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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2015

羅允彤 對 法律援助署署長

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Files (3)

[2018] HKCFI 1302-EN-2018-06-21

LAW WAN TUNG v. DIRECTOR OF LEGAL AID

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HCAL 122/2015

[2018] HKCFI 1302

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 122 OF 2015

_________________________

BETWEEN
 LAW WAN TUNGApplicant
 and
 DIRECTOR OF LEGAL AIDRespondent

_________________________

Before: Master Thomas Leung in Chambers (Open to public)
Date of Hearing: 8 June 2018
Date of Decision : 21 June 2018

_________________________

DECISION

_________________________

1.  This is the application by the Applicant for an order that the Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause be discharged or varied.

2.  The Applicant failed in her attempt to apply for leave to Judicial Review against the Respondent.  She was ordered to pay the Respondent’s costs summarily assessed at HK$200,000 on 5 February 2016.  It is commonplace that the Applicant did not effect any payment.  The Respondent applied for a Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause.  The application was supported by an Affirmation of Cheung Yue Kwan Yvonne dated 11 January 2018 ("1st Affirmation").  The 1st Affirmation had 3 exhibits, which include one Judgment by Mr Recorder Stewart Wong, SC dated 28 December 2017 ("Judgment").

3.  Paragraph 20(3) of the Judgment provides that:-

"(3) A bank statement with Standard Chartered Bank dated 2 April 2015, showing that as at that date the 2nd defendant had HK$243.78 on deposit but owed a total of HK$136,996.06 in relation to three credit cards.  Thus the net position was that she was in deficit of HK$136,752.28 as at 2 April 2015.  The position was basically the same in subsequent months: the sum on deposit remained the same, and with the net deficit being HK$135,435.09, HK$134,148.18, HK$133,976.37 and HK$137,740.60 on 2 May 2015, 3 June 2015, 3 July 2015 and 3 August 2015 respectively."

There is no dispute that the 2nd defendant mentioned in the Judgment is the Applicant in this action.

4.  The main objection by the Applicant appears at Paragraph 6 of the 1st Affirmation, which was used in support of the application for Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause made on an ex parte basis, which states that:

"To the best of my information, I verily believe that Erwiana Sulistyaningsih, the Plaintiff in DCPI 569/2015 who had been awarded damages at HK$809,430.03 plus interest and costs before HH Judge Winnie Tsui, is the debtor of the Applicant.  The Respondent has no knowledge of any other creditors or creditors of the Applicant whom the Respondent can identify."

5.  The Applicant through her solicitor made 2 Affirmations in this application.  He stated that the Applicant was indebted to Standard Chartered Bank for 3 credit cards in 2015 as reflected in the Judgment.  The Applicant was incarcerated since February 2015 and she had no means to repay the credit cards debts.  Therefore, there was material non-disclosure in the 1st Affirmation and the Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause should be discharged.  Ms Wong, who appeared on behalf of the Applicant, cited to me the Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2018) Vol. 1 at §50/9A/23:-

"The judgment creditor is required by r.1(3)(b) to state the name of any creditor of the debtor whom he (the applicant) can identify.  In such case, the court has power on making the order nisi to direct service of copies of the order and of the affidavit in support on any other creditor of the judgment debtor or indeed on any other interested persons as may be appropriate in the circumstances.  Such other creditor or other interested person is entitled to attend and to be heard on the hearing of the further consideration of the matter, when the court will be considering whether or not to make the order absolute."

6.  Further, Ms Wong quoted §29/1/51 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2018) Vol. 1 which states that it is trite law that in making ex parte applications, the applicant bears the duty of full and frank disclosure.  On any ex parte application, the applicant must proceed “with the highest good faith”.  An order obtained on ex parte basis will be discharged without consideration of the merits if it was obtained without full disclosure, and material non-disclosure is a good reason for discharge of an ex parte application.

7.  Although the Applicant has been very critical as to the contents of the 1st Affirmation, the Applicant's 2 affirmations were made by her solicitor, not by herself.  None of these 2 Affirmations disclosed the Applicant's financial status as on the date when the 1st Affirmation was made.  The Applicant did not disclose on the 2 affirmations made by her solicitor whether the Applicant’s debts have been outstanding or repaid, and if the former, how much.  The Applicant did not make out a case that the Respondent was wrong on facts in the 1st Affirmation.  

8.  If the 1st Affirmation was made in 2015, then certainly the objection would be loud and clear as the Judgment clearly showed that the Applicant was indebted up to August 2015.  However, the 1st Affirmation was made on 11 January 2018.   The Court has not been informed by the Applicant’s solicitor of the number of the Applicant’s creditors, and the amount of the Applicant’s indebtedness as of the date of making the 1st Affirmation.  For the deponent of the 1st Affirmation to state that she could not identify other creditors of the Applicant could not be said to be material non-disclosure.  The 1st Affirmation might have failed to mention that the Applicant did owe money to a bank more than 2.5 years ago before the 1st Affirmation was made, but in my view the time gap has made such complaint irrelevant.  The Applicant also failed to show what prejudice could have caused to the Applicant.

9.  Ms Wong urged me to consider that once material non-disclosure is found on the affirmation in support of the ex parte application for the Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause, the order made thereunder should be discharged.  I find that the Applicant failed to demonstrate to me that there is any material non-disclosure.  The contents of the 1st Affirmation can be drafted with more information, and its meaning can be more precise.  However, in my finding I do not consider that it amounts to material non-disclosure.

10.  Based on my findings as above, I do not think I would need to deal with Ms Wong’s proposal to discharge and re-grant the Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause.  In passing, I also bear in mind the following passage from Citibank N.A. v. Express Ship Management ServicesLtd. [1987] HKLR 1184 at 1191:-

"It would be unfortunate if it were to be thought that in laying down the very sensible and necessary principles concerning disclosure of all material facts, the courts have intended to give active encouragement to undeserving defendants to search ingeniously for facts which a plaintiff might innocently have failed to disclose, in the hope that a judge may consider them to be material and so discharge [the original order]."

11.  I dismiss the Applicant's application.  Costs should normally follow the event.  However, with the benefit of hindsight, the entire application could have been avoided if the 1st Affirmation is drafted with more precision. I make an Order nisi that there be no order as to costs, to be made absolute within 14 days.  

12.  The parties have agreed that upon dealing with this application, the proper course for me to take is to seize the matter and deal with the Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause which has been adjourned by Master K W Wong’s Order of 16 March 2018.  I make an order that the Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause dated 24 January 2018 as amended by Order made by Master M. Lam on 15 May 2018 be made absolute, and costs thereof be summarily assessed at $9,100.

13.  I thank Ms Wong and Ms Cheung for their able assistance.

  

  

 (Thomas Leung)
 Master of the High Court

  

Ms Stephanie Wong, instructed by Ching & Co., for the Applicant

Ms Yvonne Cheung, Government Counsel of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent

103527-CH-2016-02-05

羅允彤 對 法律援助署署長

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HCAL 122/2015

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

憲法及行政訴訟案2015年第122號

____________

有關  
申請人羅允彤 
 對 
答辯人法律援助署署長 

____________

主審法官 : 高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 : 2016年2月5日
判決書日期 : 2016年2月5日

判決書

 

1.  就本席考慮了一張訟費單,本席不批准。本席前一次亦已說明不批准資深大律師方面的支出。

2.  申請取消覆核許可是在很遲的階段才提出的,不過正如本席在之前的判詞指出,律政司方面在知悉本席批出司法覆核許可之後,曾經聯絡過申請人方面當時的代表律師,提出有其他方式處理羅女士法援的申請,但得不到當時羅女士的代表律師的任何回應。若事實是羅女士方面接納了律政司方面的建議的話,很多訟費是可以減省的。而如果她的代表律師不是在聆訊前的週末終止代表羅女士,聆訊亦是可以減少一次,亦都減少律師費及大律師費的支出。

3.  整體考慮了本申請的困難度及案件程序上的經歷,本席認為一個合理的訟費應該是HK$200,000,本席判決申請人需要支付這方面的費用。

(歐陽桂如)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

申請人:無律師代表,自行應訊

答辯人:由律政司署理高級政府律師張裕君女士代表

103328-CH-2016-01-28

羅允彤 對 法律援助署署長

HTML content

HCAL 122/2015

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

憲法及行政訴訟2015年第122號

____________

有關  
申請人羅允彤 
 對 
答辯人法律援助署署長 

____________

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如
聆訊日期 :2016年1月28日
判決書日期 :2016年1月28日

判決書

 

1.  本席今天要處理兩個傳票,一個是2016年1月26日由律政司方面提出,要求將申請人因申請法援而引致的擱置程序取消。第二個申請亦是律政司提出的,2015年12月23日的傳票,要求取消本席於8月12日所批予的申請司法覆核的許可。

第一個傳票申請

2.  2016年1月25日,原本是聆訊第二個傳票申請的日期,有關第二個申請的文件約於一個月前即2015年12月23日已送達申請人羅女士當時的代表律師程明裕律師行。在2016年1月23日,即上星期六,本席獲悉羅女士不再由律師代表,而是自行行事,她亦申請了法援。該法援申請其實是相對地遲,因為下一個工作天已是聆訊第二個傳票的日子。

3.  一般而言,因更換律師或者太遲申請法援,法庭不會將原定的聆訊押後。在本案中,已有足夠的時間容讓羅女士與當時的代表律師去考慮第二個傳票的申請,羅女士沒有好的解釋為何如此遲才申請法援。亦從以下本席考慮第二個傳票申請的理由中可知,沒有好的理由要將程序擱置以候羅女士法援申請的結果。事實上,將第二個傳票的聆訊押後對羅女士是有百害而無一利的。因此本席批准第一個傳票的申請,將擱置程序的事宜解除,進行第二個傳票申請的聆訊。

第二個傳票申請

4.  羅女士在區域法院經過審訊後被裁定罪名成立,2015年2月27日法庭判決監禁的刑期。羅女士向上訴法庭申請許可推翻裁決及判刑,她曾經就該上訴向法律援助署申請法援,但藉着2015年6月29日的通知書,法援拒絕了她的申請。她沒有根據《刑事案法律援助規則》第12(3)條向上訴法庭申請法援,反之,她的代表律師向本庭申請以司法覆核的方式覆核法援署署長推翻她法援的申請。在本席批出許可讓羅女士申請司法覆核之後,法援署曾經以電話方式通知程明裕律師行刑事案的法援是沒有上訴的機制的,律政司亦通知該律師行有關第12(3) 規則,告知他們未曾用盡所有可能的方式之前是不容提出司法覆核的程序,但是至今申請人仍未將她的司法覆核申請撤回,法援署因此作為答辯方申請取消本席所給予的司法覆核許可。

法律原則

5.  司法覆核是法律容許的最後可以提出的濟助,除非有例外的情況,法庭不會行使司法覆核下所賦予的權力,如果申請人未曾用盡其他所有的渠道尋求濟助(見R v Epping v Harlow General Commissioners ex parte Goldstraw [1983] 3 All ER 257, 第262頁)。只有是不尋常或非常不尋常的情況或者非常例外的情況下,法庭才會不遵從這一個原則(見Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd v New World Development Company Limited & ors (2006) 9 HKCFAR 234, 第115段)。申請人應該知會法庭還有沒有其他尋求濟助的渠道,及為何他沒有使用該些渠道(見Berich Brokerage Limited v Securities and Futures Commission [2005] 2 HKLRD 583, 第32段)。如果申請人不披露他有這些其他的申請濟助的渠道,就會可能構成一個欠缺披露重要資料的行為(見Berich Brokerage第35段)。

應用法律原則

6.  根據《刑事案件法律援助規則》第12(3) 規則:

「凡就任何罪行的定罪、命令或裁定或就與該罪行相關的定罪、命令或裁定而提出上訴,法官或(如屬向上訴法庭提出的上訴)上訴法庭或上訴法庭法官覺得上訴人的申請儘管已遭署長拒絕,上訴人仍應獲給予法律援助,則除第(2)款另有規定外,法官或上訴法庭可向上訴人給予上訴援助證書,而署長須隨即指派一名律師,以及1或2名大律師,其中1人可為首席大律師,或僅指派一名律師或大律師,按署長認為適合者而定,以代表上訴人。」

第12(3) 規則賦予上訴法庭一個很廣大的管轄權,容許上訴庭批予法援給一個上訴者,即使署長曾經拒絕給予法援。正如唐大律師向法庭指出,根據該規則而向上訴法庭提出的申請是沒有指定的表格或程序的,申請人可以在上訴聆訊開展前向上訴法官提出申請。

7.  一般而言,以常規而言,如果上訴人並非有法律代表,根據實務指示4.2第10段,他可能被帶去一個過堂的聆訊,負責給予指示的法官可以給予指示,又或者根據該實務指示第6A段,所有從區域法院而提出的上訴,一般會由上訴法庭單一法官首先處理,在實務指示4.2下所產生的任何過堂聆訊,上訴人可以向上訴法庭申請法援,根據第12(3) 規則,上訴法庭的權力是很廣大的,上訴法庭甚至比法援署署長更能夠就一件上訴案的是非曲直,在初審/原審所考慮的證據、公平理由、法律程序是否複雜的理由、訴訟點等等作出考慮。

8.  在香港特別行政區對Ong Siu Sin Kevin一案中,上訴庭法官倫明高清楚地表達,根據第12(3) 規則而行使的權力是有別於及獨立於法援署在刑事案所行使的批准法援的權力,上訴法庭並不受法援署署長的決定所約束,倫明高法官有如下的裁定:

“28. It follows that the power to grant an appeal aid certificate is not contingent upon a determination that the Director has erred in refusing to grant legal aid. Accordingly, it is not necessary to examine the copious material that the applicant has chosen to put before this court addressing the issue of alleged errors made by the Director. Clearly, the merits and the interests of justice loom large in a consideration of whether or not this Court should exercise its power...”

9.  簡單而言,上訴法庭所能夠行使的權力有異於法律援助署署長並且甚至更為廣闊,比署長所行使的權力為大,法庭還要考慮刑事案件的是非曲直及公平的原則。因此第12(3) 規則非常適用於羅女士的情況,羅女士應該嘗試尋求該規則下所賦予的濟助,而不是申請司法覆核。

10.  應用上述所釋出的法律原則,雖然法庭有酌情權可以容許進行司法覆核,但本席看不到有任何十分例外的情況以致須要進行司法覆核,反而根據第12(3) 規則所進行的程序是明顯地更為適切。

欠缺披露重要事實

11.  在申請人所提出的第86表格,當時她是有律師代表的,但該表格沒有提及第12(3) 規則,更沒有提及為何她不行使該規則所賦予她的權力。本席在2015年8月12日的聆訊時,特別提出該規則,本席曾經詢問當時羅女士的代表大律師是否應該到上訴法庭申請法援,當時的大律師告知本席該做法會「太遲」。

12.  該大律師的陳詞是屬於誤導性質,沒有考慮唐大律師今次在陳詞中向法庭所提供的法律先例,亦沒有提到關於實務指示4.2下的程序。當時該大律師引用Z v Director of Legal Aid的案例,認為司法覆核是適切的程序。不過正如唐大律師向本席指出,在該案例中,申請人已經藉着第12(3) 規則作出過申請,然後才申請司法覆核,因此該案的處境與本案不同。本案的申請人從來沒有使用過該規則的程序,因此該大律師的陳詞對法庭來說是誤導性質的。若在8月12日當天,本席有今天所有的法律典籍,當時應該是不會批予司法覆核的許可。

13.  本席考慮整體的情況後,同意律政司方面的申請,因此本席撤銷曾經發出的司法覆核許可。本席希望申請人明白基於今天的判決,對她來說押後是毫無好處的,堅持司法覆核亦無好處,對她最有利的做法是立即以傳票或信件的方式向上訴法庭提出申請法援,這個才是適切的幫助自己尋求法律援助的途徑。

(法官與雙方討論有關訟費申請事宜)

14.  本席正式下令堂費由申請人給予答辯人,批予一張大律師證書,而堂費亦包括之前申請許可及兩個傳票的申請。

(歐陽桂如)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

申請人:無律師代表,自行應訊

答辯人:由律政司轉聘唐思佩大律師代表