HCA 1633/2019
[2023] HKCFI 3321
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
民事司法管轄權
案件編號2019年第1633號
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| 聆訊日期： | 2023年及12月6日及18日 |
| 判決書日期： | 2023年12月19日 |
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判 決 書
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1. 背景
1.1 原告人曾因違反《簡易程序治罪條例》(第228章) 第4B(1) 條自建築物掉下物體及違反《入境條例》(第115章) 第17I(1) 條僱用不可合法受僱的人 (“控罪三”)，於2000年6月2日在新蒲崗裁判法院經審訊後被定罪，分別被判處罰款$1,000及監禁12個月。他其後就控罪三的刑期提出上訴得直，改爲監禁9個月。原告人曾向終審法院就定罪提出上訴許可申請，其申請遭拒絕。
1.2 原告人在2019年9月3日及2020年7月7日，分別存檔傳訊令狀及申索陳述書，看似是因控罪三的定罪被判監導致他蒙受失去自由、失業等損失爲理由，向被告人索償HK$350,000及利息。
1.3 被告人於2020月7月29日，申請剔除原告人的申索，聆案官許家灝在2020年12月17日批准申請，剔除了原告人的申索，並命令原告人須支付被告人有關本案（包括該次申請）的訟費 (“該訟費令”)[1]。訟費的款額如無法由雙方議定，則交由法庭評定。
1.4 於2022年 11 月 28 日，被告人就該訟費令存檔展開訟費評定通知書及被告人的訟費單。於2022年12月 22 日，原告人存檔反對項目清單。於2023年 1 月 31 日，雙方在何展鵬聆案官席前進行第一次提訊。何聆案官指示被告人須依照實務指示14.3的格式草擬及存檔反對項目清單及將訟費單押後至2023年 3 月 28 日作第二次提訊。於2023年 2月 21 日，原告人存檔更新的反對項目清單。其後，被告人於2023年 4 月 17 日向原告人發信，邀請原告人就爭議的項目進行討論，以嘗試達成和解或減少爭議項目，不過原告人沒有回覆。
1.5 於2023年 5月15 日，雙方在何聆案官席前進行訟費評定聆訊。何聆案官依原告人的反對項目清單於每項反對項目作出評定 (“有關訟費評定”)。經評定後，訟費總額為HK$59,369。
1.6 於2023年 5月31日，原告人存檔反對有關訟費評定的傳票申請 (“該反對傳票”)，向法庭申請批准延期交傳票反對訟費評定。
1.7 於2023年6月9日，該反對傳票於何聆案官席前進行3分鐘的聆訊。何聆案官在聽取雙方的口頭陳述後，撤銷該反對傳票。在有關錄音謄本中可見，原告人希望法庭重新評定訟費單。何聆案官認為該反對傳票並不是根據《高等法院規則》第62號命令第33條規則作出的覆核申請。即使將該反對傳票作為覆核申請處理，何聆案官亦認為沒有良好的理由，重新進行一個訟費評定(“有關判決”)[2]。
1.8 被告人於2023年6月1日向法院遞交草擬的《訟費評定證明書》，待法院批核。其後，法院於2023年8月3日發出正式蓋印的《訟費評定證明書》 (“該證明書”)[3]。
1.9 原告人於2023年11月3日存檔上訴通知書，針對該證明書提出上訴，並申請其上訴時限予以延展(“本申請”)。
2. 法律原則
2.1 首先，Lam & Lai Solicitors v Ho Chun Yan Albert [2018] 2 HKLRD 127 說明，由於訟費評定程序是由一位訟費評定官作出，《高等法院規則》第58號命令並不適用[4]：
“[11] It is to be noted that taxation is to be conducted by “taxing master”. Hence, a decision by a taxing master does not fall within a decision by a master in respect of which appeal can be brought under Order 58 to a judge.”
2.2 第二，即使本席將本申請作為訟費覆核處理，本席亦應跟隨《高等法院規則》第62號命令第33 至35條規則。根據 Tin Wan Tung v Wong See Yin & Ors, HCA 167 of 2011, 17 January 2017：
“[16] First of all, I agree that even if the court does decide to hear the Taxation Appeal, then it should proceed under the rules and procedures set out in Order 62, rule 35 of the RHC (instead of Order 58).
[17] With reference to Order 62, rule 35(1) specifically, the defendants have wrongly adopted a “wholesale” approach in the Taxation Appeal. In particular: –
(1) The defendants can only apply to “review the taxation as to that item or part of an item”, which means that the defendants should only be permitted to ask the judge to review the items reviewed by the Taxing Master in her decision. Therefore, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Appeal Notice are not within the scope of review by the judge.
(2) In fact, paragraph 4 of the Appeal Notice should not be considered either, as the defendants are asking the judge to review the costs of the taxation review, and not the Taxing Master’s decision “to allow or to disallow any item in whole or in part on review under rule 34, or with the amount allowed in respect of any item by a taxing master on any such review”.
(3) Thus, only paragraph 3 of the Appeal Notice is proper and may be considered, as the defendants are not entitled to “appeal” the other items.
[18] This is further supported by the fact that under Order 62, rule 35(1) of the RHC, the defendants may apply to a judge to review each item “if, but only if, one of the parties to the proceedings before the taxing Master requested that officer in accordance with rule 34(4) to state the reasons for his decision in respect of that item or part on the review” (emphasis supplied).
[19] Thus, the defendants are required to request the Taxing Master to state the reasons for her decision in respect of the items they want to review. Without the specific reasons for each item, the defendants are unable to properly set out their grounds of “review”, effectively forcing the judge to rehear the arguments heard by the Taxing Master, contrary to the position that this court is not required to conduct a taxation de novo.”
2.3 在 Tin Wan Tung一案中，陳法官已清楚解釋根據《高等法院規則》第62號命令第35條規則， 法庭是不應該及不必要將訟費整體重新作出評定。
3. 分析
3.1 本席強調本申請是針對該證明書的上訴，而原告人並不是就有關判決提出上訴。
3.2 原告人在聆訊中亦確認他希望本席可以重新評定訟費單。
3.3 本申請明顯是根據《高等法院規則》第58號命令作出。這程序上的錯誤已提供足夠原因將本申請撤銷。Tin Wan Tung第9至15段說明：
“[9] As submitted by the plaintiffs, I agree that the defendants were misconceived from the beginning in having taken out the Taxation Appeal under Order 58 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A (“RHC”), as if it were an ordinary appeal against a master’s decision.
…
[11] Furthermore, the challenge to the taxation brought by the defendants clearly comes within the review mechanism, and so there is no room to challenge these matters under the inherent jurisdiction of the court [see: CKF v LLL (Ibid), per Cheung JA at paragraphs 17 and 18].
[12] These principles were echoed by Poon J (as he then was) in Leong Yuet Wah v Wong Wei Lin,HCMP 428/2006 (Decision dated 6/02/2009), where the learned judge dismissed the appeal for the same reason.
“[5] ... Order 62, rule 2(4) provides that the powers and discretion of the court as to costs shall be exercised subject to and in accordance with Order 62. The powers and discretion as to costs covered by that rule must include the powers and discretion exercisable by a taxing master on review of his own decision on taxation and the court on review of the master’s decision. It follows that a party who wishes to challenge a decision made by the taxing master must follow the specific review mechanism in rules 33 to 35. He cannot avail himself of his general right to appeal to a judge in chambers under Order 58.” (emphasis supplied)
[13] Poon J went on to explain at paragraph 9 of that decision why a failure to follow the review mechanism in Order 62 of the RHC cannot be cured: –
“[9] The second point taken by Mr Lam is this. He submitted if there is any procedural irregularity in not following the review mechanism in Order 62, the court can still exercise the discretion under Order 2 to cure the defect. He submitted that the error made by the taxing master involved a simple point of law. The master had already given his reasons. The petitioners will not suffer any prejudice if the appeal is to be heard now. I disagree. As I have pointed out in the course of the submissions, there exists a very good reason for the review mechanism. When the matter is brought before the master again on review, he can revisit his decision with the benefit of further submissions. If persuaded, he may change his mind. If that happens, the reviewing party will achieve what he wants there and then. If the master confirms his decision and the reviewing party brings the matter further, the master will have to give full reasons for his decision made on review, which will be placed before the judge when the matter goes before him. When the review mechanism is not followed, the taxing master will be deprived of the opportunity of re-considering his decision and the court, his full reasons for the decision that he made on review. This deficiency cannot be remedied by the court’s exercising the discretion under Order 2.” (emphasis supplied)
[14] If the defendants are permitted to proceed in this case with the Taxation Appeal, the Taxing Master will be deprived of a second review of her decision pursuant to Order 62, rule 35 of the RHC before any appeal. Moreover, under this review procedure, the judge in chambers is only required to consider the reasons for the Taxing Master’s decision on her review and not required to conduct a taxation de novo [see: Chan Yin Na v Union Medical Centre Ltd [2011] 5 HKC 158, at paragraph 26].
[15] For the reasons stated above, I agree with the plaintiffs that the Taxation Appeal is wholly inappropriate and should accordingly be dismissed.”
3.4 即使本席將本申請作為訟費覆核處理，本申請很明顯沒有跟隨《高等法院規則》第62號命令第33至35條規則。
3.5 正如被告人指出，該反對傳票的聆訊並非就有關訟費評定的覆核聆訊，而只是原告人申請延期交傳票去作出反對有關訟費評定的申請 (《高等法院規則》第62號命令第33(2) 條規則)。覆核聆訊與延期的申請本質上相異。在該反對傳票的聆訊中，原告人沒有、而法庭亦無要求原告人根據《高等法院規則》第62號命令第33(3)條規則，向訟費評定官交付反對書。反而，正如上文第1.7段所述，何聆案官認為無良好的理由延期給予原告人作重新申請。
3.6 再者，由於何聆案官並沒有根據《高等法院規則》第62號命令第34條規則作出覆核，因此，本申請同樣不符合《高等法院規則》第第62號命令第35(1)條規則的規定，即任何在法官席前提出的覆核申請，只可在訟費評定官席前的法律程序的其中一方已按照34(4)條規則請求該名人員述明他在覆核時就該項目或該部分所作決定的理由之後才提出。
3.7 基於以上原因，本席駁回原告人的上訴。
3.8 法庭處理延展上訴期限的申請，一般會考慮：延誤了多少時間；造成延誤的原因；上訴的成功機會；及批准逾期上訴將會對訴訟另一方造成的損害。本席認為在本案中是否批准原告人逾期提出上訴，主要取決於上訴的成功機會。由於本席認為原告人的上訴應被駁回，本席亦拒絕延展上訴期限。
4. 結論
4.1 本席駁回本申請。本席作出以下暫准訟費命令: 原告人須支付被告人就本申請之訟費。倘若與訟雙方在14天內沒有申請更改此暫准訟費令，此命令將成為絕對命令。
4.2 被告人的訟費以簡易程序評定。被告人已於2023年12月14日 提供及送達其訟費陳述書。原告人須於7天內向法庭提供及向被告人送達 其反對理由（不超過兩頁）。 其後，本席將書面作出簡易評定。
原告人：無律師代表，親自應訊。
被告人：由律政司高級政府律師王家琪代表。
[1] 原告人其後就許家灝聆案官作出的命令提出上訴。其申請遭駁回。
[2] 謄本8A-H
[3] 總額為HK$59,369
[4] Lam & Lai Solicitors §11 per Lam VP