HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2015

CHOY BING WING v. HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV11/2004CHOY BING WING v. THE SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE HONG KONG SAR
  • CACV1233/2001CHOY BING WING v. OFFICIAL RECEIVER
  • CACV164/2003CHOY BING WING v. OFFICIAL RECEIVER & TRUSTEE OF NG YAT CHI, DISCHARGED BANKRUPT ANOTHER
  • CACV172/2013CHOY BING WING v. PRESIDENT OF HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (HKIE)
  • CACV193/2005THE SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE HONG KONG SAR v. CHOY BING WING
  • CACV275/2015CHOY BING WING v. HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS
  • CACV78/2003CHOY BING WING v. OFFICIAL RECEIVER
  • HCA125/2005CHOY BING WING v. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUDICIARY OF HKSAR, CHINA AND OTHERS
  • HCA1994/2012CHOY BING WING v. PRESIDENT OF HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (HKIE)
  • HCA2351/2005CHOY BING WING v. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF HKSAR, CHINA AND OTHERS
  • HCA2458/2007CHOY BING WING v. BUILDING AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, CHINA AND OTHERS
  • HCA3509/1994MICHAEL EDWARD BROWN v. CHOY BING WING
  • HCA6115/1988CHOY BING WING v. NG YAT CHI
  • HCA667/2003CHOY BING WING v. OFFICIAL RECEIVER & TRUSTEE OF NG YAT CHI, DISCHARGED BANKRUPT AND ANOTHER
  • HCAL48/2016CHOY BING WING v. APPEAL COMMITTEE OF THE HONG KONG INSTITUTION OF ENGINEERS
  • HCB12343/2009RE CHOY BING WING
  • HCB242/1992CHOY BING WING v. OFFICIAL RECEIVER
  • HCCT8/1992CHOY BING WING v. THE HONG KONG & SHANGHAI HOTELS, LTD.
  • HCMP3353/2015CHOY BING WING v. PRESIDENT OF HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (HKIE)
  • HCMP959/2014CHOY BING WING v. DIRECTOR OF HOUSING DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Files (3)

101601-EN-2015-11-27

CHOY BING WING v. HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS

HTML content

HCA 309/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 309 OF 2015

____________

BETWEEN  
 CHOY BING WINGPlaintiff

and

 HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERSDefendant

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 18 November 2015
Date of Decision: 27 November 2015

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

1.  There are 2 summonses before the court:

(1) The defendant’s application: (a) to strike-out the statement of claim and to dismiss the action; (b) alternatively to determine a question of law (“the Question”) under Order 14A, namely,

“whether the references to a person being ‘convicted of a criminal offence’ in the Defendant’s Constitution and Disciplinary Regulations include the situation where a person was found guilty of criminal contempt of court”; and

(2) The plaintiff’s application to strike-out the plaintiff’s strike-out summons.

Background

2.  The background facts are neither disputed nor disputable.

3.  The plaintiff (“Mr Choy”) used to be a member of the defendant (“HKIE”).

4.  Article 13(4)(d) of the Constitution of HKIE provides that if a member shall be found by the Board of Inquiry to have been guilty of “improper conduct”, the Council may, amongst others, order that his membership be suspended for any period.

5.  “Improper conduct” is defined under Article 13(5)(c) to include “conviction by a competent tribunal of a criminal offence which in the opinion of the Council renders a member unfit to be a member”.

6.  Under Article 13(4A) of the Constitution, an appeal against an order by the Council for improper conduct shall lie to an Appeal Committee and the decision of the Appeal Committee shall be final. 

7.  Mr Choy was committed twice for contempt of court in HCMP 4694/2003 and HCMP 1313/2010 (collectively “the Contempt Proceedings”).  For that, he was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months and 4 months respectively. [1]

8.  On 3 October 2012, HKIE gave written notice of the hearing to be held before the Board of Inquiry on 9 November 2012 at 2:30 pm.

9.  On 24 October 2012, the Plaintiff commenced HCA 1994/2012 against the President of HKIE for an injunction to prevent the holding of the inquiry hearing on 9 November 2012.

10.  HCA 1994/2012 was struck out and dismissed.  Mr Choy’s appeal therefrom was dismissed by Mimmie Chan J.  His further appeal to the Court of Appeal was struck out for persistent and contumelious disobedience of the court’s directions.  His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was likewise dismissed.

11.  On 9 November 2012, in the absence of Mr Choy, the Board of Inquiry found Mr Choy to have been guilty of improper conduct by reason of the 2 committals for contempt.

12.  On 17 January 2013, pursuant to the finding of the Board of Inquiry, the Council of HKIE ordered that Mr Choy’s membership with HKIE be suspended for 3 years with effect from 18 January 2013 to 17 January 2016 (“the Suspension Order”).

13.  On 21 January 2013, Mr Choy served on HKIE a notice of appeal against the Suspension Order.  An Appeal Committee has been appointed as a result.  That appeal is pending and hence the Suspension Order is not yet in force.

14.  On 5 February 2015, Mr Choy issued the present action against HKIE for a declaration that the Suspension Order was null and void.

A preliminary question of recusal

15.  At the outset, I have asked the parties whether they objected to my hearing this case because one of the findings of contempt relied on by HKIE was against me when I was Registrar of the High Court, although I bore no personal grudge against Mr Choy.  Neither party sought my recusal. In actual fact, the issues at stake are on points of law and not on merits of the acts in contempt or the contempt procedure itself.  I therefore proceeded to hear this case.

Legal principles for striking out

16.  The following principles are well established and have been well set out in the skeleton submission of Ms Lau, counsel for HKIE:

(a) It is only in plain and obvious cases that the court should exercise its summary powers to strike out any pleading. The claim must be obviously unsustainable, the pleadings unarguably bad and it must be impossible, not just improbable, for the claim to succeed before the court will strike it out.

(b) A reasonable cause of action means a cause of action with some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered.  So long as the statement of claim discloses some cause of action, or raises some question fit to be decided by a judge or jury, the mere fact that the case is weak is no ground for striking out.

(c) A proceeding is frivolous when it is not capable of reasoned argument, is without foundation or cannot possibly succeed.  A proceeding is vexatious when it is oppressive and/or lacks bona fides.

(d) As regards “abuse of the court’s process”, the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused.  The court will prevent the improper use of it machinery and will, in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation.

Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016, Vol. 1, §§18/19/4-18/19/10

Mr Choy’s pleaded case

17.  Mr Choy seeks a declaration that the Suspension Order was null and void.  The grounds for his claim can be summarized as follows:

A. HKIE charged him twice for having been convicted of criminal offence under the Contempt Proceedings;

B. HKIE violated his common law rights, as underpinned by Articles 39 and 87 of the Basic Law and Article 11(2) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“BORO”), by failing to disclose his criminal records of convictions and sentences;

C. HKIE made the Suspension Order on 17 January 2013, after a delay of over 65 days from the purported hearing date of 9 November 2012 in the absence of Mr Choy;

D. HKIE violated Regulation 6.3 of the Disciplinary Regulations and the rule of natural justice that a man may not be a judge in his own cause; HKIE turned a blind eye to its cause of non-disclosure; and

E. The decision of Mimmie Chan J in HCA 1994/2012 was wrong.

18.  It will be useful to analyze the Question first as it forms the core dispute.  After that, the answers to Mr Choy’s pleaded case will become obvious.

Whether “conviction of a criminal offence” under the Constitution and Disciplinary Regulations includes a finding of criminal contempt of court

19.  Mr Choy submits that the judgments in the Contempt Proceedings made “findings” that he was in contempt of court.  The words “conviction” or “sentence” were not used.  Fingerprints of his would have been taken before the trial: section 59 of the Police Force Ordinance, Cap 232.  Had he been convicted, there would have been a certificate of conviction.  Not being a court of law, HKIE could not lay a criminal charge against him and suspend him for 3 years.  There is no other avenue to sort out the Suspension Order.  Only a court of law has that power under Article 83 of the Basic Law, so Mr Choy submits.

20.  Mr Choy relies heavily on the dicta of Rimer J cited in Cobra Golf Inc and anor v Rata and others [1998] Ch 109, 137C-F, wherein it is stated that contempt of court is not a criminal offence although the standard of proof is the criminal standard.

21.  In the Cobra Golf case, the issue before Rimer J was whether there was a privilege against self-incrimination for civil contempt and whether civil contempt constituted the commission of a criminal offence (at pages 128E & 129E).

22.  In the course of his judgment, Rimer J referred to 2 lines of authorities.  The first line appears to have held that a proceeding for civil contempt of court was not for a criminal offence although the standard of proof was the criminal standard (at pages 128D to 142C).  Mr Choy relies heavily on one case in this line of authorities, namely, Garvin v DomusPublising Ltd [1989] Ch 335, 345, per Walton J (appearing at page 136C of the Cobra Golf case).  The second line of authorities held, some being obiter dicta, that proceedings for civil contempt was a common law misdemeanour and criminal in nature (at pages 142C to 155H).  Included in the second line of authorities was a case relied on by Ms Lau, namely, Balogh v St Albans Crown Court [1975] 1 QB 73, Lord Denning MR at 85H , Stephenson and Lawton LJJ at 87C & 91E. 

23.  Rimer J did not directly answer the question of whether or not civil contempt was a criminal offence.  At page 156H-157A, he heldthat proceedings for civil contempt were for the “recovery of a penalty” in respect of which there was a privilege against self-incrimination. He relied on the second line of authorities.  Implicitly, he did not accept the proposition that contempt of court was not a criminal offence.  Accordingly, contrary to Mr Choy’s submission, the Cobra Golf case does not assist him.

24.  In Hong Kong, it has been held that an intention and act to interfere with or impede the due administration of justice is criminal contempt. Criminal contempt is a common law criminal offence punishable by imprisonment.  See Chiu Luen Public Light Bus Co Ltd v Persons Unlawfully Occupying or Remaining on the Public Highway& ors[2014] 6 HKC 298 at §§123 & 124, Au J.

25.  In fact, Mr Choy himself has contended before the court in HCMP 4694/2003 that the 1st contempt was “criminal” contempt.  He challenged the court’s jurisdiction there, contending that he could only be tried in a criminal court upon indictment and Order 52 of the Rules of the High Court gave no jurisdiction in respect of criminal contempt: judgment of Hartmann and Suffiad JJ dated 12 December 2005, at §9.

26.  Hartmann and Suffiad JJ agreed with Mr Choy that the contempt of which he stood accused was a criminal contempt, being conduct which interfered with the due administration of justice.  A criminal contempt was a matter for the Secretary for Justice to raise, acting as the guardian of the public interest in ensuring the protection of the due administration of justice. Whilst proceedings in respect of criminal contempt have in the past been instituted by way of indictment, it was now the preferred practice to proceed by way of committal proceedings under Order 52 of the Rules of the High Court even for criminal contempt (§§ 10-11, 13-16).

27.  Before Mimmie Chan J in HCA 1994/2012, Mr Choy took a contrary argument, namely, that contempt of court was not a criminal matter, that he had not been “sentenced” to imprisonment in a criminal manner, that a committal for contempt does not amount to a criminal conviction and there was no basis for the President of HKIE to initiate the disciplinary inquiry.  That was rejected by the learned judge (at §§9-11 of her decision dated 12 August 2013).

28.  Having regard to the above analyses, I am of the view, firstly, that contempt of court is a criminal offence.

29.  Secondly, for contempt of court, a defendant does not have to be “charged” by the police but can be directly brought before the court. The court could on its own volition consider whether he was guilty of contempt in the face of the court.  See eg Balogh v St Albans Crown Court.  Alternatively, the defendant can be made the subject of contempt proceedings by the Secretary of Justice as a guardian of public interest: HCMP 4694/2003, 12 December 2005, at §10.

30.  Accordingly, section 59 of the Police Force Ordinance, Cap 232, concerning the power and duty of the police to take fingerprints of a suspect or person “charged” does not apply.

31.  Thirdly, the word “convicted” or “conviction” simply means that a person charged has been found, or has pleaded guilty: Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (8th ed.) pp. 608 – 610, citing (amongst others) S (an infant) v Recorder of Manchester [1971] AC 481 at 489B-C, Lord Reid; R v Manchester Justices [1937] 2 KB 96 at 101 Humphreys J.

32.  Fourthly, the conviction of contempt will be recorded and a subsequent court dealing with another conviction (whether of a similar or dissimilar offence) of that person should be informed about it: R v Newbury Justices ex parte Pont& ors (1983) 78 Cr App R 255, at 262 per May LJ.

33.  Applying the above principles, there can be no doubt that Mr Choy had been convicted twice of a criminal offence of contempt of court.  The absence of the word “sentence” in the judgments in the Contempt Proceedings is irrelevant.  It is undeniable that Mr Choy had been sentenced to imprisonment twice and he had served those sentences.

34.  It is an abuse of the process of the court for Mr Choy to re-run the contradictory arguments before Hartmann and Suffiad JJ, and Mimmie Chan J to challenge HKIE’s current application.

35.  At this hearing, Mr Choy relies heavily on another case of General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627 for the proposition that the court must distinguish between public law (criminal law) and private law (civil law).  The HKIE is a statutory body for fact finding and is not a court of law.  Under Article 83 of the Basic Law, it is a court of law that has power to issue the Suspension Order against him, so Mr Choy submits.

36.  In the Spackman case, the Medical Council had power to direct the registrar to erase the name of a medical practitioner from the register if he was (i) convicted of felony or misdemeanor; or (ii) after due inquiry be judged by the General Council to have been guilty of “infamous conduct” in any professional respect. 

37.  Viscount Simon LC pointed out the significant distinction between the 2 situations.  Under situation (i), the decision of the Council was properly based on the fact of the conviction and the practitioner could not go behind it and endeavour to show that he was innocent of the charge and should have been acquitted.  In situation (ii), the decision of the Council, if adverse to the practitioner, must be arrived at after due inquiry. 

38.  The infamous conduct of the medical practitioner in question was a finding of adultery in a divorce suit and fell within situation (ii).  The Council refused to hear evidence tendered by the medical practitioner with a view to showing that he was not guilty of the infamous conduct alleged and that the finding of the Divorce Court against him as co-respondent was wrong.  The House of Lords held that the Council had not made “due inquiry”.  (p 634-635 of the judgment)

39.  To the extent that Mr Choy reminds the court to distinguish between public/criminal law and private/civil law, and that HKIE/Board of Inquiry is not a court of law, there is no reason to disagree with him.  However, the Spackman case does not assist Mr Choy on whether or not a finding of contempt of court was a conviction.  To the contrary, it assists HKIE in that, just like the Medical Council in Spackman, HKIE can rely on a court’s conviction to initiate an investigation against a member for “improper conduct”. 

40.  Spackman required the Medical Council to make due inquiry which included the hearing of evidence.  In the present case, HKIE/Board of Inquiry had given opportunities for Mr Choy to appear and make representation.  It was Mr Choy who opted not to attend the hearing.

41.  Mr Choy relies also on a number of other authorities:

(i) The Reasons for Decision of To J in the present case dated 29 September 2015. That decision concerns Mr Choy’s appeal against a Master’s decision on directions for disposal of the present summonses and, without disrespect, has no bearing on the issue before me.

(ii) R v Palmer [1992] 1 WLR 568, 572F where it was held that a court dealing with a person for criminal contempt has no power to make a probation order.  It neither supports Mr Choy’s proposition (in his letter dated 19 December 2011) that contempt of court is not a criminal offence; nor his allegation that the President had perjured himself when stating that Mr Choy had been “convicted” of contempt.

42.  Having regard to the above analyses, the reference to a person “being convicted of a criminal offence” in the Constitution includes the situation where a person is found guilty of contempt of court. 

43.  I now proceed to analyze Mr Choy’s pleaded case.

Ground A – That HKIE charged Mr Choy twice for having been convicted of criminal offence

44.  To put the position straight: it was not HKIE but the Secretary for Justice who applied for committal for contempt in the Contempt Proceedings.  What HKIE did was to rely on (and justifiably so) the findings of the contempt in the Contempt Proceedings as the bases for initiating disciplinary investigation.  Ground A is a plainly unarguable cause and there is no chance of Mr Choy succeeding in it.

Ground B – HKIE violated Mr Choy’s common law rights, as underpinned by Articles 39 and 87 of the Basic Law and Article 11(2) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Cap 383 (“BORO”), by failing to disclose his criminal records of convictions and sentences.

45.  Mr Choy has had no criminal convictions before any of the 2 findings of contempt.  He was not charged by the police for contempt and the usual process of taking fingerprints of a suspect pursuant to the Police Force Ordinance was not gone through.

46.  Whilst these were true, they were irrelevant. I repeat paragraphs 29-30 above.  In fact, the police had purported to obtain the fingerprints of Mr Choy whilst he was detained.  It was objected to by Mr Choy and, for reasons that this court need not investigate, the police had not pursued it.

47.  HKIE does not have access to Mr Choy’s criminal record.  In any case, I can hardly see how failure to disclose someone’s conviction record (even if it existed) can prevent the findings of contempt from being a conviction, or the Board of Inquiry from proceeding with the hearing.

48.  Mr Choy claims that his common law right is underpinned by various legislative provisions:

(i) Article 39 of the Basic Law, which provides for application of ICCPR and other conventions to Hong Kong;

(ii) Article 87 of the Basic Law, which provides for the right of an arrested person to a fair trial and presumption of innocence until convicted; and

(iii)  Article 11(2) of BORO, which provides for minimum  guarantee for a person charged with a criminal offence.

49.  These provisions are simply irrelevant for the reasons given under Ground B.

50.  Ground B is frivolous or vexatious.

Ground C – HKIE made the Suspension Order on 17 January 2013, after a delay of over 65 days from the purported hearing date of 9 November 2012 in the absence of Mr Choy

51.  The hearing of 9 November 2012 was to decide the question of whether or not Mr Choy was guilty of improper conduct.  The Board of Inquiry could not decide the penalty. It was the job of the Council.  The Constitution and the Regulations did not prescribe the time when the Council should decide the penalty after the Board of Inquiry had made its finding and Mr Choy did not point to any relevant provision.  The complaint under Ground C is in lack of a reasonable cause, and is frivolous or vexatious. 

Ground D – HKIE violated Regulation 6.3 of the Disciplinary Regulations and the rule of natural justice that a man may not be a judge in his own cause, HKIE turned a blind eye to its cause of non-disclosure

52.  Under Regulation 6.3(b) of the Disciplinary Regulations of HKIE, the Board of Inquiry may at its discretion suspend the conduct of the investigation or inquiry if there are “pending legal proceedings in respect of the Alleged Offender on the same subject matter that initiated or resulted in his or its investigation or inquiry and if in his or its view, the pending legal proceedings may affect such investigation or inquiry or its outcome”.

53.  The subject matter that initiated or resulted in the investigation of Mr Choy was the findings of contempt.  The Contempt Proceedings had been concluded and were not pending.  On the other hand, HCA 1994/2012 was to stop the President from exercising his powers in investigating Mr Choy. Regulation 6.3 was simply not engaged.  In any case, Regulation 6.3 merely confers on the Board of Inquiry a discretion, not obligation, to suspend its inquiry. 

54.  There was no breach of natural justice.  The disciplinary hearing was heard by a Board of Inquiry independent from the Investigation Commission.  Mr Choy did not complain about the constitution of each of these bodies.  Their members were not judging their own cause.  The issue of non-disclosure of Mr Choy’s conviction record was unsustainable for reasons given under Ground B.

55.  Further, HCA 1994/2012 had been struck out. There cannot be any complaint that the Board of Inquiry had proceeded improperly on 9 November 2012 in the face of that High Court action. 

56.  Ground D is frivolous or vexatious.

Ground E – The decision of Mimmie Chan J in HCA 1994/2012 was wrong

57.  The proper avenue to challenge the decision of Mimmie Chan J was closed.  It is simply frivolous or vexatious and an abuse of court process to challenge it in the present action. 

Abuse of process

58.  Under Article 13(4A) of the Constitution, an appeal against an order by the Council for improper conduct shall lie to an Appeal Committee.  Mr Choy has resorted to that channel already.  This is a clear abuse of the process of the court for him to commence the present action in parallel.  This action ought to be struck out.

59.  In summary, there cannot be any doubt that Mr Choy had been convicted of a criminal offence and hence was guilty of “improper conduct” within the meaning of Article 13(4)(d) and 5(c).  Ground A is unarguably bad and doomed to fail.  Grounds B to E are frivolous or vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.  Ground C also lacks a reasonable cause of action.  It is plain and obvious that the statement of claim ought to be struck out and the action dismissed.

HKIE’s application under Order 14A

60.  Under Order 14A of the Rules of the High Court, the Court may upon the application of a party or of its own motion determine any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or matter where it appears to the Court that (a) such question is suitable for determination without a full trial of the action; and (b) such determination will finally determine (subject only to any possible appeal) the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein. 

61.  The Question clearly satisfies the above two requirements.  I repeat paragraphs 19-42 above and answer the Question with a “Yes”.

Mr Choy’s summons to strike out HKIE’s summons

62.  In paragraph 1(ii)(a) of his summons, Mr Choy refers to the Cobra Golf case at page 136 and R v Palmer at page 572 in contending that HKIE has no ground to issue its summons as contempt of court is not a criminal offence.  Given that the court now accepts the submission of HKIE, Mr Choy’s contention is plainly unarguable.

63.  In paragraph 1(ii)(b) of Mr Choy’s Summons, Mr Choy said that he had made known the “plot (presumably of HKIE’s) in its bundle dispatched to the HKIE of HKSAR government in its attempt [to] make [Mr Choy] a convict in the criminal record under Cap 232 on 8/12/2005 by sending a police to gain entry into Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre by impersonating Solicitor Wong to procure the Plaintiff’s finger prints as a convict.  It is the prosecution duty of [HKIE] to disclose the criminal record of [Mr Choy] under Cap 232.”

64.  I repeat the analyses under Ground B.

65.  The grounds for striking out HKIE’s summons are unarguable.

Conclusion

66.  I order that:

(1) In respect of HKIE’s summons,

(a) The plaintiff’s claim be struck out and the action be dismissed on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous or vexatious and is an abuse of the process of the court;

(b) The Question is determined by answering it with “yes”.

(2) Mr Choy’s summons be dismissed.

67.  Mr Choy has wholly failed in both summonses.  I make an order, nisi, that costs should follow the event and be to HKIE. The costs are summarily assessed and allowed, again on nisi basis, in the sum of $150,000.

68.  I thank Ms Lau for her assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The plaintiff appeared in person

Ms Zabrina Lau, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the defendant


[1] See the judgments in HCMP 4694/2003, of Hartmann and Suffiad JJ dated 25 October 2005 at §93 and 7 December 2005, at §29; and the judgments in HCMP 1313/2010 of McMahon and Macrae JJ dated 7 January 2011, at §41 and 11 February 2011, at §18.

100690-EN-2015-09-29

CHOY BING WING v. HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS

HTML content

HCA 309/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 309 OF 2015

____________

BETWEEN

 CHOY BING WINGPlaintiff

and

 HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERSDefendant
____________
Before:  Hon To J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 22 September 2015
Date of Decision:  22 September 2015
Date of Reasons for Decision: 29 September 2015

_________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION
_________________________

Background

1. The plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) is a member of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, which he mistakenly referred to as the “Hong Kong Institute of Engineers”.  The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers (the “Institution” or “Defendant”) is a body corporate set up under the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers Ordinance (Cap 1105).  Hitherto, the Plaintiff and the Institution conducted this and other litigations on the basis that they are proper parties to the litigations.  For the purpose of this appeal, I shall also proceed on that basis but remind the parties of the need to amend the pleadings. 

2. Under Article 13 (4) (a) of the Constitution and Disciplinary Regulations of the Institution, if a member is found to have been guilty of improper conduct, the Council of the Institution may order the member to be expelled from the Institution, or that his membership be suspended, or that he be reprimanded or be removed as a member.  “Improper conduct” is defined in Article 13 (5) to include, inter alia, “conviction by a competent tribunal of a criminal offence which in the opinion of the Council renders a member unfit to be a member”.

3. The Plaintiff was committed for contempt of court on two occasions in HCMP 4694/2003[1] and in HCMP 1313/2010[2], for which he was sentenced to 6 months’ and 4 months’ imprisonment respectively.

4. On 17 January 2013, the Institution ordered that the Plaintiff’s membership with the Institution be suspended for three years with effect from 18 January 2013 to 17 January 2016 on the basis of the above improper conduct.  On 5 February 2015, the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings against the Institution seeking a declaration that the Suspension Order is null and void.

5. On 3 August 2015, the Defendant took out a summons (“Defendant’s Summons”) applying to have the Plaintiff’s statement of claim struck out and action dismissed pursuant to Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court and its inherent jurisdiction; and further or alternatively to have the following question determined by the court, pursuant to Order 14A rule 1:

“Whether the references to a person being “convicted of a criminal offence” in the Defendant’s Constitution and Disciplinary Regulations include the situation where a person was found guilty of criminal contempt of court”.

On the same day, the Defendant filed the affirmation of Chan Chi Chiu in support of the application (“Chan’s Affirmation”).

6. On 6 August 2015, the Plaintiff filed his affirmation in opposition to the Defendant’s Summons.

7. On 10 September 2015, the Plaintiff took out a summons seeking to strike out the Defendant’s Summons (“Plaintiff’s Summons”) and filed an affirmation in support of the application.  In my view, all these steps are quite unnecessary.  If the Institution fails to substantiate its application at the hearing, the Defendant’s Summons will be dismissed.  That would have the same effect as what the Plaintiff is seeking to achieve by his striking out application under the Plaintiff’s Summons.

8. At the hearing on 11 September 2015, Master Ho gave the following directions (the “Order”):

(1) The Defendant’s Summons and the Plaintiff’s Summons are to be heard together and adjourned to a date to be fixed with three hours reserved before a judge;

(2) The Plaintiff to file and serve a supplemental affirmation within the next 14 days from the date hereof in relation to the Defendant’s Summons;

(3) Leave be given to the Defendant to serve an affirmation in reply, if any, within 14 days thereafter;

(4) Affirmation in support of the Defendant’s Summons be treated as affirmation in opposition to the Plaintiff’s Summons;

(5) No further affirmation to be filed without leave of the Court; and

(6) Costs for both the Defendant’s Summons and the Plaintiff’s Summons be reserved.

9. These are usual directions to be given for the hearing of inter parte summonses.  But the Plaintiff took great exception to the words “if any” in paragraph (3) of the Order.  On 14 September 2015, the Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal against Master Ho’s Order and seeks to set aside the words “if any” in paragraph (3) of the Order.  He also filed a third affirmation in support of his appeal.  The appeal was set down before me for hearing on 22 September 2015.

10. On 17 September 2015, the Defendant’s solicitors, Messrs Wilkinson & Grist, applied by letter to be excused from the hearing on costs considerations but furnished a written skeleton argument. I granted that application. 

 Discussion

11. The thrust of the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal is that Chan Chi Chiu, the current president of the Institution, gave a perjured statement in paragraph 5 of Chan’s Affirmation that the Plaintiff was sentenced to prison twice.  The basis of the Plaintiff’s assertion is that notwithstanding his was twice committed for contempt of court, he was not convicted and sentenced to prison.  Whether that proposition is correct is a point of law to be determined at the substantive hearing of the Defendant’s Summons and the Plaintiff’s Summons. 

12. The directions given by the Master was a matter of case management for the master.  The master has wide discretion in case management matters which the appellate court will not interfere, unless the master has erred in point of law.  Here, the directions given were usual and proper directions for the expedient disposal of the two summonses.  An applicant in an application usually has the chance of the ‘last word’.  Thus, in respect of the Defendant’s Summons, it was proper for the master to grant leave to the Defendant to file its affirmation in reply to the Plaintiff’s affirmations.  By adding the words “if any”, the master gave the Defendant the option of filing or not filing any affirmation in reply if the Defendant considers it unnecessary. 

13. The Plaintiff complains that by giving the option the Defendant would be at liberty not to file affirmation in reply and he would be deprived of the opportunity of requiring an answer from the Defendant, in particular Chan Chi Chiu, to his accusation of fraud and perjury.  With respect, I disagree with that submission.  Even without the words, “if any”, the Defendant may choose not to file affirmation in reply by default.  At the substantive hearing of the two summonses, the court will determine their merits on the basis of the evidence in the affirmations filed. If the Defendant chooses not to file any affirmation in reply, it would forgo its right and opportunity to tender evidence to rebut the evidence filed by the Plaintiff.  If the Defendant chooses not to respond to any evidence in the Plaintiff’s affirmations, it will work to the advantage of the Plaintiff.  The court will not be able to consider any new evidence other than that which is already filed.  The Plaintiff will be spared of the burden of having to deal with any evidence contained in the affirmation in reply, if one is filed.  Of course, what I say is without prejudice to any evidence that was already filed.  The court will determine the merits of the two summonses on the basis of the evidence filed. 

Conclusion

14. The directions given by the master are usual directions for the expedient disposal of the two summonses.  They are fair and appropriate in the circumstances.  The master committed no error of law.  He could not be criticised for including the words, “if any” in the Order.  Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal with costs to the Defendant.  The costs are to be taxed, if not agreed.

( Anthony To )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The plaintiff appeared in person

Attendance of Messrs Wilkinson & Grist, for the defendant, was excused



[1] See judgment dated 25 October 2005

[2] See judgment dated 7 January 2011

100372-EN-2015-09-10

CHOY BING WING v. HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS

HTML content

HCA 309/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 309 OF 2015

____________

BETWEEN

 CHOY BING WINGPlaintiff
 and
 HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERSDefendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 7 September 2015
Date of Handing Down Decision : 10 September 2015

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

I. Introduction

1. The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers (“Institution”) was incorporated under The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers Ordinance Cap 1105. Under the Ordinance, the Institution was established as a body corporate, and its management was vested in its Council.[1] The plaintiff (“Choy”) is a member of the Institution.

2. Choy had been committed for contempt of court on 2 occasions under Judgment dated 25 October 2005 in HCMP4694/2003 and under Judgment dated 7 January 2011 in HCMP1313/2010 for which Choy was sentenced to 6 months’ and 4 months’ imprisonment respectively.[2]

3. In HCA1994/2012, Choy commenced proceedings against the defendant therein, named as “President of the Hong Kong Institute of Engineers (HKIE)” (“President”) for an injunction to prevent the President from inter alia continuing disciplinary proceedings against Choy. On 31 May 2013, Master M Wong struck out Choy’s claim in HCA1994/2012. On 1 August 2013, Mimmie Chan J dismissed Choy’s appeal against such decision, and handed down Reasons for Decision on 12 August 2013. On 19 February 2014, the Court of Appeal dismissed Choy’s appeal against the decision of Mimmie Chan J. On 13 June 2014, the Court of Appeal dismissed Choy’s Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against their decision of 19 February 2014.

4. On 5 February 2015, Choy commenced the present action against the Institution. In the Statement of Claim,

(a) Choy complained that the Institution in breach of various provisions of the Police Force Ordinance Cap 232, the Basic Law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance Cap 383 wrongfully charged him twice by way of disciplinary proceedings arising out of convictions of alleged criminal offence by competent tribunals in HCMP4694/2003 and HCMP1313/2010, but deprived/violated Choy’s rights by reason of non-disclosure of criminal records of convictions and sentences, and by ignoring Choy’s complaints which led Choy to commence HCA1994/2012 against the President.

(b) The Institution in violation of its Disciplinary Regulations (“Regulations”) and principles of natural justice and without any ground at all condemned and penalised Choy with “3 years suspension as a member ordered in the disciplinary hearing held on 17/1/2013, a delay of over 65 days from the purported hearing day of 9/11/12 as previously fixed prior to the writ issued on 24/10/12 [in HCA1994/2012] in the total absence of [Choy]”.

(c) The Institution did not make any decision in the disciplinary proceedings before Choy commenced HCA1994/2012 on 24 December 2012 to claim for injunctive relief under article 35 of the Basic Law, so Mimmie Chan J’s decision made on 1 August 2013 to strike out Choy’s claim in HCA1994/2012 and her Reasons for Decision handed down on 12 August 2013 were totally wrong and erroneous.

(d) Choy also complained of the “courts’ refusal to release tape recordings for appeals to verify the authenticity of court documents required under Order 59 r 9 Cap 4A, Section 54 of Cap 4”. Choy contended he had made submissions to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (“Standing Committee”) for interpretation of article 35 of the Basic Law “to resolve the issue of [Choy’s] constitutional rights under the Basic Law (Law) for tape recordings treated as legal proceedings under CFAO of Chapter 484 (law) in CFA’s direction ruling dated 7/6/2014”, and he was awaiting reply from the Standing Committee as to his right to tape recordings of hearings “to verify the authenticity of court documents for issues such as the perjuries committed by the [President] in his affirmation dated 11/12/2012 and the omissions of [Choy’s] submissions for the judicial remedies provided to HK residents under Article 35 of the Basic Law”.

5. In the Statement of Claim, Choy claimed for (a) a declaration that the Institution’s order of 3 years’ supervision dated 9 November 2012 was null and void, (b) “[any] judicial remedies as the court thinks fit”, and (c) costs.

6. On 18 February 2015, the Institution’s solicitors filed acknowledgment of service giving notice of intention to defend.

7. On 23 March 2015, the Institution filed its Defence to dispute Choy’s claim without prejudice to its alleged right to apply to the court to strike out Choy’s claim and/or for further and better particulars of the Statement of Claim and/or to reply to Choy’s allegations when particularised, if appropriate. It is unnecessary for the present purpose to set out the fullness of the Institution’s defence save to highlight that the Institution claimed inter alia that:

(a) On 7 January 2006, the Investigating Commission was appointed pursuant to Regulation 3.1 of the Regulations (June 2005) of the Institution to consider if the matters in paragraph 2 above appeared to have disclosed a prima facie case of improper conduct (“Case”) under articles 13(4)(d) and 13(5) of the Constitution of the Institution.

(b) On 27 March 2012, the Investigating Commission unanimously resolved to refer the Case to a Board of Inquiry pursuant to Regulation 3.6 of the Regulations.

(c) On 6 July 2012, the Executive of the Institution appointed a Board of Inquiry pursuant to Regulation 4.2 of the Regulations to further investigate the matter.

(d) At the inquiry hearing on 9 November 2012 in which Choy was absent, the Board of Inquiry found Choy guilty of improper conduct under articles 13(5)(c)-(d) of the Constitution of the Institution.

(e) On 17 January 2013, the Council of the Institution ordered Choy’s membership with the Institution to be suspended for 3 years with effect from 18 January 2013 to 17 January 2016 pursuant to article 13(4)(d) of the Constitution (“Suspension Order”).

(f) On 21 January 2013, Choy served on the Institution an appeal notice against the Suspension Order. An Appeal Committee had been appointed to consider the appeal pursuant to Regulation 5.2 of the Regulations. The Suspension Order was not yet in force pending the decision of the Appeal Committee.

8. On 27 March 2015, Choy in his Reply claimed the averments in the Defence were irrelevant except there was no basis for the Institution “to assert “sentence” of “conviction” to justify any course of action taken by its Council or so”, and that all along the Institution acted contrary to the Police Force Ordinance Cap 232 and Hong Kong’s “Penal Code”, so the Institution committed perjury by making false accusations against Choy in the Defence. Choy made clear that his Reply was without prejudice to his rights to apply for further and better particulars of the Defence and/or for specific discovery.

9. The Case Management Summons filed on 2 June 2015 was heard before Registrar KW Lung on 20 July 2015. The learned Registrar ordered that:

“1. The matter is adjourned to a date to be fixed by the parties as [Choy] has left the Court without leave, with the following directions:

a. The defendant shall, within 14 days from the date hereof, take out an application for striking out of [Choy’s] claim, if so advised;

b. Liberty to apply.

2. Costs of this application be [the Institution’s] costs in the cause.”

10. On 22 July 2015, Choy issued a summons for an order that “[no] bailiff shall be present beside [him] at any hearing”, and for costs of the summons to be costs in the cause (“Summons”). On 24 July 2015, the Institution’s solicitors wrote to the court to indicate that the Institution took a neutral stance in respect of the Summons and would leave it to the court to give any directions as it thought fit for the purpose of maintaining order in any future hearings and facilitating the conduct of proceedings in a smooth and judicious manner. The Institution’s solicitors therefore sought indulgence for their attendance at the hearing of the Summons to be excused with no order as to costs of the Summons.

11. The Summons came before Master K Lo on 29 July 2015 (“Master Hearing”). At the Master Hearing, Master K Lo refused the application by the Summons with no order as to costs (“Order”).

12. On 6 August 2015, Choy filed Notice of Appeal against the Order (“Appeal”), and sought an order that (a) the Order be set aside in its entirety and (b) costs of the Appeal and costs below be paid by the Institution to Choy to be taxed if not agreed. The Appeal was scheduled to be heard before this court on 7 September 2015 (“Hearing”).

13. On 7 August 2015, Choy wrote to Master K Lo to request for “Decision/records” for the appeal against the Order made at the Master Hearing. The learned master subsequently allowed for release of the transcript of the Master Hearing to Choy (“Transcript”).

14. On 13 August 2015, the Institution’s solicitors wrote to the court to indicate the Institution took a neutral stance in respect of the Appeal and would leave it to the court to give any directions as it thought fit for the purpose of maintaining order in any future hearings and facilitating the conduct of proceedings in a smooth and judicious manner. The Institution’s solicitors therefore sought indulgence for their attendance at the hearing of the Appeal to be excused with no order as to costs of the Appeal.

15. On 25 August 2015, this court granted liberty to the defendant to decide whether or not to attend the Hearing.

II.    Appeal

16. At the beginning of the Hearing, this court invited Choy to make oral submissions to support the Appeal. Choy asked whether this court had received his letters dated 28 August and 2 September 2015 (with enclosures) sent to a number of addressees including this court. This court did receive such letters. In the course of the Hearing, he also handed up to this court a copy of a letter dated 18 August 2005 by Ma CJHC (as he then was) to him in respect of HCA424/2005.

17. Choy complained that the Transcript did not record “Choy’s conduct” as the reason for the Order. He suggested there were omissions in the Transcript, but Master K Lo refused to release the tape-recording of the Master Hearing to him. Choy submitted that the Appeal would be meaningless without the tape-recording of the Master Hearing to demonstrate the omissions in the Transcript. Choy said he would follow the practice set out in the letter dated 18 August 2005 from Ma CJHC (as he then was) to apply to the appeal court (ie this court) for release the tape-recording of the hearing in the lower court (ie the Master Hearing), and he made such oral application accordingly at the Hearing.

18. Choy in his letters urged Ma CJ to give clarification in respect of his complaint, and asked also for release of the tape-recording and transcript of hearings before Master H Au-yeung, Master M Wong and Registrar KW Lung in HCA1994/2012 and in the present action. Choy also complained of (a) fabrication by A Cheung J (as he then was) of transcript of proceedings in HCA424/2005, (b) failure by the court to release full transcript of the proceedings before A Cheung J (as he then was) in HCA424/2005 for his appeal in CACV263/2005,[3] (c) fabrication by Lam J (as he then was) of judgment/orders in HCA2351/2005, and (d) failure of the court to release tape-recording to show co-fabrication of orders by Messrs Wilkinson & Grist and Master H Au-yeung in HCA1994/2012.

19. After this court refused Choy’s oral application at the Hearing for the aforesaid transcript and tape-recording of the aforesaid proceedings, Choy left the courtroom of his own accord. Since Choy was leaving the courtroom, I reserved decision including reasons to be handed down on 10 September 2015.

20. After the Hearing, Choy wrote to Ma CJ and this court by letters dated 7 and 8 September 2015 to ask for inter alia (a) reasons for refusal of Choy’s oral application for transcript and tape-recording to be given in this Decision to be handed down on 10 September 2015, and (b) release of the tape-recording and transcript of the Hearing to him.

III.   Appeal from Master

21. It is trite that an appeal from the master to judge in chambers is dealt with by an actual rehearing of the application which led to the order under appeal, and the judge treats the matter as though it came before him for the first time.  The judge will give the weight it deserves to the previous decision of the master; but he is in no way bound by it.[4]

22. Notwithstanding Choy’s complaint about the Transcript, since (as explained in the above paragraph) an appeal from the master to judge is dealt with by an actual rehearing of the application which led to the order under appeal, and the judge treats the matter as though it came before him/her for the first time, the tape-recording of the Master Hearing is unnecessary for the purpose of the Appeal. This is sufficient to justify refusal of Choy’s request for the tape-recording of the Master Hearing.

23. I am also not persuaded that Choy’s requests in his letters for transcript and tape-recording in respect of proceedings in other court actions would be pertinent to the present Appeal in the present action, which dealt with the limited issue of whether or not this court should grant Choy’s application for an order that “[no] bailiff shall be present beside [him] at any hearing”. I am unable to see how the proceedings in HCA424/2005 and CACV263/2005 would be pertinent to the present Appeal. In any event, Choy’s appeal against the order of Master M Wong dated 31 May 2013 in HCA1994/2012 had been dismissed, and such dismissal is now final (see paragraph 3 above). As regards Choy’s complaints against the orders of Master H Au-yeung in HCA1994/2012, they had been rejected by DHCJ Linda Chan SC in paragraphs 19-25 of her decision dated 28 March 2013, and Choy’s application for leave to appeal against such decision was dismissed by DHCJ Linda Chan SC on 20 May 2013 and subsequently by the Court of Appeal on 24 June 2013 (and such dismissal is now final). I am unable to see any relevance of those proceedings to the present Appeal, and this is sufficient reason for this court to refuse Choy’s application for release the transcript and tape-recording of hearings in the other actions as he requested.

24. For the above reasons, I have refused Choy’s request for transcript and tape-recording in his letters dated 28 August and 2 September 2015 for the purpose of the Appeal.

IV.  Discussion

25. Choy complained that Registrar KW Lung arranged for a Bailiff to be present in the court room behind him at the hearing of the Case Management Summons on 20 July 2015. Choy submitted he should be able to make fearless submissions at court hearings, and placing a Bailiff “beside [him]” at the court room at the hearings would inhibit him from making fearless submissions to the court, including his outspoken condemnation of judges who had done injustice to him. Choy asked for the relief that the Bailiff should not be present at future hearings that he participates in the present action.

26. At the Master Hearing, Master K Lo dismissed the summons on the ground that (a) Choy should not have involved the Institution by issuing an inter partes summons since it was the court and not the Institution that requested for presence of the Bailiff at previous court hearings, and (b) there was no legal basis (whether pursuant to statutory procedural rule or inherent jurisdiction of the court) for the relief sought, which was not a judicial matter.

27. Since the Appeal is by way of rehearing, I need not revisit the reasons given by Master K Lo. However, in fairness to Choy, I should say that I am not with the learned master in respect of the reason she gave in paragraph 26(a) above. Unless otherwise specified, court hearings in civil litigation are inter partes hearings. In dealing with the procedure and process of inter partes court hearings, it is not appropriate for a litigant to seek relief by unilateral application to the court. In my view, procedurally speaking (and in contra-distinction to the merits of the application discussed below), Choy is not wrong in making his application by the inter partes Summons. Likewise, on a matter of regulating court process and procedure, the Institution and its legal representatives had the good sense to save costs by asking for their attendance at the hearing of the Summons to be excused.

28. In my view, the court in the administration of justice possesses incidental and ancillary inherent powers to enable it to give effect to its jurisdiction, and such powers (which are procedural and “inherent”) are developed and utilised on the basis of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Such inherent powers may be exercised where necessary in the interests of justice. The court has inherent power to regulate and protect its own procedures and processes and/or to prevent abuse of its processes. It has long been accepted the court’s inherent powers may be invoked to ensure the fairness, integrity and efficiency of its process. Alderson B in Cocker v Tempest (1841) 7 M & W 502 stated that the power each court has over its own process is unlimited. If the court did not have such a power, then “the Court would be obliged to sit still and see its own processes abused for the purpose of injustice” (see Cocker at 503-504). In my view, such inherent power may be more than a matter of discretion, and it may amount to a duty of the court.

29. It is therefore plain that in appropriate cases the court has inherent power to arrange for a bailiff to be present in the court room to facilitate the proper and effective conduct of proceedings and thereby protect the fairness, integrity and efficiency of the judicial process. Whilst the court should be mindful that as part of the judicial process litigants are entitled to make proper submissions at court hearings in support of their case, the court must also be alert to prevent abuse that would strike at the public confidence of the court’s process and so diminish the court’s ability to fulfil its function.

30. In the circumstances, it is obvious that the balancing exercise in deciding whether or not to arrange for a Bailiff to be present in the court room is hearing-specific, and a host of considerations relevant to the particular hearing, including the essential features or attributes of the relevant proceedings and litigants, are going to shape the exercise of the court’s inherent power for each hearing.

31. For the Hearing, this court did not see any need to arrange for a Bailiff to be present in the court room. However, it is not possible to visualise all the circumstances and developments in the present action as it progresses towards final disposal. As explained above, the balancing exercise is hearing-specific, and it is inappropriate to grant any blanket order that generally debars a Bailiff to be present at any court hearing in the present action. Where necessary, it is a matter that must be considered by the tribunal for each relevant hearing.

32. In the circumstances, the Order by Master K Lo to refuse the application under the Summons is correct although I agree with the result for different reasons. Since the Institution’s solicitors did not attend the Master Hearing, it was also appropriate for Master K Lo to direct that there be no order as to costs in respect of the Summons.

V.    Conclusion

33. I therefore dismiss the Appeal. I also order that there be no order as to costs in respect of the Appeal.

34. I further do not see any sufficient justification for release of the transcript and tape-recording of the Hearing to Choy, and his application by letter dated 7 September 2015 for such is dismissed. First, he attended the Hearing, but chose to absent himself in the course of it. Secondly, the Institution’s legal representatives did not appear to make any addresses at the Hearing. Thirdly, the Hearing lasted for a few minutes. Choy by his letters dated 7 and 8 September 2015 noted this court had refused his oral application and expressly asked for reasons for such refusal to be given in this written Decision. I have given my reasons above. Fourthly, the Hearing came to a close when Choy left the court room except for the court announcing the date and time for handing down this written Decision.

35. Each case must be considered on its own. For the present case, even if Choy wishes to appeal against this court’s refusal of his oral application (as indicated in his letter dated 7 September 2015) and/or dismissal of the Appeal, the fullness of the reasons for this court’s refusal/decision is set out herein for Choy to consider and for all to see.

(Marlene Ng)
Deputy High Court Judge

The plaintiff appeared in person.

Attendance of Wilkinson & Grist, solicitors for the defendant, was excused.



[1] see sections 3, 7 and 8 of the Ordinance

[2] see Ruling as to Penalty dated 7 December 2005 in HCMP4694/2003 and Judgment on Penalty dated 11 February 2011 in HCMP1313/2010

[3] Choy referred to the letter dated 18 August 2005 from Ma CJHC (as he then was) that Choy should make his request for transcript (if so required for his appeal in CACV263/2005) to the Court of Appeal

[4] see Hong KongCivil Procedure 2015 Vol 1 para 58/1/2 at p 1024