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Civil Action2007

CHOY BING WING v. BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA AND OTHERS

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79620-EN-2011-11-15

CHOY BING WING v. BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA AND OTHERS

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HCA2458/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2458 OF 2007

____________________

BETWEEN

 CHOY BING WINGPlaintiff
 and  
 BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA1st Defendant
 DIRECTOR OF CIVIL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA2nd Defendant
 COMMISSIONER OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA3rd Defendant

____________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 15 November 2011

Date of Decision: 15 November 2011

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

 

1.  This is Mr Choy’s application for leave to appeal against my decision dated 4 October 2011.

2.  Mr Choy appeared this morning and asked me whether I had answered his letter dated 7 November 2011.  In substance, the background of this matter was a request for transcripts.  As will be revealed in the reasons for dismissing the leave application below, I had in fact answered Mr Choy’s previous request for transcripts, but I had not answered his letter dated 7 November 2011 because I considered that letter as abusive in nature.

3.  Without hearing further from me, Mr Choy walked out of court at about 10:09 am and did not pursue his application for leave to appeal.

4.  In the premises, that application ought to be dismissed outright.  However, to put the record absolutely straight, I would deal briefly with that leave application.

Background

5.  On 21 November 2007 the Plaintiff, Mr Choy, issued the writ against the 1st to 3rd Defendants, amongst other defendants.  On 7 January 2008 the action was discontinued, and I gave leave, as Registrar.  It was ordered that the costs of the action be paid by Mr Choy to the three Defendants now before this court to be taxed if not agreed.  The costs of the first three Defendants represented by the Department of Justice were taxed at $61,566 under an allocatur dated 18 February 2009. 

6.  By an order dated 26 July 2011 Master Ho imposed a charging order absolute on Mr Choy’s property in Queens Road West based on the allocatur.  Mr Choy’s appeal against the charging order absolute was dismissed by me on 4 October 2011.

7.  Mr Choy seeks leave to appeal against my decision.  In seeking leave to appeal, it is up to Mr Choy to satisfy this court that his appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard.  In his summons, Mr Choy set out the following grounds of appeal:

(a) whether it is contrary to legal principles for a judge to refuse release of transcripts and/or tape records to a party for a hearing conducted during that party’s absence;

(b) whether it is contrary to legal principles and against public interest for a judge who had dealt with the same case or party previously and been complained of judicial wrongdoing to refuse to recuse and to continue to deal with the same case on subsequent and consequential matters; and

(c) whether a judge can make a charging order absolute for obstruction of justice by turning a blind eye to complaints of hearsay affirmations without recusal, but pressing ahead, hearing the party concerned for the complaint against her.

8.  Insofar as the first ground of appeal is concerned, it is not clear to which set of transcripts or tape records Mr Choy was referring to.  If Mr Choy was referring to the transcript of the proceedings before Master Ho, I have dealt with Mr Choy’s request.  On 22 September 2011 Mr Choy, by letter, asked me to order Master Ho to release papers, tapes and transcripts unconditionally for exposure of his bias.  Through my clerk and by a letter dated 26 September, I replied as follows:

“The request for transcript and tape-recording has been dealt with by Master Ho, and I shall not deal with the same again.”

9.  As for the papers for assessment of costs, if Mr Choy is referring to the documents which Master Ho has ruled to be privileged, then this is a matter that should not be dealt with by correspondence, but, if appropriate, by appeal.

10.  As matters turned out, on the day of hearing of the appeal against Master Ho’s order, Mr Choy walked out without pursuing his appeal.

11.  Next, if Mr Choy’s request for transcripts concerned the hearing before me on 4 October, again, I have dealt with his request.  By my clerk’s letter dated 6 October 2011, I have replied, stating that the transcript of reasons are to be given free of charge.  If Mr Choy wanted a transcript and tape, he should undertake to pay fees.

12.  As it turned out, Mr Choy never undertook to pay fees, and so the transcript was not provided to him.

13.  The reasons for my decision dated 4 October 2011 had been delivered to Mr Choy on or about 20 October 2011. 

14.  Subsequent to the reply letter of my clerk dated 6 October, Mr Choy wrote to me yet again, making certain complaints and also asking me to issue the transcripts and tapes free of charge for his onward submission to the Chief Executive.  By my clerk’s letter dated 10 October 2011, I replied to Mr Choy, stating that I have given directions as per my letter dated 6 October 2011.  Those directions stood.  Again, Mr Choy did not undertake to pay for the fees of the transcript.

15.  In the premises, I cannot see why Mr Choy can complain that I refused to release the transcripts.  The first ground of appeal cannot stand.

16.  In relation to the second ground of appeal, this effectively had been dealt with in my reasons for decision dated 4 October 2011.  There is nothing from Mr Choy to suggest that I have misapplied any legal principles.  To put the matter straight, if Mr Choy had been put in gaol, that was not a matter dealt with by me.  The contempt proceedings which formed the basis of his gaol sentence were not handled by me.  The second ground of appeal cannot stand.

17.  In relation to the third ground of appeal, the charging order absolute was made by Master Ho based on material before him.  Mr Choy had lodged an appeal, but did not pursue it on 4 October.  He walked out in the middle of his application for my recusal.  He has not shown cause as to why my decision on 4 October was erroneous as a matter of law, nor could he show in what way Master Ho had wrongly exercised his discretion in granting that charging order absolute. The third ground of appeal cannot stand.

18.  In summary, it has not been demonstrated that Mr Choy’s intended appeal has any reasonable prospect of success or that there is any reason in the interest of justice to justify his appeal to the Court of Appeal.

19.  I therefore dismiss Mr Choy’s application.

(Submission re costs)

20.  Costs be to the 1st to 3rd Defendants, summarily assessed and allowed at $8,604.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Plaintiff appearing in person

Mr Mark Chan, SGC of the Department of Justice, for the 1st to 3rd Defendants

78719-EN-2011-10-04

CHOY BING WING v. BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE<br>GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG<br>SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA AND OTHERS

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HCA2458/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2458 OF 2007

____________________

BETWEEN

 CHOY BING WINGPlaintiff

and

 BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA
1st Defendant
 DIRECTOR OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA
2nd Defendant
 COMMISSIONER OF INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, CHINA
3rd Defendant
____________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 4 October 2011

Date of Decision: 4 October 2011

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

 

1.  Mr Choy walks away from court at 10.12 am whilst I was preparing my short reasons for decision. That it his decision of deciding to leave the courtroom and proceedings will continue despite his absence.

2.  This is the application by Mr Choy for my recusal. It is not a case based on any actual bias of the court against him. He appears to be relying on a case of apparent bias.

3.  In the past Mr Choy had made all sorts of allegations against me whilst I was Registrar.  Those allegations were irrelevant to the present matter before me in this case and I disregard them altogether.

4.  In one occasion in the past Mr Choy had been jailed for contempt which he described as arising because of my conduct. That matter had ended already and I believe Mr Choy has served his sentence. Again, that matter is entirely irrelevant to this case.

5.  It is not uncommon for a litigant to make comments against a judge, lodge complaints or lose an application before the judge.  That does not mean that when he comes back the judge will be biased against him or her.

6.  In this application today I agree with Mr Leung that the proper test to be applied is whether a fair minded and informed observer would conclude that there will be a real possibility of bias in the circumstances.

7.  In my view, there is nothing advanced by Mr Choy which would suggest any possibility of bias in the circumstances of this case.

8.  This court will administer justice in accordance with the law and decide a case upon the evidence placed upon this court.  Any personal attacks which Mr Choy has launched against me in the past will not be taken into account and therefore I dismiss Mr Choy’s application for recusal.  There simply is no ground to entertain it.

(Discussion re appeal application)

9.  Mr Choy as the appellant is absent now so he is taken as not pursuing his appeal against Master Ho’s decision. 

10.  Even if he were to pursue that appeal I can hardly see any valid grounds for allowing that appeal.

11.  The matter arose out of a charging order nisi taken out by the first three Defendants for a judgment debt owed by Mr Choy in this case.

12.  At the application for a charging order absolute Mr Choy and the first three Defendants appeared before Master Ho.

13.  Mr Choy asked for Master Ho to be excused on the ground that the learned Master had dealt with certain matters in the present proceedings, in particular, in refusing to release certain documents requested by the Plaintiff in taxation proceedings.

14.  Further, Mr Choy relied on his complaint against the learned Master of judicial wrongdoing against the Plaintiff.

15.  In that application for recusal, again it was not Mr Choy’s case that there was actual bias on the part of the Master. 

16.  In respect of apparent bias the general principle is the same.  The court must ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased.  It must ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.  See Chau Siu Woon v Cheung Shek Kong[2010] 3 HKLRD 49.

17.  Mr Choy alleged that the Master had ruled against him in a previous taxation and there was a pending appeal against such a decision. The nature of that decision and the relevant considerations were different from those in the present case, which concerned a charging order application.

18.  As pointed out by Mr Leung, acting for the first three Defendants, that appeal did not concern the three Defendants in this case.  But in any case, in my view, the fact that a litigant is appealing against the learned Master’s decision in another matter formed no sufficient basis for alleging that the Master was or could be biased against him.

19.  As in dealing with the application for my recusal earlier on, the fact that Mr Choy had lodged complaints against the learned Master of judicial wrongdoing again is irrelevant and does not form a sufficient basis for recusal of the Master.  See the case of Yung Mei Chun v Chan Sing Chuen, unrep., HCMP 1178/2009, 15.4.2011.

20.  In my view, no fair minded and informed person would conclude that there is a real possibility or real danger that Master Ho could be biased against Mr Choy.  The first part of the appeal relating to recusal of the Master therefore cannot stand.

21.  The second part of the appeal concerns the charging order application. 

22.  A judgment debt was owed by Mr Choy. The costs owed had been taxed and therefore formed a judgment debt owed by Mr Choy against the Defendants.

23.  There is no dispute that Mr Choy has a beneficial interest in the property involved. 

24.  The main argument advanced by Mr Choy in his affirmation was that the order on which the judgment debt was based was not final but an interlocutory order under appeal.

25.  In my view, the fact that an order was subject to an appeal does not mean it was not final or interlocutory in nature.  Unless and until the judgment has been overturned on appeal the judgment creditor would be entitled to enforce it by way of a charging order. The correct test is simply whether the judgment or order is for an ascertained sum of money and in this case that test is satisfied.

26.  The existence of an appeal does not operate automatically as a stay of execution.  There is, in fact, no application for a stay on the part of the Plaintiff.

27.  Furthermore, according to the Defendants they have not been served with the relevant documents concerning the appeal, being CACV217 of 2008. 

28.  The Defendants therefore queried whether or not the alleged appeal is relevant to the present action or at all.

29.  In any case, considering the evidence submitted by Mr Choy, I cannot see him having shown cause as to why the charging order nisi should not be made absolute.

30.  I am of the view that the learned Master came to the correct decision in making an order absolute for the charging order.

31.  The present appeal, therefore, should be dismissed.

(Discussion re costs)

32.  Costs are assessed summarily and allowed at $14,500, to be paid by Mr Choy.

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Plaintiff appearing in person

Mr Matthew Leung, Senior Government Counsel, of the Department of Justice, for the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Defendants

Please refer to HCMP2467/2011 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

61832-EN-2008-07-23

CHOY BING WING v. BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA AND OTHERS

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HCA 2458/2007

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2458 OF 2007

----------------------

 

BETWEEN

  
 CHOY BING WINGPlaintiff
 and 
 BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA1st Defendant
   
 DIRECTOR OF CIVIL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA  2nd Defendant
   
 COMMISSIONER OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA3rd Defendant
   
 DIRECTOR OF HOUSING DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA 4th Defendant
   
 PRESIDENT OF HONG KONG INSTITUTION OF ENGINEERS   5th Defendant

 

--------------------

 

Before:  Hon Fung J in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  18 July 2008

Date of Decision:  18 July 2008

Date of Reasons for Decision: 23 July 2008

--------------------------------------

REASONS  FOR  DECISION

--------------------------------------

 

1.  The Plaintiff is appealing the decision of Master Ho on 24 June 2008 in taxation hearing with the 5th defendant as receiving party ordering that the documents sought by the Plaintiff from the 5th defendant for the purposes of preparation of objections to the sum allowed on provisional taxation be limited to inspection by the Court.

2.  At the hearing, the Plaintiff requested that I recuse from sitting and I refused to do so.  I also dismissed the appeal with costs.  I now give my reasons.

Recusal

3.  The Plaintiff said he did not have confidence in my honesty and/or reliability by reason of his honest opinion, rightly or wrongly, based on what he gathered from a recent appeal by defendants previously convicted by me sitting in the District Court.   The prosecution case involved the ICAC evidence and the Plaintiff had no trust in the ICAC.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal has been reserved.

4.  Mr. Lui, for the 5th Defendant, submitted that there was no basis for my recusal.

5.  Three classes of cases call for disqualification of a judge from sitting:

(1) actual bias;

(2) presumed bias;

(3) apparent bias.

6.  There is no evidence of actual bias.  The Plaintiff’s ground is based his perception rather than fact.

7.  There is no presumed bias as I have no interest, pecuniary or proprietary, in the outcome of the case.

8.  As to apparent bias, the test is usually stated as follows:

“A particular judge is qualified from sitting if the circumstances are such as would lead a reasonable, fair-minded and well informed observer to conclude that there is a real possibility that the judge would be biased.”

9.  Applying the test, any reasonable, fair-minded and well informed observer must have regarded the Plaintiff’s apprehension as tenuous or frivoulous.

10.  Hence, I refused to recuse myself.

Background

11.  The Statement of Claim alleged, inter alia, that the 5th Defendant conspired with the Government in trying to disqualify him as a professional engineer as a result of his “conviction” (of contempt of court) and imprisonment.  He did not accept the findings of the Court, and queried whether there was any conviction.   He sought disclosure of papers and files containing injurious falsehoods and sought damages to his livelihood.

12.  The Plaintiff discontinued the action against all the Defendants, and costs of the action were ordered to be paid by the Plaintiff to the 1st to 5th Defendants, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.  The Registrar allowed on provisional taxation the sum of $63,903.  The Plaintiff objected and sought a hearing. 

13.  He sought “all documents and records and details of meetings for the Plaintiff to bridge the gap of 2 to 3 hours to that of 14.5 hours” in order to prepare the list of objections.  Master Ho ordered that the correspondence between the 5th Defendant, his solicitor and counsel be produced for the Court’s inspection only.

Plaintiff’s grounds

14.  The Plaintiff alleged there was a conspiracy referred to above.  He sought all documents and files containing the communications between the Secretary and the 5th Defendant.  He submitted that the 5th Defendant’s lawyers could not have spent 14.5 hours without looking at those documents.

15.  The Plaintiff submitted that by instructing counsel to suppress the disclosure, there must have been a conspiracy by the 5th Defendant.

Defendant’s grounds

16.  Mr. Lui submitted as follows:

(1) The 5th defendant is willing to deposit with the taxing master all papers and vouchers relating to all items contained in the bill of costs (including solicitor’s correspondence and counsel’s advice) in compliance with O.62, r.23, RHC;

(2) There were no documents between the Secretary of Justice and the 5th Defendant;

(3) The documents to be produced are under legal professional privilege until waived (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2008, Vol. 1, para. 24/5/22);

(4) The Plaintiff is not entitled to the documents under the rules or PD 14.3 on taxation of costs;

(5) The Court must be careful in ordering disclosure of privileged documents to non-legally represented party (see Goldman v Hesper [1988] 1 WLR 1238 (CA)).

Discussion

17.  Under O. 62, r. 23(1), RHC, the person whole filed his bill of costs for taxation shall deposit with the taxing master all papers and vouchers relating to the items contained in the bill of costs.  PD 14.3 stipulates the lodging of the bundle of all documents relating to the items objected to with the Court 2 clear days before the hearing.

18.  No specific document is listed out in the rules or the Practice Direction, but as a matter of practice, privileged documents such as solicitors’ correspondence and counsel’s advice are produced to the taxing master without disclosure to the other party unless otherwise ordered by the taxing master.

19.  In Goldman v Hesper, the English Court of Appeal referred to the previous O.62, r.29, RSC (the not entirely similar counterpart of our O. 62, r. 23(1), RHC) stipulating the production of the “requisite documents” at the appropriate taxing office, which unless the taxing master otherwise ordered, included solicitor’s correspondence and attendance notes, and cases to counsel to advice and the advice and opinion.

20.  Taylor LJ said at p. 1243 B-G:

“It is therefore clear that there is now a statutory requirement on a claimant for costs to disclose privileged documents to the court.  Normally, where privilege exists it applies to protect disclosure not only to the opposing party, but also to the court. So the rule clearly makes inroads into that general protection.  It follows that once a party puts forward privileged documents as part of his case for costs some measure of their privilege is temporarily and pro hac vice relaxed.  In most cases, as Hobhouse J observed in Pamplin’s case [1985] 1 WLR 689, 695, no problem would arise on taxation about privilege.  However, when the problem does arise the taxing officer has the duty of being fair to both parties: on the one hand, to maintain privilege so far as possible and not disclose the contents of a privileged document to the paying party unnecessarily; on the other hand, he has to see that that party is treated fairly and given a proper opportunity to raise a bona fide challenge.  The contents of documents will almost always be irrelevant to considerations of taxation which are more concerned with time taken, the length of documents, the frequency of correspondence and other aspects reflecting on costs…

It would not be practicable or helpful for this court to seek to lay down any firm criteria as to the circumstances in which such an extreme course may be necessary. All will depend on the facts of the individual case. One factor which may affect the course taken by the taxing officer may be whether the party is represented by a lawyer or costs clerk, or whether he appears in person. Clearly in the former case there would be more opportunity for flexibility in the approach adopted by the taxing officer. He might, for example, think it appropriate to allow disclosure of privileged documents to the paying party's lawyer, but not to be divulged to his client.”

21.  It is obvious that the Plaintiff is trying to seek disclosure of documents which went beyond the necessary consideration for the purpose of taxation, and in a way, to seek the documents alleged to be in existence and prayed for in the action now discontinued.  The action has not gone past the initial stages and no detailed consideration of the contents of the documents is expected to be necessary.  The consideration that the Plaintiff is not represented by any lawyer or law costs draftsman is also relevant.  In any case, I am quite sure that taxing master upon seeing the documents will strike the right balance and see to it the rights of the opposing parties be protected.

22.  In the premises, the appeal is dismissed.

Costs

23.  I awarded the costs of the appeal to the 5th Defendant as no convincing argument was made as to why costs should not follow the event. 

24.  Mr. Lui asked for gross sum assessment.  The sum proposed was $45,100 inclusive of counsel’s fee and solicitor’s time costs.

25.  Having considered the issues and documents involved, I am of the view that counsel’s fee claimed was reasonable, and I allowed it in full.  I considered that the solicitor’s costs should be less than counsel’s fee by reason of the nature of the work reasonably expected to be involved.  I allowed the gross sum of $25,000.

  (B Fung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Choy Bing Wing, the Plaintiff in person, present

Mr Mike Lui, instructed by Messrs Wilkinson & Grist, for the 5th Defendant