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Civil Action2022

楊嬡 v. 南華金融控股有限公司 AND ANOTHER

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Files (4)

[2024] HKDC 1429-CH-2024-09-11

楊嬡 對 南華金融控股有限公司及另一人

HTML content

DCCJ 3374/2022

[2024] HKDC 1429

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2022年第3374號

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原告人楊嬡 
 及 
第一被告人南華金融控股有限公司 
第二被告人TEM HOLDINGS LIMITED 
 (原創新電子控股有限公司) 

————————

主審法官:區域法院暫委法官鄭欣琪內庭聆訊(書面處理)
原告人的書面陳詞日期:2024年5月8日
第一被告人的書面陳詞日期:2024年5月22日
原告人的書面回應陳詞日期:2024年6月1日
判決書日期:2024年9月11日

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判決書

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1.  原告人於2022年8月31日展開本案件。

2.  第一被告人於2023年5月24日,以傳票及根據第 336H 章《區域法院規則》第 18 號命令 19 條,申請剔除原告人的《申索陳述書》內,針對第一被告人的申索及第一被告人的名字,以及剔除原告人的《回覆第一被告人的抗辯書》。

3.  第一被告人的剔除申請之理由是,原告人的申索陳述書及回覆書(i)並無披露合理的訴訟因由;(ii)屬於惡意中傷、瑣屑無聊或無理纏繞;或(iii)在其他方面而言,是濫用區域法院的法律程序。

4.  2023年10月4日,區域法院聆案官陳碧琪命令剔除原告人之傳訊令狀連同申索陳述書中第一被告人的名字並撤銷當中針對第一被告人的所有申索及訴訟,理由是該申索陳述書未能披露合理的訴訟因由。聆案官同時命令剔除原告人的回覆書。

5.  同日,原告人就聆案官命令呈交上訴通知書。上訴於2023年12月27日進行聆訊。本席聽取雙方陳詞後,於2024年3月18日頒下判決書(下稱「判決書」),駁回原告人的上訴。

6.  2024年3月21日,原告人就判決書的命令提出上訴許可申請。原告人及第一被告人及後就該申請提交了書面陳詞。

法律原則

7.  根據第 336H 章《區域法院規則》第 63A(2) 條,除非法庭信納有關上訴有合理機會得直,或有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,否則不得批予上訴許可。

8.  「有合理機會得直」指該機會必須為合理,勝訴機會非出於空想,但無需達致相當可能得直:參見鄧灼全 aka 鄧灼銓 對 鄧尉池 , 以其個人身份及其鄧巡撫堂司理的身份[2024] HKCA 473 第13段。

原告人的上訴許可申請

9.  本席考慮了原告人的傳票、2024年3月21日存檔的非正式誓詞、以及雙方的書面陳詞,認為原告人的擬上訴沒有合理機會得直。

10.  首先,原告人聲稱她是「南華的客戶」,就這一點本席經已在判決書內作出考慮及分析,認為原告人並沒有提出任何事實基礎,說明她是第一被告人(即南華金融控股有限公司)的客戶,以及第一被告人需向原告人附上什麼法律負責:見判決書第13至17段。

11.  本席留意到原告人在她的書面陳詞中指出,她買股票及暫存股票的公司為「南華證券投資有限公司」,她聲稱南華證券投資有限公司的職員請她將任何聯絡被告人的信函寄至第一被告人的地址,所以她「只能控告可以聯絡的相關方南華金融控股有限公司」。本席認為原告人的邏輯難以理解,即使假設她聲稱的為事實,也無法說明她如何就此對第一被告人(即南華金融控股有限公司)有任何訴訟因由。

12.  有關原告人指南華證券投資有限公司和第一被告人有相同地址的說法,本席已經在判案書第18段指出,這不代表南華證券投資有限公司和第一被告人等如同一間公司,或第一被告人對原告人負有什麼法律責任。

13.  至於原告人指稱第一被告人侵犯了她的權益,判決書第17段已經說明,在原告人沒有提出合理的訴訟基礎之情況下,法庭無法接納第一被告人須就原告人指稱的事項(即使假設為真實)負上法律責任。

14.  基於上述原因,本席認為原告人沒有任何合理理據,說明判決書有錯誤的地方。本席因此判定認為原告人的擬上訴沒有合理機會得直,在此駁回其申請,並命令原告人須向第一被告人支付其上訴許可申請的訟費。如雙方不能同意訟費金額,則交由訟費評定官評定。

  ( 鄭欣琪 )
區域法院暫委法官

原告人:無律師代表,並親自行事

第一被告人:由梁陳彭律師行代表

[2024] HKDC 538-EN-2024-04-03

楊嬡 v. 南華金融控股有限公司 AND ANOTHER

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DCCJ 3374/2022

[2024] HKDC 538

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 3374 OF 2022

——————————

BETWEEN

 楊嬡Plaintiff
 and 
 南華金融控股有限公司1st Defendant
 TEM HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Defendant
 (原創新電子控股有限公司) 

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Before: Deputy District Judge Norman Hui in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 4 January 2024
Date of Decision: 3 April 2024

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DECISION

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1.  The plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal (“the Application”) against the decision of this court dated 20 October 2023 (“the Decision”) took place on 4 January 2024 (“the Hearing”) where the Decision ordered that the plaintiff’s statement of claim dated 31 August 2022 (and reply dated 9 November 2022) against the 2nd defendant be struck out.

2.  The matter first came before Master Patrick Siu where the 2nd defendant successfully struck out the statement of claim (and reply) which then prompted the plaintiff to issue an appeal on 8 May 2023 against the said order. The aforesaid appeal led to a hearing before this court and eventually the Decision.

3.  The plaintiff issued her summons and supporting affirmation against the Decision on 1 November 2023. The plaintiff appeared at the Hearing and Mr Wong Shing Tak appeared for the 2nd defendant.

Legal principles

4.  Section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance provides:-

“(2) Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that… (a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or (b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

5.  It was held in Ma Bik Yung v Ko Chuen [2009] 3 HKC 359 that a reasonable prospect of success is whether the applicant for leave can show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chances of success on appeal. It was thereafter held in KNM v HTF and Ors., HCMP 288/2011, the Court of Appeal via the judgment of Hon Fok JA (as he then was) held at §9 and §23 respectively that:

“§9. The relevant test of whether an appeal has a reasonable prospect of success… therefore means an appeal with prospects that are more than “fanciful” but which do not need to be shown to be “probable”.

§23. By way of preface, however, it is pertinent to note that the proposed grounds of appeal all seek to attack findings of fact made by the Judge after an evaluation of the evidence adduced before him. In the circumstances, unless the applicant can show that the Judge misunderstood the evidence, or failed to appreciate its effect, or overlooked some documentary evidence, or other indisputable evidence, which should have compelled him to a different conclusion, this court will not interfere with those findings of fact.”

6.  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2024 Vol 1 at 59/0/54 states that:

“There are many authorities for the proposition that an appeal will not be entertained from an order which it was within the discretion of the judge to make, unless it can be shown that he exercised his discretion under a mistake of law… or in disregard of principle… or under a misapprehension as to the facts… or that he took into account irrelevant matters… or failed to exercise his discretion… or the conclusion which the judge reached in the exercise of his discretion was “outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.”

7.  As such, it is trite that an appeal must show that the decision was based upon a mistake in the application of law or a mistake in the finding of facts. Where the appeal is based upon a mistake in the finding of facts, it is not enough to show that the judge merely exercised their discretion upon reasonable disagreements of certain arguments or evidence placed before the court but that the finding was totally outside the ambit of any possible reasonable disagreement.

8.  An appeal is not an opportunity for the losing party to repeat the same arguments with the hope that another judge(s) or court may come to a different conclusion.

9.  The background of this case is stated in the Decision and shall not be repeated here.

10.  The Decision struck out the statement of claim against the 2nd defendant since:

(1)  the plaintiff’s case disclosed no reasonable cause of action by virtue of:

(a)  the plaintiff has not pleaded any cause of action against the 2nd defendant;

(b)  complaints against the 2nd defendant were made without pleading what was the specific relationship between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant and thus any related duty imposed on the 2nd defendant to the plaintiff;

(c)  the statement of claim inferred the 1st defendant owed the plaintiff an explanation and required her consent in dealing with the 2nd defendant’s shares (especially at an allegedly extremely low price) but there is no or no clear link between the two defendants and more importantly no or no clear duty imposed on the 2nd defendant in this action;

(d)  the statement of claim pleaded that the plaintiff was holding 70,000 shares of the 2nd defendant at the time when the 2nd defendant’s shares were sold on an unspecified date in August 2020 but there is no factual basis for how this equated to a “claimed” amount owed to the plaintiff in the sum of $571,200 from the 2nd defendant.

(2)  the plaintiff’s case was frivolous by virtue of:

(a)  the 2nd defendant’s privatization and cancellation of its listing status was in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations of the Securities and Futures Commission with activities being publicly announced;

(b)  the process was known by the plaintiff but she admittedly was busy and unable to attend the relevant EGM dealing with, inter alia, her shares in the 2nd defendant;

(c)  even if the plaintiff attended the relevant EGM, her presence and vote would not have changed the outcome.

11.  China Gold Finance Ltd v CIL Holdings Ltd, CACV 11/2015, 27/11/2015, unreported, the Court of Appeal stressed that the appellate process is not designed to give unsatisfied litigants an additional opportunity for repeating previous submissions on the evidence and factual aspects of the case hoping appellate judges may come to a different view. Such conduct was seen as unhelpful and a misuse of the appellate process.

12.  The plaintiff submitted her supporting affirmation in relation to the Application which stated various matters previously entertained in relation to the Decision. In any event, the plaintiff made further submissions to allegedly expand on her supporting affirmation in relation to the Application at the Hearing but nothing new or of substance arose since the plaintiff repeated her previous submissions already considered in the Decision. Regretfully the plaintiff used the opportunity at the Hearing to simply repeat her previous submissions at length with consistently vocal vigour.

13.  The plaintiff submitted points at the Hearing which were also made pursuant to the Decision with what I can only characterize as being, at most, thematic variations only but without substantive differences. As such, at the Hearing, the plaintiff submitted that, inter alia:

(a)  The plaintiff never gave authorization to either the 1st or 2nd defendant to deal with her shares in the 2nd defendant;

(b)  The plaintiff was neither consulted nor gave authorization to delist the 2nd defendant although she was a shareholder of the 2nd defendant and later the plaintiff did admit at the Hearing she did receive information about the delisting through the mail;

(c)  Listed companies must send circulars to shareholders such as the plaintiff herself although she later admitted at the Hearing she was aware of public announcements relating to the 2nd defendant;

(d)  The 2nd defendant made an announcement in accordance with the guidelines of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange but the plaintiff was not aware of the relevant information pertaining to the 2nd defendant before it was delisted (退市) but later admitted at the Hearing the 1st defendant informed her of the same;

(e)  It is not known why the 2nd defendant allowed its stock price to fall to the level that it did;

(f)  The 2nd defendant needed to inform the plaintiff of the delisting but she later admitted at the Hearing she was so informed and was also informed of the EGM but she was unavailable to attend;

(g)  Shareholders such as the plaintiff must be treated fairly;

(h)  The result is that the 2nd defendant’s stock price was valued extremely low, a forced result that was unfair against the plaintiff (and other shareholders of the 2nd defendant).

14.  The finding of facts and ruling by this court in the Decision were explained in detail but the plaintiff failed to identify any error, let alone put forward any grounds to show that the finding(s) was plainly wrong and unreasonable given all the evidence before the court.

15.  In conclusion, this court is not satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success. Further, the plaintiff has not shown that there was some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

16.  The Application is dismissed.

Costs

17.  This court queried Mr Wong about why the 2nd defendant failed to file a skeleton submission in compliance with Practice Direction 5.4 given the Hearing was set down for 30 minutes before this court. Mr Wong with surprisingly cavalier frankness replied that he chose not to file any skeleton submission since the 2nd defendant told him that this case was trivial and meaningless and therefore the 2nd defendant did not want to waste resources and legal costs. Mr Wong then submitted that, in any event, he was prepared to deal with the Hearing via his verbal submissions only and that would be sufficient.

18.  The purpose of Practice Directions is to ensure that, inter alia, the efficient, expeditious and economical dispatch of the court’s business as held by DDJ David Chan in The One Credit Limited v Yeung Yuen Fu (unreported, [2020] HKDC 10, 6 January 2020) citing Kwan Kwok Leung v Wong Hei Yu Winny (unreported, DCCJ 5406/2007, 28 November 2008) from HH Judge M Ng (as she then was).

19.  More specifically, as was held in Falcon Private Bank Ltd v Borry Bernard Edouard Charles Ltd & Anor, (unreported, HCA 1934/2011, 9 July 2012) where To J held at §§28-29 that (and this particular part of the decision was never appealed) the purpose of Practice Direction 5.4 is to, inter alia, ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings in court, is not meant to be a strait jacket, and only prescribe the minimum time for filing and serving skeleton submissions before the hearing of ordinary or usual contested interlocutory summonses listed before a judge and appeals to a judge in chambers and contested interlocutory summonses listed before a master for more than 30 minutes. Practice Direction 5.4 in fact still gives a judge or master in an appropriate case to give such directions which allow for a longer time scale since to do so does not offend Practice Direction 5.4 which prescribes only minimum time requirements. As such, there is no room for legal practitioners formally instructed to appear before the court to simply choose not to comply with Practice Direction 5.4 without reasonable explanation(s) provided to the court.

20.  Whether this court found Mr Wong’s submissions sufficient is beside the point since compliance with Practice Direction 5.4 allows the court to be, inter alia, better and earlier apprised of the key points to be argued at a hearing thus ensuring the orderly conduct of proceedings in court. It bears repeating of consequences of non-compliance under Practice Direction 5.4 is that:

“30. Those not observing or complying with these directions may be called upon to explain such failure and, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, may be penalized in costs irrespective of whether or not they are the parties who succeed on the application. Parties are warned that to ensure observance of and compliance with these directions, a party who has breached any of such directions may, despite his success in the application or appeal, still be deprived of all or part of his costs of the application or appeal as a penalty. Further, such costs penalty may be imposed irrespective of whether or not the breach has resulted in any adjournment of the hearing or any other forms of wastage of time or costs.”

21.  I order that the plaintiff pay costs of and occasioned by the Application to the 2nd defendant to be summarily assessed by paper disposal (unless otherwise directed) and that this court will be taking into account §§18-20 hereinabove. The 2nd defendant do within 7 days from the date hereof lodge and serve its statement of costs.

22.  Should the plaintiff require translation of this decision into Punti, she may contact my clerk to arrange for an appointment for a court interpreter to verbally translate this decision to her at the District Court Building at a mutually convenient time. Furthermore, the 2nd defendant must serve on the plaintiff a Chinese translation of the sealed copy of the order together with the sealed copy of the order made herein.

  ( Norman Hui )
Deputy District Judge

The plaintiff appeared in person

Mr Wong Shing Tak of Chung & Kwan, for the 2nd defendant

[2024] HKDC 276-CH-2024-03-18

楊嬡 對 南華金融控股有限公司及另一人

HTML content

DCCJ 3374/2022

[2024] HKDC 276

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2022年第3374號

————————

原告人楊嬡
及
第一被告人南華金融控股有限公司
第二被告人TEM HOLDINGS LIMITED
(原創新電子控股有限公司)

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主審法官:區域法院暫委法官鄭欣琪內庭聆訊(公開)
聆訊日期:2023年12月27日
判決書日期:2024年3月18日

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判決書

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1.  原告人於2022年8月31日展開本案件。

2.  第一被告人(下稱「南華金融」)在各方存檔狀書後,於2023年5月24日,以傳票及根據第336H章《區域法院規則》第18號命令19條,申請(下稱「剔除申請」)剔除原告人的《申索陳述書》內,針對南華金融的申索及南華金融的名字,以及剔除原告人的《回覆第一被告人的抗辯書》(下稱「回覆書」)。

3.  南華金融的剔除申請之理由是,原告人的申索陳述書及回覆書(i)並無披露合理的訴訟因由;(ii)屬於惡意中傷、瑣屑無聊或無理纏繞;或(iii)在其他方面而言,是濫用區域法院的法律程序。

4.  2023年10月4日,區域法院聆案官陳碧琪命令剔除原告人之傳訊令狀連同申索陳述書中南華金融的名字並撤銷當中針對南華金融的所有申索及訴訟,理由是該申索陳述書未能披露合理的訴訟因由。聆案官同時命令剔除原告人的回覆書。

5.  同日,原告人就聆案官命令呈交上訴通知書。上訴於2023年12月27日進行聆訊。

案情摘要

6.  申索陳述書的內容十分簡短。原告人提出其申索金額為港幣571,200元,並指「南華金融控股有限公司竟可事前不經我了解和同意創新電子控股有限公司自2020年8月至退市前關於退市和退市價的多份公告和通函包括相關建議諮詢等,任由創新電子控股有限公司竟以其股票8346股價低迷時的極低價0.0855元(港幣)強行收購我7萬股股票」。

7.  南華金融在其抗辯書否認申索陳述書之所有內容及申索款項,並指南華「在所有關鍵時候與原告人並無任何法律及/或事實的契約、合同及/或其他任何類似關係(無論明示或暗示、書面或口頭)」。

8.  原告人在其回覆書中,聲稱她是「南華證券的客戶」,並指:「南華證券完全有責任轉交創新電子寄發給股東包括我關於退市和擬收購價的建議通函;作為股東,我完全有權利通過南華證券表達我對創新電子退市和以收購價的意向建議和發出投票指示等包括投票反對上市公司董事會提出的建議和計劃;但是,南華證券僅在2020年12月9日前告知我創新電子在2020年12月16日有股東大會,我問南華證券會議內容,南華證券只回覆我重要,我因事並未出席,我在其後看到南華證券的月結單才得知創新電子以極低價擅自或強行收購我的股票。另外,港交所也曾就此回覆我(檔案編號:CS202111001):上市公司進行某些活動時,須向股東寄發通函,閣下經紀行或銀行應收到創新電子的公司行動訊息。閣下的經紀行或銀行應按照與閣下的協定和方式轉交予閣下。作為股東,閣下可向閣下的經紀行或銀行發出投票指示,包括投票反對上市公司董事會提出的建議和計劃」。

原告人擬額外呈交的文件

9.  除了原告人分別為期2023年12月11日及26日的書面陳詞外,原告人欲在聆訊向法庭呈交一份「南華證券投資有限公司」發給原告人日期為2016年8月31日的月結單。第一被告人大律師反對原告人呈交該文件。

10.  法庭考慮到文件只有一頁,而且第一被告人大律師有機會就文件內容向法庭作口頭陳詞,法庭容許原告人呈交該文件。法庭將於下文處理原告人依賴文件所提出的說法。

法律原則

11.  高等法院歐陽桂如法官在吳艷嫦及另一人訴李雪芬主任及另一人(HCA 1164/2011,2011年12月23日)一案的判決書第21至27段,就剔除狀書的法律原則有以下的扼要說明:

「剔除申請

有關剔除狀書的法律原則

20. 《高等法院規則》第18號命令第19(1) 條規則規定如下:

「法庭可在法律程序的任何階段基於以下理由,命令剔除或修訂有關訴訟的任何狀書或任何令狀的註明,或任何狀書或該註明上的任何東西 –

(a) 該狀書、註明或東西並無披露合理的訴訟因由;或

(b) 該狀書、註明或東西屬於惡意中傷、瑣屑無聊或無理纏擾;或

(c) …

(d) 在其他方面而言該狀書、註明或東西是濫用法庭的法律程序;

並可命令擱置或撤銷有關訴訟或命令據此登錄判決(視屬何情況而定)。」

21. 此外,法庭亦同時享有固有司法管轄權,在類似的情況下命令剔除或修訂有關訴訟的任何狀書或任何令狀的註明。法庭可以分開或同時行使其固有的司法管轄權力及第18號命令第19(1) 條規則所賦予的權力。

22. 一個「合理的訴訟因由」是一個有可能成功的訴訟因由。就算與訟一方的案情薄弱,成功機會不大,他的訴訟因由亦算作一個合理的訴訟因由,申請人亦不能倚賴此理據剔除狀書:見《香港民事訴訟程序》2011年第1冊第18/19/6段。

23. 另一方面,要構成一個合理的訴訟因由,原告人不能只單純指出訴訟因由的名稱或類別,他必須列出所有重要的事實,目的是使另一與訟者能夠透過這些重要事實瞭解原告人的整個案情,從而準備對策。如果一個狀書未能達到以上的要求,則此狀書將被視為不完全,以及未能透露任何合理的訴訟因由。

24. 「瑣屑無聊」是說這訴訟不可以用道理去辯論的,沒有基礎或勝訴機會的,這包括濫用法院程序的訴訟。「無理纏擾」則是說這訴訟構成欺壓。

25. 「濫用法院程序」意味著法院的程序一定要以真心誠意和恰當地行使,而不可濫用。

26. 一般而言,如一項爭議已由有司法管轄權資格的法院裁定,法院就涉及的當事人的權利和義務的判決是最終及不可推翻的。這是「既判案件原則」,違反這原則可被視為濫用法院程序。

27. 一般而言,法庭在行使剔除狀書的權力時,如狀書的不完整(例如未包含重要的詳情)是能夠補救的話,法庭並不會即時剔除狀書的有關部份,而會准許原告人修改狀書。但若狀書的缺陷是無可救藥及原告人的索償必然失敗,而任何修改都是無補於事的話,法庭會行使剔除整份狀書以及撤銷該項訴訟的權力。」

12.  法庭在處理本案時,充分考慮了原告人提出的申訴及上述的法律原則,尤其考慮了法庭只會在狀書有無可救藥的缺陷及原告人的索償必然失敗的情況下,才行使剔除狀書的酌情權。

就本案的決定和理由

13.  法庭認為,原告人的申索陳述書或回覆書,均沒有無披露任何合理的訴訟因由。原告人聲稱她是「南華證券的客戶」,但卻沒有提出事實基礎,說明她和第一被告人(即南華金融控股有限公司)在法律上有什麼關係,以及第一被告人如何在該法律關係下需向原告人負責。

14.  比如說,如果原告人指稱和第一被告人有合約關係,則須起碼提出一些基本事實,例如合約關係是在何時建立、以何種方式建立、相關條款是什麼、條款在什麼情況下被違反、違反條款如何導致損失等。如果原告人指稱第一被告人違反侵權法,則須起碼提出第一被告人如何對原告人負有侵權法下的責任、在什麼情況下違反該責任、違反責任如何導致損失等。

15.  法庭認同第一被告人所指,於狀書中說明訴訟因由及列出重要的事實基礎之要求,不會因為訴訟人無律師代表而降低:參見 Chan Kong v Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (Hong Kong) Ltd [2009] 2 HKLRD 455第17段。

16.  在本案,第一被告人已於抗辯書、支持剔除申請的誓章、及2023年5月8日的信函中,說明其立場是原告人的申索沒有法律基礎。然而原告人依然沒有提出合理相關的訴訟因由,比如原告人在就本上訴呈交的誓詞中,指「我曾有買股票提供在南華交易證明等,另我在南華買股票按常理有協議這些合約有法律效力可證明南華對我的責任,這是常理」。但原告人始終沒有提出事實基礎,說明所謂的「南華」是第一被告人、而所謂的協議是在什麼時候和情況及以什麼形式建立。

17.  原告人的主要投訴,似乎是指「南華證券」沒有履行責任轉交或向她了解是否收到及同意「創新電子」寄發給她作為股東關於退市和擬收購價的建議通函;只回覆她「創新電子」於2020年12月6日的股東大會為重要,而沒有回覆她關於會議內容;以及「創新電子」以所謂的極低價擅自或強行收購她的股票。然而在原告人沒有提出合理的訴訟基礎之情況下,法庭無從理解第一被告人如何須就上述的事項(即使假設為真實)負上法律責任。

18.  如上文所述,原告人向法庭呈交了一份南華證券投資有限公司發給她的月結單。原告人指月結單顯示南華證券投資有限公司的地址和第一被告人(即南華金融控股有限公司)的地址一樣,所以是同一間公司。原告人更聲稱,在她開展本案之前,她曾致電南華證券投資有限公司,獲職員告知她可以發函至第一被告人的地址。即使假設原告人所講屬實,法庭認為她亦不能就此說明南華證券投資有限公司和第一被告人等如同一間公司,或第一被告人對原告人負有什麼法律責任。

19.  另外,原告人多番引用的港交所回覆,即使假設其內容準確,亦無助她向法庭說明她對第一被告人的訴訟因由是什麼。

20.  基於以上理由,法庭認為原告人的狀書並無披露合理的訴訟因由。同時,原告人在沒有合理基礎下展開及繼續本訴訟,屬瑣屑無聊及無理纏繞,亦構成濫用法院程序。

21.  法庭因此駁回原告人的上訴,維持聆案官日期為2023年10月4日的命令(包括訟費命令),並命令原告人須向第一被告人支付其上訴(包括就2023年12月27日的聆訊)的訟費,包括大律師證書。如雙方不能同意訟費金額,則交由訟費評定官評定。

 

( 鄭欣琪 )

 區域法院暫委法官
原告人:無律師代表,並親自應訊
第一被告人:由梁陳彭律師行延聘傅楚之大律師代表

 

 

[2023] HKDC 1435-EN-2023-10-20

楊嬡 v. 南華金融控股有限公司 AND ANOTHER

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DCCJ 3374/2022

[2023] HKDC 1435

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 3374 OF 2022

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BETWEEN

 楊嬡Plaintiff
 and 
 南華金融控股有限公司1st Defendant
 TEM HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Defendant
 (原創新電子控股有限公司) 

------------------------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge Norman Hui in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 31 July 2023
Date of Decision: 20 October 2023

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DECISION

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1.  The plaintiff issued an appeal on 8 May 2023 against the order of Master Patrick Siu dated 24 April 2023 where the statement of claim dated 31 August 2022 (and reply dated 9 November 2022) against the 2nd defendant was struck out upon the 2nd defendant’s application to strike out the same issued on 1 December 2022 pursuant to the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H, Order 18, rule 19(1)(a), (b), (d).

Preparatory matters leading up to the appeal against the striking out of the statement of claim against the 2nd defendant

2.  For the avoidance of doubt, on 25 July 2023, it was the 2nd defendant that filed and served the hearing bundle, dramatis personae and chronology which were used at the appeal despite the fact that it should have been the plaintiff doing so. In any event, the aforesaid documents were not disputed or challenged by the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff did not file any written submissions in support of this appeal, nonetheless counsel for the 2nd defendant, Miss Toni Chan (陳玄同大律師), did file and serve written submissions on 25 July 2023 on behalf of the 2nd defendant.

The statement of claim and the plaintiff’s notice of appeal

3.  The statement of claim reads as follows:-

“原告人就下述各項提出申索金額為港幣571,200元

南華金融控股有限公司竟可事前不經我了解和同意創新電子控股有限公司自2020年8月至退市前關於退市和退市價的多份公告和通函包括相關建議、諮詢等,任由創新電子控股有限公司竟以其股票8346股價低迷時的極低價0.0855元(港幣)強行收購我7萬股股票。” (emphasis added)

4.  The plaintiff’s appeal against the striking out of the statement of claim against the 2nd defendant was made pursuant to the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H, Order 58 whereby the relevant particulars of the plaintiff’s notice of appeal were as follows:—

“1. 取消上述命令,即原告繼續申索Tem和Tem自付訟費包括對我的訟費;2. Tem 賠償因其嚴重失責而須還我的應有利益和其衍生費用。

原因:

(1) 熟悉上市公司規則且比較公平公正的港交所曾於2021年12月31日回覆我指出上市公司進行某些行動時,須向股東 (即持其股票者)寄發信函,閣下有權投票反對上市公司董事會提出的建議和計劃;這應是法庭正確判案的指引,依據和關鍵:

2. 請Tem提供以下真實的書面紀錄證明:

(1) 須寄給我(持有其股票的股東)關於其退市和退市價的建議和計劃等的諮詢文件,以及獲得我了解和同意的書面紀錄證明;

(2) 投票決定其退市和退市價的股東姓名、股數、曾購股票的價格和投票情況的書面紀錄證明;未能出席上述投票的股東姓名、股數、曾購股票的價格和未能出席的原因的書面紀錄證明;

3. 我於2023年1月30日致區域法院的誓詞中提到:Tem如何真實準確地確保核實持有其股票的股東清楚其收購股東股票的價格並退市的極重要公司行動包括建議等得到我的了解和同意,有何書面證明? 同時,我也提供了我曾購買Tem股票成為其股票的證明,所以,法庭在未清楚了解事實和真相前在2023年4月24日宣判剔除我對Tem的申索是錯判。”

5.  The notice of appeal does not provide any clear ground(s) why the statement of claim should not have been struck out against the 2nd defendant per se but rather it is more a combination of observations and demands made against the 2nd defendant. Nonetheless, matters relating to the notice of appeal shall be dealt with later in this decision.

Appeal from master and striking out

6.  This appeal is made pursuant to the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H, Order 58 where it is trite that an appeal from a master to a judge in chambers is dealt with by an actual rehearing of the application which led to the order under appeal and the judge treats the matter as though it came before him for the first time. The judge will give the weight it deserves to the previous decision of the master but is in no way bound by it.

7.  The 2nd defendant cited Yifung Properties Ltd & Ors v Manchester Securities Corp & Ors, HCA 1341 & 1359/2014, 19 October 2015, where Au-Yeung J held that each limb under Order 18, rule 19(1) forms a separate ground for striking out as is evidenced by the disjunctive “or”. As such, even if a cause of action might appear to be reasonable on the face of the pleading, the court is still at liberty to consider evidence and decide if the pleading should be struck out under another limb.

8.  It will be noted that in Leung Kwai Ling v HK Glory Properties Ltd, HCA 347 & 432/2013, 28 November 2013 at §51 where DHCJ Marlene Ng (as she then was) also found that a party may apply for striking out on the basis of not just a singular part of Order 18, rule 19(1) such as Order 18, rule 19(1)(a), but also on the grounds under Order 18, rule 19(1)(b) to (d) as well in an alternative or cumulative manner.

9.  At this appeal of the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant maintained its position to strike out the statement of claim pursuant to the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H, Order 18, rule 19(1)(a) as its primary ground and Order 18, rule 19(1)(b) and (d) in the alternative.

10.  Order 18, rule 19 reads as follows:-

(1)  The court may, either of its own motion or on application, at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the indorsement of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that—

(a)  it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; or

(b)  it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

(c)  it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

(d)  it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court,

and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

11.  As cited by the 2nd defendant as a trite and principal proposition, as pursuant to Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, Vol 1, §18/19/4, it is only in plain and obvious cases that the court should exercise its summary powers to strike out the indorsement on any writ or any pleading under O 18 r 19. Disputed facts were to be taken in favour of the party sought to be struck out. The applicant bears the burden to show a plain and obvious case in order to strike out the plaintiff’s claim but plain is not the same as simple and obvious since if a statement of claim however complicated, if it can be seen that there is no cause of action, a court can, and probably will, order it to be struck out.

12.  Furthermore, pursuant to Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, Vol 1, §18/19/7, a proceeding is frivolous when it is not capable of reasoned argument, without foundation or where it cannot possibly succeed. The 2nd defendant also relies on the commentary from Yifung (ibid.) where it was held that where a litigant brings a claim knowing that there is no substance in it or that it is bound to fail, or if the claim is on its face so manifestly misconceived that it can have no prospect of success, it may be deemed frivolous and an abuse of process.

No reasonable cause of action

13.  The 2nd defendant proceeded under Order 18, rule 19(1)(a) as its primary position for striking out the statement of claim since it discloses no reasonable cause of action. After fully considering the statement of claim and understanding that the 2nd defendant bears the burden that only in plain and obvious cases that the court should exercise its summary powers to strike out the statement of claim, I do strike out the statement of claim against the 2nd defendant. From a comprehensive reading of the statement of claim, I find that there has not been any reasonable cause of action pleaded against the 2nd defendant.

14.  Firstly, the plaintiff has not pleaded any cause of action against the 2nd defendant which is necessary since the material facts and thereafter the corresponding relief are dependent on the same.

15.  Secondly, the statement of claim pleads that the plaintiff did not understand what was being done to her shares in the 2nd defendant nor did the plaintiff consent to how her shares in the 2nd defendant were being dealt with. Such complaints against the 2nd defendant were made without pleading what was the specific relationship between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant and more importantly how, why or what any duty and/or responsibility was to be imposed on the 2nd defendant to the plaintiff that would allow for such complaints to be made. Notably, there is reference in the statement of claim to the 1st defendant having some role in the statement of claim whereby the said company had generally owed the plaintiff an explanation and her consent regarding the 2nd defendant’s shares but there is no or no clear link between the two defendants and more importantly no or no clear duty imposed on the 2nd defendant in this action.

16.  Thirdly, the statement of claim pleads that the shares in the 2nd defendant were forcibly sold during a downturn at an extremely low price. Such complaints against the 2nd defendant were made without pleading under what conditions the said shares were forcibly sold, what was deemed to be a downturn, when exactly was the purported downturn or why there was a downturn. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not plead nor had any basis to plead that the price in the shares in the 2nd defendant was extremely low without stating what was expected as a fair price or in fact pleading why it was an extremely low price, in particular when there has not been pleaded any facts or factual basis for pricing of the 2nd defendant’s shares at all.

17.  Fourthly, the statement of claim pleads that the plaintiff “claims” $571,200 against the 2nd defendant. Although the statement of claim does indicate the plaintiff was holding 70,000 shares of the 2nd defendant at the time when the 2nd defendant’s shares were sold on an unspecified date in August 2020, there is no factual basis whatsoever for how this would equate to there being a “claimed” amount owed to the plaintiff in the sum of $571,200 from the 2nd defendant.

Frivolous proceedings

18.  I have already found that the statement of claim is to be struck out against the 2nd defendant for there being no reasonable cause of action disclosed but for the sake of completeness, I have also considered the 2nd defendant’s alternative basis under Order 18, rule 19(1)(b) that the plaintiff’s statement of claim is frivolous. For reasons to be explained hereinbelow, I again find that the statement of claim should be struck out.

19.  The 2nd defendant has provided unchallenged evidence relating to the process of how the 2nd defendant’s shares were dealt with as explained hereinbelow.

20.  The 2nd defendant’s entire process of privatization and the cancellation of its listing status was conducted according to the relevant rules and regulations which took place in stages with the relevant announcements issued to the public. As such, the 2nd defendant issued via the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to the general public the said relevant announcements from 22 September 2020 to 11 January 2021 which were checked and confirmed by the Securities and Futures Commission as being proper.

21.  It will be noted that the 2nd defendant on 22 September 2020 also issued its offeror recommendation announcement regarding privatization and every cancelled share of the 2nd defendant was to be at a value of $0.0855. In relation to such matters, various other relevant information was released, namely, details of the relevant legal procedures undertaken in the Cayman Islands, obtaining of the shareholders’ EGM resolution and its approval, timetable of the privatization proposal and the cancellation of the 2nd defendant’s listing status, effective date of the privatization proposal and the cancellation of the 2nd defendant’s listing status. Again, all of the foregoing matters were made available to the general public.

22.  In fact, in the plaintiff’s affirmation dated 30 January 2023 she stated that after she received a letter about the 2nd defendant’s shareholders meeting in November 2020, the plaintiff thereafter contacted “南華” which is presumably the 1st defendant , about what was going to happen at the said meeting but that “南華” only replied that it was important. In this said affirmation of the plaintiff dated 30 January 2023 and verbally in court upon being asked again, the plaintiff replied that she knew of when and where the 2nd defendant’s shareholders meeting would take place but that she was busy and was therefore unable to attend.

23.  The 2nd defendant carried out its EGM with a sufficient amount of its shareholders present sufficient for and it was agreed by its shareholders the process and results from privatization and cancellation of its listing status. It will be noted that even if the plaintiff had voted against the various resolutions at the EGM, the plaintiff holding 70,000 shares in the 2nd defendant (accounting for only approximately 1.33% of the shares) would not have changed the outcome of the EGM.

24.  The plaintiff was at all times aware of the details relating to the EGM, such details were also made to the general public and publicly accessible, but chose not to attend the same. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff had attended the EGM and voted in a way consistent to her choice, her presence and vote would not have changed the outcome in any event. Given the foregoing, the statement of claim does not have any substance, is bound to fail, has no prospect of success and is hereby struck out against the 2nd defendant as being frivolous.

Abuse of the process of the court

25.  This ground for striking out the statement of claim under Order 18, rule 19(1)(d) was not substantially pursued by the 2nd defendant whereby the court may find that it is an abuse of process to start a case without solid foundation, hoping that something will turn up in the course of the proceedings, a situation similar to the present case. However, I need not make any distinct finding on the same given my foregoing reasons for striking out have already satisfied Order 18, rule 19(1)(a) and (b).

The plaintiff’s notice of appeal and the reply

26.  Again for the sake of completeness, although I have struck out the statement of claim against the 2nd defendant, I shall also briefly deal with the plaintiff’s notice of appeal and reply.

27.  The plaintiff’s notice of appeal sought relief against the 2nd defendant by claiming that, inter alia, the order of Master Patrick Siu be set aside and that the plaintiff be entitled to continue its claim against the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff’s notice of appeal further states that due to the 2nd defendant’s serious negligence, the plaintiff was entitled to monetary relief (as claimed in the statement of claim). In summary, the plaintiff has stated that the reasons for such relief to be granted in the notice of appeal was because she had the right to vote (at the EGM) and that the relevant and authentic written records relating to the details of the EGM should be provided to her (implicitly meaning that the written records were not provided to her). The plaintiff’s verbal submissions at the appeal were essentially the same as in the notice of appeal.

28.  Given my foregoing findings relating to the striking out of the statement of claim against the 2nd defendant, the plaintiff’s notice of appeal simply does not have any validity. The 2nd defendant was not negligent nor was the plaintiff denied any access to the EGM or the relevant documents as claimed. The plaintiff was aware of the relevant details of the EGM and the relevant documentation was available and accessible to the plaintiff and general public.

29.  The reply pleads that before the 2nd defendant acquired the plaintiff’s 70,000 shares at $0.0855 per share, the plaintiff was dissatisfied with “南華證券” which is presumably the 1st defendant, since there was no confirmation that ensured that the plaintiff had understood what was going to happen to her shares nor did the plaintiff grant her consent on how her shares were to be dealt with.

30.  The statement of claim has already been struck out against the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff’s claim is at an end, but nonetheless for the sake of completeness I strike out the reply. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the plaintiff was not denied any access to the EGM or the relevant documents as claimed. It again bears repeating that the plaintiff was aware of the relevant details of the EGM and the relevant documentation was available and accessible to the plaintiff and general public.

Conclusion

31.  Having considered the submissions of the parties and all the relevant documents before me, I dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal and the statement of claim (and reply) is hereby struck out against the 2nd defendant.

Costs

32.  I make a costs order nisi that the plaintiff do pay costs of and incidental to this appeal to the 2nd defendant forthwith, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

33.  The foregoing order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary by summons within 14 days from the date hereof.

34.  Should the plaintiff require translation of this decision into Punti, she may contact my clerk to arrange for an appointment for a court interpreter to verbally translate this decision to her at the District Court Building at a mutually convenient time. Furthermore, the 2nd defendant must serve on the plaintiff a Chinese translation of the sealed copy of the order together with the sealed copy of the order made herein.

  ( Norman Hui )
Deputy District Judge

The plaintiff appeared in person

Miss Toni Chan, instructed by Chung & Kwan, for the 2nd defendant