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Matrimonial Causes2015

YNNA v. HCKW

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Files (5)

[2023] HKFC 226-CH-2023-11-10

余 對 許

HTML content

FCMC 6626 / 2015

[2023] HKFC 226

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號2015年第6626宗

——————————

 余呈請人
 及 
 許答辯人

——————————

主審法官︰區域法院暫委法官彭家光內庭聆訊 (書面處理)
判決書日期︰2023年11月10日

------------------------------

判 決 書
( 上訴許可申請 )

------------------------------

1.  在本判案書,本席稱呈請人為‘女方’,答辯人為‘男方’。

2.  在2021年10月27日,男方以傳票作出申請,要求法庭頒令︰

(1)  按2021年5月26日之命令,女方須立即取消從訴訟雙方聯名戶口轉賬每月35,000元作為兩名家庭子女贍養費之指示(‘第(1)項申請’);

(2)  女方須退回因上述轉賬每月35,000元之指示未取消,由2021年7月起從每月轉賬而多得之款項(‘第(2)項申請’);

(3)  按2019年12月19日之命令,女方須簽署所有必需之文件將一筆款額為14,600元現存於兩名家庭子女就讀之學校之存款存入訴訟雙方之聯名戶口(‘第(3)項申請’);

(4)  訟費(‘第(4)項申請’)。

3.  在2022年11月1日,應男方申請,本席頒令許可男方撤回傳票之第(1),(2)及(3)項申請。在2023年7月7日,本席頒下判決書,頒令女方須付男方就2021年10月27日存檔之傳票申請之訟費之40%,包括保留訟費。

4.  在2023年9月20日,女方以傳票針對2023年7月7日的訟費命令提出上訴許可申請。男方反對女方上述申請,在2023年9月28日提交了反對陳述書。

5.  女方就訟費命令作逾期上訴許可申請,男方認為女方逾期多天,法庭不應行使酌情權給予延期。法庭有酌情權決定是否給予延期,在決定如何行使酌情權時,法庭會考慮的因素包括︰

(a)  延遲的時間多少;

(b)  延遲的理由;

(c)  倘若給予延期,申請的成功機會;及

(d)  倘若給予延期,可能對另一方構成的不公平。

6.  在本案而言,女方逾期的情況非常嚴重。女方說,因她外遊差不多一個月,回港後又忙於替女兒找大學,因此才遲了提出本申請。

7.  早於2023年7月3日,區域法院書記已發信通知訴訟雙方,法官將於2023年7月7日就訟費事宜頒下判案書,請訴訟各方於上述日期準時到法院領取判案書。因為女方並沒有在2023年7月7日到法院領取判決書,在2023年7月10日,司法常務官以平郵將判決書寄給女方。在2023年7月16日,女方才離港。本席認為,在離港前女方應已收到判決書。按以上的考慮,本席不接受女方所說在2023年8月7日回港才收到判決書的說法。又無論如何,女方說,在2023年8月7日回港後收到判決書後,因事一直沒有拆看判決書內容,直至2023年9月16日才‘真真正正’有時間去閱讀判決書。本席認為,女方以上的說法十分牽強,也難以令人接受。眾所周知,判決書是重要的文件,女方不應該置之不理一個多月。

8.  經小心考慮以上各點後,本席不接受女方所說逾期作出本申請的理由。

9.  法庭須考慮女方申請的成功機會。女方提交了共10頁之陳詞大綱,扼要來說,其內容不外只是重複女方在原審時已提出的論據,本席已在作出判決時加以考慮也在判決書交代了判決理由,不在此重複。本席認為,女方提出之上訴許可申請理由,並沒有合理機會得直。雖然如此,本席在此作出兩點澄清︰-

(1)  在陳詞大綱第5頁第(3)點,女方說,對男方在2022年11月1日撤回傳票之第(1)、(2)、(3)項申請,她完全不知情。在2022年11月1日的聆訊中,應男方申請,本席頒令許可男方撤回傳票之第(1)、(2)、(3)項申請,當時女方親自出席,女方不會所謂不知情;

(2)  在陳詞大綱第6頁第(6)段,女方說,在判決書第5頁第10段H行寫明她否認男方不合理,不合作等說法,但在N行指她沒有否認男方所說,是否互相矛盾?在第N行本席指出的是女方並沒有否認,男方所說在男方提出本申請後,她才透露已在2021年10月18日到銀行辦理取消手續的事實,而在H行所說女方否認男方所說女方不合作、不合理等說法,這只是就女方的說法作一個敍述,其間並沒有所謂互相矛盾的情況。

10.  法庭也須考慮倘若給予延期,可能對男方構成的不公平。在反對陳述書,男方說︰

21. … 本人看不到申請人為何不負責這一切費用!Costs to follow the event。奈何申請人只需支付40%,雖然本人感遺憾但尊重,如今更不能准許上訴。

11.  在今天,男方提出上訴許可申請的限期已過去,若准許女方逾期上訴,本席接受,男方難免會感到並不公平。

12.  在考慮女方的上訴許可申請時,須考慮香港法例第336章《區域法院條例》第63A條的條文。有關條例節錄如下:-

「(1) 根據第63條批予的上訴許可,可─

(a) 就在有關的判決、命令或決定中出現的某個爭論點而批予;及

(b) 在聆訊該許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭認為為使有關上訴得到公正、迅速及合乎經濟原則的處置而需要的條件的規限下批予。

(2) 聆訊有關上訴許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭除非信納─

(a) 有關上訴有合理機會得直;或

(b) 有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,

否則不得批予上訴許可。」

13.  綜合來說︰-

(1)  女方逾期提出本申請,其延誤實屬十分嚴重;

(2)  女方並沒有就延遲提供合理之理由;

(3)  倘若給予延期,女方並沒有合理機會得直;

(4)  倘若給予延期,會對男方構成不公。

14.  經小心考慮以上各點後,本席拒絕女方之上訴許可申請,女方之上訴許可申請失敗,本席頒令女方須付男方本申請之訟費,若訴訟雙方不能就訟費金額達成協議,將由法庭評定。

  ( 彭家光 )
區域法院暫委法官

呈請人:親自行事

答辯人:親自行事

[2023] HKFC 128-CH-2023-07-07

余 對 許

HTML content

FCMC 6626 / 2015

[2023] HKFC 128

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號2015年第6626宗

——————————

 余呈請人
 及 
 許答辯人

——————————

主審法官︰區域法院暫委法官彭家光內庭聆訊(非公開)
聆訊日期︰2023年5月12日
判決書頒佈日期︰2023年7月7日

-------------------------

判決書
(訟費)

-------------------------

1.  在本判案書,本席稱呈請人為‘女方’,答辯人為‘男方’。

2.  在2021年10月27日,男方以傳票作出申請,要求法庭頒令︰

(1)  按2021年5月26日之命令,女方須立即取消從訴訟雙方聯名戶口轉賬每月35,000元作為兩名家庭子女贍養費之指示(‘第(1)項申請’);

(2)  女方須退回因上述轉賬每月35,000元之指示未取消,由2021年7月起從每月轉賬而多得之款項(‘第(2)項申請’);

(3)  按2019年12月19日之命令,女方須簽署所有必需之文件將一筆款額為14,600元現存於兩名家庭子女就讀之學校之存款存入訴訟雙方之聯名戶口(‘第(3)項申請’);

(4)  訟費(‘第(4)項申請’)。

3.  在2022年11月1日,應男方申請,本席頒令許可男方撤回傳票之第(1),(2)及(3)項申請。這是有關男方傳票第(4)項的訟費申請的判案書。

4.  根據《區域法院規則》(香港法例第336H章)第62號命令第5條規定︰

(1)  區域法院就訟費行使其酌情決定權時,須在情況恰當的範圍(如有的話)內,考慮 --

(aa) 第1A號命令第1條規則列出的基本目標;

(a) 第16號命令第10條規則述及的任何分擔提議,而該提議是依據一項保留使區域法院知悉此事的權利而使區域法院知悉者;

(b) 任何繳存法院的款項及其款額;

(c) 任何根據第33號命令第4A(2)條規則提出的書面提議;

(d) 任何明示為“除訟費外無損權利”且關乎有關法律程序的任何爭論點的書面提議,但如作出該提議的一方在提議作出時,本可藉根據第22號命令作出附帶條款付款或附帶條款和解提議,以就訟費作自保,則區域法院不得考慮該提議;

(e) 各方的行為舉措;

(f) 某一方是否已在其案件中局部勝訴(即使他並未全盤勝訴);及

(g) 區域法院已被促請注意的由某一方作出的任何可被接納的和解提議。

(2)  就第(1)(e)款而言,各方的行為舉措包括 ——

(a) 某一方提出或持續某特定指稱或爭論點,或對某特定指稱或爭論點提出爭議,是否屬合理;

(b) 某一方持續其案件或某特定指稱或爭論點或對之作出抗辯的方式;

(c) 在申索中全盤或局部勝訴的申索人有否誇大其申索;及

(d) 在法律程序展開前以及法律程序進行中的行為舉措。

5.  男方說,他是成功之一方,加上女方之訴訟行為屬欺壓性及惡意,所以男方要求本申請之訟費。

6.  就男方的傳票的第(1)、(2)項申請,事源在2019年12月,訴訟雙方及本案之介入人就附屬濟助事宜達成了一個整體的和解方案,其中包括介入人將3,500,000元存入訴訟雙方聯名戶口用作支付兩名家庭子女之贍養費。在當時,訴訟雙方就兩名家庭子女之每月贍養費金額未有共識,只是同意暫定為兩名家庭子女每月35,000元,訴訟雙方簽署了指示給銀行從聯名戶口轉賬每月35,000元給女方作為兩名家庭子女之贍養費。整體和解方案的內容見區域法院謝沈智慧法官在2019年12月19日之頒令。在2021年5月,訴訟雙方同意,每名家庭子女之每月贍養費為25,000元,即兩人共每月50,000元。有關協議見法庭在2021年5月26日頒發之同意命令。按2021年5月26日之命令,訴訟雙方在2021年6月簽署了指示從銀行戶口轉賬每月50,000元給女方作為兩名家庭子女贍養費。

7.  男方說,由2021年月中開始,他經代表律師多次將男方已簽署之表格給女方,要求女方簽署指示給銀行取消從聯名戶口轉帳35,000元給女方之指示,但女方不合作,無奈下男方才在2021年10月27日提出本申請。雖然在2021年10月18日女方將妥為簽署之表格交回銀行,但男方說,女方並沒有即時知會男方,直至男方提出本申請後,女方才在其反對誓章中提及此事。

8.  取消每月35,000元轉賬之指示,由2021年11月起生效。由2021年7月至2021年10月,女方多得35,000元×4 = 140,000元。男方說,女方遲遲不肯將這筆款項退回。在2021年11月24日,女方退回37,941.8元,直至2022年10月12日,才肯退回餘下102,058.2元。

9.  男方的傳票的第(3)項申請涉及在2009年男方替大女兒繳交給學校的留位費,一直存在學校的銀行戶口,現學校打算退回。男方指,本應將款項發還給他,因為他是付款人,但他同意將款項存入訴訟雙方聯名戶口。

10.  就取消每月35,000元轉賬一事,女方否認男方所說女方不合作、不合理等說法。女方說,因為男方一直使用了錯誤的表格,銀行不接受,所以才引致遲遲不能夠成功取消每月35,000元之轉賬指示。在2021年10月初,女方從男方收到正確的表格後,便在2021年10月18日將表格簽署交回銀行。男方並沒有否認女方所說男方使用錯誤表格的說法。因此,本席接受女方這一點說法。雖然若說男方在約2021年10月7日才經律師將最後一份表格交給女方律師,女方在月中便到銀行辦理,便不應說女方行為不合作、或不合理,但女方並沒有否認男方所說,在男方提出本申請後,她才透露已在2021年10月18日到銀行辦理取消手續一事。又本席注意到,在2021年10月7日之信件,男方律師已提及,若女方不在7天之內回覆,男方將採取法律行動。經小心考慮以上各點後,本席認為,男方在2021年10月27日發出上述傳票之第(1)項申請,這本是無可厚非的,但在2021年11月,銀行停止了每月35,000元轉賬,男方應當時便知女方已辦妥了取消手續,而至2022年11月男方才撤回傳票之第(1)申請。

11.  就退回140,000元一事,在2021年11月24日女方退回37,941.8元。當時女方律師去信男方,說大女兒去英國開學、宿費、大學泳隊費用、警方登記費用,機票其花費102,058.2元,又說按2019年12月19日命令Q段之承諾,男方須負責這些費用,所以女方在140,000元中扣除,餘款37,941.8元退回。所以女方說,男方在2021年10月27日發出傳票第(2)段申請,是無理之行為。男方並不接受女方針對2019年12月19日命令Q段之解釋。就訴訟雙方在這一方面的爭議,本席認為無須也不應該在此作出討論,因為無論如何,按2019年12月19日Q段,男方的付款責任為男方直接向學校付款,換言之這是他個人之責任,所以不論是否男方如女方所說有付款責任,女方不能將所謂欠款從訴訟雙方聯名戶口中支付。不論男方是否如女方所說有付款責任,女方不應該從上述140,000元中扣起102,058.2元。在2022年10月12日,女方將102,058.2元退回。經小心考慮以上各點,本席認為可視在傳票第(2)點申請方面男方為成功之一方。若有需要,女方應尋求法律意見,自行考慮是否採取行動向男方追討上述102,058.2元。

12.  有關14,600元,這是10多年前之事。男方傳票的要求是女方須按2019年12月19日之命令將款項存入訴訟雙方聯名戶口。本席曾向男方查詢,究竟按2019年12月19日之命令那一個條款,女方須將14,600元存入訴訟雙方聯名戶口,男方無答案。按2019年12月19日之命令,訴訟雙方已解決了他們之間之附屬濟助事宜。有關14,600元,與本婚姻訴訟並無關係。本席認為,男方不應在本婚姻訴訟案件中提出這一項申請。

13.  男方指女方拒絕調解。從訴訟雙方就本申請提交之法庭文件,及他們在本案一貫之表現看來,他們可說是水火不容,各持己見也各不相讓,這幾年來他們也是爭拗不絕,也提出了不少法庭申請。本席認為,不能將無法調解一事完全地歸咎於任何一方。

14.  男方的第(1)項申請,雖然女方沒有及時知會男方,事實上在男方作出申請時已經解決,又無論如何男方應不久後便知道已經解決。就第(2)項申請,他是成功之一方,他的第(3)項申請並不成功。經小心考慮以上各點,又就男方各項申請所涉及之訟費扼要地作衡量後,本席頒令女方須付就男方2021年10月27日存檔之傳票申請之訟費之40%,包括保留訟費。

  ( 彭家光 )
區域法院暫委法官

呈請人: 無律師代表和親自出席審訊

答辯人: 無律師代表和親自出席審訊

[2021] HKFC 172-EN-2021-08-27

YNNA v. HCKW

HTML content

FCMC 6626/2015

[2021] HKFC 172

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 6626 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 YNNAPetitioner

and

 HCKWRespondent
 WWCAIntervener

----------------------------

Coram:  District Judge K K PANG in Chambers (Disposal on papers)

Date of Petitioner’s Submissions:  30 July 2021

Date of Respondent’s Submissions:  12 August 2021

Date of Judgment:  27 August 2021

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J U D G M E N T

(Application for Leave to Appeal)

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1.  I refer the Petitioner Wife and the Respondent Husband as W and H respectively.

2.  On 2 July 2021, I handed down the Judgment by which it was ordered that W’s claim for a lump sum payment in compensation for W’s expenses incurred by her for maintenance of the children of the family for the period from 1 February 2017 to 31 May 2021 be dismissed.In my judgment dated 2 July 2021, I take the view that the children maintenance matter including W’s so-called claim for backdating is fully settled by the consent order dated 19 December 2019, save to the limited extent of the proviso under the paragraph 5 thereof and subject to the developing needs of the Children, and that, by the consent order dated 26 May 2021, the parties have also fully settled the question of the quantum of the monthly payment out for the children of the family under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019.

3.  This is W’s application for leave to appeal against the Order made on 2 July 2021. W puts forwards two grounds relying upon which in support of the intended appeal: -

(1)   The Learned Judge erred in law by holding that W’s claim is fully settled by the consent order dated 19 December 2019 and the consent order dated 26 May 2021;

(2)   The Learned Judge erred in law by failing to duly consider or failing to give reasons for dismissing the backdating claim, in particular for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 May 2021. 

4.  I take the view that W’s intended Ground of Appeal (1) simply raises issues that have already been canvassed during the substantive hearing of the matter and have been adequately dealt with in the Judgment dated 2 July 2021. As to the intended Ground of Appeal (2), despite that it is argued otherwise on behalf of W, I take the view that the reasons of the Judgment dated 2 July 2021 are fully set out in the paragraphs 2 to 20 thereof. About W’s claim for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 May 2021, as said in the paragraph 19 of the Judgment dated 2 July 2021, I take the view that, W’s claim having been fully settled under the terms of the order dated 19 December 2019, the proviso under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019 clearly is solely for the benefit of the children of the family, and that W’s so-called claim for backdating is for her own benefit and therefore it does not fall within the proviso under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019.

5.  After having carefully considered the matters set out in the above, I am satisfied that W’s intended grounds of appeal do not have a reasonable prospect of success.

6.  Section 63A (2) of the District Court Ordinance provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. There is no reasonable prospect of success in any of the said grounds of appeal. Nor is there any other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. Accordingly, it is ordered that W’s summons dated 30 July 2021 for leave to appeal be dismissed

7.  W is unsuccessful in the present application. Currently, I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. It is ordered nisi that W shall pay H the costs of this application with certificate for counsel. The above costs order nisi becomes absolute 14 days after the order is made unless a party has applied to the court for varying the order.

 ( K K PANG )
 District Judge

Wong & Co. for the Petitioner

Felix Li instructed by Ip & Heathfield for the Respondent

[2021] HKFC 124-EN-2021-07-02

YNNA v. HCKW

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FCMC 6626/2015

[2021] HKFC 124

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 6626 OF 2015

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BETWEEN  
 YNNAPetitioner

and

 HCKWRespondent
 WWCA Intervener

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Coram:  District Judge K K PANG in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  26 & 27 May 2021, 15 June 2021

Date of Respondent’s Closing Submission:  3 June 2021

Date of Petitioner’s Closing Submission: 10 June 2021

Date of Judgment: 2 July 2021

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

 

Background

1.  The parties were married in 2001 in Hong Kong. The children of the family (the ‘Children’) were born in 2002 and 2005 respectively. The Petitioner Wife (‘W’) petitioned for divorce on behaviour on 29 May 2015. By the order dated 10 November 2015, by consent it was ordered that the joint custody of the Children was granted to the parties with care and control to W. The Decree Nisi was granted on 22 February 2016. By the Order dated 17 May 2016, by consent it was ordered that the Respondent Husband (‘H’) do have defined access to the Children including day and staying access. Upon W, H and the Intervener’s joint application, an order in terms of a global settlement regarding the arrangements for finances and full and final settlement among all three parties was made by HHJ A.N. Tse Ching on 19 December 2019. The paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019 provides that the Intervener do pay a sum of HK$3,500,000 (the ‘Intervener’s Funds’) into a joint name account of the parties to be used solely for the maintenance for the Children … without prejudice to the parties arguing on the reasonableness of such periodical sum.

2.  By another Order of HHJ A N Tse Ching dated 19 December 2019, it was ordered that: -

(1)  W do file and serve her evidence in support of quantum of Children maintenance on or before 6 February 2020;

(2)  H do file and serve his opposing affirmation on or before 5 March 2020;

(3)  W’s reply on or before 19 March 2020.

3.  By the Order of HHJ C K Chan dated 11 September 2020, it was ordered that unless W do file and serve her supporting affirmation within 21 days of the order, W’s claim for children maintenance be dismissed. W filed her affirmation dated 5 October 2020. By the Order of HHJ C K Chan dated 16 November 2020, it was ordered that trial of W’s application for children maintenance be fixed on 26 and 27 January 2021, and H do file and serve the opposing affirmation within 14 days and W do file and serve the replying affirmation within 14 days thereafter. H filed the opposing affirmation dated 20 November 2020 and W filed the replying affirmation dated 3 December 2020. By the Order of HHJ K K Pang dated 24 December 2020, it was ordered that the parties do file and serve updated Form E on or before 7 January 2021. The parties filed their updated Form E both dated 7 January 2021.

4.  Despite that it was ordered that W do file and serve her evidence in support of the quantum of Children maintenance on or before 6 February 2020, W did not make any claim for backdating when she presented her case in the supporting affirmation dated 5 October 2020. In the concluding paragraph of W’s replying affirmation dated 3 December 2020, however, W prayed for an order for periodical maintenance for the benefit of the older daughter at the rate of HK$41,378.5 per month and the younger daughter at the rate of HK$47,603.5 per month from February 2017 onwards.

5.  In W’s Opening Submission dated 14 January 2021, Ms Chiang counsel for W submits that, since W has been paying the Children’s expenses out of her own savings and personal loans from relatives and friends, she is entitled to make the claim for backdating of the Children’s periodical payments from February 2017. It is noted that Ms Chiang did not quantify W’s claim for backdating in the Opening Submission. She simply sought an order for a monthly sum as decided by the court to be paid directly by H or to allow W to withdraw such sum from the Intervener’s Funds or money to be injected into the Intervener’s Funds.

6.  In the Opening Submission, Ms Chiang further submits W’s case can be seen in W’s updated Form E dated 7 January 2021 where W averred that: -

(1)  For the period from the parties’ separation in 2015 to February 2017, H paid the general household expenses and the Children expenses as he did during the marriage;

(2)  Since H moved out of the matrimonial home in February 2017, he had continued the payment for: - (a) food expenses fixed at HK$7,200 per month; (b) the salary of the domestic helper; and (c) school fees, but refused to pay other general household expenses or children expenses;

(3)  W started to receive HK$35,000 each month under the order dated 19 December 2019. After that, H stopped the payment of the said food expenses of HK$7,200 per month from August 2020.

7.  In his Opening Submission, Mr Li contests that it will be unfair to H, if W is allowed to make a new claim for backdating by way of the replying affirmation dated 3 December 2020. Additionally, Mr Li rejects W’s claim that there was shortfall and at the same time contends that if there was any shortfall in the Children maintenance, it would have already been fully settled by the order dated 19 December 2019. Mr Li underlines that W receives totally around HK$40M of assets under the order dated 19 December 2019. It is said that, according to the said consent order, she keeps the former matrimonial home valued at around HK$15M and receives two lump sums of HK$1.5M and HK$5M respectively and a further sum, estimated at around HK$18M, upon the sale of some landed properties in Shanghai.

8.  The trial fixed on 26 and 27 January 2021 was vacated due to the covid 19 pandemic and was re-fixed to take place on 26 and 27 May 2021. On 26 May 2021, the parties reached an out of court settlement regarding the quantum of the Children’s monthly maintenance. It was agreed that: -

(1)  The monthly sum payable under paragraph 5 of the Order dated 19 December 2019 be varied up to HK$50,000 per month, i.e. HK$25,000 per month for each child, the first payment to be made on 1 June 2021, until the Children attain the age of 18 or cease to receive full time education, whichever is the later;

(2)  Any surplus in the Intervener’ Funds be equally shared by the Children at the end of the day;

(3)  H’s undertakings under Recitals Q and R of the order dated 19 December 2019 do carry on.

9.  Despite the parties’ settlement agreement in the above, the parties are still at loggerheads with W’s claim for backdating of the periodical payments from February 2017. The trial of W’s claim for backdating lasted for two days.

10.  In W’s Closing Submission dated 10 June 2021, Ms Chiang argues that H’s contention that W’s claim for backdating is fully settled by the order dated 19 December 2019 is misconceived. In her submission, the order dated 19 December 2019 reflects settlement for AR and preliminary issue but the issue of the Children’s maintenance is intentionally left open by the consent order. She stresses that a backdating order contains an element of compensation. She submits that W’s claim is supported by her evidence in her Affirmation dated 5 October 2020 that the monthly sum of HK$7,200 that H used to pay to the domestic helper was not enough to buy food for the family and she had to pay an extra sum of HK$5,000 per month in average. She also submits that, in W’s replying affirmation dated 3 December 2020, W furthermore gave evidence that H ceased usual payments for general household expenses and children expenses and as a result she needed to borrow from friends and relatives to meet the shortfall.

11.  In the Closing Submission, Ms Chiang suggests the court to take the agreed monthly sum of HK$50,000 for the Children as the Children’s reasonable expenses for the purpose of the calculation of backdating. In Ms Chiang’s submission, W’s claim is for the period from February 2017 to May 2021 (53 months). HK$50,000 X 53 = HK$2,650,000. It is accepted that W shall give credit to payments received by her during the same period. From February 2017 to July 2020 (43 months), H paid HK$7,200 per month, and from August 2020 to May 2021 (10 months), W received HK$35,000 per month out of the Intervener’s Funds. After having given credit to HK$7,200 X 43 + HK$35,000 X 10 = HK$659,600, W’s claim is for HK$1,990,400. In the alternative, if the court does not take the said sum of HK$50,000 per month for the calculation of W’s claim, Ms Chiang suggests the court to use W’s Form E dated 8 August 2015 and her 2nd Form E dated 7 January 2021 to gauge the amount actually spent by W on the Children over the years. In her submission, somehow the court can arrive a figure of HK$32,073 per month for the two Children.

13.  Mr Li takes great exception to Ms Chiang’s closing submissions on the calculation of W’s claim. It is also noted that W does not provide the particulars of her claim for backdating until the service of her Opening Submission, and the calculation until the service of her Closing Submission.

14.  Mr Li asserts that W shall not pursue the backdating without leave under the ‘12-month rule’ as provided by s.12 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (‘MPPO”).

15.  To deal with the last paragraph in the above first, I take notice that s.12 MPPO provides that a person shall not be entitled to enforce through the court the payment of any arrears due under a maintenance order made by the court. Clearly, this is not the present situation. Accordingly, I do not accept Mr Li’s contention about the so called ‘12-month rule’.

16.  As to Mr Li’s contention that if there was any shortfall in the Children maintenance, it would have been already fully settled by the order dated 19 December 2019, I take notice of the following terms of the said order: -

A.  AND UPON the Petitioner, the Respondent and the Intervener agreeing and confirming … the arrangements for finances and full and final settlement between all 3 parties …;

B.  AND UPON the Petitioner, the Respondent and the Intervener hereby acknowledging to the Court and each other that the provisions herein are accepted in full and final settlement of all claims that each of the parties may have against the other and/or their respective estates, including inter alia for maintenance pending suit, periodical payments, or nominal maintenance, lump sum or sums, secured periodical payments, transfer and/or settlement of property order, order for sale and/or other property adjustment orders including claims arising under the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, the Married Persons Status Ordinance, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Ordinance and/or any other relevant Ordinances in Hong Kong or relevant legislation in any other jurisdiction, and including civil claims or disputes or issues concerning beneficial ownership of properties and assets;

C.  AND UPON the Petitioner and the Respondent agreeing and acknowledging to the Court and to each other that the terms herein shall be binding …;

F.  &AND UPON the Petitioner and the Respondent agreeing and acknowledging that all assets subsequently acquired by either the Petitioner or the Respondent by way of gifts, inheritance or in any other way shall remain in their respective absolute sole beneficial ownership;

G.  AND UPON the Petitioner and the Respondent agreeing, acknowledging and undertaking that subject to the terms of settlement herein: - (1) They shall each be solely responsible for his or her own debts and liabilities incurred prior to the date of the Consent Summons and thereafter;

Q.  AND UPON the Respondent undertaking to the Court and to the Petitioner that he shall pay directly to the school of the children (1) school fees; (2) school miscellaneous fees; (3) school bus; and (4) school trips of the Children until further order of the Court;

R.  AND UPON the Respondent undertaking to the Court and to the Petitioner that he shall pay directly to the current domestic helper monthly salary until expiration of her current employment contract;

BY CONSENT, IT IS ORDERED that: -

1.   …

2.   The Petitioner’s and the Respondent’s respective claims for all forms of ancillary relief against each other or each other’s estate within and without the jurisdiction of Hong Kong including claims for maintenance pending suit, periodical payments, nominal maintenance, secured periodical payments, property transfer or settlement orders, orders for sale and lump sum orders under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap. 192) and all other relevant legislation, do stand dismissed;

   …

5.   The Intervener do pay a sum of HK$3,500,000 into a joint name account of the Petitioner and the Respondent, to be used solely for maintenance and education of the family children … the quantum of payment out to be HK$35,000 per month in addition to Recital Q & R above, all without prejudice to the Petitioner and the Respondent arguing on the reasonableness of such periodical sum at substantive hearing;

17.  I take notice that W was represented by counsel during the making of the order dated 19 December 2019.

18.  It is trite that there shall be no full and final settlement when dealing with the developing needs of children. After having carefully considered the terms of the order dated 19 December 2019, however, I am prepared to accept that the children maintenance matter including W’s so-called claim for backdating is fully settled by the order dated 19 December 2019, save to the limited extent of the proviso under the paragraph 5 thereof and subject to the developing needs of the Children.

19.  According to the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019, the parties have reserved the right to argue on the reasonableness of the quantum of the monthly payment out from the Intervener’s Funds for the benefit of the Children. In this regard, the parties have reached an out of court settlement regarding the Children’s monthly maintenance. On 26 May 2021, by consent it was ordered that the quantum of the payment out as provided under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019 be varied to HK$50,000 per month for the Children, namely HK$25,000 per month each, payable on the 1st day of each month starting from 1 June 2021. In the circumstance, I take the view that the parties have also fully settled the question of the quantum of the monthly payment out for the Children under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019. Ms Chiang has expressed that the backdating can be described as compensation to W. As such, it is for W’s benefit. By no stretch of the imagination that W can seek a lump sum payment in compensation of so called backdating under the proviso described in the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019.

20.  The above finding is sufficient to dispose of W’s present application. In such case, it is unnecessary for me to embark a discussion on the other contentions raised by Mr Li in opposition, such as his complaints about procedural unfairness or criticisms on Ms Chiang’s calculation.

21.  In conclusion, it is ordered that W’s application for backdating is dismissed.

22.  W is unsuccessful in the present application. Currently, I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. It is ordered nisi that W shall pay H the costs of her claim for backdating with certificate for counsel. The above costs order nisi becomes absolute 14 days after the order is made unless a party has applied to the court for varying the order.

( K K PANG )
District Judge

Melinda Chiang instructed by Wong & Co. for the Petitioner

Felix Li instructed by Ip & Heathfield for the Respondent

[2021] HKFC 78-EN-2021-04-30

YNNA v. HCKW

HTML content

FCMC 6626/2015

[2021] HKFC 78

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 6626 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 YNNAPetitioner

and

 HCKWRespondent
 WWCAIntervener

------------------------

Coram: District Judge K K PANG in Chambers (Disposal on papers)

Date of Petitioner’s Submissions: 8 March 2021

Date of Respondent and Intervener’s Joint Submissions: 23 March 2021

Date of Judgment: 30 April 2021

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J U D G M E N T

(Application for Leave to Appeal)

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Background

1.  The parties were married in 2001 in Hong Kong. The children of the family, two daughters, were born in 2002 and 2005 respectively. The Petitioner Wife (‘W’) petitioned for divorce on behaviour on 29 May 2015. By the order dated 10 November 2015, by consent it was ordered that the joint custody of the children of the family was granted to the parties with care and control to W. The Decree Nisi was granted on 22 February 2016. By the Order dated 17 May 2016, by consent it was ordered that the Respondent Husband (‘H’) do have defined access to the children of the family including day and staying access. Upon W, H and the Intervener’s consent joint application, an order in terms of a global settlement regarding the arrangements for finances and full and final settlement among all three parties was made by Her Honour Judge A.N. Tse Ching on 19 December 2019. The paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019 provides that the Intervener do pay a sum of HK$3,500,000 into a joint name account of the parties to be used solely for the maintenance for the children of the family … without prejudice to the parties arguing on the reasonableness of such periodical sum at the substantive hearing. The substantive hearing of children maintenance is fixed to take place on 26 and 27 May 2021.

2.  The Recital N and the paragraph 1(2) of the order dated 19 December 2019 provides as follows:

N.   AND UPON the Petitioner and the Respondent agreeing that they shall jointly appoint a single-joint expert (‘SJE’) on valuation of properties within 14 days from the date of the Consent Summons for the purpose of evaluating the current open market value on present day basis of the South Horizons Property, the Lakeville 2104 Property and the Lakeville 702 Property (‘Total Valuation’), failing which the identity of SJE on valuation of properties shall be determined by the Court upon the joint application by the Petitioner and the Respondent; and the fees of the single-joint expert shall be shared by the Petitioner and the Respondent equally;

1.   The Petitioner shall receive the following 2 lump sums:-

(1) …

(2) A sum calculated by the following mathematical formula within 12 months of Decree Absolute or, if it is earlier, 14 days after receipt of the net proceeds of sale in the event that either Lakeville 2104 or Lakeville 702 is sold to a third-party buyer to be paid into the Petitioner’s Renminbi Mainland PRC bank account :-

  (Total Valuation / 2) less value of the South Horizon Property

3.  By the solicitors’ letter dated 3 February 2020, H made application for the Court’s directions on the appointment of SJE pursuant to the Recital N. By the Order of His Honour Judge S Lo dated 31 March 2020, it was ordered that: - (1) Cushman & Wakefield (‘C&W’) be appointed as SJE for the valuation of the South Horizon Property; (2) Shanghai Wan Long Real Estate Appraisal Co Ltd (‘SHWL’) be appointed SJE for the valuation of the Lakeville 2104 Property and the Lakeville 7902 Property. On 31 May 2020, SHWL issued two valuation reports. According to the SHWL reports, as of 26 April 2020 the Lakeville 2104 Property and the Lakeville 702 Property were valued at RMB ¥21,000,000 and RMB ¥24,900,000 respectively.

4.  On 21 December 2020, W issued the summons for an order that: -

(1)   Leave to file and serve the expert report of C&W on the valuation of the Lakeville 2104 and the Lakeville 702 dated 26 November 2020;

(2)   Directions on the implementation of Recital N and/or Paragraph 1(2) of the consent order dated 19 December 2019, including but not limited to the determination of the Total Valuation as defined therein;

(3)   Further and/or other orders;

(4)   Costs be in the cause.

5.  In W’s supporting affirmation filed on 29 December 2020, there was produced and marked exhibit ‘1’ copy of the valuation report issued by C&W dated 26 November 2020. As per the said C&W report, as of 26 April 2020 the Lakeville 2104 Property and the Lakeville 702 Property were valued at RMB ¥24,900,000 and RMB ¥25,800,000 respectively, and as of 11 November 2020 the Lakeville 2104 Property and the Lakeville 702 Property were valued at RMB ¥25,200,000 and RMB ¥26,100,000 respectively. As such, W averred that she was advised and verily believed that she had grounds to seek leave to adduce the CW report to challenge the expert evidence of the SHWL reports as follows: -

(1)   The SHWL reports undervalued the Lakeville 2104 and 702 Properties;

(2)   It would be fair to the parties to adopt a more recent report in determining the open market value of the said properties;

(3)   The SHWL reports adopted a mixed approach of comparison method with investment method. There was no explanation in the SHWL reports as to how such approach was taken and there were no comparable provided in the SHWL reports that were supposed to form the basis of the valuation under the comparison method;

(4)   It would be considered more of a norm for a comparison approach to be taken as C&W did in their report in the valuation of residential properties.

6.  After having read the papers and heard counsel for the parties, I delivered an ex tempore decision that W’s summons dated 21 December 2020 be dismissed with costs at the end of the hearing on 1 March 2021. It was also expressly directed that the dismissal of the said summons was without prejudice to W to take out a fresh application, if so advised.

7.  By the summons dated 8 March 2021, W applied for leave to appeal against the order dated 1 March 2021 and costs.

8.  The draft Notice of Appeal contains 3 grounds of appeal: -

(1)   The Learned Judge erred in law by failing to give sufficient reasons for dismissing the summons dated 21 December 2020.

(2)   The Learned Judge erred in law by wrongly holding that the only remedy of a Family Court Litigant who was dissatisfied with a valuation report produced by a SJE was to set aside the appointment of that expert, with the correct legal position was that an application for further directions, such as the admission into evidence of an additional valuation report by a different expert, could be made pursuant to Order 38 r 4A, without setting aside the appointment of the original expert.

(3)   All in all, the Learned Judge plainly should have allowed the Summons to proceed to substantive arguments, instead of dismissing it at a 15 minutes call over.

9.  W’s solicitors have applied for and been provided with the transcript of the hearing dated 1 March 2021 (‘the Transcript’). Although the Transcript is not included in the Hearing Bundle, I shall make reference to it in the discussion below.

10.  About the grounds of appeal (1) and (3), I take notice of the followings: -

(a)  It was W’s solicitor’s estimate that the length of the hearing dated 1 March 2021 was 15 minutes;

(b)  At the hearing dated 1 March 2021, all parties were represented by counsel who have lodged with the court and served on the other parties full Submissions;

(c)  Counsel for W did not seek an adjournment. Actually, counsel for W said that she had no further submissions to make[1];

(drt)   The Transcript clearly shows that, during the hearing dated 1 March 2021, I have fully explained to counsel my observations and concerns about W’s application as well as the reasons of my decision, and furthermore I have adjourned the hearing to give counsel for W the time for reflections and taking further instructions before the conclusion of the hearing, and additionally counsel for W has had the opportunity of fully address the court on W’s case. Indeed, counsel for W repeatedly averred to the Court that she understood the Court’s question and views [2].

11.  After having carefully considered the matters set out in the above, I am satisfied that the grounds of appeal (1) and (3) do not have a reasonable prospect of success.

12.  As to ground of appeal (2), I must clarify that W’s averment that I hold that the only remedy of a Family Court litigant who was dissatisfied with a valuation report produced by a SJE was to set aside the appointment of that expert is a misstatement. The Transcript clearly shows that I do not hold such view. I also take notice that it is H and the Intervener’s submission that nowhere in the Recital N it is contemplated that any party including W will challenge the valuation or that the court will be stepping in to interfere with the valuation. I clarify that, as the Transcript shows, I am open to that matter.[3]

13.  The reason for my decision dated 1 March 2021 can be seen in the Transcript[4]. I shall not regurgitate the same here. Simply put, and as set out in the paragraph 6 of counsel for H and counsel for the Intervener’s joint Submission, the court does not see why W should be allowed to adduce another expert valuation report while the court is not tasked with performing a valuation assessment and there is no upcoming trial. It is worthy of noting that notwithstanding that W averred in her supporting affirmation that she was advised and verily believed that she had grounds to challenge the expert evidence of the SHWL reports, she did not make an application for any substantive relief to challenge the expert evidence of the SHWL reports in the summons dated 21 December 2020.

14.  After having carefully considered the matters set out in the above, I am satisfied that the ground of appeal (2) does not have a reasonable prospect of success.

15.  Section 63A (2) of the District Court Ordinance provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. There is no reasonable prospect of success in any of the Draft Grounds of Appeal. Nor is there any other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. Accordingly, it is ordered that the summons dated 8 March 2021 for leave to appeal be dismissed.

16.  W is unsuccessful in the present application. Currently, I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. It is ordered nisi that W shall pay H and the Intervener’s costs of the summons dated 8 March 2021 with certificate for counsel. The above costs order nisi becomes absolute 14 days after the order is made unless a party has applied to the court for varying the order.

( K K PANG )
District Judge

Kenneth K Y Lam and Melinda Chiang instructed by Wong & Co. for the Petitioner

Felix Li instructed by Ip & Heathfield for the Respondent

Jeremy S K Chan instructed by Fairbairn Catley Low & Kong for the Intervener


[1] See Line A at p.8

[2] See Line O at p. 6 and Line Q at p. 7 of the Transcript

[3] See Lines I to O, T to V at p. 6 and Lines A to C at p.7

[4] Lines Q to U at p. 3, the whole of pp. 4 to 7