HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Competition Tribunal Enforcement Action2023

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV1093/2025COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS
  • CACV1094/2025COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS
  • CACV143/2020COMPETITION COMMISSION v. W. HING CONSTRUCTION CO LTD AND OTHERS
  • CACV157/2021COMPETITION COMMISSION v. W. HING CONSTRUCTION CO LTD AND OTHERS
  • CACV257/2019COMPETITION COMMISSION v. W. HING CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD AND OTHERS
  • CACV46/2021COMPETITION COMMISSION v. FUNGS E&M ENGINEERING CO LTD AND OTHERS
  • CAMP369/2023COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS
  • CAMP370/2023COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA1/2017COMPETITION COMMISSION v. NUTANIX HONG KONG LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA1/2018COMPETITION COMMISSION v. KAM KWONG ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA1/2019COMPETITION COMMISSION 對 FUNGS E&M ENGINEERING CO LTD 及另八人
  • CTEA1/2020COMPETITION COMMISSION v. QUANTR LTD AND ANOTHER
  • CTEA1/2021COMPETITION COMMISSION v. QUADIENT TECHNOLOGIES HONG KONG LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA1/2022COMPETITION COMMISSION v. GRAY LINE TOURS OF HONG KONG LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA1/2023COMPETITION COMMISSION v. MULTISOFT LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA2/2017COMPETITION COMMISSION v. W. HING CONSTRUCTION CO LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA2/2020COMPETITION COMMISSION v. T.H. LEE BOOK CO LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA2/2021COMPETITION COMMISSION v. HONG KONG COMMERCIAL CLEANING SERVICES LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA2/2022COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS
  • CTEA3/2020COMPETITION COMMISSION v. LINDE HKO LTD AND OTHERS

Files (3)

[2025] HKCT 3-EN-2025-03-25

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023

(HEARD TOGETHER)

[2025] HKCT 3

CTEA 2/2022

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LIMITED1st Respondent
 ANALOGUE HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Respondent
 SHUN HING ENGINEERING CONTRACTING COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
 SHUN HING HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent
 SER KA WAI5th Respondent
 CHENG KIT SHUN6th Respondent
 KWAN SIU KIN7th Respondent

____________________

ANDCTEA 2/2023

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2023

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LIMITED1st Respondent
 JOHNSON CONTROLS HONG KONG LIMITED2nd Respondent
 YORK INTERNATIONAL (NORTHERN ASIA) LIMITED3rd Respondent
 JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL PLC4th Respondent
 LEE YUI MING5th Respondent

____________________

(HEARD TOGETHER)

Before: Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 6 June 2024
Date of Decision: 6 June 2024
Date of Reasons for Decision: 25 March 2025

_________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________________

1.  On 6 June 2024 I heard at the same time case management conferences in CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023. The reason they were heard together was because the Commission had listed a summons in each proceeding that they be consolidated. I indicated at the outset of the hearing that I would not make such an order, although I had no objection (and neither did the Respondents in the two proceedings) to them being heard one after the other. As can be seen from the titles to the two proceedings they have one common party. They both concern alleged contraventions of the First Conduct Rule (“FCR”) in connection with tendering for air-conditioning maintenance, installation, repair or replacement works. There is little overlap between the facts other than for the business activity, which is the subject of the alleged anti-competitive practices and the identity of the 1st Respondent. It seemed to me clear that the opposition to the application to consolidation of the principal Respondents in both proceedings, principally on the grounds that it would result in them having to participate in a longer, more complicated trial, is justified. It also seemed to me that although the total hearing time for the trial of the two proceedings might be shortened, there was potentially plenty of room for complication, because the Tribunal would be hearing two different cases simultaneously. I have, therefore, reserved dates for the trial in CTEA 2/2022 from 26 October 2026 to 13 November 2026 and CTEA 2/2023 from 30 November 2026 to 18 December 2026.

2.  The Commission has also sought directions that “the evidence in the trial of CTEA 2/2022, insofar as it is relevant to the issues in CTEA 2/2023, do stand as evidence in the trials thereof”. I am not prepared to make such a direction until the evidence (in the form of witness statements) have been served and an informed view can be taken on whether this is practical or will create more challenges than it avoids. I dismissed the Commission’s summons filed on 12 April 2024 in CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023. The costs of the summons be the Respondents’ costs in the cause.

3.  The directions sought by the Commission for the further conduct of the two proceedings are largely conventional. There were differences over the inclusion of some and directions and time periods for compliance with the directions for exchange of witness statements. I made the directions contained in the orders dated 6 June 2024, which for ease of reference I have included as Annex 1 and 2 to these reasons.

Further and Better Particulars sought by 2nd to 4th Respondents in CTEA 2/2023

4.  The 2nd to 4th Respondents (“Johnson Controls”) seek further and better particulars of various paragraphs of the Notice of Originating Motion (“ONA” and “Particulars” respectively). I will approach the dispute over Johnson Control’s entitlement to the Particulars, by first setting out the Request and the paragraphs of the ONA to which they relate, followed by the principles I consider relevant in determining Johnson Control’s entitlement to them and then how they apply to the facts.

“1. Under paragraph 11(b) of the Originating Notice of Application dated 23 May 2023 (‘ONA’)

Of the plea that:

‘Orders under section 93(1) of the Ordinance that the Undertakings and the Individuals do pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty in such amount as the Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) considers appropriate;’

Request

1.1 Please state the amount of any pecuniary penalty sought against the 2nd to 4th Respondents (the ‘Proposed Penalty’);

1.2 Please state the methodology for calculation of the Proposed Penalty and any assumptions, parameters and alleged facts underlying the methodology, including but not limited to:

(a) The value of sales alleged to be related to the Proposed Penalty;

(b) The area of commerce alleged to be affected by the alleged Collusive Conduct (as defined in paragraph 7 of the ONA) and how, if at all, the alleged area of commerce affects the Proposed Penalty;

(c) The financial year(s) applied in calculating the Proposed Penalty and the basis for selecting the financial year(s);

(d) The gravity percentage applied in calculating the Proposed Penalty and the basis for selecting that gravity percentage;

(e) The duration multiplier applied in calculating the Proposed Penalty and the basis for selecting that duration multiplier; and

(f) Any aggravating, mitigating and other factors alleged to be relevant to the Proposed Penalty and the effect of those aggravating, mitigating and/or other factors on the Proposed Penalty.

2. Under paragraph 11(d) of the ONA

Of the plea that:

‘For the purpose of securing compliance with any order made by the Tribunal pursuant to §11(c)(i) of this Application, orders under section 1(b) of Schedule 3 of the Ordinance that the Undertakings do adopt and implement, to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commission, effective competition compliance programmes in such time period and manner as the Tribunal shall determine;’

Request

2.1 Please state the basis for seeking an order that the 2nd to 4th Respondents ‘do adopt and implement, to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commission, effective competition compliance programmes in such time period and manner as the Tribunal shall determine’, including but not limited to:

(a) Any alleged defects in the 2nd to 4th Respondents’ existing compliance policies; and

(b) The proposed changes (both in terms of the time period and manner) to the existing compliance policies.

3. Under paragraph 11(e) of the ONA

Of the plea that:

‘Orders under section 96(1) of the Ordinance that the Undertakings do pay to the Government an amount equal to the reasonably incurred costs of and incidental to the Commission’s investigation into their conduct or affairs, to be assessed;’

Request

3.1 Please state the particulars of the alleged ‘costs of and incidental to the Commission’s investigation’ sought against the 2nd to 4th Respondents, including but not limited to the alleged costs attributable to the 2nd to 4th Respondents.”

5.  As can be seen what is sought is details of the relief that the Commission invites the Tribunal to order against Johnson Controls.

The Relevant Legal Principles

6.  The function of properly particularised pleadings is well-established. They include:

(1)  to inform the other side of the nature of the case they have to meet as distinguished from the mode in which that case is to be proved;

(2)  to prevent the other side from being taken by surprise at the trial;

(3)  to enable the other side to know what evidence they ought to be prepared with and to prepare for trial;

(4)  to limit the generality of the pleadings, the charge and the evidence;

(5)  to limit and define the issues to be tried; and

(6)  to tie the hands of the party so that he cannot, without leave, go into any matters not included (although if the opponent omits to ask for particulars, evidence may be given which supports any material allegation in the pleadings).

See Angela Chen v Wai Wai Chen[1].

7.  As Stuart-Smith J (as he then was) observed in Pedro Emiro Florez Arroyo v EquionEnergia Limited[2]:

“9. … it must now be axiomatic that the purpose of statements of case is to ‘enable the court and the parties to identify and define the real issues in dispute’ … That is necessary for the furtherance of other aspects of the Overriding Objective, including ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, saving expense and ensuring that litigation is dealt with expeditiously and fairly.

10. Seen in this light, the necessity for amendments arises where a party wishes to raise or pursue an issue which the existing pleadings do not accurately and fairly identify for the Court and the other party. The touchstone should be whether the existing pleadings identify the issue with sufficient particularity to enable the opposing party to understand the case it has to meet so that it can take appropriate steps to prepare to meet it (which may include accepting that it is well founded, assessing and pursuing the prospects of settlement, attempting to defeat it, or any variation on these themes) and, if necessary, to enable the Court to rule on the issue in due course…

14. In my judgment, the level of precision that is required when pleading an issue or case… should be determined by the need to provide a fair and sufficient indication to the Court and the opposing party of the case that is being brought and that the opposing party has to meet. … If that information is not provided, there can be no equality of arms and the opposing party is unfairly disadvantaged.” (emphasis added)

8.  A similar point in relation to a party’s ability to consider a settlement being assisted by proper particulars is made in CS Low Investment Ltd v East Asia Warburg Ltd & Others[3]:

“A plaintiff must plead his case with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to gauge its strength, to admit or deny the allegation made and reasonably to assess the propriety of a payment into court.”(emphasis added)

9.  Rule 7 of the Competition Tribunal Rules (Cap. 619D) (“CTR”) provides that all proceedings before the Tribunal must be commenced by filing an originating notice of application in Form 1 in the Schedule, which must state the reliefs sought and the grounds on which the reliefs are sought. More specifically, Competition Tribunal Practice Direction No.1 (“CTPD 1”) [88] provides that:

“The originating notice of application, initiating the proceedings in the Tribunal, should contain not only the material facts relied upon, but also a succinct presentation of the arguments of fact, economics (if applicable) or law supporting the findings and relief sought, so that from the outset the Tribunal and the respondent are apprised of the substance of the case advanced by the applicant.” (emphasis added)

This is reinforced by [12], which states that “Cases will be managed and directions given by the Tribunal so that the parties’ respective cases are disclosed and the real issues identified and focused upon as early as possible” and the Tribunal will [10] “ensure that cases are as efficiently, inexpensively and expeditiously disposed of as is consistent with fairness”.

10.  I agree with Mr Shieh that in considering how these principles apply it is relevant that they involve the determination of a criminal charge[4] (within the meaning of the Arts. 10 and 11 of the Bill of Rights, albeit not criminal proceedings) and that the Commission invites the Tribunal to impose significant penalties. It is all the more important given the character of the proceedings that a respondent is fully informed at outset of the case, including the relief, advanced against it[5].

Discussion

11.  It is not in dispute that Johnson Controls is entitled to know the case against it in sufficient detail to be able to respond to it either by defending it or proposing a settlement. The Commission’s position assumes that liability will be tried first and only if the Tribunal finds that Johnson Controls has contravened the FCR will the proceedings move onto the penalty stage at which time the Commission will have to provide the type of particulars that Johnson Controls seek. Thus says the Commission it is not necessary at this stage to provide the particulars that Johnson Controls seek.

12.  Johnson Controls dispute this. It says, correctly, that as the Commission’s pleaded case is currently formulated they assume that any penalty will be determined in accordance with the four-stage process explained by Godfrey Lam J (as he then was) in Competition Commission v W Hing Construction Co Ltd (No3)[6]. This involves:

(1)  Stage 1: determining a base amount;

(2)  Stage 2: making adjustments for aggravating, mitigating and other factors;

(3)  Stage 3: applying the statutory cap;

(4)  Stage 4: applying any reduction considered appropriate because of the contravenor’s cooperation and considering a plea of inability to pay.

13.  Stage 1 has several components. First, the value of the undertaking’s sales directly or indirectly related to the contravention in the relevant geographical area. Secondly, a gravity percentage. Thirdly, the period during which the contravening conduct took place (i.e. the duration), which is used as a multiplier applied to the relevant value of the undertaking’s sales. Johnson Controls say that consistent with Form 1 in the Schedule of the CTR and CTPD 1, it is necessary for it to be told, albeit succinctly, “the arguments of fact, economics (if applicable) or law supporting the findings and relief sought, so that from the outset the Tribunal and the respondent are apprised of the substance of the case advanced by the applicant[7].” These will include the following facts and matters, which Johnson Controls seek by way of Particulars:

(1)  §1.1: The amount of the pecuniary penalty;

(2)  §1.2(a): The value of sales;

(3)  §1.2(b): The area of commerce directly or indirectly related to the alleged contravention (for calculating the value of sales);

(4)  §1.2(c): The relevant financial year (for calculating the value of sales);

(5)  §1.2(d): The gravity percentage and its basis;

(6)  §1.2(e): The duration multiplier and its basis; and

(7)  §1.2(f): Any aggravating, mitigating and other circumstances relevant to the calculation of the pecuniary penalty.

14.  It seems to me clear that Johnson Controls is correct and that the combined effect of footnote 5 to Form 1 and [88] is that a compliant Originating Notice of Application will provide the particulars that they seek at the very least of the penalty and the investigation costs. In the case of the compliance program I incline to the view that it is not necessary to provide a draft programme, but the ONA should identify what the Commission says its principal components should be.

15.  The Commission argued before me relying on Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A, O18 r12(3B), that the Tribunal should not make an order for particulars unless it is satisfied that it is necessary to fairly dispose of the matter or to save costs. CTPD 1 [25](b) provides that O18 is not applicable unless there are pleadings. Plainly the ONA is not a pleading for this purpose otherwise this rule would be rendered meaningless as the proceedings are always commenced by an ONA.

16.  The Commission is bringing a complaint of a criminal nature, which if made out would normally result in a penalty being imposed, often of a significant amount. Although, CTPD 1 [89] encourages succinctness, it is clear from [88] that an ONA is meant to be a comprehensive exposition of the case a respondent has to meet and that this includes “the findings and relief sought”. It seems likely that the express reference to relief was included, because it is not something that will necessarily be apparent from the matters relied on to prove a contravention, but it forms an important part of the case against the respondent and one, which the respondent is entitled to be told at the outset. The Commission argues that the Tribunal is entitled to take into account in determining the penalty to impose all the circumstances of the case including findings made after a trial on liability and, therefore, it is premature to require the Commission to plead its case as to the calculation of the penalty. It seems to me that this consideration rather than suggest that it is not necessary for the Commission to state its case on the determination of the penalty at this stage, points to the opposite conclusion. If it is thought that evidence may be called and arguments advanced at the trial on liability, which prove to be relevant to the penalty then it is all the more important that the parties know what the competing cases on penalty are before trial in order that the kind of matters the Commission has in mind (but has not identified) as being relevant to the four-stage process I have briefly summarised earlier, might be properly investigated at trial.

17.  It is difficult to see how requiring the Commission to state what at the time the proceedings are commenced it will invite the Tribunal to order by way of penalty and how it should be calculated is imposing an unreasonable burden on the Commission given the character of the proceedings. It is also likely to facilitate rather than hinder the prospects of the parties agreeing to dispose of the proceedings by way of the Kam Kwong procedure.

18.  I will, therefore, make an order in the terms of paragraph 1 of Johnson Controls summons filed on 9 May 2024. I note that the Commission has not provided an alternative formulation were I minded to make an order for Particulars of paragraph 11(b) of the ONA.

19.  So far as paragraph 2 of the summons (competition compliance programmes) is concerned, I will order request 2.1(a). In my view if the current compliance policies are said to be defective the defects should be identified in order that they can be examined at the trial on liability as in my view it is foreseeable that this may have relevance to liability, as they may be relevant to Johnson Control’s staff actions, as well as the possible penalty. I do not think that at this stage the proposed changes are necessary.

20.  The final request in paragraph 3 of the summons is an order that the costs of the investigation be paid by Johnson Controls. The Commission’s response to this request is that it is not necessary to dispose of the matter fairly or save costs. I disagree. For the reasons I have explained the Commission is required to provide details of the relief that it seeks. In the case of the costs of the investigation this is a liquidated amount that must be known to the Commission, even if it may increase. This is a fact that supports the relief sought and should be provided.

Costs

21.  I will make a costs order nisi that the Commission pays Johnson Controls costs of the summons filed on 9 May 2024 in CTEA 2/2023 with a certificate for two counsel, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

  (Jonathan Harris)
President of the Competition Tribunal

Mr Norman Nip SC and Ms Leticia Tang, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the Applicant (in both actions)

Mr Peter So, of Deacons, for the 1st Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022) and the 1st Respondent (in CTEA 2/2023)

Mr Daniel R Fung SC and Ms Ebony Ling, instructed by Wong Heung Sum & Lawyers, for the 3rd Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Dicky Cheung, instructed by Au Yeung, Chan & Ho, for the 4th Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Tang & Ku, for the 5th and 6th Respondents (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Taylor Li and Ms Polly Li, instructed by KCL & Partners, for the 7th Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Paul Shieh SC and Mr Jonathan Ng, instructed by Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th Respondents (in CTEA 2/2023)

Mr Stephen Crosswell, solicitor advocate of Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th Respondents (in CTEA 2/2023)

The 5th Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in CTEA 2/2023)

Order dated 6 June 2024 in CTEA 2/2022

IT IS ORDERED that:-

A.  Witness (as against the Applicant and the 3rd, 4th and 7th Respondents (the “Shun Hing Respondents”) only)

1.  The deadline for the filing and exchange of witness statements as to fact be extended to 112 days from the date of this Order;

2.  All witness statements as to fact in reply (if any) to be filed and exchanged within 56 days thereafter;

3.  Such witness statements shall stand as evidence in chief of the respective witnesses unless otherwise directed by the Tribunal;

B.  Counsel’s advice (as against the Applicant and the Shun Hing Respondents only)

4.  Parties do within 28 days after the exchange of witness statements as to fact obtain Counsel’s advice (if necessary).

C.  Interlocutory Applications (as against the Applicant and the Shun Hing Respondents only)

5.  The deadline for parties to take out all interlocutory applications as may be advised, including any witness summons application under Rule 36 CTR, be extended to 28 days after §4 above.

D.  Hearsay Evidence (as against the Applicant and the Shun Hing Respondents only)

6.  The requirement under section 47A of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 8) that notice shall be given by any party proposing to adduce hearsay evidence in these proceedings be dispensed with.

E.  4th CMC and trial window

7.  The matter be adjourned to a date to be fixed for the Fourth Case Management Conference (“4th CMC”) with 3 hours reserved before the Honourable Mr Justice Harris.

8.  Parties shall within 14 days from the date of this Order, confer with each other and write to the Tribunal to:

(a)  fix a date for the 4th CMC; and

(b)  fix a trial window.

9.  Parties shall confer with each other and submit a list of all proposed directions not less than 14 days before the 4th CMC.

F.  Language

10.  The language to be used in these proceedings (including at trial) will be English.

11.  Witness statements and documents in a language other than English must be submitted with a proposed translation for use at trial. Only those parts sought to be relied upon by the parties at the trial, and such other parts as are necessary to give fair and proper context, need to be translated.

12.  Parties shall endeavour to reach an agreement on any proposed translation of documents within 28 days of receipt thereof, failing which the party serving the proposed translation shall obtain a certified translation of the relevant document.

G.  Other Matters

13.  The list of documents filed by the Applicant on 27 March 2024 be provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent within 7 days from this Order and any amended or supplemental list of documents filed by the Applicant by provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent on the same day when such list is served on the other Respondents in these proceedings.

14.  Liberty to apply.

15.  Costs of the 3rd CMC hearing on 6 June 2024 be in the cause.

Order dated 6 June 2024 in CTEA 2/2023

IT IS ORDERED that:-

A.  Witness (as against the Applicant and the 2nd – 5th Respondents only)

1.  All witness statements as to facts shall be filed and exchanged within 56 days from the date of: (a) the determination of the Summons of the 2nd to 4th Respondents dated 9 May 2024 for Further and Better Particulars of the Originating Notice of Application dated 23 May 2023; or (b) service of the Further and Better Particulars (if so ordered), whichever is later.

2.  All witness statements as to fact in reply (if any) to be filed and exchanged within 56 days thereafter;

3.  Such witness statements shall stand as evidence in chief of the respective witnesses unless otherwise directed by the Tribunal;

B.  4th CMC and trial window

4.  The matter be adjourned to a date not before 11 June 2025 for the Fourth Case Management Conference (“4th CMC”) with 3 hours reserved before the Honourable Mr Justice Harris.

5.  Parties shall within 14 days from the date of this Order, confer with each other and write to the Tribunal to:

(a)  fix a date for the 4th CMC; and

(b)  fix a trial window.

6.  Parties shall confer with each other and submit a list of all proposed directions not less than 14 days before the 4th CMC.

C.  Language

7.  The language to be used in these proceedings (including at trial) will be English.

8.  Witness statements and documents in a language other than English must be submitted with a proposed translation for use at trial. Only those parts sought to be relied upon by the parties at the trial, and such other parts as are necessary to give fair and proper context, need to be translated.

9.  Parties shall endeavour to reach an agreement on any proposed translation of documents within 28 days of receipt thereof, failing which the party serving the proposed translation shall obtain a certified translation of the relevant document.

D.  Other Matters

10.  Liberty to apply.

11.  The list of documents filed by the Applicant on 21 March 2024 be provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent within 7 days from this Order and any amended or supplemental list of documents filed by the Applicant be provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent on the same day when the such list is served on the other Respondents in these proceedings.

12.  Costs of the 3rd CMC hearing on 6 June 2024 be in the cause.



[1]  [2024] HKCFI 60 at [6].

[2]  [2013] EWHC 3150.

[3]  CACV 37/1990, 12 July 1990 at [4] per Kempster JA.

[4]  Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Limited[2019] HKCT 2 [50]-[51], [2019] HKEC 1490.

[5]  See the observations of Tang VP at [29] of HKSAR v Chu Chi Wah (No. 2) [2010] 4 HKLRD 715.

[6]  [2020] 2 HKLRD 1229.

[7]  [88].

[2024] HKCT 1-EN-2024-01-11

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023

(HEARD TOGETHER)

[2024] HKCT 1

CTEA 2/2022

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LIMITED1st Respondent
 ANALOGUE HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Respondent
 SHUN HING ENGINEERING CONTRACTING COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
 SHUN HING HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent
 SER KA WAI5th Respondent
 CHENG KIT SHUN6th Respondent
 KWAN SIU KIN7th Respondent
ANDCTEA 2/2023

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2023

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING1st Respondent
 LIMITED 
 JOHNSON CONTROLS HONG KONG LIMITED2nd Respondent
 YORK INTERNATIONAL (NORTHERN ASIA) LIMITED3rd Respondent
 JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL PLC4th Respondent
 LEE YUI MING5th Respondent

____________________

(HEARD TOGETHER)

Before: Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 27 November 2023
Date of Decision: 27 November 2023
Date of Reasons for Decision: 11 January 2024

_________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________________

1.  On 25 October 2023 I handed down my decision in respect of applications heard on 29 August 2023 in CTEA 2/2023 (“1st Action”). The applications were for an order that a Kam Kwong application that had been made in the 1st Action (although wrongly formulated as an order for a declaration and penalty by consent[1]) by the Commission and the 1st Respondent (“ATAL”) be heard together with a similar application in CTEA 2/2022 (“2nd Action”), although no such application had been issued and listed in the 2nd Action before 29 August 2023. I determined that the applications in the 1st Action and (necessarily when the requisite application was made) in the 2nd Action, be heard at or immediately after the trial of the Actions or when all the Respondents had agreed that the Actions be determined by Kam Kwong applications for the reasons explained in my decision. The Commission seeks leave to appeal that decision along with directions to which ATAL and 5th and 6th Respondents (employees of ATAL) agree for the Kam Kwong applications in the 2nd Action to be heard at the same time as the Kam Kwong applications to be made in the 1st Action.

2.  I wrote to the Parties in both Actions on 18 September 2023 directing that as the Commission and ATAL sought one penalty of HK$150,000,000 be imposed in both the Actions that at the next CMC the following questions be addressed:

“2.1 Issue 1: whether one pecuniary penalty can be imposed in two proceedings;

2.2 Issue 2: if yes, the matters to be taken into account in determining the appropriate penalty;

2.3 Issue 3: when the pecuniary penalty in Action 1 should be determined (this matter was addressed in Action 2); and

2.4 Issue 4: whether the facts of the Actions make it appropriate for a single pecuniary penalty to be imposed.”

3.  It was apparent from ATAL’s skeleton that it understood that my concern was whether the Tribunal could properly give one composite judgment imposing one composite fine in two proceedings. At the hearing it was accepted by both the Commission and ATAL that this would not be appropriate, although the calculation of the penalties would need to be calculated so as to avoid unfairly imposing in each proceeding a penalty, which duplicated the penalty imposed in the other proceeding. This seems to me broadly correct. As a consequence, the 2nd and 4th questions did not require consideration.

4.  The 2nd question is academic, because it is the same issue as that already determined in the 1st Action and in respect of which leave to appeal is sought, namely, whether the Kam Kwong application in respect of ATAL should be determined at this stage or, as I have directed, at trial or, if all the Respondents reach agreement with the Commission, at that stage. For the same reasons it seems to me that the Kam Kwong Proceedings in the 2nd Action should be dealt with after trial or if all the Respondents reach agreement with the Commission, at that stage. As I understand it the Commission and ATAL accept, unsurprisingly, that the Kam Kwong Applications should be dealt with together, whenever that may be. I refused to grant leave to appeal. The question of when a Kam Kwong application be determined is, in my view, clearly a matter of discretion and its determination ultimately a case management decision. There is no material point of law involved. The Commission simply wish to reargue the matter before the Court of Appeal.

5.  I also determined, on the 1st Respondent’s application, that the Commission should disclose correspondence relating to cooperation agreements entered between two of ATAL’s employees and the Commission. Leave is also sought to appeal that decision (“Decision”). I also refused leave in respect of this application. It does not seem to me that it has been demonstrated that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or raises an issue on which in my view it would be helpful for the Court of Appeal to opine. However, I ordered an interim stay of my Decision until the determination of ATAL’s application to Court of Appeal.

6.  I will direct on the consent summons dated 18 August 2023 in CTEA 2/2023 and the summons dated 27 September 2023 in CTEA 2/2022 that the two proceedings be heard together with liberty to apply, and costs reserved. I will make no other directions until the Court of Appeal has determined the leave application in CTEA 2/2023 other than in respect of costs. In my view the vast majority of the time at the Case Management Conference involved dealing with the applications for leave to appeal and the questions I refer to in [2], which in the case of issue 1 seems from the lengthy submissions filed by the Commission to have been misunderstood by the Commission. I order that 80% of the costs in both proceedings be paid by the Commission; 20% be paid by the 1st Respondent to the  3rd to 7th Respondents in CTEA 2/2022 and 2nd to 5th Respondents in CTEA 2/2023 with a certificate for two counsel.

  (Jonathan Harris)
President of the Competition Tribunal

  

CTEA 2/2022

Mr Norman NIP SC, Ms Leticia Tang and Mr Jonathan Fung, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the applicant

Mr Abraham Chan SC and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Deacons, for the 1st and 2nd respondents

Ms Ebony Ling, instructed by Wong Heung Sum & Lawyers, for the 3rd respondent

Mr Dicky Cheung and Mr Jonathan Ip, instructed by Au Yeung Chan & Ho, Solicitors, for the 4th respondent

Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Tang & Ku Solicitors, for the 5th and 6th respondents

The 7th respondent appeared in person

CTEA 2/2023

Mr Norman NIP SC, Ms Leticia Tang and Mr Jonathan Fung, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the applicant

Mr Abraham Chan SC and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Deacons, for the 1st respondent

Mr Paul Shieh SC and Mr Jonathan Ng, instructed by Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th respondents

Mr Stephen Crosswell, solicitor advocate of Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th respondents

The 5th respondent was not represented and did not appear



[1] See [3] of my decision in Competition Commission v Kam Kwong Engineering Co Ltd [2020] 4 HKLRD 61.

[2023] HKCT 9-EN-2023-10-25

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

CTEA 2/2023

[2023] HKCT 9

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2023

________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING1st Respondent
 LIMITED 
 JOHNSON CONTROLS HONG KONG LIMITED2nd Respondent
 YORK INTERNATIONAL (NORTHERN ASIA)3rd Respondent
 LIMITED 
 JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL PLC4th Respondent
 LEE YUI MING5th Respondent

________________

Before: Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 29 August 2023
Date of Decision: 25 October 2023

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

1.  On 29 August 2023 I heard the first case management conference in this matter. There were a number of differences between the Respondents over the directions that should be made. What follows are my reasons for making the contentious directions.

2.  The Commission and the 1st Respondent issued consent summonses dated 17 and 18 August 2023 for a hearing of a Kam Kwong application on 27 November 2023. This gave rise to a number of issues. First, the 17 August summons envisages an order being made which results in one penalty being imposed for contraventions of the Competition Ordinance (“Ordinance”) in not only the present proceedings, but CTEA 2/2022. The Commission and the 1st Respondent appeared not to have given thought to whether this was possible. It is far from clear to me that either it is permissible under the Ordinance or that even if it is, it would be appropriate to make such an order. I have directed that this issue be addressed fully by the Parties to both CTEA 2/2022 and 2/2023 at the hearing on 27 November 2023. This specific issues I have asked to be addressed are as follows:

“1. Whether one pecuniary penalty can be imposed in 2 different proceedings.

2. If the Tribunal can impose a pecuniary penalty in 2 different proceedings generally (not specifically CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023) the matters to be taken into account in determining what penalty to impose.

3. When the pecuniary penalty in CTEA 2/2022 should be determined (this matter was addressed in CTEA 2/2023).

4. If the Tribunal can impose one pecuniary penalty in 2 different proceedings whether or not the facts of CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023 make it appropriate for the Tribunal to do so in CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023 or whether there are material differences, which make it inappropriate or not practical. Mr. Justice Harris is presently of the view that in practice the presumption must be that different cases should be considered separately and that the determination of 2 cases together will be the exception. It is, therefore, not a matter of comparing in detail the facts of the 2 cases. It will be necessary for the Commission to demonstrate that the present cases lend themselves to being dealt with together. If this cannot readily be done the application is unlikely to be successful. The Commission should bear in mind that its application needs to be formulated in a way, which permits all the Respondents in both cases to assess the application and determine what their position in respect of them is.”

3.  Secondly, although the 18 August summons sought consolidation of the 17 August summons with the like summons issued in CTEA 2/2022, no application for consolidation in CTEA 2/2022 was before me and, in fact, no summons for consolidation had been issued in CTEA 2/2022 by the time of the hearing. It is necessary for an application for consolidation to be made in both proceedings and for the Respondents in both proceedings to given the opportunity to make submissions if they wish. It should have been clear to the Commission that the matter could not be dealt with by filing a consent summons in one set of proceedings only signed by the Respondent in CTEA 2/2023 to the proposed Kam Kwong application.

4.  Thirdly, the 2nd Respondent in CTEA 2/2023 objected to the Kam Kwong application in the present proceedings being determined before the trial on the grounds that the penalties to be imposed against all Respondents found to have contravened the Ordinance should be dealt with at the same time. It was not in dispute before me that in criminal proceedings the established practice is for all defendants to one criminal case to be sentenced together[1]. This is to ensure consistency in sentencing. It was the Commission’s position that although proceedings before the Tribunal involve the determination of a criminal charge[2] the Tribunal is not required to follow the practice of the criminal courts as is made clear by section 144(1) of the Ordinance, which provides that the Tribunal may decide its own procedures and may, so far as it thinks fit, follow the practice and procedure of the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction. In this respect the Commission is correct, however, in my view the real issue is whether or not the reasons for the practice of the criminal courts apply to a case such as the present, it also being clear from section 144(1), that if the Tribunal thinks it appropriate it has the power and discretion to adopt a similar practice to the criminal courts. In my view the reasons for the Tribunal following a similar practice is that it assists in achieving consistency in penalties and it is more efficient for the Tribunal to deal with sentencing at one hearing when it will be at its most familiar with the facts of the case. The Commission and the 1st Respondent (who understandably would prefer to dispose of the complaint against it as soon as possible) argue that to delay the determination of penalties would discourage respondents from settling proceedings against them. I find this wholly unconvincing. The suggestion that a respondent having concluded that it is better to settle the case will continue to fight because the penalty agreed in principle with the Commission will not be determined by the Tribunal until after trial or all the respondents have reached a Kam Kwong settlement seems to me specious. Why would they do so? Out of spite?

5.  It would seem to me that in the present case, and generally in future cases, the appropriate procedure is for the Tribunal to determine liability first and adjourn the determination of the penalty until after trial or after all the respondents have agreed to a Kam Kwong settlement. This is how the Kam Kwong application in the present case should proceed.

6.  Fourthly, certain terms of the confidentiality order in particular the definition of “Non-confidential Document”. The issue here is whether or not the definition should (as the 2nd to 4th Respondents contend) refer to documents which have not been designated by the Commission or the originator of the document as confidential or (as the Commission contends) refer to documents which have been designated as non-confidential. The significance, of what at first appears a fine distinction, goes to the process of resolving a dispute over whether a document should be treated as confidential. The 2nd to 4th Respondents say that the Commission’s wording results in the more procedurally cumbersome and time consuming requirement for a party, who is told that a document has not been designated as non-confidential, to challenge the consequence of this when it should be for a party disclosing a document to make a positive decision whether or not it is confidential and that in the absence of such a decision the default position should be that the other parties are entitled to treat it as non-confidential; although as Mr Shieh emphasised, the recipient will still be subject to the normal restrictions on the use of disclosed documents. He also submitted that the authorities[3] have made it clear that the presumption is that all evidence should be made available to a person who defends a criminal complaint, and that the onus is on the party asserting confidentiality to prove it by evidence and the Commission’s formulation effectively reverses this burden. The Commission argue that the Commission having to decide whether a document is non-confidential would be extremely burdensome. If its formulation is used a party which considers that is should be permitted to use a document free of the restrictions imposed by the confidentiality order can ask the Commission, and if it does not agree the Tribunal, to look at the individual document and make a decision. It will be apparent from the Commission’s argument that it is proceeding on the basis that it will not decide at the time of discovery whether or not a document should be designated as confidential.

7.  I agree with the 2nd to 4th Respondents. The Commission’s proposal is inconsistent with the principles established by the authorities. The Commission’s argument also seems to me rather disingenuous. One might reasonably expect its formulation to indicate that a party complying in good faith with the directions, in particular the Commission, would take the trouble to ascertain whether a document should fairly be disclosed free of any assertion of confidentiality. The Commission’s argument concedes that the Commission does not intend to do so. In practice it proposes effectively to assert confidentiality over all documents and leave the Respondents to challenge the “decision” in respect of any document it thinks worthwhile. This seems to me an inappropriate approach.

8.  I, therefore, direct that [1.3] and [4] of the 2nd to 4th Respondents’ proposed directions be adopted.

9.  Fifthly, it is known that cooperation agreements have been entered into between the Commission and two of the 1st Respondent’s employees. In addition to the cooperation agreements themselves, the 2nd Respondent also seeks disclosure of the correspondence and communications relating to the cooperation agreements. The 2nd Respondent argues that this is justified because it is a well-established principle that where a person is given immunity and presented as a witness against other alleged parties, the court and the defence are to be given a “warts and all” account of the circumstances in which the immunity agreement has been reached. This is explained by G Lam J (as he then was) in Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd (No 2)[4]:

“105. … The phrase originated in this context from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v Tsui Lai‑ying & Others [1987] HKLR 857, given by Silke JA, where he said (at p 873B):

‘It is clear beyond peradventure that in cases like this the accomplice should be presented to the Court warts and all. The defence, is entitled to know everything about him, the terms of the immunity and any matters surrounding it which could affect the credibility of his evidence. …’

106. One example of the reasons for this need was given by Hartmann JA in HKSAR v Chong Chi Ho (unrep, CACC 259/2008, 29 May 2009), at §51:

‘For example, the manner in which he came to agree to give accomplice evidence may reveal that he was more interested in protecting himself than giving evidence as to the truth.’”

10.  The Commission opposes disclosure of the cooperation agreements and the associated documents. It does so on the following grounds. First, that the cooperation agreements are not relevant; they merely provide the basis for the Commission and the 1st Respondent agreeing to make the Kam Kwong application. The Commission says that it will reconsider its position if it decides to call the two individuals who are a party to the cooperation agreements. Secondly, they are privileged[5]. Thirdly, the associated documents are not relevant.

11.  It does not seem to me that the decision referred to in footnote 5 is relevant as it is to be distinguished on the grounds that it involved communications between the Commission and a third party, which did not result in an agreement. The present position is materially different and engages materially different considerations.

12.  The Commission says that the originating notice of motion was prepared before the cooperation agreements and that at present there is no live issue as to the accuracy of the information that has been provided to the Commission by the 1st Respondent’s employees and, which will form part of its case as the proceedings proceed. It seems to me that this is to misunderstand what is relevant.

13.  The Commission has been provided with information from the 1st Respondent’s employees and this, if I have understand things accurately, would have formed part of the material before them when the Commission decided to commence the proceedings and will inform the way in which the Commission pursues the complaint going forward.

14.  The cooperation agreements form the basis on which the 1st Respondent and its employees agreed to provide assistance to the Commission in, inter alia, the prosecution and investigation of the 2nd Respondent.

15.  It matters not whether 1st Respondent’s employees are ultimately called a witnesses to give sworn testimony at trial. The cooperation agreements are not relevant only by way of undermining any live witness testimony. The associated documents are relevant for the purpose of evaluating the credibility of any underlying information provided. This is analogous to the requirement under RHC (Cap. 4A) O.41 r.5(2) that a deponent (who is usually not cross-examined at the interlocutory stage) shall state the source and grounds of his information or belief in his affirmation—the underlying rationale is to enable the contesting party the opportunity to explore those grounds and evidentially counter them: Commissioner of Police v Lin Xin Nian[6].

16.  Therefore, it is only fair that the circumstances in which the 1st Respondent and its employees, being the accomplice have cooperated, should be presented to the Court “warts and all” and the 2nd Respondent is entitled to know everything about the terms of the cooperation agreements and the manner in which the 1st Respondent and its employees agreed to provide the information and assistance to the Commission. This is relevant to assessing the veracity of any such information—which is currently being deployed by the Commission against the 2nd Respondent.

17.  I agree with the 2nd Respondent that without prejudice privilege does not apply in respect of “successful” communications, i.e. those where leniency or settlement is granted. This is a stance that has been accepted by the Commission: see Nutanix at [28][7]. The without prejudice privilege is founded upon the public policy of encouraging litigants to settle their differences rather than litigate them to a finish: Nutanix at [55][8].

18.  In R v Bernardo[9], Lesage J of the Ontario Court of Justice held that the privilege surrounding the plea negotiations between the Crown and Homolka (an accomplice of Bernardo) did not prevent disclosure of the materials to Bernardo, because the negotiations had resulted in a plea and Homolka was no longer at risk of prejudice [16]–[17]. A person can reasonably be held to expect that if his leniency application is successful, the statements made by him will be disclosed and used vis-à-vis third parties: Nutanix[10] at [50]. This is explained by Gordon J in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited[11]:

“…A cartel claim, by definition, involves collusion between two or more actors. In the same way that it is both inevitable and self-evident that the statements of a cooperating criminal conspirator will be used against (ie, disclosed to) the non-cooperating conspirators, it must be taken for granted that a cartel participant contemplating a confession to the authorities knows, or should know, that his statements will be used by the authorities to prosecute the other party or parties.”

19.  In the present case, the 1st Respondent and its employees have successfully reached cooperation agreements with the Commission. The disclosure of the associated documents will not result in any prejudice to them.

20.  In my view the cooperation agreements and the communications between the Commission and the 1st Respondent and its employees are discoverable.

21.  The Commission should circulate the Respondents a draft order reflecting my decision and send the agreed version to my clerk.

  (Jonathan Harris)
President of the Competition Tribunal

Mr Norman Nip SC and Ms Leticia Tang, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the applicant

Mr Peter So, of Deacons, for the 1st respondent

Mr Paul Shieh SC and Mr Jonathan Ng, instructed by Baker & McKenzie for the 2nd to 4th respondents

Mr Stephen Crosswell, solicitor advocate, of Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th respondents

The 5th respondent was not represented and did not appear



[1]  See by way of example and explanation of the reasons for this practice Mayo JA in HKSAR v Wong She Wa (Unrep., CACC 58/1998, 30 April 1999) at p6.

[2]  Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd [2019] 3 HKC 307.

[3]  Competition Commission v ATAL Building Services Engineering Ltd [2022] 4 HKLRD 425, [13]–[24].

[4]  [2018] 3 HKC 173 at [105]–[106].

[5]  Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Limited[2018] HKCT 1, [55]–[65].

[6]  [2000] 4 HKC 404 at 409C-D (DHCJ McMahon, as he then was).

[7]  Supra.

[8]  Supra.

[9]  [1994] OJ No. 1718.

[10]  Supra.

[11]  [2008] FCA 88 at [30].