Case Detail

CACV000164/2003

CACV 164/2003

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 164 OF 2003

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 667 OF 2003)

____________________________

BETWEEN
	CHOY BING WING	Plaintiff

	AND

	OFFICIAL RECEIVER & TRUSTEE OF NG YAT CHI, DISCHARGED BANKRUPT	1st Defendant
	STEPHENSON HARWOOD & LO	2nd Defendants

____________________________

Coram: Hon Woo JA and Hon Stone J in Court

Date of Hearing: 31 October 2003

Date of Judgment: 6 November 2003

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Woo JA:

Preliminary application

1. At the start of the hearing of this appeal, the plaintiff made an application to us to step down from hearing the appeal. He put forward three points in support:

(1) He doubted the independence of the judges of the judiciary. He drew our attention to a judgment dated 9 May 2003 of Recorder E Chan SC in HCA 3397/2002 in which he appeared as a basis for saying that the judges were not independent and it would be highly dangerous for them to hear his cases because they would deny him justice. He requested a judge outside the judiciary be appointed to hear this appeal.
(2) He submitted that I should not hear this appeal because the judicial acts that I carried out in two previous cases were contrary to the law. He identified the cases as my judgment dated 24 May 2002 in CACV 1233/2001 referred to below and my judgment dated 9 November 1999 when I sat as a Court of First Instance Judge in HCMA 554/1999.
(3) He also submitted that any judge who had made a previous decision on matters in connection with the issues he raised should not sit on such matters again. Regarding Stone J, he intimated that as Stone J had endorsed Yeung JA's judgment in an appeal case involving him, Stone J should not hear any of his cases again.

2. In our view, none of these points has any substance and we dismissed his preliminary application.

3. Thereafter, the plaintiff refused to address us on the appeal, on the ground, as he submitted, that he would not have a just hearing.

4. Notwithstanding, we have perused all the papers relating to this appeal and the skeleton submissions of counsel for the defendants, and are able to reach our judgment in this appeal.

Background

5. This is an appeal from the decision of Yuen JA made on 25 July 2003 ordering the plaintiff to provide security for costs of the appeal brought by the plaintiff against an order of Deputy Judge Muttrie made on 11 June 2003. The sum ordered to be secured was $75,000. By the order of the Deputy Judge, the plaintiff's statement of claim was struck out on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and was otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. The action was dismissed. The Deputy Judge also made a Grepe v Loam order against the plaintiff, who was ordered to pay the costs of the application to the defendants, to be taxed on the indemnity basis if not agreed.

6. The action stemmed from on a bankruptcy matter. The plaintiff was a creditor of Ng Yat Chi, a bankrupt. The 1st defendant was appointed as Mr Ng's trustee in bankruptcy in HCB 242/1992.

7. In 2001, the plaintiff took out a notice of motion against the 1st defendant under s 84 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance for an order that the 1st defendant disclose to the plaintiff documents connected with the sale of the entire shareholding in a company called Alljean Investment Ltd, part of Mr Ng's assets, and for an enquiry into the 1st defendant's conduct in connection with the sale after the disclosure of the documents.

8. On 15 February 2001, Yuen J (as she then was) dismissed the plaintiff's motion with an order nisi for costs against him. Subsequently the plaintiff asked for a variation of the costs order nisi on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On 2 May 2001, Yuen J refused to vary the costs order.

9. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed against the decision on costs. However, he did not apply for leave to appeal, which was held by Master Kwan on 22 May 2001, and upheld by Kwan J on appeal on 7 June 2001, to be required.

10. The plaintiff appealed against Kwan J's decision in CACV 1233/2001. The Court of Appeal, comprising Chu J and I, dismissed the appeal on 24 May 2002. The plaintiff sought leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, which was refused on 19 July 2002. The plaintiff applied for leave from the Court of Final Appeal, and the application was dismissed by the Appeal Committee on 17 September 2002.

11. In all the proceedings referred to above, costs orders were made against the plaintiff. The costs had been taxed to a sum of about $440,000.

12. On 24 March 2003, Deputy Judge To made a charging order against a property of the plaintiff for the taxed costs. The plaintiff appealed in CACV 78/2003. On the application of the 1st defendant, on 30 May 2003, Cheung JA ordered the plaintiff to provide security for costs of the appeal in the sum of $75,000. The plaintiff sought leave to appeal out of time from Cheung JA's order for security for costs but did not appear before the Court of Appeal, comprising Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA, on 18 July 2003. His application for leave to appeal out of time was dismissed with costs.

13. In the present action, HCA 667/2003, the plaintiff issued a writ against the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendants, who were the 1st defendant's solicitors in the legal proceedings referred to above. The statement of claim challenged the jurisdiction and lawfulness of the various courts in the above 2001 and 2002 proceedings in making the costs orders. In substance, it sought two declarations, namely, a declaration that the costs order against the plaintiff are all void and unenforceable in law, and a declaration that the 1st defendant be subject to an enquiry as to the transaction in disposing of the shares in Alljean Investment Ltd.

14. The defendants applied for the statement of claim be struck out and for a Grepe v Loam order to prohibit further or new proceedings.

15. On 11 June 2003, Deputy Judge Muttrie struck out the statement of claim and made a Grepe & Loam order.

16. On 25 June 2003, the plaintiff issued the notice of appeal in CACV 164/2003. Upon the defendants' application, on 25 July 2003, Yuen JA made an order for security of costs of the appeal by requiring the plaintiff to pay a sum of $75,000 into court within 14 days, that until such security is given, the appeal be stayed, and that in default of such security being furnished within the period of 14 days, the appeal do stand dismissed without further order with costs to be taxed and paid by the plaintiff to the defendants.

17. Against Yuen JA order, the plaintiff took out a summons on 4 August 2003 under order 59 rule 14 (12) of the Rules of the High Court to appeal. This is the appeal before us.

The appeal

18. On appeal from a decision of a single Judge of the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal would not exercise a discretion afresh and cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by a single Judge, unless there was error in principle. See para 59/14/26 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure, 2002, Vol 1.

19. Order 59 rule 10(5) of the Rules of High Court provides:

"The Court of Appeal may, in special circumstances, order that such security shall be given for the costs of the appeal as may be just."

20. It is an established category of "special circumstances" where the respondent in the appeal will be likely to encounter undue delay or be put to undue expense in enforcing any order for costs in respect of the appeal. If the appellant contends the security should not be awarded because it will prevent him pursuing his appeal, one of the conditions he has to fulfil is to demonstrate that his appeal has a sufficiently good chance of success to justify exposing the respondent to the injustice of having to bear his own costs win or lose. See paras 59/10/30 and 59/10/35 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure, 2002, Vol 1.

21. It is clear from her decision dated 25 July 2003 that Yuen JA has considered all the aforesaid matters. Taking into account the history given rise to the present action, and the fact that the plaintiff has so far refused to pay any of the costs ordered against him and his opposition to an appeal against the charging order for enforcing the taxed costs, Yuen JA was satisfied that there was adequate justification for the proposition that the defendants would be likely to encounter undue delay or be put to undue expense in enforcing any order for costs in respect of the appeal against Deputy Judge Muttrie's order dated 11 June 2003.

22. Yuen JA also considered the merit of the plaintiff's appeal against the Deputy Judge's order and concluded that it was difficult to see how the plaintiff could say that his prospect of success on the appeal was so high that he needed not provide security for costs. I can discern no ground whatever for saying that this decision is wrong, for to say the least the plaintiff's claims for the declarations in relation to the costs orders and the enquiry are clearly res judicata, and it would be most unlikely that the Grepe v Loam order can be successfully challenged in view of the history of this matter that I have attempted to summarise above.

23. Having considered the quantum of the costs as suggested by the defendants, supported by a skeleton bill, Yuen JA ordered the costs in the sum $75,000 to be secured.

24. There was ample material for Yuen JA to come to her conclusions referred to above. I am not satisfied that Yuen JA erred in principle or in any other manner in the exercise of her discretion.

25. The plaintiff's appeal against Yuen JA order must be dismissed.

26. I would make an order nisi as to costs against the plaintiff. I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to order costs on the indemnity basis as sought by the defendants in their counsel's skeleton submissions.

Stone J:

27. I agree.

(K H Woo)	(William Stone)
Justice of Appeal	Judge of the Court of First Instance

Representation:

The Plaintiff, in person

Mr Sanjay A Sakhrani, instructed by Messrs Stephenson Harwood & Lo, for the Defendants.

CACV000164A/2003

CACV 164/2003

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 164 OF 2003

(On Appeal from HCA No. 667 of 2003)

---------------------------------------

BETWEEN:
	CHOY BING WING	Plaintiff

	AND

	OFFICIAL RECEIVER & TRUSTEE OF NG YAT CHI, DISCHARGED BANKRUPT	1st Defendant
	STEPHENSON HARWOOD & LO	2nd Defendant

Coram: Hon Yuen JA in Chambers

Date of hearing: 22 July 2003

Date of Decision: 25 July 2003

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DECISION

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1. This is an application by the Defendants for security for costs of an appeal by the Plaintiff against an order of Deputy Judge Muttrie made on 11 June 2003 striking out the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and was otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and dismissing the Plaintiff's action.The deputy judge also made a Grepe v Loam order against the Plaintiff and ordered him to pay the costs of the application to the Defendants, to be taxed on the indemnity basis if not agreed.

Background

2. By way of background, the Plaintiff was a creditor of Ng Yat Chi, a bankrupt. The 1st Defendant was appointed Mr Ng's trustee in bankruptcy in HCB 242/1992.

Plaintiff's application against 1st Defendant

3. In 2001, the Plaintiff issued a Notice of Motion against the 1st Defendant under s.84 Bankruptcy Ordinance ("BO"), a provision under which the court exercises control over trustees in bankruptcy. The motion was for an order that he disclose to the Plaintiff documents connected with the sale of the shares of a company called Alljean Investment Ltd which were part of Mr Ng's assets, and for an inquiry into the 1st Defendant's conduct in connection with the sale after the disclosure of documents.

4. I heard the matter on 8 February 2001 and in a written decision handed down on 15 February 2001, held that the evidence before me did not persuade me that the 1st Defendant was guilty of misconduct as alleged by the Plaintiff.

Costs order

5. I dismissed the motion and gave an order nisi that the costs follow the event, i.e. that the Plaintiff pay the 1st Defendant's costs.

6. The Plaintiff asked for a variation of the costs order nisi on the ground that s.84 BO did not give the court jurisdiction to order costs against him.

7. On 26 April 2001, I heard the application for variation. For reasons set out in a written decision handed down on 2 May 2001, I held,after comparing s.84 BO with s.81 Bankruptcy Act ("BA"), that what in England would only have been an administrative complaint had been turned in Hong Kong (by the different wording in s.84 BO) into legal proceedings, so that the court did have jurisdiction to order costs.

Plaintiff's failure to obtain leave to appeal against costs order

8. The Plaintiff sought to appeal the decision on costs, but not the order dismissing the Notice of Motion. At the hearing before me on 22 July 2003, he said he did not appeal the order dismissing the notice of motion because, contrary to the reasoning set out in the decision on costs, he still regarded the Court's decision in the application under s.84 BO as an administrative act only.

9. Be that as it may, he did seek to appeal the order that he pay the 1st Defendant's costs. However he did not apply for leave to appeal,even though the appeal was from an order of costs only.

Proceedings before Master Kwan

10. On 22 May 2001, Master Kwan sitting as Registrar of Civil Appeals held that his Notice of Appeal was invalid for want of leave.

Proceedings before Kwan J

11. The Plaintiff appealed Master Kwan's order and appeared before Kwan J, arguing that no leave was required. The Plaintiff relied on Hellyer v Sheriff of Yorkshire [1975] Ch 16, derived from what in England is known as the Scherer principle. However, his appeal was dismissed by Kwan J on 7 June 2001on the ground that, following Ho Lee Man v Wong Wai Kai [1993] 1 HKC 183, the Scherer principle did not apply to Hong Kong by virtue of s.14(3)(e) High Court Ordinance.

Proceedings before Court of Appeal (CACV 1233/2001)

12. The Plaintiff appealed Kwan J's decision in CACV 1233/2001.This was heard by the Court of Appeal (Woo JA and Chu J) on 24 May 2002.

13. It would appear that it was at this stage that the Plaintiff sought to rely on the decision of the Court of Appeal (Nazareth VP, Mortimer JA and Keith J) in Li Ngan Shui Brumen v Official Receiver [1995]1 HKC 133 in support of his submission that his notice of motion under s.84 BO was only an administrative complaint for which no costs order could be made against him.

14. The Court of Appeal in CACV 1233/2001 dealt with that submission in paragraphs 16-18 of the judgment which I shall not repeat here. The Court of Appeal in CACV 1233/2001 affirmed the decision on costs dated 2 May 2001 that s.84 BO was distinguishable from s.81 BA and gave rise to judicial proceedings with costs implications.

15. Apart from the reasons set out in paragraphs 16-18 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in CACV 1233/2001, it might also be observed that the Court of Appeal in Li Ngan Shui Brumen was apparently not addressed on the differences in the bankruptcy legislation of England and Hong Kong. It would appear from the law report that there were no arguments on s.84 BO, nor was it drawn to the attention of that court that in England, a complainant could either go to the Court under s.80 BA (which is word for word identical to s.83 BO) or to the Board of Trade under s.81 BA (which is different from s.84 BO - principally in that in s.84 BO, the inquiry is by the Court at an inter-partes hearing, and perhaps more importantly, there has been added s.84(4) BO which refers to "liability under this section", language which is consistent with civil rights and remedies, rather than simply administrative complaints).

Application for leave to appeal to CFA

16. Not content with the decision of the Court of Appeal in CACV 1223/2001, the Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Leave was refused by the Court of Appeal on 19 July 2002 on the basis that the matter did not involve any question of great general or public importance.

17. The Plaintiff applied for leave from the Court of Final Appeal but on 17 September 2002, the Appeal Committee (Chan, Bokhary and Ribeiro PJJ) dismissed the application under the procedure in rule 7(2) of the Court of Final Appeal Rules.

18. Although no reasons were given for the dismissal, the decision of the Court of Appeal in CACV 1223/2001 would have been before the Appeal Committee. If the Appeal Committee had considered that the Court of Appeal had not dealt with the Plaintiff's submission based on Li Ngan Shui Brumen persuasively, so that there remained (as the Plaintiff suggests) two conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal, it would not have ordered that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable grounds for leave to appeal.

19. It must therefore be taken that the decision of the Court of Appeal in CACV 1223/2001 in respect of s.84 BO is final.

Costs liabilities

20. The costs orders made against the Plaintiff in the series of hearings above have now accumulated to a sizeable amount of more than $400,000 (after taxation), with interest accruing. No payment has been made by him at all.

Charging Order

21. On 24 March 2003, Deputy Judge To made a charging order against a property of the Plaintiff.

22. The Plaintiff lodged a notice of appeal (CACV 78/2003) against the charging order.

23. The 1st Defendant issued a summons for security for the costs of that appeal on the basis that it would be likely to encounter undue delay or be put to undue expense in enforcing any costs order in respect of the appeal, and that the appeal was an abuse of the process of the court and was vexatious.

24. On 30 May 2003, Cheung JA ordered the Plaintiff to provide security for costs by paying $75,000 into court within 14 days, stayed the appeal in CACV 78/2003 until payment in, and made an order that in default of payment in, the appeal be dismissed with costs to the Defendant. There was also an order that the Plaintiff pay the Defendant's costs of the application for security.

25. I was informed at the hearing on 22 July 2003 that no payment in was made. The Plaintiff sought leave to appeal out of time from the order for security for costs but did not appear before the Court of Appeal (Rogers V-P and Le Pichon JA) on 18 July 2003. His application was therefore dismissed with costs.

New action - HCA 667/2003

26. In the meantime, on 21 February 2003, the Plaintiff had issued a writ in HCA 667/2003 against the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendants, who were the 1st Defendant's solicitors in the proceedings referred to above.

27. The Statement of Claim pleaded the proceedings set out in paragraphs 3 - 17 above and alleged that "in the premises, the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage due to the wrongful conduct of the Defendants in conspiring to procure and induce the Courts into making unlawful, fraudulent and unjust Orders against the Law". The particulars pleaded were that (a) there has been a prima facie case of fraud and/or conspiracy of fraud involving the 1st Defendant, the mortgagee bank and the purchaser of the shares in Alljean, that (b) I had failed in my administrative duty to oversee bankruptcies in asking for cogent evidence without proper regard to prima facie evidence properly laid before the court, that (c) I had erred in concluding that the court had jurisdiction to order costs against him, that (d) the Court of Appeal had "not been honest" in refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, that (e) the Appeal Committee had "not been honest" in refusing leave and that (f) "the Courts have acted in a manner to create gross injustice and ruin to the rule of law in Hong Kong".

Strike-out application

28. The Defendants applied to strike out and for a Grepe v Loam order to prohibit further or new proceedings.

Judgment below

29. On 28 May 2003, Deputy Judge Muttrie heard the application and on 11 June 2003, he handed down a written decision granting the orders set out in paragraph 1 above.

30. On 25 June 2003, the Notice of Appeal in CACV 164/2003 was lodged. It is in respect of this appeal that the Defendants lodged this application for security for costs.

Application for security for costs

31. The grounds for the application are that in light of the Plaintiff's attitude and conduct in refusing to pay any part of the costs ordered in favour of the 1st Defendant in the history of the proceedings set out in paragraphs 3-17 above, the Defendants were likely to suffer difficulty or expense in enforcing a costs order against the Plaintiff, and that the prospects of the Plaintiff's success on appeal are so low that an order for security for costs would be proper.

Guidelines

32. It is recognised that the Court of Appeal would order security for costs of an appeal upon proof (or in some cases, even upon a presumption) that the respondent to the appeal would be likely to encounter undue delay or be put to undue expense in enforcing any order for costs in respect of the appeal, such as where the appellant's conduct indicates that he is likely to resist enforcement of any costs order (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, 59/10/30).

Application of guidelines to present case

33. In the present case, the Plaintiff's failure or refusal to pay any part of the costs liabilities in the proceedings in paragraphs 3-17 above over the course of so many years, his resistance of the charging order before Deputy Judge To in March 2003, his intention to appeal (in CACV 78/2003) from the charging order, and his failure or refusal to pay the security for costs ordered by Cheung JA on 30 May 2003 in that appeal provide clear proof that the Plaintiff would be likely to resist enforcement of any costs order that might be made against him in this appeal (CACV 164/2003).

34. No affirmation was filed by the Plaintiff but in the hearing on 22 July 2003, he opposed the application on the ground that he had refused to pay the accumulated costs because he believed that his view that the court had no jurisdiction to order costs under s.84 BO was right, the Court of Appeal in CACV 1223/2001 had been "dishonest" in refusing to accept his view, and the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal had been "dishonest" in refusing to let him argue the point before the Court of Final Appeal.

35. Whatever the Plaintiff's beliefs, the upshot still is that he has refused to pay any of the costs which have accumulated with interest accruing. Indeed, given those beliefs, the likelihood is that he will continue to refuse to pay the costs. Although the 1st Defendant has obtained a charging order on a property belonging to the Plaintiff, he indicated at the hearing on 22 July 2003 that he was using the property as his office and that if he loses the use of the property, that would affect his livelihood. It is clear from that that the Plaintiff would not easily give up possession of the property for sale under the charging order.

36. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is adequate proof that the Defendants would be likely to encounter undue delay or be put to undue expense in enforcing any order for costs in respect of the appeal (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, 59/10/30).

37. Although it may be possible for an intended appellant to resist an order for security for costs by relying on the likelihood of success of his appeal, that is not the case here.

38. The written decision of Deputy Judge Muttrie striking out the claim and making the Grepe v Loam order is thorough and well-reasoned. As far as the Plaintiff's complaints against the 1st Defendant are concerned, the Plaintiff had failed in his motion in February 2001 and had decided not to appeal that decision, which, for the reasons set out in the decision and above, was a judicial decision and not an administrative one as it would have been in England. In seeking to relitigate the matter, the Plaintiff is in effect trying to lodge an appeal out of time under a fresh action.

39. As for the court's jurisdiction to order costs under s.84 Bankruptcy Ordinance, the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal has refused leave to appeal that decision. However genuine may be the Plaintiff's grievance about not having his day in court before the Court of Final Appeal, in the court structure here, that has to be the end of the matter (Chow Shun- yung v Wei Pih Stella FAMV 2/2003).

40. Although the Plaintiff has made allegations of "fraud" against the Court of Appeal and the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal, it would appear that this is only an inference that he has made solely from the fact that the Court of Appeal in CACV1223/2001 has not dealt with the decision in Li Ngan Shui Brumen in a manner which he finds persuasive, and that the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal has denied him the opportunity to present his appeal to the Court of Final Appeal at an oral hearing. Those can hardly be particulars of fraud. Therefore it is difficult to see how the Plaintiff can say that his prospects of success on appeal are so high that he need not provide security for costs.

41. I have noted that the order as filed did not say that the Plaintiff is prohibited from commencing any further new legal proceedings in respect of the same claim or subject matter in HCB 242/1992 or the writ or statement of claim in HCA 667/2003 without the leave of the Court as in Grepe v Loam (1887) 37 Ch D 168, although the following words in the order showed that it was intended that the Plaintiff would be able to commence new proceedings if he could obtain leave from the court ("and if notice of any such proceedings shall be given to the 1st and 2nd Defendants without such leave being obtained ..."). The omission of a reference to leave in the first part of the order is a matter for amendment of the order by the judge under the slip rule, and the Defendants have by their solicitors given an undertaking to apply to the court within 7 days for amendment of the order so that it follows the formulation in Grepe v Loam.

Quantum of security for costs

42. Finally as to quantum, the Defendants have sought security for costs in the sum of $80,000. This was supported by a skeleton bill showing a bill of $84,000 on a party and party basis. The estimated brief for counsel is reasonable. The hourly rates for the partner in charge of the case and the solicitor assisting him are the usual rates accepted by the taxing masters in party and party taxation. The Plaintiff has estimated 3 hours for the hearing of the appeal. However, given that the Defendants' legal representatives are familiar with the history of the matter, some of the time spent by solicitors preparing for the appeal could be saved and I would reduce the estimate to a sum of say, $75,000.

Order

43. In the circumstances, I would order that the Plaintiff do provide security for the Defendants' costs of this appeal by paying a sum of $75,000 into court within 14 days, and that until such security is given the appeal be stayed, and that in default of such security being furnished within the period of 14 days, the appeal do stand dismissed without further order with costs to be taxed and paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendants.

44. There will also be an order nisi that the Plaintiff pay the Defendants' costs of the application for security. Mr Sakhrani asked for costs to be taxed on the indemnity basis. As this application for security for costs is a discrete interlocutory matter where the Plaintiff was in effect in the position of a respondent, I do not see any grounds for a higher basis of costs save for the time referred to in the following paragraph.

45. I would make an order nisi that the Plaintiff pay the Defendants' costs of their lawyers' attendance on an indemnity basis from 10:00 am (when the hearing was scheduled to start) to 10:25 am (when the Plaintiff eventually arrived). The Plaintiff's excuse for arriving late was that he had thought that the application would be heard by Cheung JA and he did not wish to attend the hearing because of his dissatisfaction with the judge as a result of the hearing on 30 May 2003. Whatever excuse the Plaintiff may have for his late arrival, that had nothing to do with the Defendants. As it was, the time was lost and there was no reason why the 1st Defendant (who is publicly funded) would have to pay the difference in costs between the indemnity basis and the party and party basis.

	(MARIA YUEN)
	Justice of Appeal

Representation:

The Plaintiff, in person, present

Mr Sanjay Sakhrani instructed by Messrs Stephenson Harwood & Lo for the Defendants

CHOY BING WING v. OFFICIAL RECEIVER & TRUSTEE OF NG YAT CHI, DISCHARGED BANKRUPT ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

Files (2)

(1)	He doubted the independence of the judges of the judiciary. He drew our attention to a judgment dated 9 May 2003 of Recorder E Chan SC in HCA 3397/2002 in which he appeared as a basis for saying that the judges were not independent and it would be highly dangerous for them to hear his cases because they would deny him justice. He requested a judge outside the judiciary be appointed to hear this appeal.

(2)	He submitted that I should not hear this appeal because the judicial acts that I carried out in two previous cases were contrary to the law. He identified the cases as my judgment dated 24 May 2002 in CACV 1233/2001 referred to below and my judgment dated 9 November 1999 when I sat as a Court of First Instance Judge in HCMA 554/1999.

(3)	He also submitted that any judge who had made a previous decision on matters in connection with the issues he raised should not sit on such matters again. Regarding Stone J, he intimated that as Stone J had endorsed Yeung JA's judgment in an appeal case involving him, Stone J should not hear any of his cases again.