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CPK v. CY

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76898-EN-2011-05-23

CPK v. CY

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FCMC 7599 / 2007

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 7599 OF 2007

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 CPKPetitioner

and

 CYRespondent
------------------------

Coram: Deputy District Judge S. Lo in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Dates of Hearing: 12th –15th April 2011

Date of Parties’ written closing submissions: 19th April 2011

Date of Parties’ oral closing submissions: 20th April 2011

Date of Judgment: 23rd May 2011

-------------------------

J U D G M E N T
(Ancillary Relief)

-------------------------

 

BACKGROUND

1.  This is the Petitioner’s application for ancillary relief including a child’s maintenance against the Respondent.

2.  The parties were married on 24th November 2004 and there is a child of the family (“Child”), born in June 2005 (now 5 years and 11 months old). The custody, care and control were granted to the Petitioner (“Wife”) with defined access to the Respondent (“Husband”). The Child is attending K.3 at a Kindergarten in Tai Po and will soon move to primary education with ICQM after this summer. 

3.  The Wife is aged 32 under the employment of the Hospital Authority as a medical officer of Paediatrics Department of a hospital earning about $79,800 per month (including allowance and benefit).

4.  The Husband aged 37 is also under the employment of the Hospital Authority occupying the post as an associate consultant (since 2006) at a Family Medicine Centre earning about $123,300 per month (including allowance and benefit). 

5.  The parties separated in November 2006. The divorce proceedings were commenced by the Wife in June 2007 on the basis of “unreasonable behaviour”. The marriage between the parties lasted for about 3 years when the Decree Nisi was granted on 7th December 2007.

6.  The Husband was first ordered to pay $6,000 per month from 10th September 2007 for the Child’s maintenance after the Wife had lodged a Summons for interim maintenance on 6th September 2007 and after the hearing for maintenance pending suit, the Husband was ordered to pay $17,000 per month from 1st December 2007 up till now.

THE LAW

7.  The governing principles in relation to the distribution of the family assets in the dissolution of marriage are set out section 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (“MPPO”), Cap. 192, which states as follows:

(1)   It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 4, 6 or 6A in relation to a party to the marriage and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say-

(a)  the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(b)    the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c)  the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(d)    the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

(e)  any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;

(f)  the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;

(g)    in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.

6.    The Court of Final Appeal in LKW v DD[1] set out 4 principles as to how section 7 shall be approached, which are stated briefly as follows:

a.   The first is that the implicit objective of a section 7 exercise is to arrive at a distribution of assets which is fair as between the parties[2];

b.    The second is that the concept of fairness requires the refutation of any gender or role discrimination[3];

c.   The third principle is that, with a view to eliminating insidious discrimination and promoting fairness, judges should check their tentative views on distribution against a “yardstick of equal division” which should be departed from only for good, articulated reasons[4];

d.    The fourth principle is that the court should not countenance any attempt to engage in costly and often futile retrospective investigations of the failed marriage which tend to deplete the parties’ (and the courts’) resources and to increase antagonism and discourage settlement[5]. 

7.    The Court of Final Appeal further laid down 5 steps for a section 7 exercise briefly as follows:

a.   The first step in the exercise is to ascertain the financial resources of each of the parties calculated as at the date of the hearing[6];

b.    The next step is for the court to assess the parties’ financial needs[7];

c.   If surplus assets would remain after the parties’ needs have been catered for, the next step in the exercise should generally be for the court to apply the sharing principle to the parties’ total assets, leaving the “needs” question previously considered to be dealt with under that principle[8];

d.    The fourth step therefore involves considering whether good reasons exist for departing from the principle of equal division[9];

e.   When deciding the outcome, the court is not bound to depart from equality in the division of the parties’ assets even if one or more of the factors considered are engaged on the facts.  The weight to be given to such considerations is a matter of discretion for the court[10].

8.  Concerning the children’s maintenance, the jurisdiction of the court to make orders for the financial support of the children is found in section 5 of the MPPO. In making orders under section 5, the court shall regard to the matters in section 7(2) of the MPPO, which are set out below:

Without prejudice to subsection (3), it shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 5, 6 or 6A in relation to a child of the family and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say-

(a)  the financial needs of the child;

(b)   the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child;

(c)  any physical or mental disability of the child;

(d)   the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(e)  the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated;

and so to exercise those powers as to place the child, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1), just to do so, in the financial position in which the child would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of those parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards him.

9.  According to section 7(2) of the MPPO, the court has the duty to consider the matters mentioned in section 7(1) (a) and (b) when exercising those powers relating to the child.

INDENTIFICATION OF ASSESTS

10.  In relation to the distribution of the family assets, the first step is to identify the assets of the parties and the family as at the date of hearing. At this stage, the court need not attempt to distinguish between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property, that being an exercise best undertaken (if necessary) when considering distribution of the assets.[11]

11.  The Matrimonial Home jointly owned by the parties was sold in 2010 with net proceeds being paid into court in the sum of $2,606,918.25.

12.  The Scenic Car Park is jointly owned by the parties with agreed valuation of $615,000 and outstanding loan for the sum of $116,300 giving rise to a net value of $498,700. It is not in dispute that the Husband’s father had made the down payment of $20,000 which shall be repaid to his father by the Husband.

13.  According to the Husband’s Form E dated 29th March 2011, he holds the following assets and liabilities in his sole name which are not disputed by the Wife:

 i.value in Royal London 360 accounts $542,842
 ii.value of the BMW car$40,000
 Less: 
 i.Wing Hang Credit Ltd. (P. loan)$101,622
 ii.BOC Credit Card  $275,825
  Sub-total$205,395

14.  The Husband acquired a car park at Metro Town, Tseung Kwan O, New Territories, Hong Kong on 20th October 2008 (“Metro Town car park”). It is not challenged by Mr. Leung, Counsel for the Wife, that such property is acquired by the Husband well after the separation without the help or contribution by the Wife. Source of assets is a material factor to provide a good reason for excluding it from the equality principle on the basis that it is not an item of matrimonial property.[12] The issue whether there are good reasons to depart from the equality principle will be discussed later.

15.  According to the Wife’s 3rd Form E dated 1st April 2011, she holds the following assets and liabilities in her sole name which are not disputed by the Husband:

i. value in all bank accounts$929,338.85
 ii.value in all stocks$141,072.25
 iii.value in all insurance policies$518,095.61
 Less: 
 Visa Credit Card $48,199.94
  Sub-total $1,540,306.77

16.  The following issues relating to the assets held by the parties are in dispute:

i.  Whether the Husband’s beneficial interests in joint name banks and securities accounts held with his mother shall be treated as half only.

ii.  Whether the Husband’s beneficial interests in the Scenic Flat jointly owned with his parents shall be treated as his parents’ assets.

iii.  Whether the Husband holds any interest in PM Academy Ltd and PM Group Ltd.

iv.  Whether the Le Point Flat acquired by the Husband under his sole name shall be regarded as the family assets.

v.  Whether the Parc Versaills Flat acquired by the Wife and her father in joint name shall be regarded as the family assets.

vi.  Whether the Wife owes a loan to her mother for $200,000 for the purchase of the Matrimonial Home.

vii.   Whether the outstanding legal costs owed by the Wife to her lawyers are about $1.05 million.

viii.  Whether the Wife holds any valuable jewellery.

ix.  Whether the Wife’s Gratuity and 5% Housing Allowance should be counted as the family asset.

Whetherthe Husband’sbeneficial interests in joint name banksand securities accounts held with his mother be treated as half only.

17.  There are 2 bank accounts and 5 securities accounts in the joint name of the Husband and his mother. The Wife argued that the Husband has 100% beneficial interest thereof whilst the Husband said that he has only 50% interest.

18.  Regarding the Husband’s interest in one of the 5 securities accounts (CIS Ltd. formerly known as HIFG Ltd.), the Husband stated in his 3rd Form E dated 29th March 2011 that the 2,000 shares of stock no.13 well exist before the marriage and that 1,000 shares were sold for the marriage and the payment for the Matrimonial Home. Hence, the remaining 1,000 shares belong to his mother and the Husband has no interest.  Since Mr. Leung, Counsel for the Wife, did not particularly challenge this statement at the trial, I accept that the Husband has no more interest in this account.

19.  As to the remaining 2 bank accounts and 4 securities accounts, I consider that strictly speaking, the court needs to chase the sources of contribution to all these 6 accounts since their openings in order to see how much the Husband and his mother respectively contribute to these accounts in the past. However, since the Husband’s mother only worked until 1997 and has no income thereafter, I consider that she can only make very minimal financial contributions to these accounts after 1997. On the other hand, the Husband has become a registered medical officer with significant income since 1998. In the circumstances, I accept on balance of probabilities that the Husband has 100% interest thereof. Therefore, the total value the Husband’s interest in these 2 bank accounts and 4 securities accounts is $293,244 ($23,092 + $270,152).

Whether the Husband’s beneficial interests in the Scenic Flat jointly owned with his parents shall be treated as his parents’ assets

20.  The Scenic Flat was jointly purchased by the Husband and his parents in 1998, 6 years before the marriage and sold in September 2007 with net proceeds of about $2.5 million. The Husband said that the down payment and initial payments were mainly from his parents and that the mortgage instalments were paid out from the joint name bank account of the Husband and his mother. The Husband submitted that the Scenic Flat which was independently acquired shall wholly belong to his parents.[13]

21.  I do not entirely agree to the Husband’s submission. I accept that the down payment and initial payments were mainly from his parents since these facts are not challenged by the Wife.  However, in relation to the mortgage instalments paid out from the joint name bank account of the Husband and his mother, I am of the view that the Husband was all along solely responsible for such instalments since his mother has retired in 1997 and has no income thereafter.

22.  The Husband fails to disclose how much the down payment and initial payments were made by his parents. I consider that he has the duty to do so.[14] As he fails to make full disclosure in this regard, I am entitled to draw adverse inference against him. Mr. Leung, Counsel for the Wife, suggests me to treat the Husband holding 1/3 interest. In my judgment, it is a fair suggestion as the Husband and his parents jointly owned the Scenic Flat. Hence, 1/3 interest of the net sale proceeds of the Scenic Flat in the sum of $829,744 (ie $2,489,231 / 3), rounding up to $830,000 will be counted to be his assets.

23.  The Husband submits that the Scenic Flat is a property acquired well before the marriage and that due to the parties’ short marriage, 1/5 of his interest therein shall be shared by the Wife. The issue of short marriage raised by the Husband will be dealt with in the latter part of this judgment.

Whether the Husband holds any interest inPM Academy Ltd and PM Group Ltd.

24.  The Wife said that the Husband’s father is holding 50% shares in these 2 companies on trust for the Husband who denied the same during the trial. I have no doubt to reject his denial since it obviously contradicts the following evidence given earlier by him when he was legally represented:

(1)   In parts 2.4 and 2.6 of his 1st Form E dated 28th September 2007, he stated that he has 50% of the shareholding in PM Group Ltd. and attached its financial records thereto. In part 2.13, he further stated he has the liability of $995,431.6 for PM Group Ltd.

(2)   In paragraph 7 of the social investigation report dated 10th December 2007, he told the social work officer that he ran a medical centre, namely PM Group Ltd which gave him no benefit.

(3)   According to the transcripts of the hearing for maintenance pending suit on 10th October 2007, in which the Husband was legally represented, his lawyer referred the presiding judge to part 2.6 in the Husband’s Form E and submitted that the clinic invested by the Husband was running at a huge loss.

(4)   Paragraph 40 of the judgment of Deputy Judge CK Chan (as he then was) dated 13th November 2007 made reference to the clinic business ran by the Husband.

25.  I can understand why he has to deny it especially after having read the following in his written closing submission:

“Y&P (the Wife’s solicitors) breached confidentiality and sent the private clinic data to Husband’s Hospital human resources. Wife accused husband of running private clinic. Wife’s revenge type of hostility created unnecessary legal cost and protracted litigation. Husband hopes that this is Y&P’s business proposal instead of Wife’s shameful character.”

26.  Mr. Leung, Counsel for the Wife, rightly conceded that the capital value of these 2 companies is not significant as the financial statements for the year ended 31st March 2009 confirm PM Group Ltd. has accumulated loss of about $191,000 and the letter dated 17th March 2010 issued by the Inland Revenue Department shows no assessable profits from the business carried on by PM Academy Ltd.. However, Mr. Leung submitted that the income generated by the clinic in Liberte Place (“Liberte clinic”) operated by PM Group Ltd is relevant to the issue of the Child’s maintenance. This issue will be dealt with in the latter part of this judgment.

Whetherthe Le Point Flat acquired by the Husband under his sole name shall be regarded as the family assets.

27.  The Husband signed the sale and purchase agreement to buy the Le Point Flat and paid 5% deposit by credit card for $152,050 on 15th October 2006 just about 1 month before the date of separationon 19th November 2006. It is not challenged by Mr. Leung, Counsel for the Wife, that all the further deposits were paid by the Husband’s mother and that the Husband had to borrow money from his parents by mortgaging their Whampoa Garden property in order to get a loan of $2,310,000 from Bank of East Asia. The Husband also borrowed a short duration personal loan of $600,000 from Dah Sing Bank in order to complete the transaction of the Le Point Flat in May 2008.

28.  In the opening submission of the Wife, Mr. Leung originally submitted that only the 5% deposit in the sum of $152,050 paid by the Husband shall be regarded as the family assets. Nonetheless, in his closing submission, Mr. Leung suddenly changed his stance that the Le Point Flat shall be regarded as the family assets.

29.  In my judgment, the 5% deposit paid by the Husband is definitely part of the family assets since it was paid before the separation. As to the remaining 95% of the purchase price, the evidence produced by the Husband clearly shows that it was paid by the Husband and his mother without help or contribution of the Wife.[15] At this stage, I would consider the Le Point Flat is a family asset but there will be a good reason in favour of the Husband to depart from the equality principle. I will discuss this issue later.

Whetherthe Parc Versaills Flat acquired by the Wife and her father in joint name shall be regarded as the family assets.

30.  The Wife jointly purchased with her father a property in Parc Versaills in July 2008, about 20 months after the parties’ separation in November 2006. The agreed current market value is $6.52 million and after the deduction of the outstanding mortgage loan of about $3.88 million, the net value is about $2.64 million.

31.  In the 2nd Form E of the Wife dated 29th July 2010, she stated that the down payment of $1.56 million was paid for the purchase of the Parc Versaills Flat and that the mortgage was $3.64 million. In her 3rd Form E dated 1st April 2011, she stated the down payment $1.04 million and the mortgage $4.16 million. No explanation was given by the Wife or her lawyers as to such discrepancies.

32.  As to the time of making such down payment, although it was not mentioned by the Wife, I consider that it shall be around May 2008, namely about 2 months before the date of purchase in July 2008. Regarding the amount of the down payment, I choose the figure of $1.04 million as stated in the Wife’s 3rd Form E instead of $1.56 million in her 2nd Form E. The reason is that the mortgage sum stated under the Particulars of Purchase in her 2nd Form E is $3.64 million which is lower than the amount outstanding on mortgage as stated in both of her 2nd and 3rd Form Es. Assuming the Wife has not defaulted in payment of mortgage installments, the original mortgage sum must be higher than the outstanding sum. Therefore, the figure of $1.56 million in her 2nd Form E is, in my view, incorrectly stated for unknown reason.

33.  Mr. Leung, Counsel for the Wife, submitted that as the Parc Versaills Flat was acquired well after the parties’ separation, it shall not be regarded as the family assets. In my view, his submission is too simple. First of all, the Wife does not disclose as to how much she and her father contribute to this down payment and the subsequent mortgage instalments. I consider that she has the duty to do so.[16]

34.  In view of the strong income of the Wife, I am satisfied that she and her father are able to pay the mortgage installments without help or contribution from the Husband. If the entire down payment was paid by her father, I may well exercise my discretion to exclude the Parc Versaills Flat from the family assets. On the other hand, if the entire down payment was paid by the Wife herself, I have some hesitation to exercise my discretion to exclude the same from the family assets for the obvious reason that she shall not be able to save this $1.04 million down payment during the period after separation until the date of such down payment. The third scenario is that if only part of the down payment was paid by the Wife, it all depends on how much it is and whether she is able to save this part of the down payment during such period.  In other words, the crux of the issue is whether she has to use her savings during the marriage so as to pay this part of the down payment. As what I have said earlier, the Wife fails to make full disclosure in this regards and I may have to attribute robustly certain portion of this down payment to her based on the evidence available. To be fair to the Husband, even though he has not raised this issue at the trial, I am of the view that I have the duty imposed by section 7 to consider it.[17]

35.  In the 1st Form E of the Wife dated 21st September 2007, she disclosed the balance in her bank accounts for about $377,000 in part 2.3 and the balance in her stocks accounts for about $135,000 in part 2.7. Hence, she has the available cash for about $512,000 at that time since the stocks can be realized very easily.

36.  In the 2nd Form E of the Wife dated 29th July 2010, she disclosed the balance in her bank accounts for about $1,136,000 in part 2.3 and the balance in her stocks accounts for about $123,000 in part 2.7. Thus, she has the available cash for about $1,259,000 at that time. That is to say, she is able to save about $747,000 during the period from September 2007 to July 2010 (around 2 years and 10 months). Indeed, she also explained at the trial that it may probably be due to increase in value of the stocks.

37.  The next question is when the down payment of $1.04 million was made in May 2008, how much did the Wife contribute to the same? No evidence in this regard is given by the Wife. Therefore, I have to attribute robustly certain portion of this down payment to her based on the evidence available. According to the 1st Form E of the Wife dated 21st September 2007, she has the available cash for about $512,000 at that time. Thus, I consider that she shall not be able to pay the entire down payment in May 2008 and that part of it must be paid by her father. In my judgment, the reasonable sum which I robustly attribute is $300,000. That is to say, I find that the Wife contributed $300,000 to this down payment.

38.  As I have said earlier, the crux of the issue is whether she has to make use of her savings during the marriage so as to pay this sum of $300,000. Again no submission is made by the parties in this regard. No information is available as to the Wife’s financial situation, in particular her available cash at the time of separation in November 2006. In the light of her saving pattern (including the increase in value of her stocks) in the past and her contract gratuity equivalent to 15% of her total monthly basic salary for every 2-year contract period, I am satisfied that from November 2006 (i.e. date of separation) up to May 2008 (i.e. date of down payment), she is able to save this sum of $300,000 without using her savings made during marriage. As a result, I am of the view that since the Wife acquires the Parc Versaills Flat without the help and contribution of the Husband, I may exercise my discretion to exclude it from the family assets when I am considering any good reasons for departure from the equality principle in the latter part of this judgment.

Whetherthe Wife owes a loan to her mother for $200,000 for the purchase of theMatrimonial Home

39.  The Wife alleged that she owes a loan to her mother for $200,000 for the purchase of the Matrimonial Home and produced the bank statement of her mother to support the same. The Husband does not challenge such allegation. I therefore accept that $200,000 shall be deducted as her liability from the assets of the Wife.

Whether the outstanding legal costs owed by the Wife to her lawyers are about $1.05 million

40.  The Wife said that the outstanding legal costs due to her lawyers are about $1.05 million. However, no legal bills except one issued by the Wife’s solicitors on 28 September 2007 was produced. She testified at the trial that such figure was only told by her solicitor and that she has not yet paid this sum.

41.  I have no comment on this figure because it is a matter of contract between the solicitor and his client. Nevertheless, I consider that at least, she shall produce a legal bill issued by her solicitor to prove such sum. Although the Wife has no doubt incurred the liability to pay the legal costs to her solicitor, the actual amount is not yet quantified as she is always entitled to dispute this amount by way of taxation in the court. If she has no dispute on these legal costs of $1.05 million, there is no reason why she chooses not to settle the same before the trial bearing in mind that she has sufficient cash in her bank accounts according to her latest Form E. Since the amount of the legal costs due to her solicitor cannot be ascertained at this moment, I refuse to accept it as part of her liability to be deducted from her assets.

Whether the Wife holds any valuable jewellery

42.  In the Wife’s Form Es, she claims no valuable jewellery. In her Reply to the Husband’s Further and Better Particulars dated 5th November 2009, she answers that around 8 pieces of small items of gifts were received at the wedding banquet, which were kept in her mother’s safe deposit box together with  her sister’s wedding gifts. The Husband said that she shall have received at least 19 pieces of gold rings, neck laces and diamond ring as wedding gifts from the Husband’s father and relatives in addition to another list of jewellery from the Wife’s family.

43.  The Wife testified at the trial that the wedding jewelleries have been given to her mother as gifts and she will not ask her mother for return.

44.  The Husband submits that it is against the traditional culture for the daughter to give her wedding jewelleries to the mother as gifts and that instead of taking as gift, the Wife’s mother just helps keeping the jewelleries in the safe.

45.  I think that the Husband’s submission is only sensible if the marriage between them has not been broken down. After divorce, the wedding jewelleries may no longer be memorable to the parties. I cannot say that it is unreasonable for the Wife to give all these jewelleries to her mother as gifts especially, when the parties’ relationship is deteriorating after separation. Besides, the value of these jewelleries is not really significant in the sense that it will greatly affect the outcome of this case. I do not think that the Wife being a medical professional has to give false testimony in the court. In this regard, I accept the Wife’s evidence that she has no valuable jewellery.

Whether the Wife’sGratuity and5% Housing Allowance should be counted as familyassets

46.  The Husband said that in June 2011, the Wife will receive the Gratuity for $209,502 (i.e. $58,195 (her basic salary) x 15% x 12 months x 2 years). He further said that according to the written confirmation from HA Human Resource manager, the Wife shall be entitled to 5% housing allowance from July 2007 to June 2011 for $139,668 (i.e. $58,195 x 5% x 12 months x 4 years).

47.  However, I consider that since the parties have separated in November 2006, she acquires such sums without the help or contribution of the Husband. I may exercise my discretion to exclude them from the family assets when I am considering any good reasons for departure from the equality principle in the latter part of this judgment.

Assessing the parties’ financial needs

48.  The next step is for the court to assess the parties’ financial needs.

49.  The Husband said that the Wife has future rapid salary increment as her salary has increased from $49,000 to $79,796 (about 63%) within 4 years and that she has good promotion chance to Associate Consultant.

50.  I consider that both parties shall have very bright future in respect of their medical careers in different fields but I am not in a position to comment on their increase in salary and promotion chance in the future.

51.  The Husband further said that he is a chronic hepatitis B carrier and suffers from anaemia of unknown origin which will cast potential big health risks to him. In my view, it has no or little significance since he himself is a very senior medical professional with very strong income and substantial assets.

52.  In short, it cannot be disputed that the parties’ earning capacities and present salaries are already adequate for their respective financial needs in their foreseeable future.

Deciding to apply the sharing principle

53.  Since the total resources and incomes of the parties are sufficient to go beyond and to meet both their financial needs, I decide to apply the sharing principle unless there is good reason, capable of articulation, for departing from an equal division, which will be discussed below.

Considering any good reasons for departing from equal division

Source of assets as a material factor

54.  For the Matrimonial Home and Scenic Car Park which were purchased by the parties with intent for family use, it is well settled in law that source shall not be considered as a material factor.[18] Therefore, the fact that the Husband has greater financial contributions to these properties is not a good reason for departure of equality principle.

55.  For the Le Point Flat, as discussed in paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 above, the Husband acquires the same with very little though not entirely without help or contribution of the Wife. I consider that it is a good reason to depart from the equal division. In my judgment, 5% of its agreed value, namely $210,000 ($4.2 million X 5%) shall be added to the Husband’s assets.

56.  For the Parc Versaills Flat, the Wife’s Gratuity and 5% Housing Allowance, since I am satisfied that the Wife acquires them without help and contribution of the Husband, I exercise my discretion to exclude them from the Wife’s assets. For the Metro Town car park, I also exercise my discretion to exclude them from the Husband’s assets on the same reason.

57.  For the MPF of the parties, the Wife has $240,712 whilst the Husband has $739,993 according to their respective last Form Es. The Husband submits that it would be most unfair if the Husband’s 7 years of pre-marital MPF and 4.5 years post separation MPF (i.e. 11.5 years outside marriage) are to be divided equally for this short marriage. I accept the Husband’s submission in this regards since the parties have not made any contriutions as to the increase in value of the other parties’ MPF after their separation based on the similar rationale given relating to the Wife’s Gratuity and 5% Housing Allowance. I accept the Husband’s suggestion to use the figures of the parties’ own MPF as stated in their respective first Form Es (which are the figures nearest to the date of the separation). For the Wife, she has $125,786.49 in her MPF account and the Husband has $320,668.44 at the time of making the said Form Es. These figures will be added as their respective assets.

58.  According to the Wife’s first Form E, she has about $377,000 in her bank accounts. However, in her latest Form E, her savings increase to about $929,000. I also consider that the Husband has made no contribution to the increase of about $552,000 (i.e. $929,000 - $377,000). Thus, to be fair to the Wife, such sum shall not be shared by the Husband and be deducted from the Wife’s assets.

Conduct as a material factor

59.  In my view, there is no “obvious and gross” conduct of the parties, which I have to consider.[19]

Financial needs as a material factor

60.  As mentioned above, it is not a good reason to depart from the equal division since the parties’ incomes are already adequate for their respective financial needs.

Duration of the marriage as a material factor

61.  As the parties’ marriage lasted for less than 3 years, I agree that it is a short marriage. However, the custody of the Child who is only 5 years and 11 months old now is granted to the Wife. In my judgment, since the parties both being medical professionals must have great expectation for the Child to receive very good and high education in the future, the Wife has to take care of him for the coming almost 20 years until the Child completes the tertiary education or even higher.

62.  Thus, in respect of the Husband’s interest in the net sale proceeds of the Scenic Flat for the sum of $830,000, I am of the view that this marriage with a young child though short is not a good reason to depart from the equal division.

Contributions to the welfare of the family as a material factor

63.  I accept that the contributions of the Wife are as follows:

i.  The multiple and pivotal roles she played in the marriage by being a working mother and looking after the young son as well as paying some household expenses, such as management fees, rate etc.

ii.  She has delayed her studies to further advance her career in order to help the Husband in his studies to pass the examination and get promotion and not to put the baby’s health at risk.

iii.  She has assisted the Husband in building up business of PM Academy Ltd. and PM Group Ltd., for instance, interviewing the clinic nurses and finding substituted or locum doctors for the clinics.

64.  Regarding the Husband’s contributions, I also recognise that he made a lot of financial contributions to the family. For instance, the Husband borrowed a loan of $600,000 by way of mortgage of the Scenic Flat and that the said sum of $600,000 was used as down payment to purchase the Matrimonial Home. As to the repayment of this $600,000, I consider he was wholly responsible for the same.

65.  It is not disputed by the Wife that the Husband continued to pay the mortgage instalments and most of the management fees, government rent and rate of the Matrimonial Home until its sale in September 2010. He also continues to make similar financial contributions to the Scenic Car Park up to now. He seems to suggest his greater financial contributions to the family assets to be a good reason for departure of equal division.

66.  In my judgment, the parties’ contributions to the welfare of the family are more or less the same since there is no place for discrimination between a husband and wife and their respective roles and there should be no bias in favour of the money-earner and against the home-maker and the child-carer.[20] In other words, I do not find the Husband’s greater financial contribution is a good reason for departure of equal division.

Compensation as a material factor

67.  No issue is raised by the parties under this head.

Deciding the outcome

68.  Before deciding the outcome, I summarise the family assets as follows:

  i.Net sale proceeds of Matrimonial Home  
   paid into court  $2,606,918.25[21]
  ii.Net value of Scenic  
   Car Park jointly owned $498,700[22]
  iii.Assets in Husband’s sole name  
   a. Royal London 360 account and BMW car$582,842[23] 
   b. banks and securities accounts$293,244[24] 
   c. interest in Scenic Flat$830,000[25] 
   d. interest in Le Point Flat$210,000[26] 
   e. MPF$320,668.44[27] 
   Less:  
   a. Wing Hang Credit Ltd. (P. loan) $101,622[28] 
   b. BOC Credit Card$275,825[29] 
   c. Down payment by his father for purchase of Scenic Car Park$20,000[30] 
   sub-total  $1,839,307.44
  iv. Assets in Wife’s sole name  
   a. bank ,stocks accounts and insurance policies$1,588,506.71[31] 
   b. MPF$125,786.49[32] 
   Less:  
   a. Visa Credit Card$48,199.94[33] 
   b. Increase in value in bank accounts $552,000[34] 
   c. Loan due to her mother for purchase of Matrimonial Home$200,000[35] 
   sub-total $914,093.26
   Grand total $5,859,018.95

69.  After dividing this sum equally, each party shall have about $2.93 million. I remind myself that I am not bound to depart from equality in the division of the parties’ assets even if one or more of the factors considered above are engaged on the facts.[36] Nonetheless, stepping back and looking at the overall impact of the factors discussed above, I am satisfied that each party has about $2.93 million is a fair result. Therefore, the Wife is entitled to $2,015,416.22 (i.e. $5,859,018.95/2 - $914,093.26).

Order

70.  In the circumstances, I make the order in relation to the distribution of assets as follows:

a.  The Wife do transfer all her interest or share in the Scenic Car Park to the Husband within 3 months from the date hereof;

b.  The necessary expenses for effecting the above transfer including but not limited to legal costs and stamp duty, if any, shall be borne by the parties in equal share;

c.  Upon documentary proof of the above transfer, the sum of $2,015,416.22 be released to the Wife from the payment into court for $2,606,918.25 and the balance thereof in sum of $591,502.03 be released to the Husband from the court forthwith;

d.  Half of the interest accrued on the said payment into court be released to the Husband and the remaining interest be released to the Wife;

e.  Upon compliance with paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above, all claims which each party may have against the other for ancillary relief be dismissed; and

f.  The parties have liberty to apply to the court in relation to the terms and implementation of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above.

Maintenance of the Child

71.  The next issue is the maintenance of the Child. The Husband is currently paying $17,000 per month as maintenance pending suit for the Child. The current monthly expenses on the Child are $16,850 as set out in the Wife’s latest Form E. The Wife said that such expenses are expected to rise very soon after the Child’s entering into primary education in the coming September. For instance, the Child is prepared to join the musical instrument classes and Taekwondo. She estimated his expenses will increase to $22,340 per month.

72.  The Wife also said that the general expenditure of the Parc Versaills Flat where 3 people, namely the Child, her mother and herself, (the domestic helper is agreed by the parties to be excluded) are living together is $34,247 as set out in her latest Form E and the Child’s share shall be $11,416 (i.e. $34,247 / 3). Hence the total costs for the Child is $33,756 (i.e. $22,340 + $11,416).

73.  The Husband contends that the Wife exaggerates some expenses such as school fee and that she also includes $800 management fee of her mother’s Kwun Tong house as part of the utilities. He also argued that the Wife’s father should be counted for the purpose of dividing the general expenditure of the Parc Versaills Flat so that it shall be divided by 4 instead of 3.

74.  For the school fee, the Wife has already adjusted in her new estimate of the Child’s expenses of $22,340. She also explained that her father is not living together with them in the Parc Versaills Flat but just sometimes stays overnight there during some weekends. I accept the Wife’s evidence in this regard and agree with the Wife’s proposed division of the general expenditure of the Parc Versaills Flat by 3 rather than 4. I also agree that the monthly expenses of the Child will increase after promoting to the primary education since the parties must expect the Child to receive very good education in the future.

75.  As to the $800 management fee, I accept it shall not be included as part of the Wife’s utilities expense. For the remaining expenses, since they are not challenged by the Husband, they are accepted by me. Thus, the monthly expenses of the Child are $32,956 (i.e. $33,756 -$800).

76.  Mr. Leung, Counsel for the Wife, submitted in his written closing submission that 1/3 of the monthly expenses of the Child are to be shared by the Wife and 2/3 by the Husband due to the income disparity between them.

77.  At the oral closing submission, Mr. Leung invited the court to consider the Husband’s income from the Liberte clinic. According to the Liberte clinic balance sheet produced by the Husband in his first Form E dated 28th September 2007, the average monthly net profit is about $60,000 for the period from January 2006 to April 2007. Mr. Leung agreed that the profit after April 2007 shall not be considered because some of the figures concerning expenses after April 2007 are incomplete.

78.  The Husband stated in his first Form E that PM Group Ltd. which operates the Liberte clinic and the Olympia clinic suffered from loss of over 1.3 million as at December 2006. The Olympia clinic was close down in 2006 due to continuous loss for 2 years. But according to the financial statements for the year ended 31st March 2009, PM Group Ltd. has accumulated loss of only about $191,000, which means that this company has made about $1.1 million profit during the period from January 2007 to March 2009 (i.e. about 27 months) and recovered almost all the previous loss. That is to say, the average income of this company is about $40,000 per month (i.e. $1.1 million / 27) during the period of 27 months. In the circumstances, I consider that this company is beginning to gain profit now. Although the Husband denied at the trial that he has any interest in this company, I have already determined that he holds 50% beneficial interest thereof[37]. Since the Husband fails to produce any updated financial statements of PM Group Ltd. in his latest Form E, I have to draw adverse inference against him. Hence, I conclude that the Husband has an additional income of $20,000 from the Liberte clinic or PM Group Ltd., namely half of the average income during the said period of 27 months.

79.  The Wife’s income is about $80,000 and the Husband’s is about $143,000 ($123,000 + $20,000). In my view, the monthly expenses of the Child for $32,956 are to be shared by the following ratio:

(i)    80/223 by the Wife:     $11,823 (round up to $12,000)

(ii)   143/223 by the Husband:  $21,133(round up to $21,000)

80.  I therefore order the Husband to pay the Wife $21,000 per month as maintenance of the Child, first payment to be made on the 1st June 2011 and thereafter on the first day of each succeeding month until the Child reaches the age of 18 or finishes full time education whichever is the later, and grant a section 18 declaration.

Smart Kids, Child Tax Allowance and vacation of registration against Le Point Flat

81.  There is an outstanding summons taken out by the Wife dated 30 June 2009 concerning the costs for Smart Kids education products for the benefit of the Child. The parties eventually agreed at the hearing on 20 April 2011 that the Husband do pay the Wife $20,000 as his share thereof within 14 days with costs of the said application reserved.

82.  The parties further agreed to give undertaking at the hearing on 20 April 2011 that the Wife shall claim the Child tax allowance in 2011 and odd years thereafter whereas the Husband shall claim such allowance in 2012 and even years thereafter.

83.  The Wife has registered a Notice of ancillary relief against the Le Point Flat in the Land Registry. I now make a separate order for vacation of such registration at the own costs of the Wife. In my view, it is totally unnecessary for the Wife to do so especially when the sale proceeds of the Matrimonial Home has been paid into court which is sufficiently secured the interest of the Wife in these ancillary relief proceedings.

COSTS

84.  In CACV 196/2009, Hon Kwan JA said in paragraph 123 of the judgment:

“In matrimonial cases, as in other cases, costs should normally follow the event. The court also retains a discretion to deprive successful litigants of costs under the principles in In re Elgindata Ltd. (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207 (L v C, CACV 169/2006, 19 March 2008, paragraph 23, per Yuen JA). The general rule that costs follow the event does not cease to apply simply because the successful party raised allegations on which he failed, but where that has caused a significant increase in the length or costs of the proceedings, he may be deprived of the whole or a part of his costs. As the Judge had remarked, the wife had taken an over-inflated view of the merits of her case and the assets she should be awarded. The approach she took in relation to the valuation of O Ltd. and the accounts caused a significant increase in the length and costs of the proceedings. It is not fair she should be awarded all of her costs at trial. I would exercise the discretion to reduce the award of the costs of the trial to the wife by half.”

85.  First, I find that the Husband unreasonably denies and has not fully and frankly disclosed his interest in PM Group Ltd. and PM Academy Ltd. whereas the Wife did make full and frank disclosure as to her assets save the down payment of the Parc Versaills Flat. Besides, I am of the view that the Husband unreasonably refuses to accept the Wife’s open offer concerning the Child’s maintenance. On the other hand, both parties have also caused significant increase in the length or costs of the proceedings as they raised a lot of factual disputes which I consider unnecessary or even I find against them.

86.  Looking at the circumstances as a whole, I would exercise the discretion to make an order nisi that the Husband do pay half of the Wife’s costs for the ancillary relief proceedings including all costs reserved and the Wife’s summons dated 30th June 2009, to be taxed if not agreed. Such costs order nisi will become absolute unless any of the parties apply to vary the same within 14 days.

  

  

(Simon Lo)
Deputy District Judge

Mr. Richard Leung instructed by Messrs. Yuen & Partners for the Petitioner

Respondent acting in person



[1] FACV No. 16 of 2008

[2] At §56 of LKW’s case

[3] At §57 of LKW’s case

[4] At §§58-61 of LKW’s case

[5] At §§62-70 of LKW’s case

[6] At §§71-73 of LKW’s case

[7] At §§74-79 of LKW’s case

[8] At §§80-82 of LKW’s case

[9] At §§83-130 of LKW’s case

[10] At §§131-132 of LKW’s case

[11] At §71 of LKW’s case

[12] At §94 of LKW’s case, Mr. Justice Ribeiro PJ said “Where one of the parties acquires certain assets after separation without any help or contribution from the other, the court may well exercise its discretion to exclude such property from an equal division. However, if at Step 2, an endeavour to meet the parties’ financial needs is the sole or paramount concern, its acquisition after the separation may not prevent such property from being included in the award.”

[13] At §93 of LKW’s case, Mr. Justice Ribeiro PJ said “So where it is a short marriage, the court may well be inclined to regard as excludable non-matrimonial property, assets acquired by one of the parties before the marriage or acquired in the course of the marriage from some wholly external source.”

[14] At §73 of LKW’s case, Mr. Justice Ribeiro PJ said “The parties have an important duty to ensure that the court has sufficient information regarding their assets.  They must make full and frank disclosure and a party who fails to do so runs the risk of the court drawing adverse inferences and robustly attributing assets to him or her, or making adverse costs orders.”

[15] See footnote 11 above

[16]   See footnote 14 above

[17]At §69 of LKW’s case, Mr. Justice Ribeiro PJ said “The essence of this fourth principle is reflected in Thorpe LJ’s illuminating comment in Parra v Parra:[75]“..... the outcome of ancillary relief cases depends upon the exercise of a singularly broad judgment that obviates the need for the investigation of minute detail and equally the need to make findings on minor issues in dispute. The judicial task is very different from the task of the judge in the civil justice system whose obligation is to make findings on all issues in dispute relevant to outcome. The quasi-inquisitorial role of the judge in ancillary relief litigation obliges him to investigate issues which he considers relevant to outcome even if not advanced by either party. Equally he is not bound to adopt a conclusion upon which the parties have agreed. But this independence must be matched by an obligation to eschew over-elaboration and to endeavour to paint the canvas of his judgment with a broad brush rather than with a fine sable. Judgments in this field need to be simple in structure and simply explained.” (emphasis added)

[18]At §98 of LKW’s case, Mr. Justice Ribeiro PJ said “It should be noted that these refinements are not generally applicable to the matrimonial home and other assets which have been intended for and devoted to family use.  Lord Nicholls pointed this out in Miller/McFarlane as follows:

“The parties’ matrimonial home, even if this was brought into the marriage at the outset by one of the parties, usually has a central place in any marriage. So it should normally be treated as matrimonial property for this purpose. ... inprinciple the entitlement of each party to a share of the matrimonial property is the same however long or short the marriage may have been.”

[19] At §104 of LKW’s case, Mr. Justice Ribeiro PJ said “Conduct, or more accurately, negative conduct, is therefore only to be regarded as a material factor if it is “obvious and gross” in the sense explained in Wachtel v Wachtel or, which comes to the same thing, if it is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard”

[20] §57 of LKW’s case

[21] See §11 above

[22] See §12 above

[23] See §13 above

[24] See §19 above

[25] See §22 above

[26] See §55 above

[27] See §57 above

[28] See §13 above

[29] See §13 above

[30] See §12 above

[31] See §15 above

[32] See §57 above

[33] See §15 above

[34] See §58 above

[35] See §39 above

[36] §131 of LKW’s case

[37] See §§24 – 26 above

62235-CH-2008-07-08

蔣 訴 張

HTML content

FCMC 7599 / 2007

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號 2007 年第 7599 宗

______________________

 蔣呈請人
 及 
 張答辯人

______________________

主審法官 :區域法院陳振國暫委法官內庭聆訊 (非公開)

聆訊日期 :2008 年 7 月 7 日 – 8 日

裁決日期 :2008 年 7 月 8 日

_________________

判案書

_________________

 

1. 這是一宗有關家庭子女探視權的審訊。

2. 為方便起見,本席將稱呈請人為 「母親」;答辯人則為 「父親」。

背景

3. 母親現年 30 歲;職業是一名兒科醫生。

4. 丈夫現年 34 歲;職業亦是一名醫生。

5. 與訟雙方於 2004年結婚。

6. 雙方婚後育有一名兒子,現年剛滿 3 歲,與母親及一名傭人同住。

7. 母親於 2007年6月5日以父親的行為向法庭提出離婚呈請。法庭於2007年12月7日頒發了暫准離婚令。

8. 雙方曾就兒子的管養權及探視權有所爭議。因此,法庭將有關的爭議押後至今天進行正式的審訊。但在審訊前,即2008年6月25日的一次聆訊中,父親表示他不再堅持爭取兒子的管養權,因此,本席在當天頒令將兒子的管養權判給母親。但雙方仍就父親對兒子的探視安排未能取得協議。因此,本席今天仍要為兒子的探視安排作出裁決。

9. 有關探視權方面,本席曾於2007年12月10日給予父親以下的臨時探視命令:-

(1)  每星期五晚上 6 時至 9 時;

(2)  每星期六下午 2 時至晚上 9 時;

(3)  每月第一個週末的留宿探視,即由星期六下午 2 時至星期日中午 12 時,由2008年1月開始;

(4)  父親在探視時須 往兒子住所接兒子,及在探視完畢後將兒子送返住所;

(5)  有關的探視不應在母親的在塲下進行。

10. 由於雙方就兒子的臨時探視安排仍有爭拗,因此,本席於2008年2月1日發出命令,將兒子的交接地點,由兒子住所的單位門口,改在兒子所住大廈的大堂。

11. 父親似乎對於以上的臨時探視權命令並不滿意。他希望法庭可頒布一個更寬鬆的探視權命令。母親則基本上希望現狀保持,並推辭父親增加留宿探視的要求。

爭議

12. 綜觀雙方的証據及立塲,雙方其實對以下幾點並無爭議:

(1)    為免爭拗,他們雙方都同意法庭頒發 一個特定探視權的命令;

(2)    母親原則上同意父親除可有日間探視外,亦應有留宿探視。留宿探視的次數可以增加,並包括兒子學校長假期的留宿探視;

(3)    於探視日期,如兒子因病未能進行探視,母親同意事先以電話通知父親,並將兒子的病況告之;

(4)    母親同意父親可不時與兒子通電話;及

(5)    母親同意如需為兒子安排出國留學或移民,須事先得到父親的同意。

13. 至於雙方未能同意的爭議則包括:-

(1)  週末留宿探視的時間,父親認為應由星期六下午 2 時至星期日晚上 9 時;母親則希望保持由星期六下午 2 時至星期日中午 12 時;

(2)  父親希望留宿探視可由現時每月一次,增加至每月兩次,即時開始;母親則希望這個安排可於2009年1月才開始;

(3)  父親希望兒子學校長假期的一半有留宿探視,由2009年的農曆年開始;母親則希望由2009年的暑假才開始;

(4)  父親希望週末留宿探視時,母親可於九龍黃埔花園的一個青年中心將兒子交給父親;母親則認為應該維持於外祖父母所住大廈的大堂交接;

(5)  父親希望如他因公務而預知不能在某天進行探視,在他 7 天前通知母親的前題下,探視可延期一週;母親則反對,並說這會嚴重影響她與家人的生活安排;

(6)  父親希望如在探視日期,他因緊急公務而未能去接兒子,可由祖父母去代他接送兒子;母親則反對;

(7)  在探視進行時,如遇上颱風 8 號風球警告或黑雨警告,父親希望可於有關警告取消後的 2 小時內才將兒子送回母親;母親則要求在 1 小時內送回;及

(8)  父親要求母親將兒子的新住址、學校名稱及地址相告;母親則反對。

法律

14. 在考慮子女的管養權或探視權時,本席是須考慮香港法例第 13 章《未成年人監護條例》第 3 條的規定。本席現將該有關的條例節錄如下:-

「3. 一般原則

(1) 有關未成年人的管養或教養問題,以及有關屬於未成年人或代未成年人託管的財產的管理問題,或從該 等財產所獲收益的運用問題─

(a) 在任何法院進行的法律程序中(不論該法院是否第2條所界定的法院)─

(i) 法院須以未成年人的福利為首要考慮事項,而考慮此事項時須對下列各項因素給予適當考慮─

(A) 未成年人的意願(如在顧及未成年人的年齡及理解力,以及有關個案的情況後,考慮其意願乃屬切實可行者);及

(B) 任何關鍵性資料,包括聆訊進行時社會福利署署長備呈法院的任何報告;

…..。」

15. 從以上條例可見,本席在裁決有關子女管養權或探視權的爭議時,首要的考慮是該些家庭子女的福利。

社會調查報告

16. 社會調查主任劉先生曾就兒子管養權及探視權的爭議作出調查,他分別於2007年11月26日及2008年6月13日作出兩份報告。

17. 以兩份報告的內容可見,劉先生認為與訟雙方對於兒子都是關心及愛護。由於兒子從小就與母親及外祖父母一起生活,因此兒子與母親方面的關係是明顯比較密切。

18. 劉先生亦匯報了在臨時探視權命令頒布以來大約 6 個月間的探視情況。據他所說,雙方曾在某些時段內對探視安排有所紛爭。例如母親認為兒子對父親的探視安排非常抗拒,亦有指控說兒子在探視時被堂兄欺負。在另一方面,父親則認為母親方面阻撓他對兒子的探視。

19. 但總括來說,劉先生認為在過往6個月間,他可見到兒子與父親的關係己開始重建。因此,劉先生在建議將兒子管養權交給母親之餘 ,亦建議父親將有合理的探視權,這包括留宿的探視。最後,劉先生說基於雙方對於探視安排的紛爭,他亦希望法庭頒令一個特定的探視權,以免雙方繼續爭拗。

20. 雖然劉先生在雙方同意下,今天沒有出庭作供及接受盤問,但本席從他的兩份報 告中留意到以下的重要事項:-

(1)  與訟雙方的離婚並沒有對兒子造成非常重大的不良影響,兒子仍能保持情緒穩定,亦得到父母親及外祖父母對他的喜愛;

(第一份社會調查報告第12段,文件夾第94頁)

(2)  雖然母親方面曾指控兒子的堂兄欺負兒子,但劉先生認為與訟雙方及有關人仕都表現得情緒穩定,沒有証據顯示任何一方有對兒子造出傷害性行為;

(第一份社會調查報告的第13段,文件夾第95頁)

(3)  與訟雙方都是關心及愛護兒子;

(第二份社會調查報告第13段,文件夾第177頁)

(4)  在父親探視兒子開始後,兒子與父親的親密關係是與日俱增,兒子與雙方都保持著密切的關系;

(第二份社會調查報告第13段,文件夾第177頁)

(5)  父親要求多些探視安排,從而見証兒子的成長,這要求是為合理及可理解的;

(第二份社會調查報告第13段,文件夾第178頁)

(6)  母親及母親的親人是有鼓勵及努力安排父親的探視;及

(第二份社會調查報告第17段,文件夾第178頁)

(7)  兒子在某些塲合曾抗拒父親的探視,但當抗拒過後,兒子能與父親及父親的家人有自然的交流,這反映了兒子在探視的初期是需要一點適應的時間。

(第二份社會調查報告第13段,文件夾第178頁)

証據及陳詞

21. 雙方在審訊開始時同意為避免無謂的爭拗,他們都不需要就對方的証據及証人的証供作出盤問,這包括社會調查主任的証供。他們希望法庭在考慮過雙方各自存檔的誓章証據、証人的誓章証據、社會調查報告及雙方的陳詞後,作出就探視權的裁決。

22. 本席從本案的歷史及雙方的誓章中留意到,與訟雙方對對方是持有相當嚴重的敵視態度。例如在母親及外祖母的誓章中,是有不少篇幅描述雙方在婚姻持續期間的關係,父親怎樣對母親使用暴力等等的指控。就這方面來說,本席認為沒有絲毫証據顯示父親將會對兒子使用暴力,因此本席認為母親的這些嚴重指控,就算屬實,亦不會對有關的探視權爭議有重大的影響。如果強令雙方在庭上進行盤問,亦只會勾起雙方這些不快經歷,對解決雙方的爭議毫無益處。

23. 基於以上理由,本席亦認為雙方不就對方的証據作出盤問是一個合理及適當的做法。因此,本席將會考慮已存檔的文件証據及庭上陳詞後,就有關的探視權爭議作出裁決。

父親的証據及陳詞

24. 綜觀父親的証據及陳述,他的主要論點如下:-

(1)  父親認為母親及家人在他探視兒子的問題上是故意留難,並教唆兒子抗拒父親;

(2)  從社會調查報告及過往的探視安排可見,兒子在初時可能對父親有些抗拒,但當兒子在被接走後,兒子的表現判若兩人。兒子能和父親、祖父母及他的堂兄相處融洽。父親甚至可以拿出他們相處時所拍下的照片及影碟為証;

(3)  社會調查主任的報告清楚表明父親要求增加探視是合理及可理解的,報告亦說明父親與兒子的關係現更形親密;

(4)  父親認為應增加他對兒子的留宿探視,包括兒子學校長假期的探視,這可令兒子增加與父親的溝通,亦可增加兒子與父親親友,包括祖父母及其他朋友等的聯繫,這都對兒子的成長有所裨益;

(5)  在父親的計算下,就算法庭完全接納父親的探視建議,這亦意味著父親只可在全年中的24個週末中與兒子渡過,而母親則有28個週末與兒子渡過;

(6)  父親在得到一些長假期的留宿探視後,他可與兒子及家人在一些重要節日中一起渡過,他們甚至可安排一些外地的旅行;

(7)  父親否認兒子的堂兄曾欺負兒子,他甚至呈遞相片以証明堂兄與兒子一起時雙方相處愉快;

(8)  父親希望週末交接能在紅磡黃埔花園的一間青年中心中進行,以免雙方有所爭拗;及

(9)  父親認為他是有權得知兒子的住址及學校資料,而父母雙方都可以與學校聯絡,這才是一名正常學生應有的安排。

祖母的証據

25. 祖母在本案中存檔誓章,但本席留意到她基本上是重覆父親的論據,因此本席並不打算在這作出詳細論述。

母親的証據及陳詞

26. 至於母親方面,她的誓章及今天的陳詞是主要包括以下幾點:-

(1)  父親在婚姻持續期間對她及家人的種種不是,包括對她使用暴力;

(2)  母親並不反對父親對兒子的探視,包括留宿探視。但母親認為有關留宿探視的增加應該 是循序漸進;

(3)  母親說兒子對於父親的探視是非常抗拒,因此有多次的探視是不能順利進行;

(4)  母親否認她及家人有教唆兒子抗拒父親的探視,但父親仍對她及外祖父母等作出無理指控;

(5)  由於兒子的抗拒,每次探視時都令母親及外祖母等費盡唇舌,才可令兒子跟隨父親離開,這對兒子造成不必要的壓力;

(6)  母親亦認為在探視期間,兒子的堂兄曾對兒子進行欺負的行為,而父親或祖父母們未有加以阻止;

(7)  母親說她與兒子將於本月底搬入大埔區居住,兒子亦將於 8 月會到同區的一所國際學校讀幼稚園。這將是對兒子生活上的一個重大改變,因此她希望增加週末探視至每月兩次,可在兒子搬遷大約半年後才進行,即由2009年1月才開始。至於學校長假期的一半留宿探視,則由2009年暑假才開始;

(8)  有關週末探視兒子的交接地點,母親反對在紅磡交接,她認為在她父母官塘所住大廈的大堂是為適當。她說她父親可於星期五下午開車載兒子到官塘交給父親。至於星期六,兒子在早上需要到九龍城上一些特別課程 ,所以理想的交接地點仍是在官塘她父母居所的大堂;

(9)  至於父親要求在他因公務而未能行使探視權時,父親可以 7 天前的通知順延探視一週,或由祖父母去接兒子進行探視方面,母親表示反對。她認為如父親未能行使探視權時,她身為母親應可與兒子一起,她認為母親與兒子的聯係比祖父母與兒子的聯係更加重要;及

(10)         母親說父親曾擅自到學校要求接走兒子,這是為難學校,因此,她認為如父親不承諾在非探視期間不會擅自到學校接觸兒子,母親是不會同意將學校資料告之父親。

外祖母的証供

27. 外祖母方面亦有存檔誓章,其內容亦大致與母親的相同,本席亦不打算在這詳述。

本席意見

28. 本席考慮過雙方的証據及案件的所有情況後,本席所得的第一個印象是雙方在很多事情上都是堅持己見,各不相讓。

29. 但以法庭的角度而言,本席須要考慮的是何種安排是最符合兒子的利益。

30. 本席認為在原則上,法庭是應該鼓勵沒有管養權的一方,盡量可以增加與兒子相處的時間,這可令離婚對於兒子的不良影響減至最少,亦對兒子日後的成長有所裨益。亦基於這個論點,法庭在大多數的情況下,都會盡量頒發 一個寬鬆的探視權命令。

31. 就本個案而言,如法庭純粹以這角度去考慮兒子將來的探視安排,本席認為父親的增加探視建議,實屬適當。

32. 但由於母親的反對,本席須要進一步考慮:如法庭批准父親的探視安排,這會否對兒子的福利造成一些不良的影響。

33. 母親在這方面的主要論點是:兒子現時對於父親的探視非常抗拒,每次父親來接兒子時都會對兒子造成不必要的壓力。因此,母親認為增加留宿探視,不應即時進行,而是給予兒子更多時間去適應。

34. 在這問題上,母親曾要求法庭考慮她們在一次探視交接時所拍的片段,以証明兒子是不願意接受父親的探視。從影片中,本席確實是見到兒子不願意跟隨父親離去。

35. 但本席認為兒子只是一名 3 歲的孩童(在拍攝片段時還未滿 3 歲),這樣小年紀的兒童根本就不知道什麼是探視安排,很多時他們的所謂「意願」在很大程度上只是反映了與他親近的人的意願。

36. 從社會調查報告的內容及父親提供的相片等可見,兒子在過往父親的探視期間,兒子與父親及家人是有著愉快的經歷。本席相信兒子在與父親及家人相處期間,是完全沒有抗拒的情況出現。

37. 母親的另一個憂慮是兒子在探視期間被堂兄欺負,她甚至形容這是一件懷疑虐兒事件。

38. 在這問題上,父親曾嘗試呈遞堂兄的書面証據及錄影片段以支持堂兄沒有欺負兒子的這一事實。相反地,母親則訴說堂兄的品行及成績如何不好,以及父親及祖母如何無能力控制堂兄的劣行等。

39. 社會調查主任劉先生曾就這方面作出查詢,他的結論是沒有証據顯示有這些欺凌的發生。加上母親事實上沒有實在証據証 明這些所謂欺凌事件是怎樣發生,因此本席認為母親在這方面是有所過慮。再者,堂兄只有11歲,他是在祖父母的照顧下成長,如過往真有欺凌的事件發生 (但本席強調這並不是本席所裁定的事實) ,本席亦相信該些事件不會再次重演。

40. 但本席明白到兒子在短期內會就住址及學校方面有很大的轉變,因此雖然本席認同有關的留宿探視應該增加,但本席亦認為不應即時執行有關的改變,以使兒子能有一個適應期。

41. 至於適應期的長短問題,本席認為一個為期 2 個月的適應期是為適當。換句話說,有關每月增加一次週末留宿探視的安排,應於2008年10月開始。

42. 至於留宿探視的時間方面,本席認為由星期六下午 2 時至星期日中午 12 時是為適當。

43. 至於學校一半長假期的留宿探視,本席認為適當開始的時間是2009年農曆年假期。

44. 至於探視兒子的接送地點問題,本席明白到過往在外祖父母住所大堂交接是發生過問題,本席亦同意如換一個公眾的地點來進行交接,可能對事情有所幫助。

45. 至於父親因特別公務而要求將探視順延,或要求由祖父母代他接送兒子,本席明白到父親是一名醫生,事實上是有可能須要因特別公務而未能行使探視,本席認為父親的要求非無道理,予以批准。

46. 至於在探視時如遇上颱風或暴雨警告,本席認為在有關 的8號颱風訊號或黑雨警告取消的一小時內送還兒子是為適當。

47. 最後,本席認為父親要求得知兒子住址及學校資料的要求並無不妥,亦不會造兒子造成傷害,理應批准。

命令

48. 基於以上的理由,本席現頒發以下的特定探視權命令:-

(1)  父親可於每月的第一及第三個星期五,由下午 6 時至晚上 9 時進行探視,兒子交接的地點仍在外祖父母居所的大堂;

(2)  於每月第二及第四個週末,父親可有留宿探視,由星期六下午 2 時至星期日中午 12 時,兒子交接地點在紅磡黃埔花園方樹泉青少年中心的地下內;

(3)  除了每月第四個週末的留宿探視安排於2008年10月才開始外,以上的探視安排即時生効。為避免誤會,2008年7月11日,本星期五,即是為每月第二個週末的留宿探視;

(4)  於探視日期,如兒子出現身體不適的話,母親應以電話盡早通知父親,並告之父親有關 兒子的病況;

(5)  如父親預知因公務而不能進行探視,父親在給予母親 7 天通知的前題下,可將探視順延一週;

(6)  如父親因緊急公務而不能進行探視,祖父母可代父親接送兒子,並進行探視;

(7)  父親可不時與兒子通電話;

(8)  母親在兒子搬到新住址及新學校的 7 天內,以書面通知父親有關的新住址及學校資料;及

(9)  母親在未得父親的同意或法庭的准許下,不得為兒子改名及送兒子到外地留學或移民。

訟費

49. 本席現會處理有關訟費問題。

(法庭與雙方討論有關訟費問題)

50. 本席認為雙方雖然觀點不同,但都是真心愛惜兒子,因此本席認為訟費方面,包括以往保留的訟費,不作命令。

寄語

51. 本席最後在這想表明,在探視權的問題上,其實很多時都是沒有絕對「對」或「錯」的答案。最理想的做法理應是雙方都應該平心靜氣,盡量以一個客觀及容忍的態度去考慮對方的論據及立塲,在適當時盡量作出妥協。但如凡事都堅持己見,互相爭拗,毫不退讓,這肯定不是兒子之福。

 

 

 ( 陳振國 )
區域法院暫委法官

  

呈請人 : 無律師代表

答辯人 : 無律師代表