HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2020

李早珠 AND ANOTHER v. 施純禧

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV151/2023莊裕安 v. 特首李家超 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV153/2017東莞市枝記市場投資管理有限公司 AND ANOTHER v. YIP KWOK CHI
  • CACV158/2018郭卓堅 v. 立法會主席梁君彥AND ANOTHER
  • CACV216/2019莊裕安 v. 終審法院司法常務官 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV263/2020深圳市深超科技投資有限公司 v. 世紀晶源科技有限公司 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV88/2013TOPWELL CORPORATION LTD v. 關錦泉 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV96/2021CENTRE CHASE INVESTMENT LTD v. THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF CASTLE PEAK ROAD INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BUILDING AND ANOTHER
  • CAMP217/2024曹雯娟小姐 v. 馬惠屏小姐 AND ANOTHER
  • CAMP73/2019MAN LIN HEUNG THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MAN KWAI YIN ALSO KNOWN AS MAN KWAI YIN v. 梁根林AND ANOTHER
  • CAMP74/2019MAN TIN FOOK ALSO KNOWN AS MAN TIM FOOK, DECEASED, AS REPRESENTED BY MAN MAY YUNG UNDER O.15 R.15 RDC v. 梁根林AND ANOTHER
  • DCCJ2373/2002大通行文儀有限公司 AND ANOTHER v. CHERIE-MINT IMPEX LTD AND ANOTHER
  • DCCJ3374/2022楊嬡 v. 南華金融控股有限公司 AND ANOTHER
  • DCCJ5245/2025莊如芬 v. 黃志輝 AND ANOTHER
  • DCEC1145/2013NG NING FU v. 王聯權 AND ANOTHER
  • DCEC133/2001Yan Hon Kan v. 文洪模板工程 AND ANOTHER
  • DCEC1809/2018CHEUNG TAK HING v. 文佑德經營泉興裝飾公司 AND ANOTHER
  • DCEC2332/2015MOHAMMAD ZARBAS formerly known as MOHAMMED ZARBAS v. 廖超能 AND ANOTHER
  • DCEC2917/2017LEUNG SIU KAM v. 梁國強 AND ANOTHER
  • DCEC2997/2019YU XI v. 馮華強 AND ANOTHER
  • DCEC46/2006CHAN YIU MAN v. 冼錦堂 AND ANOTHER

Files (2)

[2022] HKDC 1451-EN-2022-12-15

李早珠 AND ANOTHER v. 施純禧

HTML content

DCCJ 206/2020

[2022] HKDC 1451

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 206 OF 2020

________________

BETWEEN

 李早珠1st Plaintiff
 李家榮2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 施純禧Defendant

________________

Coram:  His Honour Judge Harold Leong in Chambers (by paper disposal)

Date of Decision:  15 December 2022

___________________

DECISION

___________________

1.  This is an application for leave for Appeal by the defendant against the decision of this court dated 13 July 2021 (“the Decision”).

Background

2.  This is a case concerning noise disturbance and nuisance between neighbours and the plaintiffs seek various injunctions against the defendant. The details of the background have already been set out in the Decision and needed not be repeated here.

3.  In summary, in the Decision, the court found that there was regular service but the defendant failed to acknowledge service within the prescribed time (Order 13 Rule 6 of the Rules of the District Court, Cap. 336H) and after considering the discretion under Order 13 Rule 9, found that the defendant does not have “a real prospect of success” and therefore entered judgment and granted various injunctions sought.

4.  The defendant applied for leave to appeal on 27 July 2021 but did not set out any grounds for appeal. In view of the COVID situation, the court gave directions for parties to submit written submissions and for the matter to be dealt with by way of paper disposal.

The applicable law

5.  The applicable law is section 63A of District Court Ordinance Cap. 336 under which it is stated:

“(2) Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that—

(a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

The grounds for appeal

6.  According to the Skeleton Submissions of the Defendant for Leave to Appeal (“the defendant’s submissions”) prepared by his counsel, Mr. Lai Ming (“Mr. Lai”), the grounds of appeal appeared to be that the court has erred in mixed law and facts (paragraph 11 of the defendant’s submission).

7.  However, Mr. Lai does not dispute on the application of law Order 19 rule 9 nor the test applicable to set aside a regular judgment (paragraph 13 of the defendant’s submissions). The grounds for appeal was really against the finding of facts of the court: that is, despite of the evidence produced in the Defendant’s Affirmation filed on 29 April 2021, the court has erred in finding that there was no real chance of success.

8.  In short, the main ground of appeal was against the court’s comment that “the defendant only made a general denial without substance (“空泛的否定”) against the allegations of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs on noise” when the defendant has submitted various documents from HKHA, the Police etc. documenting that there were many complaints made by the plaintiffs but the various investigations done did not detect any noise. Therefore, these indicated that “the defendant could not possibly produce any noise or the complained nuisance” (paragraph 14 of the defendant’s submission).

9.  Mr. Lai then went on to suggest that somehow, the court was unaware that this general denial concerned only with the noise from his unit, and that the defendant had not denied the two convictions he had.

10.  However, paragraph 20 of the Decision stated, as I translate:

“However, the defendant, in his affirmation, only made a general denial without substance against the allegations raised by the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs. He did not provide any evidence to show why the noise could not have come from the defendant’s unit.”

11.  Firstly, the court is clearly aware that this denial only concerned with noise from the defendant’s unit. The court actually asked the defendant who had a chance to clarify this during the hearing, and this was accepted by the court (see paragraph 25 of the Decision).

12.  Secondly, Mr. Lai had clearly taken the “general denial without substance” comment out of context of paragraph 20 of the Decision: the sentence that follows explains the comment: the defendant did not provide any evidence to show why the noise could not have come from his unit. Indeed, the only evidence he ever provided was that noise was not detected by HKHA or the police after the numerous complaints were made.

13.  In other words, the court has in hand two affirmations (one from each plaintiff with minute details of the history and characters of the many incidents of disturbance as well as actions taken which cumulated in one conviction on 6 November 2019 of the defendant for public nuisance (on 15 March 2019 to early morning of the next day, between 11:24pm and 3:41am, repeatedly pressing the plaintiffs’ unit’s doorbell about 50 times and banging on the front metal gate etc.) and another conviction on 7 January 2020 for common assault of the 2nd defendant.

14.  Against all these allegations, the defendant only stated in his affirmation (“本人沒有製造噪音”) or, as I translate “I personally did not produce any disturbing noise” (paragraphs 4, 5 of the defendant’s affirmation).

15.  This is clearly a bare denial.

16.  It is also entirely inadequate: as Mr. Lai rightly conceded, the defendant failed to give any evidence on his household condition (e.g. household routine and habits), in particular, who else lived in the defendant’s unit and whether they might be producing the disturbing noise.

17.  Further, as stated in the Decision, the defendant also failed to produce any evidence to support the belief (if indeed that was his belief) that such noise could not have come from his unit.

18.  Thus, the case that the defendant brought forward was that, despite numerous complaints, he was never caught making noises and disturbance against the plaintiffs (except on the two occasions which accumulated in the convictions). So according the defendant, although he had repeatedly pressed the door bell and banged the front gate of the plaintiffs’ unit disturbing them over some 4 hours in one night, and he had also assaulted the 2nd plaintiff, he had never himself caused any disturbing noise to be produced from his unit.

19.  The plaintiffs stated the whole history of the incidents of disturbances which, inter alia, explained how difficult it was to catch the disturbances (e.g. the noises were randomly made or that “guerrilla tactics” were used when the security guards came round etc.), and the two convictions were part of the whole history.

20.  On the other hand, the defendant did not address any of the allegations except stating that “I personally did not produce any disturbing noise”. He made no mention of the convictions but now sought to argue that these convictions should be treated as somehow separate events without attempting to explain how they could have occurred without the previous history of disturbance as alleged by the plaintiffs.

21.  Mr. Lai then went to argue that the complaints of noise made by the plaintiffs were “improbable” being “round the clock”, “so powerful that internal facilities in the plaintiffs’ apartment were damaged”, that “soundwaves can only be unidirectional” and question why no other neighbours were complaining etc.

22.  In my view, these are new arguments bordering on expert opinion coming from the bench. It is entirely inappropriate.

23.  Mr. Lai then went on to attempt to give evidence regarding the household habits of the defendant. Not only that this is new and unsupported evidence, it is again evidence coming from the bench and is entirely inappropriate.

24.  On evaluation of all the evidence submitted by the parties, the court is entitled to make a decision as to whether the defendant has demonstrated a defence which has a real prospect of success.

25.  It is trite that an appeal on the finding of facts is not a chance for the party concerned to take another bite at the cherry simply because the party does not agree with the court’s decision. Instead, the threshold was a “formidable one”: the party needs to demonstrate that “(i) that there was no evidence to support the finding; or (ii) that it was contrary to documentary or other incontrovertible evidence which the judge overlooked” (see Rossington Investments Ltd v Lam Ping Kwong & Another [2002] 4 HKC 671) and, as such, the finding was “plainly wrong”.

26.  In my view, Mr. Lai has not demonstrated that.

Further considerations

27.  Furthermore, it not to say that even if the defendant is able to demonstrate a defence which has a real chance of success, he has an automatic entitlement to have the default judgment set aside. In exercising the discretion under Order 13 Rule 9, the court has regard to all relevant circumstances of the case. These other relevant factors will then have to be weighed against the dominant factor of the merit in order to see where the justice of the case lies (paragraph 13/9/13, Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022)

28.  The Decision clearly stated the conduct of the defendant during the application: despite the court allowing two time extensions for the defendant to file and serve his affirmation in opposition (pending application for Legal Aid) until 27 October 2020, the defendant did not comply with the order. Even when Legal Aid was refused on 11 March 2021, the defendant did not file and serve his affirmation until one day before the hearing (29 April 2021), thus depriving the plaintiffs the chance to file and serve any affirmations in reply according to the direction of the court (paragraphs 9 to 13 of the Decision).

29.  Thus, there was a delay of some 6 months for the defendant to file and serve his affirmation, and this was for an application for default judgment for failure to file and serve an acknowledgement of service and defence.

30.  It was made clear in the Decision that under usual circumstances, the court could consider refusing to accept the defendant’s affirmation. The fact the court considered it at all was already an exercise of discretion in favour of the defendant (paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Decision).

31.  Another consideration is that the plaintiffs are only seeking injunctive relief against disturbing noises (paragraphs 27 i) a) and b) of the Decision, “injunctions a and b”); various inappropriate behaviours towards the plaintiffs (paragraphs 27 i) c) of the Decision, “injunction c”); and spraying of insecticides (paragraphs 27 i) d) of the Decision, “injunction d”).

32.  If the defendant’s position is that no disturbing noise has ever been produced from his unit by anyone living there and that he has never sprayed any insecticide into the plaintiffs’ unit as alleged (both of which he did not quite state as his case in his affirmation), then he should not have any concern nor hardship in complying with injunctions a and b, and injunction d. As for injunction c, the defendant is clearly not in a position to dispute given his previous two convictions.

33.  These are clearly relevant factors “to be weighed against the dominant factor of the merit in order to see where the justice of the case lies”.

Conclusion

34.  Taking all the relevant circumstances of the case, the court is not satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

35.  As such, the application must be dismissed with costs of the application be to the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs. If no agreement as to costs can be achieved, the plaintiffs shall lodge and serve a summary bill of costs within 28 days of this decision and the defendant shall lodge and serve a summary list of objections 28 days thereafter, with costs to be summarily assessed on paper. The 1st and 2nd plaintiffs’ own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid regulations.

  (Harold Leong)
District Judge

Ms Lee Hoi Wan, of Messrs So, Lung & Associates, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid Department, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Lai Ming, instructed by Messrs T C Wong & Co, for the defendant

[2021] HKDC 767-CH-2021-07-13

李早珠及另一人 對 施純禧

HTML content

DCCJ 206/2020

[2021] HKDC 767

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2020年第206號

---------------------

第一原告人李早珠 
第二原告人李家榮 
 與 
被告人施純禧 

--------------------

主審法官:區域法院法官梁國安內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2021年4月30日
決定日期:2021年7月13日

--------------------

決定書

---------------------

1.  這是第一及第二原告人的申請。

2.  第一及第二原告人於2020年1月13日入稟法院,根據原告呈堂的誓章(AFFIRMATION OF CHENG TSUI WAN MACKEY filed herein on 16 January 2020) ,傳訊令狀於2020年1月14日送達給被告人。

3.  但被告人沒有在期限內發出送達認收書及抗辯書,所以第一及第二原告人於2020年7月7日提出本申請,要求法庭頒布不作為的裁決。

案件背景

4.  第一及第二原告人是母子關係, 與被告人是樓上樓下的鄰居。

5.  簡單來說,第一及第二原告人的案情是大約由2015年直到現在,多次於晚上及凌晨時份受到由被告人屋內發出的噪音滋擾,不能入睡。

6.  第一及第二原告人也曾向被告人,屋宇處及警方作出多次投訴。直至2019年,被告人更加直接騷擾第一及第二原告人,例如於晚上及凌晨多次按第一及第二原告人單位門鈴,及襲擊第二原告人。

7.  第一及第二原告人呈堂的證供顯示,被告人於2019年11月6日在觀塘裁判法院被裁定在公眾地方犯防擾罪,也於2020年1月7日在同一法院內被裁定普通襲擊罪。

8.  第一及第二原告人於是入稟法院申請強制令,禁止被告人單位發出噪音等等。

9.  申請的聆訊於2020年8月31日進行,當時被告人呈上一份2020年8月31日的申請法律援助通知備忘錄。

10.  有鑒於此,本法庭頒下非正審強制令,也寬限被告人可於2020年9月28日或之前送達及存檔反對誓章,第一及第二原告人可於2020年10月27日或之前送達及存檔回答誓章,及押後申請的聆訊等等。

11.  之後,法庭根據被告人的申請,再將反對誓章的時限推遲到2020年10月27日。

12.  法律援助署於2021年3月11日發出拒絕法律援助申請通知備忘錄,拒絕被告人的法律援助申請。

13.  被告人並沒有遵守法庭有關反對誓章時限的命令,只是在本審訊之前一日存檔及送達反對誓章。當然,在這緊迫的時間內,第一及第二原告人也不能及時存檔及送達回答誓章。

法庭的考慮

14.  被告人違反法庭命令,也完全沒有給予機會給第一及第二原告人準備回答誓章,對第一及第二原告人並不公平。一般而言,本席可以考慮不接受被告人的誓章。

15.  但就算本席再次寬容被告人,接受考慮被告人在誓章內的證據, 本席也認為這些證據不能支持被告人的案情。

16.  總括來說,被告人承認記得收過律師行的信件,但因認為自己沒有發出噪音,所以沒有理會。

17.  因此,本席認為傳訊令狀是正規地送達被告人的,而對這方面,各方都沒有爭議。

18.  所以根據區域法院規則336H章第13號命令第6條規則,本席可以作出裁決。

19.  當然,根據同一命令第9條規則,法庭是有絕對酌情權擱置裁決,主要考慮的因素,是被告人有否真正機會可以成功抗辯。

20.  但被告人在誓詞中,只是對第一及第二原告人的指控作出空泛的否定,沒有提出任何證據可以證明為何噪音不是由被告人單位發出。

21.  被告人也指出第一及第二原告人投訴 “近千次” ,都 “不獲受理” ,但顯然這是不正確的,因為第一及第二原告人的投訴引致被告人兩次經法庭定罪。被告人在誓詞中,對這隻字不提。

22.  所以,本席認為,就算被告人提出擱置裁決申請,他的案情也沒有真正機會可以成功抗辯。

23.  因此本席裁決第一及第二原告人勝訴。

24.  第一及第二原告人的律師指控被告人在誓詞中作出虛假聲明,可能觸犯藐視法庭的罪行。

25.  但本席在庭上向被告人查詢,被告人聲稱,他在誓詞中所指的 “投訴噪音不獲受理” ,他的意思只是第一及第二原告人對被告人家中發出的噪音的投訴不獲受理,並不是第一及第二原告人對被告人晚上按門鈴及拍打鐵閘發出的噪音所作的投訴不獲受理。

26.  本席體諒被告人沒有律師代表,所作的誓詞儘管有些不正確,但嚴重程度沒有達致藐視法庭的地步。

命令

27.  本席作出以下命令:

i)    向被告人頒令,禁止被告人:

(a)  故意導致或容許巨大聲響由被告人位於香港德朗邨德瑞樓29樓2902室的單位(“被告人單位”)發出,對第一及第二原告人造成滋擾;

(b)導致或容許巨大聲響於晚上11時至早上7時由被告人單位發出,對第一及第二原告人造成滋擾;

(c)  襲擊,騷擾,威脅或纏繞第一及第二原告人,包括對第一及第二原告人大聲叫駡或講粗言穢語,未經容許下對着第一及第二原告人拍照,故意停留在第一及第二原告人的10米範圍內意圖作出以上行為;及

(d)從樓上對第一及第二原告人位於香港德朗邨德瑞樓28樓2802室的單位噴殺蟲水。

ii) 被告人須支付第一及第二原告人於本案的訟費,若然雙方就訟費未能達成協議,則可交由法庭評定; 及

iii) 第一原告人及第二原告人本身之訟費須根據法律援助規例評定。

( 梁國安 )
區域法院法官

第一及第二原告人: 由羅本信律師行的黃麗英律師代表

被告人: 沒有律師代表,並親自應訟