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Competition Tribunal Enforcement Action2021

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. QUADIENT TECHNOLOGIES HONG KONG LTD AND OTHERS

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[2023] HKCT 6-EN-2023-07-26

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. QUADIENT TECHNOLOGIES HONG KONG LTD AND OTHERS

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CTEA 1/2021

[2023] HKCT 6

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 1 OF 2021

________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant

and

 QUADIENT TECHNOLOGIES HONG KONG LIMITED1st Respondent
 QUADIENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY LIMITED2nd Respondent
 TOPPAN FORMS (HONG KONG) LIMITED3rd Respondent
 SMARTECH BUSINESS SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LIMITED4th Respondent

________________

Before:Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers
Date of Hearing:2 September 2022
Date of Decision:14 June 2023
Date of Reasons for Decision:26 July 2023

_________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________________

1.  On 14 June 2023 I handed down my Decision this matter dealing with redaction of certain information in the Statements of Agreed Facts referred to in my judgment.  I permitted certain redactions to be made in accordance with the directions explained and ordered in the judgment.  Appended to this Reasons for Decision are the Statements of Fact redacted in accordance with those directions.

 (Jonathan Harris)
 President of the Competition Tribunal

Mr Derek Chan SC and Ms Allison Wong, instructed by MinterEllison LLP, for the applicant

Attendance of Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd respondents, was excused

Attendance of Slaughter and May, for the 3rd respondent, was excused

Attendance of Stephenson Harwood, for the 4th respondent, was excused

  

Appendix 1

STATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS (R1 and R2)

(Prepared pursuant to Rule 39 of the Competition Tribunal Rules, Cap. 619D (“CTR”) and

Paragraph 72 of the Competition Tribunal Practice Direction No. 1 (“CTPD1”))

PART A — INTRODUCTION

1.  On 25 November 2021, the Competition Commission (“Commission”) issued proceedings pursuant to sections 92, 94 and 96 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (“Ordinance”) before the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) against, inter alia, Quadient Technologies Hong Kong Limited (previously known as Neopost Hong Kong Limited) (“Neopost HK”) and Quadient International Supply Limited (previously known as Neopost International Supply Limited) (“NISL”), being the 1st and 2nd Respondents in these proceedings respectively, seeking:

(a) A declaration that the 1st and 2nd Respondents have contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Ordinance;

(b) A pecuniary penalty against the 1st and 2nd Respondents in respect of their contravention of the First Conduct Rule pursuant to section 92 of the Ordinance;

(c) An order requiring the 1st and 2nd Respondents to pay to the Government an amount equal to the amount of the costs of and incidental to the Commission’s investigation into their conduct or affairs, reasonably incurred by the Commission in connection with proceedings for the contravention;

(d) Costs of these proceedings; and

(e) Such further or other relief as the Tribunal may consider appropriate.

2.  Subject to the approval of the Tribunal, the Commission and the 1st and 2nd Respondents agree to dispose of these proceedings by way of the summary procedure as provided for in Rule 39 of the CTR and §72 of the CTPD1. The procedure as envisaged by the parties is that sanctioned by the High Court in England and Wales in the case of Re Carecraft Construction Co Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 172 and clarified by the English Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Rogers [1996] 1 WLR 1569, and as adopted in Hong Kong for proceedings under section 214 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) and section 168H of the former Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32). Further, the procedure was endorsed by the Honourable Mr. Justice Jonathan Harris in his Reasons for Decision handed down on 17 July 2020 in CTEA 1/2018 as a “readymade blueprint for disposing of proceedings under the Ordinance” (Competition Commission v. Kam Kwong Engineering Company Ltd and Others[2020] HKCT 3, at §17) and by the Honourable Madam Justice Linda Chan in her judgment handed down on 3 November 2020 (Competition Commission v. Quantr Limited and Others[2020] HKCT 10). Additionally, the same procedure was adopted by the Honourable Mr. Justice Godfrey Lam (as he then was) in his Judgment handed down on 16 December 2020 in relation to the penalty proceedings in Competition Commission v. Nutanix Hong Kong Limited and Others[2020] HKCT 11.

3.  This Statement of Agreed Facts (“Statement”) is submitted pursuant to Rule 39 of the CTR and §72 of the CTPD1. The Tribunal is asked to make the orders sought on the basis of the facts set out in this Statement.

4.  For the purpose of resolving these proceedings summarily, by reference to the facts as set out below, the Commission contends and the 1st and 2nd Respondents admit that, from 19 April 2018 to 23 January 2019, they have contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Ordinance by having made or given effect to an agreement to fix prices, rig bids and allocate customers regarding the sale of Neopost branded inserters (“Neopost Inserters”) in Hong Kong (“Subject Conduct”), as more particularly described in paragraph 52 below.

5.  The facts as set out in this Statement are agreed by the Commission and the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The Statement is filed before the Tribunal to support the joint application by the Commission and the 1st and 2nd Respondents for an order to be made under Rule 39 of the CTR (“Joint Application”).

6.  If the Tribunal for whatever reason is of the view that these proceedings shall not be dealt with by way of the Joint Application, no admission or concession by either the Commission or the 1st and 2nd Respondents or liability to a pecuniary penalty or costs (save and except the matters set out in paragraphs 53 to 55 below), shall be referred to or relied upon by either the Commission or the 1st and 2nd Respondents at any adjourned or subsequent hearing or in any other proceedings without the prior written consent of both the Commission and the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

7.  The Commission shall also be at liberty to disclose a redacted version of this Statement to any third party where it considers proper to do so in the interests of the public.

PART B – UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO LIABILITY

B1. The Parties

Neopost

8.  Neopost HK is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Unit 602, One Hysan Avenue, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong. It was incorporated on 13 June 2008 and its name was changed to Quadient Technologies Hong Kong Limited on 1 April 2020.

9.  Neopost HK is wholly owned by Mailroom Holding B.V., a company registered in the Netherlands, which in turn is wholly owned by Quadient S.A. (formerly known as Neopost S.A., registered in France) (“Neopost S.A.”). Neopost S.A. is the parent company of the Neopost Group.

10.  NISL is, and was at all material times, a company registered in England and Wales with its registered office address located at Here East, 14 East Bay Lane, London, United Kingdom, E15 2GW. It was incorporated in 2003 and its name was changed to Quadient International Supply Limited on 28 January 2020.

11.  NISL is wholly owned by Neopost (Holdings) Ltd., a company registered in England and Wales, which in turn is wholly owned by Neopost S.A.

12.  By reason of the matters set out in paragraphs 8 to 11 above, Neopost HK and NISL are, and were at all materials times, sister companies having the same ultimate parent company, namely Neopost S.A.

Toppan

13.  Toppan Forms (Hong Kong) Limited (“Toppan HK”) is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Room 51-75A, 10th Floor, Kowloonbay International Trade & Exhibition Centre, 1 Trademark Drive, Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong.

Smartech

14.  Smartech Business Systems (Hong Kong) Limited (formerly known as Pitney Bowes Hong Kong Limited) (“Smartech”) is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Unit 1902, 19th Floor, 88 Hing Fat Street, North Point, Hong Kong.

B2. Distribution of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong

15.  Inserters are machines that insert letters and other correspondence into envelopes for mass mailing. Government departments, insurance companies and banks, which may need to dispatch large volumes of mail, are the usual customers of inserters.

16.  Neopost S.A. is an international company specializing in mail-related solutions, which include the manufacture of inserters. NISL distributed Neopost Inserters worldwide. In Hong Kong, Neopost Inserters were at all material times sold through local distributors which entered into distribution agreements directly with NISL. Inserters were supplied by NISL to the local distributors which were then sold to the end-users and customers. At all material times, NISL had no employees of its own in Hong Kong, and instead relied on a service agreement between Neopost HK and NISL for Neopost HK to conduct NISL’s business activities in Hong Kong on its behalf, including but not limited to the management of local distributors.

17.  Mr. A was, at all material times, employed by Neopost HK as its Business Development Manager Asia Pacific. His terms of employment required him inter alia to support the sales and marketing activities of NISL’s distributors in Hong Kong. At the material times, he managed the distributors in Hong Kong on behalf of NISL, and was their sole point of contact for Hong Kong based distributors of Neopost products.

18.  At the material times, Toppan HK, Smartech, and another Hong Kong company known as Jardine OneSolution (HK) Limited (currently known as HKBN JOS Limited) (“JOS”), were non-exclusive distributors of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong. The relevant distribution arrangements for each of these entities were as follows:

(a) On 18 July 2006, NISL entered into a distribution agreement with JOS for the latter to resell Neopost frankers. Frankers are machines that produce an ink stamp on a letter, or any document to be mailed, as proof of postage paid. Although JOS’s distribution agreement with NISL only covered frankers, JOS was in practice also allowed to resell certain models of Neopost Inserters (from at least 2015 onwards).

(b) On 14 April 2009, NISL entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Toppan HK for the latter to resell Neopost Inserters.

(c) In February 2018, NISL entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Smartech for the latter to resell Neopost’s frankers. Whilst Smartech’s distribution agreement did not cover inserters, NISL had on 1 September 2017 entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Smart Post (Hong Kong) Limited (“Smart Post”), a wholly own subsidiary of Smartech, for Smart Post to resell Neopost Inserters.

19.  Separately, Smartech was the exclusive distributor in Hong Kong for Pitney Bowes branded inserters and frankers.

B3. The relevant facts leading up to the Subject Conduct

20.  Set out below are the relevant undisputed facts leading up to the formation and implementation of the Subject Conduct.

B3a. “Gentlemen Agreement” between Neopost HK/NISL, Toppan HK and JOS from 2010 to 2017

21.  Since 2010, there had been a “Gentlemen Agreement” set up by Neopost HK/NISL to govern the relationship between Toppan HK and JOS with respect to the sale of Neopost Inserters and frankers. Among other things, the “Gentlemen Agreement” required Toppan HK and JOS not to sell to each other’s customers (“Gentlemen Agreement”). Neopost HK/NISL required the distributors to adhere to the terms of that agreement in order to retain their authorisation to sell both frankers and inserters.

22.  Since commencement of the Ordinance, there was one incident in which Toppan HK and Neopost HK/NISL attempted to enforce the Gentlemen Agreement as a result of JOS selling to a customer of Toppan HK. However, in early March 2017, JOS responded to Neopost HK/NISL that it did not accept the Gentlemen Agreement or any agreement or understandings then in place involving JOS.

B3b. Attempted revisions to the Gentlemen Agreement by Neopost HK/NISL in 2017

23.  In the process of recruiting Smartech to be a new distributor for Neopost Inserters in early 2017, Neopost HK/NISL considered modifying the Gentlemen Agreement to apply to Toppan HK and Smartech, to manage conflicts between the three distributors. In this connection, two draft documents were prepared by Neopost HK/NISL seeking to prohibit JOS, Toppan HK and Smartech from selling Neopost products to each other’s customers. Internal discussions at Neopost HK/NISL were held between Mr. A and his superiors concerning options for incentivising and/or forcing the distributors to agree to and comply with a new version of the agreement.

24.  After realizing that the two draft documents might contravene the Ordinance, Neopost HK/NISL came up with the idea of requiring the winning distributor (the newcomer) to purchase products from the losing distributor if the customer was a customer of the losing distributor (the incumbent) at a pre-defined price (“Inter-Distributor Purchase Agreement”). In this regard, a draft document was prepared by Neopost HK/NISL and circulated internally, but ultimately the agreement reached between the parties extended well beyond the terms of the Inter-Distributor Purchase Agreement.

B3c. Meetings between Neopost HK/NISL, Toppan HK and Smartech leading up to the Subject Conduct

25.  Despite objections by Toppan HK, Neopost HK/NISL formally appointed Smartech as a distributor of Neopost products in Hong Kong in February 2018.

26.  On 26 February 2018, Mr. A (Neopost HK/NISL) arranged and attended a meeting with Mr. B, who was at the material time the Assistant General Sales Manager of Toppan HK (who later became the General Sales Manager of Toppan HK in January 2019 and Mr. C, who was the Small Mailing Business Sales Director of Smartech, to facilitate and promote cooperation between them. During that meeting, Mr. A tried to comfort Mr. B that the introduction of Smartech as an additional distributor should not affect Toppan HK’s existing customer base and business. However, there was no conclusion reached at the meeting. On 29 March 2018, Mr. A arranged another meeting with Mr. B and Mr. C to continue with their discussion at the previous meeting but, again, no conclusion was reached among the parties.

B4. The Subject Conduct

27.  Set out below is the Commission’s case (which is not disputed by Neopost HK and NISL) in relation to the Subject Conduct.

B4a. Meeting of 19 April 2018

28.  On 19 April 2018, Mr. A arranged and attended a meeting with Mr. B and Mr. D, who was at the material times the Sales Manager of Toppan HK and team leader of the Machinery Products and Services team, at the office of Toppan HK. In a preceding WhatsApp message, Mr. A had asked Mr. B to meet to discuss the “price” issue.

29.  During the meeting, among other things, Mr. A initiated a discussion that Toppan HK and Smartech should focus on their own customers and not actively approach the other’s customers, and Toppan HK agreed. Toppan HK and Smartech would avoid cut-throat price competition with each other. If Toppan HK noticed that a customer was Smartech’s customer, Toppan HK’s quotation should be higher than that of Smartech, and vice versa.

30.  On the same day, after the meeting, Mr. A sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. B, which stated “I discussed with [Mr. C]. All good. Shall we have a meeting together in my office? ….”. In other words, Mr. A discussed the idea raised during the meeting with Mr. C afterwards, who was on board with the idea, so Mr. A reported back to Mr. B and arranged another meeting to further discuss the arrangement.

B4b. Meeting of 4 May 2018

31.  On 4 May 2018, at the invitation of Mr. A (Neopost), Mr. B and Mr. D (Toppan HK), and Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. E, who was at the relevant time Smartech’s Services Director, attended a meeting with Mr. A at the office of Neopost HK. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to reduce “conflicts” between the two distributors of Neopost Inserters (i.e. Toppan HK and Smartech), by which was meant, the degree to which they would compete for and poach each other’s customers.

32.  In summary, the attendees reached an agreement (“Toppan HK Smartech Agreement”) that:

(a) If a company requesting a quotation for Neopost Inserters had been using Pitney Bowes’ inserters (meaning that the company was Smartech’s customer, since Smartech was the exclusive distributor of Pitney Bowes’ inserters), Toppan HK would allow Smartech to win the request for quotation (“RFQ”) by quoting a price higher than Smartech’s;

(b) On the other hand, if the company requesting the quotation for Neopost Inserters had been using Neopost Inserters (meaning that the company was probably Toppan HK’s customer), Smartech would allow Toppan HK to win the RFQ by quoting a price higher than Toppan HK’s;

(c) In addition, the party winning the RFQ would then source the Neopost Inserters from the losing party instead of directly from Neopost HK/NISL (which did not reflect a need for technical assistance from one party to the other but rather aimed to ensure that both of Toppan HK and Smartech would obtain business); and

(d) Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. D (Toppan HK) could make enquiries of each other to ascertain whether a particular customer was either Toppan HK’s or Smartech’s customer.

B4c. Subsequent meetings and contacts between Toppan HK and Smartech giving effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement

33.  After the meeting on 4 May 2018, representatives of Toppan HK and Smartech maintained regular contacts to exchange competitively sensitive information in furtherance of the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, at first primarily between Mr. D and Mr. C and subsequently between Mr. D and Mr. F (who was at the relevant time Smartech’s Senior Business Manager). Several of the relevant contacts and associated disclosures were recorded in the daily planner of Mr. D, as well as in WhatsApp messages between the relevant individuals. While Neopost did not attend or directly participate in the meetings and discussions between Toppan HK and Smartech described below (other than the meetings described in paragraph 50), the dealings between Toppan HK and Smartech arising from the meetings and discussions in this section are undisputed for the purpose of this Statement.

34.  This included exchanging intended quotation prices and models of inserters, before submitting quotations or bids to potential customers. In several cases, this was done with the explicit or implicit understanding that one party would bid a higher price than the other in an attempt to ensure that the latter would win the relevant business (for example, as it was its existing customer). On at least two occasions, Smartech purchased Neopost Inserters from Toppan HK after it won the business opportunities (that is, the Department of Health and Zurich Services (HK) Ltd. tenders, described further below). There was also one occasion where Toppan HK purchased Neopost Inserters from Smartech (that is, The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited tender below).

B4c(i)  Business opportunities discussed at meeting of 24 May 2018

35.  On 24 May 2018, Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. D (Toppan HK) met at a Pacific Coffee coffee shop near the office of Toppan HK. At this meeting, among other things, Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D the details of three intended Smartech quotations relating to Neopost Inserters, which Mr. D recorded in his daily planner. The relevant details and discussions, from the 24 May meeting and afterwards, are set out below.

Canon Hong Kong Company Ltd. (“Canon”)

36.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to Canon a price quotation of HK$350,000 for a Neopost DS180 inserter. He further proposed that Toppan HK submit a quotation between HK$380,000 and HK$400,000 for this inserter to Canon. Mr. D later found out that Toppan HK had already submitted a quotation to Canon. Smartech was ultimately selected to supply a Pitney Bowes inserter (which it had also quoted for).

Department of Health (“DOH”)

37.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to the DOH a price quotation of HK$325,000, plus an additional 14% for an all-inclusive maintenance package, for a Neopost DS90i inserter. On that same day but before the meeting, Mr. F had contacted Mr. C through WhatsApp to discuss the DOH deal and to enquire whether they needed to communicate with Toppan HK regarding the deal. Ultimately, although the DOH was Toppan HK’s customer, Toppan HK was not invited to submit a quotation (unknown to Smartech). Smartech won this tender in November 2018 and, in purported compliance with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, sourced a Neopost DS95i inserter from Toppan HK in December 2018. The tender document signed and submitted by Smartech included a clause 22(a), whereby the supplier was regarded to have represented and warranted to the Government that it had not engaged in collusion in relation to the invitation to quotation.

Hong Kong Cable TV Ltd. (“Cable TV”)

38.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to Cable TV a price quotation of around HK$230,000 to HK$250,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. Subsequently, Mr. D contacted Mr. C and Mr. F to inform them that Cable TV was Toppan HK’s customer; ultimately, however, Toppan HK was not invited to bid. On 25 May 2018, Smartech quoted a price of HK$230,000 for this inserter to Cable TV, in line with Mr. C’s disclosure to Mr. D, though the net price was HK$188,000 to reflect the application of a special trade-in discount. Cable TV subsequently purchased a Pitney Bowes inserter from Smartech.

B4c(ii) Business opportunities discussed after meeting of 24 May 2018

39.  Subsequent to the meeting on 24 May 2018, Toppan HK and Smartech maintained regular contacts in respect of inserter business opportunities to give effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, including those which Mr. D recorded in his daily planner. These included the business opportunities set out in the following paragraphs.

United Asia Finance Ltd. (“UA Finance”)

40.  In late May 2018, Mr. C and Mr. D were in contact with respect to a tender from UA Finance for an inserter. Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to quote for two models of Neopost Inserter (DS95i at HK$260,000 and DS180i at HK$330,000). Mr. D understood that UA Finance was Smartech’s customer and, in accordance with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, that Smartech should win the tender. Toppan HK submitted a quote of HK$296,000 for a DS95i (i.e. which was higher than the quote of HK$260,000) which Smartech intended to submit for the same model). UA Finance ultimately purchased a Pitney Bowes inserter from Smartech (which it had subsequently quoted for).

Zurich Services (HK) Ltd. (“Zurich”)

41.  In late May 2018, Mr. C and Mr. D were in contact with respect to a tender from Zurich for an inserter. Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to submit either a quotation of HK$370,000 for a Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter or HK$199,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. Mr. D understood that, since Zurich had been using a Pitney Bowes inserter, the expectation under the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement was that Toppan HK was to let Smartech win the tender. In WhatsApp messages discussing Toppan HK’s submission in relation to this tender, Ms. G (who was at the relevant time Toppan HK’s Account Manager) and Mr. D determined that Toppan HK’s quotation for a Neopost DS75i inserter should not be very much higher than Smartech’s quotation (though still higher in order to let Smartech win the tender). Toppan HK ultimately provided to Zurich a final quotation price of HK$230,000 (HK$200,000 for the Neopost DS75i inserter and HK$30,000 for ‘Optical Mark Recognition’) whereas Smartech submitted a final quote of HK$174,000 for the same model (inclusive of a HK$25,000 trade in discount). Smartech eventually was awarded the tender for the DS75i inserter, and sourced the inserter from Toppan HK pursuant to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement.

OCBC Wing Hang Bank Ltd. (“OCBC”)

42.  In or around late May or June 2018, Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to submit a quotation for three Neopost DS75i inserters to OCBC, while Mr. C indicated that Smartech intended to submit a quotation for a Pitney Bowes inserter. Since the two companies were quoting different brands of inserters, Mr. D and Mr. C considered these quotations to fall outside the coordination envisaged in the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement (i.e., a “free f[ight]” as Mr. D indicated in his daily planner). OCBC ultimately selected Smartech to supply a Pitney Bowes inserter.

The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Ltd. (“HKMC”)

43.  On 9 June 2018, Toppan HK provided a quotation of HK$968,000 for a Neopost DS200i inserter and Neopost AIMS software to Fuji Xerox (Hong Kong) Ltd. (“Fuji Xerox”), a reseller of inserters, for an end user, the HKMC. Fuji Xerox’s quotation was successful. Smartech (which had also submitted a quotation to Ricoh for HKMC) was unsuccessful. Mr. C requested that Toppan HK source the inserter from Smartech (instead of from Neopost directly) and Mr. D and Mr. B (Toppan HK) agreed to do so. On 13 June 2018, Mr. A emailed Mr. D and Ms. G (Toppan HK) regarding the purchase of the DS200i inserter, indicating that “I will tell [Mr. C]to bill you as in the attached, total58,800 euro”. Toppan HK sourced the Neopost Inserter and software from Smartech for HK$562,160.

Transport Department (“TD”)

44.  On 11 June 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C in relation to the potential sale of an inserter to the TD. Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that the TD was using a Neopost MM4 inserter and hoped to switch to a Neopost DS63 inserter, and indicated that he hoped that Smartech would let Toppan HK win the deal. Ultimately, Smartech was not invited to bid, while Toppan HK was chosen by the TD to supply a Neopost DS75i inserter and sourced the inserter from Neopost directly.

Sun Hung Kai Real Estate Agency Ltd. (“SHK”)

45.  On 6 July 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C to discuss their quotations for the sale of an inserter to SHK through Fuji Xerox. Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to quote HK$248,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter, while Mr. C disclosed that Smartech intended to quote HK$350,000 for a Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter. Smartech submitted a quotation to Fuji Xerox at the disclosed price for this model of inserter (along with other Pitney Bowes models) and ultimately sold (for delivery to SHK) a Pitney Bowes Relay 4500 inserter for HK$230,000.

Registration and Electoral Office (“REO”)

46.  On 18 July 2018, Mr. D notified Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to provide a quotation for a Neopost DS180i inserter to the REO and would like Smartech to quote a higher price to help Toppan HK win the bid. On 9 November 2018, Mr. F sent Mr. C a WhatsApp audio message which said (in translation from the original Chinese), “[Mr.C], just to let you know that [I] have just talked to [Mr. D], and for Kowloon Bay it should be…that is, they should be the window [in the sense of designated winner] for the new site of the Registration and Electoral Office, and if it gets to prices or things like that, tell [Mr. D]to contact you direct then; he said that he had already told you 2 or 3 months ago. So it doesn’t matter. Should be quoting for DS-180, quoting for DS-180. I am updating you on this first.” Thereafter, Mr. D called Mr. F to inform him that the REO was Toppan HK’s customer and not viable for Smartech. By “not viable” it was meant that Smartech should not submit any bid to REO and that it would not win even if it did so. On 3 January 2019, Mr. F sent Mr. D a WhatsApp audio message which said (in translation from the original Chinese), “Hi [Mr. D], another REO tender has arrived, let’s coordinate when you start working on it, thanks!” On 11 January 2019, Toppan HK submitted to the REO a quotation for the Neopost DS180i inserter of HK$593,000, while Smartech submitted a higher quotation of HK$650,000 for the same model. The tender documents submitted by each party included an anti-collusion clause (clause 24(a)) and a signed Non-collusive Quotation Certificate. The REO subsequently purchased the inserter from Toppan HK in April 2019.

Discovery Bay Management Services Ltd. (“DBMS”)

47.  On 31 August 2018, Ms. G informed Mr. D via WhatsApp message that DBMS intended to change its inserter to Neopost’s DS75. As the customer was using Pitney Bowes’ machines, Mr. D believed that it was Smartech’s customer and responded that (in translation from the original Chinese) “we should discuss with ST [i.e. Smartech]”. On 4 September 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C and disclosed to him that Toppan HK intended to propose to DBMS a Neopost DS85i inserter for HK$300,000 or a Neopost DS75i inserter. On 6 September 2018, Toppan HK submitted a quotation for a Neopost DS75i inserter for HK$188,000, while on 21 September 2019, Smartech submitted a quotation of HK$288,000 (inclusive of a special trade-in discount of HK$32,000) for a Neopost DS85 (i.e. a lower price than the intended quotation for the same model disclosed by Toppan HK) or Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter. On 5 November 2018, Mr. F sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. D to ask about the progress of the deal. DBMS ultimately did not proceed to purchase an inserter.

Official Receiver’s Office (“ORO”)

48.  In or around September or October 2018, Toppan HK and Smartech discussed the open tender issued by the ORO for an inserter. Mr. D asked Mr. F to have Smartech submit a quotation of higher than (HK$180,000) for a Neopost DS75i inserter. On 19 September 2018, Mr. F sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. C to inform him of Mr. D’s request and indicated that he would accordingly submit a quotation of HK$188,000, with which Mr. C agreed. On 20 September 2018, Smartech duly submitted a quotation of HK$188,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter (being a quotation of HK$198,000 for the machine with a HK$10,000 trade-in discount), while on the same day Toppan HK submitted a lower price for the same model of HK$149,000 (being a quotation of HK$154,000 for the machine with a HK$5,000 trade-in discount). On 22 October 2018, Mr. F discovered that JOS had won the tender at a price of HK$153,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter (inclusive of stand or cabinet, maintenance and trade-in discount). The following day, Mr. F sent WhatsApp audio recordings to raise his concern with Mr. C regarding JOS’s low quotation price and had him relay this concern to Mr. D, and stated (in translation from the original Chinese) “I helped him raise to 188,000, I helped him raise to 188,000”.

Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (“SMBC”)

49.  In or around November 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. F to request him to coordinate for the sale of an inserter to SMBC (which Mr. F understood to mean that Smartech should not quote for SMBC), if Smartech received an invitation to quote from SMBC. On 22 November 2018, Mr. F informed Mr. C of this request by WhatsApp message. The basis for the request was that Mr. D considered SMBC to be Toppan HK’s customer. Prior to these conversations, on 30 August 2018, Toppan HK had submitted a quotation of HK$947,400 for a Neopost DS200i inserter and AIMS and OMS software. On 27 November 2018, Smartech submitted the higher quotation price of HK$1,200,000 for the same inserter and software package (inclusive of a HK$100,000 trade-in discount). Toppan HK was eventually awarded the tender in May 2019.

B4c(iii) Other contacts

50.  On 27 July 2018, Mr. A, Mr. C, Mr. D and Mr. B met at Neopost HK’s office, at which it was confirmed that all attendees were fine with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement. On 7 December 2018, the same individuals attended a further meeting at Neopost HK’s office, at which it was agreed among the attendees that the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement would continue into 2019.

51.  The regular contacts between Toppan HK and Smartech for the purpose of giving effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement continued until at least 23 January 2019.

B5. The Contravention

52.  It is the Commission’s case (which is not disputed by Neopost HK and NISL) that:

(a) Each of Neopost HK and NISL contravened section 6(1) of the Ordinance (i.e. the First Conduct Rule) during the period between 19 April 2018 and 23 January 2019 by virtue of the Subject Conduct (“Contravention”), i.e. the making and/or giving effect by Neopost HK and NISL to an agreement with Smartech and Toppan HK to fix prices, rig bids and allocate customers regarding the sale of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong, as more particularly described in paragraphs 27 to 51 above;

(b) the Contravention had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition;

(c) the Contravention constitutes “serious anti-competitive conduct” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Ordinance; and

(d) the conduct of Mr. A is attributable to Neopost HK and NISL insofar as the Contravention is concerned, and Neopost HK and NISL are jointly and severally liable for the Contravention.

PART C – UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO CALCULATION OF THE RECOMMENDED PECUNIARY PENALTY AND INVESTIGATION COSTS FOR NEOPOST HK AND NISL

53.  The financial years of Neopost HK and NISL start on 1 February and end on 31 January. The Contravention took place primarily in their financial year ending on 31 January 2019, which is the relevant year for the purposes of calculating the recommended pecuniary penalty for Neopost HK and NISL (“Relevant Year”).

54.  The relevant value of sales which is directly or indirectly related to the Contravention comprise the sale by Neopost HK and NISL of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong (“Value of Sales”). In the Relevant Year, Neopost HK and NISL generated a Value of Sales in the total sum of HK$8,031,331.

55.  According to the definition of “turnover” under section 2 of the Competition (Turnover) Regulation (Cap. 619C), the turnover of Neopost HK and NISL in the Relevant Year is in the total sum of HK$18,655,781.

56.  As for the Commission’s costs of and incidental to its investigation into this matter, the Commission has incurred such costs in the sum of HK$1,428,304 (see Annex 1).

Dated this 26th day of June 2023.



___________________________________________________________________
MINTERELLISON LLP
Solicitors for the Applicant
HOGAN LOVELLS
Solicitors for the 1st and 2nd Respondents

ANNEX 1

CTEA 1/2021

Breakdown of the Competition Commission’s

costs of and incidental to the investigation into the Subject Conduct

ItemHeads of Investigation Costs ClaimedQuantityAmount (HK$)
1Costs related to the execution of warrants issued under s. 48 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (“CO”), from 23 January 2019 to 30 January 20195 warrants756,148
External digital forensic services 756,009
Local subsistence allowance, travelling and other charges 139
2External compliance expert advice regarding assessment of the compliance programmes of the subject undertakings9.6 hours66,528
3External audio recording and transcription services regarding interviews conducted under s. 42 CO8 interviews37,675
4External translation services regarding translation of s.42 interview transcripts and other Chinese language documents, for use by Competition Commission staff, and external Counsel5 transcripts168,398
5External legal services regarding legal advice104 hours398,624
6Miscellaneous: charges for company searches and business registration searches40 searches931
 Total: 1,428,304

Appendix 2

STATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS (R3)

(Prepared pursuant to Rule 39 of the Competition Tribunal Rules, Cap. 619D (“CTR”) and

Paragraph 72 of the Competition Tribunal Practice Direction No. 1 (“CTPD1”))

PART A — INTRODUCTION

1.  On 25 November 2021, the Competition Commission (“Commission”) issued proceedings pursuant to sections 92, 94 and 96 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (“Ordinance”) before the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) against, inter alia, Toppan Forms (Hong Kong) Limited (“Toppan HK”), being the 3rd Respondent in these proceedings, seeking:

(a) A declaration that the 3rd Respondent has contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Ordinance;

(b) A pecuniary penalty against the 3rd Respondent in respect of their contravention of the First Conduct Rule pursuant to section 92 of the Ordinance;

(c) An order requiring the 3rd Respondent to pay to the Government an amount equal to the amount of the costs of and incidental to the Commission’s investigation into their conduct or affairs, reasonably incurred by the Commission in connection with proceedings for the contravention;

(d) Costs of these proceedings; and

(e) Such further or other relief as the Tribunal may consider appropriate.

2.  Subject to the approval of the Tribunal, the Commission and the 3rd Respondent agree to dispose of these proceedings by way of the summary procedure as provided for in Rule 39 of the CTR and §72 of the CTPD1. The procedure as envisaged by the parties is that sanctioned by the High Court in England and Wales in the case of Re Carecraft Construction Co Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 172 and clarified by the English Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Rogers [1996] 1 WLR 1569, and as adopted in Hong Kong for proceedings under section 214 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) and section 168H of the former Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32). Further, the procedure was endorsed by the Honourable Mr. Justice Jonathan Harris in his Reasons for Decision handed down on 17 July 2020 in CTEA 1/2018 as a “readymade blueprint for disposing of proceedings under the Ordinance” (Competition Commission v. Kam Kwong Engineering Company Ltd and Others[2020] HKCT 3, at §17) and by the Honourable Madam Justice Linda Chan in her judgment handed down on 3 November 2020 (Competition Commission v. Quantr Limited and Others[2020] HKCT 10). Additionally, the same procedure was adopted by the Honourable Mr. Justice Godfrey Lam (as he then was) in his Judgment handed down on 16 December 2020 in relation to the penalty proceedings in Competition Commission v. Nutanix Hong Kong Limited and Others[2020] HKCT 11.

3.  This Statement of Agreed Facts (“Statement”) is submitted pursuant to Rule 39 of the CTR and §72 of the CTPD1. The Tribunal is asked to make the orders sought on the basis of the facts set out in this Statement.

4.  For the purpose of resolving these proceedings summarily, by reference to the facts as set out below, the Commission contends and the 3rd Respondent admits that, from 19 April 2018 to 23 January 2019, it contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Ordinance by having: (i) made or given effect to an agreement to fix prices, rig bids and allocate customers regarding the sale of Neopost branded inserters (“Neopost Inserters”) in Hong Kong; and (ii) engaged in a concerted practice by exchanging competitively sensitive information (together, the “Subject Conduct”), as more particularly described in paragraph 49 below.

5.  The facts as set out in this Statement are agreed by the Commission and the 3rd Respondent. The Statement is filed before the Tribunal to support the joint application by the Commission and the 3rd Respondent for an order to be made under Rule 39 of the CTR (“Joint Application”).

6.  If the Tribunal for whatever reason is of the view that these proceedings shall not be dealt with by way of the Joint Application, no admission or concession by either the Commission or the 3rd Respondent or liability to a pecuniary penalty or costs (save and except the matters set out in paragraphs 50 to 52 below), shall be referred to or relied upon by either the Commission or the 3rd Respondent at any adjourned or subsequent hearing or in any other proceedings without the prior written consent of both the Commission and the 3rd Respondent.

7.  The Commission shall also be at liberty to disclose a redacted version of this Statement to any third party where it considers proper to do so in the interests of the public.

PART B – UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO LIABILITY

B1. The Parties

Toppan

8.  Toppan HK is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Room 51-75A, 10th Floor, Kowloonbay International Trade & Exhibition Centre, 1 Trademart Drive, Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong.

Smartech

9.  Smartech Business Systems (Hong Kong) Limited (formerly known as Pitney Bowes Hong Kong Limited) (“Smartech”) is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Unit 1902, 19th Floor, 88 Hing Fat Street, North Point, Hong Kong.

Neopost

10.  Quadient Technologies Hong Kong Limited (which was formerly known as Neopost Hong Kong Limited) (“Neopost HK”) is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Unit 602, One Hysan Avenue, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong.

11.  Quadient International Supply Limited (which was formerly known as Neopost International Supply Limited) (“NISL”) is, and was at all material times, a company registered in England and Wales with its registered office address located at Here East, 14 East Bay Lane, London, United Kingdom, E15 2GW.

B2. Distribution of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong

12.  Inserters are machines that insert letters and other correspondence into envelopes for mass mailing. Government departments, insurance companies and banks, which may need to dispatch large volumes of mail, are the usual customers of inserters.

13.  NISL distributed Neopost Inserters worldwide. In Hong Kong, Neopost Inserters were at all material times sold through local distributors which entered into distribution agreements directly with NISL. Inserters were supplied by NISL to the local distributors which were then sold to the end-users and customers.

14.  Mr. A was at all material times employed by Neopost HK as its Business Development Manager Asia Pacific.

15.  At the material times, Toppan HK, Smartech, and another Hong Kong company known as Jardine OneSolution (HK) Limited (currently known as HKBN JOS Limited) (“JOS”), were non-exclusive distributors of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong. The relevant distribution arrangements for each of these entities were as follows:

(a) On 18 July 2006, NISL entered into a distribution agreement with JOS for the latter to resell Neopost frankers. Frankers are machines that produce an ink stamp on a letter, or any document to be mailed, as proof of postage paid. Although JOS’s distribution agreement with NISL only covered frankers, JOS was in practice also allowed to resell certain models of Neopost Inserters (from at least 2015 onwards).

(b) On 14 April 2009, NISL entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Toppan HK for the latter to resell Neopost Inserters.

(c) In February 2018, NISL entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Smartech for the latter to resell Neopost’s frankers. Whilst Smartech’s distribution agreement did not cover inserters, NISL had on 1 September 2017 entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Smart Post (Hong Kong) Limited (“Smart Post”), a wholly own subsidiary of Smartech, for Smart Post to resell Neopost Inserters.

16.  Separately, Smartech was the exclusive distributor in Hong Kong for Pitney Bowes branded inserters and frankers.

B3. The relevant facts leading up to the Subject Conduct

17.  Set out below are the relevant undisputed facts leading up to the formation and implementation of the Subject Conduct.

B3a. “Gentlemen Agreement” between Neopost HK/NISL, Toppan HK and JOS from 2010 to 2017

18.  Since 2010, there had been a “Gentlemen Agreement” set up by Neopost HK/NISL to govern the relationship between Toppan HK and JOS with respect to the sale of Neopost Inserters and frankers. Among other things, the “Gentlemen Agreement” required Toppan HK and JOS not to sell to each other’s customers (“Gentlemen Agreement”). Neopost HK/NISL required the distributors to adhere to the terms of that agreement in order to retain their authorisation to sell both frankers and inserters.

19.  Since commencement of the Ordinance, there was one incident in which Toppan HK and Neopost HK/NISL attempted to enforce the Gentlemen Agreement as a result of JOS selling to a customer of Toppan HK. However, in early March 2017, JOS responded to Neopost HK/NISL that it did not accept the Gentlemen Agreement or any agreement or understandings then in place involving JOS.

B3b. Attempted revisions to the Gentlemen Agreement by Neopost HK/NISL in 2017

20.  In the process of recruiting Smartech to be a new distributor for Neopost Inserters in early 2017, Neopost HK/NISL considered modifying the Gentlemen Agreement to apply to Toppan HK and Smartech, to manage conflicts between the three distributors. In this connection, two draft documents were prepared by Neopost HK/NISL seeking to prohibit JOS, Toppan HK and Smartech from selling Neopost products to each other’s customers. Internal discussions at Neopost HK/NISL were held between Mr. A and his superiors concerning options for incentivising and/or forcing the distributors to agree to and comply with a new version of the agreement.

21.  After realizing that the two draft documents might contravene the Ordinance, Neopost HK/NISL came up with the idea of requiring the winning distributor (the newcomer) to purchase products from the losing distributor if the customer was a customer of the losing distributor (the incumbent) at a pre-defined price (“Inter-Distributor Purchase Agreement”). In this regard, a draft document was prepared by Neopost HK/NISL and circulated internally, but ultimately the agreement reached between the parties extended well beyond the terms of the Inter-Distributor Purchase Agreement.

B3c. Meetings between Neopost HK/NISL, Toppan HK and Smartech leading up to the Subject Conduct

22.  Despite objections by Toppan HK, Neopost HK/NISL formally appointed Smartech as a distributor of Neopost products in Hong Kong in February 2018.

23.  On 26 February 2018, Mr. A (Neopost HK/NISL) arranged and attended a meeting with Mr. B, who was at the material time the Assistant General Sales Manager of Toppan HK (who later became the General Sales Manager of Toppan HK in January 2019) and Mr. C, who was the (Small Mailing Business Sales Director) of Smartech, to facilitate and promote cooperation between them. During that meeting, Mr. A tried to comfort Mr. B that the introduction of Smartech as an additional distributor should not affect Toppan HK’s existing customer base and business. However, there was no conclusion reached at the meeting. On 29 March 2018, Mr. A arranged another meeting with Mr. B and Mr. C to continue with their discussion at the previous meeting but, again, no conclusion was reached among the parties.

B4. The Subject Conduct

24.  Set out below is the Commission’s case (which is not disputed by Toppan HK) in relation to the Subject Conduct.

B4a. Meeting of 19 April 2018

25.  On 19 April 2018, Mr. A arranged and attended a meeting with Mr. B and Mr. D, who was at the material times the Sales Manager of Toppan HK and team leader of the Machinery Products and Services team, at the office of Toppan HK. In a preceding WhatsApp message, Mr. A had asked Mr. B to meet to discuss the “price” issue.

26.  During the meeting, among other things, Mr. A initiated a discussion that Toppan HK and Smartech should focus on their own customers and not actively approach the other’s customers, and Toppan HK agreed. Toppan HK and Smartech would avoid cut-throat price competition with each other. If Toppan HK noticed that a customer was Smartech’s customer, Toppan HK’s quotation should be higher than that of Smartech, and vice versa.

27.  On the same day, after the meeting, Mr. A sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. B, which stated “I discussed with [Mr. C]. All good. Shall we have a meeting together in my office? ….”. In other words, Mr. A discussed the idea raised during the meeting with Mr. C afterwards, who was on board with the idea, so Mr. A reported back to Mr. B and arranged another meeting to further discuss the arrangement.

B4b. Meeting of 4 May 2018

28.  On 4 May 2018, at the invitation of Mr. A (Neopost), Mr. B and Mr. D (Toppan HK), and Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. E, who was at the relevant time Smartech’s Services Director, attended a meeting with Mr. A at the office of Neopost HK. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to reduce “conflicts” between the two distributors of Neopost Inserters (i.e. Toppan HK and Smartech), by which was meant, the degree to which they would compete for and poach each other’s customers.

29.  In summary, the attendees reached an agreement (“Toppan HK Smartech Agreement”) that:

(a) If a company requesting a quotation for Neopost Inserters had been using Pitney Bowes’ inserters (meaning that the company was Smartech’s customer, since Smartech was the exclusive distributor of Pitney Bowes’ inserters), Toppan HK would allow Smartech to win the request for quotation (“RFQ”) by quoting a price higher than Smartech’s;

(b) On the other hand, if the company requesting the quotation for Neopost Inserters had been using Neopost Inserters (meaning that the company was probably Toppan HK’s customer), Smartech would allow Toppan HK to win the RFQ by quoting a price higher than Toppan HK’s;

(c) In addition, the party winning the RFQ would then source the Neopost Inserters from the losing party instead of directly from Neopost HK/NISL (which did not reflect a need for technical assistance from one party to the other but rather aimed to ensure that both of Toppan HK and Smartech would obtain business); and

(d) Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. D (Toppan HK) could make enquiries of each other to ascertain whether a particular customer was either Toppan HK’s or Smartech’s customer.

B4c. Subsequent meetings and contacts between Toppan HK and Smartech giving effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement

30.  After the meeting on 4 May 2018, representatives of Toppan HK and Smartech maintained regular contacts to exchange competitively sensitive information in furtherance of the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, at first primarily between Mr. D and Mr. C and subsequently between Mr. D and Mr. F (who was at the relevant time Smartech’s Senior Business Manager). Several of the relevant contacts and associated disclosures were recorded in the daily planner of Mr. D, as well as in WhatsApp messages between the relevant individuals.

31.  This included exchanging intended quotation prices and models of inserters, before submitting quotations or bids to potential customers. In several cases, this was done with the explicit or implicit understanding that one party would bid a higher price than the other in an attempt to ensure that the latter would win the relevant business (for example, as it was its existing customer). On at least two occasions, Smartech purchased Neopost Inserters from Toppan HK after it won the business opportunities (that is, the Department of Health and Zurich Services (HK) Ltd. tenders, described further below). There was also one occasion where Toppan HK purchased Neopost Inserters from Smartech (that is, The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited tender below).

B4c(i) Business opportunities discussed at meeting of 24 May 2018

32.  On 24 May 2018, Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. D (Toppan HK) met at a Pacific Coffee coffee shop near the office of Toppan HK. At this meeting, among other things, Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D the details of three intended Smartech quotations relating to Neopost Inserters, which Mr. D recorded in his daily planner. The relevant details and discussions, from the 24 May meeting and afterwards, are set out below.

Canon Hong Kong Company Ltd. (“Canon”)

33.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to Canon a price quotation of HK$350,000 for a Neopost DS180 inserter. He further proposed that Toppan HK submit a quotation between HK$380,000 and HK$400,000 for this inserter to Canon. Mr. D later found out that Toppan HK had already submitted a quotation to Canon. Smartech was ultimately selected to supply a Pitney Bowes inserter (which it had also quoted for).

Department of Health (“DOH”)

34.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to the DOH a price quotation of HK$325,000, plus an additional 14% for an all-inclusive maintenance package, for a Neopost DS90i inserter. On that same day but before the meeting, Mr. F had contacted Mr. C through WhatsApp to discuss the DOH deal and to enquire whether they needed to communicate with Toppan HK regarding the deal. Ultimately, although the DOH was Toppan HK’s customer, Toppan HK was not invited to submit a quotation (unknown to Smartech). Smartech won this tender in November 2018 and, in purported compliance with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, sourced a Neopost DS95i inserter from Toppan HK in December 2018. The tender document signed and submitted by Smartech included a clause 22(a), whereby the supplier was regarded to have represented and warranted to the Government that it had not engaged in collusion in relation to the invitation to quotation.

Hong Kong Cable TV Ltd. (“Cable TV”)

35.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to Cable TV a price quotation of around HK$230,000 to HK$250,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. Subsequently, Mr. D contacted Mr. C and Mr. F to inform them that Cable TV was Toppan HK’s customer; ultimately, however, Toppan HK was not invited to bid. On 25 May 2018, Smartech quoted a price of HK$230,000 for this inserter to Cable TV, in line with Mr. C’s disclosure to Mr. D, though the net price was HK$188,000 to reflect the application of a special trade-in discount. Cable TV subsequently purchased a Pitney Bowes inserter from Smartech.

B4c(ii) Business opportunities discussed after meeting of 24 May 2018

36.  Subsequent to the meeting on 24 May 2018, Toppan HK and Smartech maintained regular contacts in respect of inserter business opportunities to give effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, including those which Mr. D recorded in his daily planner. These included the business opportunities set out in the following paragraphs.

United Asia Finance Ltd. (“UA Finance”)

37.  In late May 2018, Mr. C and Mr. D were in contact with respect to a tender from UA Finance for an inserter. Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to quote for two models of Neopost Inserter (DS95i at HK$260,000 and DS180i at HK$330,000). Mr. D understood that UA Finance was Smartech’s customer and, in accordance with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, that Smartech should win the tender. Toppan HK submitted a quote of HK$296,000 for a DS95i (i.e. which was higher than the quote of HK$260,000 which Smartech intended to submit for the same model). UA Finance ultimately purchased a Pitney Bowes inserter from Smartech (which it had subsequently quoted for).

Zurich Services (HK) Ltd. (“Zurich”)

38.  In late May 2018, Mr. C and Mr. D were in contact with respect to a tender from Zurich for an inserter. Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to submit either a quotation of HK$370,000 for a Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter or HK$199,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. Mr. D understood that, since Zurich had been using a Pitney Bowes inserter, the expectation under the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement was that Toppan HK was to let Smartech win the tender. In WhatsApp messages discussing Toppan HK’s submission in relation to this tender, Ms. G (who was at the relevant time Toppan HK’s Account Manager) and Mr. D determined that Toppan HK’s quotation for a Neopost DS75i inserter should not be very much higher than Smartech’s quotation (though still higher in order to let Smartech win the tender). Toppan HK ultimately provided to Zurich a final quotation price of HK$230,000 (HK$200,000 for the Neopost DS75i inserter and HK$30,000 for ‘Optical Mark Recognition’) whereas Smartech submitted a final quote of HK$174,000 for the same model (inclusive of a HK$25,000 trade in discount). Smartech eventually was awarded the tender for the DS75i inserter, and sourced the inserter from Toppan HK pursuant to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement.

OCBC Wing Hang Bank Ltd. (“OCBC”)

39.  In or around late May or June 2018, Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to submit a quotation for three Neopost DS75i inserters to OCBC, while Mr. C indicated that Smartech intended to submit a quotation for a Pitney Bowes inserter. Since the two companies were quoting different brands of inserters, Mr. D and Mr. C considered these quotations to fall outside the coordination envisaged in the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement (i.e., a “free f[ight]” as Mr. D indicated in his daily planner). OCBC ultimately selected Smartech to supply a Pitney Bowes inserter.

The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Ltd. (“HKMC”)

40.  On 9 June 2018, Toppan HK provided a quotation of HK$968,000 for a Neopost DS200i inserter and Neopost AIMS software to Fuji Xerox (Hong Kong) Ltd. (“Fuji Xerox”), a reseller of inserters, for an end user, the HKMC. Fuji Xerox’s quotation was successful. Smartech (which had also submitted a quotation to Ricoh for HKMC) was unsuccessful. Mr. C requested that Toppan HK source the inserter from Smartech (instead of from Neopost directly) and Mr. D and Mr. B agreed to do so. On 13 June 2018, Mr. A emailed Mr. D and Ms. G regarding the purchase of the DS200i inserter, indicating that “I will tellMr. C to bill you as in the attached, total58,800 euro”. Toppan HK sourced the Neopost Inserter and software from Smartech for HK$562,160.

Transport Department (“TD”)

41.  On 11 June 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C in relation to the potential sale of an inserter to the TD. Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that the TD was using a Neopost MM4 inserter and hoped to switch to a Neopost DS63 inserter, and indicated that he hoped that Smartech would let Toppan HK win the deal. Ultimately, Smartech was not invited to bid, while Toppan HK was chosen by the TD to supply a Neopost DS75i inserter and sourced the inserter from Neopost directly.

Sun Hung Kai Real Estate Agency Ltd. (“SHK”)

42.  On 6 July 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C to discuss their quotations for the sale of an inserter to SHK through Fuji Xerox. Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to quote HK$248,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter, while Mr. C disclosed that Smartech intended to quote HK$350,000 for a Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter. Smartech submitted a quotation to Fuji Xerox at the disclosed price for this model of inserter (along with other Pitney Bowes models) and ultimately sold (for delivery to SHK) a Pitney Bowes Relay 4500 inserter for HK$230,000.

Registration and Electoral Office (“REO”)

43.  On 18 July 2018, Mr. D notified Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to provide a quotation for a Neopost DS180i inserter to the REO and would like Smartech to quote a higher price to help Toppan HK win the bid. On 9 November 2018, Mr. F sent Mr. C a WhatsApp audio message which said (in translation from the original Chinese), “[Mr. C], just to let you know that [I] have just talked to [Mr. D], and for Kowloon Bay it should be…that is, they should be the window [in the sense of designated winner] for the new site of the Registration and Electoral Office, and if it gets to prices or things like that, tell [Mr. D]to contact you direct then; he said that he had already told you 2 or 3 months ago. So it doesn’t matter. Should be quoting for DS-180, quoting for DS-180. I am updating you on this first.” Thereafter, Mr. D called Mr. F to inform him that the REO was Toppan HK’s customer and not viable for Smartech. By “not viable” it was meant that Smartech should not submit any bid to REO and that it would not win even if it did so. On 3 January 2019, Mr. F sent Mr. D a WhatsApp audio message which said (in translation from the original Chinese), “Hi [Mr. D], another REO tender has arrived, let’s coordinate when you start working on it, thanks!” On 11 January 2019, Toppan HK submitted to the REO a quotation for the Neopost DS180i inserter of HK$593,000, while Smartech submitted a higher quotation of HK$650,000 for the same model. The tender documents submitted by each party included an anti-collusion clause (clause 24(a)) and a signed Non-collusive Quotation Certificate. The REO subsequently purchased the inserter from Toppan HK in April 2019.

Discovery Bay Management Services Ltd. (“DBMS”)

44.  On 31 August 2018, Ms. G informed Mr. D via WhatsApp message that DBMS intended to change its inserter to Neopost’s DS75. As the customer was using Pitney Bowes’ machines, Mr. D believed that it was Smartech’s customer and responded that (in translation from the original Chinese) “we should discuss with ST [i.e. Smartech]”. On 4 September 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C and disclosed to him that Toppan HK intended to propose to DBMS a Neopost DS85i inserter for HK$300,000 or a Neopost DS75i inserter. On 6 September 2018, Toppan HK submitted a quotation for a Neopost DS75i inserter for HK$188,000, while on 21 September 2019, Smartech submitted a quotation of HK$288,000 (inclusive of a special trade-in discount of HK$32,000) for a Neopost DS85 (i.e. a lower price than the intended quotation for the same model disclosed by Toppan HK) or Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter. On 5 November 2018, Mr. F sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. D to ask about the progress of the deal. DBMS ultimately did not proceed to purchase an inserter.

Official Receiver’s Office (“ORO”)

45.  In or around September or October 2018, Toppan HK and Smartech discussed the open tender issued by the ORO for an inserter. Mr. D asked Mr. F to have Smartech submit a quotation of higher than HK$180,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. On 19 September 2018, Mr. F sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. C to inform him of Mr. D’s request and indicated that he would accordingly submit a quotation of HK$188,000, with which Mr. C agreed. On 20 September 2018, Smartech duly submitted a quotation of HK$188,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter (being a quotation of HK$198,000 for the machine with a HK$10,000 trade-in discount), while on the same day Toppan HK submitted a lower price for the same model of HK$149,000 (being a quotation of HK$154,000 for the machine with a HK$5,000 trade-in discount). On 22 October 2018, Mr. F discovered that JOS had won the tender at a price of HK$153,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter (inclusive of stand or cabinet, maintenance and trade-in discount). The following day, Mr. F sent WhatsApp audio recordings to raise his concern with Mr. C regarding JOS’s low quotation price and had him relay this concern to Mr. D, and stated (in translation from the original Chinese) “I helped him raise to 188,000, I helped him raise to 188,000”.

Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (“SMBC”)

46.  In or around November 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. F to request him to coordinate for the sale of an inserter to SMBC (which Mr. F understood to mean that Smartech should not quote for SMBC), if Smartech received an invitation to quote from SMBC. On 22 November 2018, Mr. F informed Mr. C of this request by WhatsApp message. The basis for the request was that Mr. D considered SMBC to be Toppan HK’s customer. Prior to these conversations, on 30 August 2018, Toppan HK had submitted a quotation of HK$947,400 for a Neopost DS200i inserter and AIMS and OMS software. On 27 November 2018, Smartech submitted the higher quotation price of HK$1,200,000 for the same inserter and software package (inclusive of a HK$100,000 trade-in discount). Toppan HK was eventually awarded the tender in May 2019.

B4c(iii) Other contacts

47.  On 27 July 2018, Mr. A, Mr. C, Mr. D and Mr. B met at Neopost HK’s office, at which it was confirmed that all attendees were fine with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement. On 7 December 2018, the same individuals attended a further meeting at Neopost HK’s office, at which it was agreed among the attendees that the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement would continue into 2019.

48.  The regular contacts between Toppan HK and Smartech for the purpose of giving effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement continued until at least 23 January 2019.

B5. The Contravention

49.  It is the Commission’s case (which is not disputed by Toppan HK) that:

(a) Toppan HK contravened section 6(1) of the Ordinance (i.e. the First Conduct Rule) during the period between 19 April 2018 and 23 January 2019 by virtue of the Subject Conduct (“Contravention”), i.e. the making and/or giving effect by Toppan HK to an agreement, and/or engaging in a concerted practice including the exchange of competitively sensitive information, with Smartech and Neopost HK/NISL to fix prices, rig bids and allocate customers regarding the sale of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong, as more particularly described in paragraphs 24 to 48 above;

(b) the Contravention had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition;

(c) the Contravention constitutes “serious anti-competitive conduct” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Ordinance; and

(d) the conduct of Mr. B and Mr. D is attributable to Toppan HK, insofar as the Contravention is concerned.

PART C – UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO CALCULATION OF THE RECOMMENDED PECUNIARY PENALTY AND INVESTIGATION COSTS FOR TOPPAN HK

50.  The financial year of Toppan HK starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December. The Contravention took place primarily in its financial year ending on 31 December 2018, which is the relevant year for the purposes of calculating the recommended pecuniary penalty for Toppan HK (“Relevant Year”).

51.  The relevant value of sales which is directly or indirectly related to the Contravention comprise the sale by Toppan HK of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong (“Value of Sales”). In the Relevant Year, Toppan HK generated a Value of Sales in the sum of HK$9,223,500.

52.  According to the definition of “turnover” under section 2 of the Competition (Turnover) Regulation (Cap. 619C), the turnover of Toppan HK in the Relevant Year is HK$551,786,654.

53.  As for the Commission’s costs of and incidental to its investigation into this matter, the Commission has incurred such costs in the sum of HK$1,428,304 (see Annex 1).

Dated this 26th day of June 2023.




_________________________________

__________________________________

MINTERELLISON LLP
Solicitors for the Applicant

SLAUGHTER AND MAY
Solicitors for the 3rd Respondent


ANNEX 1

CTEA 1/2021

Breakdown of the Competition Commission’s

costs of and incidental to the investigation into the Subject Conduct

ItemHeads of Investigation Costs ClaimedQuantityAmount (HK$)
1Costs related to the execution of warrants issued under s. 48 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (“CO”), from 23 January 2019 to 30 January 20195 warrants756,148
External digital forensic services 756,009
Local subsistence allowance, travelling and other charges 139
2External compliance expert advice regarding assessment of the compliance programmes of the subject undertakings9.6 hours66,528
3External audio recording and transcription services regarding interviews conducted under s. 42 CO8 interviews37,675
4External translation services regarding translation of s.42 interview transcripts and other Chinese language documents, for use by Competition Commission staff, and external Counsel5 transcripts168,398
5External legal services regarding legal advice104 hours398,624
6Miscellaneous: charges for company searches and business registration searches40 searches931
 Total: 1,428,304

Appendix 3

STATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS (R4)

(Prepared pursuant to Rule 39 of the Competition Tribunal Rules, Cap. 619D (“CTR”) and

Paragraph 72 of the Competition Tribunal Practice Direction No. 1 (“CTPD1”))

PART A — INTRODUCTION

1.  On 25 November 2021, the Competition Commission (“Commission”) issued proceedings pursuant to sections 92, 94 and 96 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (“Ordinance”) before the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) against, inter alia, Smartech Business Systems (Hong Kong) Limited (“Smartech”), being the 4th Respondent in these proceedings, seeking:

(a) A declaration that the 4th Respondent has contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Ordinance;

(b) A pecuniary penalty against the 4th Respondent in respect of their contravention of the First Conduct Rule pursuant to section 92 of the Ordinance;

(c) An order requiring the 4th Respondent to pay to the Government an amount equal to the amount of the costs of and incidental to the Commission’s investigation into their conduct or affairs, reasonably incurred by the Commission in connection with proceedings for the contravention;

(d) Costs of these proceedings; and

(e) Such further or other relief as the Tribunal may consider appropriate.

2.  Subject to the approval of the Tribunal, the Commission and the 4th Respondent agree to dispose of these proceedings by way of the summary procedure as provided for in Rule 39 of the CTR and §72 of the CTPD1. The procedure as envisaged by the parties is that sanctioned by the High Court in England and Wales in the case of Re Carecraft Construction Co Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 172 and clarified by the English Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Rogers [1996] 1 WLR 1569, and as adopted in Hong Kong for proceedings under section 214 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) and section 168H of the former Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32). Further, the procedure was endorsed by the Honourable Mr. Justice Jonathan Harris in his Reasons for Decision handed down on 17 July 2020 in CTEA 1/2018 as a “readymade blueprint for disposing of proceedings under the Ordinance” (Competition Commission v. Kam Kwong Engineering Company Ltd and Others[2020] HKCT 3, at §17) and by the Honourable Madam Justice Linda Chan in her judgment handed down on 3 November 2020 (Competition Commission v. Quantr Limited and Others[2020] HKCT 10). Additionally, the same procedure was adopted by the Honourable Mr. Justice Godfrey Lam (as he then was) in his Judgment handed down on 16 December 2020 in relation to the penalty proceedings in Competition Commission v. Nutanix Hong Kong Limited and Others[2020] HKCT 11.

3.  This Statement of Agreed Facts (“Statement”) is submitted pursuant to Rule 39 of the CTR and §72 of the CTPD1. The Tribunal is asked to make the orders sought on the basis of the facts set out in this Statement.

4.  For the purpose of resolving these proceedings summarily, by reference to the facts as set out below, the Commission contends and the 4th Respondent admits that, from 19 April 2018 to 23 January 2019, it contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Ordinance by having: (i) made or given effect to an agreement to fix prices, rig bids and allocate customers regarding the sale of Neopost branded inserters (“Neopost Inserters”) in Hong Kong; and (ii) engaged in a concerted practice by exchanging competitively sensitive information (together, the “Subject Conduct”), as more particularly described in paragraph 49 below.

5.  The facts as set out in this Statement are agreed by the Commission and the 4th Respondent. The Statement is filed before the Tribunal to support the joint application by the Commission and the 4th Respondent for an order to be made under Rule 39 of the CTR (“Joint Application”).

6.  If the Tribunal for whatever reason is of the view that these proceedings shall not be dealt with by way of the Joint Application, no admission or concession by either the Commission or the 4th Respondent or liability to a pecuniary penalty or costs (save and except the matters set out in paragraphs 50 to 52 below), shall be referred to or relied upon by either the Commission or the 4th Respondent at any adjourned or subsequent hearing or in any other proceedings without the prior written consent of both the Commission and the 4th Respondent.

7.  The Commission shall also be at liberty to disclose a redacted version of this Statement to any third party where it considers proper to do so in the interests of the public.

PART B – UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO LIABILITY

B1. The Parties

Smartech

8.  Smartech (formerly known as Pitney Bowes Hong Kong Limited (“PBHK”)) is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Unit 1902, 19th Floor, 88 Hing Fat Street, North Point, Hong Kong. It was incorporated on 12 December 1997 and its name was changed to Smartech on 3 October 2016 when the current shareholders of Smartech acquired the entire issued shares of PBHK.

Neopost

9.  Quadient Technologies Hong Kong Limited (which was formerly known as Neopost Hong Kong Limited) (“Neopost HK”) is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Unit 602, One Hysan Avenue, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong.

10.  Quadient International Supply Limited (which was formerly known as Neopost International Supply Limited) (“NISL”) is, and was at all material times, a company registered in England and Wales with its registered office address located at Here East, 14 East Bay Lane, London, United Kingdom, E15 2GW.

Toppan

11.  Toppan Forms (Hong Kong) Limited (“Toppan HK”) is, and was at all material times, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with its registered office address located at Room 51-75A, 10th Floor, Kowloonbay International Trade & Exhibition Centre, 1 Trademark Drive, Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong.

B2. Distribution of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong

12.  Inserters are machines that insert letters and other correspondence into envelopes for mass mailing. Government departments, insurance companies and banks, which may need to dispatch large volumes of mail, are the usual customers of inserters.

13.  NISL distributed Neopost Inserters worldwide. In Hong Kong, Neopost Inserters were at all material times sold through local distributors which entered into distribution agreements directly with NISL. Inserters were supplied by NISL to the local distributors which were then sold to the end-users and customers.

14.  Mr. A was at all material times employed by Neopost HK as its Business Development Manager Asia Pacific.

15.  At the material times, Toppan HK, Smartech, and another Hong Kong company known as Jardine OneSolution (HK) Limited (currently known as HKBN JOS Limited) (“JOS”) were non-exclusive distributors of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong. The relevant distribution arrangements for each of these entities were as follows:

(a) On 18 July 2006, NISL entered into a distribution agreement with JOS for the latter to resell Neopost frankers. Frankers are machines that produce an ink stamp on a letter, or any document to be mailed, as proof of postage paid. Although JOS’s distribution agreement with NISL only covered frankers, JOS was in practice also allowed to resell certain models of Neopost Inserters (from at least 2015 onwards).

(b) On 14 April 2009, NISL entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Toppan HK for the latter to resell Neopost Inserters.

(c) In February 2018, NISL entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Smartech for the latter to resell Neopost’s frankers. Whilst Smartech’s distribution agreement did not cover inserters, NISL had on 1 September 2017 entered into a non-exclusive distribution agreement with Smart Post (Hong Kong) Limited (“Smart Post”), a wholly own subsidiary of Smartech, for Smart Post to resell Neopost Inserters.

16.  Separately, Smartech was the exclusive distributor in Hong Kong for Pitney Bowes branded inserters and frankers.

B3. The relevant facts leading up to the Subject Conduct

17.  Set out below are the relevant undisputed facts leading up to the formation and implementation of the Subject Conduct.

B3a. “Gentlemen Agreement” between Neopost HK/NISL, Toppan HK and JOS from 2010 to 2017

18.  Since 2010, there had been a “Gentlemen Agreement” set up by Neopost HK/NISL to govern the relationship between Toppan HK and JOS with respect to the sale of Neopost Inserters and frankers. Among other things, the “Gentlemen Agreement” required Toppan HK and JOS not to sell to each other’s customers (“Gentlemen Agreement”). Neopost HK/NISL required the distributors to adhere to the terms of that agreement in order to retain their authorisation to sell both frankers and inserters.

19.  Since commencement of the Ordinance, there was one incident in which Toppan HK and Neopost HK/NISL attempted to enforce the Gentlemen Agreement as a result of JOS selling to a customer of Toppan HK. However, in early March 2017, JOS responded to Neopost HK/NISL that it did not accept the Gentlemen Agreement or any agreement or understandings then in place involving JOS.

B3b. Attempted revisions to the Gentlemen Agreement by Neopost HK/NISL in 2017

20.  In the process of recruiting Smartech to be a new distributor for Neopost Inserters in early 2017, Neopost HK/NISL considered modifying the Gentlemen Agreement to apply to Toppan HK and Smartech, to manage conflicts between the three distributors. In this connection, two draft documents were prepared by Neopost HK/NISL seeking to prohibit JOS, Toppan HK and Smartech from selling Neopost products to each other’s customers. Internal discussions at Neopost HK/NISL were held between Mr. A and his superiors concerning options for incentivising and/or forcing the distributors to agree to and comply with a new version of the agreement.

21.  After realizing that the two draft documents might contravene the Ordinance, Neopost HK/NISL came up with the idea of requiring the winning distributor (the newcomer) to purchase products from the losing distributor if the customer was a customer of the losing distributor (the incumbent) at a pre-defined price (“Inter-Distributor Purchase Agreement”). In this regard, a draft document was prepared by Neopost HK/NISL and circulated internally, but ultimately the agreement reached between the parties extended well beyond the terms of the Inter-Distributor Purchase Agreement.

B3c. Meetings between Neopost HK/NISL, Toppan HK and Smartech leading up to the Subject Conduct

22.  Despite objections by Toppan HK, Neopost HK/NISL formally appointed Smartech as a distributor of Neopost products in Hong Kong in February 2018.

23.  On 26 February 2018, Mr. A (Neopost HK/NISL) arranged and attended a meeting with Mr. B, who was at the material time the Assistant General Sales Manager of Toppan HK (who later became the General Sales Manager of Toppan HK in January 2019) and Mr. C, who was the Small Mailing Business Sales Director of Smartech, to facilitate and promote cooperation between them. During that meeting, Mr. A tried to comfort Mr. B that the introduction of Smartech as an additional distributor should not affect Toppan HK’s existing customer base and business. However, there was no conclusion reached at the meeting. On 29 March 2018, Mr. A arranged another meeting with Mr. B and Mr. C to continue with their discussion at the previous meeting but again, no conclusion was reached among the parties.

B4. The Subject Conduct

24.  Set out below is the Commission’s case (which is not disputed by Smartech) in relation to the Subject Conduct.

B4a. Meeting of 19 April 2018

25.  On 19 April 2018, Mr. A arranged and attended a meeting with Mr. B and Mr. D, who was at the material times the Sales Manager of Toppan HK and team leader of the Machinery Products and Services team, at the office of Toppan HK. In a preceding WhatsApp message, Mr. A had asked Mr. B to meet to discuss the “price” issue.

26.  During the meeting, among other things, Mr. A initiated a discussion that Toppan HK and Smartech should focus on their own customers and not actively approach the other’s customers, and Toppan HK agreed. Toppan HK and Smartech would avoid cut-throat price competition with each other. If Toppan HK noticed that a customer was Smartech’s customer, Toppan HK’s quotation should be higher than that of Smartech, and vice versa.

27.  On the same day, after the meeting, Mr. A sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. B, which stated “I discussed with [Mr. C]. All good. Shall we have a meeting together in my office? ….”. In other words, Mr. A discussed the idea raised during the meeting with Mr. C afterwards, who was on board with the idea, so Mr. A reported back to Mr. B and arranged another meeting to further discuss the arrangement.

B4b. Meeting of 4 May 2018

28.  On 4 May 2018, at the invitation of Mr. A (Neopost), Mr. B and Mr. D (Toppan HK), and Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. E, who was at the relevant time Smartech’s Services Director, attended a meeting with Mr. A at the office of Neopost HK. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to reduce “conflicts” between the two distributors of Neopost Inserters (i.e. Toppan HK and Smartech), by which was meant, the degree to which they would compete for and poach each other’s customers.

29.  In summary, the attendees reached an agreement (“Toppan HK Smartech Agreement”) that:

(a) If a company requesting a quotation for Neopost Inserters had been using Pitney Bowes’ inserters (meaning that the company was Smartech’s customer, since Smartech was the exclusive distributor of Pitney Bowes’ inserters), Toppan HK would allow Smartech to win the request for quotation (“RFQ”) by quoting a price higher than Smartech’s;

(b) On the other hand, if the company requesting the quotation for Neopost Inserters had been using Neopost Inserters (meaning that the company was probably Toppan HK’s customer), Smartech would allow Toppan HK to win the RFQ by quoting a price higher than Toppan HK’s;

(c) In addition, the party winning the RFQ would then source the Neopost Inserters from the losing party instead of directly from Neopost HK/NISL (which did not reflect a need for technical assistance from one party to the other but rather aimed to ensure that both of Toppan HK and Smartech would obtain business); and

(d) Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. D (Toppan HK) could make enquiries of each other to ascertain whether a particular customer was either Toppan HK’s or Smartech’s customer.

B4c. Subsequent meetings and contacts between Toppan HK and Smartech giving effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement

30.  After the meeting on 4 May 2018, representatives of Toppan HK and Smartech maintained regular contacts to exchange competitively sensitive information in furtherance of the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, at first primarily between Mr. D and Mr. C and subsequently between Mr. D and Mr. F (who was at the relevant time Smartech’s Senior Business Manager). Several of the relevant contacts and associated disclosures were recorded in the daily planner of Mr. D, as well as in WhatsApp messages between the relevant individuals.

31.  This included exchanging intended quotation prices and models of inserters, before submitting quotations or bids to potential customers. In several cases, this was done with the explicit or implicit understanding that one party would bid a higher price than the other in an attempt to ensure that the latter would win the relevant business (for example, as it was its existing customer). On at least two occasions, Smartech purchased Neopost Inserters from Toppan HK after it won the business opportunities (that is, the Department of Health and Zurich Services (HK) Ltd. tenders, described further below). There was also one occasion where Toppan HK purchased Neopost Inserters from Smartech (that is, The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited tender below).

B4c(i) Business opportunities discussed at meeting of 24 May 2018

32.  On 24 May 2018, Mr. C (Smartech) and Mr. D (Toppan HK) met at a Pacific Coffee coffee shop near the office of Toppan HK. At this meeting, among other things, Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D the details of three intended Smartech quotations relating to Neopost Inserters, which Mr. D recorded in his daily planner. The relevant details and discussions, from the 24 May meeting and afterwards, are set out below.

Canon Hong Kong Company Ltd. (“Canon”)

33.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to Canon a price quotation of HK$350,000 for a Neopost DS180 inserter. He further proposed that Toppan HK submit a quotation between HK$380,000 and HK$400,000 for this inserter to Canon. Mr. D later found out that Toppan HK had already submitted a quotation to Canon. Smartech was ultimately selected to supply a Pitney Bowes inserter (which it had also quoted for).

Department of Health (“DOH”)

34.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to the DOH a price quotation of HK$325,000, plus an additional 14% for an all-inclusive maintenance package, for a Neopost DS90i inserter. On that same day but before the meeting, Mr. F had contacted Mr. C through WhatsApp to discuss the DOH deal and to enquire whether they needed to communicate with Toppan HK regarding the deal. Ultimately, although the DOH was Toppan HK’s customer, Toppan HK was not invited to submit a quotation (unknown to Smartech). Smartech won this tender in November 2018 and, in purported compliance with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, sourced a Neopost DS95i inserter from Toppan HK in December 2018. The tender document signed and submitted by Smartech included a clause 22(a), whereby the supplier was regarded to have represented and warranted to the Government that it had not engaged in collusion in relation to the invitation to quotation.

Hong Kong Cable TV Ltd. (“Cable TV”)

35.  Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to provide to Cable TV a price quotation of around HK$230,000 to HK$250,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. Subsequently, Mr. D contacted Mr. C and Mr. F to inform them that Cable TV was Toppan HK’s customer; ultimately, however, Toppan HK was not invited to bid. On 25 May 2018, Smartech quoted a price of HK$230,000 for this inserter to Cable TV, in line with Mr. C’s disclosure to Mr. D, though the net price was HK$188,000 to reflect the application of a special trade-in discount. Cable TV subsequently purchased a Pitney Bowes inserter from Smartech.

B4c(ii) Business opportunities discussed after meeting of 24 May 2018

36.  Subsequent to the meeting on 24 May 2018, Toppan HK and Smartech maintained regular contacts in respect of inserter business opportunities to give effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, including those which Mr. D recorded in his daily planner. These included the business opportunities set out in the following paragraphs.

United Asia Finance Ltd. (“UA Finance”)

37.  In late May 2018, Mr. C and Mr. D were in contact with respect to a tender from UA Finance for an inserter. Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to quote for two models of Neopost Inserter (DS95i at HK$260,000 and DS180i at HK$330,000). Mr. D understood that UA Finance was Smartech’s customer and, in accordance with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement, that Smartech should win the tender. Toppan HK submitted a quote of HK$296,000 for a DS95i (i.e. which was higher than the quote of HK$260,000 which Smartech intended to submit for the same model). UA Finance ultimately purchased a Pitney Bowes inserter from Smartech (which it had subsequently quoted for).

Zurich Services (HK) Ltd. (“Zurich”)

38.  In late May 2018, Mr. C and Mr. D were in contact with respect to a tender from Zurich for an inserter. Mr. C disclosed to Mr. D that Smartech intended to submit either a quotation of HK$370,000 for a Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter or HK$199,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. Mr. D understood that, since Zurich had been using a Pitney Bowes inserter, the expectation under the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement was that Toppan HK was to let Smartech win the tender. In WhatsApp messages discussing Toppan HK’s submission in relation to this tender, Ms. G (who was at the relevant time Toppan HK’s Account Manager) and Mr. D determined that Toppan HK’s quotation for a Neopost DS75i inserter should not be very much higher than Smartech’s quotation (though still higher in order to let Smartech win the tender). Toppan HK ultimately provided to Zurich a final quotation price of HK$230,000 (HK$200,000 for the Neopost DS75i inserter and HK$30,000 for ‘Optical Mark Recognition’) whereas Smartech submitted a final quote of HK$174,000 for the same model (inclusive of a HK$25,000 trade in discount). Smartech eventually was awarded the tender for the DS75i inserter, and sourced the inserter from Toppan HK pursuant to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement.

OCBC Wing Hang Bank Ltd. (“OCBC”)

39.  In or around late May or June 2018, Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to submit a quotation for three Neopost DS75i inserters to OCBC, while Mr. C indicated that Smartech intended to submit a quotation for a Pitney Bowes inserter. Since the two companies were quoting different brands of inserters, Mr. D and Mr. C considered these quotations to fall outside the coordination envisaged in the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement (i.e., a “free f[ight]” as Mr. D indicated in his daily planner). OCBC ultimately selected Smartech to supply a Pitney Bowes inserter.

The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Ltd. (“HKMC”)

40.  On 9 June 2018, Toppan HK provided a quotation of HK$968,000 for a Neopost DS200i inserter and Neopost AIMS software to Fuji Xerox (Hong Kong) Ltd. (“Fuji Xerox”), a reseller of inserters, for an end user, the HKMC. Fuji Xerox’s quotation was successful. Smartech (which had also submitted a quotation to Ricoh for HKMC) was unsuccessful. Mr. C requested that Toppan HK source the inserter from Smartech (instead of from Neopost directly) and Mr. D and Mr. B (Toppan HK) agreed to do so. On 13 June 2018, Mr. A emailed Mr. D and Ms. G (Toppan HK) regarding the purchase of the DS200i inserter, indicating that “I will tell[Mr. C] to bill you as in the attached, total58,800 euro”. Toppan HK sourced the Neopost Inserter and software from Smartech for HK$562,160.

Transport Department (“TD”)

41.  On 11 June 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C in relation to the potential sale of an inserter to the TD. Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that the TD was using a Neopost MM4 inserter and hoped to switch to a Neopost DS63 inserter, and indicated that he hoped that Smartech would let Toppan HK win the deal. Ultimately, Smartech was not invited to bid, while Toppan HK was chosen by the TD to supply a Neopost DS75i inserter and sourced the inserter from Neopost directly.

Sun Hung Kai Real Estate Agency Ltd. (“SHK”)

42.  On 6 July 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C to discuss their quotations for the sale of an inserter to SHK through Fuji Xerox. Mr. D disclosed to Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to quote HK$248,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter, while Mr. C disclosed that Smartech intended to quote HK$350,000 for a Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter. Smartech submitted a quotation to Fuji Xerox at the disclosed price for this model of inserter (along with other Pitney Bowes models) and ultimately sold (for delivery to SHK) a Pitney Bowes Relay 4500 inserter for HK$230,000.

Registration and Electoral Office (“REO”)

43.  On 18 July 2018, Mr. D notified Mr. C that Toppan HK intended to provide a quotation for a Neopost DS180i inserter to the REO and would like Smartech to quote a higher price to help Toppan HK win the bid. On 9 November 2018, Mr. F sent Mr. C a WhatsApp audio message which said (in translation from the original Chinese), “[Mr. C], just to let you know that [I] have just talked to[Mr. D], and for Kowloon Bay it should be…that is, they should be the window [in the sense of designated winner] for the new site of the Registration and Electoral Office, and if it gets to prices or things like that, tell[Mr. D]to contact you direct then; he said that he had already told you 2 or 3 months ago. So it doesn’t matter. Should be quoting for DS-180, quoting for DS-180. I am updating you on this first.” Thereafter, Mr. D called Mr. F to inform him that the REO was Toppan HK’s customer and not viable for Smartech. By “not viable” it was meant that Smartech should not submit any bid to REO and that it would not win even if it did so. On 3 January 2019, Mr. F sent Mr. D a WhatsApp audio message which said (in translation from the original Chinese), “Hi[Mr. D], another REO tender has arrived, let’s coordinate when you start working on it, thanks!” On 11 January 2019, Toppan HK submitted to the REO a quotation for the Neopost DS180i inserter of HK$593,000, while Smartech submitted a higher quotation of HK$650,000 for the same model. The tender documents submitted by each party included an anti-collusion clause (clause 24(a)) and a signed Non-collusive Quotation Certificate. The REO subsequently purchased the inserter from Toppan HK in April 2019.

Discovery Bay Management Services Ltd. (“DBMS”)

44.  On 31 August 2018, Ms. G informed Mr. D via WhatsApp message that DBMS intended to change its inserter to Neopost’s DS75. As the customer was using Pitney Bowes’ machines, Mr. D believed that it was Smartech’s customer and responded that (in translation from the original Chinese) “we should discuss with ST [i.e. Smartech]”. On 4 September 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. C and disclosed to him that Toppan HK intended to propose to DBMS a Neopost DS85i inserter for HK$300,000 or a Neopost DS75i inserter. On 6 September 2018, Toppan HK submitted a quotation for a Neopost DS75i inserter for HK$188,000, while on 21 September 2019, Smartech submitted a quotation of HK$288,000 (inclusive of a special trade-in discount of HK$32,000) for a Neopost DS85 (i.e. a lower price than the intended quotation for the same model disclosed by Toppan HK) or Pitney Bowes Relay 7000 inserter. On 5 November 2018, Mr. F sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. D to ask about the progress of the deal. DBMS ultimately did not proceed to purchase an inserter.

Official Receiver’s Office (“ORO”)

45.  In or around September or October 2018, Toppan HK and Smartech discussed the open tender issued by the ORO for an inserter. Mr. D asked Mr. F to have Smartech submit a quotation of higher than HK$180,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter. On 19 September 2018, Mr. F sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. C to inform him of Mr. D’s request and indicated that he would accordingly submit a quotation of HK$188,000, with which Mr. C agreed. On 20 September 2018, Smartech duly submitted a quotation of HK$188,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter (being a quotation of HK$198,000 for the machine with a HK$10,000 trade-in discount), while on the same day Toppan HK submitted a lower price for the same model of HK$149,000 (being a quotation of HK$154,000 for the machine with a HK$5,000 trade-in discount). On 22 October 2018, Mr. F discovered that JOS had won the tender at a price of HK$153,000 for a Neopost DS75i inserter (inclusive of stand or cabinet, maintenance and trade-in discount). The following day, Mr. F sent WhatsApp audio recordings to raise his concern with Mr. C regarding JOS’s low quotation price and had him relay this concern to Mr. D, and stated (in translation from the original Chinese) “I helped him raise to 188,000, I helped him raise to188,000”.

Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (“SMBC”)

46.  In or around November 2018, Mr. D contacted Mr. F to request him to coordinate for the sale of an inserter to SMBC (which Mr. F understood to mean that Smartech should not quote for SMBC), if Smartech received an invitation to quote from SMBC. On 22 November 2018, Mr. F informed Mr. C of this request by WhatsApp message. The basis for the request was that Mr. D considered SMBC to be Toppan HK’s customer. Prior to these conversations, on 30 August 2018, Toppan HK had submitted a quotation of HK$947,400 for a Neopost DS200i inserter and AIMS and OMS software. On 27 November 2018, Smartech submitted the higher quotation price of HK$1,200,000 for the same inserter and software package (inclusive of a HK$100,000 trade-in discount). Toppan HK was eventually awarded the tender in May 2019.

B4c(iii) Other contacts

47.  On 27 July 2018, Mr. A, Mr. C, Mr. D and Mr. B met at Neopost HK’s office, at which it was confirmed that all attendees were fine with the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement. On 7 December 2018, the same individuals attended a further meeting at Neopost HK’s office, at which it was agreed among the attendees that the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement would continue into 2019.

48.  The regular contacts between Toppan HK and Smartech for the purpose of giving effect to the Toppan HK Smartech Agreement continued until at least 23 January 2019.

B5. The Contravention

49.  It is the Commission’s case (which is not disputed by Smartech) that:

(a) Smartech contravened section 6(1) of the Ordinance (i.e. the First Conduct Rule) during the period between 19 April 2018 and 23 January 2019 by virtue of the Subject Conduct (“Contravention”), i.e. the making and/or giving effect by Smartech to an agreement, and/or engaging in a concerted practice including the exchange of competitively sensitive information, with Toppan HK and Neopost HK/NISL to fix prices, rig bids and allocate customers regarding the sale of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong, as more particularly described in paragraphs 24 to 48 above;

(b) the Contravention had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition;

(c) the Contravention constitutes “serious anti-competitive conduct” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Ordinance; and

(d) the conduct of Mr. F and Mr. C is attributable to Smartech insofar as the Contravention is concerned.

PART C – UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO CALCULATION OF THE RECOMMENDED PECUNIARY PENALTY AND INVESTIGATION COSTS FOR SMARTECH

50.  The financial year of Smartech starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December. The Contravention took place primarily in the financial year ending on 31 December 2018, which is the relevant year for the purposes of calculating the recommended pecuniary penalty for Smartech (“Relevant Year”).

51.  The relevant value of sales which is directly or indirectly related to the Contravention comprise the sale by Smartech of Neopost Inserters in Hong Kong (“Value of Sales”). In the Relevant Year, Smartech generated a Value of Sales in the sum of HK$3,454,860.

52.  According to the definition of “turnover” under section 2 of the Competition (Turnover) Regulation (Cap. 619C), the turnover of Smartech in the Relevant Year is in the total sum of HK$40,997,015.

53.  As for the Commission’s costs of and incidental to its investigation into this matter, the Commission has incurred such costs in the sum of HK$1,428,304 (see Annex 1).



Dated this 26th day of June 2023.




__________________________________

__________________________________

MINTERELLISON LLP
Solicitors for the Applicant

STEPHENSON HARWOOD
Solicitors for the 4th Respondent

 

ANNEX 1

CTEA 1/2021

Breakdown of the Competition Commission’s

costs of and incidental to the investigation into the Subject Conduct

ItemHeads of Investigation Costs ClaimedQuantityAmount (HK$)
1Costs related to the execution of warrants issued under s. 48 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (“CO”), from 23 January 2019 to 30 January 20195 warrants756,148
External digital forensic services 756,009
Local subsistence allowance, travelling and other charges 139
2External compliance expert advice regarding assessment of the compliance programmes of the subject undertakings9.6 hours66,528
3External audio recording and transcription services regarding interviews conducted under s. 42 CO8 interviews37,675
4External translation services regarding translation of s.42 interview transcripts and other Chinese language documents, for use by Competition Commission staff, and external Counsel5 transcripts168,398
5External legal services regarding legal advice104 hours398,624
6Miscellaneous: charges for company searches and business registration searches40 searches931
 Total: 1,428,304

[2023] HKCT 1-EN-2023-06-14

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. QUADIENT TECHNOLOGIES HONG KONG LTD AND OTHERS

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CTEA 1/2021

[2023] HKCT 1

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 1 OF 2021

________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
QUADIENT TECHNOLOGIES HONG KONG LIMITED1st Respondent
 QUADIENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY LIMITED2nd Respondent
 TOPPAN FORMS (HONG KONG) LIMITED3rd Respondent
 SMARTECH BUSINESS SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LIMITED4th Respondent

________________

Before: Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 2 September 2022
Date of Decision: 14 June 2023

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

Introduction

1.  On 10 June 2022 I heard an application for orders by agreement between the Commission and the Respondents for orders in accordance with the Kam Kwong[1] procedure, namely:

(1)  In respect of the 1st and 2nd Respondents:

“1. There be a declaration that the 1st and 2nd Respondents have contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (‘Ordinance’);

2. The 1st and 2nd Respondents do pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty in the sum of HK$1,399,000 pursuant to section 93 of the Ordinance within 14 days from the date hereof and provide documentary evidence of such payment to the Applicant within 7 days from the date of payment;

3. Pursuant to section 96 of the Ordinance, the 1st and 2nd Respondents do pay to the Government the sum of HK$476,101, being one third of the costs of and incidental to the investigation into their conduct or affairs, reasonably incurred by the Applicant in connection with these proceedings; and

4. The 1st and 2nd Respondents do pay to the Applicant one third of the Applicant’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings herein, to be taxed if not agreed.”

(2)  In respect of the 3rd Respondent:

“1. There be a declaration that the 3rd Respondent has contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (‘Ordinance’);

2. The 3rd Respondent do pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty in the sum of HK$3,372,000 pursuant to section 93 of the Ordinance within 14 days from the date hereof and provide documentary evidence of such payment to the Applicant within 7 days from the date of payment;

3. Pursuant to section 96 of the Ordinance, the 3rd Respondent do pay to the Government the sum of HK$476,101, being one third of the costs of and incidental to the investigation into its conduct or affairs, reasonably incurred by the Applicant in connection with these proceedings; and

4. The 3rd Respondent do pay to the Applicant one third of the Applicant's costs of and incidental to the proceedings herein, to be taxed if not agreed.”

(3)  In respect of the 4th Respondent:

“1. There be a declaration that the 4th Respondent has contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (‘Ordinance’);

2. The 4th Respondent do pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty in the sum of HK$808,000 pursuant to section 93 of the Ordinance within 14 days from the date hereof and provide documentary evidence of such payment to the Applicant within 7 days from the date of payment;

3. Pursuant to section 96 of the Ordinance, the 4th Respondent do pay to the Government the sum of HK$476,101, being one third of the costs of and incidental to the investigation into its conduct or affairs, reasonably incurred by the Applicant in connection with these proceedings. Such sum be paid by the 4th Respondent in equal monthly instalments over 6 months; and

4. The 4th Respondent do pay to the Applicant one third of the Applicant’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings herein, to be taxed if not agreed.”

2.  As is apparent from the orders that are sought the Parties have agreed that both liability and the penalties should be dealt with together. As is also apparent from the orders that the Parties seek both liability and the precise penalties that the Commission seeks are agreed. The Parties have, as required by the Kam Kwong procedure, agreed Statements of Agreed Facts. As the position of (A) the 1st and 2nd, (B) the 3rd and (C) the 4th Respondents were negotiated separately there are three Statements of Agreed Facts (“Statement(s)”). The normal practice is that they should be appended to this decision. However, for reasons explained in [6]–[39] they need to be redacted. The redacted Statements of Agreed Facts will be appended to another short decision, which I anticipate will be handed down in approximately two weeks when redacted versions of the Statements of Agreed Facts prepared in accordance with this Decision have been prepared by the Commission. Consequently it is not necessary to repeat the background to the matter and the details of the contraventions in the body of this decision as this will be dealt with in the Statements.

3.  There are only two issues that are controversial. Neither of them impact on the terms of orders to be made. As will become apparent they are relevant to the Statements.

4.  The first issue was raised by the 3rd Respondent and is fairly minor, namely, that it disputes, and has not agreed in its Statement, that the contravention was specifically aimed at making customers of Neopost Inserters pay higher prices as suggested in the Commission’s written skeleton. The 3rd Respondent has submitted that the Tribunal make no finding of fact to this effect. I shall do not do so.

5.  The second issue was raised by me and concerns an application for redaction from the publicly available version of the Statements of the names of some individuals and certain figures. It was not obvious to me at the hearing what the justification for all the redactions were. This issue was adjourned for the Parties to give further thought to the matter. As matters transpired the same issue arose at a similar hearing on 12 July 2022 in CTEA 1/2022. Both matters were adjourned until 2 September 2022 in order that the issue of redaction on the grounds of confidentiality from documents filed in Competition Tribunal matters could be considered more comprehensively in order that the Tribunal could elaborate further on the relevant principles and how they are to be applied. Following that hearing further written submissions were filed by the Commission.

Confidentiality

6.  On 31 August 2022 I handed down my decision in CTEA 2/2022[2] (“August Decision”) in which I consider the approach to be taken by the Tribunal in determining applications for confidentiality orders. As is apparent from my decision it was intended to introduce the subject and my initial thinking on the principles that apply with a view to a more detailed consideration of the issue at a joint hearing on 2 September 2022 of CTEA 1/2021 and CTEA 1/2022. I have dealt with the confidentiality issues relevant to CTEA 1/2022 in a separate decision also delivered today[3]. That decision should be read in conjunction with this one.

7.  The issue of confidentiality initially arose in CTEA 1/2021 at the first hearing of the present application by the Commission for orders by consent using the Kam Kwong procedure, which I explain later in this decision, that the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents had breached the First Conduct Rule. The Commission sought confidentiality treatment of various information in the agreed Statements of Facts. The information, which it was sought to restrict was described as follows in [10]–[13] of the Commission’s skeleton argument dated 26 May 2022.

“10. The first category is information which is confidential against the public. Such information is the highlighted information set out in Part B of the Statements, and comprises (a) price-related information, (b) identities of individuals employed or formerly employed by Rs which the Commission does not intend to pursue, and (c) identities of certain non-parties. Such information is the same information in the ONA for which confidential treatment was granted by this Tribunal on 1 December 2021. The Commission respectfully seeks the same confidential treatment in respect of the Highlighted Information in Part B of the Statements.

11. No confidential treatment is requested as against Rs in respect of information of the first category.

12. The second category is information which is confidential against both Rs and the public. Such information is the highlighted information set out in Part C of the Statements, and comprises (a) the relevant value of sales directly or indirectly related to the Rs’ contravention (‘Value of Sales’), and (b) the turnover of the respective Rs in the relevant financial year (ended on 31 January 2019 for R1 and R2 and on 31 December 2018 for R3 and R4) (‘Turnover’).

13. The Value of Sales and the Turnover are sensitive commercial information relating to the Rs’ respective business interests and are not available to the public, thus falling within the ambit of s.123(1)(a)(ii) of the CO. Even if the Value of Sales and the Turnover are no longer current, the Commission submits that, in the interest of the administration of justice, publication of such information is unnecessary for the public to understand the substance of the Tribunal’s orders, and the Commission’s proposed calculation of the recommended pecuniary penalty. Further, as recognised by President G Lam J (as he then was) in Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd[2020] HKCT 11 (‘Nutanix Relief Judgment’) at §9, ‘there is a need to preserve confidentiality not only between the respondents who are actual or potential competitors but also as against other resellers of Nutanix products [i.e. the subject products] and also as against suppliers and resellers of competing products.’”

8.  It was unclear from the evidence filed why it was thought by the Commission that information relating to turnover of the businesses of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents was sufficiently confidential to justify redaction. At the hearing Mr Chan suggested that information about turnover allowed profit to be calculated, which as, when pressed he conceded, is wrong. The Commission’s approach to financial data seemed to be simply that if it was not available to third parties it was confidential and generally should not be included in information available to the public or other parties. This approach suggests that there is a rebuttable presumption that any information that is not publicly available and might be considered confidential by the person whose information it is, should be redacted in a judgment or originating process, or affirmations. This seemed to me to be wrong. The Commission’s submissions on the principles which should guide the Tribunal in determining whether or not information should be redacted were limited and I ordered the matter to be considered thoroughly at a subsequent hearing which would give the Tribunal the opportunity to consider comprehensively in the context of the Kam Kwong procedure what principles should guide it in determining applications for redaction. The authorities, which I refer to in the August Decision only dealt with the treatment of information in an originating notice[4] or in pleadings[5].

9.  In CTEA 1/2021 the Commission seeks restrictions on the following information.

(1)  price information relating to the quotations to customers of Neopost Inserters as discussed and/or submitted by the 3rd Respondent or the 4th Respondent (“Price Information”);

(2)  identities and job titles of employees of the respective Respondents not pursued by the Commission (“Employee Identities”);

(3)  identities of non-parties to the proceedings (“Non-Party Identities”);

(4)  value of sales figures; and

(5)  turnover figures.

10.  On 25 November 2021, the Commission by way of a letter together with the Affidavit of Stephen Joseph Ryan, had applied for confidential treatment over the same Price Information, Employee Identities and Non-Party Identities in the Originating Notice of Application. By an Order made on 1 December 2021, I granted the Commission’s application.

11.  The Commission asks the Tribunal to refrain from mentioning in the Tribunal’s judgment the information for which confidential treatment is sought, to exhibit redacted copies of the Statements, and/or to redact from the Tribunal’s judgment the percentage reductions for the Respondents’ cooperation to prevent reverse engineering of the value of sales and turnover of the Respondents, in line with the Tribunal’s approach in Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Limited & Others[6].

12.  At the hearing on 10 June 2022 (“10 June Hearing”), I directed the Commission and the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents to file evidence in support of the Confidentiality Application should they wish to maintain a claim for confidential treatment over the value of sales figures and turnover figures, and set down a further hearing to dispose of the confidentiality application—which took place on 2 September 2022.

13.  Subsequent to the 10 June Hearing, the Commission took steps to liaise with the respective Respondents, which indicated that they did not intend to insist on seeking confidential treatment of the value of sales figures and turnover figures. By a letter to the Tribunal dated 8 July 2022, the Commission confirmed that the parties did not insist on seeking confidential treatment of these categories of information in the present case. At the September hearing the Commission invited the Tribunal to decide whether confidential treatment should be granted over (i) Price Information; (ii) Employee Identities; and (iii) Non-Party Identities.

14.  As I explain in the August Decision:

(1)  the Tribunal has the power pursuant to Part 8 of the Competition Ordinance, Cap. 619 (“Ordinance”) to restrict the use and disclosure of confidential information, which is defined in section 123, provided to the Commission. Part 8 does not apply to disclosure ordered by the Tribunal or a court, where required by law or in connection with proceedings brought under the Competition Ordinance. Part 8’s relevance is limited to identifying the types of information that may be confidential and illustrating that the legislature recognised that the nature of competition law matters may engage concerns about confidentiality.

(2)  Although Part 8 does not apply to proceedings before the Tribunal, the Tribunal may make orders restricting the use and disclosure of confidential information in proceedings before it.

(3)  The Competition Tribunal Rules, Cap. 619D, and [11] of the Competition Tribunal Practice Direction No. 2 (Confidential Information) provide a procedure for the parties to apply to the Commission for orders restricting use and disclosure of confidential information. I shall refer to them generically as “confidentiality orders”.

(4)  In determining an application for a confidentiality order the starting point is the strong presumption that all evidence should be available to a person against whom the Commission alleges a breach of the First or Second Conduct Rule.

(5)  It is necessary for a party applying for a confidentiality order to adduce evidence justifying a restriction on the use and disclosure of information it contends is confidential and should be redacted or otherwise restricted in its availability to parties or the public.

15.  In the August Decision I introduce the principles that guide the Tribunal in determining whether or not a confidentiality ring should be ordered and, if so, on what terms [13]–[25].

16.  There is no dispute that the Tribunal can make confidentiality orders. What requires detailed consideration is the principles that guide the Tribunal in determining applications for such orders and how the principles are likely to apply in practice.

17.  In the following paragraphs I consider more generally the principles that guide the Tribunal in determining applications for confidentiality orders of whatever nature having had the benefit of further submissions from Derek Chan SC on behalf of the Commission and Timothy Parker on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in CTEA 1/2022. I then turn to consider the particular categories of information that the Commission seeks confidentiality orders in respect of in CTEA 1/2021.

Restrictions on the Open Justice Principle

18.  The Commission argued before me that it has been consistently recognised by the courts that while the principle of open justice is important, courts have an inherent jurisdiction to determine how it should be applied, and that when it is necessary in the interests of justice, the courts have the power to permit certain information to be withheld from public disclosure. In support of this proposition Mr Chan referred me to A v British Broadcasting Corporation[7], a case concerning a court order anonymising the petitioner’s name and prohibiting the publication of a name or details likely to identify the petitioner, in which the UK Supreme Court explained the courts’ power to make exceptions to the principle of open justice at [27]–[41]. Relevantly, [27] and [38] of the judgment explains:

“27. Since the principle of open justice is a constitutional principle to be found in the common law, it follows that it is for the courts to determine its ambit and its requirements, subject to any statutory provision. The courts therefore have an inherent jurisdiction to determine how the principle should be applied.

…

38. As I have explained, it has long been recognised that the courts have the power to permit the identity of a party or a witness to be withheld from public disclosure where that is necessary in the interests of justice. The Lord President was plainly right to approach the matter on the basis that the interests of justice are not confined to the court’s reaching a just decision on the issue in dispute between the parties. It is necessary in the first place to recognise that the administration of justice is a continuing process: see, for example, Attorney General v Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696, 725, per Donovan LJ. The court can therefore take steps in current proceedings in order to ensure that the interests of justice will not be defeated in the future. For example, the High Court of Justiciary has permitted undercover police officers to give evidence while screened from the sight of the general public, and without public disclosure of their identities, in order to avoid jeopardising their effectiveness in future investigations.”

In my view the position in Hong Kong is not, as the Commission contend relying for authority on A v British Broadcasting Corporation[8], simply a matter of the court exercising a wide common law jurisdiction to determine how the open justice principle applies to the facts of a particular case. In the following paragraphs I explain why Hong Kong’s law requires a rather more disciplined and rigorous approach.

19.  As was held in Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd & Ors[9] at [50], and has been accepted by the Commission, competition enforcement proceedings for breach of the First Conduct Rule (section 6 of the Ordinance) before this Tribunal involve the “determination of a criminal charge”, thereby engaging Articles 10 and 11 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“BOR”, section 8 of Cap. 383). These provisions have constitutional force by virtue of Article 39 of the Basic Law.

20.  Article 10 of the BOR enshrines (among other things) the right to a fair trial, the equality of arms, and the open justice principle:

“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.”

21.  Article 11(2)(a) of the BOR guarantees the right of a party to be informed in detail of the case against them:

“(2) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality—

(a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him.”

22.  It is thus clear that a respondent to a case brought against them for breach of the First Conduct Rule, as is the case in these proceedings, is entitled to be fully informed of the allegations against them. There is thus little room for restricting information relied on by the Commission being made available to a respondent on the grounds of confidentiality.

23.  It is also the clear intention of Article 10 that restrictions on information that would otherwise become public, being made available to the public about legal proceedings before a court or a tribunal are exceptional. A party applying for restrictions on such information being made public must demonstrate by evidence that one or more of the matters referred to in Article 10 of the BOR is engaged. In a competition case the grounds for excluding the press and the public from a trial are likely to be limited to case where it is demonstrated that “… the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice”. The express exceptions to the requirement that a judgment must be made public would, of course, never apply. This does not exclude the possibly that a decision might be redacted, although it is clear from Article 10 that this would be exceptional and that it needs to be demonstrated by a party seeking redaction that it is necessary in order either to protect their personal privacy or necessary in the interests of justice.

Applications for confidential orders

24.  The applications that have been made in the limited number of proceedings, including the two I am currently considering, so far brought before the Tribunal for confidentiality orders, are justified, so it has been argued, on the following factual grounds. First, that they involve allegations against individuals, who may or may not be respondents, which may interfere with their business or personal reputations and interests. Secondly, that if made public the information sought to be kept confidential might have a consequence, which is antithetical to the purpose of the Ordinance.

25.  So far the applications for confidentiality that have been made to the Tribunal have been in connection with:

(1)  information contained in the originating process;

(2)  information which it is anticipated will be filed and served by parties during the interlocutory stages of the proceedings; and

(3)  the present applications for redaction of information contained in a decision disposing of a case by what has come to be called by the Kam Kwong procedure[10].

The Kam Kwong procedure is a method by which the parties agree, subject to approval by the Tribunal, that a respondent has infringed either the First or Second Conduct Rule and the range of penalties that should be imposed on the respondent. It is modelled on the Carecraft procedure adopted in directors disqualification proceedings. As can be seen from [40] of my decision in Kam Kwong I made declarations that the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents had contravened the First Conduct Rule. I subsequently made similar declarations against the 3rd and 5th Respondents[11]. At a subsequent hearing I determined[12] the pecuniary and costs penalties to be imposed on the Respondents. This resulted in judgements being entered against the 1st to 5th Respondents pursuant to sections 93 and 94 of the Ordinance. The reasons for decision consisted of statements of facts agreed by the Commission and the relevant Respondents and my decision. The parties did not seek to redact any of the information in either the statements of agreed facts or in my reasons for decision.

26.  What has brought the issue of confidentiality into fine focus has been the Commission’s applications for redaction of information in the statements of agreed facts in the Kam Kwong procedure in the present case and CTEA 1/2022. In each case the applications were initiated by the Commission. The Respondents were, unsurprisingly, happy to agree to information being redacted, although when I raised concerns about the redactions at the hearings the Respondents indicated they were indifferent to whether they were permitted.

27.  It seems to me that the Commission in applying to have information redacted from the statements of agreed facts has overlooked the fact that they form part of a judgment of the Tribunal and redaction should only be made if Article 10 of the BOR is satisfied. I note in passing that although sections 152 and 154 (appeals) of the Ordinance uses the term “decision” to describe determinations of the Tribunal, sections 153A and 153B, which clarified that the Tribunal can award interest on a debt or damages ordered by the Tribunal, refers to the determinations as judgments. It is consistent with the characteristics of the proceedings and the Tribunal (it must be before a judge of the Court of First Instance (section 135)) that the decisions are properly characterised as judgments and Article 10 is engaged. I do not understand this to be controversial.

28.  It follows that if the Kam Kwong procedure results in a judgment it has to be made public. The next question is in what circumstances, if any, can a judgment which has to be made public be redacted? The Court of Appeal considered comprehensively the circumstances in which the open justice principle’s application can be modified in Asia Television Ltd v Communications Authority[13]. Cheung CJHC (as he then was) explains the circumstances in which a modification is justified in [22]–[27], [32]:

“22. Fourth, all this means that any restriction on open administration of justice necessarily represents a compromise between these important interests, rights and freedoms, and must be justified by considering and balancing all pertinent interests, rights and freedoms, including in particular those mentioned above.

23. Fifth, the case law has firmly established that the following considerations or matters do not by themselves justify any restriction on open administration of justice:

(1) Publicity of litigation leading to embarrassment and inconvenience: Re Wong Tung Kin [1989] 1 HKLR 93; Ex parte New Cross Building Society, at p.235F.

(2) Publicity leading to economic damage, even very severe economic damage: R v Dover Justices, ex p Dover District Council and Wells (1992) 156 JP 433.

(3) Professional embarrassment and possible damage to professional reputation: Ex parte Kaim Todner, at pp.975H-976C.

(4) The parties’ agreement that the proceedings be held in private: Ex parte Kaim Todner, at p.977C-E.

(5) The mere fact that the subject proceedings etc which gave rise to a judicial review application were held in private: Re The Takeovers & Mergers Panel [1996] 2 HKLR 60; Sit Ka Yin Priscilla v Equal Opportunities Commission [1998] 1 HKC 278.

24. Viewed in terms of the balancing exercise described above, it may be said that the right to privacy underlying some of these considerations or matters is in itself insufficient to justify a departure from the general rule of open justice (see also para.31 below).

25. This is hardly surprising. After all, unwanted publicity, embarrassment and so forth are some of the normal incidence of litigation. They are some of the inevitable consequences of open justice. As a general rule, no one involved in litigation, particularly the initiating party of litigation, can complain. In many but certainly not all cases, if parties desire secrecy, they may, where appropriate, go for arbitration, mediation or some other form of alternative dispute resolution.

26. Sixth, however, open justice is, from the perspective of proper administration of justice, just a means, albeit an important one, to an end, that is, doing justice between the parties concerned: Scott v Scott, at p.437; Ex parte New Cross Building Society, at p.235E. It therefore follows that where open administration of justice in a case would frustrate that ultimate aim of doing justice, it is a most important if not decisive consideration to take into account when balancing the relevant interests, rights and freedoms involved, to decide whether open justice should be restricted, and if so, by what means and to what extent.

27. The case law has very often expressed this in terms of a requirement of ‘necessity’, that is, where justice would be frustrated if open administration of justice in a particular case is not restricted, then, to the extent necessary to prevent that from happening, there may be a restriction on doing justice openly.

…

32. Eighth, where justice can be administered openly in the case itself, but to do so would or might jeopardise some right or interest of one or both of the parties outside of the case, whether open justice should be restricted and if so, the manner and extent of restriction, must be considered by conducting the balancing exercise already described. One common example is cases concerning refugees or torture claimants where it is said that the life, limb or liberty of the refugee or torture claimant or their family is or may be put at risk in the absence of some form of restriction on open justice: R (Kambadzi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 WLR 1299; Re BU (supra).”

29.  An example of circumstances which are capable of justifying departing from the open justice principle in the competition law enforcement context is a case in which it can be demonstrated that disclosure of information would harm competition and frustrate the purpose of the legislation and the proceedings. This would prejudice the interests of justice because it would interfere with the achievement of the legislation’s purpose.

30.  In the English case of Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd[14] Birss J explains the justification for keeping information out of the public domain as follows:

“16. It is clear that in the area of competition law, the need to keep certain information out of the public domain is well recognised. This is for two different reasons. One reason is that publication may discourage frankness and discourage companies from coming forward and applying for leniency. That is a good reason but it is not relevant in this case. The other reason is because publication of certain information such as pricing may itself be anti-competitive. That may be because publication could work a bit like a cartel. Another way in which publication could be anti-competitive is because it could weaken the competitive position of a party relative to others in the market. This latter point plays a major part in the reasoning of the parties before me. I accept that the point is capable of being relevant but there is a risk. In such a case it is easy to make generalised assertions that publication would harm a company’s interests. Just because a company regards the information as confidential and would prefer that it not be disclosed is not enough.”

The first reason identified by Birss J is advanced by the Commission for a number of proposed redactions in the present case, namely, redacting the identity of a witness in order to protect them from an unjustified degree of public or media attention and the ancillary risk that potential witnesses in other cases may be discouraged from assisting the Commission in its investigations if they anticipate their identity and involvement being made public[15]. However, the alleged jeopardy must be demonstrated by cogent evidence. It is not enough to identity one of the considerations, which the cases recognise may justify redaction and suggest that it applies without identifying and proving any fact or matter, which demonstrates that it does. In order for the Tribunal to undertake the balancing exercise Cheung CJHC explains in ATV[16] it must have something more than conjecture to work with in deciding whether the open justice principle should be moderated in a particular case.

31.  On 25 November 2021 in CTEA 1/2021 the Commission filed an affidavit of Stephen Ryan, the Head (Legal Advisory) of the Competition Commission. This sought an order for redaction in an Intended Originating Notice of Application (“INOA”) intended to commence CTEA 1/2021 which as I have explained in [10] I granted. Redaction was sought as against the public in respect of the first three categories of information I have referred to in [9].

32.  As the evidence justifying redaction is fairly short I will quote it in full.

“Price Information

8. Price-related information was referred to when describing the quotations submitted by either Toppan HK or Smartech and the information exchanged between them regarding the same. The information is commercial information relating to the business interests of Toppan HK and Smartech and is not available publicly.

9. Even if it is considered that the Price Information is no longer particularly current, mitigating somewhat the risks mentioned in the previous paragraph, it seems desirable to avoid any residual risks in this respect. The allegations in the Intended ONA relate to, inter alia, the exchange of competitively sensitive information and the Commission does not wish to perpetuate any harm caused by the alleged conduct (even if remote) by publishing the relevant prices to the wider world. The publication of the specific Price Information does not in any event appear necessary for the third parties to understand the substance of the Commission’s case.

Identities of Employees Not Pursued

10. This category of information concerns the identities of the individuals employed by the companies named in the Intended ONA as having been involved in the Subject Conduct. These individuals provided information to the Commission in its investigation under the Ordinance, but the Commission has not made any allegations of involvement in a contravention of a competition rule (pursuant to section 91 of the Ordinance) as regards these individuals in the Intended ONA.

11. As such, the disclosure of the identities of these individuals to the public might significantly harm their interests, including by subjecting them unnecessarily to public scrutiny, the consequences of which may be embarrassing or damaging to both their personal and professional reputations. The Commission therefore takes the view that it would not be in the interests of justice or indeed the public interest to unnecessarily expose them to the risks mentioned above.

Identities of Certain Non-Parties

12. This category of information relates to the identities of other parties which are referred to in the Intended ONA as part of the factual background to the alleged contravention. These parties did not participate in the Subject Conduct and are not named as respondents in the Intended ONA.

13. Similarly to the Identities of Employees Not Pursued, the Commission takes the view that it would not be in the interests of justice or indeed the public interest to unnecessarily expose these other parties to any inadvertent risks of being embarrassed or having their reputation and goodwill being damaged.”

33. In terms of number most of the redactions were of names of individuals. Nearly all the individual names in the INOA were redacted. I think it is accurate to say that at the time the application was made redaction of this type of information was standard and I granted the application. On 16 December 2021 the Commission’s solicitors Minter Ellison wrote informing the Tribunal that terms of settlement had been reached, and a joint application pursuant to Rule 39 of the Competition Tribunal Rules, Cap. 619D had been filed consisting of consent summonses and Statements of Agreed Facts. Redaction of information in the Statements of Agreed Facts was sought, but no new evidence in support of the application was filed. Instead the letter advanced further reasons in relation to value of sales and turnover. The letter suggested this:

“18. Part C of the Statements of Agreed Facts sets out the undisputed facts relevant to the calculation of the recommended pecuniary penalty and investigation costs.

19. The Highlighted Information in Part C of the Statements of Agreed Facts concerns the following categories of information:-

(i) The relevant value of sales which is directly or indirectly related to the Respondents’ contravention (the ‘Value of Sales’); and

(ii) The turnover of the respective Respondents in the financial year ended on 31 January 2019 (the ‘Turnover’).

20. The Value of Sales and the Turnover are commercial information relating to the business interests of the Respondents respectively and are not available to the public, thus falling within the ambit of section 123(1)(a)(ii) of the Ordinance. Although sections 125(2) and 126(1)(d) of the Ordinance expressly permit the disclosure of confidential information in connection with judicial proceedings arising under the Ordinance, the Applicant nevertheless considers that, for the reasons given immediately below and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, confidential treatment should be provided to the Value of Sales and Turnover.

21. Even if it is considered that the Value of Sales and the Turnover are no longer particularly current, it is desirable to avoid any potential harm of publishing such information to the wider world. In any event, it is the Applicant’s view that the publication of such information does not appear necessary for third parties to understand the substance of the Applicant’s proposed calculation of the recommended pecuniary penalty and investigation costs, and the orders to be made by this Tribunal as a result of the CTR39 Applications (if thought fit).”

34.  This seemed to me unconvincing. Whilst viewed from the point of view of the Respondents this information might be commercially sensitive it was not apparent to me how making this information public might frustrate the purpose of the proceedings or the Ordinance or, for that matter, how it might be said (and it was being said by the Commission, not by the Respondents) that revealing it was prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the Respondents and outweighed the conventional application of the open justice principle. At the hearing on 10 June 2022 I asked Derek Chan SC, who appeared for the Commission, why it was suggested turnover should be redacted. As I have explained earlier in this decision he told me that it allowed the relevant Respondent’s profit to be calculated. After an exchange with me, he accepted that this was wrong. It became clear in my view that there was no good reason for redacting the sales and turnover figures. In respect of the identity of individuals Mr Chan submissions added nothing of substance to the reasons for redaction given in Mr Ryan’s affidavit.

35.  It seems to me clear that there was no basis for the redaction of the sales figures and turnover and consistent with this the application to redact it was subsequently abandoned. So far as the identity of the individuals is concerned the matter is more difficult. Mr Ryan’s reasons for suggesting their names should be redacted is more conjecture than evidence. I accept that there may be cases in which there is potential prejudice to individuals interviewed by the Commission, which is sufficiently serious to justify moderating the application of the open justice principle, because if, it becomes generally known that the identity of witnesses has been made public this may impact the cooperation the Commission obtains from individuals it seeks information from in regard to future investigations. I cannot see any particular reason to think that CTEA 1/2021 is such a case.

36.  Subsequent to the hearing on 2 September 2022 and the filing of further submissions, I have received other applications by the Commission represented by other legal teams for redactions in other cases. They have also shown in my view insufficient regard to the principles that I have discussed in this Decision. At a hearing on 1 December 2022 in CTEA 2/2022 Norman Nip SC on behalf of the Commission accepted that it appeared that the Commission was not able to provide any more specific evidence to justify redacting names than the sort that I have described in the present case.

37.  The views of the Commission of what is required in order to facilitate its operations are entitled to respect and should be given appropriate weight in determining issues of the sort I have been considering. However, it does seem to me that insufficient thought has been given to this matter. The practice seems to have developed of redacting a significant amount of information from documents placed before the Tribunal with scanty evidence to justify so doing in the expectation that the Tribunal will routinely approve the redactions. When pressed to justify the practice the response has been, with respect, shallow and unimaginative.

38.  I am keen that the Tribunal facilitates the Commissions’ function rather than hinder it. It seems to me that with this in mind applications for redactions should be made having regard to the following considerations:

(1)  So far as the identity of individuals in statements of agreed facts or decisions of the Tribunal is concerned if nothing of importance turns on the identity of the individual they should be referred to as “an employee of X limited” or similar language. I would expect this normally to be sufficient for the Commission’s purposes. If the name of the individual is important than I would expect the Commission to be able to adduce precise evidence justifying its redaction. Generally not knowing the name of an individual is unlikely to inhibit the Tribunal in approving a Kam Kwong settlement.

(2)  I assume given the way the present matter has developed that either the Commission will proceed on the basis that financial information such as turnover and sales figures do not need redaction or they will ask the Respondent to justify doing so. In the present case the Respondents were indifferent, although as I have mentioned unsurprisingly happy to agree with the Commission that the information be redacted when asked.

(3)  So far as originating notices of motion are concerned generally the Tribunal will in future agree to the redaction of names of individuals as against the public. The redactions should, however, take the form of a footnote to the name redacted describing the individual as “an employee of X limited or X Respondent” or similar description unless the Commission can provide substantive evidence for not doing so.

(4)  The position in respect of redactions against Respondents raises additional issues, which I address in my Decision dated 31 August 2022 in CTEA 2/2022.

39.  For the reasons I have explained I will allow the individual names in the Statements to be replaced by the description “an employee of ‘X’ Limited or ‘X’ Respondent”.

Kam Kwong Procedure

40.  As I have explained the Parties have agreed both liability and the penalties. As the relief that is sought consists of declarations and the imposition of penalties, this matter cannot simply be disposed of by consent. It is necessary for the Tribunal to review what is proposed and consider whether or not the agreed facts demonstrate a contravention of the Ordinance and the agreed penalties are appropriate. A procedure was proposed by me in Kam Kwong for the Tribunal to determine proceedings, in which the Respondents had conceded contraventions of the Ordinance pursuant to section 6 or involvement in a contravention pursuant to section 91. The procedure is based on the Carecraft procedure adopted in disqualification proceedings brought under the Securities and Futures Ordinance, Cap. 571 and the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, Cap. 32. This has subsequently been adopted by Linda Chan J in Competition Commission v Quantr Ltd[17] and G Lam J in Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd & others[18]. The Tribunal will, however, exercise restraint when scrutinising the proposed agreement[19]. The Tribunal will not search out reasons to disagree with an agreement that the Commission, which has expertise in the subject matter of the proceedings, and Respondents consider appropriate.

41.  It is not necessary to repeat the details of the procedure. It has most recently been explained in a subsequent decision in Kam Kwong[20] dealing with Respondents, who had not accepted liability at the time of the first application to the Tribunal. Generally in my view it is not necessary in each case for the Tribunal to rehearse the principles and how they apply except in the following circumstances. First, there is a matter which is contentious. For example in Kam Kwong[21] the penalties had not been agreed and it was necessary for the Tribunal to consider the parties arguments in some detail. This required consideration of the relevant principles and how they operate in practice particularly as Competition Law in Hong Kong is still developing and the principles require explanation as do their application. Secondly, matters the Tribunal itself believes require detailed consideration. This is so in the present case in which I required further consideration of the issue of confidentiality and redaction from the Statements of information that I have discussed in the previous section.

42.  In the present case all matters have been agreed. There is no factual dispute. The Statements recite (a) the background to the contraventions of section 6 or involvement in contraventions, (b) the facts and matters said to constitute the contraventions of section 6 or involvement in the contraventions and (c) the facts relevant to the calculation of penalties and investigation costs.

43.  In my view the facts recited in the Statements demonstrate that:

(1)  The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents contravened the First Conduct Rule under section 6 of the Ordinance.

(2)  As against the 1st and 2nd Respondent a pecuniary penalty of HK$1,399,000 pursuant to section 93 of the Ordinance is appropriate and pursuant to section 96 of the Ordinance it is appropriate that the 1st and 2nd Respondents pay HK$476,101 of the costs of the investigation.

(3)  As against the 3rd Respondent a pecuniary penalty of HK$3,372,000 pursuant to section 93 of the Ordinance is appropriate and pursuant to section 96 of the Ordinance it is appropriate that the 3rd Respondent pay HK$476,101 of the costs of the investigation.

(4)  As against the 4th Respondent a pecuniary penalty of HK$808,000 pursuant to section 93 of the Ordinance is appropriate and pursuant to section 96 of the Ordinance it is appropriate that the 4th Respondent pay HK$476,101 of the costs of the investigation.

(5)  The 1st and 2nd Respondents pay the Commission one third of its costs.

(6)  The 3rd Respondent pay the Commission one third of its costs.

(7)  The 4th Respondent pay the Commission one third of its costs.

I will make an order in the terms of the three Consent Summonses agreed by the parties.

  (Jonathan Harris)
President of the Competition Tribunal

Mr Derek Chan SC and Ms Allison Wong, instructed by MinterEllison LLP, for the applicant

Attendance of Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd respondents, was excused

Attendance of Slaughter and May, for the 3rd respondent, was excused

Attendance of Stephenson Harwood, for the 4th respondent, was excused



[1]  Competition Commission v Kam Kwong Engineering Co Ltd [2020] 4 HKLRD 61, [2020] HKCT 3.

[2]  [2022] HKCT 4.

[3]  [2023] HKCT 2.

[4]  Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd CTEA 1/2017, 28 March 2017.

[5]  Taching Petroleum Company Ltd v Meyer Aluminium Ltd; Shell Hong Kong Ltd v Meyer Aluminium Ltd [2019] 6 HKC 553; [2019] HKCT 1.

[6]  CTEA 1/2017; [2020] HKCT 11.

[7]  [2015] AC 588.

[8]  Supra.

[9]  [2019] 3 HKC 307.

[10]  Competition Commission v Kam Kwong Engineering Company Ltd & others[2020] HKCT 3, 17 July 2020.

[11]  4 August 2020.

[12]  [2022] HKCT 2, 22 July 2022.

[13]  [2013] 2 HKLRD 354.

[14]  [2018] Bus LR 896, [16]; see also Shell Hong Kong Limited v Meyer Aluminium Ltd[2021] HKCT 2.

[15]  See also Shell Hong Kong [102(3)], Ibid.

[16]  Supra.

[17]  [2020] 5 HKLRD 528; [2020] HKCT 10.

[18]  [2019] 3 HKC 307; [2019] HKCT 2.

[19]  Kam Kwong [16(4)]; Quantr [5(2)]; Nutanix relief judgment [5]; supra.

[20]  [2022] HKCT 1.

[21]  Ibid.