HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Miscellaneous Proceedings2019

SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LTD v. NG HUNG MING AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV210/2011CHAN CHI LOI 對 CHENG FOR 及另二人
  • CACV420/2018徐小芳 對 MEBABOX DEVELOPMENT CO LTD 及另二人
  • CACV428/2002林榮江 訴 JOINTYAN LTD及另二人
  • CACV490/2020PHAM THI VAN ANH 及另二人 對 入境事務處處長及另一人
  • CACV51/2010N 訴 Y及另二人
  • CACV564/2021BUI THI NHI 及另二人 對 酷刑聲請上訴委員會∕免遣返聲請呈請辦事處
  • CAMP116/2019TSOI LAU FU 及另一人 對 PANG WAN FONG 及另二人
  • CAMP205/2022CHAN SAI CHIU 對 LAI CHI KIT 及另二人
  • CAMP29/2017YIP MEI NA 對 CHOW LAP KWOK PATRICK 及另二人
  • CAMP45/2023NGUYEN BUI SON 及另二人 對 酷刑聲請上訴委員會及另一人
  • DCCJ1239/2020HK DONGXIANG INTERNATIONAL TRADE LTD 對 TAI KAM FAT 及另二人
  • DCEC1992/2014LAW CHI HO 對 HOME MOVING LTD 及另二人
  • DCEC30/2023KONG WAI LUN 對 CHEN XIONGJIANG及另二人
  • DCMP1143/2016KONEW CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LTD 對 LAI SIU FUN 及另二人
  • DCMP1581/2016WONG HEI LAM 及另一人 對 TONG LAI WAH 及另二人
  • DCMP3032/2014LAW SHU KEUNG STEPHEN t/a EXCEL FINANCE COMPANY v. NG MING AND OTHERS
  • DCMP3491/2019SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LTD v. NG HUNG MING AND OTHERS
  • DCMP467/2013U PO CHU (otherwise known as YU MAN KI or YU MAN KIT) v. TSANG PUI LING AND OTHERS
  • DCMP955/2023MAXCOLM FINANCE LTD 對 TONG LO MING及另二人
  • DCPI1503/2007CHAN WAI TUNG v. TANG KWOK KWONG AND OTHERS

Files (2)

[2025] HKDC 1045-EN-2025-07-11

SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LTD v. NG HUNG MING AND OTHERS

HTML content

DCMP 3490 & 3491/2019

(Heard Together)

[2025] HKDC 1045

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 3490 OF 2019

--------------------------------

 IN THE MATTER OF the property known as Flat B on the Third Floor including the Flat Roof appurtenant thereto, Kam On Building, No.94 Nga Tsin Wai Road, Kowloon
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF a Second Mortgage dated 23rd October 2018 and registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No. 18102600960038
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Order 83A and Order 88 of the Rules of the District Court, Chapter 336H
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Sections 2, 3 & 6 of the Partition Ordinance, Chapter 352

--------------------------------

BETWEEN

 SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 NG HUNG MING1st Defendant
 YU KA YUK2nd Defendant
 WONG LAI NOG3rd Defendant

--------------------------------

AND

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 3491 OF 2019

 

--------------------------------

 IN THE MATTER OF the property known as Flat 9 on 1st Floor, Cambridge Building, Nos.6-24A Kam Wing Street, Kowloon
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF a Mortgage dated 23rd October 2018 and registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No. 18102600960022
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Order 83A and Order 88 of the Rules of the District Court, Chapter 336H
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Sections 2, 3 & 6 of the Partition Ordinance, Chapter 352

--------------------------------

BETWEEN

 SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 NG HUNG MING1st Defendant
 YU KA YUK2nd Defendant
 WONG LAI NOG3rd Defendant
 TSANG KAM SING4th Defendant

--------------------------------

(Heard Together)

Before: Deputy District Judge Ebony Ling (Paper Disposal)
Date of Written Submissions by the 1st Defendant: 2 June 2025
Date of Written Submissions by the Plaintiff: 9 June 2025
Date of Decision: 11 July 2025

--------------------------

DECISION

--------------------------

A.  Introduction

1.  This is D1 (“Ng”)’s application in each of DCMP 3490/2019 and DCMP 3491/2019 by summonses dated 2 April 2025 (the “Summonses”) for:

(1)  leave to appeal out of time against the court’s judgment dated 29 November 2024 in each of DCMP 3490/2019 and DCMP 3491/2019 (which were dealt with together) (the “Judgment”);

(2)  leave to appeal; and

(3)  stay of execution of the Judgment pending appeal.

2.  By an originating summons filed on 22 October 2019 in DCMP 3490/2019, P sought:

(1)  money judgment pursuant to O 83A of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H) (“RDC”) against Ng and D2 (“Yu”); and

(2)  an order for sale of the property known as Flat B on the Third Floor including the Flat Roof appurtenant thereto, Kam On Building, No 94 Nga Tsin Wai Road, Kowloon (“Kam On Property”) [1] pursuant to O 88 of RDC and sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Partition Ordinance (Cap 352) against Ng and D3 (“Wong”).

3.  By an originating summons filed on 22 October 2019 in DCMP 3491/2019 (together with the originating summons in DCMP 3490/2019, the “OriginatingSummonses”), P sought:

(1)  money judgment pursuant to O 83A of RDC against Ng and Yu; and

(2)  an order for sale of the property known as Flat 9 on 1st Floor, Cambridge Building, Nos 6-24A Kam Wing Street, Kowloon (“CambridgeProperty”)[2] pursuant to O 88 of RDC and sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Partition Ordinance against Ng, Wong and D4 (“Tsang”).

4.  As stated in paragraph 32 of the Judgment, it is Ng’s case at the hearing on 4 November 2024 (which he maintains in paragraph 41 of his Skeleton Submissions in this application) that the he had fully repaid all the loans mentioned in paragraph 11 of the Judgment with a total sum of $3,062,070, which consisted of:

(1)  The cashier’s order in the amount of $1,500,000 he paid to P’s solicitors on 24 January 2019;

(2)  Yu’s payment of $500,000 to P; and

(3)  Ng’s payment in the amount of $1,062,070 under Kai Ming Loans[3].

See also paragraph 34 of Ng’s 2nd Affirmation.

5.  For the reasons given in paragraphs 30 to 46 of the Judgment, the court ruled in favour of P and held that Ng and Yu had failed and/or refused to repay the outstanding amount under the Subject Loan Agreements[4]. The court also granted an order for sale in each of the respective actions.

B.  Purported grounds of appeal

6.  In his draft notices of appeal, Ng’s purported grounds of appeal in the two actions are:

(1)  The court erred in law in holding that there was no triable issue in respect of P’s claims against Ng (“Ground 1”);

(2)  The court ought to have held that there was a triable issue whether Ng had been induced by P’s misrepresentation that the respective Kam On 2nd Loan[5] and Cambridge 2nd Loan[6] were just extensions of respectively Kam On 1st Loan[7] and Cambridge 1st Loan[8] (“Ground 2”);

(3)  The court ought to have held that there is a triable issue as to whether the respective Kam On 2nd Loan and Cambridge 2nd Loan were drawn down and appropriated towards the repayment of Kai Ming Loans and/or whether P had lent any sum to Ng at all under respectively Kam On 2nd Loan and Cambridge 2nd Loan (“Ground 3”);

(4)  The court ought to have held that there was a triable issue as to whether Ng and Yu had, between themselves, fully repaid all the loans which Ng owed to P, including Kam On 1st Loan and Cambridge 1st Loan (“Ground 4”);

(5)  The court ought to have held that there was a triable issue as to whether Yu had paid P a sum of $500,000 for the repayment of the loans jointly and severally owed by Ng and Yu to P (“Ground 5”);

(6)  The court ought to have found that there was a triable issue on P’s allegation that in February 2019, Ng orally agreed with P through Mr Li Cho Chuen (“Li”) to appropriate part of the sum of $1,500,000 to the repayment of the loans owed by Yu to P in the absence of any documentary evidence, and owing to the inherent improbability, of the alleged oral agreement, which Ng denies (“Ground 6”);

(7)  The court ought to have held that Ng repaid the sum of $1,500,000 wholly towards Kai Ming Loans, or that there is a triable issue as to whether the sum of $1,500,000 was so repaid (“Ground 7”);

(8)  The court failed to take into account the sum of $200,000, being the amount of Kam On 2nd Loan together with another sum of $20,000, being the amount of Cambridge 2nd loan, which on P’s case were used to repay Kai Ming Loans, and the court ought to have found that on P’s case, by 19 December 2018, Ng and Yu owed P the outstanding principal under Kai Ming Loans only in the sum of $2,200,000 with the result that in relation to Kai Ming Loans, after paying the sum of $1,500,000 on 24 January 2019 and $1,062,070 on 25 February 2019, Ng had overpaid P by an approximate sum of $400,000 or such other sum found in excess of Ng and Yu’s indebtedness under Kai Ming Loans, which Ng is entitled to set off wholly or partly against Kam On 2nd Loan and Cambridge 2nd Loan, if they existed (“Ground 8”); and

(9)  The court ought to have held that the circumstances of P require investigation at trial, in particular, whether and/or why Yu’s cashier’s order dated 24 January 2019 for the sum of $1,500,000 was dishonoured and whether, and if so, how much Ng and Yu owed, to P under Kam On 2nd Loan and Cambridge 2nd Loan (“Ground 9”).

C.  Applicable legal principles

C1.  Leave to appeal

7.  Pursuant to section 63A of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336), leave to appeal may only be granted if the court is satisfied that the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there are some other reasons that the intended appeal should be heard. Reasonable prospect involves the notion that the prospect must be more than “fanciful” without having to be “probable”. See eg Hong Kong Balance International Trading & Logistics Co Ltd v Kwok Yiu Hung and Ng Kwok Wai[2025] HKCA 283, §13, per Kwan VP.

8.  When determining an application for leave to appeal out of time, the court will consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) whether the intended appeal has reasonable prospect of success; and (4) prejudice to other parties if leave to appeal out of time is granted. See Huang Lidong v Kwong Wing Chung[2024] HKCA 465, §13, per Anthony Chan J.

9.  Where the reasons given for the delay are not satisfactory, the applicant must show “real prospect of success” (a strongly arguable case) on the merits of his proposed appeal before the court will exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time. See Huang Lidong (supra), §16.

C2.  Stay of execution pending appeal

10.  The parties agree that the principles applicable to an application for stay of execution pending appeal are trite and are those set out in Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84, §§6-10, per Ma J (as he then was). In gist, the court has to consider (1) the merits of the appeal and (2) whether the appeal would be rendered nugatory without a stay.

D.  Leave application

D1.  Lateness and reasons for delay of the leave application

11.  The Judgment was handed down on 29 November 2024. Pursuant to O 58 r 2(4)(b) of RDC, an application for leave to appeal must be made within 28 days from the date of the Judgment, ie by 27 December 2024. Ng’s delay of 96 days in taking out the leave application on 2 April 2025 was substantial.

12.  As to his explanation for the delay, on 24 December 2024, ie 5 days before the deadline in taking out the leave application, when the lawyers who he had consulted asked him to put them in funds, Ng decided to change lawyers, even though the deadline for his leave application was approaching.

13.  He then took no action until February 2025 when his mother contacted his current lawyers. After that, it took him another month to borrow money from his mother to put his lawyers in funds on or around 5 March 2025.

14.  Notwithstanding the substantial delay which had already occurred, he gave no explanation at all as to why it took him another 4 weeks to finally take out the present application.

15.  In the premises, I find that Ng’s explanation for the delay is unsatisfactory and inexcusable. He must therefore show “real prospect of success” (a strongly arguable case) on the merits of his proposed appeal before the court will exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time.

D2.  The purported grounds of appeal

Ground 1

16.  This ground does not demonstrate how and why the court went wrong. It does not even make out a case that the court’s conclusion is wrong.

Ground 2

17.  The allegation of misrepresentation is a new argument which was not raised by Ng in the hearing of the Originating Summonses. In any event:

(1)  First, there is no evidence in support of the alleged misrepresentation or how Ng had been allegedly induced by the alleged misrepresentation.

(2)  Secondly, any allegation of misrepresentation is directly refuted by the instruction letters dated 19 December 2018 signed by Ng and Yu and addressed to P and its lawyers (the “InstructionLetters”) referred to in paragraph 36 of the Judgment, expressly instructing the latter to utilise the facility from Kam On 2nd Loan and Cambridge 2nd Loan to satisfy part of the outstanding amount under Kai Ming Loans.

Ground 3

18.  This purported ground of appeal is precisely the first ground relied on by Ng in opposing the Originating Summonses: see paragraph 31(1) of the Judgment. Ng is simply rehashing the arguments which he had deployed before. In paragraphs 35 to 39 of the Judgment, the court has already dealt with such arguments and rejected the same. In particular, the court held that Ng’s allegation is flatly contradicted by the Instruction Letters.

Ground 4

19.  It is unclear what this purported ground of appeal means. Ng and Yu are jointly and severally liable as co-borrowers under the Subject Loan Agreements: see paragraphs 11 to 12 of the Judgment. As held in paragraphs 30, 34 and 46 of the Judgment, Ng and Yu have failed to repay the outstanding amounts under the Subject Loan Agreements. Insofar as this purported ground seeks to challenge such a finding of fact, it fails to identify how and why the court went wrong.

Ground 5

20.  Ng is simply rehashing the arguments which he had deployed before. In paragraph 45 of the Judgment, the court has already held that there is simply no evidence in support of the allegation that Yu had repaid $500,000 to P. Ng has not explained how and why such a conclusion was wrong.

Ground 6

21.  It is not exactly clear what this purported ground of appeal means. Ng appears to suggest that the court ought to have found that there is a triable issue as to whether Ng had orally agreed with P to appropriate part of the sum of $1,500,000 repaid on 24 January 2019 for the repayment of loans owed by Yu to P. However:

(1)  First, it is not P’s case that the repayment of $1,500,000 was used to repay loans owed solely by Yu to P. As explained in paragraph 41 of the Judgment, the sum was used to repay part of Kai Ming Loans and an amount of $4,840 under each of Subject Loan Agreements.

(2)  Secondly, as stated in paragraph 11 of the Judgment, the Subject Loan Agreements as well as Kai Ming loans are all owed by Ng and Yu jointly and severally as co-borrowers. It is therefore unclear as to how appropriating part of the $1,500,000 to the Subject Loan Agreements, rather than Kai Ming Loans, would prejudice Ng, or is inherently improbable, due to any alleged difference in the identity of the borrowers.

(3)  Thirdly, and in any event, by treating part of the $1,500,000 as repayment under the Subject Loan Agreements actually reduces Ng (and Yu)’s indebtedness to P under the Subject Loan Agreements to Ng (and Yu)’s advantage. It is therefore unclear as to how Ng’s contention that the entirely of the sum of $1,500,000 was used to repay Kai Ming Loans would assist his case in these proceedings.

Ground 7

22.  As explained in paragraph 21(3) above, it is unclear how this purported ground would assist Ng’s case as it would only reduce the amount which he has repaid under the Subject Loan Agreements and thereby increase his indebtedness to P under the Subject Loan Agreements.

Ground 8

23.  This purported ground is misconceived for the following reasons:

(1)  Ng has failed to take into account the interest payments and late charges. As explained by P, the correct calculations as supported by evidence are as follows:

(a)  As at 15 January 2019, the total outstanding amount (including interest and late charges) under Kai Ming Loans was $2,691,557.[9]

(b)  The above amount has clearly not taken into account the $400,000 repayment from Kam On 2nd Loan and Cambridge 2nd Loan as mentioned above.

(c)  By around 24 January 2019, further interest and late charges in the sums of $4,758[10] and $270[11], ie a total sum of $5,028, accrued on Kai Ming 1st Loan and Kai Ming 2nd Loan respectively.

(d)  On around 24 January 2019, $1,274,415 out of the $1,500,000 repayment sum mentioned above was used to partially repay Kai Ming Loans.[12]

(e)  By around 1 March 2019, further interest and late charges in the sums of $18,270[13] and $21,630[14], ie a total sum of $39,900, accrued on Kai Ming 2nd Loan and Kai Ming 3rd Loan respectively.

(f)  Taking into account the $400,000 repayment mentioned in (b) above, an amount of $1,062,070 remains outstanding under Kai Ming Loans, which exact amount was repaid by Ng on 28 February 2019 as explained in sub-paragraph (2) below.[15]

(g)  There is therefore no alleged “excess”, “spillover” or “overpayment” under Kai Ming Loans.

(2)  As evidenced by a letter from P’s solicitors to Messrs Fan Wong & Tso (being Urban Renewal Authority’s lawyers) dated 25 February 2019 and the receipt on discharge of a charge dated 28 February 2019 in respect of Kai Ming Mortgage[16], an exact sum of $1,062,070 out of the purchase price of the Kai Ming Property sold by Ng to Urban Renewal Authority was paid by Urban Renewal Authority to P to discharge the Kai Ming Loans on 28 February 2019. It is incorrect for Ng to suggest that “there is no shred of any documentary evidence” in support of the same.[17] There was therefore no excess, spillover or overpayment under Kai Ming Loans.

(3)  As explained above, it is all along Ng’s case that he had fully repaid all loans with a total sum of $3,062,070, which consisted of inter alia Yu’s payment of $500,000 to P. In light of the court’s finding that Yu did not repay $500,000 to P, it follows that the Subject Loan Agreements and Kai Ming Loans have not been fully repaid.

Ground 9

24.  As stated in paragraph 33 of the Judgment, there is no dispute that the cheque in the amount of $1,500,000 paid by Yu to P was dishonoured. In the premises, there is no issue as to whether such cheque was dishonoured[18] , and the question of why such cheque was dishonoured is simply irrelevant.

25.  For the reasons above, I find that Ng has failed to demonstrate real prospects of success on the merits of any of his purported grounds of appeal. I therefore dismiss Ng’s application for leave to appeal out of time.

E.  Stay of execution application

26.  As I do not grant leave to appeal out of time, the stay of execution application falls away.

27.  In any event, there is no evidence that the appeal would be rendered nugatory. There is no absolute rule or principle that where the relevant order concerns the possession of a property, the appeal would necessarily be rendered nugatory absent a stay. The burden remains on the applicant to establish and put forward evidence that the appeal would be rendered nugatory. See Sherman Ngoi Wing Lee v Lee Hoi Wing Michael and Lee Hon Kuen Gordon, the joint executors of the estate of Lee Koon Wan[2024] HKCFI 2552, §5.15.

28.  However, in the present application, first, there is no evidence that the appeal would be rendered nugatory in respect of the sale of the Cambridge Property. As to the Kam On Property, there is no suggestion of any hardship other than financial ones, being a lower reserve price for the sale of the property than the amount offered by the Urban Renewal Authority. Not only does this fail to show that the appeal would be rendered nugatory, the reserve price may not even be the eventual sales price. A lower reserve price does not necessarily lead to any financial loss if the eventual sales price is higher than the price offered by the Urban Renewal Authority.

29.  Further, according to Ng’s 4th Affirmation filed on 9 May 2025 in DCMP 3491/2019, Ng does not reside at “the property”. Although it is unclear whether Ng is referring to the Cambridge Property only or both the Cambridge Property and Kam On Property, this reinforces the above finding that there is no suggestion of any hardship other than financial ones.

30.  For the reasons above, I dismiss Ng’s stay of execution application.

F.  Conclusion

31.  For all the reasons above, I dismiss the Summonses.

32.  I make a costs order nisi that Ng do pay P’s costs of the Summonses, with certificate for counsel. Such costs are to be summarily assessed on papers. Ng do provide his objections (if any) to the Statements of Costs filed by P together with its Skeleton Submissions within 7 days from the date of this decision.

  ( Ebony Ling )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Jason Fee, instructed by V Hau & Chow, for the Plaintiff

Mr Raymond Lau, instructed by Ng & Fang, for the 1st Defendant



[1]  Being “金安物業”defined in paragraph 3 of the Judgment.

[2]  Being “金穚物業”defined in paragraph 4 of the Judgment.

[3]  Being “啟明第一份貸款合約”, “啟明第二份貸款合約” and “啟明第三份貸款合約” as defined in paragraph 11 of the Judgment.

[4]  Being “有關貸款合約” as defined in paragraph 11 of the Judgment.

[5]  Being “金安第二份貸款合約” as defined in paragraph 11 of the Judgment.

[6]  Being “金橋第二份貸款合約” as defined in paragraph 11 of the Judgment.

[7]  Being “金安第一份貸款合約” as defined in paragraph 11 of the Judgment.

[8]  Being “金橋第一份貸款合約” as defined in paragraph 11 of the Judgment.

[9]  See paragraph 10 of Li’s 3rd Affirmation, ie $1,639,657 + $309,270 + $742,630.

[10]  See paragraphs 10 and 12(b)-(e) of Li’s 3rd Affirmation.

[11]  See paragraph 15 of Li’s 3rd Affirmation.

[12]  See paragraph 12 of Li’s 3rd Affirmation.

[13]  See paragraph 15 of Li’s 3rd Affirmation.

[14]  See paragraphs 10 and 15 of Li’s 3rd Affirmation.

[15]  ie $2,691,557 + $5,028 + $39,900 - $400,000 - $1,274,415 = $1,062,070

[16]  Being “啟明按揭” as defined in paragraph 11 of the Judgment.

[17]  See paragraph 37 of Ng’s Skeleton Submissions.

[18]  See also paragraph 26 of Ng’s Skeleton Submissions admitting the same.

[2024] HKDC 1983-CH-2024-11-29

SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LTD 對 NG HUNG MING 及另二人

HTML content

DCMP 3490/2019 及 DCMP 3491/2019

(一併處理)

[2024] HKDC 1983

香港特別行政區

區域法院

雜項案件2019年第3490號

------------------------------

 IN THE MATTER OF the property known as Flat B on the Third Floor including the Flat Roof appurtenant thereto, Kam On Building, No.94 Nga Tsin Wai Road, Kowloon
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF a Second Mortgage dated 23rd October 2018 and registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No.18102600960038
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Order 83A and Order 88 of the Rules of the District Court, Chapter 336H
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Sections 2, 3 & 6 of the Partition Ordinance, Chapter 352

------------------------------

原告人SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LIMITED 
 及 
第一被告人NG HUNG MING 
第二被告人YU KA YUK 
第三被告人WONG LAI NOG 

------------------------------

香港特別行政區

區域法院

雜項案件2019年第3491號

------------------------------

 IN THE MATTER OF the property known as Flat 9 on 1st Floor, Cambridge Building, Nos.6-24A Kam Wing Street, Kowloon
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF a Mortgage dated 23rd October 2018 and registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No.18102600960022
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Order 83A and Order 88 of the Rules of the District Court, Chapter 336H
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Sections 2, 3 & 6 of the Partition Ordinance, Chapter 352

------------------------------

原告人SUCCESS FORTUNE FINANCIAL PLANNING LIMITED 
 及 
第一被告人NG HUNG MING 
第二被告人YU KA YUK 
第三被告人WONG LAI NOG 
第四被告人TSANG KAM SING 

------------------------------

主審法官:區域法院暫委法官凌依楠法庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2024年11月4日
判案書日期:2024年11月29日

------------------------------

判案書

------------------------------

A.  背景

1.  這是一併處理 DCMP 3490/2019(“3490 案件”)及 DCMP 3491/2019(“3491 案件”)的聆訊。

2.  原告人是一所財務公司,以原訴傳票向兩單案件的第一及第二被告人追討欠款,及根據香港法例第 352 章《分劃條例》要求法庭分別向 3490 案件的第一及第三被告人及 3491 案件的第一、第三及第四被告人(以下分別稱為 “第一被告人”、“第二被告人”、“第三被告人” 及 “第四被告人”)作出售樓命令。

3.  第一被告人(50%)及第三被告人(50%)是 Flat B on the Third Floor including the Flat Roof appurtenances thereto, Kam On Building, No.94 Nga Tsin Wai Road, Kowloon(“金安物業”)分權共有的業主。

4.  第一被告人(37.5%)、第三被告人(37.5%)及第四被告人(25%)是 Flat 9 on 1st Floor, Cambridge Building, Nos.6-24A Kam Wing Street, Kowloon(“金穚物業”)分權共有的業主。

5.  第一被告人亦是 1st Floor, No.10 Kai Ming Street, Kowloon(“啟明物業”)的 100% 註冊業主。

6.  原告人在 3490 案件及 3491 案件的證據大致相同,是在每單案件中分別於2019年12月30日、2021年6月25日及2022年12月1日由其經理 Li Cho Chuen 作出的三份誓章(以下分別稱為 “Li 1st”、“Li 2nd” 及 “Li 3rd”)。

7.  第一被告人在每單案件中分別存檔了兩份日期為2020年4月14日及2021年11月22日的誓章。

8.  第二被告人沒有就兩單案件存檔抗辯通知書,也沒有存檔任何證據。

9.  在有關的案件中,第三被告人及第四被告人存檔了抗辯通知書,但沒有存檔任何證據。

10.  第二及第四被告人沒有出席本聆訊。

B.  借貸關係

11.  按 Li 1st 及 Li 2nd 誓章所述,原告人與第一及第二被告人簽訂了以下七份的貸款合約,而第一被告人亦於2018年10月23日簽署了按揭文件把他於金安物業的權益、金穚物業的權益及啟明物業的權益作為以下指出的欠債的抵押(以下分別稱為 “金安按揭” 、“金穚按揭” 及 “啟明按揭”):

日期貸款合約的簡稱編號貸款金額
(港幣$)
有關按揭
23.10.2018 啟明第一份貸款合約 SFP/M/18- 10/0009 160萬 啟明按揭
金安第一份貸款合約 SFP/M/18- 10/0010 20萬 金安按揭
金橋第一份貸款合約 SFP/M/18- 10/0008 20萬 金穚按揭
16.11.2018 啟明第二份貸款合約 SFP/M/18- 11/0008 30萬 啟明按揭
7.12.2018 啟明第三份貸款合約 SFP/M/18- 12/0004 70萬 啟明按揭
19.12.2018 金安第二份貸款合約 SFP/M/18- 12/0007 20萬 金安按揭
金橋第二份貸款合約 SFP/M/18- 12/0006 20萬 金穚按揭

12.  3490 的案件針對金安第一及第二份貸款合約及金安按揭,而 3491 的案件針對金橋第一及第二份貸款合約及金穚按揭。

13.  金安第一及第二份貸款合約及金橋第一及第二份貸款合約(以下統稱為 “有關貸款合約”),除了以下列出的還款日期外,條款大致相同。有關貸款合約均列出以下的相關條款:

(1)  第一及第二被告人須以年利率 29.04% 向原告人償還貸款;

(2)  第一及第二被告人須分期三個月作出以下還款:

還款期到期日本金
(港幣$)
利息
(港幣$)
還款金額
(港幣$)
金安第一份貸款合約
1 23.11.2018 0 4,840 4,840
2 23.12.2018 0 4,840 4,840
3 22.1.2019 200,000 4,840 204,840
金橋第一份貸款合約
1 23.11.2018 0 4,840 4,840
2 23.12.2018 0 4,840 4,840
3 22.1.2019 200,000 4,840 204,840
金安第二份貸款合約
1 19.1.2019 0 4,840 4,840
2 19.2.2019 0 4,840 4,840
3 19.3.2019 200,000 4,840 204,840
金橋第二份貸款合約
1 19.1.2019 0 4,840 4,840
2 19.2.2019 0 4,840 4,840
3 19.3.2019 200,000 4,840 204,840

(3)  條款 1 指第一及第二被告人以有關按揭作為抵押。

(4)  條款 5 指第一被告人保證他是有關按揭下的物業的法定及實益擁有人。

(5)  條款 9 指第一及第二被告人對於到期未清還的款項,不論是在法院頒布得直令之前或之後皆以上述利率計算。

(6)  條款 10 指若果第一及第二被告人於還款到期日,仍未繳足該期款項或利息,貸款合約之未付餘額必須由借款人立即全數清還。

(7)  條款 16 指若果第一及第二被告人未能如預期償還已到期之款項,附加單利利息以年利率 29.04% 計算。

14.  金安按揭及金穚按揭(以下統稱為 “有關按揭”)的條款大致相同。有關按揭均列出以下的相關條款:

(1)  條款 2.1 指第一及第二被告人須共同及分別承擔對原告人的債務責任。

(2)  條款 7.1 指若果第一及第二被告人沒有在到期日還款,原告人可以執行有關抵押。

(3)  條款 7.3 指若果第一及第二被告人於還款到期日仍未繳足該期款項或利息,他們必須立即全數還清貸款合約之未付餘額。

(4)  條款 8 指在執行有關抵押時,原告人有權要求第一被告人交出有關物業的管有權。

(5)  條款 21.1 指第一及第二被告人須支付原告人所有合理的費用及支出,包括律師費,並以律師與當事人基礎評定。

15.  金安按揭、金穚按揭及啟明按揭均是相關物業的第一按揭。

16.  根據金安按揭及金安第一及第二貸款合約,原告人向第一及第二被告人借出有關貸款。

17.  根據金橋按揭及金橋第一及第二貸款合約,原告人向第一及第二被告人借出有關貸款。

18.  第一及第二被告人於2019年1月22日起,未有在到期日償還金安第一貸款合約及金橋第一貸款合約的有關貸款。

19.  第一及第二被告人於2019年2月19日起,未有在到期日償還金安第二貸款合約及金橋第二貸款合約的有關貸款。

20.  於2019年8月27日及2019年9月23日,原告人透過律師分別向第一及第二被告人要求還款。原告人亦於2019年9月23日透過律師分別去信致第三及第四被告人。

21.  儘管如此,第一及第二被告人仍然未有及/或拒絕就着有關貸款合約下的欠款或任何欠款向原告人作出償還。

22.  原告人根據香港法例第 336H 章《區域法院規則》第 83A 號命令第 3 款及第 88 號命令第 8 款,就着有關貸款合約及有關按揭述明了相關的詳情。

23.  截至於2019年12月30日,第一及第二被告人根據金安按揭及金安第一及第二貸款合約下的總欠款為港幣511,530.39元連同有關利息及附加利息。這包括:

(1)  截至於2019年12月30日,根據金安第一貸款合約下的總欠款,港幣254,299.29元及 3490 案件中 Li 1st 第 26(m) 段所指出的利息及違約利息;及

(2)  截至於2019年12月30日,根據金安第二貸款合約下的總欠款,港幣257,231.10元及 3490 案件中 Li 1st 第 27(m)-(n) 段所指出的利息及違約利息。

24.  截至於2019年12月30日,第一及第二被告人根據金橋按揭及金橋第一及第二貸款合約下的總欠款為港幣511,530.39元連同有關利息及附加利息。這包括:

(1)  截至於2019年12月30日,根據金橋第一貸款合約下的總欠款,港幣254,299.29元及 3491 案件中 Li 1st 第 26(m) 段所指出的利息及違約利息;及

(2)  截至於2019年12月30日,根據金橋第二貸款合約下的總欠款,港幣257,231.10元及 3491 案件中 Li 1st 第 27(m)-(n) 所指出的利息及違約利息。

25.  原告人在有關誓章中指出,盡原告人所知:

(1)  第一及第三被告人管有及控制金安物業;

(2)  第一、第三及第四被告人管有及控制金橋物業。

C.  欠款

26.  本席在考慮有關誓章及證據後,接受原告的案情,指第一及第二被告人須要償還有關貸款合約下的欠款,而有關按揭分別以金安物業及金橋物業作為有關欠款的抵押。

27.  至於有關貸款合約下的利息,原告人向第一及第二被告人索償判決前及判決後的利息均以年利率 29.04% 計算。有關利息符合香港法例第 163 章《放債人條例》第 24 及 25 條。

28.  另外,原告人援引了 Honip Credit Ltd v Leung Tak Sing Paul [2021] 2 HKC 23,§§4.25-4.26 及 Maxcolm Finance Ltd v Pun Lap Shing[2024] HKCFI 603,§4.3,指貸款人於判決後可以繼續收取合約規定的利息。本席同意原告人的說法。

29.  有關貸款合約的條款非常清晰,第一及第二被告人支付利息的責任,不論是判決前或後,均須根據有關貸款合約訂下的年利率 29.04% 計算。

30.  第一被告人完全不爭議他與第二被告人向原告人借貸的事實,亦不爭議與原告人簽訂了有關借貸合約及有關按揭。他只爭議拖欠的數目。第一被告人指他與第二被告人已經償還所有拖欠原告人的款項。

31.  他的抗辯理由如下:

(1)  金安第二份貸款合約及金橋第二份貸款合約分別為金安第一份貸款合約及金橋第二份貸款合約的延續。第一被告人指他沒有在金安第二份貸款合約及金橋第二份貸款合約下收到任何貸款。根據他的說法,第一及第二被告人只向原告人借了以下款項:

(a)  根據金安第一及第二份貸款合約的貸款,總數為港幣200,000元,而不是原告人所指的港幣400,000元。

(b)  根據金橋第一及第二份貸款合約的貸款,總數為港幣200,000元,而不是原告人所指的港幣400,000元

(以下稱為 “第一個抗辯理由”)。

(2)  第一及第二被告人已經全數還清所有款項,港幣3,062,070元。當中包括金安按揭下的港幣200,000元 及金橋按揭下的港幣200,000元(以下稱為 “第二個抗辯理由”)。

32.  根據第一被告人的說法,上述的港幣3,062,070元包括以下款項:

(1)  第一被告人於2019年1月24日向原告人律師支付的港幣1,500,000元銀行本票;

(2)  第二被告人向原告人支付的港幣500,000元;及

(3)  第一被告人於2019年2月28日就着啟明按揭所支付的港幣1,062,070元。

33.  雙方沒有爭議第二被告人於2019年1月24日向原告人支付的港幣1,500,000元支票被銀行退回。因此沒有爭議原告人並沒有收到該款項。

34.  本席裁定以上的抗辯理由均不成立,理由如下。

(1)  第一個抗辯理由

35.  本席接受原告人的說法,指金安第二份貸款合約及金橋第二份貸款合約下的貸款是用作償還三份上述啟明貸款合約的部份欠款。

36.  事實上,根據第一及第二被告人簽署的日期為2018年12月19日向原告人及其律師發出的書面指示,第一及第二被告人是同意及確認這項安排的。從上述書面指示可見,事實上,是第一及第二被告人指示原告人及其律師把金安第二份貸款合約及金橋第二份貸款合約下的貸款用作發出支票,以償還三份啟明貸款合約下的欠款。因此第一及第二被告人並沒有在金安第二份貸款合約及金橋第二份貸款合約下收到任何現金。

37.  可是,雖然第一及第二被告人沒有在金安第二份貸款合約及金橋第二份貸款合約下收到任何現金,這並不代表原告人沒有於兩份貸款合約下把款項借給第一及第二被告人。

38.  原告人援引了 Annotated Ordinances of Hong Kong: Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap 163)(2021年12月版),§2.18、Totalcorp (Nominees) Ltd v Hong Kong Sai Kung Ngong Wo Resort Development Ltd (2002) 25 HKCFAR 376,§22 及上述 Honip Credit Ltd 案例,§4.28 以支持他的說法。本席同意有關的說法。

39.  因此,本席不接納第一被告人的第一個抗辯理由。

(2)  第二個抗辯理由

40.  雙方沒有爭議第一被告人於2019年1月24日向原告人支付了一筆港幣150萬元的款項。可是雙方爭議該款項所償還了的債務。

41.  根據原告人的說法,該港幣150萬元已用作償還:

(1)  三份啟明貸款合約下剩餘的欠款,總數為港幣1,274,415元;

(2)  金安第一及第二份貸款合約下的部份欠款,分別為港幣4,840元;

(3)  金橋第一及第二份貸款合約下的部份欠款,分別為港幣4,840元。

42.  原告人指在本訴訟中它向第一及第二被告人追討的欠款已分別在每份有關貸款合約下扣除了上述港幣4,840元的還款。

43.  第一被告人不同意上述說法,他指該港幣150萬元還款全數用作償還啟明按揭。他更向法庭提供了一份由原告人的律師向他發出日期為2019年1月24日的收據,指該港幣150萬元還款全數用作償還啟明按揭,沒有用作償還任何有關貸款合約或有關按揭。

44.  因此,無論是根據原告人或是被告人的說法,該港幣150萬元皆未有還清有關貸款合約下的欠款。

45.  至於第一被告人所聲稱由第二被告人所償還的港幣50萬元,完全沒有任何證據支持。第二被告人亦沒有在 3490 案件或 3491 案件中提出她有償還過港幣50萬元。因此本席不接納第一被告人的說法。

46.  基於上述原因,本席裁定第一及第二被告人須向原告人償還就着原告人在 3490 案件及 3491 案件中所追討的欠款。

D.  物業的空置管有權

47.  基於上述原因,根據有關按揭的第 8 條條款,原告人有權取得第一被告人分別於金安物業及金橋物業的空置管有權。見上述 Maxcolm 案例,§5.2。

48.  基於以下原因,本席認為就著有關物業作出分劃命令並不可行。而售樓令並不會對第一、第三及/或第四被告人造成極大困境。因此,除了向第一被告人作出有關命令,本席亦命令第三被告人向原告人交出金安物業的空置管有權,及命令第三及第四被告人向原告人交出金橋物業的空置管有權。

E.  分劃命令

49.  《分劃條例》第 2、3 及 6 條相關條文如下:–

“2. 命令分劃或出售土地財產的權力

除本條例另有規定外,凡有任何土地財產由 2 人或多於 2 人持有,則不論是以聯權共有人或分權共有人的身分持有,法院均可 —

(a) 根據第 4 條作出將該財產分劃的命令;

(b) 根據第 6 條作出將該財產出售的命令;或

(c) 拒絕作出任何命令。

3. 法律程序的提起以及法律程序的各方

(1) 凡有任何土地財產以第 2 條所提述的方式持有,則任何對該財產有權益的人,可根據本條例在法院提起法律程序,以法律行動請求作分劃或出售。

(2) 在根據本條例提起的任何法律程序中,須將《分劃規則》(第 352 章,附屬法例 A)所訂明的關於該法律程序的文件,送達署長。

(3) 除第 (2) 款另有規定外,根據本條例提起的法律程序,可針對一名或多於一名有權益的人提起,而無須送達傳票予其他有權益的人,而被告人不得以法律程序各方未全為由而提出反對。

…

6. 土地的出售

(1) 在根據本條例進行的任何法律程序中,凡法院覺得基於下列理由,將財產分劃不會對所有權益的人有利 —

(a) 與該法律程序有關的土地的性質;

(b) 有權益的人或被推定為有權益的人的數目;

(c) 有權益的人中有些人不在或無行為能力;或

(d) 任何其他情況,

則法院可作出將該財產出售的命令。

(2) 即使任何有權益的人有異議或無行為能力,法院仍可行使其根據第 (1) 款而有的權力。

  (3)   (a) 在不損害第 (1) 款的規定的原則下,如任何對該財產有權益的人向法院申請將該財產出售的命令,而非將該財產分劃的命令,則除非其他有權益的人承諾購買申請出售命令的法律程序一方的權益,否則法院如認為適合,可作出將該財產出售的命令。
   (b) 如其他有權益的人給予承諾,則法院可命令將該名申請出售命令的人所擁有的權益,按法院認為適合的方式而進行估值。

(4) 法院根據第 (1) 款或第 (3) 款作出命令時,可指示將出售所得的收益分發,並作出一切所需或適當的其他相應指示。

(5) 在根據本條進行的出售中,法院可容許任何對該財產有權益的人在出售時進行競投,但須按法院就下述各情況而認為合理的條款進行競投 —

(a) 未有繳付按金;或

(b) 將購款或其任何部分抵銷或記帳而非按實數支付;或

(c) 任何其他事宜。”

50.  田土廳的查冊紀錄顯示,金安物業及金橋物業屬第一被告人以分權共有人的身份持有,所以本案的情況符合《分劃條例》第 2 條的要求。

51.  為說明原告人作為不完整業權的法定承按人,有資格根據《分劃條例》申請分劃或出售整個業權,原告人援引了上述 Maxcolm 案例,§6.2 及 Konew Capital International Ltd v Lam Wing Fai[2024] HKDC 1067,§25。上述案例都清楚顯示,若承按人是依據法定押記賦予的權益,那麼他便符合《分劃條例》第 3 條 (1) 款所指的 “對該財產有權益的人”,有資格根據《分劃條例》申請售樓命令。

52.  對於法庭應否作出售樓令,原告人援引了 Wong Chun Kei v Poon Vai Ching [2007] 1 HKLRD 825,§§18-19。法庭於該案中解釋處理《分劃條例》申請的做法:–

(1)  聯名業主有擺脫聯名業權情況的基本權利。如別無他法,他可申請將物業分劃或者出售。

(2)  如將土地分劃並不切實可行,法庭應命令將土地出售,除非法庭接納這樣出售會對所有業主不利或會對其中一個業主造成極大困境。反對出售土地的舉證責任在於提出反對的人士。

(3)  出售土地是否有利於所有業主並不由提出反對的業主決定。法庭必須客觀判斷上述問題。

53.  由上述案例可見,除非出售物業會對所有業主不利,或者將物業出售會對其中一個業主造成極大困境,法庭是不會拒絕將物業出售。第一、第三及第四被告人均沒有向法庭披露他的收入或資產,亦沒有提出出售金安物業或金橋物業會對他們造成的困境。根據第一被告人的誓章,他並不是居住在金安物業或金橋物業,亦沒有證據顯示第三或第四被告人居住在該物業。

54.  兩個物業分別的出售底價是根據估價報告而定的,而且物業的出售將在公平及合理的情況下進行。物業的所有業主分別會根據他們所持有的業權分別獲取出售有關物業的收益。考慮到有關的出售底價,即使第一、第三及/或第四被告人所獲取的收益不足以讓他們購入另一單位居住,他們仍可以租賃形式租住另一單位,而不會沒有地方居住。

55.  第三被告人在庭上指她並沒有欠原告人任何款項,不應被起訴。另外,就着金安物業,由於正在被市區重建局收購,因此她不同意原告人控告她,要求法庭阻止原告人控告她。

56.  金安物業正在被市區重建局收購並不構成法庭拒絕作出售樓令的原因。事實上,若果第三被告人希望金安物業能夠成功被收購,這表亦她不是居住在,或不打算繼續居住在金安物業。

57.  另外,原告人提出這兩單案件下的訴訟,分別牽涉金安物業及金橋物業的業權及佔用人的權益。把第三被告人加入為被告一方,亦是法律程序所需,原告人必須通過法律程序才可以行使根據有關按揭賦予原告人的權利。正因為此項根據《分劃條例》提出的申請,是法例賦予聯名業主擺脫聯名業權情況的做法。第三被告人沒有基礎要求法庭禁止原告人控告她。

58.  在考慮作出分劃命令而不作售樓令是否可行時,本席考慮到以下事項:

(1)  金安物業是一座住宅大廈的單位,實用面積為209平方呎,亦包括實用面積為34平方呎的天台範圍。金安物業只有一個廚房及一個廁所。因此,將金安物業一分為二並不切實可行,而且不會對單位的所有業主有利。

(2)  金橋物業是一座住宅大廈的單位,實用面積為348平方呎。金橋物業只有一個廚房及一個廁所。因此,將金橋物業一分為二或三並不切實可行,而且不會對單位的所有業主有利。

59.  基於上述原因,本席分別就金安物業及金橋物業作出售樓令,詳情在下文交代。

F.  訟費

60.  跟據有關按揭條款第21.1條,借款人須支付一切貸款人為追討借款人所欠款額或為強制執行有關抵押的律師費用,並須以律師與客戶基準評定。

61.  本席認為訴訟起因是因為第一及第二被告人未能償還貸款予原告人,因此訟費應由他們負責。因此本案的訟費,包括所有保留待決的訟費,需由第一及第二被告人支付予原告人,按律師與當事人基準評定。

G.  命令

62.  就着 3490 案件,本席作出以下命令:–

(1)  第一及第二被告人須向原告人支付總款項港幣511,530.39元連同:

(a)  按尚欠本金港幣399,949.10元以年息 29.04% 計算(即每天為港幣318.20元)的利息;及

(b)  按尚欠利息港幣9,680.00元以年息 29.04% 計算(即每天為港幣7.70元)的違約利息,

上述兩者均由2019年12月31日起計直至全數支付為止;

(2)  第一及第三被告人須於本命令送達後28天內向原告人交出 ALL THAT one equal undivided 68th part or share of and in ALL THAT one equal undivided moiety or half part or share of and in ALL THAT 18 equal undivided 280th parts or shares of and in ALL THAT piece or parcel of ground registered in the Land Registry as THE REMAINING PORTION OF NEW KOWLOON INLAND LOT NO.1843 And of and in the messuages erections and buildings thereon now known as “KAM ON BUILDING (金安樓)”, No.94 Nga Tsin Wai Road (“the Building”) TOGETHER with the sole and exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy ALL THAT FLAT B on the THIRD FLOOR including the FLAT ROOF appurtenant thereto of the Building 之物業(下稱「該物業」)的空置管有權;

(3)  如第一及第二被告人向原告人支付由日期為2018年10月23日並於土地註冊處以註冊摘要第18102600960038號註冊之第二按揭(下稱「該按揭」)所擔保的總款項,在第一被告人同意或法庭作進一步指示下,原告人(在不影響其適當行使當時獲賦予的任何出售權的情況下)應將該物業的管有權交回予第一被告人及第三被告人,並向第一被告人交回構成該按揭的抵押;

(4)  該物業以公開拍賣或私人協約方式出售,出售底價不少於港幣2,200,000.00元;

(5)  原告人的代表律師侯穎承周明寶律師事務所被指派處理出售事宜;

(6)  出售該物業的收益按以下方式和優先次序應用:–

(a)  清償所有到期並影響該物業的地租、稅項、差餉及其他開支(如有);

(b)  解除優先於該按揭的所有產權負擔,包括解除此類產權負擔的費用;

(c)  支付原告人在採取強制執行程序以收回該物業管有權過程中產生的所有成本和開支(如需要的話);

(d)  支付所有拍賣行酬金和/或地產代理在出售該物業或其他交易中適當產生的佣金、費用和開支,該費用不超過該物業售價的 1%;

(e)  支付不超過港幣16,000.00元的所有物業轉易費用、收費及其他開支,不包括出售該物業時適當產生的墊支費用;

(f)  剩餘收益中與第一被告人在該物業中的 50% 權益/份額有關的部分按以下方式和優先次序使用:–

(i)  解除該按揭;

(ii)  根據本命令第8段按律師與當事人基準評定支付原告人在本訟案中的訟費;及

(iii)  在扣除處理費用和支出後的餘額(如有),將支付給影響第一被告人在該物業中權益/份額的產權負擔下,緊隨該按揭後排名的下一個產權負擔人;或如沒有下一個產權負擔人,則支付給第一被告人;及

(iv)  若經過合理查詢後無法找到第一被告人,則在扣除處理有關費用和支出後的餘額(如有)應存入法庭直至法庭進一步命令;

(g)  剩餘收益中第三被告人在該物業中的 50% 權益/份額按以下方式和優先次序使用:–

(i)  在扣除處理費用和支出後,解除影響第三被告人在該物業中的權益/份額的所有產權負擔,或如沒有其他產權負擔人,則支付給第三被告人;及

(ii)  若經過合理查詢後無法找到第三被告人,則在扣除處理有關費用和支出後的餘額(如有)應存入法庭直至法庭進一步命令;

(7)  第一和第三被告人須確實採取一切必要步驟將他們在該物業的法定業權及實益權益轉讓給買方,否則原告人代表律師侯穎承周明寶律師事務所的合夥人侯穎承先生將根據第 336 章《區域法院條例》第 38A 條獲委任簽署必要的買賣、轉易和/或轉讓協議,以使本命令得以執行;

(8)  第一及第二被告人須即時支付原告人本案的訟費,以簡易程序按律師與當事人基準評定為港幣80,000元;及

(9)  任何一方均可就本命令的執行事宜提出申請。

63.  就着 3491 案件,本席作出以下命令:–

(1)  第一及第二被告人須向原告人支付總款項港幣511,530.39元連同:

(a)  按尚欠本金港幣399,949.10元以年息 29.04% 計算(即每天為港幣318.20元)的利息;及

(b)  按尚欠利息港幣9,680.00元以年息 29.04% 計算(即每天為港幣7.70元)的違約利息,

上述兩者均由2019年12月31日起計直至全數支付為止;

(2)  第一,第三及第四被告人須於本命令送達後28天內向原告人交出 ALL THOSE 375 equal undivided 1,000th parts or shares of and in ALL THAT one equal undivided 105th part or share of and in ALL THAT piece or parcel of ground registered in the Land Registry as NEW KOWLOON INLAND LOT NO.4702 And of and in the messuages erections and buildings thereon known as “CAMBRIDGE BUILDING” (“the Building”) TOGETHER with the sole and exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy ALL THAT FLAT “9” on the 1ST FLOOR of the Building 之物業(下稱「該物業」)的空置管有權;

(3)  如第一及第二被告人向原告人支付由日期為2018年10月23日並於土地註冊處以註冊摘要第18102600960022號註冊之按揭(下稱「該按揭」)所擔保的總款項,在第一被告人同意或法庭作進一步指示下,原告人(在不影響其適當行使當時獲賦予的任何出售權的情況下)應將該物業的管有權交回予第一,第三及第四被告人,並向第一被告人交回構成該按揭的抵押;

(4)  該物業以公開拍賣或私人協約方式出售,出售底價不少於港幣2,580,000.00元;

(5)  原告人的代表律師侯穎承周明寶律師事務所被指派處理出售事宜;

(6)  出售該物業的收益按以下方式和優先次序應用:–

(a)  清償所有到期並影響該物業的地租、稅項、差餉及其他開支(如有);

(b)  解除優先於該按揭的所有產權負擔,包括解除此類產權負擔的費用;

(c)  支付原告人在採取強制執行程序以收回該物業管有權過程中產生的所有成本和開支(如需要的話);

(d)  支付所有拍賣行酬金和/或地產代理在出售該物業或其他交易中適當產生的佣金、費用和開支,該費用不超過該物業售價的 1%;

(e)  支付不超過港幣16,000.00元的所有物業轉易費用、收費及其他開支,不包括出售該物業時適當產生的墊支費用;

(f)  剩餘收益中與第一被告人在該物業中的 37.5% 權益/份額有關的部分按以下方式和優先次序使用:–

(i)  解除該按揭;

(ii)  根據本命令第8段按律師與當事人基準評定支付原告人在本訟案中的訟費;及

(iii)  在扣除處理費用和支出後的餘額(如有),將支付給影響第一被告人在該物業中權益/份額的產權負擔下,緊隨該按揭後排名的下一個產權負擔人;或如沒有下一個產權負擔人,則支付給第一被告人;及

(iv)  若經過合理查詢後無法找到第一被告人,則在扣除處理有關費用和支出後的餘額(如有)應存入法庭直至法庭進一步命令;

(g)  剩餘收益中第三被告人在該物業中的 37.5% 權益/份額按以下方式和優先次序使用:–

(i)  在扣除處理費用和支出後,解除影響第三被告人在該物業中的權益/份額的所有產權負擔,或如沒有其他產權負擔人,則支付給第三被告人;及

(ii)  若經過合理查詢後無法找到第三被告人,則在扣除處理有關費用和支出後的餘額(如有)應存入法庭直至法庭進一步命令;

(h)  剩餘收益中第四被告人在該物業中的 25% 權益/份額按以下方式和優先次序使用:–

(i)  在扣除處理費用和支出後,解除影響第四被告人在該物業中的權益/份額的所有產權負擔,或如沒有其他產權負擔人,則支付給第四被告人;及

(ii)  若經過合理查詢後無法找到第四被告人,則在扣除處理有關費用和支出後的餘額(如有)應存入法庭直至法庭進一步命令;

(7)  第一,第三及第四被告人須確實採取一切必要步驟將他們在該物業的法定業權及實益權益轉讓給買方,否則原告人代表律師侯穎承周明寶律師事務所的合夥人侯穎承先生將根據第 336 章《區域法院條例》第 38A 條獲委任簽署必要的買賣、轉易和/或轉讓協議,以使本命令得以執行;

(8)  第一及第二被告人須即時支付原告人本案的訟費,以簡易程序按律師與當事人基準評定為港幣80,000元;及

(9)  任何一方均可就本命令的執行事宜提出申請。

  ( 凌依楠 )
區域法院暫委法官

原告人:由侯穎承周明寶律師事務所延聘費朗倫大律師代表

第一被告人:無律師代表,親自應訊

第二被告人:無律師代表,缺席聆訊

第三被告人:無律師代表,親自應訊

第四被告人:無律師代表,缺席聆訊