain any evidence of probative value now, 5 years after the events complained of.

12.  I am here concerned only with the question of relevance.  Whether disclosure is or is not necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs will be considered later.  I am also not concerned at this juncture with whether there ought to be production following discovery.

13.  In my view the documents sought are relevant to the issue of quantum of the plaintiff's alleged loss of profit and loss of goodwill.  It seems to me that the documents are relevant at least in showing the number of disconnections that the plaintiff is complaining about or has evidence of, and what was the value of such agreements to the plaintiff.  Both of these matters are relevant to the plaintiff's claim of general damages for loss of profit or loss of goodwill.  I accept that the documents relating to the termination of service would also be relevant to show the duration the plaintiff's service, and hence relevant to the question of the plaintiff's alleged loss of profit and loss of goodwill.

14.  I also see force in Mr Beresford's contention that disclosure of the documents (and thus the service addresses of the customers) will enable the defendant to pursue various avenues of inquiry in gathering evidence, such as evidence of whether DM-02 or DM-22 was used in a particular location, and the testing of the degree of any interference on site.  This is a matter which may go to the defendant's counterclaim for loss and damage.  Mr Leong's argument that it is now 5 years after the matters complained of and that any evidence obtained would be of little or no probative value may or may not be correct.  That, however, does not negate the relevance of the documents in the Peruvian Guano sense.

15.  I am less impressed by the other reasons of relevance urged upon me by Mr Beresford.  The question of whether the 2-way taps are fixtures or chattel has not been raised in the pleadings.  Nor do the pleadings disclose any issue between the parties as to whether a particular disconnection did take place or not.  However, for the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the documents sought are relevant to the issues between the parties, and should prima facie be disclosed.

Whether discovery is necessary

16.  When the Master rejected the defendant's summons, he was not satisfied that discovery of the documents sought would be necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.  The Master expressed the view that what the defendant was really after was the plaintiff's list of customers.  He considered that where, as here, the defendant refuses to disclose its own list of customers; discovery of the plaintiff's list does not help much in resolving the parties' disputes, and is only oppressive in nature and will add costs and further complicate the proceedings.

17.  This matter is, however, no longer relied on by Mr Leong.  Before me, Mr Leong did not contend that if the documents sought are relevant, discovery would be oppressive.  There is no suggestion that the defendant's motive in obtaining discovery is otherwise than bona fide for the purpose of pursuing this litigation.

18.  It is trite that under Order 24 rule 8 the burden is on the party resisting discovery to show that discovery is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.  The plaintiff has adduced no evidence in this regard.  Mr Leong has not been able to tell the Court what the total number of disconnections is.  Such evidence as there is before me suggests that the number of disconnections involved may be beyond 900.  I broached with the parties whether, in the light of the comments of the Courts summarised in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2004 para. 24/0/12 on the importance of case management and the exhortations to avoid interlocutory discovery skirmishes, a more appropriate order in the present case would be to require the plaintiff to state the total number of disconnections alleged in respect of each housing estate or building as well as the relative percentages of DM-02 and DM-22 used before and after disconnection.  Mr Beresford did not warm to the suggestion.  In the end, I am persuaded that this course would not be fair to the defendant.  I bear in mind that the documents are relevant in the Peruvian Guano sense, that the plaintiff does not complain that discovery would be oppressive, and indeed has not adduced any evidence to show why discovery is not necessary.  Further, discovery may enable the defendant to carry out investigations which may yield some evidence and I cannot say at this stage that any evidence thus obtained would not be probative.  I also bear in mind that the lapse of time which has occurred between 2001 and 2004 could not be blamed on the defendant.

19.  In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that discovery would not be necessary for the purpose of disposing fairly of the issues or for saving costs.

Request for Particulars

20.  The defendant first made a request for further and better particulars by letter dated 14 February 2005.  The defendant has since issued two summonses for further and better particulars.  The first was issued on 9 March 2005 ("1st F & BP Summons") and the second on 29 April 2005 ("2nd F & BP Summons").  After the defendant served its requests, the plaintiff provided some particulars.  The defendant has pursued the rest.  I shall deal with the outstanding requests.

Request 1 under the 2nd F & BP Summons

21.  Request 1 under the 2nd F & BP Summons seeks to require the plaintiff to identify each and every 2-way tap referred to in paragraph 6(2) of the Statement of Claim.  The specific request is that the plaintiff should state whether it was a DM-02 or DM-22 (a less instrusive equipment) or some other and if so what type of 2-way tap, the date and precise place of installation.  The request also seeks particulars of the date or dates that it has been disconnected or deactivated by the plaintiff.

22.  Mr Beresford referred me to Bullen & Leake & Jacob'sPrecedents of Pleadings, 13th ed. (1990) pp. 955-956 for the proposition that a plaintiff must identify the goods in a claim for trespass or conversion.  However, he accepted that the degree of identification required will depend upon the nature of the case.  There are three aspects of identification requested: (a) as to location of the tap, (b) the date of installation and (c) as to the model number of the tap.

23.  Given that the defendant has admitted the disconnections, I do not see why the precise location or the date of installation of the taps is relevant to the plaintiff's claim.  Such information may be useful to the defendant in respect of its counterclaim.  But as Mr Beresford rightly acknowledged, the defendant cannot obtain particulars of the claim for the purpose of assisting it in its counterclaim.  Information as to location and the approximate date of installation is, however, likely to be available or can be inferred from the agreements the plaintiff have with its customers.  In my judgment, location and date of installation need not be provided by way of particulars.

24.  As noted above there are two 2-way taps involved in every connection, one outside and another inside the unit.  So far as identification of model number is concerned, the defendant wishes to know the model number of the tap outside the unit.  There is no dispute that the one inside the unit is a DM-02 tap.  Mr Leong contended that whether a DM-02 or DM-22 tap was used is not material whether to the claim or the counterclaim.

25.  I am unable to accept Mr Leong's argument that whether the tap in question is a DM-02 tap or a DM-22 tap is irrelevant to the counterclaim.  It is common ground that a DM-22 tap would constitute less interference with the defendant's signal.  That suggests that the defendant may have a stronger case on loss if the majority of the taps were DM-02 instead of DM-22.  However, this does not avail the defendant.  As noted above, the defendant is not entitled to request for further and better particulars of the allegations in the Statement of Claim merely because such particulars may assist it in its counterclaim.  As for the claim, I am not satisfied that the precise model of the tap is of relevance.  Accordingly, I am not prepared to order the plaintiff to identify in each and every case whether the 2-way tap is one of DM-02 or of DM-22.

26.  Request 1.2 seeks particulars of disconnection or deactivation.  The allegation in respect of which such particulars are sought is the following:

“The Plaintiff's 2-way tap to which the Defendant's 3-way/4-way tap output and the Plaintiff's network output are then connected (“the installation works”).”

27.  In my judgment, the particulars sought do not arise from the allegation.  I would decline to make an order on this request.

Request 2 under 2nd F & BP Summons

28.  This request seeks particulars of paragraph 8(1) of the Statement of Claim which pleads "the drop-in cables of such customers are disconnected from the Plaintiff's 2-way taps and were directly connected to the Defendant's 3-way/4-way taps only".  The requests are

(1)     identify each and every drop-in cable referred to,

(2)     state the name and address of each customer and identify all relevant contracts,

(3)     identify each and every 2-way tap referred to.

29.  Mr Beresford accepts that there is a clear overlap between this request and request 1.1 under the same summons.  There is no suggestion that the location of the drop-in cable would be different from the location of the 2-way tap.  For the reasons given above, I decline to make an order in respect of requests (1) (2) or (3).

Request 3 under 2nd F & BP Summons

30.  Request 3 under the summons the 2nd F & BP Summons seeks to require the plaintiff to identify each and every 2-way tap or other equipment which has been reconnected by the plaintiff's technicians as pleaded in paragraph 8(2) of the Statement of Claim.  The defendant wants to know whether the 2-tap way or other equipment so reconnected with DM-02 or DM-22 or some other type of 2-way tap.

31.  This request relates not to the original tap which is alleged to be the subject of trespass or conversion, but to the replacement 2-way tap.  The defendant wishes to find out whether the replacement tap is DM-02 or DM-22 or some other model.  For the reasons given above, I do not consider that the model number of the tap is relevant to the plaintiff's claim.  Again, the fact that this information may be of relevance to the counterclaim does not assist the defendant on this application.  I decline to order the particulars requested.

Request 5 under the 2nd F & BP Summons

32.  Paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claim alleges that the defendant has wrongfully deprived the plaintiff of 2-way taps by disconnecting and discarding the same.  Mr Leong pointed out that the plaintiff has indicated that its special damages are limited to the sum of HK$8,857.50 being the value of labour costs incurred by the plaintiff in completing the reinstatement work.  He submitted that since the claim for special damages are confined to labour cost, it is implicit that the plaintiff is not seeking to recover any damages under this paragraph for having been deprived of the value of any 2-way tap.

33.  In my judgment, Mr Beresford is right in his contention that the plaintiff should either abandon this allegation under paragraph 16 or provide the particulars.  It is not good enough for the plaintiff merely to state that it is not claiming any special damages on this plea.  The defendant is entitled to know whether it has to meet a case that some of the taps were disconnected and discarded.  This is especially so when the plaintiff is relying on this plea in paragraph 16 as one of the matters for claiming exemplary damages.  I would accordingly order the particulars requested unless the plaintiff takes such step as may be necessary to amend the Statement of Claim to withdraw the allegation contained in paragraph 16.

Requests 6 and 7 of the 2nd F & BP Summons

34.  It is convenient to take these two requests together.  Both relate to the defendant's request for particulars of knowledge.  The plaintiff furnished some particulars in answer to the requests but prefaced the answers by the words "such knowledge of the defendant was implied from all the circumstances of the case, including but not limited to ...".  The defendant takes objection to the words in italics claiming that those words enable the plaintiff to enlarge on the particulars, and defeat the whole purpose of seeking particulars.  Mr Leong retorted that the words would not have that effect as no court would allow a party to adduce evidence not foreshadowed.

35.  In my view it is unfortunate that the parties have to spend any time or cost in debating this question.  It is evident that the plaintiff is not able to furnish any particulars other than those already supplied.  A less objectionable form of words would be for the plaintiff to indicate that the particulars supplied are the best that could be supplied for the time being, reserving the right to furnish further particulars if and when necessary.  In my view, it would meet the interest of justice if I make no order on this request, but record, as I have already done, Mr Leong's concession that it would not be open to the plaintiff to adduce evidence outside the specific matters presently pleaded.  This is, of course, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to apply to amend the particulars or supply further voluntary particulars in amplication of its case.

Request 8 of the 2nd F & BP Summons

36.  This request seeks particulars of an allegation in paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim of damage to the plaintiff's taps "as pleaded above".  The request is to give full particulars of the alleged damage to the plaintiff's 2-way taps, identifying the 2-way taps alleged to have been damages, and stating where above it is pleaded.

37.  I agree that it is not clear from the Statement of Claim what this relates to.  I would direct the plaintiff to give the particulars requested.

Requests 3 and 4 in the 1st F & BP Summons and request 4 in the 2nd F & BP Summons

38.  These requests relate to the damages claimed by the plaintiff.  The plaintiff indicated by letter dated 18 May 2005 that it "limits its claim for damages against the Defendant to HK$8,857.50".  Mr Leong has stated both before the Master and in this Court that this relates only to the claim for special damages.  The defendant says with some justification that this has not been made clear in the letter.  Nevertheless, since this has been clarified by Mr Leong, there was no further particularisation the defendant asked for.  Mr Beresford also pointed out that the plaintiff has disclosed certain table which appeared to provide a breakdown of the labour cost said to have been incurred.  Again, it would have been better if the plaintiff indicates unequivocally that the particulars contained in the table relates to the claim of special damages.  However, no order is really called for now that the defendant knows the case it has to meet.

Orders

39.  For the reasons I have attempted to state, I would allow the defendant's appeal, set aside the Orders made by the Master (including the orders as to costs) and make the following orders:

(1)     The plaintiff do within 21 days from the date of this Order make and file and serve on the defendant an affidavit or affirmation stating whether the documents specified in the Schedule hereto are or have at any time been in its possession, custody or power, and if not then in its possession, custody or power, when it parted with them and what has become of them.

Schedule

“1.     All agreements or contracts or, where there is no agreement is writing, all documents evidencing agreement, between the Plaintiff and individual users referred to in paragraphs 7 and 18 of the Amended Statement of Claim.

2.      All agreements or contracts or, where there is no agreement in writing, all documents evidencing agreement, between the Plaintiff and individual users for the termination of any agreement referred to in 1. above.”

(2)     The plaintiff do within 21 days from the date of this order file and serve on the defendant the following further and better particulars of its Statement of Claim:

Under paragraph 16

Of the allegation that

“the Defendant has wrongfully deprived the Plaintiff of the 2-way taps by disconnecting and discarding such 2-way taps by reason whereof the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage.”

State the location of each and every 2-way tap of which the Plaintiff has been allegedly deprived.

PROVIDED THAT the plaintiff shall be relieved of its obligation to furnish the particulars under this paragraph if it shall within the said 21 days have taken such steps as may be necessary to amend the Statement of Claim to withdraw the allegation contained in paragraph 16.

Under paragraph 18

Of the allegation that

“the Defendant committed the said wrongful acts of … damaging the Plaintiff's 2-way taps as pleaded above.”

Give full particulars of the alleged damage to the Plaintiff's 2-way taps, identifying the 2-way taps alleged to have been damaged, and identifying the plea which is being referred to in the Statement of Claim.

Costs

40.  My provisional view is that the defendant is successful on the summons for discovery and should have the costs of that summons both here and below.  I make an order nisi to that effect in the summons for discovery.  As for the summonses for particulars, the defendant has only limited success.  It failed to persuade me on a fair amount of its requests whilst some fall away after clarification.  I make orders nisi that the costs of the summonses for particulars, both here and below, be costs in the cause.  The orders nisi shall be absolute unless an application is made to vary or set aside the order within 14 days from the date of the order.

 

 

(Benjamin Yu, S C)
Recorder of the Court of First Instance
Of the High Court

 

Mr Alan Leong, SC leading Mr Bernard Mak, instructed by Messrs Anthony Siu & Co., for the Plaintiff

Mr Roger Beresford, instructed by Messrs Bird & Bird, for the Defendant

21887-EN-2001-04-03

HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LTD. v. HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LTD.

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21248-EN-2000-11-24

HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LTD. v. HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LTD.

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HCA009172/2000

HCA9172/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO.9172 OF 2000

-------------------------

BETWEEN
HONG KONG BROADBAND NETWORK LIMITEDPlaintiff
AND
HONG KONG CABLE TELEVISION LIMITEDDefendant

-------------------------

Coram: Hon Cheung J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 16 November 2000

Date of Judgment: 24 November 2000

 

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J U D G M E N T

------------------------

 

The applications

1. There are two applications before me, the first is the plaintiff's application to continue with the ex parte injunction granted on 23 September 2000, the second is the defendant's application to discharge the ex parte injunction. The defendant had abandoned its application for injunction and discovery against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's case for the injunction

2. The plaintiff is a company that provides broadband internet access to users. It holds a Fixed Telecommunication Network Service Licence ("the FTNS Licence") issued by the Telecommunications Authority. The licence was granted on 1 February 2000. Under this licence, the plaintiff was required to launch the service within four months from the date of the licence and to attain a coverage of not less than 1,480 buildings within 12 months. The FTNS Licence was the first such licence issued to the plaintiff.

3. The defendant is a cable television company. Licence was first granted to the defendant on 25 May 1993. The defendant also provides broadband internet access to its customers.

4. In most multi-storey buildings in Hong Kong, there is a public television broadcast network. The network extends to each floor of the building and is connected to a cable ("the drop-in cable") which leads to individual units by a 3-way or 4-way tap output of the public network on the individual floors of the building. The defendant built its own cable network in multi-storey buildings in order to supply cable television to the occupants. Since the defendant's network also transmits television signals, in order to enable the user receiving both television signal and cable television service, the defendant would switch the drop-in cable of each unit from the tap output of the public network to the 3-way or 4-way tap output of the defendant's network.

5. In order to supply the broadband internet service to the units in multi-storey buildings, the plaintiff built its own coaxial cable network in these buildings. The method of connecting the plaintiff's network to the individual units of each floor is this : the plaintiff installed a device called a 2-way tap and redirect the drop-in cable of the unit to the 2-way tap which is connected to both the plaintiff's network and the existing 3-way or 4-way tap output of the public network. Inside the unit, the user would be given a modem to connect the drop-in cable in order to receive the broadband internet access. By means of the 2-way tap, the individual units are able to receive both the television signals and also the plaintiff's broadband access.

6. In cases where the defendant's cable customer (whose drop-in cable is already connected to the 3-way or 4-way tap of the defendant) subsequently subscribed to the plaintiff's service, the plaintiff would connect the drop-in cable to the plaintiff's 2-way tap in which the defendant's 3-way or 4-way tap output and the plaintiff's network output are connected. In order to do so, the defendant's 3-way or 4-way tap output would have to be disconnected from the drop-in cable and then immediately reconnected to the 2-way tap of the plaintiff.

7. The construction of the plaintiff's network and installation were carried out pursuant to agreements between the plaintiff and the incorporated owners of the multi-storey buildings and also between the plaintiff and the individual owners. In public estates, the plaintiff entered the agreement with the Housing Authority.

8. In March, June and August 2000, the plaintiff discovered that a number of its customers were off-line. Technicians were despatched and discovered that the drop-in cables of the customers were disconnected from the plaintiff's 2-way taps and were directly connected to the defendant's 3-way or 4-way taps only. The disconnection caused disruption to the plaintiff's service until the plaintiff's technician reconnected the plaintiff's network to the customers. By two letters dated 7 July 2000 and 29 August 2000, the defendant's solicitors, Messrs Bird & Bird ("Bird & Bird"), admitted that the defendant's employees had disconnected the plaintiff's installation.

9. On 22 September 2000, the plaintiff discovered that their installations in eight estates covering 22 blocks of building had been disconnected by the defendant. On 23 September 2000, it made the ex parte application for injunction against the defendant. Notice was served on the defendant's solicitors who apparently did not open its office on a Saturday and were not present at the hearing. I granted the injunction.

The defendant's case for discharge

10. The defendant's case for the discharge of the injunction is that the plaintiff had obtained the injunction by material non-disclosure.

Duty of frank and full disclosure

11. The duty of an applicant in an ex parte application to make full and frank disclosure is well established. Any material non-disclosure may render the order obtained to be discharged : Brink's Mat v. Elcombe [1988] 1 WLR 1350 and Behbehani v. Salem [1989] 1 WLR 726. The non-disclosure, however, must be material : Tete Access Floor Inc. v. Boswell [1991] 2 WLR 304 and A.M.D. Pack Rack Ltd & Others v. The Barrons Group Ltd & Others [1992] 2 HKLR 50 and Pacific Base Services Ltd & Another v. Silver Gain Development Ltd & Others [1996] 2 HKLR 26. The correct test of what is to be treated as material is all facts which are relevant to the weighing operation which the court has to make in deciding whether or not to grant the order : Thermix v. Schott Industrial Glass [1981] FSR 289 and Citibank NA v. Express Ship Management Services Ltd & Another [1987] HKLR 1184. Ultimately, it is a matter of discretion for the court in deciding whether there should be a discharge of an ex parte injunction in the event of material non-disclosure : Dubai Bank v. Galadari [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 120. One of the factors to be considered is whether the non-disclosure is innocently made or not : Brink's Mat and Behbehani. If the non-disclosure is innocent, the court may continue with the ex parte injunction or after the discharge, to immediately re-grant substantially the same injunction : Behbehani.

The four areas of non-disclosure

12. The four areas of non-disclosure relied upon by the defendant are as follows :

(1) The plaintiff had not disclosed that what it had done was unlawful.

(2) The statutory scheme on telecommunication installation had not been referred to by the plaintiff.

(3) The plaintiff had failed to disclose the negotiation between the parties that had commenced in March 2000.

(4) The plaintiff had not disclosed whether alternative devices could be used in connecting the plaintiff's and defendant's network to the drop-in cables which would reduce the degradation of the defendant's signal.

Interference by the plaintiff

13. The defendant argued that instead of the picture painted by the plaintiff as being the victim of the unlawful acts of the defendant, the real situation is that the plaintiff's installations had interfered with the defendant's existing network, in breach of Regulation 11 of the Telecommunications Regulations. The defendant complained that there has been degradation of its signals as a result of the plaintiff's connection.

14. Regulation 11 of the Telecommunications Regulations provides that -

"(1) No person shall use any apparatus for telecommunications in such manner as to cause direct or indirect interference with any telecommunications service lawfully carried on, or other apparatus for telecommunications lawfully operated in or outside Hong Kong.

(2) The Authority may, by notice in writing to any person possessing any apparatus for telecommunications, require him to take such measures as the Authority may consider expedient and within such time as may be specified in the notice in order to prevent interference of the nature described in subregulation (1).

(3) Any person who knowingly causes direct or indirect interference in contravention of subregulation (1) or fails to comply with any notice given under subregulation (2) shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine of $20,000."

15. This point can be shortly dealt with. In the affirmation of Leung Ka Pak, Kapak, used in support of the plaintiff's application for the ex parte injunction, the plaintiff referred to the two letters from Bird & Bird. In the letter dated 7 July 2000, Bird & Bird complained about the unlawful connection by the plaintiff of the defendant's network in March, June and July 2000. The letter stated, among other things, that -

"As you will no doubt be aware, the installation of the unlawful interconnections by you constitutes a trespass to our client's property and a breach of the Telecommunication Regulations."

"As a result of your actions our client may have incurred liability to its subscribers in respect of interruptions to our client's service and loss or distribution of subscribers data. Our client is not yet in a position to quantify any such liability. Our client reserves all its rights against you in respect of such liability."

16. The second letter was dated 29 August 2000 in which Bird & Bird referred to further unlawful connection of the defendant's network by the plaintiff in August 2000. The letter stated, among other things, that -

"As we have previously explained to you, the making of interconnections to a CATV system without the consent of the operator/owner such that it causes a degradation in the signal quality and a spillover of third party input signals constitutes both a trespass to the system and a breach of Telecommunications Regulation 11. Our client is entitled in such circumstances to exercise self help to restore the status quo."

"As we have explained, it is a clear breach of Telecommunications Regulation 11 for you to install telecommunication equipment that is connected to our client's telecommunication equipment and that interferes with our client's service without reaching a technical arrangement with our client in advance."

17. The affirmation further disclosed that the plaintiff had, at the meantime, complained to the Office of the Telecommunication Authority ("OFTA") on the actions of the defendant in disconnecting the plaintiff's device. The defendant had also complained to OFTA about the connection of the plaintiff to its network. In a letter dated 22 September 2000, OFTA informed the plaintiff that the defendant alleged that the connection by the plaintiff had violated Reg.11, degraded the performance of its network and caused disruption of its service to its customers.

18. Earlier on 8 August 2000, OFTA informed the plaintiff that the defendant had complained about the plaintiff's interference with its service. A meeting was held between the parties at OFTA's invitation on 1 September 2000 in which OFTA suggested a technical audit to verify the defendant's complaint. On 2 September 2000, the plaintiff and officers from OFTA carried out a technical audit with the finding that the measurement level of the network signals were in accordance with the requirement of Technical Requirement 1101 laid down by OFTA.

19. Apart from the affirmation, paragraph 7 of the written skeleton submission of the plaintiff submitted in support of the ex parte injunction, expressly stated that "Defendant's allegation that plaintiff breached Regulation 11 of Telecommunication Authority Regulations is not substantiated. OFTA has not rule on the matter to date. In fact proven wrong by the technical audit carried out by plaintiff in OFTA's presence".

20. Although at the hearing before me, the wording of Regulation 11 was not specifically referred to by Mr Leong SC, counsel for the plaintiff, in my view, the plaintiff had clearly discharged its duty in drawing the court's attention that the defendant had in fact complained about the interference by the plaintiff. By disclosing the defendant's complaint of interference, the plaintiff had clearly set out the context in which the application for injunction was made.

Statutory scheme

21. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff did not disclose the statutory scheme affecting the connection between the plaintiff's network and the defendant's network.

22. Section 36A of the Telecommunication Ordinance ("the Ordinance") provides that OFTA may determine the terms and conditions of interconnection of the type mentioned in subsection (3D). Subsection (3D) refers to arrangement between two or more parties for interconnection to and between telecommunication systems or services. "Interconnection" means "any connection between systems or services or elements of systems or services for the delivery of any communication, message or signal over the connection and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes interconnection to a system, to a service, between systems, between services and between a system and a service; ..." (subsection (3E)).

23. OFTA may make a determination on the request of a party to the interconnection or, in the absence of a request, if it considers it is in the interest of the public to do so (subsection (2)). The terms and conditions in a determination may include any technical, commercial and financial terms and conditions that OFTA may consider fair and reasonable (subsection (3)). The terms and conditions in a determination may include charge that a party may pay to the other, the points at which interconnection is to be made and technical standards for interconnection (subsection (3A)).

24. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's connection to its network comes within the definition of interconnection under section 36A. It further referred to a document entitled "Guidelines to Assist the Interpretation and Application of the Interconnection Provisions of the Telecommunication Ordinance (Cap.106) and the FTNS Licence" issued by OFTA in June 1995, page 3 of the document stated that -

"THE TA'S [i.e. the Telecommunications Authority] APPROACH

12. The TA is of the view that, as a matter of practice, commercially negotiated arrangements are more sustainable in the market place than arrangements which have to be imposed by determination. The TA considers the licensees should avail themselves of every opportunity to resolve issues commercially before seeking a formal determination.

13. Accordingly, the TA considers that a light handed regulatory approach to regulatory intervention on interconnection matters is preferable to detailed determinations on all interconnection matters. Should commercial negotiation prove difficult, the TA would be prepared to facilitate negotiations by way of conciliation or mediation. These would involve the TA playing an active informal part to assist the parties to reach commercial agreement before resorting to formal determination procedures.

14. The TA will intervene in commercial negotiations when requested to do so by one or all parties to a negotiation, and after considering the public interest criteria referred to above.

15. The TA considers that interconnection agreements need to be finalized promptly, efficiently and at a reasonable cost. This view recognizes that in order for the Government's objectives for competition and consumer choice to occur in telecommunications there is a need for the licensees to reach agreement on interconnection arrangements at an early date. ..."

"22. Technical interconnection determinations may include matters relating to:

· provision of points of interconnection and capacity requirements;

· technical standards to be adopted; ..."

Relevance of the statutory scheme

25. Mr Leong accepted that the statutory scheme as set out in section 36A was not dealt with in the ex parte application, but he submitted that the matter was irrelevant because the statutory scheme does not prohibit the plaintiff from making the connection even in the absence of an agreement or determination by OFTA. Furthermore, whether the plaintiff's connection amounted to interconnection remains to be argued at the trial.

26. While I agree that whether there is interconnection is a matter that cannot be conclusively determined at this stage, it does seem that the features of the plaintiff's connection to the defendant's system comes within the definition of interconnection in section 36A. However, even assuming there is interconnection, one may ask what is the relevance of the statutory scheme if it does not prohibit the connection being made in the first place? In my view, the relevance of the statutory scheme is really in the context of the interference by the competitors of telecommunication networks. In my view, the most important aspect of the requirement of disclosure is the defendant's complaint of interference. This, the plaintiff had disclosed. While the statutory scheme would provide me with a better understanding of the telecommunication framework in Hong Kong, at the end of the day, it played no part in deciding whether the injunction should be granted or not. The test is, of course, not whether if the non-disclosure had not occurred, I would nevertheless have made the order, but rather the facts not disclosed, being relevant, should have been in the scales. While initially I was inclined to accept Mr Bleach SC, counsel for the defendant's submission that the statutory scheme was one of the relevant factors to be considered, on reflection, this is not something that would be relevant to my "weighing operation". Although a party may introduce such evidence out of an abundance of caution and in order to provide the court with a fuller picture of the disputes, ultimately this matter really would have no effect in my decision. This is not a material factor.

Negotiations

27. Between March and August 2000, the parties had carried out negotiations which were not disclosed by the plaintiff. According to the defendant, these negotiations were on the interconnections of the two systems.

28. The plaintiff's case on the discussion is that the discussion did not include buildings in which the defendant did not own the drop-in cables. Mr Leong submitted that when the plaintiff obtained the licence in March, it approached the defendant to make use of its existing pathway. The initial concept was to connect to the defendant's system at the head end, namely to feed the plaintiff's signals at the defendant's Tsuen Wan head office. The discussion was on a reciprocal basis, namely that the defendant could make similar connections to the plaintiff's system. Then the discussion moved to a situation where the plaintiff would build its own pathway but connected to the drop-in cables owned by the defendant. What the plaintiff had actually done in this case was to build its own pathway and connected it to the drop-in cables owned by the owners of the building. This occurred in buildings in which the defendant did not own the drop-in cables. This had taken place while the parties were carrying out the negotiation on the first and second methods of installation. This is a fact that was known to the defendant throughout.

29. The defendant's knowledge of the matter can be supported by the following. On 6 April 2000, the defendant complained to OFTA on the connection by the plaintiff to the defendant's system. Further, the letter of Bird & Bird dated 7 July 2000 referred to the plaintiff's connection carried out on 26 March, 12, 16 June and 6 July 2000. Likewise in the second letter dated 29 August 2000, it referred to connections on 17, 19 and 28 August 2000.

30. Mr Bleach referred to the correspondence to show that the parties were referring to discussions on interconnection without specifying whether it was to be installed in buildings in which the defendant owned the drop-in cables. It was only at a late stage of the discussion that the defendant referred to connections at the drop-in cables owned by the defendant. The building that was chosen by the plaintiff for trial run in fact was a building in which the defendant did not own the drop-in cables. Hence, it undermines the plaintiff's contention that the discussion did not include buildings in which the drop-in cables were not owned by the defendant. Mr Bleach argued that the issue is not on who owned the cables, but whether there was a discussion on interconnection. He submitted that the issue of negotiation merged with the statutory scheme.

31. In my view, it is not within the ambit of an interlocutory application for the court to determine what were the actual matters that had been discussed between the parties. If there was indeed a negotiation on interconnection, all that it means is that the statutory scheme had been invoked by the parties. However, if the statutory scheme has no bearing on the issue of the lawfulness of the plaintiff's action, I do not see how a non-disclosure of the negotiation would constitute a material non-disclosure. In my view, the defendant had not make out a case for the discharge of the injunction under this ground.

Alternative method of installation

32. The defendant argued that the plaintiff could have used a different device in their connection which would reduce the degradation of the signals of the defendant. The defendant found that the plaintiff had replaced the original device with an alternative device which could reduce the level of degradation. It is submitted that the plaintiff should have disclosed the adverse effects that its connection may have on the defendant's system and whether there are other ways that the defendant's system could have been protected.

33. The plaintiff's case is that its device was found by OFTA of not causing any interference with the defendant's system. The plaintiff admitted that in the early installation, the plaintiff did not use the alternative device, the earlier installation only now accounted for less than 10% of the total installations of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further said that the result of testing of both types of devices show that the level of degradation is only slightly higher with the original device.

34. In my view, this would not be an appropriate juncture to go into detailed technical evidence. In light of the evidence that the level of degradation of these two types of devices is only slightly different, it would be imposing too much a burden if the plaintiff is required to deal with alternative methods of installation at the ex parte application. Afterall, the concern at that stage was that the defendant had removed the plaintiff's connections in the course of 24 hours which caused serious problems with the plaintiff's operation.

Defendant's application dismissed

35. I find that the defendant had not made out a case of discharge. I shall accordingly dismiss the defendant's summons to discharge the ex parte injunction.

Continuation of the injunction

36. The defendant accepted that if it fails in its application to discharge the ex parte injunction, then the injunction would continue. This is obviously a proper case for the granting of an injunction. There is a serious question to be tried on whether the defendant's action had interfered with the plaintiff's installation. In cases of this type, where the business competition is extremely fierce, damages is clearly not an adequate remedy. It is the business reputation and ability to capture a share of the market that matters. As to the balance of convenience, ultimately the question is the balance of the risk of doing an injustice : Cayne v. Global National Resources Plc. [1984] 1 All ER 225. In my view there would be less injustice in granting the injunction which may turn out to be wrong than not making the order in favour of the plaintiff at this stage. The plaintiff obviously would suffer irreparable loss if its installations are disconnected.

Variation of the injunction

37. The defendant submitted that there should be modification to the terms of the injunction by requiring the plaintiff to replace the original device with the alternative device. This would involve replacing devices both in the outside and inside of an individual's flat. Although the plaintiff has indicated that it would eventually replace the installation outside with the alternative device, there are technical obstacles in placing the device inside the flat.

38. I would not vary the terms of the injunction. The purpose of the interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo so that the plaintiff can carry on with providing service to the customers until the trial. Likewise I have to ensure that the injunction would not affect the normal operation of the defendant as well. In this case, if the plaintiff's installations are really seriously affecting the service provided by the defendant, one would expect numerous complaints from its customers. However, what has been disclosed so far are only a few complaints. I am not satisfied that the situation is such that the plaintiff should be required to completely replace its devices both inside and outside the individual flats.

Speedy trial

39. I shall continue with the injunction. It is to the benefit of the parties that there should be a speedy trial of the action, and I shall so order.

Costs

40. I shall make an order nisi that the costs of the plaintiff's application for injunction be costs in the cause and the defendant is to pay the plaintiff the costs occasioned by its application to discharge the injunction.

 

 

(P. Cheung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Representation:

Mr Alan Leong SC, leading Mr Bernard Mak, instructed by Messrs Li & Partners, for the Plaintiff

Mr John Bleach SC, instructed by Messrs Bird & Bird, for the Defendant