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2020

深圳市深超科技投資有限公司 v. 世紀晶源科技有限公司 AND ANOTHER

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[2025] HKCA 551-EN-2025-06-24

深圳市深超科技投資有限公司 v. 世紀晶源科技有限公司 AND ANOTHER

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CACV 263/2020, [2025] HKCA 551

On appeal from [2020] HKCFI 1334

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 263 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCT NO 38 OF 2019)

________________________

 IN THE MATTER OF ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD

________________________

BETWEEN

 深圳市深超科技投資有限公司Applicant
 and 
 世紀晶源科技有限公司1st Respondent
 高敬德2nd Respondent

________________________

Before: Hon Kwan VP, Chu VP and K Yeung J in Court
Date of Hearing: 3 June 2025
Date of Judgment: 3 June 2025
Date of Reasons for Judgment: 24 June 2025

_______________________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

_______________________________________

Hon Kwan VP (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court):

1.  We dismissed the appeal of the applicant at the conclusion of the hearing. These are the reasons for judgment of the court.

The notice of appeal

2.  On 23 June 2020, Anthony Chan J handed down his decision (“Refusal of Leave Decision”)[1] dismissing the applicant’s application for leave to appeal against his decision of 7 May 2020 (“SetAsideDecision”),[2] by which he set aside the ex parte order dated 21 August 2019 (“HCCT Order”) of Mimmie Chan J obtained by the applicant to enforce a Mainland arbitral award (“Award”) against the respondents.

3.  On 13 July 2020, the applicant filed a notice of appeal in CACV 263/2020 against the Refusal of Leave Decision. The orders sought in the notice of appeal are in these terms:

“FOR AN ORDER that the Refusal Decision be set aside AND FOR AN ORDER that the Applicant’s costs of this appeal and the costs of the Leave Application be in the cause of the appeal against the 7/5/20 Decision[3], to be taxed if not agreed, with counsel certificate.”

4.  The ground of appeal stated in the notice of appeal read as follows:

“The Refusal Decision was not reached by any intellectual process and/or not by proper or fair process, and/or there was fundamental error of law in that the learned Judge’s ruling (paragraph 7 of the Refusal Decision) that ‘the contention that [the court] had erred in the statutory interpretation exercise is academic’ because ‘there is no appeal against the findings of fact by the court that at the time of the Applicant’s ex parte application, its Mainland enforcement proceedings were on foot and the amount recoverable from those proceedings could not be ascertained’ is blatantly contrary to any logical or intellectual process or fundamentally wrong. If the interpretation and application of s.93 of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) (‘theAO’) construed and adopted by the learned Judge are erroneous and/or if the interpretation of s.93 of the AO as submitted by the Applicant (considered in paragraph 13 of the Refusal Decision) is adopted, the Original Decision[4] must be wrong and liable to be set aside by applying the findings of fact by the court.”

5.  On 6 July 2021, the applicant filed an amended supplementary notice of appeal in CACV 263/2020 adding grounds 1 to 4 (“ImpugnedGrounds”) to the existing ground of appeal, which was re-numbered as ground 5 (“Ground 5”). The respondents issued a summons on 23 September 2022 to strike out the Impugned Grounds on the ground that they disclose no reasonable ground of appeal, and/or are frivolous or vexatious, and/or otherwise are an abuse of the process of the court.

6.  The Court of Appeal handed down its judgment on the strike out application on 20 July 2023 (“CA Judgment”)[5] and ordered the Impugned Grounds to be struck out. In opposing the striking out application, the applicant did not invoke the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to supervise the fair processing of the application for leave to appeal by the Court of First Instance[6] (“CFI”) but sought to advance the Impugned Grounds in this appeal by a “separate and independent basis”. The CA Judgment held it is clear that the Impugned Grounds are unarguable on what the applicant called the “separate and independent basis” and that this case falls within the category of very clear and obvious cases where the Court of Appeal would and should exercise its power of striking out. Indemnity costs were awarded against the applicant.

7.  Thereafter, there is no further amendment to the notice of appeal. The orders sought in this appeal are as stated above and the only ground of appeal remains as stated in Ground 5. This must be borne firmly in mind. The notice of appeal sought an order to set aside the Refusal of Leave Decision. As noted in the CA Judgment at §35, the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal against the Set Aside Decision, presumably because it was aware of the authorities that only the CFI can give (or refuse) leave to appeal against a decision setting aside leave to enforce an arbitral award.

8.  In his submissions for the applicant in this appeal, Mr Foster Yim[7] repeated arguments that have been ruled against him in the CA Judgment, mounted direct and collateral attacks on the Set Aside Decision for which leave to appeal was refused in the Refusal of Leave Decision, advanced arguments that are outside the scope of the remaining ground of appeal being Ground 5, and sought orders that are not mentioned in the notice of appeal. It is unacceptable for counsel to make submissions on appeal in this manner.

9.  Mr Andrew Liao SC, who appeared for the respondents on appeal with Ms Jacqueline Ng[8], submitted that this appeal is unmeritorious and the way it is now advanced further makes it frivolous, vexatious, constituting a flagrant abuse of the process of the court and ought to be dismissed as such with costs on an indemnity basis.

Background

10.  The relevant background has been set out in the Set Aside Decision (§§3 to 29) and the CA Judgment (§§4 to 34). It is not necessary to recite all the details. A brief account will suffice for present purpose.

11.  The applicant advanced a loan of RMB 530 million to the 1st respondent under an agreement in 2008. The 2nd respondent provided a personal guarantee for the repayment of the loan. The respondents failed to repay the loan.

12.  The agreement contained a provision for arbitration by 中國國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會華南分會 (“CIETAC(SC)”), which changed its name to 華南國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會 (“SCIA”) with effect from 22 October 2012. On 4 April 2013, the applicant applied to SCIA for arbitration. The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of SCIA on the ground that CIETAC(SC) and not SCIA was the agreed tribunal and CIETAC(SC) was only a sub-commission of CIETAC and not an independent body.

13.  The respondents’ challenge to jurisdiction failed before SCIA and the Supreme People’s Court. The arbitration hearing took place in July 2013 and the Award was made by SCIA on 22 August 2013. The respondents were held liable to pay the applicant RMB 530 million with interest and other relief. The respondents did not apply to set aside the Award but failed to make payment.

14.  On 13 March 2015 (19 months later), the applicant brought an action in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court (“SIPC”) to enforce the Award, then in excess of RMB 958 million with interest calculated up to that time. On 16 March 2015, the SIPC granted an enforcement judgment which ordered the respondents to provide the court with a list of their properties, that such properties be frozen or preserved, and that such properties be sold or auctioned. The respondents failed to comply with the order.

15.  By a notification dated 6 March 2017, SIPC notified the applicant it had seized 5 pieces of land belonging to the 1st respondent (“5 Plots of Land”). On 30 October 2018, SIPC notified the parties of the court-appointed assessor’s valuation of the 5 Plots of Land. On 16 April 2019, SIPC affirmed the assessor’s valuation after review upon the 1st respondent’s objection. The 5 Plots of Land were auctioned and sold to the applicant on 20 January 2020 at the assessor’s valuation of RMB 486,178,488. By an enforcement judgment dated 19 February 2020, SIPC set off the purchase price against the debt owed to the applicant by the respondents and approved the transfer of the 5 Plots of Land to the applicant. By another enforcement judgment dated 21 February 2020, SIPC held that the Mainland enforcement action had been concluded.

16.  Meanwhile, on 29 July 2019, the applicant issued an ex parte summons in CFI in Hong Kong under HCCT 38/2019 for leave under section 92 of the AO to enforce the Award in the same manner as a judgment of the court to the same effect and to enter judgment in terms of the Award. As mentioned, Mimmie Chan J granted the HCCT Order on 21 August 2019.

17.  The respondents issued a summons on 30 October 2019 to set aside the HCCT Order. One of the grounds was that the enforcement of the Award infringed section 93 of the AO as, at the time the ex parte summons was issued, enforcement on the Mainland was ongoing, the 5 Plots of Land had not been sold, the amount recoverable from them could not be ascertained and the enforcement action was not concluded until 21 February 2020.

18.  Section 93 as then in force[9] provided as follows:

“93. Restrictions on enforcement of Mainland awards

(1) A Mainland award is not, subject to subsection (2), enforceable under this Division if an application has been made on the Mainland for enforcement of the award.

(2) If a Mainland award is not fully satisfied by way of enforcement proceedings taken in the Mainland, or in any other place than in Hong Kong, that part of the award which is not satisfied in those proceedings is enforceable under this Division.”

19.  By the Set Aside Decision, the judge set aside the HCCT Order on the ground that enforcement of the Award infringed section 93 and he had no jurisdiction to grant the HCCT Order afresh as section 93 went to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong court. He agreed with the judgment of A Cheung J (as he then was) on section 40C of the former AO, Cap 341 (the wording of which was very similar to section 93) in Shenzhen Kai Loong Investment and Development Co Ltd v CEC Electrical Manufacturing (International) Co Ltd [2001-2003] HKCLRT 649, which held that both double enforcement and double recovery were prohibited by the provision, and that where an award holder had applied for enforcement in the Mainland, he would have to wait until those proceedings were completed or concluded, and the amount recovered ascertained, before he could apply to the Hong Kong court for enforcement in respect of any deficiency in the recovery.

20.  The applicant issued a summons on 21 May 2020 for leave to appeal from the Set Aside Decision, on the grounds that (1) the judge had wrongly construed section 93, the decision in Shenzhen Kai Loong adopted by him was wrong, and failed to take into consideration the time limitation of enforcement in Hong Kong of six years; and (2) he erred in finding that it was not open to him to re-grant the HCCT Order.

21.  The judge refused leave to appeal by the Refusal of Leave Decision on 23 June 2020, as he did not find any merits in the proposed grounds of appeal. As there was no appeal against the findings of fact that at the time of the ex parte application the Mainland enforcement proceedings were ongoing, there was clear infringement of the prohibition against double enforcement in section 93. The provision does not admit of the applicant’s construction to allow an enforcement application to be made despite ongoing Mainland enforcement proceedings if at the time of application the award has not been fully satisfied and the unsatisfied part is reasonably ascertainable or ascertained[10]. The wording of section 93 is clear and the exception provided under section 93(2) can only apply if the award “is not fully satisfied”.

22.  The judge affirmed his agreement with the analysis in Shenzhen Kai Loong. He rejected the contention that Shenzhen Kai Loong failed to take into consideration the time limitation of enforcement in Hong Kong as he regarded this of little moment, for the reasons given in §§10 to 12 of the Refusal of Leave Decision. As for the contention it was wrong in law to find that it was not open to re-grant the HCCT Order, the applicant had not pointed out how the judge’s analysis was wrong.

23.  We turn to consider Ground 5 and Mr Yim’s submissions in this appeal.

Ground 5

24.  Ground 5 was set out verbatim in the beginning of Mr Yim’s skeleton submissions but he did not appear to have advanced any substantive arguments in relation to it in his six points (“Six Points”) that followed in his submissions. Mr Yim informed us he does not wish to abandon Ground 5 and he would ask this court to consider it nonetheless.

25.  Ground 5 is wholly devoid of merits.

26.  It asserts at the outset that the Refusal of Leave Decision “was not reached by any intellectual process and/or not by proper or fair process, and/or there was fundamental error of law”. The wording would appear to track the dicta of Mustill LJ in Aden Refinery Ltd v Ugland Ltd [1987] 1 QB 650 at 666B when discussing the residual jurisdiction of the English Court of Appeal to supervise the fair processing of the application for leave to appeal at first instance. The serious allegation that the Refusal of Leave Decision “was not reached by any intellectual process and/or not by proper or fair process” was wholly unsubstantiated.

27.  As for the fundamental error of law alleged in Ground 5, the applicant has failed to demonstrate any error of law, let alone fundamental error of law, in the Refusal of Leave Decision. The errors of law as contended in the skeleton submissions are in substance challenges to the merits of the Set Aside Decision, not the fairness of the process in making the Refusal of Leave Decision. In invoking the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, a clear distinction is drawn between a challenge to the merits of the decision and the fairness of procedure, and what one is looking for is not merely an error of law, but such a substantial defect in the fairness of the process as to invalidate the decision[11]. In any event, the applicant’s contention that the judge was wrong in the Set Aside Decision in adopting the analysis in Shenzhen Kai Loong on the construction of section 93 was rejected in the CA Judgment at §46.

28.  If the purpose of Ground 5 was to invoke the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to set aside the Refusal of Leave Decision (as borne out by the terms of the order sought in the notice of appeal), Mr Yim has disavowed any intention to rely on this in his skeleton submission, plainly recognizing that he has an “extraordinarily high hurdle to surmount” to engage the residual jurisdiction[12]. He no longer asked the Court of Appeal to set aside the Refusal of Leave Decision. Instead, he relied on a “separate doctrine” (a variation of the “separate and independent basis” that he advanced in opposing the striking out of the Impugned Grounds) that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the Set Aside Order, which the judge has no jurisdiction to make, under section 14(1) of the High Court Ordinance where an appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal as of right from every judgment or order of the CFI in any civil cause or matter. This is outside the scope of the order sought in the notice of appeal and the ground of appeal in Ground 5 and is simply not open to the applicant to pursue, not to mention that this is a volte face from the clear stance of the applicant’s former counsel that leave to appeal the Set Aside Order is required from the CFI[13].

29.  In his written reply submissions, Mr Yim contended that the applicant may take a “jurisdictional point” in the present hearing before us even if it had not been raised before the Court of First Instance and that the Court of Appeal should exercise its discretion to permit the applicant to run a new argument on a pure point of law. We firmly reject his contentions. The arguments he raised regarding excess of jurisdiction are premised on the alleged mis-construction of section 93. These arguments are variations on the same theme of the arguments taken by the applicant in its application for leave to appeal against the Set Aside Order and in its opposition to the respondents’ application to strike out the Impugned Grounds in the amended supplementary notice of appeal. It is an abuse of process to argue the jurisdictional point which has been considered substantively and rejected in the Refusal of Leave Decision and in the CA Judgment.

30.  Mr Yim acknowledged that the substantive arguments in the Six Points are outside the scope of Ground 5 and not open to the applicant to pursue. As Ground 5 is without merit, this is sufficient reason for the dismissal of this appeal.

The Six Points

31.  It is therefore not necessary to consider the Six Points. As rightly pointed out by the respondents, the Six Points are just an attempt to re-run the Impugned Grounds rejected in the CA Judgment by the back door. They are in any event without merit, we will deal with them succinctly.

(1)  First Point

32.  Mr Yim’s contention is that the Set Aside Order was made in excess of the judge’s jurisdiction. He cited Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] 1 WLR 3555 at §25 for the proposition that where the judge makes an order which is outwith his jurisdiction in that he could not (as opposed to should not) make it, a statutory provision requiring leave of the court for an appeal against the decision does not prevent an appeal to the Court of Appeal, as a decision made without jurisdiction cannot fairly be held to have been made under the provision. Mr Yim submitted that excess of jurisdiction provides a “separate doctrine” in construing the limitation on the right to appeal in the AO, such that the applicant can appeal against the Set Aside Order as of right.

33.  A similar argument he advanced in reliance on Cetelem in support of ground 4 of the Impugned Grounds was rejected in the CA Judgment[14]. In applying for leave to appeal against the Set Aside Order, the applicant had not argued before the judge that the judge could not (as opposed to should not) make that order. Nor are we able to discern in Mr Yim’s submissions for this appeal in what way the Set Aside Order was made without jurisdiction, in light of sections 84 and 92(1)(b) of the AO and Order 73 rule 10(6) of the Rules of the High Court[15]. Section 93 sets out the restrictions on the enforcement of Mainland awards, it does not set out the limits on the powers of the judge to hear and determine an application to set aside the HCCT Order. As in the CA Judgment, we do not think Cetelem assists the applicant at all, leaving aside that the time limit to appeal against the Set Aside Order has long expired.

(2)  Second to Fifth Points

34.  These points sought to draw a distinction between “recognition” and “execution”. The arguments are in effect grounds 1 and 2 of the Impugned Grounds[16], which are based on a distinction between “recognition” and “enforcement” (or “execution”). We see no reason to differ from the CA Judgment why the applicant should be permitted to launch a new argument based on the alleged distinction. Besides, it was rejected in the CA Judgment that the HCCT Order was only concerned with the “recognition” stage[17]. The contention that Shenzhen Kai Loong has misconstrued section 40C of the former AO (very similar to section 93) was also rejected in the CA Judgment. Further, Mr Yim made another about turn in the written reply submissions that his “present arguments … do not challenge the rationale of Shenzhen Kai Loong”.

(3)  Sixth Point

35.  This relates to the limitation period in Hong Kong. Mr Yim raised a new argument that an award creditor has six years to enforce the award by “recognizing” it as a judgment and thereafter a further 12 years to “execute” the judgment invoking section 4(4) of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap 347[18], in other words a total of 18 years. He contended that the judge’s construction of section 93 is wrong, as in the enactment of that provision it could not have been the legislative intent to shorten the limitation period available to the award creditor to six years.

36.  The six-year time bar was the position adopted by the applicant’s former counsel in the application for leave to appeal against the Set Aside Order[19].

37.  Besides, it is wrong to aggregate the limitation for an action to enforce an award (six years, under section 4(1)(c)) with the limitation for subsequently executing it as a judgment (12 years, under section 4(4)). Where a party fails to enforce an award within the six-year limitation period, he does not thereby lose the 12-year period for execution. He simply does not have a judgment to execute and the 12-year limitation period does not begin to run.

Costs

38.  We have ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of this appeal on an indemnity basis. We think it is appropriate to order indemnity costs against the applicant, in light of the manner in which this appeal was conducted, which can fairly be described as an abuse of the process of the court.

(Susan Kwan)
Vice President
(Carlye Chu)
Vice President
(Keith Yeung)
Judge of the Court
of First Instance

Mr Foster Yim and Mr Jasper Wong, instructed by Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam, for the Applicant (Appellant)

Mr Andrew Liao SC and Ms Jacquelyn Ng, instructed by Wellington Legal LLP, for the 1st and 2nd Respondents (Respondents)



[1]   [2020] HKCFI 1334

[2]   [2020] HKCFI 674

[3]   The Set Aside Decision

[4]   This would appear to be a reference to the Set Aside Decision.

[5]   [2023] HKCA 888; Kwan and Chu VPP and Yuen JA, with the judgment of the court given by Yuen JA.

[6]   Guangdong Changhong Electric Co Ltd v Inspur Electronics (HK) Ltd [2015] 2 HKLRD 714; China International Fund Ltd v Dennis Lau & Ng Chun Man Architects & Engineers (HK) Ltd [2015] 4 HKLRD 609; American International Group Inc v Huaxia Life Insurance Co Ltd (2017) 20 HKCFAR 503

[7]   With Mr Jasper Wong

[8]   The skeleton submissions lodged by the respondent were prepared by Ms Ng before Mr Liao was instructed.

[9]   Section 93 was repealed by Ordinance No. 1 of 2021, section 4.

[10]  As set out in §13 of the Refusal of Leave Decision and mentioned in Ground 5 of the amended supplementary notice of appeal.

[11]  CA Judgment at §37

[12]  Kyla Shipping Co Ltd v Bunge SA [2013] EWCA Civ 734 at §15, quoted in Guangdong Changhong at §16.

[13]  Applicant’s written statement dated 21 May 2020, §2; applicant’s reply skeleton submissions dated 18 June 2020, §2

[14]  CA Judgment, §§40(4), 49 to 50

[15]  Section 84 provides: “(1) Subject to section 26(2), an award, whether made in or outside Hong Kong, in arbitral proceedings by an arbitral tribunal is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment of the Court that has the same effect, but only with the leave of the Court. (2) If leave is granted under subsection (1), the Court may enter judgment in terms of the award. (3) The leave of the Court is required for any appeal from a decision of the Court to grant or refuse leave to enforce an award under subsection (1).”

Section 92(1)(b) provides: “(1) A Mainland award is, subject to this Division, enforceable in Hong Kong either - … (b) in the same manner as an award to which section 84 applies, and that section applies to a Mainland award accordingly as if a reference in that section to an award were a Mainland award.”

Order 73 rule 10(6) provides: “Within 14 days after service of the order made under paragraph (4) or, if the order made under paragraph (4) is to be served out of the jurisdiction, within such other period as the Court may fix, the debtor may apply to set aside that order, and the settlement agreement, award, order, direction or emergency relief shall not be enforced until after the expiration of that period or, if the debtor applies within that period to set aside the order made under paragraph (4), until after the application is finally disposed of.”

[16]  CA Judgment, §40(1) and (2)

[17]  CA Judgment, §§43 to 45

[18]  Section 4(4) provides: “An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable …”

[19]  Refusal of Leave Decision, §9; written statement of the applicant dated 21 May 2020, §11

[2023] HKCA 888-EN-2023-07-20

深圳市深超科技投資有限公司 v. 世紀晶源科技有限公司 AND ANOTHER

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CACV 263/2020

[2023] HKCA 888

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 263 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCT NO 38 OF 2019)

________________________

 IN THE MATTER OF ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD

________________________

BETWEEN

深圳市深超科技投資有限公司Applicant
and
世紀晶源科技有限公司1st Respondent
高敬德2nd Respondent

________________________

Before: Hon Kwan, Chu VPP and Yuen JA in Court
Dates of Written Submissions: 9, 21 and 29 December 2022
Date of Judgment: 20 July 2023

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

Hon Yuen JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an application by the Respondents in HCCT 38/2019 by a summons filed on 23 September 2022 (“the Summons”)  to strike out Grounds 1 to 4 (“the Impugned Grounds”)  of the Amended Supplementary Notice of Appeal filed by the Applicant on 6 July 2021 (“ASNOA”)  on the ground that they disclose no reasonable ground of appeal, are frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise constitute an abuse of process of the court.

2.  The Applicant oppose the striking out application.

3.  The parties have filed affirmations and lodged written submissions regarding this application. Having considered them, the court does not think it is necessary to hold an oral hearing and we will deal with the application on paper. 

Background

4.  The background of this case was summarized by Anthony Chan J (“the Judge”)  in his decisions given on 7 May 2020 (“the Set Aside Decision”)  and 23 June 2020 (“the Refusal of Leave Decision”)  as follows.

5.  Under a Cooperation Agreement made in June 2008 (“the Agreement”), the Applicant agreed to lend RMB 530 million (“the Loan”)  to the 1st Respondent (“R1”).  Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the 2nd Respondent (“R2”)  provided a personal guarantee for repayment of the Loan. 

6.  Clause 11 of the Agreement contained an agreement for arbitration by中國國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會華南分會 (South China Sub-Commission of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission)  (“CIETAC(SC)”), which changed its name to華南國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會(“SCIA”)  with effect from 22 October 2012.     

7.  The Loan funds were received by R1 on 25 July 2008.  However, after making the 1st interest payment of about RMB 10.4 million on 31 December 2008, neither Respondent made further repayment.

8.  On 7 March 2013, the Applicant obtained from Shenzhen Baoan District Court a Pre-action Asset Preservation Order against R1 to the value of RMB 39 million, under which 6 pieces of land belonging to R1 were seized.  Of these 6 pieces, 1 piece had already been made the subject of a Seizing Order in 2011 by another creditor. The remaining 5 pieces were referred to in the Decision as “the 5 Plots of Land”.

9.  On 4 April 2013, the Applicant applied to SCIA for arbitration.  On 26 April 2013, the Respondents challenged the jurisdiction of SCIA on the ground that CIETAC(SC), not SCIA, was the agreed tribunal, and CIETAC(SC)  was only a sub-commission of CIETAC and not an independent body[1].

10.  On 16 May 2013, SCIA ruled that it did have jurisdiction in the matter (“SCIA’s Jurisdiction Decision”).  Subsequently, on 15 July 2015, the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”)  held that SCIA did indeed have jurisdiction in any arbitration based on arbitration agreements entered into before CIETAC (SC)’s change of name.[2]

11.  Meanwhile, after SCIA’s Jurisdiction Decision on 16 May 2013, the arbitration hearing took place on 26 July 2013 (although the Respondents continued to dispute SCIA’s jurisdiction).

12.  By an Award dated 22 August 2013 (“the Award”), SCIA held that (a)  it had jurisdiction in the matter by reference to the SCIA Jurisdiction Decision, Article 20 of the PRC Arbitration Law, and Article 11 of the Arbitration Rules of SCIA; and (b)  the Respondents were liable to repay the Applicant the principal sum of RMB530 million with interest and other relief.[3]

13.  The Respondents did not apply to set aside the Award, but failed to make any payment under it.

14.  On 13 March 2015 (19 months after the Award), the Applicant instituted an action in the Mainland to enforce the Award.[4] On 16 March 2015, an Enforcement Judgement was granted by the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court (“SIPC”)  which ordered (i)  the Respondents to provide the Court with a list of their properties; (ii)  that such properties be frozen or preserved; and (iii)  that such properties be sold or auctioned (“the SIPC Order”). 

15.  The Respondents however failed to comply with the SIPC Order for disclosure of their properties.[5]

16.  By a Notification dated 6 March 2017, the SIPC notified the Applicant that it had seized the 5 Plots of Land.

17.  On 30 October 2018, the SIPC notified the parties of the court-appointed assessor’s valuation of the 5 Plots of Land (“the assessor’s valuation”).  Although R1 objected to the assessor’s valuation, on 16 April 2019, the SIPC informed the parties that the assessor’s valuation was affirmed after review. Subsequent developments on enforcement on the Mainland are set out in paragraph 21 below.

Commencement of HCCT 38/2019

18.  Meanwhile, on 29 July 2019, the Applicant issued an ex parte summons in the Court of First Instance (“CFI”)  in Hong Kong under HCCT 38/2019 for leave under s.92 Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609)  (“AO”)  to enforce the Award in the same manner as a judgment of the Court to the same effect, and to enter judgment in terms of the Award.  Section 92 provided (where material):

“(1)  A Mainland award is, subject to this Division, enforceable in Hong Kong either – (b)  in the same manner as an award to which section 84 applies [non-Mainland award], and that section applies to a Mainland award accordingly as if a reference in that section to an award were a Mainland award.

(2)  A Mainland award which is enforceable as mentioned in subsection (1)  is to be treated as binding for all purposes on the parties, and may accordingly be relied on by any of them by way of defence, set off or otherwise in any legal proceedings in Hong Kong”.

19.  On 21 August 2019, Mimmie Chan J made an order granting leave (“the HCCT Order”).

20.  On 30 October 2019, the Respondents filed a summons to set aside the HCCT Order.   There were 3 main grounds for the application:

(1)  the enforcement of the Award infringes s. 93 AO (then in force)  which stipulated:

“(1)  A Mainland award is not, subject to subsection (2), enforceable under this Division if an application has been made on the Mainland for enforcement of the award.

(2)  If a Mainland award is not fully satisfied by way of enforcement proceedings taken in the Mainland, or in any other place than in Hong Kong, that part of the award which is not satisfied in those proceedings is enforceable under this Division”;

(2)  the tribunal (SCIA)  which made the Award was not the one agreed by the parties;

(3)  material non-disclosure by the Applicant at the ex parte application of the enforcement proceedings on the Mainland.

Enforcement on the Mainland at the time of the ex parte summons in Hong Kong

21.  At this time, enforcement on the Mainland was still ongoing.  R1’s appeal against the decision of the SIPC was dismissed by the Guangdong Higher People’s Court on 25 October 2019.  On 20 January 2020, the Respondent’s 5 Plots of Land were auctioned and sold to the Applicant at the assessor’s valuation. By an Enforcement Judgment dated 19 February 2020, the SIPC set off the purchase price against the debt owed to the Applicant by the Respondents, and approved the transfer of the 5 Plots of Land to the Applicant. [6] 

22.  By another Enforcement Judgment dated 21 February 2020, the SIPC held that the Mainland enforcement action had been concluded.

The Judge’s Set Aside Decision

23.  In Hong Kong, the Respondents’ summons filed on 30 October 2019 to set aside the HCCT Order was dealt with by the Judge on paper.  In the Set Aside Decision of 7 May 2020, the Judge set aside the HCCT Order on ground (1)  (set out in paragraph 20 above).

24.  The Judge referred to Shenzhen Kai Loong Investment and Development Co Ltd v CEC Electrical Manufacturing (International)  Co Ltd [2001 – 2003] HKCLRT 649 in which A Cheung J (as he then was)  considered s. 40C of the former AO (Cap. 341), the wording of which was very similar to s.93 AO (Cap.609).  A Cheung J held that both double enforcement and double recovery were prohibited, and that where an award holder had applied for enforcement in the Mainland, he would have to wait until those proceedings were completed or concluded, and the amount recovered ascertained, before he could apply to the Hong Kong Court for enforcement in respect of any deficiency in the recovery.

25.  In the present case, when the Applicant issued the ex parte summons in July 2019 to enforce the Award in Hong Kong, the enforcement of the Award on the Mainland was still ongoing.  The 5 Plots of Land had not yet been sold, and the amount recoverable from them could not be ascertained.[7]

26.  The Judge concluded that on that ground alone, the HCCT Order should be set aside.  The Judge held that he had no jurisdiction to grant the HCCT Order afresh, as s.93 went to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong court to enforce the Award.[8]

27.  The Respondents’ two other grounds (SCIA’s jurisdiction and material non-disclosure)  were discussed briefly by the Judge, but as they are not material to the present application, it is not necessary for us to deal with them in this Judgment.

The Judge’s Refusal of Leave Decision

28.  On 21 May 2020, the Applicant issued a summons seeking leave to appeal from the Set Aside Decision on the following grounds:

(1)  (a)  the Judge had wrongly construed s.93; (b)  the decision in Shenzhen Kai Loong adopted by the Judge was wrong; and (c) the Judge failed to take into consideration the time limitation of enforcement in Hong Kong.

(2)  The Judge erred in finding that it was not open to him to re-grant the HCCT Order.

29.  On 23 June 2020, the Judge gave the Refusal of Leave Decision refusing leave to appeal the Set Aside Decision.  The Judge did not find any merits in the proposed grounds of appeal for the reasons set out below. 

30.  On ground (1)  (set out in paragraph 28 above), the Judge found that there was no appeal against the findings of fact by the court that at the time of the Applicant’s ex parte application under s.92 AO, the Mainland enforcement proceedings were ongoing, and the amount recoverable could not be ascertained.  Therefore, there was a clear infringement of the prohibition against double enforcement set out in s.93.

31.  Further, the only ground for asserting that A Cheung J’s decision in Shenzhen Kai Loong was wrong was that it would lead to a “loophole” or cause “mischief” due to the 6-year limitation period for enforcement of an arbitral award in Hong Kong. 

32.  The Judge pointed out that there was no basis for suggesting that the legislature was not aware of the 6-year limitation period when s.40C (Cap. 341)/s.93 (Cap. 609)  was enacted.  In any event, the Judge noted that 6 years is a long period, and the evidence before the court was that the Applicant’s Mainland enforcement proceedings were concluded in less than 5 years (2015-2020).  If the Applicant award holder was time barred, it was attributable to its own failure to take any action to enforce the Award for nearly 19 months (between the date of the Award in August 2013 and the commencement of proceedings on the Mainland in March 2015).  And in any event, it had been open to the Applicant to terminate or withdraw its Mainland enforcement proceedings if it was concerned about the limitation period in Hong Kong.   

33.  Lastly, the Judge held that the wording of s. 93 was clear.  The exception provided under s.93(2)  can only apply if the award “is not fully satisfied” (emphasis added). 

34.  As regards to ground (2), the Applicant had not pointed out how the Judge’s holding that he had no jurisdiction to re-grant the HCCT Order was wrong.  

CACV 263/2020

35.  On 13 July 2020, the Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal for an order to set aside the Refusal of Leave Decision.  It would be noted that the Applicant did not apply for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal.  Presumably this was because the Applicant was aware of the following authorities that only the CFI can give (or refuse)  leave to appeal a decision setting aside leave to enforce an arbitral award. 

36.  In Guangdong Changhong Electric Co Ltd v Inspur Electronics (HK)  Ltd [2015] 2 HKLRD 714 and China International Fund Ltd v Dennis Lau & Ng Chun Man Architects & Engineers (HK)  Ltd [2015] 4 HKLRD 609, the Court of Appeal held that it had no jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal a decision setting aside leave for enforcement of an arbitral award.  Instead, the unsuccessful party would have to resort to the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to set aside the refusal of leave decision (China International Fund and American International Group Inc v Huaxia Life Insurance Co Ltd (2017)  20 HKCFAR 503).

37.  Pausing there, it would be noted that the party challenging such refusal of leave has an “extraordinarily high hurdle to surmount” (Kyla Shipping Co Ltd v Bunge SA [2013] EWCA Civ 734, quoted in Guangdong Changhong, [16]).  In Guangdong Changhong, reference was also made to Mustill LJ’s judgment in Aden Refinery Co Ltd v Ugland Management Co Ltd [1987] QB 650, 666 where his lordship said “I can envisage that if a judge had in truth never reached ‘a decision’ at all on the … refusal of leave, but had reached his conclusion, not by any intellectual process, but through bias, chance, whimsy or personal interest, an appellate … court might find a way to intervene” (emphasis added).  Reference was also made to CGU Insurance Plc v AstraZeneca Insurance Co Ltd (Permission to appeal) [2006] EWCA 1340, where the English Court of Appeal drew a distinction between a challenge to the merits of the decision and the fairness of the procedure.  “What one is looking for is not merely an error of law, but such a substantial defect in the fairness of the process as to invalidate the decision” [79] (emphasis added).  Indeed, in CGU [99], the English Court of Appeal stressed the need for the court to be vigilant in guarding against abuse of the residual jurisdiction, so that it is limited to decisions which are not only wrong but arrived at unfairly, but “in the nature of things it is likely to be an exceptionally rare case where the submission of unfairness is justifiably advanced”.

38.  In China International Fund, this court held:

“45. …As explained above, the residual jurisdiction is different in character and purpose from a right to apply to this Court for leave to appeal. Such difference is important in the context of the structural integrity of our judicial system. It is obvious that this Court must provide a means of redress in the rare case where the decision to refuse leave in the court below cannot be regarded as a judicial decision. The same cannot be said where a judge has refused leave after giving the matter a fair and proper consideration. The rarity of occasions where it would be proper to invoke the residual jurisdiction and the very high threshold that an applicant must meet have repeatedly been emphasised, see Kyla Shipping Co Ltd v Bunge SA [2013] EWCA Civ 734 at [15]; Republic of Kazakhstan v Istil Group Ltd (No 2) at [32] to [33]; Guangdong Changhong Electric Co Ltd v Inspur Electronics (HK)  Ltd at [20]. …” (Emphasis added)

39.  With these legal principles in mind, we turn to consider the Applicant’s Grounds 1 to 4 (the Impugned Grounds)  for challenging the Refusal of Leave Decision in the ASNOA.

40.  The Impugned Grounds are as follows.

(1)  The Judge erred in holding that, if an award holder has applied for the enforcement of a Mainland award, it is debarred from applying for recognition of the award in Hong Kong at the same time (emphasis added).

(2)  On its proper construction, s. 93 AO did not debar an award holder from applying for recognition of the Mainland award by way of a Hong Kong judgment.  Instead, it only debarred the execution of such a Hong Kong judgment while the execution of the award in the Mainland is taking place (emphasis added).

(3)  Shenzhen Kai Loong was wrong in holding that s.40C AO (Cap. 341)  debarred recognition (as opposed to execution)  of a Mainland award in Hong Kong while execution of the same award was taking place in the Mainland.  A Cheung J did not take into account:

3.1.  the fact that debarring recognition of the Mainland award would have the effect of granting the award debtor a defence under the Limitation Ordinance, which was not intended by the legislature, to the detriment of the award holder;

3.2  the legislative intention may be inferred from the “Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the [HKSAR]” (“the Arrgmt”), and the subsequent “Supplemental Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the HKSAR made between the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC and the [HKSAR]” signed on 27 November 2020 (“the Supp Arrgmt”);

3.3  the Court’s [presumably meaning A Cheung J’s] construction of s. 93 AO [presumably meaning s.40C AO (Cap. 341)] offends against the principle of legality in the award holder’s fundamental right to property under Article 6 and 105 of the Basic Law is restricted without express words and not by necessary implication.

(4)  By reason of the above, the Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside the HCCT Order in the Set Aside Decision, and the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to set aside the Set Aside Decision given that it is “outwith the [CFI’s] jurisdiction”.

Discussion

41.  The legal principles concerning the jurisdiction of this Court to strike out a notice of appeal are well established, and have been summarized in Leung Chung Lan Lorraine v Hang Seng Bank Ltd[2019] HKCA 1408 at [34]:

“34. The Court of Appeal has inherent jurisdiction to strike out a notice of appeal where an appeal is plainly not competent (Aviagents Ltd v Balstravest Investments Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 150 at 154B to E, 155D to G; Ng Shek Po & Anr v Director of Lands [1996] 4 HKC 616 at 619D to E), or where the appeal is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court (Burgess v Stafford Hotel Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1215 at 1220A to G, 1221B to D; Fok Siu Wing v Hong Kong Housing Authority [2016] 1 HKLRD 238 at [6], [11] to [13]). In the case of the latter, the inherent jurisdiction would be exercised on precisely the same basis as if Order 18 rule 19 strictly applied to notices of appeal (Burgess v Stafford Hotel Ltd at 1221D)”.

42.  The Applicant has not challenged the legal principles on the Court of Appeal’s residuary jurisdiction discussed in paragraphs 36-38 above.  Rather, it is seeking to circumvent those legal principles by appealing on a “separate and independent basis” with a submission based on drawing a distinction between “recognition” and “execution” of an award, arguing that this case only concerned the “recognition” stage, by which it means only converting the Award into a Hong Kong judgment, leaving “execution” to a later stage, at which point in time s.93 would apply.  The Applicant argues that as a result, the Judge’s application of s.93 AO at the “recognition” stage to set aside the HCCT Order was done without jurisdiction.

43.  We do not accept this submission.  First, this is a new point.  The Applicant had never purported to draw a distinction between “recognition” and “execution” when the matter went before the Judge prior to the Set Aside Decision.  It would appear that such a distinction had not been alluded to in the application to the Judge for leave to appeal as well, but even if it had, in our view, there is no reason why it should be permitted to launch a new argument at that stage. 

44.  Second, the Applicant accepts that “no distinction had been drawn by the legislature between the recognition and execution stages of the enforcement of arbitration awards when enacting s. 93 [AO]” (Applicant’s Skeleton Submissions, para. 12).

45.  Third, it is clear from the terms of the ex parte summons that the Applicant was not just seeking “recognition” -- it was explicitly seeking leave “to enforce the [Award]” (emphasis added)  and the HCCT Order entered judgment in terms of the Award, expressly specifying the sums for payment (the principal of the Loan of RMB 530 million, together with interest, etc)  which the Applicant asserted it could enforce against the Respondents even though it was then undertaking enforcement proceedings on the Mainland, thus falling squarely within the prohibition in s.93 AO.  

46.  The Applicant’s challenge to A Cheung J’s decision in Shenzhen Kai Loong is based also upon the distinction between “recognition” and “execution” which we have rejected above.  As for the limitation period argument, we do not see how it assists the Applicant.  There is no material which indicates that the legislature was not aware of the limitation provision when it enacted s.93 AO. In any event, we do not agree that a limitation period causes a “loophole”. Limitation periods provide finality and serve the purpose of ensuring that litigants (award holders)  do not sit on their hands.  There is a public policy element, and if it results in an award debtor being able to apply s.93 AO, that is not a “windfall” due to a “loophole”, but simply the effect of the legislation.    

47.  We do not see how the argument based on the Arrgmt and the Supp Arrgmt helps the Applicant either. The Applicant does not suggest that the Arrgmt made a distinction between “recognition” and “execution” such as to enable an award holder who has not concluded enforcement proceedings on the Mainland to only apply for “recognition” but not “execution” of the award so to avoid the effect of s.93 AO.  As for the Supp Arrgmt, it was made on 27 November 2020, after which s.93 AO was repealed.  The Legislative Council Brief[9] for the Arbitration (Amendment)  Bill 2021 explains the provision enabling an award holder to apply for preservation measures, and how the previous restriction is lifted, allowing an award holder to make simultaneous applications to the Mainland court and the Hong Kong court for enforcement of an arbitral award.[10]  None of these materials supports the argument that before the repeal of s.93 AO, an award holder would not fall foul of this section if it applies for enforcement in Hong Kong when it has not concluded enforcement proceedings on the Mainland.  

48.  The Applicant did not develop the argument on the Basic Law in its skeleton submission, so we shall say no more on it.

49.  Finally, we would say a few words about the Applicant’s attempt to present the Set Aside Decision as being “outwith” the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.  This is based on there being a distinction between “recognition” and “execution” and the argument that the ex parte summons was only for “recognition”, which argument we have rejected above.

50.  Accordingly, we do not see how Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] 1 WLR 3555 assists the Applicant at all.  In that case, the English Court of Appeal held that a decision made by a judge which he had no jurisdiction to make was not a decision under s.44(7)  Arbitration Act 1996, and therefore the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to determine an appeal therefrom.   

51.  For the reasons set out above, it is clear that the Impugned Grounds are unarguable on what the Applicant called the “separate and independent basis”.  It has not sought to argue that if the residuary jurisdiction principles are applied, that these grounds would satisfy the high threshold required.  As such, the present case falls within the category of “very clear and obvious cases” where this court would and should exercise its power to strike them out. 

Order

52.  There will be an order in terms of para.1 of the Respondents’ Summons filed on 23 September 2022. 

Costs

53.  We also make an order nisi that the Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs.

54.  The Respondents seek costs on an indemnity basis and claimed a sum of HK$709,300.  They relied upon the decision of Chu JA (as she then was)  in Prakash Hiranand Bharwani v Middle East Petroleum Services Ltd (CACV175/2014), 17.11.2014, where indemnity costs were ordered in a case where the applicant’s notice of appeal was struck out as frivolous and an abuse of process [11].  In its skeleton submission, the Applicant made no submissions in opposition to the application for costs on an indemnity basis.  We consider that it is appropriate to order indemnity costs, and would summarily assess them at $650,000.

(Susan Kwan) (Carlye Chu) (Maria Yuen)
Vice President Vice President Justice of Appeal

Mr Foster Yim and Mr Jasper Wong, instructed by Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam, for the applicant

Mr Andrew Liao SC and Ms Jacquelyn Ng, instructed by Wellington Legal, for the 1st and 2nd respondents



[1]  The Set Aside Decision, at [9] and [10].

[2]  The Set Aside Decision, at [28] and [29].

[3]  The Set Aside Decision, at [12].

[4]  The Set Aside Decision, at [14].

[5]  The Set Aside Decision, at [15] and [16].

[6]  The Set Aside Decision, at [22] and [23].

[7]  The Set Aside Decision, at [34].

[8]  The Set Aside Decision, at [35] and [36].

[9]  AB/129 – 137.

[10]  AB/130.