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Civil Action2019

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

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Files (16)

[2024] HKCFI 2884-CH-2024-10-17

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 2275/2019

[2024] HKCFI 2884

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

_________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

及

第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

_________________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官梁俊文內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2024年7月17日
判決書日期:2024年10月17日

_________________

判 決 書

_________________


1.  有關本訴訟,本席曾應第二被告人 (「鄧先生」) 的多個申請/上訴,於2024年2月至4月期間分別進行了聆訊,並一併於2024年6月21日頒布書面判決。不過在頒布該判決之前,鄧先生又再提出其他申請,並在聆案官就該等申請作出判決後,隨即又向法官提出上訴。

背景

2.  本案與相關的HCA 1611/2019案的背景,在本席較早前頒布包括2022年7月29日的判決書和上述2024年6月21日的判決書中已有所交待,在此不贅。本席以下所述,將採用6月21日判決書中所作的定義和簡稱。

3.  今回鄧先生透過2024年6月17日的上訴通知書,要求推翻下述聆案官就他的傳票申請所作的判決:

(1) 2024年4月8日的傳票 (「該8/4/2024申請」),聆訊及判決日期2024年4月19日 (「該19/4/2024命令」);

(2) 2024年5月2日的傳票 (「該2/5/2024申請」),聆訊及判決日期2024年5月14日 (「該14/5/2024命令」);

(3) 2024年5月24日的傳票 (「該24/5/2024申請」),聆訊及判決日期2024年6月4日 (「該4/6/2024命令」)。

相關法律原則

4.  根據《高等法院規則》(「該規則」) 第58號命令提出的上訴,猶如法官重新聆訊原來聆案官席前的申請或事宜。

該8/4/2024申請

5.  鄧先生該8/4/2024申請,是(i)要求暫緩執行該管有令狀和2024年4月3日的最後遷出通知書;(ii)「申請啓動聆訊」其經修訂抗辯書及反申索書內的指控和申索。聆案官經聆訊後作出該19/4/2024命令撤銷了該申請,並命令鄧先生支付Source View訟費港幣1,040元。

6.  有關上述申請(i)所針對的,本席只需重申在2024年6月21日判決書內的分析。上述申請(ii)所指「申請啓動聆訊」的要求不能合理地理解,而事實上鄧先生在本訴訟的抗辯和反申索早已被剔除。如此申請屬濫用法庭程序。

7.  該8/4/2024申請理應予以撤銷;聆案官根據該判決命令鄧先生支付訟費無可厚非。

該2/5/2024申請

8.  鄧先生該2/5/2024申請,是(i)要求撤銷該管有令狀;(ii)重複該8/4/2024申請中所謂「申請啓動聆訊」其經修訂抗辯書及反申索書內的指控和申索。

9.  除了本席以上有關鄧先生該等申請所述之外,鄧先生透過向不同聆案官重複已被撤銷的相同申請,構成濫用司法程序。該2/5/2024申請理應予以撤銷;聆案官根據該判決命令鄧先生支付訟費同樣無可厚非。

該24/5/2024申請

10.  鄧先生該24/5/2024申請,是要求(i)撤銷該管有令狀/上述該2024年4月3日的遷出通知書;(ii)撤銷該19/4/2024命令當中的訟費命令;(iii)撤銷該14/5/2024命令當中的訟費命令;(iv)重複上述要求所謂「申請啓動聆訊」其經修訂抗辯書及反申索書內的指控和申索。

11.  換言之,鄧先生不但再一次向不同聆案官重複提出已被撤銷的申請,更要求不同聆案官去推翻另一聆案官的決定,這是不顧法院規則的濫用司法程序行為。該24/5/2024申請必須予以撤銷;聆案官根據判決而作出該4/6/2024命令,並要鄧先生支付Source View訟費是正確的。

鄧先生的其他論點

12.  鄧先生透過其2024年6月17日的誓章作出陳述,提出各聆案官席前聆訊均是3分鐘,所以各聆案官在沒有充份時間去了解案情的情況下作出判決和命令。這說法全無根據。首先,猜測或假設聆案官在聆訊前沒有閱讀聆訊文件是不切實際的。其次,鄧先生未能指各聆訊只進行了不多於3分鐘,而根據法庭記錄事實剛好相反。再者,上述鄧先生各個傳票申請濫用司法程序之嫌根本上顯而易見。

13.  鄧先生透過其2024年7月15日的誓章又作出陳述,包括指Source View單方面申請該管有令狀,違反了《香港人權法》第10和14條等,都是全無法理基礎的。他指Source View透過執達部門強制執行該管有令狀,是「強烈霸佔涉案物業」、「暴力佔領行為」、「違反了“搶劫”法例」等,也難以理喻。有關Source View當時根據該規則第45和46號命令所規定的法庭程序,去向法庭申請和其後透過執達部門強制執行該管有令狀的過程,本席已在2024年6月21日書面判決中簡述。

濫用司法程序

14.  正如鄧先生在表述中的了解,他針對本席該29/7/2022判決的進一步上訴仍有待上訴法庭處理。作為上訴方,他實在有責任並應該專注於進行該等上訴以盡快獲得結果。鄧先生必須了解,若他不斷提出其他申請及製造不恰當或欠缺程序基礎的上訴,將有可能導致對方申請或法庭自行考慮,是否以他提出無理纏繞法律程序為理由,根據《高等法院條例》第27或27A條和《實務指示》11.3,去作出限制他在處理上述上訴以外提出申請的決定。

結論/命令

15.  鄧先生透過該上訴通知書提出的上訴予以撤銷。

16.  鄧先生須支付因本上訴引致Source View的訟費。

17.  代表Source View的律師在聆訊時提交了訟費陳述書,鄧先生於聆訊有機會就該書作出陳述。該訟費現評定為港幣10,000元;鄧先生須於2024年11月1日或之前支付該訟費。

 ( 梁俊文 )
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所陳焯圻律師代表。

第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊。

[2024] HKCFI 1682-CH-2024-06-21

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 2275/2019

[2024] HKCFI 1682

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

_________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

及

第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

_________________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官梁俊文內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2024年2月8日、2月29日及4月17日
判決書日期:2024年6月21日

_________________

判 決 書

_________________

1.  本席透過本判決書同時處理本案第二被告人 (「鄧先生」) 先後提出的4個申請。

背景

2.  本案與相關的HCA 1611/2019案 (「HCA 1611案」)一併處理後,本案的原告人 (即HCA 1611案的被告人) (「Source View」) 於2021年11月22日成功地獲得聆案官頒發本案簡易判決,以及剔除並撤銷了鄧先生透過HCA 1611案向Source View提出的申索。根據該判決,Source View可獲包括交還涉案物業的空置管有。

3.  鄧先生曾先後透過不同的法律程序,以圖推翻或阻止執行上述聆案官該判決,惟均告失敗。該等程序包括他透過上訴以推翻上述聆案官該判決,為此聆案官曾批准暫緩執行該判決。該上訴其後於本席席前進行了聆訊。

4.  2022年7月29日,本席頒下書面判決撤銷了上述鄧先生該上訴 (「該29/7/2022判決」) ;原來聆案官暫緩執行上述該判決的命令也隨即失效。

5.  2022年11月17日,Source View繼而從法庭獲得針對本案第一被告人的判決。鄧先生也曾試圖申請暫緩執行該針對第一被告人的判決,但因為並無法定身份代表作為公司的第一被告人,以及欠缺理據,他的申請先後遭聆案官和法官撤銷。

6.  其後鄧先生就上述該29/7/2022判決和法庭其後作出的進一步命令提出挑戰,理據大致基於他在本案和相關HCA 1611案中的論點,因而衍生了多個法庭判決,以及至今仍有待上訴法庭處理的上訴許可申請和上訴。由於本訴訟和該些法律程序的其他背景已於相關法庭書面判決中先後交待,所以除下文所需,本席不打算在此重複。

7.  為了根據上述判決收回涉案物業的空置管有, Source View根據《高等法院規則》第45號和第46號命令,於2023年4月21日提出單方面申請,並於2023年5月16日獲法庭許可以申請針對涉案物業的管有令狀。

8.  2023年7月27日,法庭正式發出針對涉案物業的管有令狀 (「該管有令狀」)。

9.  根據該管有令狀,法庭執達主任分別於2023年12月19日和2024年1月3日,在涉案物業張貼遷出通知書 (下分別簡稱「該19/12/2023通知書」和「該3/1/2024通知書」)。

10.  鄧先生曾先後因應上述遷出通知書而提出暫緩執行該管有令狀的申請。2024年1月22日和1月24日,聆案官分別撤銷了鄧先生先後提出的申請,並命令鄧先生支付原告人訟費 (下分別簡稱「該22/1/2024命令」和「該24/1/2024命令」)。

11.  鄧先生於2024年1月24日提出傳票申請 (「該24/1/2024申請」),要求法官暫緩執行根據該管有令狀發出的「該19/12/2023通知書」,直至上述包括他針對該29/7/2022判決上訴有結果為止。鄧先生也要求推翻上述聆案官該22/1/2024命令下的訟費部份。

12.  該24/1/2024申請於2024年2月8日在本席席前進行聆訊。不過,就在聆訊前一天,即2024年2月7日,鄧先生又提出另一傳票申請 (「該7/2/2024申請」),要求暫緩執行根據該管有令狀發出的「該3/1/2024通知書」,直至上述包括他針對該29/7/2022判決上訴有結果為止。鄧先生也要求推翻上述聆案官該24/1/2024命令下的訟費部份。

13.  本席於2月8日聆訊時,詢問雙方是否可以同時聆訊上述直至當時鄧先生提出的兩個傳票申請,唯遭到鄧先生反對。

14.  本席於2024年2月8日聆訊後,押後以透過書面形式去頒布該24/1/2024申請的判決。

15.  至於該7/2/2024申請,本席於2024年2月29日聆訊後,同樣押後以透過書面形式去頒布判決。

16.  事實上,法庭執達主任於2024年2月19日再次於涉案物業張貼最後遷出通知書 (「該19/2/2024通知書」)。這引發鄧先生於2024年2月26日再向聆案官申請「禁止及擱置」執行該管有令狀。2024年3月1日,聆案官經聆訊後撤銷了該申請 (「該1/3/2024命令」),並命令鄧先生支付訟費。

17.  於2024年3月5日和3月12日,鄧先生先後存檔兩份上訴通知書,要求推翻上述該1/3/2024命令。前者是要求「禁止及擱置」該管有令狀 (「該5/3/2024上訴」);後者是要求「禁止及擱置及暫緩執行」根據該管有令狀發出的該19/2/2024通知書,以及撤銷該1/3/2024命令的訟費部份 (「該12/3/2024上訴」)。

18.  2024年4月17日,本席在聆訊上述兩個上訴後,押後透過書面形式去頒布判決,並表明可能與較早前已經聆訊的該24/1/2024申請和該7/2/2024申請一併頒布判決。

19.  因此,本席現在處理鄧先生的上述4個申請/上訴分別是:

(1) 該24/1/2024申請;

(2) 該7/2/2024申請;

(3) 該5/3/2024上訴;

(4) 該12/3/2024上訴。

鄧先生的申請/上訴及相關法津原則

20.  上段所述第(3)和(4)項針對聆案官命令提出的上訴,乃根據《高等法院規則》第58號命令提出。這猶如本席重新聆訊原來聆案官席前的申請或事宜。

21.  根據《高等法院規則》第45號命令第11條,判決或命令針對的一方,可以該判決或命令的日期後所發生的任何事宜為理由,向法庭申請擱置執行該判決或命令。上述鄧先生提出的兩個上訴,源於他於2024年2月26日的傳票申請,而他在該傳票上表明,申請的理由是該管有令狀發出後,有特殊情況出現引致該令不宜執行。

22.  無論是他的傳票申請,還是針對聆案官命令的上訴,綜觀鄧先生提交的法庭文件中所作陳述後,唯一可以合理地理解的,是他要求擱置上述本案判決的強制執行,包括其後根據該判決而發出的該管有令狀,以至根據該管有令狀而進行包括張貼遷出通知書的程序。

23.  鄧先生提出上述申請和上訴的基礎則如出一轍,就是他重申該判決和該管有令狀,以至根據該管有令狀發出遷出通知書的程序,皆沒有法律基礎。他指在針對該29/7/2022判決上訴 (甚至根據他指包括終審上訴) 有結果之前,理應擱置強制執行該判決和管有令狀。

24.  《高等法院規則》第59號命令第13(1)條規定,上訴本身並不會令擬透過上訴去推翻的判決或命令的執行因而擱置。法庭有酌情權考慮是否擱置強制執行有關判決或命令,而法庭行使該酌情權須考慮的情況,早在Star Play Development Limited v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84一案中解釋:

(1) 考慮的起點是勝訴一方不應被剝奪訴訟的成果,而勝訴一方因暫緩執行命令而會蒙受甚麼不利這點,會是相關的考慮。

(2) 若法庭認為申請方有很大機會上訴得直,這本身可能構成暫緩執行有關判令的良好理由。

(3) 申請暫緩執行的一方,起碼需要說服法庭,他的上訴理據有合理機會上訴得直,而並非僅可爭辯而已。

(4) 否則,申請方須提出其他理由,說服法院仍應暫緩執行判令。當中常見的理由,包括若不暫緩執行判令的話,那即使上訴一方最終能上訴得直,屆時結果也只會是徒然。

25.  至於鄧先生透過本席席前的申請/上訴要求撤銷各聆案官命令下的訟費部份方面,相關的原則早已確立,即訟費乃法庭的酌情權。除非聆案官在處理訟費責任或金額議題上犯上法律原則上或明顯的判斷的錯誤,否則聆訊上訴的法庭是不會干預的。

分析

26.  鄧先生與另一人在2009年1月6日以管理人的身份,與Source View簽署涉案物業的買賣協議備忘。同日,雙方也簽署轉讓契據,自該日起,Source View成為該物業的業主。Source View其後將物業出租。2019年,Source View入稟土地審裁處向承租人一方追討該物業的欠租及其他拖欠的款項,並要求獲發涉案物業的空置管有。在鄧先生和與他有關連的兩間公司都加入成為被告人之後,該案轉介本法院原訟法庭而成為本案。

27.  鄧先生在相關的HCA 1611案,則要求法庭頒令上述涉案物業買賣協議及轉讓契據違約和無效。他指稱該物業的地契規定,轉讓前須先取得政府批准,而2009年的轉讓,事先並無得到政府批准,因此交易違反地契條款。他又指稱該物業成交時,已有業權人登記在土地紀錄註册,賣家只以管理人身份簽署買賣協議備忘,不符法例要求,又指賣家身份應是業權人,才可簽署買賣合約。鄧先生在該案的指稱,同時成為他在本案中提出抗辯的理由。

28.  聆案官經考慮後裁定鄧先生所指並不足構成抗辯理由,而Source View應得本案簡易判決,以及涉案物業的空置管有和中間收益。鄧先生提出上訴,而本席在作出該29/7/2022判決以駁回鄧先生上訴時,在書面判決 ([2022] HKCFI 2252) 中逐點分析了鄧先生的論點,包括所指出售土地交易違反地契,所指身為遺產管理人沒有權利簽署契據出售土地,以及所指口頭回購土地協議等,在此不贅。本席認為鄧先生提出的主張均不構成可信或有效的抗辯理由,他在相關HCA 1611案提出的申索也明顯欠缺合理訴因,屬瑣屑無聊和無理纏擾,而不斷提出註定失敗的論點屬於濫用司法程序。

29.  鄧先生針對本席該29/7/2022判決的進一步上訴(CACV 342 & 343/2022) 仍有待上訴法庭處理,惟如上所述這本身並不構成暫緩執行該判決的理由。至於鄧先生提出的實在無異於重申其在原來上訴聆訊時的論點,談不上具很大或合理機會上訴得直,因此未能說服本席以他上訴勝算作為理由,去行使酌情權暫緩執行該判決。

30.  由於鄧先生上訴以推翻該29/7/2022判決得直勝算實在成疑,因此拒絕暫緩執行判決對鄧先生的影響,較難抵銷一再拖延Source View獲得判決的不利影響。何況在該5/3/2024上訴和12/3/2024上訴中,Source View指執達主任於2024年2月和4月進行覆核之後,Source View於2024年4月10日已經完成強制執行和收回涉案物業的空置管有。就此,鄧先生沒有提出反證。

31.  基於包括上述理由,本席拒絕鄧先生該24/1/2024申請和該7/2/2024申請有關暫緩執行的部份,以及撤銷該5/3/2024上訴和該12/3/2024上訴中有關要求聆案官禁止或擱置或暫緩執行的部份。

32.  至於鄧先生挑戰有關聆案官作出訟費命令的部份,該24/1/2024申請和7/2/2024申請並非針對相關聆案官命令的上訴,因此欠缺賦予本席去考慮干預的程序基礎。即使假設該等申請性質猶如鄧先生的另外兩個上訴,本席也認為鄧先生挑戰該些訟費部份明顯地缺乏理據。先不論鄧先生因應每次執達主任張貼遷出通知書而提出要求擱置或暫緩執行該管有令狀是重複訴訟,因此是濫用法庭程序。如上所述,聆案官拒絕鄧先生的申請是正確的。無論如何,聆案官根據席前申請判決結果去判令作為敗方的鄧先生支付申請引致Source View的訟費,合符相關法律原則。至於訟費金額方面,也不見得是不合理或偏離一般聆案官席前3分鐘聆訊的訟費計算基準。

結論/命令

33.  該24/1/2024傳票、該7/2/2024傳票、該5/3/2024上訴通知書、該12/3/2024上訴通知書一律予以撤銷。

34.  鄧先生須支付因上述申請和上訴分別引致Source View的訟費。

35.  代表Source View的律師在聆訊上述申請和上訴時已分別提交了訟費陳述書;鄧先生於每次聆訊也有機會就相關訟費陳述書作出陳述。本席在評估時考慮了包括隨該24/1/2024傳票後的3個申請/上訴需考慮的論點和原則有相同之處,認為各申請/上訴引致合理的訟費分別為:

(1) 該24/1/2024申請:港幣12,000元;

(2) 該7/2/2024申請:港幣15,000元;

(3) 該5/3/2024上訴和該12/3/2024上訴:合共港幣15,000元。

36.  鄧先生須於2024年7月8日或之前支付上述已評訟費。

 ( 梁俊文 )
 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所陳焯圻律師代表。

第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊。

[2024] HKCFI 490-CH-2024-02-01

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD及另三人

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019及
HCA 2275/2019

[2024] HKCFI 490

HCA 1611/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第1611號

________________________

原告人鄧錦祥 
 及 
被告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

________________________

及

HCA 2275/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 及 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 
  

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

________________________

(一併聆訊)

主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官梁俊文內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2024年2月1日
判決日期: 2024年2月1日

判決書


1.  鄧先生 (即HCA 1611/2019案的原告人和HCA 2275/2019案的第二被告人)  透過2024年1月5日的傳票,申請許可以提出上訴。根據傳票,本申請針對的是本席2022年11月22日和2023年1月12日判決中的訟費命令。

2.  為此,本席有需要作出下述直至今天的程序背景簡述。

3.  本席因應鄧先生曾針對聆案官所作的決定提出的上訴,於2022年7月29日頒下書面判決撤銷了該上訴,同時根據該結果作出暫時訟費命令,即鄧先生須支付其對方Source View Development Limited (“Source View”)  (即HCA 1611/2019案的被告人和HCA 2275/2019案的原告人)  的訟費,本席並於該暫時命令作實後,於2022年8月29日作出了簡易評估該訟費的命令(「該29/7/2022及29/8/2022命令」)。

4.  鄧先生沒有就上述判決和命令去申請上訴許可,反而透過其2022年9月9日的傳票申請,要求本席撤銷或擱置該29/7/2022及29/8/2022命令。本席在2022年11月29日聆訊後,同日撤銷了該申請,並根據該結果作出了訟費命令及評估了金額(「該29/11/2022命令」)。

5.  其後鄧先生透過其2022年12月9日的傳票申請,要求許可以提出上訴去推翻該29/11/2022命令。本席經2023年1月12日聆訊後,同日撤銷了該申請,並作出了訟費命令及評估了金額(「該12/1/2023命令」)。

6.  鄧先生是於2023年9月29日,才提出傳票申請正式要求本席批出逾期許可以提出上訴,去推翻該29/7/2022及29/8/2022命令。本席經2023年10月17日聆訊後,同日撤銷了該申請,並作出了訟費命令及評估了金額(「該17/10/2023命令」)。

7.  不過,鄧先生其後透過其2023年10月30日的傳票申請,要求本席批出許可以提出上訴去推翻該17/10/2023命令。本席經2023年11月23日聆訊後,同日撤銷了該申請,並作出了訟費命令及評估了金額(「該23/11/2023命令」)。

8.  今天本席席前鄧先生的傳票申請,是要求本席批出許可以提出上訴,去推翻該29/11/2022命令和該12/1/2023命令下的訟費命令。

9.  如上所述,鄧先生為針對要推翻該29/11/2022命令,已經提出過上訴許可申請,而申請已根據該12/1/2023命令予以撤銷。在本席拒絕批出該上訴許可後,鄧先生有權根據《高等法院規則》第59號命令第2B條向上訴法庭重申同樣申請,而並非針對該12/1/2023命令向本席要求許可以提出上訴去推翻該決定。鄧先生曾經收到民事上訴司法常務官的書面指示,以及本席作出該23/11/2023命令時的判決理由,已經清楚解釋有關法則和程序。在這情況下,鄧先生仍然提出這申請是重複訴訟,屬濫用法律程序。

10.  至於該29/11/2022命令和該12/1/2023命令中的訟費命令,都是分別根據當時該些申請予以撤銷的結果而作出的。前者只會是鄧先生其後針對該29/11/2022命令的上訴許可申請時的一部份,並不存在由鄧先生主觀地將之分拆,到現在才針對該命令下的訟費命令提出上訴許可申請。至於後者是根據一般慣例,訟費責任須視乎有關法律程序的結果而定。本席看不到根據該12/1/2023命令判決結果,去行使酌情權作出的訟費命令和訟費評估,存在明顯錯誤。本席在作出該17/10/2023命令和該23/11/2023命令時的判決理由,已分別解釋和重申了有關法庭訟費酌情權的法律原則。

11.  鑑於以上所述,鄧先生至今只是不斷透過上述申請重申大同小異的論點,並出現不顧和濫用法律程序的情況。今次的申請毫無理據,必須予以撤銷。

[訟費]

12.  根據此結果,本席作出訟費命令:鄧先生須支付Source View因今次申請引致之訟費。代表Source View的律師要求訟費港幣1,040元實屬合理;鄧先生表示沒有陳述。本席命令有關訟費港幣1,040元,鄧先生須於今天起計14天內支付該訟費金額。

( 梁俊文 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

HCA1611/2019原告人及HCA 2275/2019第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊。

HCA1611/2019被告人及HCA 2275/2019原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所陳焯圻律師代表。

[2023] HKCFI 3349-CH-2023-11-23

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD及另三人

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019及
HCA 2275/2019
(一併聆訊)

[2023] HKCFI 3349

HCA 1611/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第1611號

________________________

原告人鄧錦祥 
 及 
被告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

________________________

及

HCA 2275/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 及 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

________________________

(一併聆訊)

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官梁俊文內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2023年11月23日
判決日期: 2023年11月23日

判決書


1.  鄧先生 (即HCA 1611/2019案的原告人和HCA 2275/2019案的第二被告人)  透過2023年10月30日的傳票,申請許可以提出上訴。根據傳票本申請針對的,是本席2023年10月17日判決中的訟費命令 (「該訟費命令」),即鄧先生須於14天內支付對方的訟費,不過傳票上所指的金額錯誤,該經簡易評估的訟費金額是港幣16,000元。

2.  上述當日判決是有關鄧先生曾針對聆案官所作的決定提出的上訴,而本席於2022年7月29日頒下判決撤銷了該上訴,並根據該結果同時作出暫時訟費命令,鄧先生須支付其對方Source View Development Limited (“Source View”)  (即HCA 1611/2019案的被告人和HCA 2275/2019案的原告人)  的訟費。

3.  其後鄧先生針對2022年7月29日的判決向上訴法庭提出上訴 (即CACV 342/2022和CACV 343/2022),只不過他其後又透過傳票申請,要求本席“set aside” (撤銷/擱置)  2022年7月29日的訟費命令及其後8月29日的簡易評估的該訟費金額。本席在2022年11月29日聆訊後,同日撤銷了該申請,並根據該結果作出了訟費命令及評估了金額。其後鄧先生向上訴法庭提出上訴,針對及要求推翻2022年7月29日的訟費命令及其簡易評估金額 (即CACV 487/2022和CACV 488/2022),唯正如本席於2022年11月29日判決中解釋,鄧先生直至當時是從未申請許可,以向上訴法庭提出針對推翻該訟費命令或其簡易評估金額的上訴的。民事上訴司法常務官於2023年5月的書面指示中,也向鄧先生指出此弊端。

4.  於是鄧先生便透過2023年9月29日的傳票,向本席申請該等逾期上訴許可。如上所述,本席於2023年10月17日聆訊後,同日撤銷了該申請和作出了該訟費命令。

5.  鄧先生透過其誓章陳述,提及2021年11月22日和2022年11月22日的聆訊和判決,應該也是錯誤。本席相信他指的是2022年11月29日,當天聆訊鄧先生要求擱置/撤銷2022年7月29日訟費命令和其後簡易評估的訟費金額。當時鄧先生針對性地挑戰該訟費命令,便須透過向上訴法庭提出上訴,唯直至當時鄧先生根本沒有提出該等上訴許可的申請,更不存在所謂set aside (擱置/撤銷)  或stay of execution (擱置執行)  該命令的基礎。

6.  2023年10月17日的聆訊,才是鄧先生針對本席2022年7月29日判決和訟費命令,以及根據該訟費命令其後於2022年8月29日進行書面簡易評估訟費金額的逾期上訴許可申請。本席拒絕申請的理由在同日判決書已有詳述,在此不贅。

7.  在本席拒絕鄧先生的逾期上訴許可後,他有權根據《高等法院規則》第59號命令第2B條向上訴法庭重申同樣申請,而並非針對本席拒絕批予許可的決定去要求許可提出上訴以推翻該決定。同樣地上述民事上訴司法常務官的書面指示中也有解釋。

8.  假設鄧先生今次申請是在不爭本席2023年10月17日拒絕批予上訴許可的決定的情況下,純粹是針對該決定下的訟費命令,則完全沒有理據。

9.  正如本席在2023年10月17日判決時解釋,根據《高等法院條例》第14AA(4)條,法庭須信納所擬上訴有合理機會得直,或有其他有利於秉行公正的理由應進行聆訊,否則不得批予上訴許可。由於訟費乃法庭行使酌情權的事宜,除非原訟法庭行使酌情權時錯誤地應用法律原則,或沒有考慮相關事宜,或考慮了不相關的事宜,從而達至合理法庭不會作出的結論,否則上訴法庭是不會視該結論為明顯錯誤,繼而作出干預的。因此,原訟法庭也不得給予上訴許可。

10.  根據一般慣例,訟費責任須視乎有關法律程序的結果而定。本席看不到根據2023年10月17日判決結果而作出的訟費命令和訟費評估有明顯錯誤。

11.  鑑於以上所述,鄧先生今次的申請全無理據,必須予以撤銷。

[訟費]

12.  根據此結果,本席作出訟費命令:鄧先生須支付Source View因今次申請引致之訟費。經考慮Source View的訟費陳述書和鄧先生的陳述,本席簡易評估有關訟費為港幣 10,000 元;鄧先生須於今天起計 14 天內支付有關訟費金額。

( 梁俊文 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

HCA1611/2019原告人及HCA2275/2019第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊。

HCA1611/2019被告人及HCA2275/2019原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所李居頤律師代表。

[2023] HKCFI 3090-CH-2023-10-17

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD及另三人

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019及
HCA 2275/2019
(一併聆訊)

[2023] HKCFI 3090

HCA 1611/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第1611號

________________________

原告人鄧錦祥 
 及 
被告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

________________________

及

HCA 2275/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 及 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

________________________

(一併聆訊)

________________________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官梁俊文內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2023年10月17日
判決日期: 2023年10月17日

判決書


1.  鄧先生 (即HCA 1611/2019案的原告人和HCA 2275/2019案的第二被告人)  透過2023年9月29日的傳票,申請許可以提出上訴。鄧先生在傳票中指這是有關本席2003年4月19日的判決,這明顯是錯誤的。事實上鄧先生針對的,是本席於2022年7月29日頒下書面判決同時所作出的暫時訟費命令,以及根據該訟費命令其後於2022年8月29日進行書面簡易評估的該訟費金額。

2.  根據《高等法院條例》第14AA(4)條,法庭須信納所擬上訴有合理機會得直,或有其他有利於秉行公正的理由應進行聆訊,否則不得批予上訴許可。當所擬上訴的許可申請是逾期提出的,法庭則需要考慮延誤為期,以及申請人提供有關延誤的解釋。另外,除非所擬上訴具合理勝訴,否則逾期上訴許可仍是不予批准的。

3.  2022年4月19日,本席聆訊了當時鄧先生針對聆案官所作的決定提出的上訴。2022年7月29日,本席頒下書面判決,撤銷了有關上訴。根據該判決結果,本席同時作出暫時訟費命令,鄧先生須支付其對方Source View Development Limited (“Source View”)  (即HCA 1611/2019案的被告人和HCA 2275/2019案的原告人)  的訟費。

4.  其後在雙方沒有根據該暫時訟費命令所定限期內去申請更改的情況下,該暫時訟費命令自動作實。其後,經考慮Source View的訟費陳述書和鄧先生的書面陳述後,本席於2022年8月29日以書面形式簡易評估有關訟費為港幣98,000元,鄧先生須於十四天內支付該訟費金額。

5.  換言之,今次申請距離該訟費命令及簡易評估訟費已超過一年。

6.  不過,在此期間鄧先生在這兩案中,其實先後提出多次申請,當中也包括向本席提出申請要求推翻或擱置上述該訟費命令及簡易評估訟費金額。

7.  首先,2022年9月9日,鄧先生提出傳票申請,要求本席擱置上述簡易評估訟費金額。本席於2022年11月29日聆訊並撤銷了該申請。按此結果,本席命令鄧先生支付該申請引致Source View的訟費,簡易評為港幣15,000元。

8.  其後,2022年12月9日,鄧先生又提出傳票申請,要求本席給予他許可以向上訴法庭提出上訴,去推翻上述本席2022年11月29日的命令。2023年1月12日,本席在聆訊後撤銷了該申請,並命令鄧先生支付訟費,簡易評為港幣9,000元。

9.  有關本席作出上述2022年11月29日和2023年1月12日判決的解釋,可參考當時的判決書。

10.  現在鄧先生需要向其對方及法庭解釋,雖然自己曾不止一次提出法律程序去挑戰相關訟費命令和簡易評估訟費金額,卻沒有提出申請要求法庭給予許可,以向上訴法庭提出上訴去推翻該訟費命令和金額。

11.  其實本席在2022年11月29日的判決 (第3段)中 已經指出,鄧先生直至當時是從未申請許可以向上訴法庭提出上訴,去推翻該訟費命令或簡易評估的訟費金額的。雖然如此,鄧先生於2022年12月9日卻針對本席2022年11月29日之判決而去提出上訴許可申請。

12.  其後,鄧先生繼而針對有關訟費命令和訟費金額直接向上訴法庭提出上訴 (即CACV 487/2022和CACV 488/2022)。在民事上訴司法常務官指出該等上訴欠缺原訟法庭法官的上訴許可的情況下,鄧先生才提出了今次的申請。

13.  即使如此,鄧先生完全沒有透過其存檔的誓章,去解釋其延誤。本席認為,鄧先生就其延誤並無合理解釋,而是在其知悉上訴許可程序的情況下,一意孤行地選擇其針對的命令而已。

14.  無論如何,鄧先生所擬上訴,並無勝算可言。

15.  根據支持他今次申請提交的誓章,鄧先生主要指自己於相關時期是法庭批准成為其先父財產物業,包括涉案物業的遺產承辦人的,而法庭包括本席於2022年7月29日所作的判決,乃違反了相關法庭批准,因此沒有法律依據,也沒有事實證據支持。

16.  鄧先生其實在過往不同的法律程序和聆訊中,已多次重申上述論據。

17.  若鄧先生認為其針對本席2022年7月29日的判決向上訴法庭已提出的上訴一旦得直,則當時相關的訟費命令和評估金額便應順理成章予以推翻,鄧先生可以自行決定是否把推翻相關訟費命令和金額的要求,包括在其上訴中要求的濟助之中。不過,正如本席在2023年1月12日的判決中 (第6至9段)  解釋,上訴待決本身並不構成擱置執行該上訴針對命令的理據。

18.  若鄧先生指即使根據2022年7月29日之判決不變,有關訟費命令和金額也應該予以推翻的話,這便構成純粹是針對訟費命令和金額方面的上訴。由於訟費乃法庭行使酌情權的事宜,除非原訟法庭行使酌情權時錯誤地應用法律原則,或沒有考慮相關事宜,或考慮了不相關的事宜,從而達至合理法庭不會作出的結論,否則上訴法庭是不會視該結論為明顯錯誤,繼而作出干預的。因此,原訟法庭也不得給予上訴許可。

19.  根據一般慣例,訟費責任須視乎有關法律程序的結果而定。2022年7月29日本席所作出之訟費命令,乃根據既定原則和慣例,鑑於有關判決結果而作出的。正如本席於2022年11月29日之判決 (第4段)  指出,無論當時本席席前鄧先生的申請,是如他所述般是要求擱置2022年7月29日的訟費命令或其金額,或是假設是他要求本席給予許可以向上訴法庭提出上訴去推翻該訟費命令及訟費評估,本席認為皆全無理據。

20.  鑑於上述法律程序的背景,鄧先生提出今次申請既無理據,因此予以撤銷。

[訟費]

21.  根據此結果,本席作出訟費命令:鄧先生須支付Source View因今次申請引致之訟費。經考慮Source View的訟費陳述書和鄧先生的陳述,本席簡易評估有關訟費為港幣16,000元;鄧先生須於今天起計14天內支付有關訟費金額。

( 梁俊文 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

HCA1611/2019原告人及HCA2275/2019第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊。

HCA1611/2019被告人及HCA2275/2019原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所陳焯圻律師代表。

[2023] HKCFI 2538-CH-2023-10-05

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 2275/2019

[2023] HKCFI 2538

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 對 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

________________________

主審法官 : 高等法院原訟法庭法官楊家雄內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2023年9月26日
判決書日期 : 2023年10月5日

 

判 決 書

1.  就本案及相關案件HCA1611/2019的背景 ,詳見本席於2023年6月21日頒下的判決書[1](「該21/6/23判決書」)及在當中第一段所提及的其他判決,而本席亦會使用在該21/6/23判決書中使用的相同用詞。

2.  基於該21/6/23判決書中所列的原因,本席撤銷第二被告人的全部四張傳票(「該決定」)。

3.  於2023年7月4日,第二被告人存檔四張傳票,申請上訴許可,就該決定提出上訴。

4.  《高等法院條例》(第4章)第14AA(4)條規定如下:

「聆訊有關上訴許可申請的法庭除非信納 ——

(a) 有關上訴有合理機會得直;或

(b) 有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,

否則不得批予第(1)款所指的上訴許可。」

5.  基於以下原因,本席拒絕第二被告人的申請:

(i)  第二被告人現依然無地位代表第一被告人;

(ii)  無論在傳票或其支持誓章中,第二被告人均無提出第二被告人擬依仗的上訴理由及理據;

(iii)  無論在文件或在聆訊作口頭陳詞時,第二被告人只是重覆他已多次提出、亦已多次被不同的法庭駁回的說法,稱原告人不能展示或呈遞「法定產業權契據」。就第二被告人的相關說法,本席已在該21/6/23判決書中處理,在此不重覆;

(iv)  第二被告人擬提出的上訴無合理機會得直;

(v)  本席亦看不到任何其他有利於秉行公正的理由,致使上訴應進行聆訊。

6.  本訴撤銷第二被告人的申請,並命令第二被告人須向原告人支付訟費,金額以簡易程序評估。

7.  經簡易程序評估後,本席裁定第二被告人須向原告人繳付的訟費為港幣29,000元。

  ( 楊家雄 )
高等法院原訟法庭法官

第二被告人:  無律師代表,親自出庭應訊

原告人:  由屈漢驊律師事務所之陳焯圻律師代表



[1]  [2023] HKCFI 1655。

  

[2023] HKCFI 1655-CH-2023-06-21

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 2275/2019

[2023] HKCFI 1655

 

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人 SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

對

第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令

轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

________________________

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官楊家雄內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2023年6月6日
判決書日期 :2023年6月21日

判決書

1.  就本案及相關案件HCA1611/2019的背景 ,詳見本席於2023年4月21日頒下的判決書[1](「該21/4/23判決書」)及在當中第二段所引述的其他判決,而本席亦會使用在該21/4/23判決書中使用的相同用詞。

2.  本聆訊涉及4張傳票,全由第二被告人提出,並可分成兩組:

(a)  第一組兩張 ,分別申請禁制令禁止原告人執行該簡易判決 、該簡易命令及該修正判決,並撤銷該三項命令,因原告人不能「呈遞『法定產業權契據』証明其是」相關物業的業權人;

(b)  第二組另兩張,分別申請擱置及撤銷該相同三項命令,直至原告人能「展示『法定產業權契據』証明其是」相關物業的業權人。

3.  如本席在該21/4/23判決書第6-8段指出,該修正判決只關乎第一被告人。第一被告人為有限公司,沒有律師代表,而第二被告人亦沒向法庭申請代表第一被告人。

4.  第二被告人無法律地位代表第一被告人作出與該修正判決相關的申請。

5.  無論如何,第二被告人稱原告人不能證明它是相關物業的業權人 ,其說法亦是建基於第二被告人早前已多次提出,亦多次不為法庭接納的觀點 —— 即原告人無合法業權,及身為遺產管理人的賣方無權出售,故原告人不能呈遞或展示「法定產業權契據」。

6.  特別就第一組傳票,法庭已多次在判詞中向第二被告人解釋,申請禁制令以禁制原告人執行相關判決,屬濫用司法程序。

7.  就第二組傳票,值得注意的,是第二被告人不是要求擱置相關命令以待上訴,而是至原告人能呈遞所謂「法定產業權契據」以證明其業權。第二被告人的要求並無法律基礎或理據。

8.  再者,就該簡易判決及命令,第二被告人曾提出上訴,而上訴亦已被撤銷,本席無權,亦無理據將其撤銷。

9.  如上文提到,第二被告人要求擱置的理據,亦已多次不被法庭接納。

10.  本席撤銷第二被告人的全部4張傳票。

11.  本席裁定,第二被告人須向原告人支付4張傳票所涉的訟費。在考慮陳律師呈上的訟費陳述書,並經簡易程序評估後,本席評定第二被告人須支付的訟費為港幣29,000元。

 ( 楊家雄 )
 高等法院原訟法庭法官
第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊
原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所之陳焯圻律師代表

       



[1]    [2023] HKCFI 1030。

[2023] HKCFI 1030-CH-2023-04-21

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD及另三人

HTML content

HCA 2275/2019

[2023] HKCFI 1030

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人  SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 對 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 
 (按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)
 

________________________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官楊家雄內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2023年4月12日
判決書日期: 2023年4月21日

判 決 書


1.  這是第二被告人就蘇嘉賢聆案官於2022年12月29日所作的命令(「該命令」)的上訴。

2.  就本案及相關案件HCA1611/2019的背景,詳見以下判決:(1) 暫委法官徐韻華2022年1月27日[1](「判決書1」)、(2) 暫委法官梁俊文2022年7月29日[2](判決書2)、(3) 本席2022年10月31日[3]及2023年3月22日[4](「判決書3」及「判決書4」)及(4) 上訴法庭2023年3月10日)[5]。

3.  蘇聆案官所作的該命令,關乎第二被告人於2022年12月20日在HCA2275/2019存檔的傳票(「20/12/22傳票」)。就該傳票,第二被告人要求法庭擱置執行法庭於2022年11月17日頒佈的命令(「17/11/22命令」)。

4.  如本席在判決書3中提到,經聆訊後,蘇嘉賢聆案官於2021年11月22日作出簡易判決(「該簡易判決」),並於同日作出命令(「該簡易命令」),判令原告人就第二被告人、第三被告人及第四被告人勝訴。

5.  基於第一被告人沒存檔傳訊令狀送達認收書,原告人於2022年11月17日針對第一被告人成功取得判決(即17/11/22命令),並於其後(2023年2月16日)就該判決的一錯字修正(「該修正判決」)。

6.  第二被告人經20/12/22傳票要求擱置執行的17/11/22命令,只關乎第一被告人。

7.  於2022年12月29日,經聆訊後,蘇聆案官基於第二被告人無地位代表第一被告人,撤銷20/12/22傳票,並命令第一被告人須負責港幣1,040元訟費。

8.  如本席在判案書4中提到,第一被告人為有限公司,沒有律師代表,而第二被告人亦沒向法庭申請代表第一被告人。

9.  蘇聆案官的該命令,本席認為完全正確。

10.  本席拒絕如第二被告人要求命令「不宜執行」17/11/22命令,亦拒絕如第二被告人要求「剔除訟費$1040」。

11.  在其上訴通知書中,第二被告人亦要求本席命令「不宜執行」「13/12/2022頒發的執行命令」。

12.  第二被告人針對的執行命令,為原告人於2022年12月14日基於高等法院規則第45號命令第3(3)條規則發出的通告,而該通告夾附2022年12月13日再蓋章的該簡易判決。

13.  該通告與蘇聆案官的該命令全無關係。

14.  純基於這原因,第二被告人要求擱置執行該「執行命令」必應撤銷。

15.  再者,第二被告人曾不止一次,並以不同方式要求法庭命令擱置執行該簡易判決,亦已被法庭駁回:見判決書1及判決書4。

16.  本席同意陳律師的陳詞,本申請屬濫用司法程序。

17.  無論如何,本席亦有考慮第二被告人在本席席前所作的口頭陳詞,他只是重覆他稱原告人無合法業權,及身為遺產管理人的賣方無權出售,並無證明他的任何上訴有任何勝訴機會。  

18.  基於上述理由,本席駁回第二被告人的上訴,亦拒絕他嘗試作出的申請。

19.  陳律師申請訟費。

20.  本席同意本上訴無理據支持,部分亦屬濫用司法程序,第二被告人須以彌償基準向原告人支付訟費。

21.  經簡易評估後,就因本上訴第二被告人須向原告人支付的訟費,本席評估為港幣39,000元。

( 楊家雄 )
高等法院原訟法庭法官

第二被告人:  無律師代表,親自出庭應訊

原告人:  由屈漢驊律師事務所之陳焯圻律師代表



[1]  [2022] HKCFI 511。

[2]  [2022] HKCFI 2252。

[3]  [2022] HKCFI 3286。

[4]  [2023] HKCFI 782。

[5]  [2023] HKCA 276。

[2023] HKCFI 782-CH-2023-03-22

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD及另三人

HTML content

HCA 2275/2019

[2023] HKCFI 782

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人 SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

對

第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 
 (按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)
 

________________________

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官楊家雄內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2023年3月10日
判決書日期 :2023年3月22日

判決書

1.  就本案及相關案件HCA1611/2019的背景,詳見暫委法官徐韻華、暫委法官梁俊文及本席先後於2022年1月27日[1](「判決書1」)、2022年7月29日[2](判決書2)及2022年10月31[3]頒下的判決書(「判決書3」)。

2.  在本案中,第一被告人並無存檔傳訊令狀送達認收書。

3.  於2021年5月14日,原告人就第二被告人、第三被告人及第四被告人提出簡易判決申請。

4.  如本席在判決書3中提到,經聆訊後,蘇嘉賢聆案官於2021年11月22日作出簡易判決(「該簡易判決」),並於同日作出命令(「該簡易命令」),判令原告人就第二被告人、第三被告人及第四被告人勝訴。

5.  基於第一被告人沒存檔傳訊令狀送達認收書,原告人於2022年11月17日就第一被告人成功取得判決,並於其後(2023年2月16日)就該判決的一錯字修正(「該修正判決」)。

6.  第二被告人於2023年2月28日存檔傳票,要求法庭頒發禁制令,禁止原告人執行上述該簡易判決,該簡易命令及該修正判決(「該3判決」)。

7.  首先,第一被告人為有限公司,沒有律師代表,而第二被告人亦沒向法庭申請代表第一被告人。

8.  該修正判決是就第一被告人所作的判決,第二被告人無地位為第一被告人作出任何申請。

9.  就該簡易判決及命令,如本席在判決書3中第5段所述,第二被告人曾提出上訴,而其上訴亦已遭駁回 — 見判決書2。

10.  第二被告人已就梁暫委法官駁回他上訴的決定提出進一步上訴。

11.  第二被告人欲暫緩該3判決執行,他須按法律程序先向原審法庭作出申請,若被拒再向上級法庭申請。

12.  第二被告人今次的禁制令申請,是濫用司法程序。

13.  就如此濫用司法程序,第二被告人已有前科,早於2021年12月,第二被告人已曾就該簡易判決及命令申請禁制令,並遭徐暫委法官以濫用司法程序理由撤銷 — 詳見判決書1。

14.  無論如何,本席亦有考慮第二被告人於2023年2月28日存檔的誓章及他口頭陳述,他只是重覆他稱原告人無合法業權,及身為遺產管理人的賣方無權出售,並無證明他的上訴有任何勝訴機會。  

15.  基於上述理由,本席撤銷第二被告人的申請。

16.  代表原告人的陳律師要求訟費,並呈上訟費陳述書,要求第二被告人以彌償基準支付訟費。

17.  本席同意,本申請濫用司法程序,亦無理據支持,第二被告人須以彌償基準向原告人支付訟費。

18.  本席有考慮訟費金額。陳律師因在另一法庭出席聆訊,延誤了10多分鐘才出席本庭,聆訊雖預留120分鐘,但實際聆訊時間只是20分鐘,就這方面,本席扣減港幣8,600元。

19.  經簡易評估後,就因本申請第二被告人須向原告人支持的訟費,本席評估為港幣51,400元。

20.  陳律師向本席承諾不會在本席頒下本判決前執行該3命令。現本席頒下判決。該承諾不再有效。

 ( 楊家雄 )
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊

原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所之陳焯圻律師代表


[1]    [2022] HKCFI 511。

[2]    [2022] HKCFI 2252。

[3]    [2022] HKCFI 3286。

[2023] HKCFI 408-CH-2023-02-17

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019及
HCA 2275/2019
(一併聆訊)

[2023] HKCFI 408

HCA 1611/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第1611號

________________________

原告人  鄧錦祥 
 對 
被告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

________________________

HCA 2275/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 對 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

________________________

(一併聆訊)

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官楊家雄內庭書面處理
HCA1611/2019被告人及HCA2275/2019原告人的訟費陳述書日期:2022年12月29日
訟費判決書日期:2023年2月17日

訟費判決書2


1.  就本案背景及本席早前頒下的命令,見本席於2022年10月31日及2022年12月16日頒下的判決書[1]。

2.  經考慮Source View代表律師日期為2022年12月29日的訟費陳述書,本席認為Source View要求訟費的個別項目及總額均合理。經簡易程序評定後,本席裁定鄧須負責的相關訟費總額為港幣90,699.00元。

( 楊家雄 )
高等法院原訟法庭法官

HCA1611/2019被告人及HCA2275/2019原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所呈交訟費陳述書



[1]    [2022] HKCFI 3286與[2022] HKCFI 3725。

[2023] HKCFI 1599-CH-2023-01-12

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019 及
HCA 2275/2019

(一併聆訊)

[2023] HKCFI 1599

HCA 1611/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第1611號

_________________

原告人鄧錦祥 
 及 
被告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

及

HCA 2275/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

_________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 及 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令

轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

_________________

(一併聆訊)

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官梁俊文內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2023年1月12日
判決書日期:2023年1月12日

判  決  書

 

1.  鄧先生 (即HCA 1611/2019的原告人和HCA 2275/2019的第二被告人) 透過2022年12月9日的傳票,申請許可以提出上訴,去推翻本席於2022年11月29日頒下的命令。

2.  本席曾於2022年7月29日作出命令,當中的訟費命令要鄧先生向Source View Development Limited (即HCA 1611/2019的被告人和HCA 2275/2019的原告人) 支付訟費。

3.  本席於2022年8日29日簡易評估了上述訟費金額 (「該命令」)。

4.  鄧先生於2022年9月9日提出傳票申請,要求擱置該命令。本席於2022年11月29日聆訊並撤銷了該申請,並解釋了判決理由。同日本席命令鄧先生支付該申請引致Source View的訟費,簡易評為港幣15,000元,並須於7天內支付 (「本申請針對的命令」)。

5.  根據《高等法院條例》第14AA(4)條,法庭須信納有關上訴有合理機會得直,或有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,上訴應進行聆訊,否則不得批予上訴許可。

6.  鄧先生在兩案傳票提出要求上訴許可,指這是有關本申請針對的命令的“責任誰屬”。鄧先生在誓章提出的理據,是上訴法庭在正進行的CACV 342/2022和CACV 343/2022案,以至進一步上訴至終審法院,都有可能導致“其他裁決”,令本申請針對的命令成為“一宗沒有事實支持的評定”。

7.  《高等法院規則》第59號13(1)(a)條規定,提出上訴並不會自動擱置擬推翻的判決或命令的,何況是有關判決或命令引申出來的簡易評估訟費的命令。

8.  有關本申請針對的命令,本席無須重覆2022年11月29日的判決理由 (見同日的書面判決理由),唯重申當中第5段,鄧先生固然提出了上訴 (即CACV 342/2022和CACV 343/2022案),但這並不構成理據可以要求法庭擱置該上訴針對的判決,或當中的訟費命令或所引申的評估訟費命令。

9.  本申請針對的命令,正是鄧先生要求擱置該命令的申請因全無理據而須予以撤銷,以及相關的訟費結果。鄧先生未能展示擬推翻本申請針對的命令具合理得直機會,或其他理由須進行上訴聆訊,因此也必須予以撤銷。

[訟費]

10.  鄧先生須支付因本申請引致Source View的訟費,現簡易評估為港幣9,000元,須於14天內支付。

  ( 梁俊文 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

HCA 1611/2019原告人及HCA 2275/2019第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊。

HCA 1611/2019被告人及HCA 2275/2019原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所陳焯圻律師代表。

  

[2022] HKCFI 3725-CH-2022-12-16

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019及
HCA 2275/2019
(一併聆訊)

[2022] HKCFI 3725

HCA 1611/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第1611號

________________________

原告人 鄧錦祥 

對

被告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

____________________

HCA 2275/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

____________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

對

第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令

轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

____________________

(一併聆訊)

主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭法官楊家雄內庭書面處理

HCA1611/2019原告人 及 HCA2275/2019第二被告人 書面陳詞日期: 2022年11月11日及12月9日

HCA1611/2019被告人 及 HCA2275/2019原告人 書面回應日期: 2022年11月25日

訟費判決書日期: 2022年12月16日

訟費判決書

1.  就本上訴的判決,詳見本席於2022年10月31日頒下的判決書[1]。

2.  於2022年11月11日,鄧存檔申請書,要求推翻本席頒下的暫准訟費判令。

3.  在其申請書中,鄧只是重覆他在本席席前所作的陳詞,稱已就梁暫委法官判決提出上訴,並稱若上訴法庭或終審法院有其他裁判時,則本庭的訟費裁決會「成為沒有事實支持」。在2022年12月9日存檔的回應中,鄧重覆類近的陳詞,並要求擱置本席頒下的暫准訟費判令。

4.  本席不接納鄧的陳詞。提出上訴,這動作並不會自動擱置相關的判決,更遑論本上訴只涉相關訟費的簡易評定。

5.  本席命令暫准訟費判令現成絕對命令,鄧亦須向Source View 支付本申請的訟費,同樣以彌償基準計算。

6.  本席重覆判決書第17段最後一句中所作的指示。

 ( 楊家雄 )
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

HCA1611/2019原告人及HCA2275/2019第二被告人: 無律師代表,呈交書面回應

HCA1611/2019被告人及HCA2275/2019原告人: 由屈漢驊律師事務所呈交書面陳詞


[1]  [2022] HKCFI 3286。

[2022] HKCFI 3628-EN-2022-11-29

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD v. CAFE HAPPY POST LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019 & HCA 2275/2019
(Heard Together)

[2022] HKCFI 3628

HCA 1611/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1611 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN

 鄧錦祥Plaintiff

and

 SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDDefendant

_________________

AND

HCA 2275/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2275 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN

 SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED1st Defendant
 鄧錦祥2nd Defendant
 HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED3rd Defendant
 WILLCOCKS LIMITED4th Defendant

_________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 29 November 2022

Date of Decision: 29 November 2022

_________________

DECISION

_________________


1.  By his summons filed on 9 September 2022, Tang applies to set aside the costs order of this court dated 29 August 2022. It was in fact the order whereby this court made the summary assessment of costs payable by Tang pursuant to the costs order of this court made in the decision dated 29 July 2022 in respect of these actions.

2.  The costs order dated 29 July 2022 was nisi but became absolute in the absence of application to vary by either side within 14 days. What then remained was summary assessment of the costs payable by Tang. Pursuant to the same order, Source View has lodged its statement of costs and Tang has lodged his statements of objections. On 29 August 2022, this court summarily assessed the costs payable by Tang to be in the sum of HK$98,000, which should be paid in 14 days.

3.  As of today, there is never challenge against the absolute costs order in terms of the order dated 29 July 2022. Nor is there application for leave to appeal against either the absolute costs order or the summary assessment.

4.  Considering the contents of his application and affirmations in support, including the latest affirmations filed by Tang on 28 November 2022, I find no substance whatsoever, whether treating the present application as it is or as if this were an application for leave to appeal against the costs order or summary assessment.

5.  This application is devoid of merits, and ought not to have been taken out. That Tang has lodged appeals which are in progress is quite another matter. He may continue to pursue such appeals. But the present application has to be dismissed.

[Statement of costs from Source View and submissions on costs]

6.  Costs should be to Source View on an indemnity basis on the ground that the present application is effectively an abuse of process. That said, the outcome of the present application must be obvious, and therefore briefing counsel to handle this application is not justified. Nor is it justified to put in the amount of work and to incur such costs as presented in the statement of costs.

7.  Costs of Source View caused and occasioned by the present application is now summarily assessed in the lump sum of HK$15,000, payable by Tang in 7 days (from the date hereof).

 (Simon Leung)
 Deputy High Court Judge

The plaintiff in HCA 1611/2019 and 2nd defendant in HCA 2275/2019 appeared in person

Mr Alex Fan, instructed by Wat & Co, for the defendant in HCA 1611/2019 and plaintiff in HCA 2275/2019

[2022] HKCFI 3286-CH-2022-10-31

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD 對 CAFE HAPPY POST LTD 及另三人

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019及
HCA 2275/2019
(一併聆訊)

[2022] HKCFI 3286

HCA 1611/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第1611號

________________________

原告人鄧錦祥 
 對 
被告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 

________________________

HCA 2275/2019

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2019年第2275號

(原土地審裁處申請編號LDPE 2019年第818宗)

________________________

原告人SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 
 對 
第一被告人CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED 
第二被告人鄧錦祥 
第三被告人HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
第四被告人WILLCOCKS LIMITED 

(按土地審裁處成員吳紹林2019年10月21日的命令
轉介至高等法院原訟法庭審理)

________________________

(一併聆訊)

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官楊家雄內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2022年10月18日
判決書日期 :2022年10月31日

判 決 書

 

1.  這是鄧錦祥(「鄧」)就蘇嘉賢聆案官(「蘇聆案官」)於2022年7月11日所作的3項簡易訟費評估金額的上訴。

2.  Source View Development Limited(「Source View」)是HCA 1611/2019(「HCA 1611」)及HCA 2275/2019(「HCA 2275」)的唯一被告與原告。鄧是HCA 1611的唯一原告及HCA 2275中其中一名被告。

3.  HCA 2275轉介自土地審裁處案件LDPE 818/2019(「LDPE 818」)。

4.  於2021年11月22日,經聆訊後,蘇聆案官命令(包括)剔除鄧於HCA 1611中的申索(「剔除決定」),並基於高等法院規則第14號命令作出簡易判決,判令Source View於HCA 2275中勝訴(「簡易判決」)。蘇聆案官同時命令鄧須向Source View支付HCA 1611及HCA 2275(故包括LDPE 818)的訟費,金額以簡易程序評定(「訟費責任判決」)。

5.  鄧其後就剔除決定及簡易判決提出上訴。上訴聆訊於2022年4月19日在高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官梁俊文席前進行。於2022年7月29日,梁暫委法官頒下判詞,駁回鄧的上訴(「梁暫委法官判決」)。

6.  HCA 1611及HCA 2275(故包括LDPE 818)訟費的簡易評定程序,於2022年7月11日在蘇聆案官席前進行。為該聆訊,Source View及鄧分別有存檔訟費陳述書與反對陳述書。在其反對陳述書中,鄧提出的論點只針對剔除決定及簡易判決的對錯,並無觸及訟費的銀碼。經聆訊後,蘇聆案官以簡易程序評定,鄧須就HCA 1611、HCA 2275及LDPE 818向Source View分別支付訟費HK$150,000、HK$280,000及HK$60,000(「評定決定」)。

7.  於2022年7月25日,鄧就該評定決定提出上訴(即本上訴)。

8.  於存檔他的上訴通知書的同時,鄧分別在HCA 1611及HCA 2275存檔2份相同的支持誓章。雖然代表Source View的范大律師反對,但本席認為相關誓章主要並非提出任何新的事實,只是重提其反對陳述書的內容,亦可視為鄧於本上訴的陳詞。從這角度,本席批准鄧存檔及援引相關誓章。

9.  在誓章中,鄧並無就評定決定的金額提出任何反對觀點或陳詞,只是列出他的觀點稱剔除決定及簡易判決錯誤。

10.  本上訴並非關乎剔除決定及簡易判決的對錯。就該兩項決定的對錯鄧已提出上訴,亦已被駁回。

11.  在聆訊時,本席有向鄧解釋,本上訴的重㸃,不是剔除決定、簡易判決、訟費責任判決或梁暫委法官判決的對錯。本席並非鼓勵鄧就上述的決定或判決提出上訴,亦非就任何上訴的曲直作出暗示。但他若他感到受屈,他可根據法律提出上訴,但本上訴只關乎評定決定金額的對錯。

12.  鄧辯稱評定決定源於訟費責任判決,若剔除決定及簡易判決有錯,命令他負責任何數額均屬錯誤。

13.  本席不接受鄧這方面的陳詞。於2022年7月11日,在進行訟費的簡易評定程序時,其基礎是早前的訟費責任判決。在進行簡易評定程序時,蘇聆案官不需重新考慮剔除決定、簡易判決及訟費責任判決的對錯, 故相關判決對錯這議題亦不在本上訴範疇內。

14.  關於鄧須付Source View的金額,鄧並無、亦不能提出任何原因支持評定決定在法律上或事實上有任何錯誤。本席亦有考慮Source View的訟費陳述書與及鄧的反對陳述書,如上文解釋,後者的內容與他的誓章內容相約,只針對剔除決定及簡易判決的對錯。

15.  本席認為評定決定合理,並無不當或任何錯誤。

16.  本席駁回鄧的上訴。

17.  范大律師陳稱,鄧提出本上訴,全無理據,要求鄧須負責訟費,並按彌償基準計算。本席初步接納范大律師的陳詞,頒下暫准訟費判令,鄧須向Source View支付本上訴的訟費,按彌償基準計算,金額以簡易程序評定。除非鄧在期間以書面向本席申請,暫准訟費判令於本判決頒下日期14天後成為絕對命令。若如此,Source View須於暫准訟費判令成為絕對命令14天內存檔及送達訟費陳述書,鄧須於其後14天內存檔及送達反對陳述書,Source View須於之後7天內存檔及送達訟費回應書。

  ( 楊家雄 )
高等法院原訟法庭法官

HCA1611/2019原告人及HCA2275/2019第二被告人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊

HCA1611/2019被告人及HCA2275/2019原告人:由屈漢驊律師事務所轉聘范凱傑大律師代表
      

[2022] HKCFI 2252-EN-2022-07-29

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD v. CAFE HAPPY POST LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 1611/2019 & HCA 2275/2019

(Heard Together)

[2022] HKCFI 2252

HCA 1611/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1611 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN

 鄧錦祥Plaintiff
 and 
 SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDDefendant

_________________

AND

HCA 2275/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2275 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN

 SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED1st Defendant
 鄧錦祥2nd Defendant
 HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED3rd Defendant
 WILLCOCKS LIMITED4th Defendant

_________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 19 April 2022
Date of Decision: 29 July 2022

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

1.  The plaintiff in HCA 1611/2019 is one of the defendants in HCA 2275/2019 (“Tang”). The defendant in HCA 1611/2019 is the plaintiff in HCA 2275/2019 (“Source View”). This is Tang’s appeal against the decision and order of the master dated 22 N‍ovember 2021.

Background

2.  The dispute concerns Lot No 5059 of DD 51 in Fanling. By the New Grant No 9423 (“the New Grant”), Tang Chung Shau (“TCS”) became the owner of the lot. A 2-storey house was erected on the lot and became known as No 5 Luen Hing Street, Luen Wo Market, Fanling, New Territories. For the present purpose, the lot and the house thereon are collectively referred to as “the Property”.

3.  TCS died on 15 July 1998. Letters of administration were granted to Cheung Yuk Ying (“Cheung”) and Tang jointly on 1 December 2004 in respect of the estate of TCS, which included the Property. The letters were duly registered in respect of the Property at the Land Registry.

4.  In their capacity as joint administrators, Cheung and Tang sold the Property to Source View. By an assignment dated 6 January 2009, Source View became the registered owner of the Property.

5.  Immediately upon the completion of the sale and purchase, a tenancy agreement between Source View as the landlord and Tang for and on behalf of his company, Café Happy Post Limited (“Café Happy Post”), as the tenant of the Property took effect. The tenancy was for a term of 4 years. The tenancy was subsequently renewed in 2013 and then in 2017.

6.  On the ground of various breaches on the part of Café Happy Post as the tenant including non-payment of rent, Source View filed an application in August 2019 with the Lands Tribunal for rent in arrears and possession of the Property upon forfeiture of the tenancy (ie, LDPE 818/2019). Upon his application, Tang and his related companies, namely Happy Post Enterprise Limited (“Happy Post Enterprise”) and Willcocks Limited (“Willcocks”), were subsequently joined as respondents in the proceedings.

7.  In the same month, Tang commenced HCA 1611/2019 against Source View, seeking declaration that the sale and purchase as well as the assignment of the Property to Source View in 2009 was null and void.

8.  By the order dated 21 October 2019, the Lands Tribunal transferred the proceedings before it to the Court of First Instance, which became HCA 2275/2019. The respondents in the Tribunal proceedings became the defendants in the High Court action. Hence Café Happy Post as the 1st defendant, Tang as the 2nd defendant, Happy Post Enterprise as the 3rd defendant and Willcocks as the 4th defendant. A counterclaim was advanced, which essentially mirrored Tang’s claim in HCA 1611/2019.

9.  In HCA 2275/2019, Source View later took out the following summonses:

(1)  The summons dated 8 November 2021 for striking out the counterclaim of Tang pursuant to O18, r19;

(2)  The summons dated 14 May 2021 for summary judgment against Tang, Happy Post Enterprise and Willcocks for possession and mesne profits pursuant to O14, r1 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) (“RHC”); and

(3)  The summons dated 14 May 2021 for an order that HCA 1611/2019 and HCA 2275/2019 to be heard together.

10.  To mirror that, Source View took out 2 summonses in HCA 1611/2019 on 14 May 2021:

(1)  The summons for striking out Tang’s claim pursuant to O18, r19 or alternatively determination of the issues of law raised by Tang pursuant to O14A; and

(2)  The summons for an order that HCA 1611/2019 and HCA 2275/2019 to be heard together.

11.  The above summonses in the two actions have been directed to be heard before the master at the same time. Tang sought to challenge such case management directions of the master, which ended in failure. Application for leave to appeal was also dismissed: see the decisions of DHCJ Tsui dated 29 September 2021 and 12 November 2021.

12.  The above summonses were substantively heard before the master on 22 November 2021. At the end of the hearing, the master made the following orders (“the Decision/Order”):

(1)  In HCA 2275/2019, summary judgment was entered against Tang, Happy Post Enterprise and Willcocks with costs to Source View; and Tang’s amended defence and counterclaim was struck out with costs to Source View. These defendants were ordered to deliver vacant possession of the Property within 28 days and to pay mesne profit at the rate of HK$48,000 per month from 5 January 2021[1] until the delivery of vacant possession.

(2)  In HCA 1611/2019, Tang’s claim was struck out and the action was accordingly dismissed with costs to Source View.

13.  In view of the above result, the master did not make any order for these actions to be heard together.

14.  By notices of appeal filed in these actions on 6 December 2021, Tang appeals against the Decision/Order. The other two defendants subject to the judgment in HCA 2275/2019 did not lodge similar appeal, and there is no basis for supposing or allowing Tang to purport to represent any of them in what is very much his own appeal.

The principles

15.  An appeal from the master to the judge in chambers proceeds as a rehearing of the applications (ie the above summonses in these actions) before the master: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022 (Vol 1) (“HKCP”) at §58/1/2.

16.  O58, r1(5) provides that no further evidence (other than evidence as to matters which have occurred after the date of the decision or order being appealed) may be received at the hearing except on special grounds. By special grounds, it is trite that the three conditions under Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 must be satisfied.

17.  The principles governing summary judgment are trite. While it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the claim, the defendant in a summary judgment application has the evidential burden of showing issues of a bona fide and credible defence that ought to be tried or any other reason that the case should proceed to trial: see O14, r3; HKCP at §§14/1/1-14/4/39.

18.  The principles governing striking out are equally trite. According to the summonses, Source View relies on all the grounds for striking out under O18, r19. Where it is said that the pleaded case discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, no evidence will be admissible. Proceedings are frivolous when they are not capable of reasoned argument, without foundation or where they cannot possibly succeed. Proceedings are vexatious when they are oppressive or lack bona fides: see O18, r19(1)(b) and (c); HKCP at §18/19/7. A claim which is absolutely groundless or the pleading which is entirely without substance is liable to be struck out for abuse of process: see HKCP at §18/19/9; 18/19/11 and 18/19/20.

Tang’s affirmations

19.  For the purpose of his appeals in both actions, Tang has filed affirmations. Counsel for Source View objects on the ground that they were filed in breach of O58, r1(5) and the principles of Ladd v Marshall mentioned above. However, as counsel also observes, what those affirmations say is repetition of Tang’s contentions adding nothing material in terms of evidence. Those affirmations will therefore be taken into account only to the extent that they are submissions.

The claim in HCA 2275/2019

20.  In HCA 2275/2019, Source View pleaded the various tenancy agreements in respect of the Property entered into by Tang for and on behalf of Café Happy Post as the tenant. The term of the last tenancy agreement in 2017 lasted until 4 January 2021. Performance of the various tenancy agreements by payment of rent, government rent and rates by Café Happy Post for various periods as well as its eventual default were specifically pleaded. Due to default, formal demand was issued by Source View through solicitors in July 2018. Hence the forfeiture of the tenancy. Notice to occupiers was issued in August 2019. As mentioned, proceedings were subsequently filed with the Lands Tribunal.

The defence in HCA 2275/2019

21.  Only Tang has filed the defence in HCA 2275/2019. As to the pleaded claim and its quantification pursuant to the various tenancy agreements, Tang has pleaded no actual defence. What Tang contended was that the sale and purchase as well as the assignment of the Property were effected in breach of the New Grant. He also disputed his own authority as the administrator of the estate of TCS to sell the Property and to execute the assignment of the Property. He also asserted breach on the Source View of an alleged oral agreement at the same time as the sale and purchase whereby he had the alleged option to buy back the Property sometime in the future.

The claim in HCA 1611/2019

22.  As mentioned, the claim by Tang in HCA 1611/2019 mirrored his above defence in HCA 2275/2019. He claimed to nullify the sale and purchase as well as the assignment of the Property.

The defence in HCA 1611/2019

23.  Essentially, Source View denied any issue of non-compliance with the New Grant, as the District Lands Office confirmed in writing in 1972 that all the conditions of the New Grant have been complied with. It also pleaded reliance on sections 35(1)(d)[2] of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap 219 (“CPO”) as well as the terms of assignment in confirmation of the capacity of Tang as the administrator of the estate of TCS to enter into the sale and purchase as well as to execute the assignment of the Property. Reference to section 54 of CPO was also pleaded, but it is obvious and made clear in submission, that it was section 54 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance, Cap 10 (“PAO”) that it meant to rely on. No issue was taken as to the mistaken reference to the statute in this rehearing of this matter.

Breach of the New Grant

24.  Tang contended that the sale and purchase of the Property with Source View was in breach of special conditions 2 and 2(a) under the New Grant. Special condition 2(a) provides that “the grantee shall not… assign, underlet or part with possession of or otherwise dispose of the lot or any part thereof or any interest therein or, except with the prior consent, of the District Commissioner, New Territories and in conformity with any conditions imposed by him, enter into any agreement so to do”.

25.  To address the challenge, Source View managed to obtain a letter from the Lands Department dated 29 April 2016. Enclosed with the letter was an earlier letter from the Lands Department dated back on 31 August 1972 which confirmed that “the General and Special Conditions of the Particulars and Conditions of [the New Grant] have been complied with to the satisfaction of the District Commissioner, New Territories”. The fact was that there is no evidence of any indication of enforcement action by the authority on the ground of the alleged breach of the New Grant.

26.  Tang’s contention in this respect has no merit.

Authority of the administrators

27.  The contention in respect of his authority as administrator of the estate of TCS to dispose of the Property was also what Tang emphasized in his oral submission during the present hearing. However, his subjective categorization of his capacity, role and authority as an administrator of the estate of TCS defies understanding as a matter of law.

28.  The real legal situation at the material times was as follows.

29.  Pursuant to section 62 of the PAO, an administrator shall hold the property of a deceased (including immovable property) on trust for sale. Section 54 provides for the power of the personal representatives to dispose of the property, including immovable property, of the deceased. Subject to that, section 65 provides that every contract entered into by a personal representative in the due administration of an estate shall be binding on and be enforceable against and by any other personal representative for the time being of the deceased.

30.  In submissions, reliance was also placed on sections 2 and 13 of the Trustee Ordinance, Cap 29 (“TO”). Where a trust for sale or a power of sale or of property is vested in a trustee, he may sell or concur with any other person in selling all or any part of the property. For the purpose of TO, trustee includes a personal representative (i.e. an administrator) and trust and trustee extend to the duties incident to the office of a personal representative.

31.  The indisputable fact was that the conveyances in the present case were executed by Tang and Cheung as joint administrators. The self-serving query about his capacity and authority to dispose of the Property in 2009 therefore is without merit as a matter of law.

Alleged orally agreed option

32.  Actually, not much, if at all, was said by Tang in respect of this contention for the purpose of this hearing.

33.  The alleged oral agreement between the parties for Tang to buy back the Property, if ever existed, would have been expected to be documented at the same time of the contract for the sale and purchase, which was indeed written. Tang failed to discharge his evidential burden of coming up with proof in this respect as a matter of fact. The allegation is bare assertion.

34.  The alleged orally agreed option in respect of interest in land, being neither by deed nor evidenced in writing, would have been null and void and unenforceable: see sections 3(1) and 4(1) of the CPO; (for instance) Stromdale and Ball Ltd v Burden [1952] Ch 223.

35.  The alleged option, which referred to a time in the future and at a price which, even according to Tang, was up to negotiation, also suffered from uncertainty to be really binding contractual obligation.

36.  Fundamentally, it is difficult to see how Tang may seek to impeach the sale and purchase of the Property whilst at the same time advancing the case of the alleged oral option premised on the completed sale and purchase of the Property. Inherent inconsistency, that is.

37.  The assertion in respect of the alleged orally agreed option to buy back the Property is incapable of belief and does not constitute any valid defence as a matter of law.

Conclusion

38.  As discussed, none of the contentions raised in defence of the claim in HCA 2275/2019 constitute credible and valid defence. Nor do the same constitute any valid claim in HCA 1611/2019, so that such contentions were plainly liable to be struck out for want of a reasonable cause of action, being frivolous and vexatious. Raising causes that were doomed to fail obviously constituted abuse of process.

39.  It is pointed out that Tang was at all material times the alter ego of the other defendants. In any event, amongst other things, the evidence in respect of their shareholdings and directorship cast light on that. That said, it is noted that whilst Tang might intend to advance his claim in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of TCS, the predecessor in title of the Property, in HCA 1611/2019, he did not make that clear when he commenced the action, as its title reveals. As to HCA 2275/2019, Café Happy Post was sued as the contractual tenant. However, Tang initiated the joinder of himself and the other defendants, which was allowed presumably on the basis that they were necessary parties insofar as the relief claimed was concerned. Indeed, on the basis of expiration of the term of the last tenancy agreement in 2017 on 4 January 2021, Source View obtained judgment for vacant possession of the Property and mesne profits payable from 5 January 2021.

Order and costs

40.  The appeals in both actions are dismissed.

41.  Source View asks for costs on an indemnity basis on the ground that the appeals are devoid of merit. I tend to agree. Hence a nisi order that Tang shall pay the costs of Source View of and occasioned by these appeals in the actions respectively on an indemnity basis with certificate of counsel. In the absence of application to vary within 14 days, the nisi costs order shall become absolute without further order of the court. Upon that, Source View shall lodge with the court and serve on Tang a statement of costs within 7 days, and Tang may lodge with the court his comment on the statement of costs (limited to one page of A4 size paper) within 7 days thereafter. Upon receipt of the above documents or the expiry of the time for their lodging, this court shall proceed with summary assessment of costs on paper without oral hearing.

Remark

42.  The present hearing was conducted in Chinese for the benefit of Tang. If requested, court interpreter would be arranged to assist him in the handing down of this decision.

  ( Simon Leung )
Deputy High Court Judge

The plaintiff in HCA 1611/2019 and 2nd defendant in HCA 2275/2019 appeared in person

Mr Alex Fan, instructed by Wat & Co, for the defendant in HCA 1611/2019 and plaintiff in HCA 2275/2019



[1]  Ie upon the expiration of the term of the last tenancy agreement.

[2]  Not elaborated in the written submission of counsel.

[2022] HKCFI 511-EN-2022-01-27

SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LTD v. CAFE HAPPY POST LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 2275/2019

[2022] HKCFI 511

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2275 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN  
 SOURCE VIEW DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 CAFE HAPPY POST LIMITED1st Defendant
 鄧錦祥2nd Defendant
 HAPPY POST ENTERPRISE LIMITED3rd Defendant
 WILLCOCKS LIMITED4th Defendant

_________________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Winnie Tsui in Chambers
Date of Hearing:27 January 2022
Date of Decision:27 January 2022

_______________

DECISION

_______________

INTRODUCTION

1.  There are two applications before me this morning.

(1)     The summons filed by Mr Tang Kam Cheung, the 2nd defendant, on 14 December 2021.  Notwithstanding that its wording apparently seeks an injunctive relief, it is in substance an application to stay the execution of the order for possession of land made by Master Rita So on 22 November 2021 pending his appeal against that decision.

(2)     An application made by Tang by letter dated 19 January 2022 requesting that the above summons be heard by another judge and not by me.  I shall refer to this as “the recusal application”. 

THE RECUSAL APPLICATION

2.  Upon receipt of the above letter, I directed that the recusal application be dealt with at today’s hearing. 

3.  It appears from the letter that Tang’s ground for the recusal application is that I have ruled against him on three previous occasions.  They are:

(1)     On 29 September 2021, in HCA 1611/2019, a related action between the plaintiff and Tang, I dismissed Tang’s appeal against the decision of Master Kent Yee made on 14 May 2021 and made a costs order against him.  See my decision at [2021] HKCFI 2999 at paras 40 to 43. 

(2)     On 12 November 2021, I refused Tang’s application for leave to appeal against the above decision and made a costs order against him.  See my decision at [2021] HKCFI 3476 at paras 17 to 18. 

(3)     By letter dated 30 September 2021, Tang applied for a transcript of the hearing on 29 September for the purpose of pursuing his intended appeal.  He also gave an undertaking to pay the charges.  On 6 October 2021, I refused his application.  I replied to him in writing as follows:

“The written decision will be sent out to parties shortly. The Plaintiff [ie Tang] may refer to that for the purpose of his intended appeal. The request for transcript is refused.”

I had delivered my decision and reasons orally at the conclusion of the hearing on 29 September 2021.  It was later reduced into writing and that was what I was referring to in the above extract.

4.  In his oral submissions today, Tang confirms that those are the grounds in support of his recusal application.

5.  The plaintiff opposes the application. 

6.  Mr Alex Fan, appearing for the plaintiff, refers to the principles governing recusal as recently summarised and applied by Mimmie Chan J in Cosimo Borrelli as Trustee of the SFC Litigation Trust v Allen Tak Yuen Chan[2020] HKCFI 2382. 

(1)     The test is whether the circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there is a real possibility that the tribunal is biased: para 7 citing Deacons v White & Case Limited Liability Partnership (2003) 6 HKCFAR 322. 

(2)     The observer has a number of qualities.  He is not unduly sensitive or suspicious.  He takes a balanced approach to any information he is given.  He takes the trouble to inform himself on all matters that are relevant.  He appreciates that the context forms an important part of the material which he must consider before passing judgment: para 13.

(3)     The party seeking recusal must articulate the reasoning justifying the recusal.  There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the conduct giving rise to the apprehension of bias and the possibility of departure from impartial decision-making: para 8. 

(4)     The mere fact that a judge has decided applications or issues in the past adversely to a litigant is not generally a reason for that judge to recuse himself at further hearings.  The fair-minded and informed observer does not assume that because a judge has taken an adverse view of a previous application or applications, he will approach any future application with a closed mind or will pre-judge or will not deal fairly with all future applications: paras 17 to 18.

7.  Here, Tang points out that I have made rulings against him in three previous applications. 

8.  Applying the well-established principles, that fact, without more, would not lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there is a real possibility that I am biased or will not deal with the present summons fairly without any pre-judging. 

9.  Hence, Tang fails to make out a justification for my recusal.  The application is refused.

THE STAY APPLICATION

10.  By his summons, Tang seeks a stay of execution pending appeal.  I set out below the relevant procedural history.

Procedural history

11.  The plaintiff and Tang are involved in two actions, ie the present action and HCA 1611/2019.  The subject-matter of the two actions overlap.  I set out a summary of the parties’ cases in the two actions at paras 17 to 26 in my decision given at the hearing on 29 September 2021: [2021] HKCFI 2999.

12.  On 22 November 2021, Master So made a number of orders against Tang in the present action and in HCA 1611/2019.  Relevantly, for today’s purposes, summary judgment was entered against Tang, the 3rd and 4th defendants.  The three of them were ordered to deliver vacant possession of Lot No 5059 in Demarcation District 51 and the buildings built on it to the plaintiff within 28 days.  The deadline therefore fell on 20 December 2021.  This possession order is the order which Tang seeks to stay now. 

13.  On 6 December 2021, Tang lodged a notice of appeal against the master’s decision.  The appeal was listed for hearing before a judge on 19 April 2022, with three hours reserved. 

14.  On 8 December 2021, Tang wrote to the clerk to Master So applying for an extension of the time to deliver vacant possession to after the conclusion of two appeals.  First, the intended appeal in CAMP 535/2021.  Mr Fan has informed the court that that is Tang’s renewed application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against my decision in HCA 1611/2019 on 29 September 2021 (see para 3(1) and (2) above).  Second, the appeal against Master So’s decision scheduled to be heard on 19 April 2022.

15.  On 13 December 2021, the master gave the following directions:

“1. 法庭不會處理日期為2021年12月8日以信件方式提出的申請。如原告人(HCA1161/2019)/第二被告人(HCA2275/2019) [ie Tang]打算作出有關申請,應以給各方傳票方式(Inter Parte Summons)提出。

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16.  On 14 December 2021, Tang took out the present summons.  I quote below the reliefs which he seeks:

“(1) 申請禁制令禁止法庭執行聆案官在一宗兩案同堂聆訊即案件編號HCA 2275/2019及案件編號HCA 1611/2019在22/11/2021共同聆訊時,發出的收屋命令。

(2) 申請發給命令給案件編號 HCA 2275/2019的第二被告人,即本人,許可他延期履行聆案官在10:00AM. 22/11/2021,審訊案件編號HCA 2275/2019及案件編號 HCA 1611/2019同堂聆訊時所發出的命令,即本人須於審訊日後28天內遷離物業LOT NO. 5059 D.D. 51直至該兩案的上訴審訊有最終裁判的日期為止。” (underline added)

17.  In para 1, Tang applies for an injunction to restrain the court from enforcing the possession order made by the master.  In para 2, Tang asks for an extension of time to comply with the possession order until the conclusion of his appeal. 

18.  In his supporting affirmation, Tang stated that he had applied for time extension to the master by his letter dated 8 December 2021 but there was no reply. 

19.  At today’s hearing, Tang confirms that he in fact received master’s directions on 14 December, but only after he took out the summons earlier that day.  He adds that as the deadline for the possession order was approaching, and he was very concerned to have the stay in place. 

20.  The relief sought in para 1 is plainly misconceived.  In substance, what Tang wants is a stay of execution of the possession order pending appeal. 

21.  The summons was listed for hearing three days later on the Friday of that week before the summons judge.  (The date might have been fixed this way because the summons on its face asked for injunctive relief.) 

22.  At the hearing, Mr Fan appeared for the plaintiff and invited the judge to dismiss the stay application primarily on the ground that the appeal is not arguable. 

23.  The judge declined the invitation and adjourned the summons for substantive argument before a bilingual judge with three hours reserved.  That is the hearing before me today.  The judge also granted an interim stay of execution until this hearing. 

The proper course

24.  In my view, Tang’s application for stay pending appeal brought before a judge is procedurally flawed and amounts to an abuse of the court’s process.  It should be dismissed. 

25.  Where a master makes a substantive order and an appeal against that order lies to a judge, if the aggrieved party wishes to stay the execution of the substantive order pending the appeal, generally speaking, the proper course for him to take would be to make the stay application before the master who made the substantive order.  The application should be made by summons.  Any evidence which he proposes to rely on should be adduced by way of an affidavit. 

26.  The master is, generally speaking, best placed to hear the stay application.  When seeking a stay, the applicant will need to demonstrate that he has an arguable appeal as a minimum requirement: see Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd HCA 4726/2001, 7 June 2002 at para 9(6).  The master has already heard the arguments and is familiar with them.  Hence, with some refreshing of his memory, at the stay hearing (or on a paper application), he will be able to evaluate the prospect of the appeal on the merits quickly and effectively.

27.  In some cases, the master will also appreciate how a decision on stay may affect the further conduct and progress of the proceedings from a case management perspective. 

28.  If the master refuses the stay application, the proper next step for the aggrieved party is to lodge an appeal against the master’s refusal to stay.  That appeal would lie to a judge under Order 58, rule 1(1).  This appeal framework was confirmed to be the correct procedure by Ma J (as he then was) in Brand, Farrar, Buxbaum LLP v Samuel-Rozenbaum Diamond Limited HCA 5191/1998, 8 May 2002 at para 10.  The judge remarked:

“On the next day (16 April 2002), the claimant issued a notice of appeal against Master Wong’s refusal to stay execution. I would just observe here that this was the correct procedure to adopt.”

29.  In that case, the procedural framework concerning a stay of a master’s decision pending an appeal to the judge was contrasted with the regime governing a stay of a decision of a judge of the Court of First Instance pending an appeal to the Court of Appeal. 

30.  In the latter scenario, if the first instance judge refuses a stay, an application can be made to the Court of Appeal without the need to appeal.  This is because there is concurrent jurisdiction to grant stays of execution.  This exists by reason of Order 59, rule 13(1) which provides as follows:

“(1) Except so far as the court below or the Court of Appeal or a single judge may otherwise direct—

(a) an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the decision of the court below; …” (underline added)

31.  The same wording does not exist in Order 58, rule 1(4).  The text reads:

“Except so far as the Court may otherwise direct, an appeal under this rule shall not operate as a stay of the proceedings in which the appeal is brought.” (underline added)

32.  For these reasons, Ma J observed that where a master refuses a stay of execution of his order pending an appeal against that order to a judge, the correct procedure is to lodge an appeal against the master’s decision against a stay. 

33.  I should add that Ma J did not expressly say that a stay application should in the first instance be made to the master who made the substantive order.  But that must have been the premise on which the judge had proceeded when he made the observation on the “correct procedure”.  Furthermore, at para 27(1) of the decision, when discussing the facts of that case, he was clearly contemplating that that should be the correct way to follow. 

34.  I should also add that there is no express provision in the rules which stipulates that a stay application should be made to the master in the first instance, as opposed to a judge. 

35.  Again, this is different from an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a judge.  Order 59, rule 14(4) expressly provides that where an application may be made either to the Court of First Instance or to the Court of Appeal (which would include a stay application), it shall not be made to the Court of Appeal in the first instance except where there are special circumstances which make it impossible or impracticable to apply to the court below. 

36.  Notwithstanding the absence of any express rule, a party who wishes to stay a master’s order pending appeal should apply to the master in the first instance. 

37.  In SNE Engineering Co Ltd v Chim Kee Machinery Co Ltd CACV 101/2016, 15 July 2016, the Court of Appeal considered the proper interpretation and rationale of Order 59, 14(4).  There are advantages which may be gained from having the judge of the court below hear the stay application in the first instance, as opposed to the Court of Appeal.  This includes the ability of the judge to deal with the stay swiftly and effectively. 

38.  In my view, such advantages apply with equal force in the situation concerning a stay of a master’s decision.  See paras 26 to 27 above. 

39.  All these reinforce the position that a party should apply for stay from the master in the first instance. 

What should be done now?

40.  In the present case, Tang ought to have applied for the stay before Master So in the first instance, whose order it was sought to be stayed.  He tried to do so by his letter dated 8 December 2021. 

41.  However, without waiting for the result, he proceeded to take out the present summons to be heard before a judge. 

42.  If I proceed to hear his summons substantively today, I would be bypassing the well-established procedural framework governing stays of execution pending appeal from a master’s decision.  As far as I can see, there is no reason for me to do so. 

43.  Admittedly, Tang has up to now been allowed to pursue the stay application before a judge.  I therefore ask myself whether the application should be substantively disposed of today, by way of an exception to the general and well-established practice. 

44.  However, there are distinct disadvantages for me to take this course of action. 

45.  In coming to a ruling on the stay application, I would inevitably have to assess the merits of the case and express a provisional view.  I need to be satisfied that Tang’s appeal is at least arguable.  After that is done, the appeal proper will then come before a different judge in about three months’ time in April.  He will then express his own view (and this time a definitive one) on the merits. 

46.  This is undesirable.  First, there is a possibility that two judges may be expressing different or contradictory views on the same matter.  That is generally to be avoided.  Second, it is an unnecessary use of the court’s resources.  Three hours have been reserved for today’s hearing. And three more hours are reserved for the appeal in April.  The use of such time is simply not warranted.

47.  I therefore decline to hear substantive argument on the stay application today. 

Disposal of the summons

48.  To conclude, Tang ought to have applied to Master So for the stay by summons.  He ought not to have applied for an injunction in the present summons.  That is plainly misconceived.  He ought not to have applied for the stay before a judge.  All these procedural flaws have resulted in the court’s time and the plaintiff’s time being used and wasted to no practical effect.  This is particularly undesirable when the master could have and would have dealt with the stay application swiftly if Tang had proceeded in accordance with the well-established practice. 

49.  As such, I am of the view that the taking out and pursuit of the summons is an abuse of the court’s process and the summons should be dismissed. 

50.  By order of the summons judge, the possession order has been stayed on an interim basis until today.  I will not extend it. If Tang wishes to further pursue the stay, he should follow the proper procedure promptly.  In this regard, in view of the approaching Chinese New Year holiday, the plaintiff agrees and undertakes that it will not take steps to enforce the possession order within 14 days from today.

ORDER

51.  For the above reasons, I dismiss both the recusal application and Tang’s summons. 

[Submissions on costs]

52.  Tang submits that the documents prepared by the plaintiff for this hearing are more or less the same as on the previous occasions.  Deduction should therefore be made.  However, as is clear from the statement of costs, the majority of time has been spent by the plaintiff on matters other than the preparation of documents and bundles.

53.  I order that Tang do pay the plaintiff’s costs of the recusal application and the summons.  The costs be summarily assessed at $80,000, payable on or before 10 February 2022. 

( Winnie Tsui )
Deputy High Court Judge

  

Mr Alex Fan, instructed by Wat & Co, for the plaintiff

The 2nd defendant appeared in person