P v. P
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES
SUIT NO. 13264 OF 2002
_________________
BETWEEN
| P | Petitioner | |
| and | ||
| P | Respondent |
_________________
Coram : H.H. Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers
Date of Hearing : 16, 21 – 23 March 2005, 8 April, 6, 9 – 10 May, 23 – 24, 28 – 30 June, 5 – 6 July & 9 August 2005
Date of Judgement : 20 September 2005
____________________
J U D G M E N T
____________________
1. The parties are Canadian expatriates who married each other in 1983 in Canada. They have 6 children, 3 boys and 3 girls between the age of 8 and 19, with the eldest 3 born in Canada and the rest in Hong Kong after the family moved here in 1991 when the Husband was employed by Cathay Pacific Airways as an airline pilot.
2. Like most marriages that fail, there were numerous conflicts between the parties in particularly towards the latter stage of their marriage, with matters coming to a head in November 2002 when the Wife moved out of the matrimonial home in Clearwater Bay with the children and withdrew $2 million being half of the savings from the parties’ joint account, and proceeded to file for divorce against the Husband and for custody of the children and general ancillary relief as well as for leave to remove the children out of the jurisdiction to return to Canada.
3. Shortly thereafter the parties entered into discussion about the possibility of both relocating to Vancouver, Canada with the Husband taking a basing of his employment there, where each would purchase their own property with the children going between the two households.
4. Unfortunately there was to be no settlement between the parties who went ahead with the proceedings which had descended into a long and acrimonious battle over virtually every issue, in particularly those concerning their children, and over whether the Wife was suffering from the psychiatric condition of Munchausen Syndrome, to the almost complete depletion of their liquid assets. On 20th October 2004 I delivered a judgment granting custody care and control of the 4 minor children to the Wife after an unusually bitter trial that lasted more than 30 days, but postponed my decision over her application for leave to remove the children, which was then also strenuously opposed by the Husband, to be dealt with together with her application for ancillary relief, which is now the matter before me, the trial of which has turned out every bit as bitter and contentious as before, lasting a further 20 days.
5. I do not propose to recite any further details of the background and history of the case here. They could be found in my earlier judgment of 20th October 2004. It would however be relevant to update the situation and circumstances of the parties and their children since that judgment.
6. The Wife, who is now 42, has remained a housewife and lives with the 3 youngest children namely A (12), B (9) and S (8) at her village house in Sai Kung under a lease until early 2006 but with a break-clause which she says will allow her to leave Hong Kong for Canada as soon as she is allowed to remove the children out of the jurisdiction. In the meantime A is in her second year at KGV School after a successful transfer from Christian Alliance International School (“CAIS”), where the 2 youngest boys have remained.
7. The other minor child, N, who is 16 and whose custody has also been granted to the Wife, is still boarding at Grenville Christian College in Ontario, Canada but shares her time with her parents while holidaying in Hong Kong.
8. The 2nd eldest child, Y has turned 18 and, having graduated from Grenville Christian College, will be entering university at Fanshawe College in London, Ontario, Canada.
9. The eldest child C, who is now 19, used to attend the same Grenville Christian College with his 2 sisters, but left school sometime in 2004 to return to stay with his father in Hong Kong where he had worked first as a restaurant waiter and later as a chef. In June 2005 he returned to Canada to prepare for his enrolment into George Brown College in Toronto.
10. The Husband, at 43, is still in the employ of Cathay Pacific Airways as an airline captain pilot and lives in his rented village house in Clearwater Bay. He has now accepted that the Wife and the minor children should be allowed to leave for Canada in July 2006, but not earlier as intended by her, as he believes that it would be beneficial for the children to have a period of access with him in Hong Kong after these proceedings are over when he will no longer be occupied by the case and court attendances. He has also confirmed that in all likelihood he will apply for a basing of his employment in Toronto, Canada in the summer of 2006 or shortly thereafter to coincide with the Wife’s move so that he may remain close to the children, and that in any event the time for applying for a basing in Canada for this year has according to him already passed.
11. In my earlier judgment I found that there was no evidence to suggest that the Wife’s application was anything other than a genuine desire to return to Canada where the parties came from and where she believes the children’s future lies. But I also questioned whether it was realistic or practical for her to do so immediately upon the conclusion of these proceedings, and that the full spectrum of ancillary relief in particularly the needs and requirements of her and the children in Canada, if they are allowed to leave, which now seems to be the case but only a question of timing, as well as the Husband’s means and ability to make proper and reasonable financial provisions for them, need to be fully explored and investigated, which I now propose to do, before a final decision can be made of her application.
The Wife’s case
12. The Wife seeks periodical payments for herself and for the children, as well as lump sum payment and costs of the ancillary relief proceedings. Formerly she had also sought the reimbursement of school fees and medical expenses previously paid by her but subsequently not reimbursed by the Husband, but she agreed, under cross examination, that in the interest of expediency, not to pursue this. She had also requested that the Husband give her negatives of the children’s photographs, which the Husband has indicated that he is willing to supply to her after his visit to Canada where they are stored. The Wife has submitted that if this is to be an undertaking by the Husband, which I understand to be the case, she will no longer seek an order for their production on her undertaking to return the negatives to him afterwards.
13. It is however the Wife’s case that the way in which the Husband has conducted himself from the very onset of the proceedings, and in relation to his basing in Canada, and the efforts he made to destablise her in order to enhance his own position and win custody, care and control of the children and to thwart her every plan, must be taken into account by the Court in making financial orders. Had the Husband not decided to go into full scale battle with her in November 2002, the Wife says, they would both now be living in Canada, close by and financially stable, or that at the very least he could have agreed to settle the matters after she was found mentally fit by the court appointed psychiatrist Dr Lo to have custody care and control of the children, but instead he insisted on ploughing on at ruinous financial and emotional cost, with legal bills run up to the region of $6 million, of which the Wife argues that she should not have to bear the financial consequences.
14. As to her application for the removal of the children to Canada, the Wife says that now that the Husband has accepted that they be allowed to leave for Canada in July 2006, she does not see why they cannot leave right away after she has been delayed already for some considerable time as a result of the Husband’s action, and instead have to wait for another 9 months until next July for no good reason.
15. She has provided some information as to properties, school and amenities in the Ottawa area to which she would return, as it is her home area where she and the children are familiar with, and which is near her parents’ home in Cornwall, but until such time as she know when she can move and the funds she may have available to her, she cannot find a house, enrol the children into school or make arrangements for moving. She plans to initially stay with her parents until such time as she locates a property to buy in Ottawa.
16. For as long as she remains in Hong Kong, the Wife estimates her monthly expenses, to include a domestic helper, to be HK$44,357 plus her rent of HK$33,000. In addition she estimates the travel costs and holiday expenses for her and the children at a further HK$8,015 per month, totalling HK$85,372, which is about what the Husband has been paying, albeit she accepts quite tightly with his budget.
17. She says that the picture will change dramatically with her removal to Canada principally because of the costs of accommodation as not only is it much cheaper than in Hong Kong, but the money that is lost each month on rent here will be going to purchase a home as long-term security for herself and the children.
18. She estimates a suitable house in Ottawa would cost in the region of C$375,000 – $400,000 (HK$2.44 – 2.60 million), which would be funded by a deposit from a lump sum from the Husband with a mortgage for HK$2 million over 25 years at a rate of 6% giving a monthly mortgage repayment within HK$15,000 per month which is to be funded from the periodical payment from the Husband.
19. As for her monthly expenses in Canada including holiday expenses, the Wife estimates that a monthly sum of HK$41,500 for her and the children would be reasonable, bringing the total periodical payment which she would request from the Husband to HK$56,500 including the said mortgage repayment, which is much less than her present expenses in Hong Kong, and well within his means.
20. Initially the Wife had hoped that her financial claims could be resolved by way of a clean break with a large cash settlement funded by a loan against the Husband’s provident fund with Cathay Pacific. When it has become apparent that this would not be possible as the regulations of the provident fund do not allow it, the Wife now seeks that she be given an immediate cash lump sum of C$100,000 for the deposit as well as setting up the house in Ottawa, which she says can be funded either by a short term loan by the Husband, or from his share of his father’s estate which she says is sufficient to meet her such need.
21. In addition the Wife seeks an on-going interest in the Husband’s provident fund which now stands at around $6 million. She proposes that she gets 65% thereof at the date of decree absolute of divorce as a starting point, plus an additional percentage of the fund on a sliding scale that after 5 years the parties should get about equal amounts out of the fund, and thereafter it would begin to tilt in the Husband’s favour. By then she believes that with the minor children become older, she will hopefully have acquired some earning capacity to become financially independent of the Husband.
The Husband’s case
22. The Husband says that he has long believed, even prior to the divorce, that the Wife has been suffering from a factitious disorder that has represented itself in the medical realm as a means of seeking attention to herself, which together with her other shortcomings, had caused him great suspect of her parental ability which, out of his genuine concern for his children, entitled him to challenge her application for their sole custody care and control, and hence he should not be criticised for doing so or that his such action be regarded as a financial conduct to be taken into account when considering her application for ancillary relief.
23. To the contrary, the Husband argues, it was the Wife’s conduct in dissipating the matrimonial assets by withdrawing the $2 million from their joint account, and within the next 2 years proceeded to dissipate most of it on her extravagant and unnecessary spending including moving from the matrimonial home to a more expensive house, frequent overseas trips with her boyfriend, purchasing expensive airfares, needlessly paying for breast enlargement operation, and continuing to engage expensive lawyers and incurring substantial legal costs, etc. that should be taken into account when considering her entitlement to her share of the matrimonial assets.
24. In addition to wishing to establish regular access to the children after the court proceedings before they are to leave for Canada in July 2006, the Husband maintains that without his participation in their upbringing, the Wife is simply incapable of raising the children in Canada by herself as a single parent, which makes it all the more necessary for the children to remain in Hong Kong where he can continue to participate in their upbringing until July next year when he is able to get his basing in Canada so as to coincide with their move.
25. The Husband claims that only his basic pay of $131,365 is a guaranteed amount received monthly, while his other pays such as monthly duty allowance, excess flying pay and 13th month bonus and profit share are all irregular and non-guaranteed, whereas his travel allowances have to be used in part for air tickets, shortfall of monthly maintenance for the Wife and school fees for some of the children, which will in any event be reduced soon after the decree absolute when he will no longer be entitled to claim it for the Wife.
26. He believes that the Wife has grossly exaggerated her needs and expenses which are not supported by their historical spending during the marriage. He proposes that while she and the younger children remain in Hong Kong, he will pay her HK$52,000 per month for their maintenance including her rent and household utilities, which is what he thinks reasonable and which he can afford, and to continue to be responsible for the children’s school fees and medical expenses as well as their airfares, and also to pay her half of any overtime, 13th month bonus or profit share after tax that he may receive, while she should also seek employment to help out with her own finance and to meet any deficits that she may have.
27. After she moves to Canada with the children in July 2006, he proposes that they should live in Cornwall which is close to her mother’s house and where housing costs are only half that of Ottawa. He suggests that she should first rent until he gets his basing there when his provident fund will become available, from which he will pay her 45% of such fund plus interest at 5% thereof until payment, with which she can then purchase a house for herself and the children, and that he will continue to pay for the children’s maintenance and school expenses.
The Law
28. In considering any application for ancillary relief, I am required by s. 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 to have regard to the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the case including the following matters : -
“ (a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; (b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; (c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; (d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; (e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; (f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family; (g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring”.
29. And in relation to children of the family, to also have regard to the following matters : -
“ (a) the financial needs of the child; (b) the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child; (c) any physical or mental disability of the child; (d) the stand of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; (e) the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated; and so to exercise those powers as to place the child, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1), just to do so, in the financial position in which the child would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of those parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards him”.
The Wife’s means
30. I shall start with the Wife’s income, earning capacity and financial resources first, which are more simple and straightforward. There is no dispute that she has no income and has throughout the marriage been wholly dependent on the Husband. Nor is there any question that she has any property or financial resources other than the monthly maintenance from the Husband, after having exhausted the $2 million she had withdrawn from the joint account at the start of the divorce proceedings on spending and legal costs.
31. It is however argued by the Husband that she should seek employment after the divorce proceedings to help meet her monthly expenses, as she had worked in various charity organizations towards the latter stage of the marriage until the divorce proceedings, and that she had also helped out at the reception of a fitness club in exchange for the use of the gym, and as a classroom assistant at her sons’ school during the last school term.
32. With the youngest children only at 8 or 9 years old, the Wife argues that she will have responsibilities as a mother for a long time, and that unlike the Husband, she does not have any formal qualification. She says she is keen to rectify this as and when her responsibilities to the children lessen, but that when she returns to Canada, her first priority has to be to settle the family in the new environment. Her intention is that thereafter she will get some sort of training, but it will take time for her to be able to find anything other than a “pin money” kind of job, and she believes she can achieve the balance of training and work far more easily in Canada than here, where she has to compete with younger bilingual people who very often also have university degrees.
33. There is no question that if a wife earns money, the court is required to take into account of the amount received by her when assessing the amount of periodical payments to be awarded to her. On the other hand, it has been said that a wife should not be expected to go to work to reduce a former husband’s liability towards her. In the case of Ward v Ward [1948] p. 62, 64, Div Ct, Lord Merriman P said this : -
“The justices may think that this wife, having been deserted by her behind and obliged to go out to work instead of being maintained by him in a comfortable home, is entitled at the least to feel that her exertions are not made purely for the husband’s benefit; and might feel obliged in her own interests to put money by against the day when, for example, the husband may remarry or incur other commitments”.
34. A wife’s earning capacity was considered in the case of Rose v Rose [1951] P. 29, 30 – 31, CA by Somervell LJ when he said : -
“I do not propose to lay down nay general rule or to consider whether or in what circumstances a wife’s earning capacity ought to be brought into the calculation of maintenance in the case of a wife who has not been required to earn any money during the matrimonial life. But, in my view, where during the matrimonial life the means of (in this case) the husband (it is not suggested that the wife had any means) are such that the wife has not been required to go out and earn money, then I should say that, in considering the proper sum for maintenance, it would prima facie seem to be wrong that the husband should be able to say : “Now you must go out and work, and the only sum that I can be ordered to pay is a sum based on you yourself going out to work, which you were not required to do when you were my wife, and which you would not have had to do, if I had not committed adultery and broken up the home”, as in this case. That prima facie approach seems to me to be plainly right in a case such as this, where the marriage had lasted for some twenty years; the wife is a woman of forty-one years of age, who has no normal trade or calling, though no doubt she is capable of doing domestic work, and where there is a child of some four-and-a-half years of age for her to look after”.
35. His view was shared by Denning LJ who said this in the same case : -
“I agree …… that no general rule can be laid down on the matter, but this wife is certainly under no legal duty to go out to work in order to reduce the maintenance that her husband should pay. It would be quite unreasonable to expect her to do so. She cannot be expected to do it when she has a young child to look after. Of course, if a wife does earn then her earnings must be taken into account : or if she is a young woman with no children, and obviously ought to go out to work in her own interest, but does not, then her potential earning capacity ought to be taken into account; or if she had worked regularly during the married life, and might reasonably be expected to work after the divorce, her potential ought to be taken into account. Except in cases such as these it does not as a rule lie in the mouth of a wrong-doing husband to say that she ought to go out to work simply in order to relieve him from paying maintenance”.
36. And in Le-Roy Lewis v Le-Roy Lewis [1951] P. 29, 31 – 32, CA, Barnard J said : -
“It has been suggested that because she was working before the marriage and is still young, and as there are no child of the marriage, she ought at once to go back into the position she was in before the marriage and start earning her living, with as far as I can see only one object, to reduce the amount of money which the husband should pay to her, his wife. I do not accept that view. She may have been lucky, or, at any rate thought that she was lucky at the time, in marrying someone who brought about an improvement in her financial and possibly her social position, but it has been through no fault of hers that their married life together has come to an end, and I see no reason whatever, why the wife should go back to earning in order to reduce the husband’s liability to maintain her”.
37. The statutory guidelines under s. 7 (1) however requires the court also to have regard to the earning capacity which each of the parties has or is like to have, the principles enunciated above must now be read in the light of the statutory guidelines, and that the court would now expect a wife who is not encumbered by pre-school age children to take, over a reasonable period of time, such steps as are necessary to acquire or increase an earning capacity in order that she should not be financially dependent on her former husband in perpetuity, as pointed out by Singer J in T v T (Financial Relief : Pensions) [1998] 1 FLR 1072, 1080E :
“W must be encouraged to overcome the apathy which it afflicts her, to put to one side her extremely negative attitude to any suggestion that is made, and to make real attempts to find some reasonably congenial, convenient, interesting and financially rewarding work even if the hours are not ideal, the location is not ideal, the work is not what she would prefer, and she would prefer not to have to do it. For, without for a moment underestimating the difficulties which ladies of her age face in the current employment market, this Wife is in my view a lady who, should she wish to do so, would impress a prospective employer with her qualities”.
38. It has to be said, however, that it is not always easy for married women who have not worked for a number of years to get full-time, or possibly any, employment. I agree that this Wife, who had never performed well at school and dropped out of college soon after meeting the Husband, and had not worked throughout the bulk of the marriage, and with no formal qualification, has very little earning capacity indeed, if any, and that in moving her children back to Canada where she had not actually lived or worked in the past 15 years, and at her age of 42, she should not be expected to have to immediately launch herself into the job market. I accept that it is her intention to go back to school or to receive proper job training and will eventually find a job in order to become financially independent of the Husband, as she is in my view a lady who, should she wish to do so, would impress a prospective employer with her qualities as evidenced from her work at charity organisations, a situation of which however it is not realistic to expect to materialise within at least the next few years.
The Husband’s means
39. The Husband is now in the ranking of a senior captain pursuant to a service agreement with Cathay Pacific on a permanent basis. His present monthly basic salary of $131,365 will be increased to $133,291 in October this year. In addition he also received a discretionary 13th month bonus of $131,365 in December 2004, a profit share of $63,848 in March 2005, and a travel allowance of $192,850 in April 2005. It is however accepted that after the decree absolute he will not be paid a travel allowance for the Wife and so the amount will be reduced by about 20%. According to the Wife, apportioning these payments on a monthly basis will bring his monthly income to $163,702.
40. Furthermore, the Husband also received payments for hourly duty day and excess flying pay for this year in the average monthly sum of $7,487, thereby giving him a grand total of $171,180 per month on average, the Wife says, as set out in details of exhibit “P-13”.
41. The Husband however argues that save for the monthly basic salary, all the other payments either varies from month to month, or are random or unpredictable, such as the duty allowance which is not payable due to sickness or lack of flying for whatever reason, and that since September 2001 when he started to receive such payment, the average monthly sum over the years amounted to a lower figure at $3,813, less than the 2005 figure adopted by the Wife.
42. The same uncertainty, the Husband says, applies to his excess flying pay, of which last year was the highest ever in his career with Cathay Pacific, with the 2003 average only at $589 per month while the 2004 average was $3,556.
43. As regard the 13th month bonus and profit share, the Husband argues that they were not paid or only partially paid in 2 of the last 4 years, and that the reason that they were paid this year because the company recorded its 2nd highest profits in history, which is not expected to repeat in the near future due to the recent surge of oil prices to an all-time record high, thereby seriously affecting the future earnings of the company, which will no doubt in turn affect these payments.
44. It is clear from the evidence that all these payments vary from year to year, depending largely on the Husband’s performance as well as the company’s profits, and I agree with the Husband that it would be more appropriate to look to the average situation of these payments of the past few years, usually three, and to presume that the future average will be about the same under normal circumstances, but with a caveat over increasing oil price, for the court to then make an appropriate order.
45. Adopting this approach and based on the information from Exhibits P-13 and R-41, I have arrived at the following average monthly figures : -
| Monthly Average | ||
| Duty Allowance ($4,064 / 2002, $3,376 / 2003, $4,168 / 2004) | $3,869 | |
| Excess Flying Pay ($1,353 / 2002, $589 / 2003, $3,556 / 2004) | $1,833 | |
| Bonus (1 month / 2002, 2 weeks / 2003, 1 month / 2004) | $5,554 | (2 weeks) |
| Profit Share ($91,335 / 2003, nil / 2004, $63,848 / 2005) | $4,311 | |
| Travel Allowance less 20% | $12,857 | |
| $28,424 | ||
| ======= |
46. Adding these payments to the Husband’s basic salary then brings his total average monthly income to $161,715 as from October 2006.
47. In addition to these take-home pays, the Husband is also entitled to child’s education allowance for his children between the age of 5 and 18 years, which covers the majority of their school fees, a housing allowance which covers his entire rent, as well as medical coverage for him and his children up to the age of 18, in accordance with the terms and conditions as set out in his service agreement (B1 : 151).
48. The Husband also has the following remaining assets.
Provident Fund under Cathay Pacific Airways Limited Retirement Scheme
49. The provident fund which now stands at slightly over $6 million has increased significantly from about $1 million in 2000 at the rate of about $1 million a year. The Wife believes that it will continue to increase at similar rate and that by the time of the Husband’s retirement at 55, it will have become very substantial. Both parties accept that this is the most significant remaining asset.
50. The Husband however does not expect this rate of increase to continue until retirement, as part of the explanation for such increase in recent years has been his upgrade to captain with corresponding significant pay increase, and as there will be no further upgrading in the foreseeable future, he believes that the increase will gradually level off and will not be as substantial as predicted by the Wife. In any event the provident fund will become available if and when he takes a permanent basing in Canada, most likely in next summer, in which case he says that the final amount will not be a lot more than its present value.
His late Father’s Estate
51. The Husband has an interest in the estate of his late father who passed away shortly before these divorce proceedings. The Husband admits that he and his brother, who lives in Canada and has been handling the estate, are the main beneficiaries of the will, but he also alleges that his late father had left a legacy to his 7 grandchildren of C$5,000 each and hence a sum of C$35,000 will have to be distributed to the grandchildren before he and his brother are to share the rest of the estate.
52. The Wife argues that there is no evidence to suggest that a legacy has been willed in favour of the grandchildren, and that in any eve
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES SUIT NO. 13264 OF 2002 _________________ BETWEEN
_________________
Coram : H.H. Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers Date of Hearing : 16, 21 – 23 March 2005, 8 April, 6, 9 – 10 May, 23 – 24, 28 – 30 June, 5 – 6 July & 9 August 2005 Date of Judgement : 20 September 2005
____________________ J U D G M E N T ____________________
1. The parties are Canadian expatriates who married each other in 1983 in Canada. They have 6 children, 3 boys and 3 girls between the age of 8 and 19, with the eldest 3 born in Canada and the rest in Hong Kong after the family moved here in 1991 when the Husband was employed by Cathay Pacific Airways as an airline pilot. 2. Like most marriages that fail, there were numerous conflicts between the parties in particularly towards the latter stage of their marriage, with matters coming to a head in November 2002 when the Wife moved out of the matrimonial home in Clearwater Bay with the children and withdrew $2 million being half of the savings from the parties’ joint account, and proceeded to file for divorce against the Husband and for custody of the children and general ancillary relief as well as for leave to remove the children out of the jurisdiction to return to Canada. 3. Shortly thereafter the parties entered into discussion about the possibility of both relocating to Vancouver, Canada with the Husband taking a basing of his employment there, where each would purchase their own property with the children going between the two households. 4. Unfortunately there was to be no settlement between the parties who went ahead with the proceedings which had descended into a long and acrimonious battle over virtually every issue, in particularly those concerning their children, and over whether the Wife was suffering from the psychiatric condition of Munchausen Syndrome, to the almost complete depletion of their liquid assets. On 20th October 2004 I delivered a judgment granting custody care and control of the 4 minor children to the Wife after an unusually bitter trial that lasted more than 30 days, but postponed my decision over her application for leave to remove the children, which was then also strenuously opposed by the Husband, to be dealt with together with her application for ancillary relief, which is now the matter before me, the trial of which has turned out every bit as bitter and contentious as before, lasting a further 20 days. 5. I do not propose to recite any further details of the background and history of the case here. They could be found in my earlier judgment of 20th October 2004. It would however be relevant to update the situation and circumstances of the parties and their children since that judgment. 6. The Wife, who is now 42, has remained a housewife and lives with the 3 youngest children namely A (12), B (9) and S (8) at her village house in Sai Kung under a lease until early 2006 but with a break-clause which she says will allow her to leave Hong Kong for Canada as soon as she is allowed to remove the children out of the jurisdiction. In the meantime A is in her second year at KGV School after a successful transfer from Christian Alliance International School (“CAIS”), where the 2 youngest boys have remained. 7. The other minor child, N, who is 16 and whose custody has also been granted to the Wife, is still boarding at Grenville Christian College in Ontario, Canada but shares her time with her parents while holidaying in Hong Kong. 8. The 2nd eldest child, Y has turned 18 and, having graduated from Grenville Christian College, will be entering university at Fanshawe College in London, Ontario, Canada. 9. The eldest child C, who is now 19, used to attend the same Grenville Christian College with his 2 sisters, but left school sometime in 2004 to return to stay with his father in Hong Kong where he had worked first as a restaurant waiter and later as a chef. In June 2005 he returned to Canada to prepare for his enrolment into George Brown College in Toronto. 10. The Husband, at 43, is still in the employ of Cathay Pacific Airways as an airline captain pilot and lives in his rented village house in Clearwater Bay. He has now accepted that the Wife and the minor children should be allowed to leave for Canada in July 2006, but not earlier as intended by her, as he believes that it would be beneficial for the children to have a period of access with him in Hong Kong after these proceedings are over when he will no longer be occupied by the case and court attendances. He has also confirmed that in all likelihood he will apply for a basing of his employment in Toronto, Canada in the summer of 2006 or shortly thereafter to coincide with the Wife’s move so that he may remain close to the children, and that in any event the time for applying for a basing in Canada for this year has according to him already passed. 11. In my earlier judgment I found that there was no evidence to suggest that the Wife’s application was anything other than a genuine desire to return to Canada where the parties came from and where she believes the children’s future lies. But I also questioned whether it was realistic or practical for her to do so immediately upon the conclusion of these proceedings, and that the full spectrum of ancillary relief in particularly the needs and requirements of her and the children in Canada, if they are allowed to leave, which now seems to be the case but only a question of timing, as well as the Husband’s means and ability to make proper and reasonable financial provisions for them, need to be fully explored and investigated, which I now propose to do, before a final decision can be made of her application. The Wife’s case 12. The Wife seeks periodical payments for herself and for the children, as well as lump sum payment and costs of the ancillary relief proceedings. Formerly she had also sought the reimbursement of school fees and medical expenses previously paid by her but subsequently not reimbursed by the Husband, but she agreed, under cross examination, that in the interest of expediency, not to pursue this. She had also requested that the Husband give her negatives of the children’s photographs, which the Husband has indicated that he is willing to supply to her after his visit to Canada where they are stored. The Wife has submitted that if this is to be an undertaking by the Husband, which I understand to be the case, she will no longer seek an order for their production on her undertaking to return the negatives to him afterwards. 13. It is however the Wife’s case that the way in which the Husband has conducted himself from the very onset of the proceedings, and in relation to his basing in Canada, and the efforts he made to destablise her in order to enhance his own position and win custody, care and control of the children and to thwart her every plan, must be taken into account by the Court in making financial orders. Had the Husband not decided to go into full scale battle with her in November 2002, the Wife says, they would both now be living in Canada, close by and financially stable, or that at the very least he could have agreed to settle the matters after she was found mentally fit by the court appointed psychiatrist Dr Lo to have custody care and control of the children, but instead he insisted on ploughing on at ruinous financial and emotional cost, with legal bills run up to the region of $6 million, of which the Wife argues that she should not have to bear the financial consequences. 14. As to her application for the removal of the children to Canada, the Wife says that now that the Husband has accepted that they be allowed to leave for Canada in July 2006, she does not see why they cannot leave right away after she has been delayed already for some considerable time as a result of the Husband’s action, and instead have to wait for another 9 months until next July for no good reason. 15. She has provided some information as to properties, school and amenities in the Ottawa area to which she would return, as it is her home area where she and the children are familiar with, and which is near her parents’ home in Cornwall, but until such time as she know when she can move and the funds she may have available to her, she cannot find a house, enrol the children into school or make arrangements for moving. She plans to initially stay with her parents until such time as she locates a property to buy in Ottawa. 16. For as long as she remains in Hong Kong, the Wife estimates her monthly expenses, to include a domestic helper, to be HK$44,357 plus her rent of HK$33,000. In addition she estimates the travel costs and holiday expenses for her and the children at a further HK$8,015 per month, totalling HK$85,372, which is about what the Husband has been paying, albeit she accepts quite tightly with his budget. 17. She says that the picture will change dramatically with her removal to Canada principally because of the costs of accommodation as not only is it much cheaper than in Hong Kong, but the money that is lost each month on rent here will be going to purchase a home as long-term security for herself and the children. 18. She estimates a suitable house in Ottawa would cost in the region of C$375,000 – $400,000 (HK$2.44 – 2.60 million), which would be funded by a deposit from a lump sum from the Husband with a mortgage for HK$2 million over 25 years at a rate of 6% giving a monthly mortgage repayment within HK$15,000 per month which is to be funded from the periodical payment from the Husband. 19. As for her monthly expenses in Canada including holiday expenses, the Wife estimates that a monthly sum of HK$41,500 for her and the children would be reasonable, bringing the total periodical payment which she would request from the Husband to HK$56,500 including the said mortgage repayment, which is much less than her present expenses in Hong Kong, and well within his means. 20. Initially the Wife had hoped that her financial claims could be resolved by way of a clean break with a large cash settlement funded by a loan against the Husband’s provident fund with Cathay Pacific. When it has become apparent that this would not be possible as the regulations of the provident fund do not allow it, the Wife now seeks that she be given an immediate cash lump sum of C$100,000 for the deposit as well as setting up the house in Ottawa, which she says can be funded either by a short term loan by the Husband, or from his share of his father’s estate which she says is sufficient to meet her such need. 21. In addition the Wife seeks an on-going interest in the Husband’s provident fund which now stands at around $6 million. She proposes that she gets 65% thereof at the date of decree absolute of divorce as a starting point, plus an additional percentage of the fund on a sliding scale that after 5 years the parties should get about equal amounts out of the fund, and thereafter it would begin to tilt in the Husband’s favour. By then she believes that with the minor children become older, she will hopefully have acquired some earning capacity to become financially independent of the Husband. The Husband’s case 22. The Husband says that he has long believed, even prior to the divorce, that the Wife has been suffering from a factitious disorder that has represented itself in the medical realm as a means of seeking attention to herself, which together with her other shortcomings, had caused him great suspect of her parental ability which, out of his genuine concern for his children, entitled him to challenge her application for their sole custody care and control, and hence he should not be criticised for doing so or that his such action be regarded as a financial conduct to be taken into account when considering her application for ancillary relief. 23. To the contrary, the Husband argues, it was the Wife’s conduct in dissipating the matrimonial assets by withdrawing the $2 million from their joint account, and within the next 2 years proceeded to dissipate most of it on her extravagant and unnecessary spending including moving from the matrimonial home to a more expensive house, frequent overseas trips with her boyfriend, purchasing expensive airfares, needlessly paying for breast enlargement operation, and continuing to engage expensive lawyers and incurring substantial legal costs, etc. that should be taken into account when considering her entitlement to her share of the matrimonial assets. 24. In addition to wishing to establish regular access to the children after the court proceedings before they are to leave for Canada in July 2006, the Husband maintains that without his participation in their upbringing, the Wife is simply incapable of raising the children in Canada by herself as a single parent, which makes it all the more necessary for the children to remain in Hong Kong where he can continue to participate in their upbringing until July next year when he is able to get his basing in Canada so as to coincide with their move. 25. The Husband claims that only his basic pay of $131,365 is a guaranteed amount received monthly, while his other pays such as monthly duty allowance, excess flying pay and 13th month bonus and profit share are all irregular and non-guaranteed, whereas his travel allowances have to be used in part for air tickets, shortfall of monthly maintenance for the Wife and school fees for some of the children, which will in any event be reduced soon after the decree absolute when he will no longer be entitled to claim it for the Wife. 26. He believes that the Wife has grossly exaggerated her needs and expenses which are not supported by their historical spending during the marriage. He proposes that while she and the younger children remain in Hong Kong, he will pay her HK$52,000 per month for their maintenance including her rent and household utilities, which is what he thinks reasonable and which he can afford, and to continue to be responsible for the children’s school fees and medical expenses as well as their airfares, and also to pay her half of any overtime, 13th month bonus or profit share after tax that he may receive, while she should also seek employment to help out with her own finance and to meet any deficits that she may have. 27. After she moves to Canada with the children in July 2006, he proposes that they should live in Cornwall which is close to her mother’s house and where housing costs are only half that of Ottawa. He suggests that she should first rent until he gets his basing there when his provident fund will become available, from which he will pay her 45% of such fund plus interest at 5% thereof until payment, with which she can then purchase a house for herself and the children, and that he will continue to pay for the children’s maintenance and school expenses. The Law 28. In considering any application for ancillary relief, I am required by s. 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 to have regard to the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the case including the following matters : -
29. And in relation to children of the family, to also have regard to the following matters : -
The Wife’s means 30. I shall start with the Wife’s income, earning capacity and financial resources first, which are more simple and straightforward. There is no dispute that she has no income and has throughout the marriage been wholly dependent on the Husband. Nor is there any question that she has any property or financial resources other than the monthly maintenance from the Husband, after having exhausted the $2 million she had withdrawn from the joint account at the start of the divorce proceedings on spending and legal costs. 31. It is however argued by the Husband that she should seek employment after the divorce proceedings to help meet her monthly expenses, as she had worked in various charity organizations towards the latter stage of the marriage until the divorce proceedings, and that she had also helped out at the reception of a fitness club in exchange for the use of the gym, and as a classroom assistant at her sons’ school during the last school term. 32. With the youngest children only at 8 or 9 years old, the Wife argues that she will have responsibilities as a mother for a long time, and that unlike the Husband, she does not have any formal qualification. She says she is keen to rectify this as and when her responsibilities to the children lessen, but that when she returns to Canada, her first priority has to be to settle the family in the new environment. Her intention is that thereafter she will get some sort of training, but it will take time for her to be able to find anything other than a “pin money” kind of job, and she believes she can achieve the balance of training and work far more easily in Canada than here, where she has to compete with younger bilingual people who very often also have university degrees. 33. There is no question that if a wife earns money, the court is required to take into account of the amount received by her when assessing the amount of periodical payments to be awarded to her. On the other hand, it has been said that a wife should not be expected to go to work to reduce a former husband’s liability towards her. In the case of Ward v Ward [1948] p. 62, 64, Div Ct, Lord Merriman P said this : -
34. A wife’s earning capacity was considered in the case of Rose v Rose [1951] P. 29, 30 – 31, CA by Somervell LJ when he said : -
35. His view was shared by Denning LJ who said this in the same case : -
36. And in Le-Roy Lewis v Le-Roy Lewis [1951] P. 29, 31 – 32, CA, Barnard J said : -
37. The statutory guidelines under s. 7 (1) however requires the court also to have regard to the earning capacity which each of the parties has or is like to have, the principles enunciated above must now be read in the light of the statutory guidelines, and that the court would now expect a wife who is not encumbered by pre-school age children to take, over a reasonable period of time, such steps as are necessary to acquire or increase an earning capacity in order that she should not be financially dependent on her former husband in perpetuity, as pointed out by Singer J in T v T (Financial Relief : Pensions) [1998] 1 FLR 1072, 1080E :
38. It has to be said, however, that it is not always easy for married women who have not worked for a number of years to get full-time, or possibly any, employment. I agree that this Wife, who had never performed well at school and dropped out of college soon after meeting the Husband, and had not worked throughout the bulk of the marriage, and with no formal qualification, has very little earning capacity indeed, if any, and that in moving her children back to Canada where she had not actually lived or worked in the past 15 years, and at her age of 42, she should not be expected to have to immediately launch herself into the job market. I accept that it is her intention to go back to school or to receive proper job training and will eventually find a job in order to become financially independent of the Husband, as she is in my view a lady who, should she wish to do so, would impress a prospective employer with her qualities as evidenced from her work at charity organisations, a situation of which however it is not realistic to expect to materialise within at least the next few years. The Husband’s means 39. The Husband is now in the ranking of a senior captain pursuant to a service agreement with Cathay Pacific on a permanent basis. His present monthly basic salary of $131,365 will be increased to $133,291 in October this year. In addition he also received a discretionary 13th month bonus of $131,365 in December 2004, a profit share of $63,848 in March 2005, and a travel allowance of $192,850 in April 2005. It is however accepted that after the decree absolute he will not be paid a travel allowance for the Wife and so the amount will be reduced by about 20%. According to the Wife, apportioning these payments on a monthly basis will bring his monthly income to $163,702. 40. Furthermore, the Husband also received payments for hourly duty day and excess flying pay for this year in the average monthly sum of $7,487, thereby giving him a grand total of $171,180 per month on average, the Wife says, as set out in details of exhibit “P-13”. 41. The Husband however argues that save for the monthly basic salary, all the other payments either varies from month to month, or are random or unpredictable, such as the duty allowance which is not payable due to sickness or lack of flying for whatever reason, and that since September 2001 when he started to receive such payment, the average monthly sum over the years amounted to a lower figure at $3,813, less than the 2005 figure adopted by the Wife. 42. The same uncertainty, the Husband says, applies to his excess flying pay, of which last year was the highest ever in his career with Cathay Pacific, with the 2003 average only at $589 per month while the 2004 average was $3,556. 43. As regard the 13th month bonus and profit share, the Husband argues that they were not paid or only partially paid in 2 of the last 4 years, and that the reason that they were paid this year because the company recorded its 2nd highest profits in history, which is not expected to repeat in the near future due to the recent surge of oil prices to an all-time record high, thereby seriously affecting the future earnings of the company, which will no doubt in turn affect these payments. 44. It is clear from the evidence that all these payments vary from year to year, depending largely on the Husband’s performance as well as the company’s profits, and I agree with the Husband that it would be more appropriate to look to the average situation of these payments of the past few years, usually three, and to presume that the future average will be about the same under normal circumstances, but with a caveat over increasing oil price, for the court to then make an appropriate order. 45. Adopting this approach and based on the information from Exhibits P-13 and R-41, I have arrived at the following average monthly figures : -
46. Adding these payments to the Husband’s basic salary then brings his total average monthly income to $161,715 as from October 2006. 47. In addition to these take-home pays, the Husband is also entitled to child’s education allowance for his children between the age of 5 and 18 years, which covers the majority of their school fees, a housing allowance which covers his entire rent, as well as medical coverage for him and his children up to the age of 18, in accordance with the terms and conditions as set out in his service agreement (B1 : 151). 48. The Husband also has the following remaining assets. Provident Fund under Cathay Pacific Airways Limited Retirement Scheme 49. The provident fund which now stands at slightly over $6 million has increased significantly from about $1 million in 2000 at the rate of about $1 million a year. The Wife believes that it will continue to increase at similar rate and that by the time of the Husband’s retirement at 55, it will have become very substantial. Both parties accept that this is the most significant remaining asset. 50. The Husband however does not expect this rate of increase to continue until retirement, as part of the explanation for such increase in recent years has been his upgrade to captain with corresponding significant pay increase, and as there will be no further upgrading in the foreseeable future, he believes that the increase will gradually level off and will not be as substantial as predicted by the Wife. In any event the provident fund will become available if and when he takes a permanent basing in Canada, most likely in next summer, in which case he says that the final amount will not be a lot more than its present value. His late Father’s Estate 51. The Husband has an interest in the estate of his late father who passed away shortly before these divorce proceedings. The Husband admits that he and his brother, who lives in Canada and has been handling the estate, are the main beneficiaries of the will, but he also alleges that his late father had left a legacy to his 7 grandchildren of C$5,000 each and hence a sum of C$35,000 will have to be distributed to the grandchildren before he and his brother are to share the rest of the estate. 52. The Wife argues that there is no evidence to suggest that a legacy has been willed in favour of the grandchildren, and that in any event the Husband has admitted that his brother has already drawn most of his share from the account that held the estate in late 2004, she sees no reason why the Husband has not taken any step to get his share and to wind up the estate, other than the intention to keep it away from her claims. The balance left of the account now stands at slightly over C$102,000, with another sum of C$25,729 being his half share of the proceeds of another investment of his father, bringing the Husband’s total interest to C$127,776 = about HK$830,544 at the current exchange rate of about HK$6.5. 53. There is indeed no documentary evidence to support the Husband’s alleged cash gift of C$5,000 for each of the 7 grandchildren, but even if it is true that this was indeed his father’s last wish, 6 of the 7 grandchildren are the parties’ children and hence C$30,000 of which are being held by the Husband which he says for their tertiary education, in which case they should still form part of his means, albeit designated for the children’s future education. Anyway, given the amount and nature of the sum in dispute, I do not think it warrants any further investigation. His Canadian Registered Retirement Savings Plan 54. This represents the proceeds from the Husband’s military pension when he joined service in 1983 until December 1990 when he joined Cathay Pacific. He says this is a tax shelter, with no income tax yet paid on it and which defers the tax liability until his retirement, but if he were to redeem it now it would attract significant tax, and hence he has no intention to do so at this stage. It is worth about C$32,450 = HK$210,925. The Clearwater Bay Golf and Country Club Debenture 55. This has always been used by the family and the Husband says he intends to keep it as long as he remains in Hong Kong. Both parties agree that if it is sold it will fetch $200,000 but a 7.5% agency fee may have to be paid. 56. There is however a more controversial sum of C$30,000 which the Husband paid to his mother in June 2004 as repayment of a loan from her more than 20 years ago for his flying lessons, but which the Wife suspects was an attempt to move funds away from her claims and which should be regarded as part of the Husband’s assets. 57. Having heard the Husband’s evidence on this issue, I have no reason to doubt him about the original loan of C$12,000 from his mother as clearly he was then in need of financial assistance to help pay for his flying lessons. The fact that he had repaid his mother a much bigger sum, presumably to include interests thereon for all these years, and the timing of the repayment, is unfortunate and naturally caused the Wife’s suspicion. However, in view of the relatively small amount involved, I do not believe it was an attempt to obstruct or frustrate the Wife’s claims and will not treat it as part of the Husband’s asset. 58. The remaining assets are mainly household effects most of which had been divided between the parties, with or without agreement, and are not an issue here. I shall next consider the parties’ respective needs and requirements. The Wife’s needs and obligations 59. I shall start with the Wife’s needs, and of the children, while they are in Hong Kong, and then when they go to Canada. Hong Kong expenses 60. With the exception of her rental expenses at $33,000 per month for a village house in Clearwater Bay under a lease for 2 years until March 2006, almost every other item of the Wife’s monthly expenditure for herself, the children and the household as set out in her 24th Affidavit (B9 : 3262-3) at $40,957, plus $3,400 for domestic helper, and $8,015 for travelling and holiday for the family, totalling $52,372 on average, is disputed by the Husband. 61. The Husband argues that in December 2002 shortly after the divorce proceedings, the Wife put her initial amount of expenses at $41,565 per month. However, despite the fact that 2 of the eldest girls have since left Hong Kong for school in Canada and hence less expenses, the Wife’s figures have actually gone up over the years. He believes that all categories of her expenditure are embellished that even utilities and petrol have gone up by as much as 60%, while the internet charges have increased as much as 7 fold since November 2002. 62. Much of these elevated expenses of the Wife, the Husband argues, have been spent on herself such as clothing and expensive cosmetic, while her telephone bill of $3,000 average per month and her purchase of air tickets in business or first class to North America are all examples of her attempt to tailor her spending to her unrealistic level of expectations which have no foundation historically, but merely to promote a high starting point for the court’s adjustment and are wholly beyond his ability to pay. 63. It is well known that the Wife removed $2 million from the joint bank account at the time she filed for divorce, which was 50% of the savings in the account and which she was allowed to use to meet her living and other expenses pending the conclusion of the proceedings which had unfortunately and unexpectedly prolonged. 1 year later, by October 2003, the bulk of the $2 million had been exhausted on the Wife’s living expenses and spending as well as her legal costs. On 9th November 2003 she applied and obtained an interim maintenance of $30,000 for the month of October and November 2003, plus a monthly sum of $90,000 towards her legal fees on the Husband’s undertaking to continue to pay her rent and the children’s school fees. On 28th November 2003 the interim maintenance was increased to $33,000 per month commencing 1st December 2003. At both hearings, as is common for maintenance pending suit, no oral evidence was given and the parties simply relied on the affidavits and other documentary evidence, and the ordered sums were mainly meant to be interim measure pending the final hearing on ancillary relief. 64. On 10th May 2004 following the Wife’s application for a variation of the Husband’s maintenance obligations after her complaints of his failure to pay or to pay sufficiently for her maintenance, the Husband was ordered to pay $69,800 per month dating back to 1st April 2004 being $33,000 for her maintenance, $33,000 for her rent, and $3,800 towards her utility charges. In addition, his contribution towards her legal fees was increased to $150,000 per month dating back to 1st December 2003 after it was revealed that his Cathay Pacific stock options could be used to meet such expenses. 65. The Wife has given her account of how she spent all the money she has had since separation in her 24th Affidavit (B9 : 3255) to which she exhibited numerous receipts of more than 500 pages of her spending that she could find, from legal bills paid of more than $2.2 million down to her daily purchases at the supermarkets. She has also produced copies of her credit card statement as evidence of her spending on groceries, clothing, restaurants meals and entertainments for herself and the children. 66. The Husband has taken issue with some of the exhibited receipts, in particularly 3 from Wellcome Supermarket in which there was a cash-back of $500 to the Wife in each case which he argues was an deliberate attempt to inflate her needs, but which she put down as a simple mistake given especially the massive number of receipts she has exhibited. 67. The Husband also takes issue with an American Express card receipt which shows amongst supermarket purchases a Chinese magazine which the Wife cannot read and therefore suspects that the receipt belonged to somebody else but used by her again to inflate or falsify her expenses. 68. There is no question that the Wife does not and cannot read Chinese, but her evidence is that it was during a period when her mother was here and paid the groceries on that occasion while the Wife repaid her in cash. She cannot think of any reason why the magazine was purchased but denies she had been scheming to include other receipts or that she was trying to make up a story. 69. The discrepancies of these receipts certainly cast some doubt over the Wife’s case, but if she were trying to “cook the books”, as submitted on her behalf, why would there be only a few of such receipts amongst the numerous ones she has exhibited and which the Husband no doubt must have carefully scrutinize, as he has done with all her documents and exhibits throughout the proceedings ? Having heard this Wife in evidence for weeks, whom I find generally a credible witness, I am inclined to accept her explanation as to these discrepancies. 70. However, the fact that most of these receipts go to substantiate the Wife’s expenses does not necessarily follow that such expenses must be reasonable or that they accurately reflect her needs and those of the children. 71. I agree with the Husband that it is necessary to consider the historical spendings of the family, at least for the period before the breakdown of the marriage, before one can conclude whether the Wife’s claimed expenditure is reasonable, after all, that is also the period when the standard of living of the parties should be looked at and which is also relevant to the issue, and as pointed out by Thorpe J, as he then was, in F v F (Ancillary Relief) (1995) 2 FLR 45, that in many cases the investigation of the very important issue of standard of living is one that can be conducted historically almost as an exercise in pure accounting. 72. As I have said, almost all items of her monthly expenditure are disputed by the Husband, with the most contentious ones being her groceries at $12,116, family clothing at $3,992, hairdressing and dispensary at $3,690, restaurants and entertainment at about $5,000, and telecommunications including mobile phones and long distance calls at $2,993. It is not in dispute that the Wife has often used her only credit card, a HSBC Premier card, to pay for most of these expenses, in particularly for the groceries, and hence her credit card statements for the immediate period leading up to the filing of her petition for divorce in November 2002 should give at least a clearer picture of some of the family expenses before the breakdown of the marriage, which can then be compared with those after the separation and what she is now claiming. 73. According to the summary of her credit care usage from January 2002 to February 2005 prepared by the Husband (R-18), the figures of which were not challenged at the trial, the pre-divorce average from January to November 2002 yielded a figure of $11,000 per month, whereas the post-divorce average from December 2002 to early 2005 gave a monthly sum of $32,000, which is almost 3 times more, the difference of which is, to say the least, quite striking, in particularly when considering the fact that the Wife’s household has since become smaller with her separation from the Husband, and the eventual departure of the 2 eldest daughters for boarding school in Canada, one would expect some of her daily ordinary expenses would naturally be reduced accordingly, if not significantly. 74. Granted that the pre-divorce period used by the Husband in his exhibit R-18 is far shorter than the post-divorce period, and hence contains fewer data to show a more accurate picture of the Wife’s spending prior to divorce, and that the Husband might have paid for some of the family’s expenses during that period such as those of the children and the family outings including restaurants and entertainments, as well as holiday expenses overseas which would not have shown up in the Wife’s credit card statements, and which may explain the relatively lower figure in March and July 2002 during which the family might have gone on holiday, as they have habitually done so, and that the Wife had in the course of the proceedings moved out of the matrimonial home and spent more than $100,000 setting up her new home, still the disparity in her spending between these 2 periods is in my view too great to be reconciled easily. 75. The Wife has other explanations. She accepts that there was some reduction to food costs when the older children left home, but with the other 3 growing children in the house it does not work in a simple proportional way as suggested by the Husband, and also she has at least Natasha home for holidays during which there would naturally be additional expenses including purchasing new cloths and shoes for her. She denies that she had “cooked the books” in order to keep her expenses consistently at the figure she decided on soon after separation at $41,000 per month. She argues that in fact the overall grocery expenses for supermarket and wet market have actually come down by $1,251 since the divorce. 76. There is another explanation apparent from both the Wife’s affidavits and her testimony. There is no question that the Husband had been quite strict with the family’s budget during the marriage, and that due to his religious belief, he would not allow cosmetic to be used by either the Wife or any of the daughters, or for them to wear trendy or fashionable clothes such as jeans or T-shirts usually favoured by teenagers. Hence such expenses were never within the family budget, but have now become part of the Wife’s regular expenses for herself and the elder daughters which she says account for the relatively higher amount for clothing and dispensary, as well as hairdressing as she and the children now have their hair cut at barber shop instead of at home by her as before. All these expenses, she argues would not have shown up in her pre-divorce credit card statements as they did not exist then. But still they cannot fully explain away such high expenses. 77. I suspect there may yet be a further reason for the Wife’s increased expenses after the separation. It was all along her evidence that the Husband had been domineering and controlling of her throughout the marriage including keeping a tight monitor of the family budget and her spending. With her separation from him in November 2002 and the subsequent decree of divorce granted in her favour, when she felt that she was no longer under his control and with $2 million at her disposal, I believe she might have decided to somewhat indulge herself and the children, and to change her lifestyle as well, as evidenced by her use of cosmetic and the replacement of her entire wardrobe, her increased participation in sporting activities and the joining of a fitness club, and her eventual relationship with her present boyfriend, all of which no doubt have contributed to a much higher figure for many of her spending such as on groceries, clothing and personal grooming, and entertainments and holidays. All these, I believe, together with the other reasons referred to above, account for the Wife’s much higher spending since the divorce, and therefore do not truly or accurately reflect the historical spending of the family or the standard of living enjoyed before the breakdown of the marriage. 78. Of course not all these higher spending were the result of the Wife’s indulgence. Some, I am sure, were necessary or reasonable such as the purchasing of mobile phone for the older children, or regularly talking with them on long distance telephone. But others such as first class air tickets, holiday expenses in Canada and bicycle equipments, for example, as rightly pointed out by the Husband that they were either unnecessary, or should have been better budgeted in particularly in view of her proposal to leave Hong Kong for Canada as soon as possible and hence the purchase of, for example, bicycles or camping equipments could perhaps have been postponed until she and the children have settled in Canada. 79. This is all the more pertinent as she has all along been expressing her concern, and quite rightly so, both in her affidavits and through her lawyers, about the family’s deteriorating financial situation caused by these proceedings, and that even though in her mind all the faults lie with the Husband, she has, as all divorcing couples do, and has the Husband, a duty and obligation to properly and carefully budget her expenses during the course of their litigation, so as to minimise the financial impact on the family or the children’s future. 80. For these reasons, while I do not agree with the Husband that the Wife has deliberately exaggerated, inflated or falsified her expenses since divorce, I agree that they do not accurately reflect the true standard of living of this family before the breakdown of the marriage, and that a somewhat lower figure in particularly for groceries, clothing, and entertainment expenses would be more appropriate given the tight financial circumstances of the parties. 81. Upon considering all the other documents including the credit card statements of the Husband for the similar period prior to the separation, as well as the evidence of the parties before me, and taking a broader approach instead of a microscopic analysis, I find it appropriate and reasonable to reduce some $4,000 from the Wife’s groceries, $2,000 from both clothing and entertainments, and to adjust somewhat downward her various miscellaneous expenses to bring her regular monthly expenditure to $31,000, to which I would allow the provision of $3,400 for her domestic helper, and an adjusted figure of $4,000 for both her transportation and holiday expenses including her own airfares for the short period that she and the children may remain in Hong Kong. Her monthly requirements is therefore rounded up to $39,000, to which must be added her rent of $33,000, bringing her total expenditure to $72,000 per month. This of course does not include the children’s school fees and airfares for which the Husband has all along been willing to be responsible. I shall next consider the Wife’s needs and expenses in Canada. Canada expenses 82. The Wife’s proposals for maintenance in Canada were first set out in her 24th Affidavit (B9 : 3275) when she asked for a lump sum of $8 million by way of a clean-break with the Husband, with which she would purchase a house and to support herself, and periodical maintenance payments at $6,000 per month for each of the 4 younger children, totalling $24,000 which she believed as reasonable in view of the reduced living expenses in Canada. 83. When it became apparent that it would not be possible for the Husband to pay such a lump sum upfront and as a clean-break settlement of her claims, and that she would require the assistance of a mortgage for the purchase of her house, the Wife then set out her new proposals in her 28th Affidavit (B13 : 4772) in which she asked for periodical maintenance payment of $41,500 per month being $11,500 for herself and $30,000 for the 3 youngest children, now that Natasha is also in boarding school, plus a further sum of $15,000 per month for the mortgage instalments, bringing the total periodical payment from the Husband to $56,500 per month. 84. Whilst he had not challenged the Wife’s items of her expenditure in Canada as vigorously as he did with her Hong Kong expenses, the Husband nevertheless disputes the total amount of her claim by arguing that she has based her perceived requirement for normal day to day Canadian expenses with supporting receipts that basically covered only the period of her vacation in the summer of 2004, hence many of her underlying figures are unreasonably high, and that she has sought to inflate them in order to ensure that she reaches the same pre-determined level of $41,000 as before. 85. He cited the example that as the Wife’s cousin and her family of 8 children, who also live in Canada in their own home not far from where her mother lives, can live on the equivalence of less than $22,000 per month, it is preposterous for the Wife to claim that she would require $41,500 per month for her household of only 3 or 4 children. 86. The Wife acknowledges that without having actually resided in Canada, she could only estimate her monthly needs and expenses based partly on holiday expenses, and partly on her own parents’ living expenses and other information. She also accepts that expenditure during holiday such as household items and entertainment as well as transportation are likely to be higher, and has already adjusted downwards or discounted them accordingly in her estimation. 87. I accept that the Wife can only give an estimation of her needs and expenses in Canada without having actually lived there for any lengthly period, and that it would not be appropriate to compare her needs with those of her cousin as their respective needs, requirements, financial situation and standard of living may well be very different from each other. It is however also common ground that living in Canada is generally much less expensive than in Hong Kong, hence the items of her expenditure in Canada should accordingly be less than those in Hong Kong. A comparison of the 2 sets of expenses however reveals that it is not always the case. 88. Whilst the figures for groceries, hair dressing, entertainments, dispensary and telecommunication have come down somewhat, those for family clothing, household and restaurants have actually gone up. The total amount of monthly expenses has in fact only been reduced by some $6,000 without including the domestic helper, which is no longer applicable. This, according to the Husband, is still unreasonably high in view of the much lower living expenses in Canada. 89. I believe when the Wife gave her estimation of her expenses in Canada, she must have used her Hong Kong expenses as the basis, which is only natural for her to do so, but as I have found that her claimed Hong Kong expenses do not truly or accurately reflect the normal ordinary expenditure of this family, and have adjusted such expenses accordingly, it would be appropriate to do the same with some of her estimations for her Canadian expenses by reducing her groceries to $7,000, family clothing to $3,000, holiday expenses to $3,000, and some of her other miscellaneous expenses to a more realistic monthly sum of $32,000, or the equivalence of C$5,000. This is of course on the basis that the Husband shall continue to be responsible for the children’s school fees and their holiday airfares. I must stress that this estimation is the best one can arrive without concrete information of actual expenses, and can if necessary be looked at again after the Wife and the children have settled in Canada. 90. As for her estimation for mortgage payments, it is on the basis that she requires a mortgage for $2 million to fund her purchase of a house in Ottawa, at a rate of 6% over 25 years and hence at about $12,886 per month. While the Husband makes comments about it being ill-advised to take a long-term loan as most of the repayments in the first year of a mortgage goes to interest, and suggests that she should rent first, the Wife believes that the purpose of the mortgage is to fund the purchase of the house in the most cost-effective way, which a long-term mortgage does, given that the capital amount of the mortgage will be paid off once the Husband’s provident fund is paid out. A shorter term loan, she says, would be too expensive to raise the sum needed to buy a house of her choice. She argues that there is no reason why she should be limited to the very cheapest option available, especially given that there is exchange rate and interest rate vulnerability, it is therefore appropriate for her to be awarded a sum in the region of $15,000 per month towards a mortgage, which is considerably less than her present monthly rental in Hong Kong. 91. The Wife’s choice of her house in Ottawa would cost in the region of C$375,000 – $400,000 (HK$2.38 – 2.54 million), but the Husband wants her to live in Cornwall where her parents and cousin live, and where property prices are much cheaper, as Ottawa is the second highest city in housing prices in the province of Ontario, second only to Toronto, and from her exhibit “P-20”, he points out that the average price in Ottawa is less than C$220,000, whereas the Wife is seeking to purchase a house some 60 – 70% high than the average, which he finds excessive and unreasonable. 92. The Husband also believes that it would be premature for the Wife to commit any funds, or take the liability for a mortgage, before the hearing on costs in these proceedings, where she may be held responsible for the debt of more than $1.2 million in costs incurred by her to her team of lawyers since he has been representing himself, and that should the court award her finances for the purpose of funding a mortgage, such amounts should be set against her eventual entitlement to his provident funds. 93. I do not think it is for the court, and certainly not for the Husband, to dictate to the Wife where she should live after the divorce, provided that such choice of hers is not in conflict with the welfare and interest of the children, and I certainly do not think Ottawa is, in particularly in view of the fact that it is a major city in Canada with many similarities to Hong Kong where the family has made their home for the past 15 years, with possibly a lot more and better opportunities in terms of education and career available to the Wife and the children than at Cornwall. 94. The same reasoning should apply, in my view, to how much the Wife should spend in the purchase of her own home, if she were to use her lump sum to finance it. However, since she is asking the Husband to fund her mortgage at the rate of $15,000 per month, at least until she receives her full share of his provident fund, the Husband is entitled to raise the issue of whether it is necessary or reasonable for her to require a house that costs so much more than the average price. 95. There is no question that the family has lived in a house bigger than the average size in Hong Kong throughout the majority of their time here. Although the Wife will no longer have as many children in her household as before as the elder ones would either be in boarding school or in university, she would still need a house bigger than average with at least 3 bedrooms to accommodate her children, in particularly when some of those elder children may also be spending more time at her home after her relocation back to Canada. Taking into account of the standard of living this family was able to enjoy, i.e. a fairly comfortable expatriate lifestyle prior to the breakdown of the marriage, I agree that that the Wife is entitled to look for a house bigger and more expensive than the average house in Ottawa. However, before making up my mind on this issue, it is necessary for me now to consider the Husband’s needs, as it would be relevant to see how much he can afford to contribute towards the funding of the Wife’s house, or the mortgage thereof, after taking into account of his expenses, including his own housing needs in Canada, should he take a basing there. The Husband’s needs and expenses 96. Since it is the Husband’s intention to remain in Hong Kong until probably July 2006 when he is likely to get a basing in Canada, it would therefore still be necessary to consider his needs and expenses of his stay for the time being in Hong Kong. Hong Kong expenses 97. The Husband has set out his needs and expenses in his 20th Affidavit (B12 : 4348) under what he calls the Schedule of Monthly Expenditure for the family, in which he calculates his own monthly needs at $57,815, and those of the Wife at $57,519 which include her rent of $33,000, whilst his rent of the same amount will be reimbursed by his employer, putting his net living expenses less rental at $24,815 which he says is his basic minimum without any provision for vacation and travel for himself and the children which will have to be covered by his travel allowance. 98. The Wife however argues that given that the children spend the vast majority of their time with her, it is hard to see how the Husband can, in his calculation, allow the same amount for their food, transport, stationery, entertainment, computer costs, etc when they are with him, or how he can justify his total monthly expenses actually being greater than hers. 99. While I accept that the Husband might have been more involved with the children throughout the marriage than most fathers who have regular working hours, and that due to his flight schedule, he may be able to spend more time and more frequently with his children during his days off, and that some of them may even be spending significant time with him during their major school holidays, the reality is that the minor children do not live with him the majority of their time, and therefore I do not accept, as rightly pointed out by the Wife, that the Husband should have similar expenses such as groceries, utilities or other household expenses as the Wife for his household which is basically himself and his domestic helper, in particularly when he would be out of Hong Kong flying for about half of the time in any event. Making the appropriate adjustment to his various expenses accordingly, I find that $22,000 per month would be a reasonable sum for his living expenses. 100. The Husband of course has other monthly expenses which are job-related such as income protection insurance of $1,307, union duces of $3,638, pilot licence of $300, retirement scheme contribution of $6,569, and provision for income tax which he puts at $39,806 per month, totalling $51,620 which he believes will go up next year in view of the increment to his basic salary commencing October. There is also the possibility that he may have to assist his eldest son Chris with his school fees should he go to university as he is already 19 and no longer covered by his education allowance. In the meantime the Husband’s total ascertained expenses amount to $73,620 per month on average. Canada expenses 101. If the Husband takes a basing in Canada in July 2006, which he now accepts most likely to be the case, be believes that it is wholly appropriate that he has equal finances to fund the purchase and mortgage of his own property equal in value to the Wife’s, as the children will continue to spend as much time as possible with him during access and they require a suitable dwelling place during these times, as it is important for them to not in any way feel inhibited while spending time with him, and that he should be able to provide for them in a manner no less equal to that of the Wife. 102. If for whatever reason a basing is not immediate possible, the Husband says, he would still endeavour to apply for as many temporary basing as possible so that he could be close to the children, in which case he does not think he can depend on any of his relatives in Canada to accommodate him and the children during his access to them, as their places are not large enough to do so, nor is a hotel room a suitable place to meet the children. As such he proposes that a recreational property in the range of C$160,000 to C$200,000 be purchased with the assistance of a mortgage at C$1,300 (HK$8,450) per month, or to rent such a property, which should therefore be taken into account when considering his needs in Canada. 103. For the same reasoning I have given about the Wife’s housing needs, if the Husband changes his basing to Canada in July 2006, he will receive his provident fund calculated up to then with which he can then purchase his accommodation, and while it is also not for the court nor the Wife to dictate to him whether he should rent or purchase or how much it should be so long that he pays from his share, and accepting that he should have his own home in Canada where he can provide a comfortable place for the children during access instead of relying on his relatives or staying in a hotel, again the reality is that he would not be spending as much time with them as the Wife and hence may not need exactly the same type of house as the Wife in terms of size and cost. 104. As for his other living expenses, the Husband has not given much details, probably for the same reason of lack of sufficient information, but based on my observation of his expenses in Hong Kong, and taking into account of generally lower expenses in Ottawa, I believe that a monthly sum of HK$18,000 would be a reasonable estimation subject again to review if necessary upon his settlement there, which together with his job-related expenses aforesaid should bring his total requirement to at least HK$70,000 per month, possibly more as his income tax liability in Canada will certainly be significantly more, although this issue was unfortunately not fully explored by the parties at the trial, possibly due to the uncertainty of the Husband’s basing in Canada at that time. The Standard of Living 105. There is no question that the family enjoyed a comfortable standard of living during the marriage, with nice house, good food, club membership, private school for the children, and overseas holidays. The Wife however says that the Husband kept a very tight rein on finances and that there was penny-pinching in ways that were unnecessary, given the high income of the family. She acknowledges that some of her spending, and as I have found, for example, in going to a hairdresser rather than have a friend cut her hair, spending more on food, having the air conditioner on more in summer, is different now from during the marriage. Similarly, she says, if one looks at the household purchases the Husband made for himself in the last year, he has certainly decided to treat himself to many things that were denied her during the marriage, and that if anything he has adopted for himself a standard of living higher than that which he afforded the family during the marriage. 106. I agree that the spending of both parties since the breakdown of the marriage has been higher than it was during the marriage, partly because there are now 2 households instead of only one as before, which is common for most divorcing couples, in particularly when both parties have changed houses in the course of the proceedings necessitating extra spending for refurnishing their respective home. What the statute requires, however, is to look at the standard of living enjoyed by the family before, and not after, the breakdown of the marriage, and that although allegations have been made by the Wife of the Husband’s “penny pinching” in the past, which he denies and explains as proper family budgeting, there is no evidence to suggest that the family had been deprived of anything or that the standard of living had been kept lower than what should have been, and the fact that the Wife and the daughters were not allowed to use cosmetics and were restricted to certain type of clothing during the marriage was more to do with the Husband’s religious belief rather than his tight rein on finances. Contributions 107. The Wife became a full-time home-maker shortly after the birth of the eldest child. The other children soon followed as there are 6 in total as it was the Husband’s intention to have a big family. As a result the Wife had always remained the home-maker while the Husband the income earner. Within Canada the family moved several times due to the Husband’s job in the military. The family come to Hong Kong in early 1991 as a result of the Husband’s job with Cathay Pacific which required him to be away from home much of the time. The Wife says that she performed the duties of mother as well as took responsibility on many occasions when the Husband was away both on flying duties, on his personal holidays, and when he elected to stay in the Headland Hotel. She believes that the contribution she had made for the duration of the marriage are to be valued and given recognition by the court, as indeed they have been in the custody judgment, and that she will be making on-going contributions in her care of all of the children. 108. While recognising her role as a mother was important, the Husband argues that the Wife did not contribute directly financially and that putting into balance the fact that he was the sole financial provider for the family and that he was also very deeply involved in the children’s lives, the scales should tip in overall term that he was the one who had made greater contribution to the family. 109. The Husband further argues that the successes of his career had not been dependent on the Wife and that she had at no time delivered him from any problem that might have hampered, his success as a commercial pilot, and that in fact the opposite is true when she struck him on the face 3 times and withdrew $200,000 from the joint account in September 2000, which was just 4 months before he was to begin his upgrade training to captain, thereby causing unnecessary stresses to him during his training. The fact that he succeeded in his training, he says, was not because of the Wife, but rather in spite of her. 110. I do not think there is any dispute that the Wife’s main contribution to the marriage and the family was never financial but rather her looking after the home and caring for the family, including 6 children. This contribution is not only clearly and properly recognised in the statute under s. 7 (1) (f), but also in the authorities and precedents, with the leading one in White v White (2000) 2 FLR 981, 989 when Lord Nicholls said : -
111. I have found the Wife to be a loving and caring parent throughout the marriage in the parties’ custody trial and granted her sole custody care and control of the 4 minor children. As I have observed in my earlier judgment on custody, the parties experienced marital problems almost at the beginning of their marriage, partly due to the Husband’s domineering and controlling nature which contributed to the Wife’s health problems which the Court-appointed psychiatrist later diagnosed to be the cause of the psychiatric condition Somatoform Disorder. It was under these difficult situations that I found the Wife to have done a remarkable job in caring for the children and the family, and I do not agree that whatever stress the Husband might be experiencing while going through training for captain can be blamed on the Wife, but rather in reality the consequence of the breakdown of their marriage, although I do accept that she has made no financial contribution to the Husband’s assets. 112. In conclusion I am satisfied that both parties have properly discharged their respective duties in the 20 years of their marriage, with the Wife as a home-maker and the Husband as a financial provider, and that although their marriage has now come to an end, their respective duty will continue for years to come for their children, with the Wife as their primary carer, and the Husband financially. The value to either of the parties of any benefit which may be lost by divorce 113. The Wife will lose concessionary travel with Cathay Pacific as well as her health insurance and medical coverage which she was entitled to during the marriage under the Husband’s employment. 114. More importantly, she argues, she will lose the benefit of the income that accrues from the Husband’s employment, which skills were largely obtained during the marriage, and that there can be no denying that his employment with Cathay Pacific was wholly within the marriage. She therefore asks the Court to view his pilot’s training and the earning capacity it produces as “something of value” acquired during the marriage which will be lost by divorce from which he will continue to benefit after divorce, as this has been a long marriage, his Cathay Pacific earning capacity has been acquired by virtue of her being wiling to move to Hong Kong with 3 children then under the age of 5, and that his wish to have both a flying career and 6 children has been achievable only because of her role as a mother and wife, it would be unjust, she argues, that the future benefits of this employment are exclusively to the Husband, an argument she says is especially strong now that he claims to have repaid a debt for his pilot lessons to his mother out of matrimonial assets, and if I may add, with substantial interests included. 115. The Husband does not agree that he gained his ability, therefore an asset, as a professional pilot during the marriage, as he had already gained his professional pilot’s license before their marriage which enabled him to fly a wide variety of aircrafts including jet turbine types. By way of evidence, he refers to exhibit “R-38” which shows that in addition to his Canadian license, he also held a U.S. Commercial Pilots licence before the marriage, and that his application to the Canadian Military and his officer training were all completed before the date of the marriage, therefore his ability and training as a pilot is an asset that he developed before the marriage and not an asset that was acquired during the marriage as alleged by the Wife. 116. There is no question that there are a number of benefits which a wife may lose the chance of acquiring by virtue of the dissolution of the marriage, such as the loss of a chance of benefiting from the husband’s pension, in particularly where the parties are near retirement age, in which case a pension entitlement may represent a substantial asset of the family, as in this case and readily accepted by the Husband, and where the Wife can be compensated by a proper share therein, as well as her loss of insurance and medical coverage which can and will be properly considered as part of her future needs and requirement, which can be met by an order for periodical payment in her favour. I therefore do not think it is relevant or appropriate to consider whether the Husband’s earning capacity should be considered as an asset the benefit of which she will lose upon the divorce, as I do not believe it was so intended by this particular statute. Conduct of the parties and circumstances of the case 117. As referred to earlier in my judgment, it is the intention of both parties to argue that the conduct of the other should be taken into account when considering the Wife’s financial claims, and in particularly as to the division of the matrimonial assets. 118. The Wife’s case is that at the date of her petition for divorce, the plan that was in place was for the family to relocate on a basing of the Husband to Vancouver, but his conduct thereafter in the litigation has brought about the situation the parties now find themselves in where the substantial matrimonial liquid assets are depleted, and that the Wife should not have to suffer as a result of it. 119. It is clear, the Wife says, from looking at a chronology of events how the Husband’s strategy was to operate, that it was almost from the start an attempt to pull the rug out from under her feet, by alluding to the fact that he might not, after all, take the basing in Vancouver, and while he referred to her plan to move to Canada, pointedly did not mention that the children would be going with her, and leaving her uncertain as to the leasing situation of the matrimonial home, and at the same time using his access to the children to make the situation untenable to her, and later confirming that he would not take the basing, thereby putting her in more uncertainty, who was forced to reappraise her own future plans in the light of his unilateral decision. 120. It is submitted on her behalf that all these were simply the beginning of the Husband’s plan to “wrong foot” the Wife rather than try to co-operate with her. His decision to remain in Hong Kong was to thwart her plan to return to Canada and to enhance his chance of gaining custody of the children, and to do whatever he could to make life difficult for her. His conduct of the litigation since that time makes this clear, with allegation after allegation, all dismissed by the Court in the custody hearing, yet he still does not accept the Court’s findings, and insists he was right about all his allegations against her. Had he not had this attitude from the very start, that he and only he is right, she says, this matter would not have run up legal bills in the region of more than $6 million, as she would have agreed to a joint custody order at the earlier stage of the proceedings, from the emotional and financial toll would have been spared. 121. While it is her position that the Husband should never have fought in the first place, and that they should all have relocated to Canada as planned, the Wife says, at the very least he could have agreed to settle the matter after the psychiatric report by Dr Lo was received. Yet he insisted on ploughing on, at ruinous financial and emotional cost, which cannot be in the best interests of the parties as the children. The Wife therefore submits that she should not have to bear the financial consequences of the Husband’s conduct. 122. The Husband denies that he is guilty of any conduct in wasting matrimonial assets and insists that he was entitled to conduct the proceedings in the way he was advised. He says he could not have engineered the accusation of Munchausen Syndrome in the Wife in view of the evidence from the doctors who saw, treated or were aware of her complete medical history. 123. As to Dr Lo’s report, he says there were so many shortcomings that it would not provide a credible position to alleviate his concerns that the Wife continues to suffer from a psychiatric disorder. In any event, the Husband says most of the costs of the proceedings were incurred prior to Dr Lo’s evidence, and that the Wife had also made numerous applications that he deems to be unnecessary such as the one for interim maintenance despite the fact that she had already withdrawn $2 million from the joint account, and which was subsequently adjourned due to her deficient affidavit in support. In considering the full responsibility as to the conduct of the parties during these proceedings, he says, one should look at the manner in which the Wife carried out her action, by removing the children from him and half of the money in the joint, which cannot be considered as reasonable. 124. As regard the Husband’s case against the Wife on conduct, he believes that she is guilty of needless loss of matrimonial assets including her excessive or unnecessary spending since the divorce, as evidenced in her credit card bills and cash withdrawals, on sharp increase on living expenses, expensive airfares, frequent overseas vacations, unnecessary breast enlargement, bicycle and camping equipments, etc. as well as additional rental expenses by moving from the matrimonial home to a more expensive house in the course of the proceedings, and unnecessarily running up further legal costs in excess of $1 million since the custody trial by retaining a team of solicitors and counsel despite the fact that he has since been representing himself in the ancillary relief hearing. 125. The relevant parts of section 7 (1) on conduct are :
126. The reference to conduct under the section appears to be general in nature. It does not specify in what manner that conduct should be regarded, leaving it therefore entirely in the court’s discretion. It has however been suggested that conduct should be treated differently at least chronologically, from the specified criteria, as was recognised in Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] 1 ALL ER 113 where Ormrod J said :
127. On appeal of that case, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal (1973) 1 ALL ER 829 Lord Denning MR said :
128. It was however said by Davies LJ in a later case of Rogers v Rogers [1974] 2 ALL ER 361 in the Court of Appeal :
129. In another case, Armstrong v Armstrong (1974) 4 Fam Law 156, Buckley LJ said that the relevant question was not so much whether the conduct was obvious and gross but whether the conduct was such that it would be repugnant to anyone’s sense of justice to say that it ought not to be taken into account. 130. In England the original Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, upon which our Section 7 was based, was amended in 1984 to require conduct to be taken into account where it would be inequitable to disregard it. It is not clear how far if at all the changes effected by this amendment have altered the way in which conduct should be taken into account. However in K v K (Financial Provision) (1988) 1 FLR 469, Purchas L J said in the Court of Appeal : -
131. Amongst the kind of behaviour that may amount to conduct under section 25 as amended, the way in which the parties conduct themselves in relation to the family resources is a relevant factor according to Butler-Sloss LJ, as she then was, in Primavera v Primavera (1992) 1 FLR 16 when she said :
132. So if a party is reckless or fritters away family resources the court will endeavour to see that the other party does not suffer thereby or, at any rate, to reduce as well as it can the effect of such financial misconduct, as in the case of F v F (Ancillary Relief : Substantial Assets) (1995) 2 FLR 45. 133. In the leading case on financial conduct of Martin v Martin (1976) Fam 167 where the parties married in 1942, ran a farm business and separated in 1969 when the wife stayed in the farm and improved it, whereas the husband entered into a series of transactions one of which resulted in a large loss. In the court below, Purchas J said :
134. In the appeal (1976) 3 All ER 625, CA, Cairns LJ said in the Court of Appeal : -
135. In Tavoulareas v Tavoulareas (1998) 2 FLR 1131, Thorpe LJ made the distinction between marital and litigation conduct in his judgment : -
136. Thorpe LJ emphasised the same distinction between marital and litigation conduct in the case of Young v Young (1998) 2 FLR 1131, CA where he said : -
137. In a more extreme case such as M v M (Financial Provision : Party Incurring Excessive Costs) (1995) 3 FCR 321, where the wife petitioned for divorce in a county court in 1991, and after the decree nisi was pronounced in January 1992, she filed an application for ancillary relief for herself and the 2 children, but over the next 2 years the husband made numerous applications to the Court, which were usually either adjourned or dismissed with costs, and included pointless and expensive proceedings in the Chancery Division. Eventually the ancillary relief proceedings were transferred to the Family Division before Thorpe J., as he then was, and the wife was subsequently awarded a greater share of what remained of the matrimonial capital after the husband was held to have dissipated his capital on litigation. Thorpe J gave his reason as follows : -
138. Although our Section 7 has not followed the English 1984 amendment requiring conduct to be taken into account where it would be inequitable to disregard it, I believe that the various statements made in these cases remain good authorities in relation to financial conduct. 139. I have set out the chronology of the custody proceedings in details in my earlier judgement and I do not propose to repeat it here, suffice it to say that not all the applications, and there were many, were by the Husband and none, in my opinion, can be said to be totally unnecessary, pointless or manipulatively. A few of his applications such as the one for all of the Wife’s medical reports and records dating back 5 years, or one for an order for her to give her authorization to a doctor in Cathay Pacific to give his view on her psychological condition, were refused with costs against him, but there were also others that had merits or were successful, and while he can be clearly said to be obsessive about his litigation with his wife, in particularly his views over her psychological condition which, as he rightly points out, the Court eventually found necessary to look into and that the resultant psychiatric assessment did confirm his concern, albeit a different kind of disorder. 140. I accept that the Husband did at the beginning of the proceedings change his mind about taking a basing in Vancouver which might have led to the breakdown of the parties’ negotiation, but I am unable to say, taking his conduct in the proceedings as a whole, that it has been so gross or obvious, or so extreme that it would be inequitable to disregard it in considering the entitlement of the Wife, whose situation is after all not as one-sided as it was in M v M. 141. As regard the Wife’s conduct with her spending since the divorce, I have already sufficiently dealt with them earlier in this judgment and do not propose to repeat here, suffice it to say that although some of the them may be called over indulgence or unnecessary, they were not in my view as a whole so excessive or extreme to amount to a waste of matrimonial assets. There are however 2 points raised by the Husband that need to be commented on. 142. The first is over the Wife’s leaving the former matrimonial home at a lower rent and moving into another property at $33,000 per month, some $4,000 higher than the former matrimonial home, and in an area which he believes to be generally less expensive than where the matrimonial home is located. There was also significant duplication of rent, he argues, due to the haphazard manner in which the Wife negotiated the new lease which resulted in funds needlessly dissipated, together with unnecessary agency’s fees. 143. There is no question that rental expenses of her home would have been saved if the Wife had remained in the former matrimonial home. She left because the Husband had moved into her neighbourhood without any prior warning or notice in the middle of their litigation which caused her concern that he was there to spy on her. The Husband had denied this and explained that this move was to be closer to the children and to facilitate access. 144. I accept that the Wife’s action might have been somewhat impulsive, but given the circumstances of how she first found out about the Husband’s move, and the way she had been under his domination and control during the marriage and the stress and pressure she was undergoing at that time, I can understand why she felt the need to move away from him and although it resulted in higher rental and other expenses which is unfortunate, I do not regard such behaviour as gross or exceptional that should be taken into account against her. 145. The second point of the Husband is over the Wife’s continuous running up of legal costs which he deems unnecessary and wasteful of matrimonial assets since late last years when he was no longer represented by lawyers which he could no longer afford and has been representing himself, and hence he does not believe it is right for her to retain a team of solicitors and counsel for the ancillary relief hearing and to run up further legal costs in excess of $1 million. 146. It is true that the Husband has since the custody trial been representing himself and has so far acquitted himself quite well in these proceedings, which is not surprising in view of his good educational background and high intelligence. But even if I were to put aside the Wife’s fundamental right to be represented by lawyers in litigation, which cannot be argued as a wasteful behaviour if it is properly conducted, I do not think that this Wife is capable of conducting this litigation on her own, not after what she had been through for years under the control of the Husband during the marriage, and certainly not when the Husband has accused her that she could not even balance a cheque book, let alone conducting these proceedings. 147. The remaining matters under Section 7 (1) such as the age of the parties and the duration of the marriage are not in issue, nor does physical or mental disability of either party have any particular bearing now that the Wife has been certified by Dr Lo to be free of any psychological disorder. Lastly, although she as a close relationship with her boyfriend, who is a teacher of the English School Foundation in Hong Kong, there is no indication of any marriage plan in future, nor any evidence to suggest that he would leave Hong Kong to join her in Canada. 148. Having considered the means of the parties, I shall now return to the original question : when should the Wife be allowed to remove the children to Canada. She wants to do so as soon as possible, while the Husband prefers it to be in July 2006 when he in all likelihood will also take a basing in Canada. Although I can understand the Wife’s urge to leave Hong Kong away from her fight with the Husband so that she can settle down to a new life in Canada, and that I accept that once the children are allowed to go, ordinarily the earlier they are able to do so and to adjust to a new life and environment, the better it will be for them, other than these there is really no evidence of any urgency for them to go right away, and I do not think it is realistic or practical in this case as the relocation of a family of such size requires proper planning, not just to find a suitable school for the 3 youngest children, one of whom may have learning difficulty and require additional support, which the Wife will no doubt have to discuss with the Husband, but also to look for a suitable home for which funding will have to be made available, all of which cannot be done at the drop of a hat but instead require proper planning and timing, very often months instead of weeks to implement. With the children having already started the school term in Hong Kong, it will simply not be in their best interest to be disrupted from their normal life and schooling in this manner. 149. I agree with the Husband that it makes sense under the circumstances for the children to leave only upon completion of the whole school year by June or July 2006 when they will start their summer holiday, not just to preserve continuity of their schooling and to allow the Husband to re-establish his relationship with them, but also to give both parties, hopefully with proper professional help and counselling, to learn to co-operate with each other again over their children if nothing else, and to return to normal parenthood, which is vital for their children’s future interest for which I will hold both parties responsible, in particularly the Husband. 150. In conclusion I allow the Wife to remove the children upon their completion of their present full school year and in any event not later than 1st July 2006. While they remain in Hong Kong, the Husband shall pay the Wife HK$72,000 per month including her rent, to be apportioned at $54,000 for her and $6,000 for each of the 3 youngest children upon the Husband’s undertaking to continue to be responsible for all the children’s school fees and medical / dental expenses as well as their airfares for overseas vacation for which he will be reimbursed by his employer. 151. To enable the Wife to at least pay for the deposit or down payment for her home in Ottawa, which she will probably make use of her Christmas trip to do so, the Husband shall on or before 1st December 2005 pay her a lump sum of C$100,000 from his share of his father’s estate, being an advanced payment to her for the said purpose. 152. Upon the Wife and the children’s arrival in Canada, the Husband shall pay them C$5,000 (about HK$32,500) per month being C$2,000 for the Wife’s maintenance, and C$1,000 for each of the 3 youngest children, and an additional sum of C$2,000 per month being his contribution towards the mortgage payment of her house, which payment shall cease upon payment of her share of his provident fund if and when he takes a basing in Canada. His undertaking for the children’s other expenses referred to in Paragraph 150 above shall of course continue. 153. If the basing takes place in July 2006, as the Husband has proposed, his provident fund calculated up to then which is believed to be in the vicinity of around HK$7 million will become payable, from which the Wife should be given 55%, giving her about HK$3.85 million, which together with the C$100,000 from the Husband’s share in his father’s estate, should enable her to purchase her new house without any mortgage, or to pay off any existing mortgage thereby rendering the Husband’s mortgage contribution unnecessary. At which time the Husband’s tight budget will very much ease off and that he should be able to start making some savings from his monthly income. 154. With the remaining 45% of the provident fund together with the rest of his assets such as his Clearwater Bay Club Debenture and his father’s estate and as he will no longer have to contribute towards the Wife’s mortgage payment, the Husband will also have sufficient fund to set up his own home in Canada as well as to cater for the future university expenses of the elder children. 155. Under this arrangement the parties’ respective shares of the matrimonial assets are as follows : -
156. I give the Wife a slightly larger share, about 55% of the then available matrimonial assets not only because I believe she has a greater housing need for herself and the children, but also because of her more vulnerable situation with virtually no or little earning capacity at least for the next several years, and with the great disparity between hers and the Husband’s, and hence a greater need for financial security, as well as for her greater responsibilities towards the 3 youngest children as their primary carer for the next 8 to 10 years in view of the fact that the 2 youngest boys are only 8 and 9 years old respectively. In the long run, the Husband should however be able to pull even with the monthly savings he will be able to make from his income in view of the reduced monthly maintenance for the Wife as well as his own reduced expenses in Canada. 157. It is also for these reasons and for her contribution towards the family in their 20 years marriage, that I agree that she should also have a share of 40% in the future provident fund of the Husband for as long as he remains with the Cathay Pacific, which he is expected to do so until the retirement age of 55, some 12 years from now. 158. I accept that after the divorce, the Wife will not have made any direct contribution toward the Husband’s career and hence his future provident fund, but as I have already said, she will continue to contribute by being the primary carer of the younger children for years to come which should not be disregarded. Furthermore, if the Husband were not to take a basing in Canada in July 2006, and thereby liquidating part of his provident fund for distribution, the Wife would still have been entitled to a fair share of his entire provident fund when he retires. I am therefore unable to agree with the Husband’s argument that she should not have any share in his future provident fund after the decree absolute. 159. I do however agree that he should be given a somewhat larger share at 60% of his future provident fund with Cathay Pacific because he has a much greater financial responsibility to his children including their future university education expenses which could be substantial in view of the number of children involved, all of whom the parties have expected to go on to university. I also agree with the Husband that if he were to leave Cathay Pacific for another employment, in view of the uncertainty of any provident fund / pension that he may have with his new employment, the Wife should not be entitled to any share therein. This point may well be academic only as there is no indication to suggest that the Husband would leave Cathay Pacific, considering the good salary and benefits that he is receiving at present from this company. 160. In conclusion I believe that this financial arrangements for the parties and the children are the most fair and equitable under the circumstances of this case, which leave both parties with sufficient fund to live a comfortable life at a standard of living not less than before, and with security to see the children through their education in the way as expected by the parties, as well as for the parties themselves when they retire. 161. Finally, on the question of costs, I propose to make a nisi order for the Husband to pay half of the Wife’s costs of the ancillary relief application to be taxed if not agreed, such order to be made absolute at the expiration of 21 days. I make this order on the basis that the Husband has in fact already settled most, if not all of the Wife’s costs of the custody application through his monthly contribution, and that given the outcome of the ancillary relief application and the financial award that I have outlined above, I think it is fair for the Husband to pay for only half of the Wife’s costs, presumably out of his share of the provident fund, with the other half to be paid out of her own share thereof. 162. Lastly, I should not end without the following observation. With the exception of the issue over the Wife’s health problem, there was essentially nothing complicated or difficult with this case, which was no more different than many other families with several children and a wife who was essentially a home-maker and a husband the sole financial provider with a fixed income and known assets. The facts that this case has lasted almost 3 years, with 2 major trials that required more than 50 days in total in court, not to mention the numerous interlocutory applications in between, with total legal costs well in excess of $6 million which have essentially depleted and exceeded the family liquid assets, with incalculable emotional and psychological ruins to the parties and their children, are to say the very least wholly unacceptable. 163. Most of the blame must of course lie with the parties who had repeatedly failed to heed the court’s warnings from the very early stage of the proceedings of the dire consequences that they now find themselves in, but I also cannot help to feel that they have been failed by the system which was of course designed to get to the truth and justice, both in the consideration of what is in the best interest of any children of the family, and of what is fair and reasonable in the financial claims between the parties, based of course on the assumption that the parties can be trusted upon to litigate their cases sensibly and with due regard to proportionality. But, as Lord Justice Thorpe has once commented, that trust has ignored the reality that litigants are frequently psychologically or emotionally ill-equipped to conduct their cases sensibly and economically, and so the requirements of setting out their cases first by way of affidavits and later in oral testimony at the trial, very often become convenient and effective means to attack, abuse, insult and humiliate each other which only serve to bring out the worst of their emotion, while the rules allowing parties to seek further and better particulars and discovery become effective tools to extract each and every minutiae from each other of documents and information which are very often of little or no evidential value, sometimes aided and abetted by overzealous lawyers trained to win for their clients at any costs. All of these, I very regret to say, have conspired to transfer the parties’ battlefield from their home to the court at great cost of time and expenses in the name of truth and justice. 164. Although the present system does allow mediation service to be provided to the parties, it is used only at their pleasure, and the court does not have any power to direct them to receive mediation even if it appears most desirable or appropriate to do so, which I am truly convinced would have benefited the parties in this case at the very early stage of the proceedings when they were actually discussing the possibility of having joint custody of their children with the Husband taking a basing in Canada, and that with the assistance of a mediator whom they could trust, before any angry words were uttered or put down in any court papers, the end result would have been very much different. It is too late for the parties in this case, but certainly not for many of those who are contemplating divorce proceedings and who will infinitely be better served by mandatory or compulsory mediation rather than litigation.
Ms Francis Irving instructed by Messrs Weir & Associates for the Petitioner The Respondent acting in person
44239-EN-2004-10-20 P v. P HTML content IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES SUIT NO. 13264 OF 2002 _________________ BETWEEN
_________________ Coram : H.H. Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers
Date of Judgment: 20 October 2004 _________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ 1. This is the parties’ contested application for custody care and control of their 6 children following the dissolution of their marriage, although both parties accept that the 2 older children, who are already 18 and 17 respectively, should not be of such concern to the Court, and in the event that the Petitioner Mother is granted custody, her application for leave to remove the children out of Hong Kong permanently to reside in Canada. The Petitioner Mother is a 41 years old housewife and was once a part-time volunteer worker for some charitable organization, whilst the Respondent Father is 42 and an airline pilot. 2. At the commencement of the proceedings, the parties appeared to agreeable to have joint custody but each would seek the care and control of the children. By the time of the conclusion of her evidence the Mother’s position on joint custody has changed and she now seeks sole custody care and control of the 4 younger children, with defined access to the Father, and that she be allowed to remove the children from the jurisdiction in or about summer of 2005 to reside and be educated in Canada, after the hearing of ancillary relief and the finalisation of the divorce proceedings. 3. The Father is strongly opposed to the children leaving Hong Kong, being of the view that fiscal restraints require him to remain in Hong Kong for the benefit of the family as a whole, and that he cannot effectively fulfil his commitments to the children if they were to live abroad. He prefers that the parenting of the children should be shared between the Mother and him with the children remaining in Hong Kong, relying on the concept of a shared residence order which he believes is becoming more common in the UK and that Hong Kong law would encompass an order for joint custody and joint care and control in this case. If however such a concept is rejected by the Mother and / or the Court or if the Mother is adamant that she wishes to live in Canada, he would then seek an order that the children be vested in his sole custody, care and control. Background 4. Both parties were born and raised in Canada and are Canadian citizens. The Father’s father was an immigrant from the Czech Republic who had died recently, while his mother still lives in Montreal, Canada. He has a younger brother who is also an airline pilot working for Air Canada. The Father was a ‘star student” at school and had become deeply immersed in the Christian religion and its beliefs and teachings while he was in college. 5. The Mother’s father had died many years ago and her mother had subsequently remarried and now lives in Ontario, Canada. She has a sister some 4 or 5 years her senior but their relationships had not been good. She was socially active while in her teens and was involved in several relationships. 6. Unlike the Father, the Mother did not do well at school at all and only got by in college when she met the Father. After a short courtship the parties were married on 10th December 1983 in Quebec, Canada whereupon the Mother dropped out of college to become a housewife, working initially on a part-time job at a flower shop, while the Father joined the Canadian Air Force to become a pilot, during which the parties had lived in quarters provided by the Canadian Air Force in Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, Canada as well as in Germany. 7. From the outset of the marriage the Father had wanted to have a large family of 6 children. Whilst in Canada, 3 of the children were born – C (boy) on 16th March 1986 (now 18), Y (girl) on 20th September 1987 (17), and N (girl) on 16th January 1989 (15). In 1991 the Father joined Cathay Pacific Airways as a airline pilot and moved his family to Hong Kong, where the 3 remaining children were born – A (girl) on 13th April 993 (11), B (boy) on 10th August 1996 (8) and S (boy) on 18th October 1997 (7). 8. The eldest son C, who was born in 1986, was found to have attention problems when he entered kindergarten. He was subsequently withdrawn from the kindergarten and was homeschooled from 1992 to 1997, at first by his parents and later by a hired teacher. He was eventually diagnosed to have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and was sent to a boarding school in the U.S. in 1998 where he exhibited social problems and was transferred to Grenville Christian College in Canada. Unfortunately he was expelled from school a year later for various behavioural problems including stealing at a shopping mall. In 2000 he was sent by his father to a military school in Ontario when he seemed to have improved. In September 2003 he was accepted back to Grenville Christian College in Canada where he is finishing his secondary school. 9. Like C, all the other children were also homeschooled for several years first before they started formal schooling. Y and N have since September 2003 joined their elder brother in Grenville Christian College in Canada to continue with their secondary education, while the 3 younger children have remained in Hong Kong attending Christian Alliance International School (“CAIS”) in Kowloon City, a school which follows the Canadian School curriculum. 10. Perhaps due to the parties’ difference in their up-bringing, academic achievement and personal ambition and expectation, life was far from harmonious with this family, and almost from the beginning of their marriage there were conflicts and differences between the parties. It is apparent that the Father, who was ambitions and intelligent, was living a disciplined life with a strong Christian ethic, and had set himself high standards and expected the Mother and children to follow his example. Their lifestyle and social activities to a great extent would revolve around the Father’s religion and the parties became embroiled in various church activities. This lifestyle must have been in great contrast to the Mother’s experiences prior to the marriage, but she appeared to have accepted it and adjusted hers accordingly. 11. It is against this background that perhaps it is not surprising that conflicts arose as from the 2nd year of the marriage when the Father felt that he was being deceived by the Mother when he learnt of her past sexual relationships through his mother, and had had to squeeze piece-meal information from the Mother when confronted her on separate occasions which he found it difficult to put the matter to rest, whilst a visit to the then matrimonial home by the Mother’s former boyfriend and her later acceptance of his invitation to an evening of jazz in Montreal no doubt added to the tension. As a result the Father concluded that the Mother was unable to confront the truth and incapable of the responsible management of the household, which he felt must be placed firmly within his grasp. The Mother, on the other hand, resented the Father’s mistrust and believed that he was being domineering and controlling but, with the quick succession of the birth of the children and the responsibilities that came with them, decided to “flow with the tide”. 12. Over the years there had been numerous other disputes between the parties about their sexual relationship, their handling of the family’s finance and household expenditure, and the upbringing and disciplining of the children. In about 2000 the Mother became involved in various charitable organizations working as a volunteer which the Father later felt had become too extensive that she started to neglect her care of the family, which had further fuelled the parties’ conflicts. 13. Furthermore, since the early 1990s the Mother’s health appeared to have been adversely affected, starting with her birth of the 3 younger children in Hong Kong, all of which were necessitated by Caesarean section, some with complications, and there had since been an increasing and later unusually high utilization of medical treatments and hospitalizations by her, and to lesser degree, by some of the children as well, with N being hospitalized when she was only 18 months old with bacteria infection, and that the 2 younger boys had also been hospitalized for lengthly periods for various infections between 1999 and 2002. 14. Despite various attempts by the parties to seek counselling and make adjustments to save the marriage, matters finally came to head in November 2002 when the Mother moved out of the matrimonial home at Clearwater Bay with the children after accusing the Father of using physical violence on her, and shortly thereafter she withdrew $2 million from the parties’ joint account for her living expenses and those of the children. 15. On 14th November 2002 the Mother came to this Court and on ex-parte basis obtained a non-molestation injunction against the Father, and 2 days later she issued a petition for divorce based on the Father’s unreasonable behaviour, and prayed for custody care and control of the children and generally ancillary relief for herself and the children. On 18th November 2002 the Mother also launched an application for an ouster order against the Father, i.e. that he be restrained from entering their former matrimonial home. 16. A temporary truce, however, was achieved on 22nd November 2002 when the Father agreed to move out of the matrimonial home to allow the Mother and children to return to live there to his exclusion for one month until 21st December 2002, presumably to enable the parties to calm things down, and that the Mother’s applications were dismissed by consent. Unfortunately this was just the beginning of what turned out to be a long, particularly bitter and expensive litigation as, and I do not think it is an exaggeration to say so, almost every point, in particularly those in relation to the children, was bitterly contested, about which I will no doubt have more to say later. 17. Not surprisingly, the divorce became contested when the Father filed an Answer and Cross-Petition on 13th December 2003, alleging unreasonable behaviour on the part of the Mother, and seeking ancillary relief by way of lump sum or sums, and naturally custody of all the children as well. Applications soon came fast and furious, first by the Mother for interim maintenance for herself and the children, following almost immediately by the Father’s for interim custody care and control of the children. Meanwhile the Father had also withdrawn what was left in the parties’ joint account in the sum of about $2 million. 18. In the Father’s supportive affidavit for interim custody of 5th February 2003, amongst his many allegations against the Mother which included violent temper, low moral character, preference for charity work over the care of her children, too lax with their discipline, one stood out in particularly and which has since become the most controversial and contentious issue between the parties : the Mother’s psychological problems which the Father fears would cause her to be unable to take proper care of the children. He alleged that the psychological strain suffered by the Mother over the years, with the deterioration in their relationship being a contributory factor, has caused her to resort to seeking the assistance of psychologists and hence he wanted reports from all psychiatrists or psychologists that she might have seen in the last 4 years to be produced to Court, a process which he had vigorously pursued throughout the proceedings. 19. The Father’s application was naturally strenuously opposed by the Mother who insisted that she sought the help of a psychologist to help her through the abusive relationship which the Father had subjected her, and not because she had any psychological problem. In her 6th affidavit of 13th February 2003 in reply, the Mother countered by accusing the Father of violent temperament, using bullying tactics at home, lack of time for the children due to his flight schedule, his frequent away from home, as well as subjecting the children in particularly their eldest son to harsh discipline and severe corporal punishment. 20. As is common in contested custody matters, the Social Welfare Department was involved and the hearing was adjourned pending a social investigation report. In the meantime the children remained under the interim care of the Mother in the former matrimonial home with the assistance of the family’s Indonesian maid Sondang, while the Father was to have interim access to the children when he was not flying. 21. Meanwhile the parties, in one of the rare occasions in these proceedings, were able to agree to settle their divorce by amending their respective petition and cross-petition to water down their allegations against each other and on 27th May 2003 a cross-decree of divorce was granted to each party. 22. Going back slightly in time, on 31st March 2003 Miss Ma of the Social Welfare Department submitted the 1st of her investigation reports in which she recommended that the Mother’s psychological fitness in child care be assessed by a clinical psychologist after she was shown by the Father records of the Mother’s high frequency of medical attention and hospitalisation during the past 2 years which the Father suspected was psychologically caused and which might affect her child care ability, before she could complete her investigation of the custody issue. 23. Following up on this recommendation the Father issued a summons on 8th April 2003 for an order that a psychological assessment report on the Mother be obtained. In the summons he also sought further directions for the implementation of the interim access order. This application was in fact preceded by the Mother’s summons of 7th April 2003 for leave to remove the children out of Hong Kong to Canada for a month after their schools had been closed down due to the outbreak of SARS. 24. By another summons issued on 8th April 2003, the Mother also sought an order for a psychological assessment report on the Father, apparently for no particular reason other than perhaps simply in response to the Father’s summons. 25. The Wife’s application for removal of the children to Canada was, as expected, opposed by the Father as he did not think it was necessary, that some parts of Canada had also been exposed to SARS, that the Mother would not be able to take care of the children in Canada by herself, and that it would deprive him of seeing the children in the meantime. 26. The matter was forcefully argued before me on 9th April 2003 by Counsel for both sides and at the end I allowed the Mother’s application but also granted the Father staying access to the children for half of the period. The parties were eventually able to agree to be assessed by a clinical psychologist as suggested by the Social Worker and that the report was to be made available as soon as possible for the custody hearing scheduled in June 2003. 27. The fact that the children were enjoying a break in Canada during this period of course did not stop the parties from carry on their litigation in Hong Kong, when on 29th April 2003 the Father issued a summons for an order that the Mother to provide all reports and record notes of her attendance for medical advice, be they in or out patient attendance at hospitals, medical practitioners, psychologists, psychiatrists or other therapeutic consultants and physiotherapists during the last 5 years, i.e. dating back to April 1998, as he believed that such past records would be important to the clinical psychologist for a thorough assessment of the Mother’s psychological condition. 28. This application was again strenuously opposed by the Mother who argued that the Father was struggling to find reasons to persuade the Court to grant him custody of the children and hence he was merely seeking to obtain her medical records to see if there was anything that he might make use of. 29. The matter came before me on 2nd May 2003 and I refused the Father’s application on the grounds that it was too wide in scope and oppressive in nature. 30. It was of course not to be the end of the matter, and on 27th May 2003 the Father filed his Affidavit for the forthcoming custody hearing scheduled in June 2003, in which he exhibited notes which he had prepared concerning the Mother’s unusually high utilization of medical consultation and hospitalization over the past several years which caused him to believe that she may be suffering from some form of factitious disorders, conditions which are characterized by physical or psychological symptoms that are intentionally produced or feigned in order to assume the sick role which, he feared, would affect the Mother’s parenting ability, and he wished the clinical psychologist appointed by the Court to investigate such fears of his. 31. The clinical psychologist appointed back in April 2003 to carry out psychological assessment of the parties, Ms Janet Tso submitted her report in early June 2003 in which she stated that her assessment did not indicate that either parent has psychotic features or mood disorders that warranted clinical attention, although she did notice that the Mother indeed had a lot of medical treatments, and that the medical doctors who treated her should be in a better position to give their professional comments about the past medical illness of the Mother. 32. In her further Social Investigation Report which was submitted together with the clinical psychologist report, the Social Work Officer Ms Ma relied on the clinical psychologist’s assessment that the Mother was not suffering from any psychotic or mood disorder and with her sound physical health, the worry on her impaired psychological and physical conditions that may affect childcare could be ruled out, she therefore supported the parties’ agreement to have joint custody of the 6 children, but recommended that their care and control be granted to the Mother. Ms Ma also supported the Mother’s proposal that the children be allowed to leave Hong Kong with her after the divorce to live in Vancouver, Canada, provided that the Father be given access to the children. 33. This recommendation of Ms Ma in giving care and control of the children to the Mother with the right to remove them to Canada was of course not acceptable to the Father and so the hearing went ahead on 12th June 2003, during which both parties gave lengthly oral evidence and were extensively cross-examined. By that time the parties’ allegations made against each other and the number of issues had unfortunately grown to such an extent that it was no surprise that their oral evidence were to utilize most of the 10 days originally allocated for the trial, and with a number of witnesses still waiting in line to be called, the hearing had to go part-heard for a further 2 weeks in October 2003. 34. This summer break of the trial of course did not mean that the parties were going to be idle, and on 4th August 2003 the Father took out a summons for an order that the 2 youngest children B and S do attend the Christian Alliance International School (“CAIS”) in the forthcoming academic year in September 2003 instead of American International School (“AIS”) where they had been enrolled by the Mother earlier, on the grounds that CAIS is a Christian school which is adapted to the Canadian curriculum, that all the elder girls used to attend the same school with A still attending, that it is cheaper than AIS and is a more suitable school for the 2 boys. 35. The Father’s summons was naturally opposed by the Mother who argued that he was at fault for not enrolling the boys into CAIS earlier until it was too late for their registrations, and hence she had to take matter into her own hands by enrolling them into AIS which offered them a place in the middle of the last school terms, and that since the boys had settled satisfactorily in AIS, it would not be in their interests to change them to a new school again. 36. Accepting the Father’s argument that it was all along the parties’ intention to send the 2 boys, like their other children, to CAIS, that it would be a more appropriate school for them in the long term and in view of the background of this family, I allowed the Father’s application and directed that B and S should attend CAIS in September 2003. 37. The fact that the trial was not to resume until late October 2003 unfortunately gave the parties more time to find things to fight about, and they did. On 7th October 2003 the Father took out a summons for an order requiring the Mother to provide her authorization to Dr Christopher Dickson, who was employed by Cathay Pacific as their Medical Services Manager to monitor the medical reimbursement claims of the employees and their dependents, to provide a statement setting out his view on the Mother’s psychological condition on the basis of her past medical claims. Apparently the Mother’s authorization was not forthcoming after an earlier request by the Father, and so he felt obliged to take out this summons. 38. At the same time the Mother also restored her earlier application for interim maintenance for hearing, apparently having nearly exhausted all the $2 million which she had withdrawn from the parties’ joint account at the start of the proceedings on living expenses and legal costs. 39. I refused the Father’s application as it was clear that I have no power to order the Mother to give her authorization when she was not willing. As regard her application for interim maintenance, I accepted that the Mother in the meantime required $123,000 per month for her household expenses as well as her legal costs which I so ordered in her favour upon accepting the Father’s undertaking that he would be directly responsible for some of her expenses such as her rent, the household utilities, the children’s school fees and their air fares for their holidays. 40. The 2nd part of the custody trial resumed on 27th October 2003 during which evidence were taken from the Indonesian maid Sondang who had by then left the Mother’s household to work for the Father, the clinical psychologist Ms Janet Tao, the Mother’s previous psychologist Ms Nia Pryde, and 2 witnesses of the Father secured by a writ of subpoena duces tecum, namely Dr Lucy Lord, a gynaecologist whom the Mother used to regularly consult, and Dr Rose Ong, the present Medical Services Manager of Cathay Pacific who was called to produce the records of the parties’ utilization of medical expenditure. 41. Whilst the clinical psychologist Ms Tao maintained in her evidence that she was in no position to give her professional view about the Mother’s many past medical treatments, both Dr Lord and Dr Ong had expressed concerns over her unusually high utilization of medical treatments which they suspected the possibility of Munchausen Syndrome, a factitious disorder with deliberate production or feigning of physical or psychological symptoms. As neither doctors are psychiatrists, they agreed that a psychiatric evaluation of the Mother was warranted to determine this particular issue. At my suggestion the Mother agreed to do so by a psychiatrist to be jointly instructed by the parties. Unfortunately this meant that the trial would have to be adjourned, again, this time to March 2004 to give the psychiatrist time to carry out the evaluation. 42. In the meantime of course the parties would continue to find things to fight about, when on 19th December 2003 the Mother applied, on ex parte with notice to the Father, for an order to restrain him from removing the children from her without prior agreed arrangements, with costs to be paid to her on an indemnity basis. Apparently the parties had had some heated arguments over some of the Father’s access to the children, and with the Christmas and New Year holidays just around the corner, the Mother felt that the Father’s access should be defined by the Court during this period. 43. The matter came before me the next morning on urgent basis and after hearing argument from Counsel for both sides, it was resolved with certain defined access order made in favour of the Father. 44. The next fight between the parties came on 16th January 2004 over the extent of documents filed in these proceedings to be released to their jointly appointed psychiatrist for the assessment of the Mother, as although they were able to agree to instruct Dr Lo Chun Wai, they had serious argument over what pleadings and documents that Dr Lo should be allowed to see for the assessment. 45. As a result an exercise of going through the long list of documents in dispute had to be undertaken by the Court at the hearing and it was decided that all the parties’ relevant affirmations and the Mother’s past medical reports were to be provided to Dr Lo. 46. This was of course not the end of the parties’ squabbling over matters leading to Dr Lo’s assessment, and there were numerous arguments over the wordings of their joint instruction to Dr Lo, with endless accusations from each side of the other of trying to influence the good doctor in his evaluation of the Mother. 47. On 2nd March 2004, merely 2 weeks before the resumption of the custody trial, the parties came back before me for directions that each be allowed to file a further affidavit to comment, if they so wish, on Dr Lo’s report which was soon to be submitted to Court. An order was accordingly made but in addition to their comments on the psychiatric report, both parties had chosen to include numerous new allegations against each other, notwithstanding that they had already concluded their evidence in June last year, which should not really come as any surprise in view of the fact that some 9 months had since passed and new events and developments had occurred in particularly in relation with the children, one of which was indeed shocking when the Mother in early March 2004 suspected that the Father’s Indonesian helper Sondang might have sexually abused the youngest child S. The matter immediately triggered off investigations by both the police and the Social Welfare Department and up to the time of the conclusion of evidence, the outcome of the investigation was not yet known but the Father had in the meantime undertaken not to allow Sondang to come into contact with any of the children during his access to them. 48. On 6th March 2004 Dr Lo submitted his psychiatric report on the Mother in which he was of the opinion that she had suffered from Somatoform Disorder, rather than Factitious Disorder, which is a psychiatric condition in which she exhibited a variety of illness and a myriad of symptoms which were not intentionally feigned, but which he believed was manifested because she was constantly under emotional stress due to marital problems during the marriage, causing her to resort to somatize her problems in the form of physical symptoms and present herself to doctors for treatment and possible solution. 49. Dr Lo was however also of the view that such somatization behaviour of the Mother and her repeated medical consultations would not revert after the divorce case is over, and that as long as she is living a happy life without much stress and strain, her resistance to both physical and psychological illness would improve and the chance of having major illness would be low. Unfortunately this apparent optimistic view of Dr Lo was not shared by the Father who was not satisfied that he had done a full and complete assessment of the Mother whom he believed to still be suffering from Factitious Disorder, specifically Munchausen Syndrome. 50. At the 3rd and final session of the trial which was resumed on 18th March 2003, both parties were recalled back to the stand to give further evidence in respect of their latest affidavit, during which the Father revealed that he had recently moved into the Mother’s neighbourhood which he claimed was to facilitate his access to the children, and proposed to share parenting with the Mother, which was however refused by her as she did not believe that share parenting with the Father would work and that it was just his way to continue to control and manipulate her life even after the divorce. The Mother also indicated at the hearing that she would no longer agree to have joint custody of the 4 younger children with the Father, whilst the 2 eldest children C and Y are already 18 and 17 respectively and so in reality the question of their custody is no longer an issue. And so the custody battle for the 4 younger children proceeded to its bitter end. General Principles 51. In deciding on the custody or upbringing of minor children, section 3 of Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap. 13, makes general provision for the Court to have regard to the welfare of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard, the Court shall give due consideration to : -
52. The section also provides that the Court shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father. These are fundamental principles to be applied in any such case unless expressly or impliedly excluded by statute, and are substantially the same as those set out in section 1 of the English’s Children Act 1989 where the welfare of the child is no longer expressed to be “the first and paramount consideration”, but is to be the Court’s “paramount consideration”. Section 8 of the 1989 Act also provides that where the Court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge such an order, it must have regard in particular to the matters specified in section 1 (3) of the 1989 Act, which has come to be known as “the welfare checklist”, of which Waite LJ said in Re DB and CB (minors) : Southwank London Borough v B [1993] 2 FCR 607, CA as follows : -
53. Although we do not have the equivalence of section 1 (3) or 8 in our statue, I agree that most of the matters referred in the checklist, which are as follows, would be of helpful guidance and assistance to the Court in the assessment of the requirement of the children’s welfare : -
54. It is with these principles in mind that I shall now move to consider the evidence. The Father’s Case 55. The Father believes it would be in the interest of the children that he be granted their care and control, although he is not averse to the Mother having joint or shared custody with him, he does not agree that she should be given the sole custody care or control of the children for the following reasons :-
The Mother’s case 56. Although the Mother was initially amendable to share custody of the children with the Father as long as she had their care and control, she now insists that joint or shared custody with him will not work and insists that she should be given the sole custody care and control of the children, in particularly the 4 younger ones for the following reasons : -
The Social Investigation Reports 57. The initial report was unable to form any view or recommendation on the question of custody due to the Social Work Officer’s concern of the Mother’s possible psychological problems raised by the Father, but based upon the subsequent assessment of the Mother by the clinical psychologist Ms Janet Tso that she does not suffer from any psychotic or mood disorder that warrants attention, the Social Work Officer Ms Alice Ma in her Further Social Investigation Report of 10th June 2003 recommended that joint custody would be a best option for the parties and that it would be in the best interest of the children that their care and control be granted to the Mother. The Evidence 58. The amount of evidence presented in this case is indeed tremendous, given the facts that the trial had lasted more than 6 weeks, with oral testimony from 8 witnesses plus the parties who were recalled again at the final session, and that the trial bundles almost exceeded 2,700 pages, although not all the documents in them were relevant, it does speak for itself about the size of the evidence and the number of issues that have to be examined and resolved. As in the words of Thorpe L J in Re F (Shared Residence Order) [2003] EWCA Civ 592, one of the functions of the judge is of course to make express finding, another function is to be selective and to make findings that are relevant and necessary for the disposal of the issue. It is not incumbent on the judge to elaborate or extend judgments by making findings on every area or every issue, and it is open to a judge to confine him or herself to those matters which he or she selects as significant and necessary. This is what I propose to do, and since it is the Father who argues that the recommendations of the Social Investigation Report should not be followed by the Court, I shall consider his case first, and shall start with the most central and contentious issue : whether the Mother has suffered from Factitious Disorder. Factitious Disorders 59. A number of psychiatric diagnoses have been extensively referred to in the evidence, much of which are technical and are set out in details in Exhibit P – 13 from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders – 4th Edition (DSM – IV) published by the American Psychiatric Association, the main diagnostic reference of Mental Health Professionals, but for the purpose herein, it would suffice to simply refer to Dr Lo’s report as follows : -
60. The Father first raised the issue about the Mother’s health problems in his Answer to the Petition in December 2002 when he claimed that she was prone to accidents which were mainly caused by her carelessness and as a result she constantly sought medical attention and had one of the highest medical claims for dependents in the medical scheme available from his employer. 61. He repeated his concern about the Mother’s carelessness and prone to accidents in his affidavit of 5th February 2003, citing examples of her injuring her shoulder while lifting weights at the gym, falling off the trail while jogging on rugged terrain when she had to be rescued by helicopter to hospital, and injuring her shoulder again in a careless car accident. There was however not any suggestion that these health problems were in any way related to psychological disorder of the Mother. 62. It was not until the 1st Social Investigation Report of 31st March 2003 when it was revealed that the Father had shown to the Social Worker medical records of the Mother of her frequent medical attendances and hospitalizations, suspecting that they might be psychologically caused and worrying about their effects on her parenting ability. 63. In his 4th Affidavit of 8th April 2003 the Father repeated that the Mother’s seeking of medical attention had caused him to believe that she was psychologically and / or mentally incapable of looking after the children by herself, and that she should undergo psychological assessment. In the same affidavit the Father had exhibited more medical records of the Mother. 64. It was however in his 7th Affidavit filed on 27th May 2003 that the Father asserted, for the first time, that the Mother might be suffering from a Factitious Disorder, specifically Munchausen Syndrome in that she had feigned her illness, and Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy in that she might have deliberately produced or feigned illness in some of the children. 65. In his notes exhibited to his said affidavit marked “BMJP7-21” (P.1636 of the bundle), the Father said this : -
66. There is no question that the Mother had an unusually high utilization of medication consultations and hospitalization throughout the years during the marriage, and, to a lesser degree, as had some of the children. According to the records produced by Dr Rose Ong of Cathay Pacific, whilst the average annual medical expenditure for their cockpit crews and dependents is $3,800 for outpatient and $2,200 for inpatient, those for the Mother from June 1997 to May 2003 were $41,494 per year for outpatient, and $229,959 per year for inpatient, some 11/ 104 times respectively of the company’s average for the 2 type of expenditures. 67. In terms of the number of medical visits by the Mother during the said period, the figures provided by Dr Ong’s records are no less staggering :
68.. This represents an average of 56 consultations at the clinics and more than 4 admissions into hospital each year, which is like visiting the doctor more than once every week and hospitalization every 3 months, for the past 6 years. These figures have consistently placed the Mother amongst the top 10 most expensive enrolees of Cathay Pacific every year during that period, and that her family was also ranked the most expensive families for the years 2000/2001 and 2001/2002. 69. Furthermore, the Mother’s attendance history report compiled by Cathay Pacific and produced by Dr Ong shows a wide variety of illness suffered by her with a myriad of symptoms from 2000 to 2002, including, to name some more common examples, back pain/other disorders of back, spondylosis and allied disorders, respiratory infection, gastroenteritis and colitis, sprains and strains of shoulder and upper arm, neuralgia/musculoskeletal pain/chest pain, disorders of cervical region, haemorrhoids, disorders of eyelids, diseases of thymus gland, contact dermatitis/eczema, inflammation of ovary, fallopian tube, pelvic area, peptic ulcer/abdominal pain, disorders of intestine, functional digestic disorders, uti/cystitis, pleurisy, tendonitis, urinary infection etc. Granted that the Mother is an exercise/fitness enthusiast who regularly jogs and takes martial art lessons and hence may be more prone to muscle strains and other sport-related injuries, the unusually wide varieties of her illness is indeed alarming. 70.. In fact Dr Ong in her evidence at the hearing expressed her following concerns over the possibility of Munchausen Syndrome when answering questions raised by Counsel for the Father over the Mother’s illness : -
71. Dr Ong’s concern was shared by Dr Lucy Lord, who had been the Mother’s gynaecologist during the marriage, in her following evidence at the hearing :
72. As neither doctors were psychiatrist and admittedly not qualified to make any psychiatric assessment of the Wife’s condition, Dr Lo Chun Wai was therefore brought in for this purpose. He was qualified as a psychiatrist in the early 70s and has since been practising in that field and has held various chairs and important positions in the profession, including being the current president of the Hong Kong College of Psychiatrists. 73. Dr Lo was jointly appointed by the parties in January 2004 for an independent assessment and psychiatric report on the Mother. He had been supplied with a large bundle of documents including many of the parties’ affidavits and other relevant information, all of which had either been agreed between the parties, or directed by this Court. He had also met and interviewed the parties for about equal amount of time. 74. In his report dated 6th March 2004, Dr Lo found that the Mother had suffered from Somatoform Disorder in his psychiatric opinion as follows : -
75. The Father is however doubtful of Dr Lo’s opinion that the Mother had suffered from Somatoform Disorder instead of Munchausen Syndrome, or that her repeated medical consultations would not revert after the divorce case is over. He was critical of his failure to ascertain directly from those doctors who had treated the Mother in the past about her medical problems, instead of just relying on their reports which he argues was insufficient or inconclusive, in particularly that many of the Mother’s diagnosis was for pain in some part of her body which is difficult to prove otherwise and since diagnosing factitious disorders is well known to be very difficult because of the dishonesty that is involved, doctors must rule out other possible physical and mental illness before a diagnosis of factitious disorder can be considered, and to do so, the Father argues, Dr Lo should have approached these doctors directly for discussion about the Mother’s past medical problems before arriving at his present diagnosis, and in failing to do so, he does not accept that such diagnosis is conclusive. 76. In defence of his decision not to approach these doctors directly, Dr Lo explained that there was simply not enough time for him to do so in view of the number of doctors involved and the time constrain on his report. With the medical reports available to him, Dr Lo was also of the opinion that it was not necessary to approach these doctors who could not be expected to be able to reveal anything unusual about the Mother’s conditions which were not already reported. He also relied on those medical certificates produced by some of these doctors (216 – 228 CB 2) which he said all share the opinion that the Mother’s symptoms were physiologically based, had organic origins and that she was not suffering from malingering or Munchausen Syndrome. 77. After being satisfied that the diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome and Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cannot be established, Dr Lo went on to deduce in his report the reasons for the Mother’s many health problems and the basis of his diagnosis that she had suffered from Somatoform Disorder caused by the pressure from rearing 6 children and from the Father’s desire to control her during the marriage, as set out in details in Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the report. 78. In any psychiatric evaluation or assessment it is inevitable that diagnosis must to a large extent be based on information provided by the parties rather than by objective findings or laboratory investigations, and in this case Dr Lo had relied heavily on his various meetings with the parties and on documents including their affidavits provided by their lawyers. As it is the Father’s case that he had not put pressure on the Mother or controlled or abused her as alleged, the question must therefore be : Is there proper basis for Dr Lo to arrive at his diagnosis ? 79. The Mother has made numerous allegations against the Father of how he tried to dominate and control her over everything in particularly financial matter, and how his relationship had become abusive to her during the marriage. It is not necessary to repeat them here in details, but it would be useful to refer to some of the particulars in her petition as follows : -
80. Although these allegations were subsequently deleted from the Mother’s petition after the parties agreed to settle their divorce dispute, they were repeated again in details in her evidence at this hearing. All these allegations were of course denied by the Father in his Answer and subsequently in his evidence. 81. Many of these disputes are of course simply “She Said / He Said” over matters which occurred over the years and it is certainly not easy to tell from the parties’ testimony that who has been telling the truth. There are however enough circumstantial and other evidence which may shed light on what really happened to the Mother during the marriage. 82. Firstly, the Father had admitted in his Answer that : -
83. These behaviour of the Father could, in my judgment, be perceived, rightly or wrongly, by the Mother as domineering, controlling and abusive to her during the marriage. 84. Secondly, the statement by Ms Melissa Pitonyiak, a teacher hired by the Father to home-school the children between 1996 and 1997 and annexed to the Mother’s 9th Affidavit (P. 1517 B4), does lend support to the Mother’s case about the Father’s controlling nature, in which Ms Pitonyiak described him as follows : -
85. Whilst it is true that in response to this statement, the Father was able to produce a statement from another home teacher Mrs Renata Morton annexed to his 8th Affidavit (P. 1767 B4) which described him in a much more positive light, Mrs Morton did nevertheless notice obvious tension between the parties and at home as follows : -
86. Dr Lo in his report wrote that the Father tended to look down upon his wife who appeared to him intellectually backward and hereditary disadvantaged. This attitude of the Father can be found in his various affidavit, such as his 2nd when he said these : -
87. And in his 7th Affidavit, he also said this about her work in charity organizations : -
88. Whether or not there is any truth in these statements by the Father, I believe they must have an impact on Dr Lo’s impression of his attitude towards the Mother during the marriage. 89. Above all, there is the evidence of Ms Nia Pryde, a clinical psychologist to whom the Mother was referred by her doctor in November 1999 for counselling due to stress and anxiety from marital problems. In her affidavit of 9th June 2003 Ms Pryde made the following observations of the Mother : -
90. In her affidavit Ms Pryde has also exhibited copies of her consultation notes as well as a written history of the marriage by the Mother to her as well as a letter (P. 1805 – 1813 B5) that the Mother was writing to the Father but never actually gave him which, I believe, reveal as close to the truth as one can get to her frame of mind and as to what was really happening in her relationship with the Father during the marriage, in particularly her letter to him with the relevant paragraphs as follows : -
91. I am of course not suggesting that everything the Mother said in this letter about the Father must necessarily be true, but I believe it truly and accurately reflects her state of mind and feeling at that time and over the years of the marriage, as it is devoid of any lawyer’s input or gloss and cannot be said to be designed to obtain any tactical advantage or legal object, as there is no evidence to indicate that she was then contemplating any court proceedings. It represents, in my judgement, the confidential and innermost thoughts of a wife experiencing terrible stress and anxiety from serious marital difficulties. 92. Ms Pryde has said in both her affidavit and evidence that she believes, based on the Mother’s verbal and written accounts, that she was in an emotionally abusive situation which was the cause of her unhappiness. In her evidence Ms Pryde referred to Marti Tamm Loring’s book on “Emotional Abuse” (Exhibit P – 10) which described emotional abuse as follows : -
93. It is Ms Pryde’s evidence, based on the Mother’s account, that most of the overt and covert mechanisms of abuse referred therein did exist in the Father’s behaviour towards the Mother in their marriage. Ms Pryde also agrees, as mentioned in the Loring’s book, victims of emotional abuse frequently suffer from physical problems such as headaches, stomachaches, and upper respiratory illness that are metaphors for the pain of emotional abuse, and that because its symptoms are so varied and so well disguised emotional abuse is difficult to recognize. 94. I accept that Ms Pryde had not seen or talked to the Father during her psychological assessment of the Mother’s condition, but given her own observation of the Mother and with the information provided by her, I believe Ms Pryde is entitled to come to her own conclusion that the Mother was in an emotionally abusive situation, and I have not been shown any evidence to suggest that Ms Pryde’s conclusion is erroneous. Regardless whether the Father had been abusive, I believe he had at least been controlling and domineering of the Mother throughout the marriage. 95. For all the reasons aforesaid I am satisfied that Dr Lo has good and proper basis to arrive at his conclusion about the Mother’s condition, and in the absence of any direct evidence to challenge his expert findings, I see no reason why his psychiatric opinion on the Mother should not be accepted. In fact his prognosis that her somatization behaviour and repeated medical consultations would not revert after the divorce seems to be borne out by the fact that the frequency of her medical consultation has since these proceedings dropped significantly. Having arriving at my conclusion that the Mother is not suffering from any psychological problem which may affect her parenting ability, I shall next consider the Father’s other allegations against her. Use of Violence 96. The Father’s case that the Mother resorts to violence is basically based on 2 incidents in 2000 in which he claims to have been hit by her by slapping during arguments, 2 other incidents in 2002 when she slapped the 2 eldest children respectively in separate incident, and her throwing objects around and using abusive or obscene language during quarrels between the parties in other incidents, which the Father believes by her such actions, the Mother has not set a good example to the younger children who had witnessed some of the incidents. 97. The Mother denies that she has a violent temper or has resorted to violence, and has given her side of the story about those incidents. The evidence reveals that the incidents involving the Father were, in my opinion, minor, insignificant and inconsequential, and certainly do not show any inclination or tendency on the Mother’s part to use violence. 98. As regard the incidents involving the 2 eldest children, the Mother has admitted slapping them for using inappropriate language, and has explained that in both situations the children had subsequently apologized, that they were able to discuss the situation mutually, and that she was also able to learn as a parent from the incidents and was determined not to allow it to happen again. 99. It is not uncommon that when married couples quarrel and fight during marriage, things may sometime get out of hands with angry words being said, objects thrown and furnitures knocked over, but it does not necessarily follow that they are violent in nature or show a violent temperament on the part of one of the parties. It depends on the nature and severity of the acts and the frequency of the occurrence. The evidence before me show that such incidents of so-called violent acts have occurred far and few in between the 20 years of this marriage, and appear to be isolated incidents which occurred during the most difficult and stressful period of the Mother’s life, and having heard and observed her for days in evidence in court, I do not find any evidence that will support the Father’s allegation that the Mother has resorted to violence or that such behaviour of hers has any negative impact on the children. Compulsive Liar and Deceitful 100. The Father has accused the Mother of being a compulsive liar which has been a characteristic of hers throughout the marriage, dating back to the early stage of the marriage when she failed to disclose to him her relationship with her boyfriends both before and after the marriage, and that she would only later reveal it on a piece meal basis, as being the main basis for his allegation. 101. There is no dispute that the Mother had not disclosed all her previous relationships with her former boyfriends to the Father prior to their marriage, which include several relationships with older men, in particularly one who was her elder sister’s boyfriend who seduced her when she was merely 12, something which she was probably ashamed of and naturally did not wish to disclose to her future husband, which is not at all unusual in human nature, and is in my opinion quite understandable in the circumstances, as explained by her in her written marital history to her psychologist Nia Pryde in 1999 (P. 1806 – 1809 B 5) when she wrote :-
102. This and the fact that the Mother had in the same document readily disclosed her other shortcomings such as her poor academic performance do not seem to support the Father’s case that the Mother is a compulsive liar. Lack of Security and Self-Esteem 103. The Father accuses the Mother of lack of self-confidence to make decisions on her own and had during the marriage relied on his support and help in addition to others, even to the extent of asking assistance with the drafting of letters or simple calculations. He believes that the Mother’s apparent lack of self-esteem and security, which is admitted by her in her petition, may stem from her poor academic achievement, as she had had to repeat a year in high school, and had passed less than half of the courses that she undertook at college. Even at the time of their marriage, the Father alleges, the Mother had significant difficulty in English spelling and grammar, and was not proficient at maths. Although she may have improved in these areas over the year, he does not believe she would be able to help the older children in many of the subjects that they are taking in high school, and that he has been the one helping them. 104. I do not think there is any dispute that the Mother had never done well at school, as she had readily admitted in her said marital history to Ms Pryde, but she insists that the Father was all along pleased to trust the full time education of the children to her, as he obviously felt that she was fully competent to fulfil this obligation for many years during the marriage, and that her ability to learn is also evidenced by the acclaims she had received from the 2 charitable organizations which she had worked for the past several years. 105. While I believe that the Mother was not the only one entrusted with the full time education of the children who were at one time or another home schooled by both parents and private tutors, and that the Father did from time to time, when he was around, assist the elder children with their maths and science subjects, I agree with the Mother that despite her poor educational background, she had been trusted by the Father with the children’s education during the marriage, and that there is no evidence to suggest that she is incapable of helping the 3 younger children with their studies, as the 3 elder children are already in boarding school. Lax with Discipline 106. The Father accuses the Mother of becoming more lax with the children’s discipline, and that since his departure from the matrimonial home, he has noticed a marked change both in the attitude and behaviour of the children living at home in that they are less respectful and wilder in their play, with temper tantrums in some of them that he has not seen before. He also accuses the Mother of allowing the children to do things which previously would not have been allowed, such as taking Y and N to a movie entitled “8 Mile” featuring a American rap singer called Eminem whose songs often contain language and contents 107. The Father also believes that since he has left, the children’s access to the internet is unsupervised and no child filter software has been installed in the computer, as a result the children have been visiting sites and downloading material which he consider to be unsuitable, that they now also have almost unlimited access to TV, and that the 2 elder girls had on some weekends been allowed to come home late after 11 p.m. All of these, the Father says, have caused him deep concern that the Mother is showing signs of her inability to support and guide the children. 108. The Mother has replied to these allegations in her 6th Affidavit (P. 1034 – 1037 B3) in which she explained that the children are not under the extreme conditions of behaviour when she is looking after them compared to when the Father does. She is also of the view that the recent events of their divorce have unsettled the children, and that they appear to live in 2 different lives in that whilst the Father is away, they would be “full of life, bubbly, argumentative, talkative, mischievous and all of the other things that children normally are”, but when they are with their Father, “they find it difficult to be so Victorian and it is inevitable that they occasionally break free from the emotional straight-jackets that he keeps them in whilst he is around”. 109. Whilst I am no expert to say whether children are supposed to react and behave in the circumstances as alleged by the Mother, I agree that it is consistent with what the home-school teachers, in particularly Ms Pitonyiak had said in her statement which I have referred to earlier, and that such behaviour of the children may be their natural reaction to the apparent differences in discipline between their 2 parents. The Father is no doubt more strict with the children’s discipline, but is the Mother too lax ? 110. The Father has cited the example of her taking Y and N to the movie “8 Mile” which I have to admit I have not seen, and for that matter nor has the Father, and that although I know who Eminem is, I have not heard any of his songs. I do however agree with the Father that the titles of some of his songs are obscene, and that their contents, judging from their titles, may well contain obscene language and undesirable subjects. Is it however improper for the Mother to take her daughters to see the movie ? To answer this question, one needs of course to find out what this movie is all about, and hence some research on the internet was necessary. 111. According to Amazon.com, the editorial review of this movie is as follows :
112. The movie was generally well received by audiences and critics alike, and according to popular movie website such as Yahoo.com, and major newspapers like New York Times, Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times all gave it a good review with an average grade of B+. 113. The Father however argues that good movie or not, it is rated “R” and that although he has not seen it, he has been told that the film contains scenes of violence, sex and drug abuse that it cannot be said to be a suitable movie for N who was then only 14. 114. The Mother denies that it is rated “R”, and that it is in fact a category “II-B” which allows teenagers to attend. She however shares the views of the Father on the nature of Eminem’s music and 8 Mile, but that the Father acts like such things do not exist in the real world and buries his head to the possible influence the lyrics of the music may have on the teenagers if left without the proper parental dialogue about the merits or failures. 115. The Mother explained that in her 6th Affidavit that her daughters had said they wanted to see the movie, as they had done previously with other movies which the Father had considered inappropriate and forbidden them to watch, although he had not seen them himself. She therefore decided in a mature fashion to take them to see the movie with her, and afterwards they discussed the movie in an intelligent manner so that they would fully understand what was good and bad with the movie, whereas the Father has historically forbidden viewing most movies and music he feels is unacceptable without any regard for people’s personal choices, and that he makes no effort in respecting the curiosities and motivations of others and their tastes, as the contents of the movie 8 Mile reflect the pressure teenagers are faced with today. 116. According to Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) which rates all movies shown in America, “8 Miles” is indeed rated “R” in the U.S., meaning it is restricted in the sense that any person under the age of 17 requires accompanying parent or adult guardian. This R-rating, which is one category before the X-rating which allows admission to adults only, is given further guideline by MPAA as follows :-
117. In Hong Kong we do not have the “R” rating in our theatres, but its equivalence is “II-B”, which is one category above the “III” rating, so in this sense both parents are correct as to the rating for “8 Mile”, and that although he has not seen the movie, the Father is probably also correct in saying that, because of its rating, the movie may well contain scenes of violence, sex and drug abuse and language in line with the themes of Eminem’s songs which he considers to be depraved. 118. The question therefore is : is it improper for the Mother to take Y and N, who were then 16 and 14 respectively, to see this category II-B movie ? 119. First of all, despite its rating, the theme and subject of the movie cannot be said to be unsuitable for teenagers : the story of a young man working and struggling in life against heavy odds for his dream. 120. Secondly, as explained by the Mother, instead of just saying no to her daughters, as the Father would have done, I do not see anything wrong or improper in the Mother taking an alternative, and what she regards a mature decision, to take them to see the movie with her, following with an discussion in an intelligent manner afterwards so that they would understand what was good and bad with the movie. I agree with the Mother that shutting the children out of all inappropriate movies or music, or for that matter, any improper material on the internet, may not be the best way to protect them, and that proper teaching and guiding them about the good and bad of such materials is in fact a better and more effective way to teach and discipline them. After all, teenagers these days will always find ways to gain access to such materials or information from friends or at school if they are unable to do so at home. I am not saying that the Mother’s method must necessarily be correct and that the Father’s is wrong, but I believe that there are very often more than one way to discipline children and parents must try to be more sensitive and less rigid to their children’s needs. 121. As regards the Father’s accusation that the Mother has allowed the children unlimited access to TV and that the 2 elder girls, Y and N, had come home late after 11 p.m. during some weekends, the Mother has given her explanation in her 6th Affidavit (P. 1036 B3). I accept her explanation that the children only get to watch TV during their free time in the evening, and that there were only 2 isolated incidents with the girls returning home somewhat late after attending a Saturday night Christian Youth Group meeting administered by the Evangelical Community Church at Tsimshatsui and the long journey home to Clear Water Bay, and that one of which was after celebrating a birthday party of their eldest brother C who happened to be visiting Hong Kong at that time. 122. I also accept that compared with the Father, the Mother is more lax with the children’s discipline and tends to allow the children more freedom in doing their own things, in particularly with the elder children, which is not a bad thing at all as when children grow older and more mature, it is only natural that they seek more independence and the right to make their own decisions. Too much independence and insufficient discipline may of course lead to under performance at school and even delinquency. The question therefore must be : if the Mother has been less strict than the Father with the children’s discipline, is it too lax for the good of the children ? 123. The Father says it is, as both girls had to miss school the following day after they had stayed out late, and that N had also failed her midterm maths exam in January 2003. 124. The Mother believes that N failed her midterm maths exam was due more to the fact that she was experiencing some emotional turmoil due to her parents’ divorce proceedings and that she had in fact arrange for her to see a psychologist. 125. Although both girls are now in boarding school and far away from their parents’ battle field, and that Y is already 17 and no longer the subject of the parties’ dispute, it is clear that the Father’s concern that the effect of the Mother’s lax discipline on the elder children has extended to the younger children who are living with her and whom he says are already exhibiting more temper tantrums. To determine whether the Father’s concern is justified, it beholds me to look to the social investigation reports and other reports for assistance. 126. I shall start with the Social Investigation Reports, the first one of which dated 31st March 2003 did in fact record the Father’s said concern. It also recorded the view of Sondang, the parties’ housemaid at that time, who said as follows : -
127. The Social Work Officer Ms Ma however did not specifically address this issue of lax discipline in her report, other than her observation of the interaction between the parties and the children when she reported that “the mother did discipline the 2 younger kids when they misbehaved like throwing hard objects around the room, using a stick playing during car ride and the mother could ask them stop and tell them patiently why their behaviours were unacceptable”. 128. Although Ms Ma did further comment that some of the children could have done better at school and that N’s school performance seemed to have fallen backward somewhat, she did not observe any particular behavioural problem amongst the children, which, if I may venture to speculate, may be the reason why she did not find it necessary to address the issue of discipline. 129. It was of course still early days when this report was filed, but I am again unable to find any concern over any discipline problem of the children in Ms Ma’s later report of June 2003 either. In fact, both B and S were observed to be doing well at school without any problem, which Ms Ma had attributed partly to the effective guidance from both parents, in particularly the Mother whom Ms Ma said should be given more credit for the boys’ progress. 130. This 2nd report is of course quite outdated by now and it would perhaps be more useful to refer to the more recent school assessments of the 3 younger children at CAIS by Dr Caleb Knight in March 2004 (p 2674 – 2683 B7). 131. Dr Knight was the educational psychologist requested by CAIS to prepare assessment reports on the 3 children, presumably after the Father had raised his concern with the school over their education. 132. For A and B, Dr Knight reported no behavioural problem which may be linked to any lax in discipline. With S, Dr Knight’s report did reveal the Mother’s concern about his behavioural difficulties including tantruming and problems in controlling his emotions. Dr Knight however did not find such problems to have anything to do with discipline. These are his findings from his report : -
133. I will no doubt return to this report later in this judgment of mine over other issues, but for present purpose I am unable to find any evidence to support the Father’s allegation that there is a problem with the Mother’s disciplinary method. As I have already pointed out, based on all the evidence before me, I agree that the Mother is comparatively less strict with the children than the Father, but there is simply no evidence to suggest that it has led to behavioral or school performance problems of the children. An isolated incident or two of the 2 girls returning home later than usual is simply not enough for the Father’s accusation to stand, and that the problems or difficulties some of the children have exhibited are more to do with their parents’ divorce and their relentless fighting, or those other reasons as set out in Dr Knight’s and other reports, rather than the Mother’s way of discipline. Poor Judgment under Difficult Situations 134. The Father has strong reservations on the Mother’s judgment in managing the children under difficult situations, as she has at times in the past refused to accept that a child has done something wrong, and he has cited 2 incidents. The first one involving their eldest son C years ago when he was accused by credible witnesses at school of spitting at other students, but the Mother openly opposed the accusation and even went to the extent of writing back to the school in what the Father says to be a very inappropriate fashion without consulting him. 135. I agree that the Mother’s letter to the school was both rude and inappropriate on that occasion, however it also appears to me just an over reaction of a protective mother who should have handled the matter better, but not a serious flaw in her judgment as alleged by the Father. 136. The 2nd incident occurred when S was about 18 months old and became very ill with severe diarrhoea and was hospitalized. It was probably caused by him drinking some contaminated bath water in their village house, but the Father accused the Mother of contacting the South China Morning Post without prior discussion with him for the purpose of exposing this incident to the public, as a result of which S’s situation was in the headlines on the front page of the newspaper, and the whole family was thereafter harassed and disturbed by a flurry of reporters from the local newspapers for days at home. The Father believes that it was a poor decision on the part of the Mother to involve the media when their concentration should have been on the welfare of their son. 137. The Mother denies having contacted the media for the purpose of exposing the incident, but merely to enquire about a recent publication concerning a similar incident in the New Territories. She says that the Father knew about her action and had in fact prepared a statement himself with the intention of bringing the matter to the authority. With the Father’s controlling character in the family, I do not believe that the Mother would have acted by herself in such important matter without the Father’s knowledge or approval. I think the parties had intended to bring the matter to the authority, perhaps even with a view to claim compensation, and went to the media for assistance without realising the consequences, for which the Father now blames the Mother. The whole thing was an unfortunate incident but I cannot say that it goes so far as to show the Mother’s poor judgment. Lack of Time for the Children 138. The Father’s concern about the lack of time which the Mother spent with the children is based on her voluntary work with charitable organisation several years ago to the extent that she appeared to be abandoning the children in pursuit of her own interests even when she was working at home. He says there were many incidents that she had been so taken up with her work-related enquiries on the phone that she ignored the children who in turn had become restless and started to seek her attention, which had affected her relationship with the younger children that they had become more attached to their former maid Sondang. 139. The Mother naturally denies that the children had been affected as a result of her voluntary work which she says was deliberately arranged in that most of it was done at home so that she could be near the children. 140. Whilst most of the Father’s allegation on this issue appears to be hearsay, it has now become merely academic as the Mother has subsequent to these proceedings quitted her voluntary work and has returned to her role as a full-time mother. There is no evidence to suggest that she will return to voluntary work any time soon after these proceedings or in future. With the children becoming more independent as they grow older, and will be spending substantial time at school each day, I do not see anything wrong even with the Mother returning to voluntary work or a part-time paid job in future as long as it does not interfere with her time for the children. 141. It is not denied that the children had a good relationship with the former maid Sondang, in particularly the 2 boys who were quite attached to her, which is only normal as she had after all served in this household for more than 5 years, but there is simply no independence evidence such as from any of the social investigation reports to suggest that the Mother’s relationship with the younger children had been affected by her voluntary work or that it had been replaced by Sondang’s. In fact the evidence that the younger children in particularly the 2 boys are so attached to the Mother is simply unchallengable. 142. Having considered all the evidence before me including the various reports, I am satisfied that the Mother has been a caring and loving parent to her children, and that she has in fact done a quite remarkable job in taking proper care of her 6 children given the difficult circumstances of this case and the numerous problems that she had had with her health and her failing marriage. With the diagnosis of Dr Lo that she has not suffered from Munchausen Syndrome, which is the cornerstone of the Father’s case, and with his remaining allegations against the Mother unable to stand on firm ground and with her improved health and newly gained confidence and determination which were readily apparent in her oral evidence in Court, I find that there is simply no proper reason or basis to suggest that the Mother is not fit to have the care and control of the children. 143. She is of course not a perfect parent, if ever there is one, and that throughout the marriage she did rely on the assistance of others such as Sondang and in particularly the Father who has no doubt, and which is not denied, made important and significant contributions towards the care and upbringing of the children, but it is the Mother’s case that there are also serious shortcomings of the Father that it would not be in the best interest of the children that he be given their custody care or control, whether jointly with her or otherwise, which is what I now turn to. Full Time Employment 144. One of the main obstacles to the Father’s case for the children’s care and control is his full time job as an airline pilot. Although he claims that he has been able to arrange with his employer to fly mainly in Asia instead of long haul to Europe, thereby reducing the time that he will be flying during his work, there will always be days when he will be out of Hong Kong, albeit for only 1 – 2 days at a time, during which he will have to rely exclusively on his maid if he is to have the care and control of the children, and with the departure of Sondang and that a new domestic servant taking her place who will no doubt have to take time to build up a relationship with the children, even assuming that she will be as capable as Sondang in taking care of the children. With all these uncertainties, I find it very difficult to agree with the Father that he would be able to handle the children’s day-to-day care and control. It is simply not practical for him to do so, and it is not the only problem or shortcoming that he has with his case. Lack of Time After Work 145. The evidence before me indicates that in the past the Father would very often be resting at home from jet lag after long flight, and that while he denies having been hiding in his study room from the noise and activities of the children, there is no question that he would spend a considerable amount of his time reading or listening to his music in his study room when he was at home not flying. There were also occasions when he would go off on an overseas trip by himself. 146. This is of course no criticism of him as he was certainly entitled to some quiet time on his own after a hard day at work, but it is again the reality that the Father, like everybody else who has a full-time job, and in particularly in his case as an airline pilot, simply needs to rest after work and hence has to rely all the more on his maid to take care of the children, which is simply not the most satisfactory arrangement as far as the children are concerned. Lack of Proper Understanding or Insight 147. One of the most serious criticisms of the Father’s parental skill is that he is often too rigid and strict with the children’s discipline, and is lacking in proper understanding or insight of their needs. 148. There is no question of the Father’s strict discipline with the children. It is all evidenced from the statements of the private tutors to the social investigation reports, as well as the children’s own words, in particularly the elder ones. Strict discipline of course is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact discipline is essential for the proper and healthy growth and development of all children. But when it is too strict or rigid and to be applied across the board for all the children irregardless of their age, needs or level of maturity, it becomes improper, unhealthy and can be counter-productive. 149. His “grounding” of the 2 girls for months for their late coming home on the 2 occasions mentioned, for example, in my view appears too strict and rigid under the circumstances. The use of corporal punishment on the children and not allowing them to cry in the past, by both parents although the Mother says she was simply obliged to follow the Father, has been conceded by the Father to be inappropriate. 150. The destruction of C’s CD which the Father considered to be unsuitable for him, or the criticism of the Mother for bringing the 2 girls to watch the movie “8 Mile” without knowing what that movie was about, and the strict prohibition of access to all TV, movies, music or books which he deemed to be unsuitable irregardless of the children’s age or maturity, without discussing with them the rights or wrongs of such materials, are further examples of the Father’s too rigid way of discipline, and, as pointed out by the Mother, his lack of understanding of the children’s needs, which is there for all to see in the ways he handled the 2 boys in particularly S in the “Sondang Incident”. The Sondang Incident 151. It will be recalled that in early March this year the 3 younger children were assessed by Dr Caleb Knight at the request of their school after the Father had raised some concern about their education. It was during his interview of S that Dr Knight became suspicious that he might have been exposed to inappropriate touching from the Father’s domestic helper Sondang which might amount to child abuse, and suggested the Mother to talk to S and to record their conversation, which the Mother did on 8th March 2004, the transcript of which was exhibited to her 14th Affirmation (P 2655 – 2663 B 7). 152. After listening to the tape, and after speaking to the other siblings and the Father, Dr Knight submitted a report on 11th March 2004, which I find useful to produce here its contents : -
153. While the matter was being investigated by the Social Welfare Department and the Police, the question of the Father’s access to S was raised at the resumed hearing on 18th March 2004, given Dr Knight’s opinion that S should not have any contact with Sondang under any circumstances even in the presence of the Father. 154. It is however clear from this report and from the subsequent correspondence between the parties and their solicitors, that it was the Father’s view that S and the other children had been manipulated by their mother to tell lies about these events, and that he was initially unwilling to follow Dr Knight’s recommendation that S have no contact with Sondang, when he indicated that he would ensure Sondang would not come into contact with S “in his absence”. It was only on 17th March when he finally agreed that there would be no contact between them, and on 18th March he gave his undertaking to the court accordingly. 155. At the hearing the Father however maintained his belief that the Mother had put S up to all these allegations against Sondang, and that he would like to put S and Sondang in the same room in his presence so that he could make his own assessment of whether S was telling the truth. He also said in his evidence that he had asked S if he was missing Sondang, as he had seen signs that he did. 156. On 31st March 2004 Dr Knight came to give his oral evidence about the matter during which he described the process of his consultations with S and what led him to his conclusion. It is his evidence that with his experience from practice for 20 years, of which 7 were with abused children, he was sure that S was telling the truth, as it would be highly unusual for a child of his age to be able to act and put on a performance like that, and, if I may add, within such a short time if he was indeed coached by the Mother, as alleged by the Father. 157. The Father had tried to suggest that the fact that S appeared to like Sondang showed that no abuse could have taken place, and that his crying and distress that Dr Knight had observed during his interview of him was because S knew he was lying against Sondang and that he felt bad about it as he knew it was not true. This was dismissed by Dr Knight as unlikely, and he also commented that it was an inappropriate thing for the Father to say that he would like to put Sondang and S in the same room for him to make his own assessment, as he said in his evidence : “Why would you expose a kid to the potential emotion and trauma ?” 158. This is where I agree with the Mother that it demonstrates the Father’s lacks of proper understanding and insight of his children’s needs. It is true that we now know that the Social Welfare Department has concluded their investigation that S’s was only a suspicions case of child sexual abuse, and that the Police has decided not to charge Sondang who has since left Hong Kong to return home to Indonesia, but it does not necessarily follow that abuse had never taken place. The important point is, irregardless whether Sondang did abuse S or not, when the allegation of abuse was first raised in March 2004 by an expert such as Dr Knight, the only normal and natural reaction one would expect from the parents, in my view, would be to protect S from any further potential harm, including keeping him away from Sondang pending the investigation, and to keep things very calm, structured and consistent with him in view of his behavioural difficulties, as recommended by Dr Knight, both in his oral evidence in Court, and in his report. 159. Unfortunately, by insisting that S must have been put up by his mother to lie against Sondang, by suggesting that S and Sondang be brought together in the same room so that he might conduct his own assessment, and by preferring to trust Sondang, the Father had either failed to place the welfare of his son in the forefront of his mind, or at least allowed his better judgment of his son to be obscured by his distrust and animosity towards the Mother in these proceedings. 160. Such behaviour of the Father is further demonstrated by events in May 2004 which involved Dr Knight again. It started on the morning of 26th April 2004 when, after a weekend access with their father, B and S were fighting and shouting while on their way to school, with S appearing inconsolable, and the Mother therefore decided to take both boys to see Dr Knight that day. 161. In his pursuant report (P. 2828 B7) Dr Knight told of the boys being upset at their father’s place over the weekend when they were screamed at and threatened by their father with punishment, and that they were told not to listen to their mother. Both boys said they did not like to go to their father’s house again. Dr Knight recommended that in view of the recent events it was important in particularly S to have an emotionally nuturing setting, that the parents should try to find an atmosphere of co-operation and calmness between them, and to stabilize the children’s home life even if this involves supervised visits between the children and their father. 162. The Father, not surprisingly, denied the boys’ story and dismissed it as another example of the Mother’s manipulation of the children against him or to obstruct his access to them. He also asked to meet with Dr Knight and the 2 boys together so as to clear up the matter. This request was rejected by Dr Knight who submitted a further report on 20th May regarding his view on supervised access with the following opinions and recommendations : -
163. At the resumed hearing on the Mother’s application for access to be supervised, instead of accepting Dr Knight’s opinion and tried to work out the access arrangement with the Mother, who by then was prepared to be more flexible with initial access to be merely in the presence of her helper or the Father’s family members rather than formal supervision by social worker, thereby providing the boys with the security they indicated would make them more comfortable, and at the same time making it easier for the Father’s access. Unfortunately the Father refused such option, and insisted that if his access had to be supervised, he preferred not to see the boys at all. Consequently for the following 4 months during the boys’ summer holiday, they did not see their father at all, while some of the elder children did. 164. This, according to the Mother, was a disturbing state of affairs as it shows clearly that the Father will do things only one way, and that is his way. She submits, and I agree with her, that even if he disagreed totally with what had happened, the Father ought to have been able to put the interests of the children first, rather than the attitude that if he could not direct how things were to happen, then he wanted nothing to do with the process. This attitude was confirmed by Dr Knight who had offered to see the Father on his own, but was refused by him as he had insisted in meeting together with the children. This attitude of the Father, the Mother argues, was particularly troubling as it sent a message to the boys which was punitive : You have said something I do not like so now I will not see you. 165. The Father had of course maintained his view that it was part of the Mother’s ploys to deny him access to the boys. The fact is, except one incident on Christmas Eve of 2003 when access had to be defined by the Court, access has always been on the basis of reasonable access including staying access whenever the Father is not flying, and the Mother has never tried to prevent access, and in fact it was she who first wrote to the Father through her solicitors, after the summer holiday, on 19th August 2004 proposing for the Father to resume his access, unsupervised, to the boys (P. 1115 C 4), and on the next day, 20th August, the Mother’s solicitors followed up with a proposal for access to start in the coming weekend. This is clearly inconsistent with someone who was trying to be obstructive on access. 166. A further example of the Father’s lack of understanding of his children’s needs and his deficient parenting skills can be seen from the way he handled the Mother’s request to change A’s school from CAIS to KGV earlier this year. Like everything else about their children, the parents were unable to agree on this matter and had to bring it to the Court before me on 1st September 2004, during which the evidence revealed that A had been unhappy at CAIS and wished to changed to KGV starting September 2004. Her request was supported by Dr Knight who had interviewed her and concluded that it would be in her best interests to attend KGV. The Father however believed that A was doing fine at CAIS and that her unhappiness was again the result of the Mother’s manipulation of her. 167. I did not accept the Father’s accusation of the Mother’s manipulation, and although some of his other arguments were not without merits, I allowed the application for A to change her school to KGV for the reasons as set out in my ruling which I do not propose to go into here again, but the evidence did reveal the way the Father handled the situation that deserves criticism, when A reported that she was unable to discuss the matter with her father : “My dad never listens to me, he ignores me and will not discuss or talk about it, and when I asked him about it, he walks away from me and tells me it is not a good school”. The Father has admitted knowing about A’s unhappiness at CAIS and her wish to transfer to KGV, but surely even if he did have good reasons not to agree to her request, he should have properly discussed the matter with A, and to do something about her difficulties at CAIS, instead of just flatly rejecting her request or ignoring her problem. 168. These incidents, in my view, not only show up the Father’s parenting skills, to be at the very least questionable, if not deficient, but also that his relationship with some of his children appears to be less close as he would like us to believe, which takes me to the Social Welfare Reports. The Social Welfare Reports 169. In the 1st report which was submitted in March 2003, at the relatively early stage of these proceedings, all the children were observed to have close physical and emotional bonding with both parents, but not surprisingly, the elder children found the Father to be a very strict parent and had used corporal punishment on them when they misbehaved in the past, as had the Mother, and whilst the elder children had expressed that they love both parents and would not want to express any view on their parents’ dispute over their custody, there appeared to be more resentment towards the Father over the way he has disciplined them. 170. For example, in paragraph 61 of the report (P. 1143 B 3), Y considered her father as a very strict parent, requiring her to wear long skirt, forbidding her to have her ear pierced, and “grounding” her for 4 months by not being allowed to go out after she had come home late on a Saturday, whereas N, whilst agreeing that both were loving parents, thought of her father as a very strict person controlling her daily life, and that she preferred to live with her mother. 171. The 3 younger children, A, B and S were not reported to have expressed any views or preference for their parents, mainly because of their relatively young age, they were however observed to be more attached to their mother. 172. Due to the allegation of possible Factitious Disorder on the Mother, the Social Work Officer was unable to reach any conclusion on the custody issue in her 1st report. In her 2nd report submitted 3 months later on 11th June 2003, on the basis of the Clinical Psychologist’s assessment which ruled out Factitious Disorder on the Mother, the Social Work Officer was able to reach her recommendation on the issue of custody in that the parties be given joint custody of the children with care and control to the Mother. It would be useful to refer to her reasons and basis for reaching her recommendation as follows : -
173. As submitted by Counsel for the Mother, in custody cases, the Social Welfare Officer is very often the only independent witness and that her evidence is of particular importance as “the eyes and ears of the Court”, while her report is required by statute to be given due consideration by the Court. Although both reports of the Social Welfare Officer Ms Ma, which were submitted in the first half of 2003, and that a lot has since changed when Y and N were still at school in Hong Kong, Ms Ma was able to comment both in her reports and in her oral evidence given in details in March 2004 on the relationship between the children and their parents, when she maintained her observations of the younger children’s close physical and emotional attachment to their mother, and despite strong challenge by the Father, stood by her opinion that it would be in the best interest of the younger children to remain in the care and control of the Mother. 174. Having heard her evidence I find Ms Ma to have properly discharged her duty in her investigation, and that her findings and observations in both her reports and testimony to be generally well supported by the evidence that have been presented before me, and that her opinion and recommendation on the issue of care and control of the children in favour of the Mother imminently sensible, practical and reasonable. 175. Ms Ma’s recommendation in her 2nd report that the parties be given joint custody, which was apparently based on their consensus at that time, but which the Mother has now retracted to be unworkable, however warrants discussion, in particularly in view of the Father’s submission that he should be given shared parenting and / or joint custody care and control of the children. Shared Parenting / Joint Custody Care and Control 176. Mr Pilbrow for the Father submits that it is apparent from the observations of the Social Investigation Reports, that both parents love the children and that the Father has maintained a strong and loving bond with the children, and that although the younger children in particularly the 2 boys are more physically attached to their mother, which is only natural and understandable at their age, the Court must also look to the long term future of these boys and recognise the essential contribution that their father must make in their late years. 177. It is also submitted that overall, the recommendation of Ms Ma has been that the parents are both equally loving parents, both have their strengths, the Father, in particular, in areas of academia and discipline, and that modern psychological opinion confirms that children benefit from the contribution given by both parents, and indeed it appears that the Mother accepts that the children should keep close contact with the Father. In the circumstances, it is submitted that the Father’s proposal that there be an order for shared parenting, which represents an order for joint care and control, in addition to joint custody, would logically be the most beneficial for the children, as the nature of the Father’s employment makes it feasible for the children to stay with him during the periods when he is not flying, as it is apparent from the oral evidence given at the hearing on his rosters that he has ample time available to be at home with the children, who have been accustomed to seeing their father at such times as he is not flying and, given the rosters are available on or about the middle of the previous month, the children’s schedule can therefore be arranged between the parties. 178. These are no doubt attractive arguments and I don’t think there is any dispute that joint custody and / or shared parenting would be the most ideal arrangement for children when the marriage of their parents breaks down, that is, in normal situation where, as agreed by Mr Pilbrow, there is a modicum of understanding and co-operation between the parents. Sadly, Mr Pilbrow also concedes, these protracted proceedings have caused the rift between these 2 parents to widen, and I may add, to a state rarely seen in other cases, which has been further intensified by the occurrence of the recent events involving A and the 2 boys that I have just referred to. 179. Irregardless whether the Father’s stance in these events was correct or not, it is submitted on his behalf that, in any event, the Court should not be deflected from its primary obligation in this case, namely, to review where the future welfare of these children lies, in which case it is submitted that 2 important factors stand out. Firstly, it is of paramount importance that the relationship between the Father and the 2 boys is reinstated and allowed time to regenerate. Secondly, it would be foolhardy of this Court to consider the mother’s application to remove the children from Hong Kong until such time as the financial aspects of this divorce are sorted out, as the disastrous effects of these proceedings upon the liquid assets of the family are such that it is most probable the only financial support left will be the Father’s income from his present employment. It is argued that the material effects of this must be investigated before the court is on a position to reflect on the relevant factors required by the guidelines set down by the relevant authorities such as Payne v Payne on relocation of children. 180. Whilst the Father’s present income is adequate to support the family in Hong Kong, it is argued that a move to Canada would materially affect this, a matter which needs to be examined at the final ancillary relief hearing, and since the Mother has just taken a tenancy of a flat and admitted that she is happily in love with another man, it is submitted that her application to remove the children shall either be dismissed at this time, or adjourned sine die, in which case the Father asks that the children’s legal custody, which is submitted at present remains jointly vested in the Mother and the Father, should remain the same, as the Father has always been the motivator and the better qualified to administer the children’s lives and education. 181. Furthermore, it is submitted that the Father is a man of strong religious principles, which have been instilled in the older children and he wishes should be a guiding influence to all of them. With the history of the Mother’s medical problems and also those of the children, together with the possibility of a factitious disorder continuing or re-emerging, there remains a great number of question-marks about the ability of the Mother to properly look after the long-term welfare of the children, especially if without the Father’s supervision, it is submitted that, taking into consideration all the relevant factors pertaining to the immediate and long-term future welfare of the children, the Father’s proposal of joint custody, care and control is most sensible, which is supported by a trend which has emerged in recent UK authorities which considers that the retention of joint parenting rights is almost automatic. 182. The Mother believes what the Father actually wants from shared parenting is that he has the children half of the time on his off days. She does not think such an arrangement is workable, considering the problems over access the recent months, even before the involvement of Dr Knight, the Father’s approach was to demand 50% of time with the children but then made no other arrangements. While it is accepted that as a general principle shared parenting has a lot to command it, the Mother believes that this can only be in families where there is a genuine cooperation between the parties, a willingness to look ahead and leave the past behind, and a willingness to work together. It cannot work in circumstances such as where the Father one minute says he wants defined access, then asks why he should being the children home on time if they are having a good time with him. 183. This is simply unworkable, it is submitted on behalf of the Mother, when the Father has shown absolutely no willingness to consider anyone else’s perspective than his own. He has ignored professional advice from all corners. It appears that since such proceedings have began he has had at least 5 months off work on stress-related sick leave, yet he has not felt it was necessary to seek professional help in spite of the recommendations from Dr Lo, Dr Knight and the social worker when it has been said that he had no insight and had made bad judgments. 184. It is also submitted for the Mother that in additional to the major issues that were at the centre of her allegations against the Father in her petition, there have also been on-going low level frustrations that surely mitigate against any shared parenting arrangements, with many of these issues having ended up before the Court or have been aired during evidence which appear to be irritants deliberately employed by the Father to simply make life difficult for her, with numerous examples including : -
185. While these can be described as annoyances, the Mother argues, they are never-ending and as such very much colour the relationship between the parties, and so the question has to be asked : what has the Father done to show that he can co-operate with shared parenting ? It is submitted that what he really wants is the children half the time and to do things his way, which is altogether a different prospect. Seeing the way he handled the recent question of supervised access to the 2 boys, and his refusal to see them at all if he could not see them on his terms, the Mother argues that it is quite clear that “sharing” is a concept alien to him, and his insistence on doing things his way and his way only make shared parenting an impossibility. The only working solution, the Mother submits, is that if care and control is granted to her, there has to be a defined access order to the Father. 186. It is for the same reasons, the Mother submits, that joint custody is not a realistic option, as while it is recognized that the modern approach is towards inclusion, not exclusion, this case is so extreme that joint custody is simply not workable, and that from the events of recent months, there has been nothing to cause her to change her position that she would seek sole custody. 187. An order for joint custody, where the Court grants custody to both parents, but physical care and control to only one of them, was until recent years rarely made in Hong Kong, whilst joint custody care and control was indeed almost unheard of. The most commonly made order is of course sole custody to one parent with a bundle of parental rights over the children, including their physical care and control and the right to make all important decisions on the children’s upbringing such as their education, religion and medical treatment, without consulting the non-custodial parent who is usually granted only rights of access, and generally must apply to the Court if he wants to be consulted on matters relating to the children’s welfare. 188. The effect of a sole custody order is therefore to transfer most, if not all, of the parental rights and authority, which both parents used to have, equally, during the marriage, to the custodial parent exclusively, with the non-custodial parent effectively excluded in the circumstances from having any decision-making role on matters affecting the welfare of the children, which may also have practical implications on a day-to-day basis as well, for example, in getting information from the children’s school or in urgent medical situation. This has no doubt caused difficulties and created conflicts between parents in some cases and has attracted criticisms of the law from practitioners. 189. Orders for custody and access are of course no longer made in England as a result of the sweeping reform brought by the Children Act 1989 which makes general provisions for the Court to have regard to the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration in determining any question with respect to his upbringing, with the abolition of orders for custody and access, which were replaced by new forms of order known respectively as residence and contact orders, as well as the abolition of the legal concept of parental rights, with the legal status of parenthood defined in terms of parental responsibility. 190. The philosophy of the 1989 Act was to promote the family so far as it was consistent with the welfare of the child, on the belief that children are generally best looked after within the family with both parents playing a full part in the children’s upbringing and without resort to legal proceedings. The Act therefore replaced the existing terminology of parental rights and authority by the phrase parental responsibility which is defined in the Act as “all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property”. 191. The 1989 Act does not produce a list of these rights, duties, powers, responsibilities or authority because it would be practically impossible to do so, as such a list would necessarily change from time to time to meet different needs and circumstances. The Act does provide that where a child’s mother and father were married to each other at the time of the birth, they shall each have parental responsibility for their child and that notwithstanding separation or divorce, each parent continues to have parental responsibility even if a residence order has been made in favour of one of them, as the English Law Commission considered that parents should not lose their ability to make decisions about their children simply because they were separated or divorced. The Act therefore supports the idea that “once a parent, always a parent”, and that the primary responsibility for deciding on the upbringing of the child should remain with the parents even after their separation or divorce. 192. The philosophy of the Act therefore is that a parent who does not have the child living with him should still be regarded as a parent so that he can be given information and an opportunity to take in the child’s upbringing. He cannot exercise a power of veto over the other parent, but can refer any dispute to the Court if necessary. It also encourages his involvement with the child and thus promotes the child’s welfare. The retention of parental responsibility to a parent who does not live with his child after divorce would therefore give him a voice in any major issue over the child, thereby hopefully minimising conflicts with the other parent. 193. With both parents having parental responsibilities after separation or divorce, the Act also provides that each of them may act independently in meeting that responsibility without the need to consult the other except where statute expressly requires the consent of the other. The right to act independently must of course be read with the duty not to act in a way that would be incompatible with the child’s welfare, or that a parent can ignore the need to consult the other parent on important issue. 194. We of course do not have our equivalence of the Children Act 1989, although the Law Reform Commission has recently recommended similar changes to our law relating to guardianship and custody of children. In the meantime our Court can still only make the usual orders for custody and access, or joint custody care and control as argued by the Father in this case. 195. The concept of shared parenting as I understand from the Father’s argument, is based on an order for joint custody care and control when the children will share their time and residence, not necessarily on equal basis, with their parents who still retain all parental responsibilities towards them, and at the same time to take the decisions that have to be taken when the parent is having their care and control. The English authorities which Mr Pilbrow for the Father has referred to are all about parental responsibilities and residence order, but I agree it would be helpful to refer to the leading case of D v D (Shared Residence Order) [2001] 1 FLR where Hale L J went though the basic principles upon which a first instance judge is to exercise his discretion in deciding what is best for the children, when she said : -
196. Butler-Sloss P sitting in the same court, agreed and added as follows : -
197. Applying these principles, it is quite clear that it is not necessary to show that exceptional circumstances exist before a joint custody care and control order may be granted. What is required is, as in all cases involving children, to demonstrate that the order is in the best interest of the children in the particular facts of the case. 198. The Mother does not agree that joint custody with the Father is workable, let alone joint custody care and control. She does accepts that the Father would continue to have a voice in important decisions affecting the children, such as education, health, religion, and matters of a serious nature, which is similar to the concept of parental responsibility under the 1989 Act, but the complete lack of co-operation from the Father, his insistence in doing things his way, his constant undermining of the Mother, his failure to put the children’s interests first, and his inability to see any fault in himself, which, if seen, could be rectified with help, the Mother argues, strongly mitigate against joint custody. The fact that he has never denied that he told the children not to listen to their mother, and that she was damaging them, she submits, are clearly no foundation for a joint custody order. 199. Sadly, with the evidence before me, I have to admit that the Mother does have some very valid points in her argument. In addition to the numerous examples that she has referred to in her submission, and from what I have seen and read throughout these proceedings, of the Father’s inability to co-operate with the Mother, one needs to go no further than to look into the 4 trial bundles of correspondences of the more than 400 letters, consisting of more than 1100 pages, written between the parties’ solicitors which contain ample evidence of the parties’ disagreements over anything concerning their children from major decisions such as change of school or overseas trips, down to the most trivial matters, not just at the beginning of their litigation when emotion was expectedly running high, but throughout the whole proceedings up to this very stage, with the animosity between the parties at such high level despite the time that has elapsed since their separation that I have to agree with Counsel for the Mother that it can only be described as extreme. 200. I accept that there does not have to be perfect harmony or total agreement between parents before the Court can consider making an order for joint custody. Even during the best of time in a happy marriage, parents do not always agree over the welfare of their children. It is simply not possible in human nature, and in this case, not every dispute between the parties was the Father’s fault, and although the fact that in the case of D v D the judge also found exceptionally high level of animosity between the parents but still went on to make an order for shared residence, and which the Court of Appeal did not disapprove, it should however not distract from the fact that in this case, the main difficulty lies with the Father. 201. As conceded by Mr Pilbrow for the Father, for joint custody to work, there must be understanding and co-operation, if not also mutual trust and respect, between the parents. But with the Father’s deep-rooted distrust of the Mother, his constant belittling of and undermining her ability, his labelling her as a compulsive liar and deceitful person, his insistence in things his way, his inability to see any fault in himself and that all the faults are in the Mother, his firm belief that the Mother is still suffering from Factitious Disorder and hence would not be able, or willing, to devote her time and care for the children, and the possibility that he may continue to want to be controlling of her after the divorce, how can one possibly expect that there will be co-operation from the Father once these proceedings are over ? He has so far failed to demonstrate that he is prepared to co-operate with the Mother, and it would be wholly irresponsible of me to simply accept his words and leave the children’s welfare to chance. 202. We all know how children can be affected by their parents’ conflicts which have been particularly bitter in this case where some of the children have become pawns in a power struggle between their parents, who find themselves unable to distinguish between their personal bitterness about the breakdown of the relationship and the necessity of focusing on the future well being and interest of their children. 203. We have seen how the children, in particularly the 3 youngest ones, have been affected by the recent incidents. Although the elder ones have been in boarding school and have thus been kept out of their parents’ conflicts most of the time, it does not mean that they have been able to escape unscathed. One simply needs to read the following harrowing statement of the eldest daughter Y (Exhibit P – 10) to realise how badly they have been affected too : -
204. Sadly, the parties apparently have failed to take heed of their children’s plight, and have allowed their relationship to deteriorate to such a state, which is most unfortunate, as I never for one moment have any doubt of the Father’s love and concern for his children, and with his strength in areas of academia and discipline, I am certain that the children would have benefited from his contribution, and a joint custody order would have been the ideal arrangement for the children, and would have been agreed by the Mother at the earlier stage of these proceedings. I can now only hope that given time, and perhaps with proper counselling, the parties especially the Father will one day be able to set aside their differences for the sake of their children, and to demonstrate better understanding and co-operation in parenting, and when that happens, the Father’s request for joint custody will no doubt be considered much more sympathetically by the Court. 205. For now, however, for all the reasons I have given, I am not convinced that it would be in the best interest of the children for the Father to be given joint custody or joint custody care and control with the Mother. I agree that she should be given sole custody care and control of the 4 younger children in order that the present arrangements for them can continue, so that things can be kept calm, structured and consistent for them as advised by Dr Knight, with defined access to the Father including staying access during his day off in Hong Kong, plus half of all the children’s major school holidays, the details of which no doubt the parties will want to address me later. Removal / Relocation of Children 206. With custody care and control of the children given to the Mother, what remains to be dealt with is her application for removal of them out of Hong Kong to live in Canada, which is of course also strenuously opposed by the Father. 207. Both parents are from Canada, but came to Hong Kong because of the Father’s job. With their root in Canada and with most of their respective family members still living in Canada, and their elder children are also studying in Canada, one can safely assume that, had this marriage continued, the younger children would sooner or later follow the footsteps of their elder siblings to study abroad in Canada, and that the parties would also eventually return to live in Canada, probably upon the Father’s retirement from Cathay Pacific. 208. This assumption of the parties’ future plan has now been interrupted by the breakdown of their marriage, so is it reasonable to maintain this assumption, or as in the words of Thorpe L J in the leading case on relocation, Payne v Payne [2001] 1 FLR 1052, when he asked : -
209. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the Mother’s application is motivated by any desire to exclude the Father from the children’s life or anything other than a genuine desire to return to Canada where she believes the children’s future lies. But is it realistic to do so soon after these proceedings in the summer of 2005 as proposed by the Mother, or that is it founded on practical proposals both well researched and investigated ? The Father argues that it is not, as the financial aspect of the divorce has yet been sorted out, before which it would be foolhardy for the Court to allow the Mother to remove the children from Hong Kong, as the disastrous effects of these proceedings upon the liquid assets of the family are such that it is financially impossible for him to just rely on his income from his present employment to maintain the Mother and the children in Canada. 210. Furthermore, the Father submits, as it is of paramount importance that his relationship with the 2 boys be reinstated and allowed time to regenerate, which I have agreed, the Mother’s removal of the children should therefore be postponed. 211. The disastrous effect of these proceedings upon the liquid assets of the family which the Father refers to is the legal costs that the parties have incurred which have exceeded $6 million in total and which the Father says have depleted almost all the liquid assets, save for his stock option which he says will not last up to early 2005 the way legal costs are incurring, and his small inheritance from his Father’s estate which he says he wants to preserve for the children’s future college expenses. 212. Exactly how much assets are left remains to be seen at the forthcoming ancillary relief hearing in January 2005, but legal costs of more than $6 million is a staggering sum for any family of any means, let alone one with 6 children to be maintained, some of whom will soon be entering university, and hence substantial provisions for their school fees and living expenses will have to be made. 213. All these will naturally have serious impact on the Father’s ability to maintain and support the Mother and the children in Canada at the same standard of living which they have so far been able to enjoy, in particularly of the fact that a not insubstantial sum of money will have to be provided up-front for setting up a new home for them in Canada, and all the ancillary expenses that come with it. I agree with the Father that with the question of final ancillary relief coming up soon in January 2005 for hearing when the Father’s assets and financial situation will be much clearer, it would be prudent for me to postpone my decision on the Mother’s application until then, which should not affect her proposed schedule for departure in the summer of 2005. 214. As to the question of costs, although the Mother is the successful party and deserves to get her costs, especially since she is without income and has all along been dependent on her husband, the fact that I have not heard any argument from the parties on this issue and with the ancillary relief matter coming up for hearing soon, it would be appropriate to also reserve the question of costs for the hearing in January 2005. 215. Regardless of the outcome then, the sad truth is that this case has taken almost 2 years and more than $6 million in legal costs, which illustrates all too uncomfortably that there is much wrong with our system when parental disputes over children are still mainly being handled in an adversarial manner with the litigating parties, often aided and abetted by their lawyers, dictating an oppressive style of litigation, instead of a more conciliatory or problems-solving manner, and which is way too expensive and exhaustive of family assets. The Law Reform Commission has made recommendations for sweeping reform to our law relating to the guardianship and custody of children. It is high time that such recommendations be accepted and implemented. 216. Finally I should not conclude without expressing my deep gratitude to all the expert witnesses including the Social Welfare Officer, and especially Counsel for both parties for their most valuable assistance rendered to this Court throughout the trial, whose ability to remain fair and courteous to each other while arguing their case for their client most forcefully and in such competent and skilful fashion in this most difficult and bitter case was indeed nothing short of exemplary.
Representation : Mrs Francis Irving instructed by M/S Weir & Associates for the Petitioner. Mr David Pilbrow instructed by M/S Johnson Stokes & Master for the Respondent. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||